CIMIC

CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC)

Course AuthorsCederic de Coning

ACCORD/NUPI

Stephen E. HenthorneJSSTR/CIMIC

Series EditorHarvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

Peace Operations Training Institute

© 2008 Peace Operations Training Institute


CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION (CIMIC)

Course AuthorsCederic de Coning

ACCORD/NUPI

Stephen E. HenthorneJSSTR/CIMIC

Series EditorHarvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

© 2008 Peace Operations Training Institute Peace Operations Training Institute 1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202 Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA www.peaceopstraining.org First edition: March 2008 Cover: UN Photo #133057 by Martine Perret The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute, the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. Although every effort has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course Author(s) disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated largely from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching document, consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine. Only officially vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with diametrically opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in keeping with the norms of pure and free academic pursuit.

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Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC)

FOREWORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V FORMAT OF STUDY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII METHOD OF STUDY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VIII LESSON 1 – OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 Course Overview 1.2 CIMIC Concepts and Terminology

LESSON 2 – COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2.1 The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations 2.2 A Concise History of UN Peace Operations 2.3 Snapshot of a Complex Peace Operation: UNMIL 2.4 AU Policy Framework on Peace Operations

LESSON 3 – PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION IN COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

3.1 From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding 3.2 Peacebuilding Phases 3.3 Peacebuilding Actors 3.4 Coordination and Synchronization 3.5 Coordination in Complex Peace Operations 3.6 Conclusion

LESSON 4 – CIMIC STRUCTURE AND LIAISON & INFORMATION MANAGEMENT. . . . . . 71

4.1 What is Liaison? 4.2 CIMIC Structures in UN Peace Operations 4.3 Information Management 4.4 Civilian Information 4.5 CIMIC Centres (CC) and Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOC) 4.6 UN CIMIC Command and Control 4.7 Conclusion

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LESSON 5 – MISSION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

5.1 What is Mission Support? 5.2 What is Community Support? 5.3 What are QIPs?

LESSON 6 – NEGOTIATIONS AND FACILITATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

6.1 Why are Communication and Negotiation Skills Necessary? 6.2 Preparing for a Facilitation Meeting 6.3 Cross-Cultural Communication Regarding Negotiations 6.4 Basic Communication Techniques 6.5 Preparing for Negotiation 6.6 Some Important Guidelines 6.7 Further Reading for Negotiations

LESSON 7 – INTERPRETERS AND MEDIA RELATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

7.1 Cultural Awareness 7.2 Working with Interpreters 7.3 Media Relations 7.4 Interview Guidelines

APPENDIX A – LIST OF ACRONYMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

APPENDIX B – LIST OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153

APPENDIX C – NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

APPENDIX D – DPKO CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION POLICY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .160

APPENDIX E – USE OF MILITARY OR ARMED ESCORTS FOR HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166

APPENDIX F – USE OF MILITARY ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

APPENDIX G – IASC REFERENCE PAPER ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

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FOREWORD

Civil-military coordination provides the interface between the military component of a peace operation and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights and rule of law dimensions of the same operation, as well as others in the larger peacebuilding system. It is a crucial function of any complex peace operation because it is a ‘force-multiplier’ that contributes to the mission achieving a system-wide impact on the conflict system it is attempting to transform. UN Civil-Military Coordination (UN CIMIC) officers are trained to understand humanitarian principles and guidelines so that they can facilitate the coordination of the military–humanitarian interface and ensure that any military support offered is complimentary to the humanitarian agenda. They are also trained to understand the role and functions of the various development and peacebuilding actors so that they can facilitate and coordinate the support that the peacekeeping force can provide to others in the mission as well as to the local community.

This course is based on the training material developed by the African Civil-Military Coordination (ACMC) programme (2004-2007). The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) took overall responsibility for the ACMC programme. CIMIC training was conducted in partnership with a number of regional peacekeeping training centres in Africa. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana, conducted CIMIC Courses in West Africa. The Peacekeeping School in Mali (EMP) conducted a French CIMIC Course. The Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya, conducted CIMIC Courses in East Africa. The South African National War College (SANWC) in Tswane, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC) in Harare, and ACCORD conducted CIMIC Courses in Southern Africa. The PSTC also conducted two in-mission CIMIC Courses in AMIS (Darfur, Sudan), and ACCORD conducted in-mission CIMIC Courses in MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and UNMIS (Sudan), a CIMIC Course for Female Peacekeepers with UN DPKO and a UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination UN (CMCoord) Course with UN OCHA. Most of these centres are continuing to conduct CIMIC courses even though the ACMC programme has officially come to an end.

The ACMC programme was funded by the Government of Finland. The German Government, through GTZ, supported the participation of the PSTC in the ACMC Programme. The French Government supported the course conducted at the EMP in Mali.

As there was no UN peacekeeping civil-military coordination training material in existence when the programme was initiated, the ACMC programme produced its own training material for United Nations and African peacekeeping operations. The training material, which consists of a handbook and a more comprehensive course manual in English and French, can be accessed through ACCORD’s Web site at http://www.accord.org.za/. The training material was developed in close cooperation with the regional peacekeeping training centres in Africa and was evaluated by representatives of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including most of its field missions in Africa, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,

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several other UN agencies, the African Union and several Regional Mechanisms for peace and security in Africa, including ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC.

While aimed at UN CIMIC officers, all military and civilian students will find this correspondence course useful as it will improve their understanding of the institutional cooperation that needs to occur between mission components, and between the mission and the rest of the system, in order to ensure a sustainable peace process.

From a policy perspective, the ACMC programme and this course were guided by the UN policy documents on civil-military coordination, namely the UN DPKO’s “Civil-Military Coordination Policy” adopted in September 2002, the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003, and the IASC Reference Paper on “Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies” of June 2004. These policy documents are included as appendices at the end of the course book.

A course of this nature can never cover all potential variations, especially not in this fast-changing and highly dynamic environment. The focus of the course is on principles, policies and broad approaches. The course provides examples of CIMIC structures and operations from a number of UN and African missions, but ultimately it would be up to each CIMIC officer to interpret and apply the general knowledge contained in the course to their own mission context.

This course is based on training material that was developed over a period of three and a half years by the ACMC programme, in which more than 500 people participated. All of them contributed to the development and conceptualization of the civil-military coordination concept formulated in this course. In particular, we wish to thank our colleagues at ACCORD, and our ACMC partners, the KAIPTC, EMP, PSTC (GTZ), SADC-RPTC and SANWC, for co-developing the programme’s training material. We painstakingly worked through five drafts of the training manual and tested and refined them over seven training courses. We would also like to thank our colleagues in DPKO, OCHA, UNHCR, the many other UN agencies, UN and African peace operations, and the many individual experts, who assisted us with evaluating and refining the training manual.

It is our intention that this course will be revised and updated periodically, and any comments, corrections, suggestions and contributions of examples and case studies are most welcome and can be submitted to [email protected].

Cedric de Coning and Stephen E. Henthorne 2007

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FORMAT OF STUDY

This course is designed for independent study at a pace determined by the student.

Course format and materials permit:

• MODULAR STUDY • EASE OF REVIEW • INCREMENTAL LEARNING

STUDENT’S RESPONSIBILITY

The student is responsible for:

• Learning course material • Completing the End-of-Course Examination • Submitting the End-of-Course Examination

Please consult your enrolment confirmation email or the end of this course for examination submission instructions.

Please visit http://www.peaceopstraining.org/course_extras to view a video introduction to this course

by author Cedric de Coning.

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METHOD OF STUDY

The following are suggestions for how to proceed with this course. Though the student may have alternate approaches that are effective, the following hints have worked for many.

• Before you begin actual studies, first browse through the overall course material.

Notice the lesson outlines, which give you an idea of what will be involved as you proceed.

• The material should be logical and straightforward. Instead of memorizing individual

details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.

• Set up guidelines regarding how you want to schedule your time.

• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each

lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If you are able to, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.

• When you finish a lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. For any error, go back to

the lesson section and re-read it. Before you go on, be aware of the discrepancy in your understanding that led to the error.

• After you complete all of the lessons, take time to review the main points of each

lesson. Then, while the material is fresh in your mind, take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

• Your exam will be scored, and if you achieve a passing grade of 75 percent or

higher, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 percent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.

• One note about spelling is in order. This course was written in English as it is used in

the United Kingdom.

LESSON 1

OVERVIEW AND CONCEPTS

1.1 Course Overview

1.2 CIMIC Concepts and Terminology

Lesson 1 / Overview and Concepts 2

LESSON OBJECTIVES

After completing this lesson, the student should be able to:

• Define CIMIC and its equivalent concepts and terminology within the peace operation field;

• Explain the principles and guidelines behind CIMIC;

• Explain CIMIC structure and organization; and

• Understand the role and function of CIMIC.

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military coordination provides the interface between peace and security objectives on the one hand, and relief and reconstruction objectives on the other. It is crucial if a complex peace operation is to have a holistic impact on the conflict system it is attempting to transform.

Civil-military coordination officers are trained to understand humanitarian principles and guidelines so that they can facilitate the coordination of the security and humanitarian interface and ensure that any military support offered is complimentary to the humanitarian and development agenda.

Please visit http://www.peaceopstraining.org/course_extras to view a video introduction to this lesson by

course author Cedric de Coning.


1.1 Course Overview

From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

In the twenty-first century, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions. Most UN peace operations since 1989 have, in effect, been peacebuilding operations, in that their focus was on supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace processes. These included classic peacebuilding tasks such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), justice sector reform, organizing elections, training and restructuring new police forces, and facilitating the transition from interim to transitional and, eventually, to democratically elected governments.

The development from peacekeeping to peacebuilding has emerged as new, mostly civilian dimensions were added to traditional military peacekeeping mandates. These new dimensions were aimed at assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace process by:

1) Supporting transitional arrangements;

2) Establishing new or reforming existing national institutions such as the defence force, police service, and the judiciary;

3) Assisting with the organization of elections;

4) Supporting constitution drafting processes; and

5) Facilitating restorative justice initiatives.

In order to ensure that all the different dimensions (political, security, development,

human rights, etc.) of these peacebuilding operations work together as one coherent mission, the need developed to establish dedicated mechanisms and modalities that would facilitate coordination and cooperation. Several specialized coordination functions developed over the years. Within the military component, the civil-military coordination branch was developed to act as the focal point for coordination between the military and the various civilian components, agencies, and communities with whom the military peacekeeping force has to interact within the peace operations context.

Complex Peace Operations and CIMIC “While I was serving with the NATO force in former Yugoslavia, I quickly came to the conclusion that commanders in complex peace operations absolutely require a dedicated CIMIC capability.” Brigadier General Gunnar Lundberg, Commander of the NORDPOL Brigade in former Yugoslavia from December 1996 to June 1997


NATO and the European Union

NATO, EU, and coalition-type operations are typically deployed in a contested environment as peace enforcement operations. They are deployed either to secure a cease-fire, or to support a cease-fire or peace agreement in situations where there is still considerable hostility by some factions against the peace agreement (an example of this is the Taliban in Afghanistan). They are also generally deployed as a military force with a separate mandate and identity from the UN or other international or regional groupings that may be active in the conflict-prevention, peacemaking, or peacebuilding spheres in the same country. The EU’s concept of operations does allow for integrated civilian-military-police operations under EU auspices in the future, but no such integrated operations have been deployed to date.

CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force as a separate legally mandated entity and the civilian actors in their area of operations. Civil-military coordination in the UN peacebuilding operations context is motivated by the need to maximize coordination between the military component and the civilian components of the same integrated mission, between the military component and the rest of the UN system, and between the military component of the UN mission and other non-UN external and internal civilian actors in the same mission area.

The AU and RECs

The African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, for example SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS and IGAD, are in a somewhat similar position. The REC operations undertaken to date – for example the various operations undertaken under the auspices of ECOWAS in West Africa – have all been military operations in support of, but separate from, UN and other peace initiatives.

African Union CIMIC Doctrine

The AU has adopted the principle that, where no specific AU doctrine or policy exists, it will make use of the applicable UN policies.

AMIS peacekeepers in Darfur, Sudan. (Source: Patrick-André Perron, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:African_Mission_in_Sudan.jpg)


The AU has deployed two fully-fledged peace operations to date, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003-4 and the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was deployed in 2004 and became a hybrid UN/AU mission (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. AMIB had a small civilian component (political and mission support), but it was essentially a military mission. AMIS had, apart from its military observers and protection force, a significant civilian police component. AMIS also had civilian units such as humanitarian affairs and political affairs sections. The AU and RECs are developing the capacity to deploy multidimensional peace operations through the African Standby Force (ASF) initiative, and although the initiative has mainly concentrated on the military dimensions of the ASF to date, it intends to add the civilian and police dimensions in the second phase of the ASF’s implementation plan. The AU and RECs do not have a specific CIMIC doctrine at present, but the AU intends to develop such a doctrine in the second phase of the ASF’s implementation phase.

Different CIMIC Contexts

UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has, under the authority of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), facilitated the development of a series of UN humanitarian civil-military coordination policies and guidelines. These include:

1) The “Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (the so-called Oslo Guidelines of May 1994);

2) The discussion paper and guidelines on the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001 (see Appendix E); and

3) The “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003 (see Appendix F).

In addition, in June 2004, the IASC adopted a reference paper on “Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies” that complements and expands the principles and guidelines previously developed on the use of military and civil defence assets and armed escorts (see Appendix G). It also provides guidance of a more general nature for civil-military coordination in humanitarian emergencies.

UN and NATO Use of CIMIC

In order to differentiate between the UN use of the acronym CIMIC when it refers to ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ and the NATO use of the acronym CIMIC when it refers to ‘Civil-Military Cooperation’, it is important to note that in this course CIMIC refers to ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ as per the UN definition, unless otherwise specified.


The complex emergency guidelines and the reference paper also introduced a new concept into our vocabulary, namely UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord), which is defined as:

…the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.1

Taken together, these four humanitarian civil-military coordination guidelines mentioned in the quote above represent the UN policy on humanitarian civil-military coordination, and they will serve as the policy basis for the humanitarian-military relationship in this manual and course.

The UN guidelines for humanitarian-military coordination can be summarized in the following six operating principles for the use of military assets in humanitarian operations.

1) Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.

2) Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only if the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be as a last resort.

3) A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. As much as possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.

4) Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.

1 OCHA. 2003, Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations

Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, March 2003, OCHA, Geneva, p.5. See Appendix F.

CIMIC Terminology in Missions

AMIB – CIMIC AMIS – CIMIC MINUSTAH – CIMCOORD MONUC – CIMCOORD and CIMIC ONUB – CIMIC UNFICYP – Civil Affairs (CA) UNTAET – Civil-Military Affairs (CMA) UNOCI – CIMCOORD UNMEE – CIMIC UNMIL – CIMIC UNMIS – CIMIC & Civil Military Liaison (CML)


5) The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance should be avoided.

6) Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains its international and multilateral character.

CIMIC in Peacebuilding Operations

From a UN peacebuilding operations perspective, it should be noted that the UN humanitarian policies and guidelines for civil-military coordination are exclusively focused on the “humanitarian dimension” of civil-military coordination. Coordination between the military and humanitarian actors is one of the most prominent aspects of civil-military coordination during the humanitarian emergency phase of any operation, but in the peacebuilding operations context, civil-military coordination is not limited to “humanitarian” civil-military coordination.

In UN peace operations, civil-military coordination takes place between the military component and all the civilian components of the UN mission, other members of the UN system and all the other external and internal actors in the mission area. Thus, apart from the humanitarian actors, civil-military coordination in the UN peacebuilding context will include actors such as the following:

• A political affairs component; • The civil affairs component; • The public information component; • The human rights component; • The DDR coordination unit; • The rule of law or judicial affairs component; and • The mission support component.

All of these components exist within the context of the UN mission, as well as a vast range of development and peacebuilding actors outside the UN mission. These components also exist within the local authorities, local communities, and local civil society actors. UN civil-military coordination also extends throughout the life of the UN peacebuilding mission. These stages are stabilization, transitional, and consolidation stages of a peacebuilding operation. The humanitarian emergency phase typically coincides with the stabilization phase of the UN peacebuilding operation. Civil-military coordination in the UN peacebuilding context thus extends beyond the coverage of the UN humanitarian civil-military coordination policies introduced earlier.


Released in September 2002, DPKO developed a civil-military coordination policy specifically for UN peace operations (see Appendix D). The DPKO definition of civil-military coordination is as follows:

UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, joint planning and exchange of information, between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations or the civilian community to achieve UN objectives.2

Because of the different meanings associated with the different acronyms that already existed in the civil-military coordination field, and because DPKO did not want to add to the confusion of introducing yet another acronym, the DPKO policy has refrained from using an acronym for civil-military coordination. However, in practice, DPKO has been using the abbreviation “CIMIC” in most of the missions it has established since 2000. CIMIC is currently 2 UN. 2002, Civil-Military Coordination Policy, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New

York, p.2. See Appendix D.

AMIS SO1 CIMIC Tasks

1. Responsible for all CIMIC matters at Force Headquarters level; 2. Advises the FHQ on all matters with regards to civilian environment; 3. Transforms the commanders guidance into CIMIC concepts; 4. Activates CIMIC centres when and where needed and maintains the CIMIC

network as widely as possible; 5. Participates in humanitarian planning on request, through the provision of advice,

especially concerning security issues; 6. All sector CIMIC officers should report incidents to the SO1 CIMIC; 7. Accompanies Force Commander or Deputy Force Commander on visits to sectors;

and 8. Advises Force Headquarters on CIMIC matters.

