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Cisco Guard Packet Analysis

Apr 06, 2018

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 1

    DDoS: Anatomy of an AttackA Packet Flow Perspective

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 2

    Objective

    This example follows an attack through the Cisco

    Guard DDoS Mitigation Appliance process toexplain and simplify the following:

    Understand the different modes, policies, and

    filters that are used and created. Understand the different show reports that

    could be used to explain how the flow of trafficties in with the protection cycle that is at play inthe guard module.

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    Assumption

    This example runs through a few simple attack

    vectors so that a minimal number of policies aretriggered, making it easier to explain from apacket flow perspective.

    The Cisco Guard DDoS Mitigation Appliance isin protect mode to begin with. (This exampledoes not include explanations of all the different

    mechanisms available with the guard.)

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    Denial-of-Service AttacksDoS and DDoS

    Web Server

    Web Server

    mbehring

    Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are

    meant to deny access to authorizedusers and consume enterpriseresources:

    Bandwidth

    CPU

    Memory blocks

    The hacker can use compromised

    PCs and servers that becomezombies or bots to launch theattack (distributed DoS [DDoS]).

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    TYP SYN Flood Attack Vector

    With the TCP SYN Flood attack, the attacker is hoping to:

    Fill and overflow the TCP server queue (memory) so thatthe oldest SYN_RVCD entries are flushed.

    Fill the TCP queue faster than the typical SYN + ACKround-trip time (RTT) so that valid customer SYN_RVCD

    entries are crowded out.

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    TYP SYN Flood Attack (Spoofed)

    Demo Lab Setup Used toGenerate the Attack Vectors

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    TCP SYN-Flood Pushing Out the Old EntriesSYN

    Attacker

    TCP Server

    SYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYN

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    drop

    Server TCP TableFilling Faster than ItCan Execute FIFO

    New SYN MessagesPush Out OldestSYN_RCVD Entries

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    TCP SYN-Flood SYN_RCVD Gets PushedSYN

    Attacker

    TCP Server

    SYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYNSYN

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    SYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVDSYN_RCVD

    drop

    SYN

    SYN / ACK

    ACK ?

    No SYN_RCVD

    Waiting when theACK Gets Back

    Valid User

    Valid User Gets to theACK, but the ServerDoes Not Set Up

    Data?

    Silence

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    Understanding Policy Types The CiscoGuard DDoS Mitigation Appliance has policy

    templates that can be used to construct the policy. Policiescan even be constructed based on onsite learning.

    There are several policy templates, including: Tcp_services (for non HTTP TCP services)

    Udp_services (User Datagram Protocol [UDP] services)

    http (HTTP that flows through port 80)

    Dns_tcp (DNS-TCP protocol traffic) Tcp_connections (connection characteristics)

    Tcp_ratio (ratios between different types such as syn vs fin/rst)

    .

    ..

    Other protocols (those not covered or learned explicitly by the guard)

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    TFN Attack Tool:

    Configuration for ZoneDefault Zone Template thatDictates the Choice (Proxy orNo Proxy) Type ofProtection.Other Valid Choices are:GUARD_TCP_NO_PROXY

    GUARD_VOIP

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    The Policy Templates thatAre Continuously Monitored

    Based on Traffic ProtocolType

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    Screen for Select TCPServices; Click to SeeDetails

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    Details List the ParameterUsed to Analyze the Flow,such as dst_ip, src_ip etc.