AMIS SO2 CIMIC Humanitarian Agencies Tasks

1. Reports to SO1 on humanitarian activities; 2. Acts as a point of contact for humanitarian agencies and liaison officers from other

organizations; 3. Handles all requests with regards to humanitarian matters; and 4. Participates in humanitarian planning through the provision of advice.

AMIS SO2 CIMIC Local Affairs Tasks

1. Reports to the SO1 on local affairs (that is, concerning local authorities and civilians); 2. Acts as a point of contact for locals; 3. Handles all requests with regards to local matters; and 4. Participates in local planning through the provision of advice.


used in the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB), the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI).

In order to differentiate between the UN use of the acronym CIMIC when it refers to “civil-military coordination” and the NATO use of the acronym CIMIC when it refers to “civil-military cooperation”, it is important to note that in this course CIMIC refers to “civil-military coordination” as per the UN definition, unless otherwise specified. At some points, where necessary, this course will refer to UN CIMIC.

UN CIMIC should be understood within the context of the role of the military component in the overall mission mandate. The primary role of the military component of a UN peacebuilding operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. A secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. For instance, in the context of a DDR programme, the military component, over and above its security function, may be in a position to provide transport, medical services, camp building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services to the civilian DDR unit within the mission and the various agencies and actors that support the national DDR coordination mechanism.

CIMIC as a Specialized Function

The primary mandate of the military component of a UN or African peace operation will always be ensuring a safe and secure environment. CIMIC is one of the secondary roles that are performed by a few specialists in support of the overall mandate. This is reflected in the human, financial, and operational resources dedicated to the CIMIC function in comparison to those dedicated to the security function of the military component.

Local staff of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) stand in front of a generator donated to the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) during the handover ceremony of the first batch of equipment and supplies by UNMIS in El Fasher, Sudan. 11 January 2007. (Source: UNMIS Photo/Frederic Noy)


For example, in the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) there are 10 CIMIC staff officers at Force (FHQ) and Sector headquarters (SHQ) – three at FHQ and one each at seven SHQs. The total approved force strength for UNMIS is 10,000 troops, so the CIMIC staff represent 0.001% of the total force strength. If a CIMIC role is created at each of the ten team sites envisaged, the total number of CIMIC staff officers will become 20, or 0.002% of the total force strength. The FHQ CIMIC staff represents 3.3% of all FHQ staff (92), and if we combine the FHQ and SHQ staff (467) then the total CIMIC compliment (10) represents 2.1% of all staff officers in the mission.

Similarly, in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), there are seven CIMIC staff officers at FHQ and one CIMIC staff officer at each of the four SHQ, that is, eleven CIMIC staff officers in total. The CIMIC compliment in UNMIL thus represents 0.0007% of the 15,000 approved force strength, or 0.07% of the 160 FHQ and SHQ staff officers.

It is clear that CIMIC remains a highly specialized function that represents a very small percentage of the overall effort of the military component.

CIMIC Structure and Organization

In all current UN and AU peace operations, the CIMIC function is undertaken by two different types of CIMIC officers, namely staff officers and unit officers. In UN missions, the CIMIC branch consists of staff officers at the FHQ and SHQ level. At unit level, there are usually liaison officers of some kind, but these are not officially part of the CIMIC branch in the mission. In practice, however, the FHQ and SHQ CIMIC staff will work closely with the liaison officers at unit level, as that is where most of the CIMIC mission support and community support tasks are performed.

Battalion CIMIC Officer Tasks

1. Function mainly as a liaison officer between the battalion and the various civilian entities in the battalion’s Area of Responsibility (AOR);

2. Coordinate between the battalion and the various civilian agencies it is in contact with;

3. Coordinate any joint actions undertaken by the battalion and a civilian agency – for example, providing an armed escort for a humanitarian convoy; and

4. Undertake CIMIC projects, that is, community development projects, such as rebuilding a school, to improve the condition of the local community, to strengthen the relationship between the battalion and the last community and to build confidence in the peace process.


Force Headquarters

At Force headquarters, there will be a small CIMIC cell. The FHQ CIMIC cell is usually either a sub-section of the operations branch, or in some cases it may be a separate command function. The CIMIC HQ cell is usually organized around a CIMIC Chief at colonel or lieutenant colonel level, as well as a Deputy CIMIC Chief at lieutenant colonel or major level. The other CIMIC staff at FHQ is usually organized as liaison officers for the sectors (as in UNMIL) or around thematic areas, for example those responsible for dealing with humanitarian agencies and those dealing with local authorities (as in AMIS). A CIMIC cell at FHQ can range from three (AMIS and UNMIS) to seven (UNMIL) and will rarely be more than ten.

Sector Headquarters

At Sector headquarters, there is usually at least one CIMIC officer at the rank of major or captain. In some missions there may be a team of two or more CIMIC officers per sector organized around team sites or CIMIC houses (such as in UNMEE). The CIMIC Sector officer serves as the link between the units and the HQ, maintains sector level CIMIC information, and serves as a coordination point between the military component and civilian partners at sector level.

Unit Level

Many units, which are typically infantry or mechanised infantry battalions – but which also include specialized units such as engineering battalions, transport units, medical hospitals, and air wings – do not deploy into a peace operation with a pre-identified CIMIC officer. Soon

AMIS Sector CIMIC Officer’s Tasks

1. Advises sector commander on all matters with regards to civilians in the sectors. 2. Informs and advises the sector commander and MILOBS on the evolving

civilian environment. 3. Transforms the sector commanders guidance into CIMIC concept. 4. Activates a CIMIC Centre in the sector. 5. Close liaison with UNPOL with regards to matters of law and order. 6. Participates in civilian planning through the provision of advice. 7. Focal point for all humanitarian agencies and NGOs. 8. Liaison between AMIS and civilians. 9. Attends meetings with NGOs and local authorities. 10. Collection of information on humanitarian assistance. 11. Sharing of information with humanitarian actors concerning security issues. 12. Facilitation of military support to humanitarian activities. 13. Advises the command on CIMIC matters. 14. Enhances social interaction between AMIS and civilian population, e.g.

organizing sport, women’s groups, etc. 15. Identifies and coordinates QIPs in collaboration with humanitarian agencies.


after deployment, however, they realize the need to have some kind of liaison officer that can serve as a focal point for contact with civilian partners. We will refer to this person as a unit-level CIMIC officer for the purposes of this course.

This course is specifically aimed at training and preparing the CIMIC staff officers that will be employed within these three levels (FHQ, SHQ and unit level).

CIMIC Functions

This course distinguishes between three different civil-military coordination functions, namely liaison and information management, mission support, and community support.

Liaison and information management lies at the core of coordination and refers to a wide range of activities involving the exchange and management of information. Depending on where one finds oneself on the coexistence-cooperation spectrum, these activities can include, for example, joint assessments, joint planning, and attending or hosting coordination meetings. Liaison and information management takes place at all levels (FHQ, SHQ, and at unit level).

Mission support refers to those actions a military component undertakes in support of a civilian partner, for instance, providing transport, specialized equipment or expertise, or a security escort for a humanitarian convoy.

Community support refers to those actions military units undertake to support local communities and to build confidence in the peace process. Such actions can include rehabilitating infrastructure such as roads and bridges,

supporting social services such as schools and clinics, and supporting national reconciliation and nation-building initiatives, such as national and cultural celebrations and sports initiatives.

All CIMIC activities or operations fall under one of these three functions; this course will deal with each in great detail. These three CIMIC functions form the operational core of civil-military coordination. CIMIC policies are aimed at defining and directing these three CIMIC functions. CIMIC structure and organization provide the command, staff, and organizational structures to execute these functions and to integrate them with the larger military organization

Pakistani UNMIL peacekeepers and Liberian villagers repair a flooded road on the outskirts of Voinjama, Liberia. UNMIL has been working on various projects to improve the living conditions of the local residents there. (Source: UN Photo #120801, Eric Kanalstein)


and structures. CIMIC planning is aimed at the overall CIMIC campaign plan and the specific operations that flow from each of these three functions. The various individual CIMIC skills included in this CIMIC course and manual are all aimed at enabling the CIMIC officer to carry out one or more of these CIMIC functions to the best of his or her ability.

It is important to note that the work of the CIMIC officers will focus primarily on liaison and information management. The mission support and community support CIMIC activities will typically be carried out by the appropriate tactical unit that has the requisite resources and expertise. CIMIC officers will channel the requests for mission and community support, advise on the appropriateness of the support, and coordinate among the various stakeholders involved, whilst the actual tactical execution of the mission and community support tasks will not be the responsibility of the CIMIC officers. In some cases, however, especially at unit level, it cannot be ruled out that the CIMIC officer may be tasked to carry out specific CIMIC operations, such as commanding a military escort for a humanitarian convoy or supervising a specific community support project – such as rehabilitating a local school.

Conclusion

In this section we covered:

• A brief introduction to CIMIC; • CIMIC aims and objectives; • The methodology of this course; • A short overview of the course; • Different CIMIC contexts; and • Different CIMIC functions.

The project cycles of the different dimensions, clusters and programmes of complex peace operations need to be synchronized with one another, and with the overall mission strategy. Individual programmes need to continuously adjust their planning to the feedback received from elsewhere in the system to ensure that the combined effect on society is positive, consistent, and produced at a rate that can be absorbed by the internal actors.

It is the total cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in all these sectors that slowly builds a positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritization, and sequencing between these dimensions and sectors are very important. This is why coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.


CIMIC Response Matrix

Phase Type Description CIMIC Category Guideline

Direct Support

Direct delivery of food, water, shelter, emergency health

services

Community Support

Military should not provide direct support,

except in life saving emergencies as option of

last resort

Indirect Support

Enable direct delivery, for

instance through logistical support or

security escort

Mission Support

Military can provide indirect support, on

request, provided doing so will not endanger aid workers or beneficiaries,

and will not affect the humanitarian

independence of the agency concerned

Humanitarian Emergency

Infrastructure Support

Enable indirect and direct support, for instance through rehabilitation of

roads and bridges, providing air traffic control service, etc.

Mission Support or Community

Support, depending on

requesting agency

Military can provide infrastructure support, on request, provided doing so will not endanger aid workers or beneficiaries,

and will not affect the humanitarian

interdependence of the agency concerned

Peacebuilding

Rehabilitation, reconstruction and capacity

building

Rehabilitate infrastructure and

support social services

Mission Support or Community

Support, depending on agency being

supported

Military can undertake or support development action, provided doing so will not endanger civilian partners or

beneficiaries, and that it is well coordinated with

all stakeholders


1.2 CIMIC Concepts and Terminology

Peace operations do not take place in isolation and will always require some form of coordination between the peace operation itself and other internal and external stakeholders in the country in which the peace operation is deployed. Whereas in the past it was something carried out primarily as a liaison task, it has now developed into a dedicated and specialist function that is considered a critical factor in the success of contemporary complex peace operations. This section will discuss terminology and concept differences between the UN and other organizations.

During the Cold War, most peace operations were cease-fire monitoring missions. Since 1989, starting with the UNTAG operation in Namibia, the scope and complexity of peace

Key Concepts Complex Emergency: a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or major breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency. Conflict Prevention: diplomatic, military and development actions intended to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Development: long-term initiatives aimed at supporting national objectives such as achieving socio-economic goals, or reducing poverty. Emergency Relief: action to provide immediate survival assistance and protection to the victims of crisis and violent conflict. The main purpose is to save lives by providing short-term assistance in the form of water, sanitation, food, medicines and shelter. Peacebuilding: action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict. Peace Enforcement: action, mandated by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorising the use of force to protect non-combatants. Peacekeeping: a field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of cease-fires, separation of forces or other peace agreements. Peacemaking: the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. Reconstruction: the long-term process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from the conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict. Recovery: action aimed at restoring the capacity of the internal actors to rebuild and recover from crisis and to prevent relapses by linking emergency relief programmes with development, thus ensuring that the former is an asset for the latter. Rehabilitation: action aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure that can save or support livelihoods; overlaps with emergency relief and is typically targeted for achievement within the first two years after the conflict has ended. Transition: the period following the signing of a peace agreement and the transition from an appointed interim government and before democratic elections take place.


operations has broadened considerably. In most cases since 1989, peace operations have been mandated to support the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. This has resulted in many new tasks aimed at assisting the host country to sustain the momentum of the peace agreement by:

1) Supporting transitional arrangements;

2) Establishing new or reforming existing national institutions such as a new defence force, a new police force, and a new judiciary; assisting with the organizing of elections;

3) Supporting constitution drafting mechanisms; and

4) Assisting with special restorative justice initiatives, and with reconstruction and recovery programmes.

Most of these new tasks have been aimed at preventing the conflict from re-emerging by

addressing the root causes of the conflict, and most new peace operations since the 1990s have been, in effect, peacebuilding operations.

These new tasks meant that peace operations were expanded to include new components and new specialists, mostly civilian, and this required the traditional peacekeepers – military observers and lightly armed forces – to undertake much larger, more dangerous and complex peacebuilding operations than before. In order to ensure that all these new and different components work together as one coherent mission, the need developed to establish dedicated mechanisms and structures to facilitate coordination and cooperation.

However, it is clear that despite a growing awareness in the 1990s, the security, socio-economic, political, and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict operations are inter-linked. The agencies that undertake these operations have been finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent country strategies. The failure to effectively coordinate relief, development and security programmes has been identified as a major cause for concern by most of the major evaluations and best practice studies undertaken over recent years.

Why Do We Need Civil-Military Coordination?

There are many reasons why we need to coordinate, but the following three – interdependence, duplication and leverage – lie at the core of civil-military coordination.

Interdependence

The various components and their sub-units that make up a peace operation are interdependent when no single component or unit can achieve the mandate of the operation on its own. The success of each component is a factor of the contribution it makes to the achievement of the overall mission objective. It is only if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual component or unit can be said to have been worthwhile. In this context, coordination is the process that ensures that an individual unit is connected to the larger system of which it is a part, and without which it cannot succeed.


For instance, the electoral component cannot successfully support the organization of an election if others, such as UNPOL and the military component, do not help to create a safe and secure environment. If the administration does not provide logistical support, and if various other units such as Civil Affairs, Human Rights and Public Information do not focus their areas of expertise and resources on the common objective, the election may fail.

In order to achieve effective civil-military coordination, the various components involved in the election need to share information, undertake joint planning, undertake joint operations, and cooperate in confidence-building initiatives.

Duplication

In the absence of meaningful coordination, overlap, duplication and an overall uneconomic and inefficient application of resources will be features of the mission. Different components will use time and resources to collect the same information, and many components will focus on the same high profile cases while neglecting other often more inaccessible cases. The more meaningful the coordination, the more efficient the overall effort will be.

For instance, if the medical unit of a peacekeeping battalion, a local clinic, and medical non-governmental organizations do not coordinate efforts, they may all end up covering the same area and may neglect others. If they coordinate their efforts they can spread out and cover a much wider area, with each providing a service according to their appropriate role, resources, and capabilities.

Leverage

By combining effort, through mutual support and by coordinating different initiatives to coincide over the same time period, one is achieving the power of leverage – that is, achieving more together than each component would have been able to achieve on its own. Leverage is achieved through the exchange of information, joint planning, mutual support, and ongoing coordination and feedback. For instance, through coordination, the various components involved in a DDR campaign (the military component, military observers, police, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, local authorities, conflicting parties, local community, former combatants and their families) will mutually reinforce each others’ efforts, and in so doing develop a positive momentum around the DDR campaign that will help each component overcome the obstacles it faces in its own area of specialization.

3 Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre “Dispatches” Vil. 5, No.3.

Some Common Myths about CIMIC

• CIMIC is Civil/Public Affairs; • CIMIC does not have a role outside peace support or humanitarian

assistance operations; and • CIMIC expertise/training is not required below brigade level.3


CIMIC and Other Similar Concepts

Civil-military coordination is one of those areas within the peace operation field that suffers from a lack of common understanding and shared terminology. There are many different concepts that describe essentially the same activity, that is, coordination and cooperation between the civilian, military and police components in peace operations. Some of the most commonly used concepts you may come across are as follows.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The most widely used term, especially in the western military community, is Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). According to the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies Standardisation Programme, the definition of CIMIC is as follows:

CIMIC is the relationship of interaction, co-operation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces, civilian organisations, agencies and in-theatre civil influences, which are necessary to achieve an effective response in the full range of operations.4

The NATO definition of CIMIC is:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil populations, including national and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.5

The EU definition of CIMIC, although their new acronym is CIMCO, is:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between military components of EU-led Crisis Management Operations and civil role-players (external to the EU), including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.6

4 ABCA. 2001. “Civil Military Co-operation”, Chapter 9, American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies

Standardisation Program, http://abca.hqda.pentagon.mil/, accessed on 5 August 2001, p.1. 5 NATO. 2000. “NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)”, CIMICWG 001-00,

WP(MC411), NATO, Brussels, p.1. 6 EU. 2002, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-Led Crisis Management Operations,

ESDP/PESD COSDP 67, European Union, Brussels, p.9.

Cooperation

Cooperation means “working together for a common purpose”. Oxford Dictionary


Civil Military Operations (CMO)

The Unites States military establishment uses the term “Civil Military Operations” and “Civil Affairs”. Civil-Military Operations are:

…the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organisations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include the performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.7

A U.S. Combatant Commander, according to U.S. doctrine, has two primary responsibilities: “To Fight and Win Their Nation’s Wars” and “To Conduct Civil-Military Operations”.8

7 United States. Joint Publication 3-57 (Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs), Field Manual 41-10 (Civil Affairs

Operations), and Joint Publication 1-02 (Civil-Military Operations). 8 United States. Joint Publication 1-02 (Civil-Military Operations). 9 de Coning, C.H. 2007, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A

Norwegian Perspective, Security in Practise No.5, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, p.7.

Coherence

Coherence implies an overall state of mutual consistency among the different policies and actions of various agencies.

Oxford Dictionary

In the peace operations and peacebuilding operation context, ‘coherence’ can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security and development dimensions of a post-conflict intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective.9


Civil-Military Relations (CMR) There is another concept and field of studies – ‘Civil-Military relations (CMR)’ – that falls outside the peace operations realm. The study of CMR focuses on the role of the military and other security forces in a democracy. It typically deals with the relationship between the military and civil society in countries in transition, where it informs Security Sector Reform (SSR). CMR is particularly relevant for societies that are undergoing transformation from military rule to civilian rule, or where the military played a particular prominent domestic role. CIMIC officers may deal with CMR issues as the peace operations force and UN Police are often in the training of new security forces, but it is important to make a clear conceptual distinction between CIMIC and CMR.

Source: This drawing is an an approved variation of Figure 2-1: ‘CA Activities In Support of CMO’ that appears on page 20, Department of The Army, FM 41-10 Civil-Affairs Operations, February 2000.

Civil Affairs (CA)

Civil Affairs is made up of designated active and reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations.10

Civil Affairs Activities

These are activities performed or supported by civil affairs that: (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional speciality skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.11

10 United States. Joint Publication 3-57 (Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs), Field Manual 41-10 (Civil Affairs

Operations), and Joint Publication 1-02 (Civil-Military Operations). 11 Ibid.


UN Civil-Military Coordination Definitions

The definition for UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) is:

…the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.12

The DPKO definition for civil-military coordination is as follows:

UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, joint planning and exchange of information, between military elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations or the civilian community to achieve UN objectives.13

As discussed in the previous section, DPKO has refrained from using an acronym for civil-military coordination but has used CIMIC in practice since 2000.

Civil-Military Coordination in the UN Peace Operations Context

What most of these approaches to civil-military cooperation have in common is that they see civil-military cooperation as a command tool. It is something done in the service of the commander and military mission. It is there to assist and serve the military commander in the execution of his or her military task and the achievement of his or her military objectives.

The essential difference between these approaches and similar activities undertaken in the UN context is that UN peace operations have an integrated military, civilian, and police mandate and mission structure. The civil-military relationships between components of the peace operation and between the peace operation and the rest of the UN System will already be pre-determined, to a large degree, by the organizational structure of the specific UN peace operation.

12 OCHA, op. cit. 13 UN, op. cit.

Coordination

Coordination means making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organized way.

Oxford Dictionary

Coordination is "the organization of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing."

Collins Dictionary


In contrast, CIMIC in NATO and EU doctrine is motivated by the need to establish cooperation between the military force, as a separate legal entity, and external (external to NATO or EU) civilian role-players in the same area of operations. UN peace operations are motivated by the need to maximize coordination among its own multidimensional components, and to establish cooperation between the UN peace operation and other actors in the same mission area.

UN CMCoord

The focal point for UN humanitarian coordination policy and training in the UN System is the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA has, under the authority of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), facilitated the development of the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (MCDA) (see Appendix F). This set of guidelines also introduced a new term into our vocabulary, namely UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord).

The IASC MCDA guidelines have been developed to address the use of military and civil defence assets to support humanitarian assistance in all complex emergencies, including in the UN peace operations context. The guidelines serve as a crucial reference point for all persons involved in civil-military coordination.

UNWRA

Military Staff Committee

ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, IDA, IBRD, IFC, ICAO, UPU, WMO, IMO, WIPO, IMU, IFAD,UNIDA,GATT

UN website: http://www.un.org

UNOMIG, UNMIL UNDOF, UNFICYP UNIFIL, UNTSO UNMOGIP INUKOM MINURSO ONUSAL UNPROFOR UNMEE ETC.

Trusteeship Council

General Assembly Int’l

Court of Justice

Main Committees Standing Committees Other subsidiary organs

Economic & Social Council

UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNITAR, UNDP, UNEP, UNU, UN Special Fund, World Food Council, HABITAT, UNFPA

Regional Commissions Funct’l Commissions Other commissions

Security Council

Secretariat


The guidelines have been developed to address all civil-military coordination scenarios in complex emergencies and have been influenced, to a large degree, by the recent experiences of humanitarian agencies working alongside NATO and U.S.-led multinational coalitions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. In these situations, the distance between the humanitarian community and the military forces is typically much greater than that experienced in UN peace operations where the military force is part of the UN mission and under the overall control of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.

From a UN peace operations perspective, it should also be noted that the IASC MCDA guidelines are limited to the humanitarian dimension of civil-military coordination. Humanitarian coordination is one of the most important aspects of civil-military coordination in UN peace operations during the early phase of a new operation, but it is not the only area of civil-military coordination. Coordination should take place among all components, at all levels, and during the whole life of a UN peace operation, that is, from the earliest assessments and planning stages, to the deployment and stabilization phase, and through the peacebuilding phase until the peace operation has been withdrawn.

UN DPKO

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has participated in the IASC MCDA process, but it has also, in parallel, been busy developing a civil-military coordination policy specifically for UN peace operations. Although civil-military coordination has been part of UN peace operations in one form or another since its inception, there was no specific UN doctrine or policy that governed civil-military coordination until September 2002, when the DPKO released its first “Civil-Military Coordination Policy” (see Appendix D).

Humanitarian Coordination Coordination is the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include:

1. Strategic planning; 2. Gathering data and managing information; 3. Mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability; 4. Orchestrating a functional division of labour; 5. Negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political

authorities; and 6. Providing leadership.

Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action. Source: Minear, L. & Chellia U. 1992, UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990-1992, Occasional Paper 13, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Providence, p.3.


Therefore, we not only have different NATO, EU, U.S. and UN definitions for civil-military coordination, but even different definitions within the UN System, although it should be noted that there are no major inconsistencies between the OCHA and DPKO definitions. The difficulty with establishing one UN System definition that will satisfy all the role-players in the United Nations, let alone one definition that the international community can agree on, is indicative of how complex coordination in the peace operations context is.

Coordination, Cooperation and Coexistence

One of the most obvious differences between civil-military cooperation (as it is used in NATO CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (as it is used in the UN context) is the use of two different words, “cooperation” and “coordination”.

In the UN context, “cooperation” is viewed as the strongest relationship that can exist between civilian, military, and police components. It is seen as a relationship where the component partners agree to synchronize their policies and behaviour so that they can undertake joint action. Most often, however, the institutional effort necessary to achieve full “cooperation” can only be achieved and maintained under special conditions, for a limited time and for a specific purpose, for instance during an election. Under normal circumstances, a less intense relationship is preferred, and this state, especially in the humanitarian context, is referred to in its minimal form as “coexistence”. This normally implies that the parties to this relationship exchange information, come together for coordination meetings, and that they may, from time to time, undertake some form of joint activity, for instance a humanitarian convoy with a military escort. Regardless of whether there is open “cooperation” or only tenuous “coexistence”, a minimum level of “coordination” is required. “Coordination” in the UN context can therefore range on a scale from “cooperation” in its maximum state to “coexistence” in its minimum state.

Coordination

Cooperation Coexistence


1. Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) refers to coordination between:

a. The local military and the peacekeeping force; b. The military component of the peacekeeping mission and the civilian actors; c. The civilian components and the police component of a peace operation; d. The civilian components of a peace operation and the local population.

2. Which of the following statements best describes the role of UN peace operations?

a. The UN deploys a peace operation to prevent tensions from escalating into violent conflict;

b. The UN deploys a peace operation to monitor a cease-fire agreement and/or to assist with the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement;

c. The UN deploys a peace operation to make peace among the parties; d. The UN deploys a peace enforcement operation to force the parties to make peace.

3. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is responsible for:

a. Humanitarian civil-military coordination policies and guidelines b. The establishment of refugee camps c. The training of soldiers for peacekeeping operations d. The development of guidelines for the protection of prisoners of war

4. Civil-Military Coordination, in the UN context, refers to a function:

a. Within the peace operation responsible for liaising with the local authorities; b. Within the humanitarian agencies responsible for liaison with all military forces

present in a complex emergency; c. Within the rebel forces responsible for liaising with the peace operation; d. In the military component of the peace operation that is responsible for liaison

between the military and civilian actors in the mission area. 5. The United Nations organ responsible for mandating UN peace operations is:

a. The Security Council; b. The Secretariat; c. The General Assembly; d. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

LESSON 1 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ


6. The primary mandate of the military component of a UN peace operation is: a. To provide armed escorts; b. To provide humanitarian support; c. To provide a safe and secure environment conducive to the sustainable

implementation of the peace agreement; d. To undertake community support projects.

7. The three civil-military coordination functions are:

a. Coordination meetings, armed escorts, and QIPs projects; b. Liaison and information management, mission support, and community support; c. Information exchange, joint planning, and joint operations; d. Information centres, military assets, and armed escorts.

8. Why do we need civil-military coordination?

a. Because the military are dependent on civilian assets; b. Because the civilians are dependent on military assets; c. Because by coordinating, when appropriate, they avoid duplication, make optimal use

of resources, and achieve a system-wide impact; d. Because the military and civilians have the same mandate.

9. Coordination means:

a. Making people work together; b. Making sure everybody follows the same rules; c. Making use of competition to ensure higher productivity; d. Making people, things and parts function together efficiently.

10. CIMIC staff officers in UN peace operations are deployed at:

a. Force HQ; b. Battalion HQ; c. Sector HQ and Battalion HQ; d. Force and Sector HQs.

ANSWERS: 1b, 2b, 3a, 4d, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8c, 9d, 10d

LESSON 2

COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS

2.1 The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations

2.2 A Concise History of UN Peace Operations

2.3 Snapshot of a Complex Peace Operation: UNMIL

2.4 AU Policy Framework on Peace Operations

Lesson 2 / Complex Peace Operations 28

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Describe the legal basis for peace operations within the UN Charter;

• Explain the development of peace operations from classical peace operations to complex peace operations; and

• Understand the need for an integrated, holistic mission approach to multifunctional and multidimensional operations.

INTRODUCTION

United Nations peace operations are the most prevalent form of peace operations in the world today. Approximately 75% of the UN’s approximately 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in 2007 are deployed in Africa. Many UN peace operations in Africa take place alongside African peace operations, or they took over a mission from an African peace operation. It is thus important for UN peacekeepers to also know something about African peacekeeping.

In Africa, conflict management has been an important area of focus for the African Union (AU) and its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). As a result, the OAU and the AU – and in some cases sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community for West Africa (ECOWAS) – have deployed African peace operations in the past. With the establishment of the African Standby Force and sub-regional Standby Brigades, Africa’s capacity to deploy peace operations in the future will be even further enhanced. UN CIMIC officers need to understand how UN and African peace operations are structured and how peace operations that will be undertaken under their auspices are likely to function. The aim of this lesson is to place CIMIC in the UN and AU peace operations environment.


course author Stephen E. Henthorne.


2.1 The Legal Framework for UN Peace Operations

The UN Charter does not provide a definition for peace operations, nor does it provide guidelines for when peace operations should be established. Peace operations came about as a result of the foresight and creative interpretation of the UN Charter by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjöld. Pearson was the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Hammarskjöld was the UN Secretary-General at the time that peace operations were first conceived and implemented in 1949.

The authority of the United Nations as the international body responsible for global peace and security derives from Article 1(1) of the UN Charter. It states that the purpose of the United Nations is:

…to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.

1 UN. 1992, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, United Nations Press,

New York. 2 Ibid.

Peace Operations

Peace operations occur when the United Nations or other bodies are authorized to deploy civilian and police personnel to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement or ceasefire. Key prerequisites are consent, impartiality and minimum use of force. Peace operations of this kind are normally associated with UN Security Council authorization under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, entitled “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” The UN Agenda for Peace defines peace operations as a “field mission, usually involving military, police and civilian personnel, deployed with the consent of the belligerent parties to monitor and facilitate the implementation of cease-fires, separation of forces or other peace agreement”.1

Conflict Prevention

Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.2


Chapter VI of the UN Charter is entitled “The Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. In Article

33, the Charter states:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Although Chapter VI does not specifically refer to the deployment of troops to monitor or supervise ceasefires or peace agreements, most of these kinds of peace operations missions were authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter. Classical peacekeeping operations are often referred to as Chapter VI missions. This refers to the fact that these missions are only authorized to use minimum force, in other words, to only use force in self-defence.

Chapter VII of the UN Charter is the chapter that provides for enforcement powers. It is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. Article 39 empowers the Security Council to “determine” threats to the peace, make “recommendations”, or “decide” what measures need to be taken to restore international peace and security. Article 41 deals with enforcement measures “not involving the use of armed force”, such as economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 gives

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement usually occurs in a hostile environment where consent is absent, but where the United Nations Security Council, often out of humanitarian considerations, authorizes use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally sanctioned resolutions or agreements. Peace enforcement is normally associated with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” The most important factor in both peace operations and peace enforcement is the impartiality of the peacekeepers.

Enforcement

Enforcement actions occur when the UN Security Council authorizes the use of force to restore a breach in the international peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to restore peace in cases where one party has been identified as the aggressor, and/or to undertake punitive measures against a country that in some other way is in contravention of international norms. “Enforcement” is different from “peace enforcement” in that impartiality is not a factor in “enforcement”, as the aim is not to make peace between conflicting parties but to act against a party that has been identified as the aggressor.


the Security Council the power to take any action that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Most Security Council resolutions do not refer to a specific Chapter in the UN Charter when authorizing an operation, but most analysts agree that any mandate beyond self-defence derives its authority from the UN’s powers under Chapter VII. If a peace operation’s mission is authorized to use “all necessary means to protect innocent civilians from imminent danger” or any wording to that effect, it would generally be regarded as having some Chapter VII powers. Many peace operations have been given Chapter VII mandates, especially since the end of the Cold War, and this has, to a large degree, added to the confusion in terminology between what constitutes “peace operations” as opposed to “peace enforcement”.

The UN Charter remains relevant to any discussion and analysis of peace operations. No matter how peace operations adapt to their environment, they have to remain true to the spirit, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter, especially Chapters VI and VII.

3 Ibid.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.3 The UN also distinguishes between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Multi-National Force (MNF)

Multi-National Force is a reference to any grouping of countries or a coalition of the willing that come together to undertake a joint operation. An MNF is normally associated with peace enforcement operations authorized by the UN Security Council.


2.2 A Concise History of UN Peace Operations

The first UN observer mission was deployed in Palestine under the name the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) after the first Arab/Israeli war from June 1948 until the end of the 1950s. The early missions were intended to be nothing more than a symbolic presence, consisting of lightly armed or unarmed military personnel from around the world, deployed to “internationalize” an inter-state conflict and raise the political costs of a resumption of war once a ceasefire had been reached.

In 1960, the UN was asked to establish a massive operation in the Republic of the Congo. Its scope and mission were unprecedented in an era otherwise known for its small-scale and limited peace operations. At its peak, the UN Operation in the Congo had more than 20,000 troops and 2,000 civilian technical experts (as large as the largest contemporary UN peace operation in Africa). The conflict in the Congo resulted in the deaths of 250 UN peacekeepers, including the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a plane crash. After this disastrous experience, the conventional wisdom in 1964 in international circles was that the UN would never again deploy a peace operations mission in a civil-war situation. Indeed, during the Cold War period that followed, all peace operations missions undertaken were of the classical interstate ceasefire monitoring type – for example, the missions in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Kashmir, Lebanon, and the Sinai desert.

Helicopter landing at an UNTSO observation post in Khiam, Lebanon. March 2003. (Source: UNTSO Photo)

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

The process during which combatants are disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated back into the community. In the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the DDR process is referred to as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) to accommodate the fact that some of the combatants had to be repatriated to their country of origin whilst others wished to be resettled rather than to be reintegrated back into their original communities. In Liberia, this process is known as DDRR, for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration. Each country may thus use a slightly different version to address their specific needs.


The end of the Cold War resulted in a new period of hope in the United Nations. New types of expanded peace operations were undertaken in the early 1990s in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia. These missions went much further than the classical observer-type missions, in that they assisted parties to implement comprehensive ceasefire and peace agreements. In the case of Cambodia and Namibia, they temporarily oversaw the transitional arrangements.

The experiences of the UN in the mid-1990s, however, especially the failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 and the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, resulted in many doubting the future role of UN peace operations. Many European countries opted rather for sub-regional peace operation through NATO. The UN had over 70,000 peace operations personnel deployed around the world in 1993, with total expenditures ranging from US$3-4 billion per annum. In 1998, this figure hovered around 10,000 personnel, with expenditure barely exceeding US$800 million.

This trend was suddenly reversed in 1999, when new missions were deployed in Kosovo (UNMIK), East Timor (UNTAET), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE). It would appear that the international community, when confronted by multiple conflicts outside of Europe, realized once again that the UN is the only appropriate global body to deal with international peace and security.

By 2004, the UN peace operations’ budget had reached almost US$3 billion for 11 peace operations, and estimates for 2005 were in the region of US$4.5 billion. By the end of 2004, new complex peace operations had been established in Afghanistan, Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia. By early 2007, the number of missions had increased to 18, with approximately

100,000 military, police and civilian UN peacekeepers deployed, with an unprecedented UN peacekeeping budget of approximately US$5.2 billion. In comparison with the small and weak UN missions of the mid- to late-1990s, the contemporary UN complex peace operations represent a significant shift in the political will of the international community to invest in peace operations and to use the United Nations as the vehicle of choice for these types of operations.

UNHCR and UNMIK assist several other agencies in the beginning of a programme to return Roma to Mitrovica, some 60 miles north of Pristina. They fled the area at the beginning of hostilities in 1999 and have been mostly in makeshift camps since then. 7 March 2007. (Source: UNMIK Photo, Robert E. Sullivan)


Contemporary United Nations Complex Peace Operations

Contemporary UN complex peace operations are, in effect, peacebuilding operations in that they have mandates that combine political, security, development, rule of law and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict.