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    se@GUARD-conf-zone-Demo>show policies | include tcp_services/any/analysis

    Policy State IStatus Threshold Proxy List Action Timeout

    tcp_services/any/analysis/pkts/dst_ip act a-accpt 100.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/pkts/dst_port act a-accpt 400.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/pkts/global act a-accpt 150.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/pkts/src_ip act a-accpt 200.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/reqs/dst_ip act a-accpt 100.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600

    tcp_services/any/analysis/reqs/dst_port act a-accpt 250.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/reqs/global act a-accpt 150.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/reqs/src_ip act a-accpt 150.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/syns/dst_ip act a-accpt 50.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/syns/dst_port act a-accpt 150.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600tcp_services/any/analysis/syns/global act a-accpt 100.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600

    tcp_services/any/analysis/syns/src_ip act a-accpt 150.00 - 0 to-user-filters 600

    The same set of services when viewed through the CLI commands on the Cisco Guard DDoSMitigation Appliance; multiple elements of the same packet are analyzed (packets, registrations, synmessages, etc.) along with dst_ip, src_ip

    All these services listed selectively apply to the traffic flows during the analysis mode; that is the firstmode the Cisco Guard DDoS Mitigation Appliance starts in.

    It is important to understand the action to-user-filters, which specifies traffic to be directed to the user

    filtersbefore

    going on to the basic mode.The filter will live 600 sec (10 min) as long as there is no more activity.

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    Traffic Could Get Directed tothe USER FILTERS as TheyGo Between the Analysisand Basic Modes.

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    Show Counters Before theAttack

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    TFN Attack Tool

    Launch the Spoofed TCPSYN Attack.

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    Two Dynamic Filters AreAdded:The two flows under

    Analysis mode aretriggered with thisattack.

    Action is to-user filterskeying off protocol (6);

    destination port (80).

    Because it is higher thanthe thresholds (50 and150 as seen), the action

    is to forward it off to theuser filters.

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 19

    Because there is no

    legitimate traffic, all themalicious spoofed traffic iscaught by the user filters.

    Almost allthe traffic iscaught by user filter.

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    Graphical View of MaliciousTraffic

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    Packet Flow Through the Defense Modules

    Detection Passive copy of traffic monitoring

    Analysis Diversion for more granular inline analysis

    Flex filters, static filters, and bypass in operation All flows forwarded but analyzed for anomalies

    Basic Protection Basic antispoofing applied

    Analysis for continuing anomalies

    Strong Protection Strong antispoofing (proxy) if needed Dynamic filtering of zombie sources

    AnomalyVerified

    AttackDetected

    AnomalySourcesIdentified

    Learning Periodic observation of patterns to automatically update baseline profiles

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 22

    Cisco DDoS Solution

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name ServersProtected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    CiscoGuard XT

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    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name ServersProtected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    Cisco Guard XT

    Target

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    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    2. Activate: Auto/Manual

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name Servers

    Protected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    CiscoGuard XT

    Target

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    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    2. Activate: Auto/Manual

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name Servers

    Protected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    3. Divert Only Target Traffic

    CiscoGuard XT

    BGP Announcement

    Target

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    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    2. Activate: Auto/Manual

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name Servers

    Protected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    4. Identify and Filterthe Malicious Traffic

    3. Divert Only Target Traffic

    CiscoGuard XT

    BGP Announcement

    Target

    Traffic Destinedto the Target

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 27

    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    2. Activate: Auto/Manual

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    Protected Zone 2:Name Servers

    Protected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    4. Identify and Filterthe Malicious Traffic

    LegitimateTraffic to

    Target

    3. Divert Only Target Traffic

    CiscoGuard XT

    BGP Announcement

    5. Forward the Legitimate

    Traffic

    Traffic Destinedto the Target

    Target

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    2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID 28

    Cisco DDoS Solution

    1. Detect

    2. Activate: Auto/Manual

    Cisco Detector XT

    Protected Zone 2:Name Servers

    Protected Zone 3:E-Commerce Application

    Protected

    Zone 1:Web

    4. Identify andFilter the MaliciousTraffic

    LegitimateTraffic to

    Target

    6. Non-TargetedTrafficFlows

    Freely

    3. Divert Only Target Traffic

    BGP Announcement

    5. Forward the Legitimate

    Traffic

    Traffic Destinedto the Target

    Target

    CiscoGuard XT

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