The UN’s capability to undertake such system-wide peacebuilding operations is what sets it apart from NATO and the AU. The EU is the only other multilateral body that currently has the potential to develop such a complex peacebuilding operations capacity in the mid- to long-term, but it has not yet demonstrated its capacity to deploy such operations to date.

Integrated Missions

Combining such a diverse range of functions under one institutional framework has proven to be a daunting task for the UN. In order to manage these interdependencies in the field, the UN has developed the “Integrated Missions” model that is essentially aimed at enhancing coherence between the UN Country Team (that is humanitarian and developmental in focus) and the UN peace operation (that is peace and security focused).

As with any new innovation, this model has not been without its detractors, and it has highlighted various technical, administrative, organizational and budgetary challenges that need to be overcome before all aspects of the model can be fully implemented.

UN Peace Operations

In the UN context, the term “peace operations” is used broadly for any UN (blue-hat) operational deployment that is aimed at supporting a peace process. For instance, the name of the department responsible for such operations is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). UN peace operations typically include civilian, police and military components and are headed by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Depending on the type of mission, the civilian component typically includes units that specialize in political affairs, legal affairs, civil affairs and human rights; and, in recent operations, often separate gender and child protection units, and units that specialize in electoral affairs, DDR, public information, and mission support (finance, personnel, administrative and logistics). Police officers, together with prison experts and legal advisors, deal with the rule of law aspects of the peace process, including justice sector reform.

Mission Civilian Components

• Political Affairs • Public Information • Human Rights • Electoral • Civil Affairs • Gender • Child Protection • Legal Affairs (Rule of Law) • DDR • Humanitarian Affairs • Mission Support

− Administration − Personnel − Finance − Logistics − JLC − MOVCON − IT − Communications


Integration in the AU context is used in a generic sense to refer to multi-dimensional coordination and cooperation. For instance, the AU’s “Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF)” refers to a mechanism where the military, police and civilian planning functions are combined in one process, as opposed to the UN’s “Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)” that refers to the coming together of planners from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and planners from the UN Development Group (UNDG), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and other UN agencies (i.e. a system-wide initiative).

Use of Force

Another trend is the new, more robust approach to the use of force that has become a defining characteristic of contemporary complex UN peace operations. Although contemporary UN complex peace operations in Africa are still grounded in, and characterized by, the core principles of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force, the interpretation and application of these principles in practice have undergone significant development.

Consent still implies that the parties to the conflict must invite the UN presence and agree on its role, but it is now recognized that the strategic consent at the level of the leadership of the parties to the conflict does not necessarily translate into operational and tactical consent at all levels in the field.

Impartiality still implies that UN peace operations will not take sides in the conflict among the parties to the conflict, but it does not imply that the UN will stand by when civilians are in the imminent threat of danger, nor that it will not record and report human rights abuses that may or may not have or are still taking place, including by the parties to the conflict.

UN Integrated Missions

Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)

Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC)

Joint Operation Center (JOC)

Integrated Mission Planning Team (IMPT)

Principal Deputy Special Representative of the

Secretary-General (P/DSRSG)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Resident

Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG RC/HC)

Force Commander

(FC)

Police Commissioner

Director of Administration

(DOA)


Minimum use of force still implies that UN peace operations will use the minimum use of force necessary to protect itself and others covered by its mandate, but it is now understood that UN peace operations should have the capacity and mandate to prevent or counter serious threats, including those it has been mandated to protect.

2.3 Snapshot of a Complex Peace Operation: UNMIL

A close look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2004 will give us an opportunity to see a complex peace operation in action. This in a context where the peace process is still very fragile, and where humanitarian relief and security issues are still high on the agenda, many post-conflict reconstruction processes are already underway. In a sense, UNMIL is also a laboratory in that the UN peace operations mission’s mandate and structure clearly reflects a post-conflict reconstruction posture. Many of the mission’s offices, units, and programmes are new to UN peace operations or reflect a new expanded vision that has not yet been applied elsewhere. For instance, the humanitarian coordination function is fully integrated with the peace operations mission, and this approach is likely to set the tone for improved coordination over the full spectrum of post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

Structure of UNMIL

The United Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has a senior management structure consisting of:

• SRSG; • Deputy SRSG for Operations and Rule of Law; • Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction; • Force Commander; • UNPOL Commissioner; • Director of Administration; and • A number of civilian sections.

First all-female UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) arrives at Roberts International Airport in Liberia. 30 January 2007. (Source: UNMIL Photo/Eric Kanalstein)


Reporting directly to the SRSG are the:

• Gender Advisor Unit; • Legal Affairs Section; • Communications and Public Information Office; • Resident Auditor; • HIV/AIDS Unit; and • Political Planning and Policy Unit.

Reporting to the DSRSG for Operations and Rule of Law are the:

• Civil Affairs Section; • Corrections and Prison Advisory Service; • Human Rights and Protection Section; • Legal and Judicial System Support Division; • Disarmament and Demobilization (DD) Section; • UN Police Commissioner; and • Electoral Advisory Unit.

The Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery, and

Reconstruction has a Relief, Recovery, and Rehabilitation Section that is sub-divided into two units and four sector offices. They are a Resource Mobilization and Trust Fund Programme, Quick Impact Projects Unit, and an Integrated Humanitarian Coordination and NGO liaison Unit. The Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery, and Reconstruction is also the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC).

The UN Country Team (UNCT) is made up of the:

• UN Development Programme (UNDP); • United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); • United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); • World Health Organization (WHO); • World Food Programme (WFP); • Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); • Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); • International Organization for Migration (IOM); • World Bank; and • UN Field Security Coordinator (UNFSCO).

Following an agreement to pursue an integration strategy, OCHA formally merged with

UNMIL’s Humanitarian Coordination and NGO liaison Unit on 1 July 2004.


UNMIL follows an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP). The IMIP is a consolidated mission-wide strategic and operational framework for the implementation of UNMIL’s mandate. On the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1509 (2003), the IMIP identifies eight core goals and breaks these down into 86 projects. The core goals are:

1) Consolidation and strengthening of peace and security;

2) Establishment of mechanisms and programmes for disarmament and demobilization;

3) Rehabilitation and reintegration of all ex-combatants into civil-society;

4) Establishment of the rule of law;

5) Establishment of safeguards for human rights;

6) Facilitation of and the functioning and restoration of state authority;

7) Provision of factual information to the public through public media campaigns; and

8) Coordination of UN agencies.

The UNCT in Liberia works on the basis of three key strategy and planning documents: the 2003-2005 UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF); the 2004 Consolidated Appeal (CAP); and the National Transitional Government of Liberia, UN, and World Bank Joint Needs Assessment (which formed the basis for the Liberia Reconstruction Conference in February 2004). The Joint Needs Assessment was systematically constructed as a Results Focused

Transitional Framework (RFTF), and an Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) was established. RIMCO is headed by the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, with the United Nations and the World Bank as vice-chairs.

The RFTF framework identifies results expected in eight priority areas: security, restructuring and retraining of the Armed Forces of Liberia; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; assistance to refugees; strengthening governance, democratic development and the rule of law; preparations for elections; provision of basic social services; restoration of key public infrastructure; and, strengthening economic management capacity. The RIMCO structure provides for eight RFTF Technical Working Committees (RWC), one for each of the sectors identified above. Each RWC is chaired by a government representative, typically the relevant minister, and co-chaired by the appropriate UN agency.

UNMIL Major Goran Arvidsson addresses the crowd about weapons collection in the DDRR programme. Harper, Liberia, 31 January 2004. (Source: UNMIL Photo/Margaret Novicki)


As the post-conflict reconstruction process is still in the early stages, it is crucial to establish coordination mechanisms that will result in the exchange of information across dimensions, so that those working in, for instance, refugee repatriation and elections, can adjust their planning based on the feedback received from those working with the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants. Meaningful and effective coordination is thus a key contributor to ensuring that the international community’s investment in post-conflict reconstruction programmes in a given situation results in sustainable peace.

2.4 AU Policy Framework on Peace Operations

The Common Defence and Security Policy for Africa envisages the use of the armed forces of African states collectively to ensure that Africa’s common defence and security interests and goals are safeguarded in the face of common threats that may include:

1. Inter-state conflicts;

2. Intra-state conflicts;

3. Unstable post-conflict situations; and

4. Grave humanitarian situations, as well as other circumstances.

Common external threats are varied and may include: external aggression (including invasion of an African country), international terrorism, cross-border drug-crimes, mercenaries, and arms proliferation.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created to be a standing decision-making organ for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is intended to be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis in Africa.

The African Standby Force (ASF)

The ASF provides for five sub-regional standby arrangements, each up to brigade size, which will provide the AU with a combined standby capacity of 15-20,000 troops. Each regional arrangement will include between 300 and 500 military observers, who are trained and ready to deploy on 14 days notice, and a police standby capacity of at least 240 individual officers and two company-strength police units (gendarmerie). This should enable the AU to staff two complex peace operations with a police component each. There will also be a centrally-managed roster of civilian specialists in mission administration, human rights, humanitarian operations, governance, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).


Upon the recommendation of the PSC, the AU has the right to intervene in a Member State under grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and threats to legitimate order – in order to restore peace and stability.

At the time this course was drafted, the AU deployed three peace operations. The first was to Burundi in 2003 – the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) – which was replaced in 2004 with a United Nations peace operation (ONUB). The second was a peace operation to Darfur in 2004, namely the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which became a hybrid UN/AU mission (UNAMID) on 31 December 2007. A third operation, to Somalia (AMISOM), was deployed in the beginning of 2007.

The founding principles for an African approach to peacekeeping were adopted at the first meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) that took place in Addis Ababa in 1995. These principles were further expanded on at a second ACDS meeting that was held in Harare in 1997. At the third ACDS meeting, held in Addis Ababa in 2003, a Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force was established, and this Framework was subsequently adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Maputo in 2003.

Possible Mission Scenarios

1. AU/regional military advice to a political mission; 2. AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission; 3. AU/regional stand-alone observer mission; 4. AU/regional traditional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive

deployment missions; 5. AU complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission with low-level spoilers, an

enduring feature of many current conflicts; or 6. AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where the international community

does not act promptly (peace enforcement).

Former African Union military personnel don the traditional United Nations blue beret during a ceremony which officially signals the transfer of authority, in accordance with the timeline specified in Security Council resolution 1769, from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the joint African Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in El Fasher, Darfur. December 2007. (Source: UN Photo #167256, Shereen Zorba)


The ASF will eventually be made up of five regionally-based standby brigades, namely: one in East Africa (EASBRIG), one in southern Africa (SSF), one in Central Africa, one in West Africa (ESF), and one in North Africa. The ASF will consist of these regionally-organized brigades, each made up of various national units stationed in their own countries with a regional Brigade HQ and planning element. The various sub-units will train using the same SOPs and doctrines and, from time to time, will train together to ensure interoperability. These units will be complemented by military observers, police and civilian specialists. The ASF Policy Framework provides for a “roster of civilian experts” to fulfil human rights, governance, demobilization, disarmament, repatriation and reconstruction tasks.

The ASF will perform functions in the following areas:

1. Observation and monitoring missions; 2. Other types of peace support missions; 3. Intervention in Member States in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a

Member State in order to restore peace and security; 4. Preventive deployment; 5. Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; 6. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in conflict

areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and 7. Any other functions as may be mandated by the PSC or Assembly.

To perform these functions, the ASF Policy Framework sets a number of parameters to

provide guidance on the establishment and operationalization of the force:

1. The AU shall be the sole legitimate mandating authority; 2. Strategic management capability, consisting of a 15-member planning element

(PLANELM) staff at the AU and regional HQs; 3. Mission level management capability, made up of skeleton brigade HQs; 4. Mission components, namely standby multi-disciplinary civilian, military and police

contingents, in their countries of origin and ready for deployment at appropriate notice; 5. Doctrine and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that shall be consistent with those of

the UN; 6. Training infrastructure, devolving on a number of regional centres of excellence; 7. Command, control, communication and information systems; and 8. Logistical infrastructure, consisting of regional logistical bases and donor-held equipment

and external assistance towards strategic air- and sea-lift.

Working with the UN

The AU and REC do not have the capacity to undertake complex, multi-dimensional peace operations on their own. The United Nations has thus continued to take the leading role for the humanitarian and development aspects whenever such regional deployments take place.


Strategic-Level Management Structure and Processes of the ASF

The ASF is thus envisaged as a multi-dimensional standby system, and as such it makes provision for the following strategic management structure: the Peace and Security Council (PSC) has the sole authority for mandating and terminating AU Peace Support Operation; the Chairperson of the Commission is responsible for the overall management of AU PSOs; the Head of the PSO will make use of the AU Planning Element (PLANELM) to plan any new PSO; the PLANELM is responsible for developing an integrated mission plan, in consultation with all the stakeholders, i.e., other departments within the AU Commission, Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PPCs), Regional Mechanisms, relevant members of the UN family and other international and regional organizations, bilateral partners, the parties to the conflict, where appropriate, and the Government and civil society of the country that will host the PSO.

To facilitate this process the PLANELM shall establish, at the earliest opportunity, for each new mission envisaged, an Integrated Planning Task Force (IPTF) consisting of representatives of all AU units that may be called upon to play a role in the envisaged or mandated PSO, T/PPCs, and Regional Mechanisms. In addition, the PLANELM should establish a Planning Consultation Forum (PCF), which can serve as a vehicle for the consultation and coordination with external (non-AU) stakeholders and partners.

Mission-Level Management Structures and Processes

The mission-level or operational management structure will be informed by the mandate of the mission, but it will typically consist of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), one or more Deputy SRCC, a Force Commander, a Commissioner of Police, various heads of substantive civilian components, and a Head of Mission Support.

Each of these people has specific tasks to follow and personnel to command. The Deputy

SRCC is responsible for coordination clusters of substantive civilian components as per the mission’s mandate. The Force Commander (FC) is responsible for achieving the military objectives of the mission’s mandate, and the Commissioner of Police (COMPOL) is responsible for achieving police objectives of the mission’s mandate.

The exact number of civilian personnel, their seniority, and the structure of the various substantive civilian components that will be needed in any given PSO will be informed by the mandate and scope of the mission.

Mission Operation Centre (MOC)

The Mission’s Operation Centre (MOC) is a 24-hour monitoring centre where duty officers from the military, police, substantive civilian and mission support components monitor and coordinate mission operations. The MOC serves as a crisis management centre, dealing with incidents as they occur, and serves as the communications hub between all military, police and civilian headquarters and AU headquarters. The MOC is responsible for producing a Daily Situation Report (D-Sitrep) for the mission leadership and AU headquarters.


The Office of the SRCC

The size and composition of the Office of the SRCC will be determined by the mandate of the mission, but it is typically headed by a Director of the Office and various personal support staff of the SRCC.

The Office of the SRCC has the overall responsibility for the multi-dimensional coherence and coordination of the mission. It shall thus have the capacity to coordinate all elements of the mission’s mandate and is supported by a senior mission management team. Typically, it comprises the DSRCC(s), Director of the Office of the SRCC, Force Commander, Commissioner of Police, Head of Political Affairs, Spokesman and the other Heads of Civilian Components, as well as the Head of Mission Support and others as directed by the SRCC.

Mission Analysis Cell (MAC)

The Mission Analysis Cell (MAC) is a mission-wide information analysis and management function that monitors the peace process by collating and analysing all the information gathered by the military, police and civilian components of the mission. The MAC consists of officers seconded from the military, police, and substantive civilian components, and its reports reflect the political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions of the process. The MAC is responsible for producing forward-looking analytical reports on specific issues of concern.

Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC)

The Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell (MPEC) is responsible for conducting and facilitating mission-wide planning, including multi-year plans, annual plans, phased transition plans, planning for special events, and eventually the planning for the drawing down of the mission. The MPEC is also responsible for analysing and evaluating mission progress and provides periodic reports to the mission leadership on progress achieved to ensure that mission plans are adjusted to reflect changing conditions, capitalize on gains, or counter unintended consequences. The MPEC is also responsible for identifying best practices and incorporating between the mission, internal and external stakeholders, and partners through hosting regular coordination meetings and by participating in those meetings hosted by other agencies. The MPEC consists of officers seconded from the military, police and substantive civilian components.


Sector Offices

When the size of a mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) is so large that it cannot be managed efficiently with one headquarters, the mission will divide the AOR into multiple Sectors and create an integrated Sector Headquarters for each. The Sector HQ will be headed by a civilian Head of Sector (HoS) who reports directly to the SRCC.

The HoS facilitates coordination among the sector level components. The Heads of Components report to their respective chains of command for operational purposes, with due consideration to sector-level coordination.

The Financing of African Peace Operations

The single most important factor when considering the future of peace operations in Africa is financing. The AU experience is that even relatively small, unarmed military observer missions have proven too costly to be financed solely from its own budget or from the African Peace Fund. Instead the AU, and the OAU before it, has to rely on donor funding to finance its peace missions.

The AU’s first peace operation, AMIB, had an approved strength of just over 3,000 troops and an operational budget of approximately US$130 million per year. This was a significant expense in the South African context. For instance, in comparison, the budget of the AU Commission for 2003 was approximately $32 million.

The AU’s second peace operation, AMIS, was even larger still with approximately 6,700 personnel and an annual budget of approximately $466 million. AMIS was also donor funded, and as indicated earlier, the EU and the U.S. contributed the bulk of the mission’s budget.

Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan (right, with microphone) in Ethiopia to co-chair the donor pledging meeting for the African Union Mission (AMIS) in the Darfur region of western Sudan, seen here addressing staff members of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), headquartered in Addis Ababa. May 2005. (Source: UN Photo #76231, Evan Schneider)


As can be seen from these two examples, it is clear that, for the foreseeable future, the AU will be dependent on donor support for its peace operations. This is problematic because the AU’s dependency on external resources denies its freedom to independently take decisions on some of the strategic, operational and even tactical aspects of the peace operations it may wish to undertake. Finding the appropriate balance between African and partner interests will thus probably be the dominant feature of the relations between these partners over the short- to mid-term.

Africa has made tremendous efforts to address its perennial security problems. Within the framework of the PSC Protocol, the ASF promises to provide an effective instrument for rapid peace operations intervention. On the basis of the financial constraints explained above, the institutional and operational limitations of regional organizations to undertake complex peacebuilding operations, and the emerging division of labour between the UN and regional organizations, one can conclude that it should be unlikely that the AU or regional organizations will continue to undertake AMIS-type, long-term peace operations in the foreseeable future. Instead, more often than not, the AU is likely to undertake military observer operations, and regional organizations like ECOWAS are likely to undertake short-term stabilization missions like the ECOMIL mission in Liberia.

For further reading, please see:

• UN DPKO (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp) • Peacekeeping Best Practices (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/) • Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping


1. The key principles for UN peace operations are:

a. Consent, Impartiality and Minimum Use of Force; b. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality; c. Consent, Impartiality and Independence; d. Consent, Neutrality and Self-Defence.

2. In the UN Charter, the UN is dedicated to:

a. Supporting fundamental human rights, when relevant; b. Discouraging conflicts between nations, except as a last resort; c. Maintaining international peace and security; d. Promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty, where compatible.

3. Which of the following possible mission scenarios are in the African Standby Force Policy

Framework? a. Military advice to a political mission; b. Military support in the case of a man-made disaster, e.g. chemical accident; c. Military support in the case of a natural disaster, e.g. flood; d. Military support in the case of a famine.

4. The ASF stands for:

a. The Alternative Standby Force; b. The African Standby Facility; c. The African Standby Force; d. The African System Facility.

5. The Head of Mission of a multidimensional UN peace operations is the:

a. Force Commander; b. Police Commissioner; c. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG); d. Director of Administration.



6. The African Union mission-level management structure includes: a. A Force Commander; b. A Judicial Commissioner; c. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG); d. A CIMIC Officer.

7. Which of the following is one likely to find in a UN Integrated Mission structure?

a. Humanitarian Logistics Communications Centre; b. Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC); c. Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC); d. Police Coordination Committee.

8. Which one of the following civilian components is one unlikely to find in a UN peace

operation? a. Human Rights Unit; b. Gender Unit; c. Political Affairs Unit; d. Food Security Unit.

9. The UN defines peacebuilding as:

a. Measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace; b. Measures and structures that will enforce peace; c. Measures and structures that will ensure freedom and democracy; d. Measures and structures that will alleviate poverty and ensure sustainable

development. 10. The UN defines conflict prevention as:

a. Preventing peace agreements from falling apart; b. Preventing disputes from arising, preventing disputes from escalating, and limiting

their spread when they do occur; c. Preventing societies from having national dialogues that can lead to violence; d. Preventing hate speech.

ANSWERS: 1a, 2c, 3a, 4c, 5c, 6a, 7c, 8d, 9a, 10b


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LESSON 3

PEACEBUILDING AND COORDINATION IN COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS

3.1 From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

3.2 Peacebuilding Phases

3.3 Peacebuilding Actors

3.4 Coordination and Synchronization

3.5 Coordination in Complex Peace Operations

3.6 Conclusion

Lesson 3 / Peacebuilding and Coordination in Complex Peace Operations 50

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Identify the three phases that may be generally applicable to most peacebuilding processes;

• Identify both the external and internal actors involved in peacebuilding operations;

• Explain the role of CIMIC in synchronizing the different peacebuilding dimensions and programmes; and

• Understand why coordination is needed and how it is applied in the peace operations context.

INTRODUCTION

In the 21st century, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which is about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing transitions. There are important differences in approach between CIMIC in a peacebuilding context and CIMIC during a humanitarian emergency phase. A CIMIC officer thus has to understand what peacebuilding means, how it differs from humanitarian action, and what the implications of those differences are.

Civil-Military Coordination is one of several coordination mechanisms that have been developed in the peace and relief operations environment. It is important for the CIMIC officer to understand the role coordination plays in general in this environment and to contextualize the role of CIMIC within this broader role.




3.1 From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding

The international response to conflict, as developed in the context of the United Nations, is to try first to prevent conflict (conflict prevention). If that fails, the next step is to make peace by facilitating negotiation among the parties (peacemaking). If a ceasefire or peace agreement is reached that includes a neutral third-party monitoring role, the UN or a regional organization authorized by the Security Council would typically deploy a peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and to support the implementation of the peace agreement. Once the conflict zone has been stabilized and a peace process has been agreed upon, the international community would shift its focus from emergency assistance to post-conflict reconstruction. This phase is focused on rebuilding and reconciliation, with the aim of addressing the root causes of the conflict so as to prevent it from re-occurring (peacebuilding).

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management is increasingly shifting from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change. The nexus between development and peace has become a central focus of peacebuilding thinking and practice over the last decade.

Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding operations are international interventions that support the process of reconciliation and reconstruction in post-conflict societies. In the short term, they are designed to assist peace processes and prevent a relapse into conflict, but their ultimate aim is to address the root causes of a conflict and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace.

It is clear, however, that despite a growing awareness in the 1990s that the security, socio-economic, political, and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict operations are inter-linked, the agencies that undertake these operations have been finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent country strategies. Coherence can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian, and development dimensions of a peacebuilding intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective.

The failure to effectively coordinate humanitarian relief, development and security programmes has been identified as a serious cause for concern by most major evaluations and best practice studies undertaken in recent years.

Civil-military coordination is thus a critical element in any peacebuilding process, without which it would be impossible to achieve an overall state of mutual consistency among the different policies and actions of the various agencies engaged in a given peacebuilding operation.


Generic Peacebuilding Dimensions and Sectors

Providing a safe and secure environment

Security sector governance, reform & transformation Security

Disarmament & demobilization

Support the peace process and oversee the political transformation

Democratization and participation

Elections: assistance, capacity building and monitoring

Governance: capacity building, strengthening the civil service, good governance, policy development

Political, governance & participation

Conflict prevention and dispute resolution

Humanitarian assistance: food, water & sanitation, shelter, health & refugees/IDPs Repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction Physical infrastructure: roads, ports, airports, electricity, telecommunications Social services: health, education, social welfare, population registration, civil society

Economy: employment, agriculture, micro-lending, etc

Socio-economic

Free press: policy development, capacity building, public information (radio, TV, print)

Truth and reconciliation commission processes

National dialogue, nation-building, confidence building

Human Rights Human rights, justice &

reconciliation

Justice sector reform/rule of law: police, corrections, the judiciary

Concepts and Definitions in Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is a holistic concept that provides for simultaneous short, medium and long-term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace. It requires a coherent and coordinated multidimensional response by a broad range of role-players including government, civil society, the private sector and international agencies.

These various actors undertake a range of interrelated programmes that span the security, political, socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of society. This range, collectively and cumulatively, addresses both the causes and consequences of the conflict and, in the long-term, establishes the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development.


3.2 Peacebuilding Phases

Peacebuilding is situated in the period between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to a normal development process. It is possible to identify three phases that may be generally applicable to most peacebuilding processes: the stabilization phase, the transitional phase, and the consolidation phase.

Stabilization Phase

The stabilization phase is the emergency period that follows immediately after the formal ending of hostilities and typically focuses on establishing a safe and secure environment and responding to the consequences of the conflict through emergency relief operations. The World Bank estimates that there is a 50% chance that any new peace agreement may fail – the risks are even higher when natural resources are at stake.

Transitional Phase

The transitional phase typically starts with the appointment of an interim government followed by, in the shortest reasonable period, some form of election or legitimate traditional process to elect a transitional government, constituent assembly or some other body responsible for writing a constitution or otherwise laying the foundation for a future political dispensation. The transitional stage typically ends with an election, run according to the new constitution, after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power.

Consolidation Phase

The consolidation phase is aimed at supporting the newly elected government and civil society with a broad range of programmes aimed at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic recovery and supporting ongoing processes of change and development. An example could be security sector and judicial sector reform processes.

The transition from the peacebuilding process to a normal development process is gradual, and it will typically be very difficult to pinpoint the exact period when such a transition occurred. The peacebuilding process can generally be said to have come to and end when: a newly elected government is in a position to ensure the human security of all its citizens without extraordinary external assistance; the government has extended its control and protection throughout its territory; and the foundation of the rule of law and social justice has been firmly established. The new society can thus reasonably be expected to continue on the path to sustainable peace and development without undue internal or external threats to its stability.

Peacebuilding Roleplayers

Both internal (government, civil society, business) and external parties (peace operation, UN Country Team, INGOs, donor agencies) must be considered.


Peacebuilding Dimensions

One can identify a number of dimensions that are common to most peacebuilding operations. See the above table entitled “Generic Peacebuilding Dimensions and Sectors.” It is important to recognize, however, that each country will have its own unique combination of these themes.

3.3 Peacebuilding Actors

When considering the different actors in peacebuilding operations, we can make a distinction between internal and external actors.

External Actors

There are a number of external actors that need to be considered in the peacebuilding context. Key among these is the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs and donor agencies.

In many post-conflict situations the UN, the AU or sub-regional organizations – for example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa – will deploy a peace operation to stabilize the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peace operation’s effort and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the peacebuilding work can be carried out without fear of disruption.

The different members of the UN System in a given country are commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a Resident Representative, who is typically the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The Resident Representative (RR) is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN System in the country and is often also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). The members of the UNCT include the UNDP, World Bank (WB), UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), World Food

Internal and External Players

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties. The external actors are the peace operation, the UN Country Team, international NGOs, regional and sub-regional organizations like the EU, AU or ECOWAS and donor agencies.

The UNCT Typically Includes:

• RR/RC/HC • UNDP • World Bank • UNHCR • WFP • UNICEF • WHO • UNIFEM • OCHA • …and others.


Programme (WFP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and others.

All of these agencies, funds and offices have their own mandates, budgets and programmes. The RC/HC’s function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonize their policies and programmes.

The international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include a broad range of independent non-profit organizations that work in the humanitarian assistance and development spheres. Most NGOs have developed a specific field of specialization. Some, like Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), focus on the health sector. Oxfam is known for its work in the water and sanitation and preventive health sectors. Others, like CARE International and World Vision have a more cross-cutting approach and may be involved in food distribution, agriculture projects and support of refugees or internally displaced persons. In some cases, these NGOs will execute programmes for which they have obtained their own funding, whilst in others

they may act as implementing partners for UN agencies like UNHCR (refugees) or WFP (food distribution).

The donor community includes multilateral donor agencies such as the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC/ECHO), and bilateral donor agencies like JICA (Japan), USAID (US), DFID (UK), GTZ (Germany), NORAD (Norway), SIDA (Sweden), CIDA (Canada), and GOAL (Ireland). Most of these donor agencies are present at the country level.

Staff deliver food donated by the UN World Food Programme and World Vision to the Malakal Teaching Hospital in Sudan. December 2006. (Source: UN Photo #133845, Tim McKulka)

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (at head of table) meets with the UN Country Team in Damascus, Syria. April 2007. (Source: UN Photo #143463, Eskinder Debebe)


Internal Actors

The internal actors are comprised of the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, the private sector and civil society in all its different varieties. In principle, the host government and other internal actors should play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that they are unable to fulfil this role in the early stages of peacebuilding operations. As a result, the international aid community, by default, often plays more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. At a minimum, coordination processes should ensure that the host community participates in all decisions that affect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop the capacity to play their rightful role. As the peacebuilding process develops, the internal actors should play an increasingly important role.

3.4 Coordination and Synchronization

A key characteristic of the peacebuilding process is that all of these dimensions are inter-linked and interdependent. The programmes and agencies are interdependent in that no single programme can achieve the goal of the peacebuilding operation – addressing the consequences and causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own. It is only if the combined and sustained effort proves successful in the long term that the investment made in each individual programme can be said to have been worthwhile.

The project cycles of the different dimensions, clusters and programmes need to be synchronized with each other and with the overall peacebuilding strategy. Individual programmes need to continuously adjust their planning to the feedback received from elsewhere in the system in order to ensure that the combined effect on the society is positive, consistent and produced at a rate that can be absorbed by the internal actors.

It is the total collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in all these dimensions and sectors that slowly builds a positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritization and sequencing between these dimensions and sectors are thus very important. This is why coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations, as well as why CIMIC has such an important role to play in these types of operations.

CIMIC and Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding operations are neutral, third-party interventions in that they do not take sides among the former parties to the conflict when supporting the implementation of a peace agreement.1 As the peace process develops, however, this neutrality shifts away from a focus on the parties to a neutral guardianship of the peace process. In some exceptional circumstances this may mean acting against one or more of the parties to safeguard the provisions of the peace 1 Tschirgi, T. 2003, Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity

Closing?, A paper prepared for the International Peace Academy (IPA) conference on ‘Security and Development: Assessing International Policy and Practise since the 1990s, 5 December 2003, IPA, New York, p.2.


agreement. In general, however, this implies working closely with the parties to the peace agreement in the implementation of the various stages of the peace process. In the consolidation phase, this means working closely with the newly elected government to support them in their efforts to consolidate the transition from war to peace. UN peacebuilding operations are thus not neutral and impartial in the same sense that these concepts are used to define humanitarian action.

The primary role of the military component of a peacebuilding operation is to ensure a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can operate. The secondary role of the military component is to make its resources available to external and internal actors in support of the overall mission objectives. For instance, in the context of a DDR programme, the military component may be in a position to provide transport, medical services, camp-building, weapons storage and/or weapon destruction services, over and above its security function. Similarly, in the context of a UN-supported election, where a UN peace operation is deployed, the military component may be in a position to assist with the identification of suitable sites for polling stations, engineering support, and the provision of transport, manpower, and equipment – over and above its security function.

The use of military assets in the peacebuilding context differs from the use of military assets in the humanitarian context in that there is no assumption of independence, based on the neutrality and impartiality of the civilian peacebuilding partners. In the peacebuilding context – for example, in a DDR or elections programme – both military and civilian partners are understood to be engaged in an activity aimed at bringing about a specific outcome that will fundamentally change the dynamics of the situation. Those opposed to an election, for instance, will be opposed to all that are involved in the electoral process, regardless of whether they are civilian or military. Therefore, the close cooperation between military and civilian partners in the peacebuilding context does not have the same implications for the security of the civilian partners, or beneficiary population, as it would have in the humanitarian context.

The Brazilian Battalion of MINUSTAH set up a checkpoint outside of the Sonapi Warehouse area where the Voting Tabulation Center (VCT) is located. Checkpoint #3 re-inforces MINUSTAH’s military show of force before, during and after the elections, as many of the vehicles coming from Cite Soleil must pass through this point. February 2006. (Source: MINUSTAH Photo/Sophia Paris)


Once this distinction with humanitarian action is established, it makes sense for the peacebuilding operation to integrate the overall management of the resources at its disposal. In this context, these kinds of military support are seen as leveraging the resources that exist within the different components of the mission, so that ultimately the peacebuilding operation can maximize the impact it has on the peace process by mustering and focusing all of its available resources on a specific outcome, e.g. facilitating a successful election.

CIMIC should be integrated into the larger mission effort and should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders. For instance, community support actions should be aimed at helping the local community; that is, they must be based on the need of the community (“needs driven” as opposed to “supply driven”) and the community should be encouraged to take ownership of, and direct, these projects. CIMIC actions should be coordinated with all partners and stakeholders (e.g. in the case of a military unit rehabilitating a school, such services should be coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities: local education authorities, local community leaders, UNICEF, OCHA, NGOs working in the education field, and others that may be active in the area) so that the actions of the military unit are complementary to the actions (humanitarian and development) that are being undertaken by appropriate civilian and humanitarian actors. For instance, a CIMIC school rehabilitation project should not be in competition with, or undermine, the activities of these civilian actors. It should be undertaken in support of a larger school rehabilitation programme, so that the school that is rehabilitated through CIMIC action will be integrated into, and supported by, the larger programme – thus ensuring sustainability.

3.5 Coordination in Complex Peace Operations

It is clear that despite a growing awareness in the 1990s that the security, socio-economic, political and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict operations are inter-linked, the agencies that undertake these operations have been finding it extremely difficult to meaningfully integrate these different dimensions into coherent country strategies. The failure to effectively coordinate humanitarian relief, development and security programmes has been identified as a major cause for concern by most of the major evaluation and best practice studies undertaken over recent years. For instance, the “Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding,” which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom over the last decade, has identified a lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it terms a “strategic deficit” – as the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study found that more than 55% of the programmes it evaluated did not show any link to a larger country strategy.2

In the post-conflict reconstruction context, coordination can be understood as the effort to ensure that the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of a post-conflict intervention in a particular crisis are directed towards a common objective.

2 Smith, D. 2003, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein

Study on Peacebuilding, PRIO, Oslo, p.16.


Everybody Wants To Coordinate But Nobody Wants To Be Coordinated

There is a saying in the relief community that sums up the core dilemma of coordination: “Everybody wants to coordinate but nobody wants to be coordinated.” According to Antonio Donini, one of the leading researchers in the humanitarian coordination field, “few knowledgeable persons would dispute that the effective provision of humanitarian assistance requires that duplication, waste and competition among agencies be avoided”.3 Peter Uvin adds that “all documents on peace-building stress the need for improved coordination: there is no single need more emphasized”.4 And yet, effective coordination in the field has proved difficult to achieve.

Barnes provides an example from her experiences in Mozambique that echoes the feedback received from people in many other similar situations. She reports that the “meaning of coordination varied depending on which of the stakeholders employed it at a given moment and that the various stakeholders competed to place their agencies at the forefront of the process to enhance their own legitimacy and subsequent fundraising capacities”.5

Peter Uvin provides a useful list of reasons why effective coordination appears to be so elusive:

The lack of coordination is partly due to widely recognized factors: the multitude of actors, often numbering in the hundreds [...]; the high cost in time and money that effective coordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin to maneuver by the discipline of coordination. Note that multilateral agencies and international NGOs share most of these problems, with the additional problem that the financing structures of humanitarian and development assistance place them in competition with each other.6

So What Does Coordination Mean?

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English explains that cooperation means “working together for a common purpose,” whilst coordination means “making things, people and parts function together efficiently and in an organized way.” The Collins English Dictionary provides an insight into coordination that seems even more relevant for our purpose.

3 Donini, A. 2002, The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda, Occasional

Paper #22, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence. 4 Uvin, P. 1999, The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthesis and Commentary on the Lessons

Learned from Case Studies on the Limit and Scope of the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations, DAC, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, OECD, Paris, p.18.

5 Barnes, S. 1998, Humanitarian Aid Coordination During War and Peace in Mozambique, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala.

6 Uvin, op. cit., p.19.


It defines coordination as “the organization of the activities of two or more groups in such a way that each may work more efficiently and be aware of what the other group(s) are doing.”

The most authoritative definition of coordination appears to be that coined by Minear &

Chellia:

Coordination is the systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include: (1) strategic planning; (2) gathering data and managing information; (3) mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability; (4) orchestrating a functional division of labour; (5) negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities; and (6) providing leadership. Sensibly and sensitively employed, such instruments inject an element of discipline without unduly constraining action.7

The Dimensions of Coordination

There are many factors that frustrate coordination, but two deserve particular attention. The first is the sheer number of international and local actors involved, and the second is the wide-ranging scope of activities undertaken by these actors. The interaction among this large number of actors and the interplay among the multiple dimensions explain the complexity inherent in post-conflict reconstruction operations. To these we can still add an infinite number of complicating factors including, amongst others: the language and socio-cultural gaps between those undertaking post-conflict reconstruction programmes and the beneficiaries they are intended to assist; moreover, the inconsistencies and selectivity of the neo-liberal international policy regime that serve to compound existing global inequalities.8

The information revolution has multiplied the number of actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction operations. It has amplified the influence of the media, nurtured a more educated and better informed public, and increased the number of institutions and agencies engaged in peace, security, relief and reconstruction actions.

7 Minear, L. & Chellia U. 1992, UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis

1990-1992, Occasional Paper 13, Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Providence, p.3. 8 Pugh, M. & Cooper, N. 2004, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation, Lynne

Rienner Publishers, London, p.197.

Civilian Context

CIMIC personnel investigate, analyse and assess the civilian context to assist in the execution of military tasks.

Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, 1999


The Political Dimension

At the strategic level, the UN Security Council, the AU Peace & Security Council, and the conflict management bodies of the African sub-regional organizations are responsible for peace and security related matters. Very often one or more of these bodies will have been responsible for facilitating the peace process, and they will continue to support the peace process as it unfolds.

These bodies are likely to have a representative or office in the country, or send envoys who will visit the country regularly to engage with the parties to the conflict. Where a UN or AU peacekeeping mission has been deployed, it is typically headed by a civilian Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). In UN peacekeeping operations, the SRSG will have the support of a political affairs section for strategic and national level political processes and a civil affairs unit that have a presence throughout the country to engage with local government, community and traditional leadership structures.

The SRSG and his staff, other envoys, diplomats and visiting delegations will provide ongoing support and mediation services to the parties to the peace process. It will be necessary to coordinate the various efforts aimed at supporting the negotiations process so that the international community is consistent in the messages communicated to the various parties. It is not uncommon for parties to switch between mediators or to otherwise manipulate a peace process if the various external players are not coherent in their support. These various processes need financial support and technical assistance, and coordination will include the mobilization of funds and the division of labour among the various agencies to support these various processes.

The Security Dimension

In many post-conflict situations, the UN, the AU or sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS will deploy a peacekeeping operation to stabilize the situation and to monitor and support the peace process. The bulk of a peacekeeping operation’s efforts and resources will be focused on ensuring a safe and secure environment so that the rest of the post-conflict reconstruction work can be carried out without fear of disruption. Although the peacekeeping mission may be involved in Security Sector Reform (SSR), it is

Congolese police trained by MONUC civilian police demonstrating their skills at their graduation ceremony, Kisangani, DRC, August 2003. (Source: MONUC Photo/Kevin Jordan)


common for the actual training, transformation or establishment of new police and/or defence force to be supported by one or more bilateral partners. The role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone is an example.

Where a peacekeeping mission has been deployed, it often becomes a natural point of convergence for the various international agencies and NGOs, but as has been highlighted elsewhere, this does not imply a management or control function. UN, AU or sub-regional peacekeeping operations have no power or authority over other agencies. Increasingly, however, UN and other peacekeeping forces recognize the importance of coordination; it is now common for a peacekeeping force to have CIMIC officers, and sometimes units, dedicated to this task.

The Socio-Economic and Reconciliation Dimensions

The socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions are the traditional focus of post-conflict reconstruction programmes, and there is a wide range of role-players in these dimensions. The first of these are the members of the UN System, commonly referred to as the UN Country Team (UNCT). The UNCT is headed by a Resident Representative who is typically the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The Resident Representative (RR) is also the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN System in the country and often also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). Where there is a peacekeeping mission deployed, it is now common practise that one of the Deputy SRSGs will be from the humanitarian or development community and have the RC/HC function. The members of the UNCT include the UNDP, World Bank, UN High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO), UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and others. All of these agencies, funds and offices have their own mandates, budgets and programmes. The RC/HC’s function is to ensure that the UNCT develops a coherent programme in support of the needs of the country where they are based. The members of the UNCT meet on a regular basis and use various coordination mechanisms to harmonize their policies and programmes.

The other members of the humanitarian relief and reconstruction community include: international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international multilateral donor

Ross Mountain (right), Deputy SRSG and UN Development Programme Resident Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo speaks at a press conference to launch the report, "A Global Survey of the Cost of Registration and Elections Report - CORE", at UN Headquarters in New York. With him are Pippa Norris (left), Director of the Democratic Governance Group, UNDP; and Jeff Fisher (centre), Senior Director, Center for Transitional and Post-Conflict Governance, International Foundation for the Election Systems. May 2006. (Source: UN Photo #118310, Mark Garten)


agencies like the European Union (EU) and European Commission (EC), and bilateral donor agencies and independent organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Although these various relief and reconstruction agencies are often viewed as highly independent because they lack a formal organizational hierarchy, they actually form a closely interconnected network linked by various value chains. For instance, many NGOs operate as implementing agents for UN agencies, whilst the donors may fund both the UN agencies and the NGOs at various levels in the value chain. An improved understanding of these inter-relationships may reveal opportunities for enhanced coordination.

From a coordination perspective, the donor agencies deserve particular focus since they are a relatively small number of donor countries (approximately twelve) that are responsible for funding the vast majority of post-conflict reconstruction programmes. Most of these countries are also important players in the peace and security dimension. If the coordination among the donors can be improved, it should have a substantial impact on the cohesion of post-conflict reconstruction operations. Unfortunately, there is a well-documented discrepancy between their willingness to coordinate and their actual practices.

Peacekeeping operations also have an increasingly important role to play in the socio-economic and reconciliation dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction operations. There has been a growing realization that in order to contribute to sustainable peace, peacekeeping missions need to have multidimensional mandates that incorporate political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation aspects. The activities carried out by the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL), as highlighted in Lesson 2, are an indication of how these expanded mandates have also resulted in more funds from the peacekeeping assessed contributions budget being allocated to post-conflict reconstruction programmes. This implies a greater scope for duplication and competition between the peacekeeping mission, the UNCT and the rest of the relief and reconstruction community, but also more opportunities for synergy and coordination as these various role-players increase their interaction and understanding of each other’s roles, mandates and operating cultures.

Coordination with the Internal Actors

The internal actors would include: the government of the day, the parties to the conflict, and the private sector and civil society in all its shapes and sizes. In principle, the host government and community should play the lead role in the reconstruction process, since it is indeed their own future that hangs in the balance. Unfortunately, in many cases, the capacity of the internal actors has been so severely diminished by the conflict that it is unable to fulfil this role. As a result, the international aid community is, by default, playing more of a leading role than would otherwise be desired. At a minimum, coordination processes should ensure that the internal actors participate in all decisions that affect them, and that there is a process in place to support them to develop the capacity to play their rightful role. This adds a capacity building dimension to coordination, because if the international community is going to be successful it needs the host community to take ownership of the process. If they do not initially have the capacity to set priorities and generate policies as to how these priorities should be pursued, it is in the international community’s interest to develop that capacity as a prerequisite for further success.


Core Elements of Coordination

Separating Coordination and Management

There should be a clear distinction between management and coordination. Decision-making takes place in the management function, whilst the coordination function is used to exchange information. If these two functions are separated, coordination will not pose a threat to any unit or programme. This is because each individual agent will retain full control over his/her own decision-making function.

For coordination to be palatable to defensive institutional cultures, it has to be non-threatening; and for it to be non-threatening, it has to be voluntary and free of any decision-making power over the participating agency.

Strategic Direction

One of the prerequisites for a coherent peace operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual units, offices and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress. The overall country strategy is produced by the cumulative and collective planning efforts of all the units, offices and programmes in the system.

The peace and security aspects of such an overall strategy are derived from the UN Security Council resolutions that determine the mandate of the mission and the strategic plans developed by the SRSG to implement that mandate. The humanitarian and development community’s strategies are derived from common assessment and appeal processes that may result in a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), a Common Country Assessment (CCA), a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – depending on the specific case.

The peace operation, the UN Country Team and other external actors, such as the NGO and donor community, need to work closely with the internal community, including both government and civil-society representatives. This is done with a view to developing one common country strategy. In Liberia, for instance, these different actors have come together to jointly develop a common strategy known as the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF).

Planning and Assessments

In order to achieve the desired level of synergy it is now becoming common practice to enrich planning at a higher, or home headquarters, level through integrated planning mechanisms and joint assessment missions. For example, in the UN Secretariat in New York, planning for peace operations now has an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) system that brings various UN departments and agencies together to provide input into the planning process. It is also now common practice to undertake joint assessment missions that assist in ensuring that there is a common understanding of the problems that need to be addressed.


At the field headquarters or mission management level, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and other senior managers coordinate with the representatives of government, parties to the peace process, heads of the various agencies, organizations, diplomatic missions and international organizations. They use various regular and ad-hoc meetings to achieve their coordination objectives. The senior managers also make use of a number of strategic planning instruments to encourage a broadly cohesive approach within the peace, security, humanitarian and development community – and to ensure that this approach supports the needs and priorities of the host community. Apart from the common strategic planning frameworks introduced above, missions also use various other mechanisms to exchange information among components at the HQ level. The Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMAC) is one example. The JMAC is a jointly staffed unit where the information gathered by various components (military units, military observers, UNPOL, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, etc.) is collated and analysed. In this way, the mission management benefits from one consolidated information picture about the mission and the peace process that has been informed by all the different perspectives within the mission.

Mobilizing Resources

The international community has developed various tools to mobilize resources. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). The CAP is first and foremost a strategic planning and coordination tool. The humanitarian community sees the CAP as the main strategy-setting tool in responding to man-made and other slow-onset disasters.

In the development dimension, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank will typically take the lead to coordinate fundraising for common priorities through donor conferences. The donor conference for Afghanistan in January 2001 and the conference for Liberia in February 2004 are two such examples.

Michael Møller (centre), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus, and Head of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP), meets with Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos (left) and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat in Nicosia. September 2007. (Source: UN Photo #151005)


In some cases, transitional appeals are launched on the basis of a Common Country Assessment (CCA), and then serve as the foundation for a UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and/or a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), as appropriate. Once the funds have been allocated, the coordination shifts to implementation and operational coordination.

In the case of UN peace operations, the missions are funded through assessed contributions. Part of the work of the CIMIC Officer will be to understand how these different funding mechanisms work, as well as which mechanisms within and outside the mission budget can be accessed to facilitate specific projects, e.g. Quick Impact Projects.

Operational Harmonization

The humanitarian and development communities have developed various coordination frameworks that they use in all situations where they are operational, regardless of whether they operate alongside a peace operation or not. In any given situation, the UNCT and other humanitarian and development role-players would thus have been engaged prior to, and during, the conflict period. It is important for those who deploy after the signing of a peace agreement to develop an understanding of existing UNCT and humanitarian coordination mechanisms so that they can harmonize their own coordination efforts with those of the UNCT and RC/HC.

Since UNAMSIL in 2000, a practice has developed whereby one of the Deputy SRSGs is typically from the humanitarian or development community and has the RC/HC function. The Deputy SRSG RC/HC would regularly meet with all the actors in the humanitarian and development community to ensure that there is close coordination between the peace operation and the humanitarian and development community.

At the operational level, one would typically find that coordination takes place within clusters and sectors such as health, water and sanitation, shelter, refugees and IDPs, DDR, security sector reform, justice sector reform/rule of law, and so on. There have also been initiatives to create synergy across clusters, such as the UNHCR’s 4R’s concept – repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction. The concept aims to ensure linkages between all four processes, so that durable solutions for returning populations can be fostered.

Military and civilian actors have developed several coordination forums over the last

Refugees in the Zam Zam camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Darfur region of the Sudan. July 2004. (Source: UN Photo #14579, Eskinder Debebe)


decade. The military coordinates through Civil-Military Operation Centres (CMOCs), CIMIC Centres, CIMIC houses, or Civil-Military Affairs Branches, depending on who implements the concept. The humanitarian inter-agency approach to coordination would typically include a neutral coordination platform known as Humanitarian Operations Centres (HOCs) and Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs). Normally OCHA would be entrusted with facilitating the humanitarian coordination arrangements. The UN Joint Logistical Centre (UNJLC), of which WFP is the custodian, would coordinate logistical aspects of a humanitarian mission. For the development dimension, UNDP, in support of the RC, will provide a Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) or at least a development coordination officer.

Many of these coordination tools are mirrored at the tactical level, and adjusted to the practical realities on the ground. For instance, in Afghanistan, some CIMIC units have developed the CMOC into a mobile concept where CIMIC officers would visit the humanitarian and development agencies in their area of operations. The mobile CMOC concept was developed because the humanitarian agencies were too busy and thinly staffed to attend coordination meetings. In another situation, sector and battalion-level CIMIC cells established CIMIC houses. The CIMIC house was located outside the military compound, so that civilians could easily make contact with CIMIC officers without first having to go through a military security checkpoint and sign-in process that most civilians find intimidating and frustrating. The CIMIC house is open to local and international NGOs and UN agencies and serves as a focal point for information, as well as a facility where meetings can take place.

The various coordination mechanisms at the strategic, operational and tactical levels all aim to encourage the flow of information between different components, dimensions, clusters and sectors, and among the different actors in these various networks. The coordination mechanisms also serve as vehicles through which joint operations can be planned and synchronized. On a more practical level, coordination facilities assist with the sharing of resources and the centralization of key areas into common service points. For example, the UNJLC is one such common service point through which all the different aid agencies can manage the clearance of their goods through customs, etc. The HIC is an attempt to collect all available humanitarian information and make it available to the wider humanitarian and development community.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The country strategy initiative should be supported by a monitoring and evaluation system. Such an inter-agency initiative should not only provide feedback on individual and overall progress but also encourage programmes and agencies to participate in the overall coordination process. All actors should be requested to report on the steps they took to synchronize their plans and operations with the others in the system, as well as with the overall objectives of the mission. In this way, the evaluation process becomes normative: it encourages and rewards behaviour that enables coherence; it discourages and sanctions behaviour that inhibits coordination.


Another important element is the ability of the system to monitor the effect it is having on its environment. The project-cycles of the different programmes and agencies need to be synchronized to ensure that their combined and cumulative effect on the host society is positive. Projects must be consistent and delivered at a rate that can be absorbed by the local communities. When the ultimate aim of the international operation is sustainable peace, then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation has to reflect the optimal relationship between delivery and absorption.

3.6 Conclusion

Peacebuilding is thus an all-encompassing concept that incorporates a wide variety of responses aimed at supporting the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of the many facets of a society recovering from conflict. It seeks to alter the conditions that led to the conflict in the first place. Ultimately, peacebuilding is aimed at establishing the conditions necessary to ensure social justice and sustainable peace and development.

The key characteristic of peacebuilding operations is that all the different dimensions are interrelated and interdependent. It is the collective and cumulative effect of all the programmes undertaken in these different dimensions that slowly builds positive momentum towards sustainable peace. The timing, prioritization and sequencing between these dimensions are thus very important. This is why coordination is a critical success factor in peacebuilding operations.

Good coordination requires a web of coordination structures at all levels, working both from the bottom up and from the top down. This is necessary to ensure feedback in both directions. At the strategic level, coherence among the UN, AU, ECOWAS and the donor community is key. At the operational and tactical level, a vast network of liaison and coordination mechanisms exist. The network is feeding the system with the information it needs to remain focused on those areas that require the most effort, whilst staying true to the overall goals and objectives of the mission.

For further reading, please see:

• “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations,” Chapter XV on the “World Bank in Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and Chapter XVI on “Recovery, Development and Sustainable Peace.”

• On the UN experience in Sierra Leone, see “Transition and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: the UN Country Team Approach” at http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia/.


1. Peacebuilding operations are:

a. Local interventions; b. International interventions; c. National operations; d. Local operations.

2. The first phase of a Peacebuilding operation is the:

a. Stabilization phase; b. Transparent phase; c. Contrasting phase; d. Humanitarian crisis phase.

3. In Peacebuilding operations, we differentiate between which two types of actors?

a. Combatant and non-combatant; b. Internal and external; c. Military and civilian; d. UN and non-UN.

4. Peacebuilding operations are:

a. Biased, first party interventions; b. Biased, third party interventions; c. Neutral, second party interventions; d. Neutral, third party intervention.

5. Coordination in Peacebuilding operations can take place across various dimensions, such as:

a. Political, security, socio-economic and reconciliation; b. Political, military, police and humanitarian; c. Health, shelter, water and sanitation; d. Refugees, IDPs and the local population.

6. The security dimensions is responsible for:

a. Securing the peace agreement to prevent a relapse of the conflict; b. Stabilizing the situation and maintaining a safe and secure environment; c. Ensuring economic security and prosperity; d. Providing food security and preventing human suffering.



7. The main factor that inhibits coordination in a multi-agency environment is: a. Conflicting mandates and roles; b. Scarce resources; c. Violent conflict; d. Unclear Security Council mandates.

8. Which of the following is not an element of coordination?

a. Planning; b. Assessment; c. Mobilizing resources; d. Public information.

9. Peacebuilding operations are a combination of which of the following UN peace instruments?

a. Humanitarian assistance and counter-insurgency operations; b. Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction; c. Development assistance and security sector reform; d. Failed states and the war on terror.

10. Which of the following are not Internal Actors?

a. Multinational corporations; b. Local civil society; c. Government of the day; d. Traditional leaders.

ANSWERS: 1b, 2a, 3b, 4d, 5a, 6b, 7a, 8d, 9b, 10a

LESSON 4

CIMIC STRUCTURE AND LIAISON & INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

4.1 What is Liaison?

4.2 CIMIC Structures in UN Peace Operations

4.3 Information Management

4.4 Civilian Information

4.5 CIMIC Centres (CC) and Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOC)

4.6 UN CIMIC Command and Control

4.7 Conclusion

Lesson 4 / CIMIC Structure and Liaison & Information Management 72

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Explain CIMIC structures at the HQ, sector, battalion and company levels;

• Know how to achieve effective liaison from several perspectives;

• Understand the importance of information management from both the perspective of the military and civilian information spheres.

INTRODUCTION

This lesson deals with the way CIMIC is managed in peace operations, as well as how liaison and information management lies at the core of all operational CIMIC activities. There is no single correct or generally accepted way in which CIMIC is accommodated in military command structures.

This lesson will discuss a number of different examples of how CIMIC branches or cells have been structured at headquarter, sector, battalion and company level. The aim is to familiarize the CIMIC officer with a number of ways in which CIMIC can be organized so that he or she will have a broad understanding of how CIMIC can be structured.

Liaison forms the basis on which mission support and community support operations are undertaken and is the main function of CIMIC officers. It is thus critical for every CIMIC officer to understand what liaison and information management means and how to go about operationalizing the CIMIC liaison role in complex peace operations.




4.1 What is Liaison?

Liaison occurs when a channel of communication is established between two or more elements, with the purpose of exchanging information among them. In the peace operation context, the aim is to coordinate (within the coexistence-to-cooperation range – see Lesson 1) the respective initiatives, campaigns and programmes of various mission components, as well as those of the mission and other agencies and organizations.

In the CIMIC context, liaison refers to the activities undertaken by CIMIC staff officers at all levels to ensure the exchange of information between the military command level they serve (Force HQ, Sector HQ or unit level command) and their civilian counterparts.

Who is Responsible for Liaison?

Every programme, office, or unit is responsible for liaison. All programmes, offices or units must ensure that their plans and activities are coordinated with others operating in the same environment, with the objective of enhancing the overall strategic direction of the mission. Liaison and coordination is thus a shared responsibility.

In some cases, a specialized unit or office will facilitate coordination. In the peace operations context, it is now the norm that a peacekeeping force or military component will be deployed with a dedicated civil-military coordination (CIMIC) capacity. Most UN peace operations deploy with CIMIC officers at Force and Sector HQ. It is not yet common among UN Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to deploy battalions and other specialized units with a dedicated CIMIC capacity. Once deployed, however, such units usually quickly discover the need to appoint a CIMIC or liaison officer.

Management and Coordination

There should be a clear distinction between management, or command, and coordination. For coordination to be palatable to defensive institutional cultures, it has to be non-threatening. And for it to be non-threatening, it has to be voluntary and free of any decision-making power over the participating agency.

Strategic Direction

One of the crucial prerequisites for a coherent peace operation is a clearly articulated overall strategy against which individual units, offices and programmes can benchmark their own plans and progress.


The CIMIC officers at HQ and Sector level, and the officers performing the CIMIC function at unit level, represent the military component’s dedicated effort to ensure that there is a meaningful exchange of information between the military component, at all levels, and its external (international agencies and NGOs) and internal (local communities and authorities) civilian counterparts.

How is Liaison Achieved?

Liaison occurs when information is exchanged. Liaison is most effective between components that are directly interdependent on each other. Therefore, most coordination takes place within sectors or clusters – for example, all those working in the water and sanitation area, or all those involved in organizing or supporting an election.

Liaison can be achieved through verbal communication or the exchange of written information. Verbal communication occurs through face-to-face meetings or via some form of telephone or radio communication. Face-to-face meetings can be informal or formal, and they can occur on a one-to-one or group (meeting) basis. If circumstances require it, CIMIC officers

Coordination-With versus Coordinating Others

People have different perceptions about what coordination means. For instance, there is a difference between coordination with others and coordinating others. In the latter cases, there is an assumption of control where one party is exerting some kind of influence on the others, where in the former the power is neutral. Liaison, as it is used in this lesson, refers to coordination with others in a power-neutral fashion where all the players are regarded as equal and where none has the right to control or instruct others. Coordination, in this context, is a voluntary action based on mutual respect and the recognition of mutual interdependence.

Coordination is a Shared Responsibility

In the UN context, mission coordination is a shared responsibility. No single multidimensional mission component (political, security, humanitarian, development, human rights, etc.) should be the central point around which the others are coordinated. Each component should take responsibility for coordination around its own area of responsibility. For instance, OCHA would typically facilitate the coordination of humanitarian assistance. Overall strategic coordination and planning is the responsibility of the Office of the SRSG. The SRSG will typically make use of a Planning Team, an Operations Centre and a Mission Analysis Cell to achieve this level of strategic coordination.


can establish some form of operation centre, often referred to as a Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) or a CIMIC Centre.

Communication: A key requirement for any CIMIC officer is thus that they must be effective communicators. This implies that they should be fluent in the mission language. If they are going to be working with the local community, a good working knowledge of the local language(s) will be a tremendous asset. It also implies that they should be good at cross-cultural communication and negotiation and that they are experienced in participating in and chairing meetings constructively and efficiently. CIMIC officers are likely to host coordination meetings that share security information, and they may attend meetings hosted by OCHA or other agencies that coordinate or exchange information on other matters.

Relationships: CIMIC officers need to proactively reach out to their civilian counterparts and develop constructive relationships so that they can exchange information in an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect. This implies that the CIMIC officers should study the mandate and role of each of its civilian counterparts so that they develop an understanding of their place in, and of their contribution to, the overall system.

Operation Centres: CIMIC officers should also be readily accessible to their civilian counterparts. This is where the CMOC or CIMIC Centre becomes useful, in that they provide a forum the civilian agencies can come to when they need to request assistance or obtain information. In cases where the military is regularly approached to provide security escorts or military assets to support civilian partners, the CMOC can serve as a useful place to gather regularly to exchange information, process requests, and provide feedback on such requests.

CIMIC equipment: CIMIC officers should also have the equipment necessary to ensure that they are able to undertake their liaison task. They should have their own transport so that they can drive to meeting locations and to where their civilian counterparts are based. They should have the technology and communication equipment necessary to communicate with their military and civilian colleagues, as well as the computer equipment to write reports.

A cargo airplane containing equipment and vehicles for the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) unloads at the Air Force Base in Abidjan. August 2005. (Source: UN Photo #87719, Ky Chung)


Processing requests for military support: When a request is made for military support, the CIMIC officer receives the request, processes it, and submits it to the relevant operational command level for approval. Once approved, the CIMIC officer will provide feedback to the agency that made the request, facilitate the planning of the task, and place the relevant tactical operators in direct contact with each other for the execution of the task. The CIMIC officer will monitor the execution of the task, facilitate an After Action Review (AAR), where appropriate, and report on the outcome of the support rendered within the CIMIC reporting structures.

4.2 CIMIC Structures in UN Peace Operations

Although the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has had a civil-military coordination policy in place since September 2002 (see Appendix D), there are no specific DPKO guidelines on what the CIMIC organizational structure must look like in a UN peace operation. Most UN peace operations have slightly different organizational structures, and it is thus not surprising if they have different CIMIC structures as well. In fact, most UN peace operations that have established civil-military coordination units to date have not only had different organizational structures, but they have even used different concepts and doctrinal approaches. For example, the term “civil affairs” is used in UNFICYP, presumably because of the pre-CIMIC UK Civil Affairs doctrine; Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) is used in UNMEE because it was first introduced by the Danish-based high-readiness brigade (SHIRBRIG) when it deployed the initial mission headquarters, and most of the countries that participated in SHIRBRIG at the time were NATO trained; and in UNTAET, and later in UNMISET, they used the term Civil-Military Affairs (CMA) because that was the concept used by the initial Australian-led INTERFET force.

There are very few countries, outside Europe, North America and Australia that have CIMIC doctrines that provide for specific CIMIC organizational structures. Approximately 50% of the UN’s peace operations troops come from only 10-15 countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Ukraine, etc. None of these countries have a specific CIMIC doctrine or CIMIC organizational structures at battalion, brigade or higher HQ levels – and none of them train CIMIC specialists. Prior to ACCORD’s African Civil-Military Coordination Programme, on which this course is based, the only trained CIMIC specialists one was likely to find in a UN mission were officers that have attended CIMIC/CMO related courses in Europe or the United States, and these courses would have been based on NATO or U.S. doctrine. The only other training that has been conducted over the past few years is the humanitarian civil-military coordination courses run by OCHA. It is thus likely that most CIMIC officers in a

Typical CIMIC Organogram

CIMIC HQ |

CIMIC Sector Cell |

Battalion CIMIC officer |

Company CIMIC officer

AMIS CIMIC Organogram

SO1 CIMIC (Lt Colonel) |

SO2 Humanitarian Agencies (Major) & SO2 Local Affairs (Major)

| 8 x CIMIC Sector Officers (Captain)


UN peace operation have not had any previous exposure to CIMIC in their national doctrine, and they are unlikely to have been on a CIMIC course.

Headquarter Level

In most contemporary UN complex peace operations, one is likely to find some form of CIMIC branch at the headquarter and sector levels. This will typically consist of a section or unit within the operations branch at headquarters with a mirror organization at sector level. There are, however, exceptions. For instance, UNTAET initially gave so much importance to CIMIC that it had a CMA branch equal in status to the operations branch. At a minimum, one can expect that one staff officer will be assigned with the CIMIC task, but it is becoming more frequent that such a unit will consist of between two to 10 officers and that it will report to the Chief of Operations, or Chief of Staff.

In some missions, the UN Military Observers HQ section may have its own CIMIC cell or CIMIC liaison officer, and in such cases, there is likely to be close cooperation between the UNMO CIMIC officer and the peace operations force CIMIC officer. The African Mission in Sudan (AMIS II) is unique in that it has a CIMIC structure at HQ and Sector level in what is otherwise principally an observer mission.

The headquarters-level CIMIC unit will be responsible for advising the Force Commander on the civilian environment and the CIMIC campaign plan, providing guidelines to the sectors on CIMIC operational priorities, and developing a report on all the CIMIC operations carried out throughout the operation. The HQ CIMIC cell will also maintain a database of all CIMIC-related information in the mission. In some cases, the CIMIC unit may run a Civil-Military Operation Centre (CMOC) or CIMIC Centre at HQ level or meet with and brief humanitarian and other civilian agencies on a regular basis. Alternatively, CIMIC officers will participate in the operational-level coordination mechanisms established by other agencies, such as a UN Humanitarian Operations Centre (UNHOC) or Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) run by OCHA, or a UN Joint Logistical Centre (UNJLC) hosted by WFP.

The size and specific organization of the CIMIC staff within HQs is a function of the mission. The CIMIC staff does not necessarily consist of specialists with skills applicable in a civilian environment. However, it must be comprised of a staff of trained operational officers who understand CIMIC principles and procedures and the environment in which they will

Role of the CIMIC Officer

The appointment of skilled and trained CIMIC staff ensures that on matters pertaining to the civil-military interface, the commander is advised by specialists. A commander needs staff that understands the significance of the often-unique mandates and operating principles of the different civilian agencies. A commander will not undertake an operation without the benefit of advice of an intelligence or logistics officer, and in complex peace operations, nor should they do so without the benefit of a CIMIC officer.



operate. Furthermore, it is also important that they understand the workings of NGOs and IOs. They must be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organizations and vice versa, as well as carrying out accurate civil-military assessments and providing practical advice to the commander. Above all, they must have the experience and credibility to work closely with all other staff to ensure that civil-related factors are integrated into all plans.

Sector Level

The CIMIC Cell at sector level will typically be a mirror structure to the HQ unit, although probably slightly smaller. Apart from functioning as a conduit for information between the battalions and the force HQ, it will also participate in sector-level coordination activities. These will most likely be humanitarian or other civilian coordination meetings organized by OCHA, or in some cases the sector HQ may host a CMOC of its own. The sector-level CIMIC cell will gather and maintain a database of CIMIC information for the sector and collate all the CIMIC reports from the sector and submit these to the sector HQ. In some cases, for instance in UNMEE, the CIMIC cell at sector level will also be involved in identifying, facilitating and monitoring CIMIC projects and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).

Battalion Level

CIMIC organizational structures below sector level (i.e. at battalion or unit level) are a national responsibility. Thus, the organizational structure for CIMIC at battalion level and below depends on national doctrine. As pointed out above, most countries that contribute formed units to UN peace operations do not have CIMIC doctrines. As a result, most battalions in UN peace operations do not have dedicated CIMIC officers or organizational structures.

However, once deployed, they soon realize that they need to establish some form of liaison function within their command structure – and one of the existing officers is then typically given the additional responsibility of being the CIMIC officer (although units will not necessarily use this terminology). Some countries give this task to the operations officer or his deputy; others have assigned it to the intelligence officer; and some have given the task to the battalion commander’s adjutant. None of these situations are ideal, as the officer already has a task for which he/she has been trained and prepared, and he/she usually finds it impossible to do justice to both appointments.

However, these officers normally soon find the CIMIC work very challenging and start devoting more time and energy to it. Their CIMIC responsibilities give them the opportunity to engage people – within the UN System, among the humanitarian and development community, and with the local community – that they would not have otherwise had the opportunity to work with. They usually find the work very rewarding.

AMIS CIMIC

CIMIC Staff at Force HQ (January 2006)

SO1 CIMIC (LtCol.) SO2 CIMIC (Maj.: Humanitarian Agencies) SO3 CIMIC (Maj.: Local Affairs) Total: 3

CIMIC Staff at Sector HQ 1 CIMIC officer (Capt.) for each Sector HQ Total: 8

Total CIMIC Staff in AMIS: 11


The CIMIC officer at battalion level will function mainly as a liaison officer between the unit and the various civilian entities in the battalion’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). The CIMIC officer will serve as a communication channel between the battalion and the various civilian agencies it is in contact with, coordinate any joint actions undertaken by the battalion and a civilian agency (for example, providing an armed escort for a humanitarian convoy), and undertake community support and development projects, such as rebuilding a school. These are intended to improve conditions in the

local community, to strengthen the relationship between the battalion and the host community, and to build confidence in the peace process.

In most cases, the CIMIC officer will work on his/her own, but in some cases he/she may have a staff of three to five people. This will probably depend on the workload. In many situations where there is no serious security threat, most of the battalion’s work will be in support of CIMIC operations; in such cases, the CIMIC officer’s workload may result in he/she being allocated more staff. Another scenario – likely during a humanitarian crisis – is where the CIMIC officer has to manage a CMOC, coordinate several daily meetings with different humanitarian sectors, and process a large number of convoy requests.

Company Level

Much of what has been said about the battalion level is true for the company level. There is unlikely to be a CIMIC appointment at company (COY) level prior to deployment. However, soon after deployment in UN peace operations, especially in situations where the COY may be deployed a long distance away from the battalion headquarters and where it may have its own sizeable AOR (Area of Responsibility), the need to have a liaison officer will become apparent. This is especially true when there is a

UNMIL CIMIC


1 CIMIC Chief (Col.) 1 CIMIC Deputy (LtCol.) 4 CIMIC Liaison Officers (Maj.: 1 for each sector) 1 secretary Total: 7

CIMIC Staff at Sector HQ 1 CIMIC officer for each Sector HQ (Maj. or Capt.) Total: 4

Total CIMIC Staff in UNMIL: 11

Challenges ahead of parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste. United Nations Military Liaison Officers (UNMLO) check with the Timor-Leste Border Patrol Border Unit (BPU) on the patrol programme and gather information on the local security situation. June 2007. (Source: UN Photo #148109, Martine Perret)


sizable number of civilian agencies in the COY’s AOR, but even the liaison needs with the host community is typically enough to result in the appointment of a CIMIC officer. Again, as at battalion level, the person taking on the CIMIC officer task differs from unit to unit, but in many cases, the COY 2nd in command has been given this task.

4.3 Information Management

The success of civil-military coordination is directly linked to the quality and quantity of information shared. CIMIC officers at all levels need to understand: (1) what information may be required from them; and (2) what information they need to obtain from a military perspective.

Military Information

From the military perspective, the information that will be most useful is:

a. An understanding of the civilian environment within which the military operates: i. A “who does what, where” list of civilian agencies operating in the military

unit or HQ’s Area of Operation (AO); ii. The existence and location of local authorities and key social infrastructure

(hospitals, clinics, schools, etc.); iii. An assessment of the most pressing socio-economic needs of the communities

within the AO; and b. An assessment of the likely scope and nature of requests for military support that can

be anticipated.

The Civilian Environment: In order to develop an understanding of the civilian environment, the CIMIC officer will have to develop and maintain, on a regular basis, information relating to (i) to (iii) above. Some of this information can be obtained directly by the CIMIC officer, but the rest could be obtained by making use of other military resources such as military observers or regular patrols at unit level. The CIMIC officer may develop a questionnaire or assessment form and may ask military observers and units to provide the information identified on the questionnaire on a regular basis, for example, monthly. A patrol aimed at obtaining such information is known as a CIMIC patrol.

UNMIS CIMIC


1 CIMIC Chief (Col.) 1 CIMIC Deputy (LtCol.) 1 CIMIC Secretary Total :3

CIMIC Staff at Sector HQ 1 CIMIC Officer for each Sector HQ (Maj. or Capt.) Total: 7

Total CIMIC Staff at UNMIS: 10

Note that in UNMIS 'CIMIC' officers are referred to as Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLO).


Other information can be obtained through liaison with civilian counterparts that may already have the same information. For instance, a Sector level CIMIC officer will find that his or her OCHA or humanitarian affairs colleague would also maintain a “who does what, where” database of humanitarian organizations.

Intelligence: The CIMIC officer needs to be sensitive to the differences between operational intelligence and CIMIC information and to ensure that these two types of information are gathered, processed, and disseminated separately. This will ensure that the CIMIC effort is not undermined by suspicion or fears (on the side of the humanitarian partners) that the information they exchange with the CIMIC officer may impact negatively on their impartiality and neutrality. It is therefore not advisable to ask one person to double as both CIMIC and Intelligence officer at any command level.

Reporting: Some information will be requested from Force HQ and will thus form part of

the regular monthly or weekly reporting system.

Advice to the Commander

One of the principal reasons why a CIMIC officer is gathering information about the CIMIC environment through liaison is because he or she is responsible for advising their commander on all civil-military related matters. It is not possible to train all soldiers or humanitarian and development workers as CIMIC or CMCoord specialists, but by training a few we are creating a capacity for advice within the system. CIMIC officers are strategically placed at all command centres to act as an interface between the military component and their civilian counterparts, and to advise commanders on the appropriate actions to take when it comes to relationships with various civilian agencies in any given mission area.

Liaison Officers

An LO is a military officer that is located with a specific civilian agency to establish a communication channel between the peacekeeping force and the agency. An LO should:

• Understand the mandate, structure and operating principles of the peacekeeping force and the civilian agency where they are placed;

• Be knowledgeable of the relevant policies, principles and guidelines that will govern the civilian-military relationship between the force and the civilian agency;

• Create and maintain a professional and transparent relationship with the civilian agency;

• Participate in the planning process of both the civilian agency and the peacekeeping force;

• Advise the head of the civilian agency of the support the peacekeeping force can provide, including the limitations and implications linked to such support; and

• Advise the commander on the needs of the civilian agency and the appropriateness (on the basis of the relevant guideline) of the support requested by the civilian agency.


Community Support Projects: In cases where the Sector or unit-level CIMIC officer is involved in facilitating QIPs or unit-level community support projects, such a database should include:

1. A record of all proposals submitted; 2. Information on whether the proposal has been approved, denied, or is pending; 3. Information on the status of implementation of those projects that have been approved;

and 4. Related information, such a list of potential contractors, or places where goods regularly

needed can be procured, etc. 4.4 Civilian Information

From the civilian side, the information that civilian mission components, UN agencies, NGOs and the local community and authorities would be most interested in is:

• Information relating to the security situation; and

• Information relating to the assistance the military can offer in support of the military effort.

Security Information: In terms of security, civilian agencies will be interested in any information that will enable them to have a better picture of the threats and risks they may face. They will be interested in: any security-related incidents (political or criminal), mine threats and incidents, road conditions, weather reports, and any military action that may result in increased tension in a specific area. CIMIC officers thus have to obtain this kind of security-related information from within the military establishment by attending briefings and through individual meetings with relevant staff. In the case of classified information, CIMIC officers will have to, in consultation with the relevant functional specialists, decide what information can be shared with civilian partners. CIMIC officers will have to sensitize their colleagues to the need to share information with civilian partners and to therefore refrain from unnecessarily classifying information that may be of use beyond the military.

Military Support: In terms of the support the military can provide to their civilian counterparts, we can distinguish between mission support – that is, the support provided to external actors such as mission civilian components, UN agencies and international NGOs – and community support – that is, support provided to local communities, local authorities, local NGOs, etc. Mission support can be either in the form of security or assets.

UN Sri Lankan peacekeeper patrols the notorious slums of Martissant. Port au Prince, Haiti. April 2007. (Source: MINUSTAH Photo/Marco Dormino)


Security Support: Security support typically occurs in the form of a military escort for a civilian convoy or mission. The CIMIC officers thus need to familiarize themselves with: (1) the baseline UN policy in this regard, that is, the “Use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys” of September 2001 (see Appendix E); (2) any mission specific policies and SOPs that may exist with respect to armed escorts; and (3) the capability, experience and willingness of the military units within the CIMIC officer’s AO – so that this information can be shared with civilian partners. The CIMIC officers also need to familiarize themselves with the scope of the need for military escorts, such as: How many agencies may require escorts on a regular basis? What is the size of the civilian convoys and what kind of cargo do they transport? Which routes do they regularly use? This kind of information should be shared with the military planners so that they can decide how best to meet such a need, if appropriate, with the means at their disposal. One element of the information-management database that a CIMIC officer needs to maintain for his or her AO relates to the potential provision of security support to civilian partners.

Use of Military Assets: When it comes to the potential use of military assets to support the activities of the civilian partners in the CIMIC officer’s AO, he or she would need to familiarize him or herself with: (1) the baseline UN policy in this regard, that is, the “Guidelines on the use of military or civil defence assets to support UN humanitarian activities in complex emergencies” of March 2003 (see Appendix F); (2) any mission specific policies and SOPs that may exist with respect to the use of military assets in support of civilian partners; and (3) the resources, capability, experience and willingness of the military units within the CIMIC officer’s AO to render such support so that this information can be shared with the civilian partners.

At the same time, the CIMIC officer needs to develop an understanding of what the potential for requests of this nature in his or her AO may be. The CIMIC officer needs to be able to provide planning and operation colleagues with a rough estimate of the frequency with which they can anticipate such requests, the nature and scope of such requests (what kind of support can the military anticipate being regularly asked to provide), and the areas/locations where such support may be required to be provided. The CIMIC officer thus needs to develop and maintain a database of both the potential resources that the military force may have to offer, as well as a database of the potential need for such services. Such a database will enable the CIMIC officer to effectively respond to any requests for assistance, especially in emergency situations.

UN peacekeepers from Brazil rescue stranded Haitians from their flooded homes in Cite Soleil. Heavy rains from tropical storm Noel left thousands homeless. Port-Au-Prince, Haiti. October 2007. (Source: MINUSTAH Photo/Marco Dormino)


Institutional Memory: With most military units being rotated every six months, and with CIMIC staff officers at Force and Sector HQ being rotated every year, institutional memory is a major problem for the military component in any peace operation. The maintenance of these CIMIC databases is thus crucial in ensuring that institutional memory is transferred between units and between Force and Sector-level staff officers. QIPs often take more than six months (the typical deployment period for a formed unit) to progress from the proposal to finalization, and a project that was identified by one unit may thus be implemented by another. Many food security and health problems are seasonal. This implies that the institutional memory regarding the previous response has to be transferred over a 12-month period to the 3rd unit in the rotation cycle. Well maintained, low-tech and easily transferable databases are critically important if we are to avoid re-inventing the wheel with every new rotation.

4.5 CIMIC Centres (CC) and Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOC)

CC/CMOCs are offices established by the military to assist them to interface with the surrounding civilian environment. International military forces deployed to a complex emergency will usually establish a CC/CMOC and staff it with CIMIC officers. They are often located outside military compounds to facilitate access and the exchange of information between military personnel, civilian organizations, and the local authorities and population. CC/CMOCs and CIMIC officers have limited decision-making authority. CIMIC officers provide the appropriate – and often direct – conduit to their respective military commander and military components, which might provide support to humanitarian action (e.g. engineering, logistics, and medical).

The key functions of a CC/CMOC are to:

1. Provide initial points of contact; 2. Provide a focal point for liaison; 3. Facilitate the exchange of information; 4. Provide advice on the availability and mechanics of military assistance to civilian

organizations; 5. Re-enforce the legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the civil authorities and the local

population; and 6. Validate and coordinate requests for military support.

1 United States. JP 3-57 (Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs) and FM 41-10 (Civil Affairs Operations).

Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC)

CMOC is an ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of: engaged military forces, other government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent.1 The U.S. term “Civil-Military Operations Centre” (CMOC) is most closely related to the NATO term “CIMIC Centre.”


CC/CMOCs will generally focus on coordinating functions that are related to specific operational events. These may include: support to the conduct of elections; the return of refugees; major economic initiatives; the repair of infrastructure; visits by major figures in the international community; and the eventual withdrawal of the military force. CMOCs meet with local authorities, politicians and representatives from the community and other interest groups. International agencies are only one of their many contact points.

In the case of the U.S. Military, those used to the traditional functions of the CMOC described in the preceding paragraph may not find the traditional CMOC. In some instances, the CMOC, as used by the U.S. Military to conduct Civil-Military Operations (CMO), may be found to have become an enlarged version of the Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell, feeding information collection into the Civil Information Grid (CIG). The CIG provides the capability to coordinate, collaborate, and communicate to develop the civil components of the common operating picture (COP). The Civil Information Grid increases the situational understanding for the supported commander by vertically and horizontally integrating the technical lines of communication. This framework links every CA soldier as a sensor and consumer to the Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell of the CMOC and the CMO cell. Civil-Military Operations and CIMIC have some similarities but are not the same in either design or function.

A CCC (CIMIC Coordination Centre) is often referred to as a coordination centre within the mission, as part of the CIMIC FORCE HQ organizational structure – whereas the CC/CMOC would be established outside the mission for public access – but subordinate to the CCC. Either way, CIMIC structures depend on operational and mission needs.

4.6 UN CIMIC Command and Control

Although there are, in some cases, separate CIMIC units at HQ, sector, battalion and company level, command and control remains within the operational line of command. This does not mean that there is no direct communication between the CIMIC units at all these levels but rather that such communication does not represent formal instructions or reports. The CIMIC units would communicate guidelines and priorities from the top down, and the CIMIC units would report from the bottom up, but all official communication would be channelled through the operational command and control network.

Lesson 4 / CIMIC Structure and Liaison and Information Management 86

CIMIC Sector Liaison Matrix: Example of Liaison Meetings at Sector Level from UNMIS in 2005

Sr No Meeting Frequency Purpose Attendees Role of CIMIC officer

1 QIPs Steering

Committee Meeting

Fortnightly

To approve QIPs proposals received within the Sector from all agencies, prior to dispatch for approval from the Regional Coordinator.

Head of Office (UNMIS), CIMIC officer, Civil Affairs Officer (UNMIS), Regional Administrative Officer, OCHA Area Coordinator.

1. Study proposals received. 2. Prepare list of observations, if any. 3. Present Military point of view, if applicable.

2 Humanitarian

Agencies Security Meeting

Fortnightly To discuss the security situation within the Sector and any latest inputs received.

Head of Office (UNMIS), CIMIC officer, UN Security, Representatives from all Humanitarian Agencies.

1. To present updates on the latest Security situation. 2. To attend to matters of Military/Security nature.

3 Military

Operational Briefing

Alternate days

To discuss the security situation and updates received from UNMOs and other agencies

Sector Commander, Ops Officer, UNMOs, all other concerned Military officers.

To update notes on security situation and seek clarifications, if any.

4 Steering Group Meeting Weekly

To discuss Humanitarian situation within the Sector and address any urgent situations.

Head of Office (UNMIS), CIMIC officer, UN Security, Representatives from all Humanitarian Agencies.

1. To keep abreast of the latest Humanitarian Situation. 2. Provide Liaison to organize military assistance, if requested.

5 Emergency Meetings As required To address emergencies/crisis

situations at short notice.

Head of Office (UNMIS), CIMIC officer, UN Security, Representatives from all concerned UN/Humanitarian Agencies.

1. To participate in bringing about relief on an emergent basis. 2. To provide any assistance from military resources, as requested.

Source: Maj. Amit Pande, CIMIC & DDR Officer, Sector III (Malakal), UNMIS (2005)


4.7 Conclusion

Although there are no specific doctrines or guidelines in UN or AU peace operations on the organizational structure for CIMIC units or cells at this stage, one is likely to find some kind of CIMIC structure at HQ and sector level. Regardless of the small differences between missions, these CIMIC structures will all be responsible for CIMIC operations – which are fairly similar across the different missions.

CIMIC organizational structure at battalion and company level is a national responsibility, but as most UN and AU troop contributors do not have a specific CIMIC doctrine, these battalions are normally not deployed with specific CIMIC appointments or structures. Nevertheless, these units soon discover the need for a CIMIC liaison officer of some sorts, and one of the other staff officers are then tasked with the additional responsibility of performing the CIMIC duties.

Although there is likely to be direct communication between the various CIMIC units at HQ, sector, battalion and company level, all official communications will take place on the operational command and control network.

Liaison and information management lies at the core of all CIMIC activity. The CIMIC officer will spend most of his or her time obtaining and exchanging information through liaison, managing the information in some kind of database, and making the information in the database available, as needed, to military colleagues and civilian partners. The CIMIC officer thus has two different clients. There is a need to provide the military component with information on the civilian environment and needs, and there is a need to keep civilian partners informed about security risks and related information.

When requests are made for military support (mission support or community support), the CIMIC officer receives the request, processes it, and submits it to the relevant operational command level for approval. Once approved, the CIMIC officer will facilitate the planning of the task and place the relevant tactical operators in direct contact with each other for execution of the task. The CIMIC officer will monitor the action and facilitate an “after action review,” where appropriate, and report on the outcome of the support rendered within the CIMIC reporting structures.

In conclusion, effective liaison and meaningful information management are critical success factors in peace operations in general, and CIMIC operations in particular.

A United Nations Military Liaison Officer (UNMLO) is talking about the security situation with a family in Fatumean, Covalima district, Timor-Leste. June 2007. (Source: UN Photo #148110, Martine Perret)


1. In a UN peace operation one would find CIMIC staff officers at:

a. Headquarter level; b. Sector level; c. Battalion level; d. Headquarter and Sector level.

2. The CIMIC Cell at sector level will typically be:

a. Very different from its sister cell at the Force HQ; b. Very different to the Battalion CIMIC cell; c. A mirror structure of the HQ unit, but smaller; d. A mirror structure of the Battalion level, but bigger.

3. The key function of a CMOC is to:

a. Provide medical services; b. Provide communication services; c. Provide a focal point for liaison; d. Provide security.

4. Who is responsible for liaison?

a. The Office of the SRSG; b. All programmes, units and offices; c. CIMIC officers; d. CMCoord officers.

5. Liaison is achieved through:

a. Mission support; b. Community support; c. Exchange of information; d. Quick Impact Projects.



6. Liaison officers should firstly: a. Understand the mandate of the peacekeeping operation and the role of the military

component; b. Understand the mandate of the humanitarian agencies; c. Understand the need of the local community; d. Understand the policies of the Government of the day.

7. CIMIC structures in different UN peace operations will generally:

a. Resemble each other but allow for their specific mission context; b. Be fundamentally different; c. Be identical in every way; d. Resemble the CIMIC structures at DPKO in New York.

8. Which person will you typically find in a CIMIC Unit at Force Headquarters Level?

a. CIMIC Chief; b. Chief Medical Officer; c. Armed Escort Liaison Officer; d. Chief QIPs Officer.

9. A peacekeeping battalion’s CIMIC structure is determined by:

a. The Force Commander; b. National governments and/or the Battalion Commander; c. Local authorities; d. The humanitarian community.

10. Information from the military that is usually most useful to civilian agencies includes:

a. Public information briefings; b. Medical and health briefings; c. Humanitarian assessments; d. Information on the security situation.

ANSWERS: 1d, 2c, 3c, 4b, 5c, 6a, 7a, 8a, 9b, 10d



LESSON 5

MISSION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND

QUICK IMPACT PROJECTS

5.1 What is Mission Support?

5.2 What is Community Support?

5.3 What are QIPs?

Lesson 5 / Mission and Community Support and Quick Impact Projects 92

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Explain the four stages of mission support operations; • Discuss some of the challenges and opportunities that arise out of mission support

operations; • Understand a number of principles applicable to community support operations; and • Discuss how operating procedures for the approval and implementation of QIPs differ

slightly from mission to mission.

INTRODUCTION

Mission support refers to cooperation extended to any civilian component or agency by the military component of a peace operation, for example, when the military component provides an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy. When mission support operations are undertaken, CIMIC officers are typically responsible for planning, coordinating and facilitating the actions of the military units responsible for executing the task. It is thus important for CIMIC officers to understand what mission support is and where it fits into the role and function of CIMIC in the context of complex peace operations.

Community support refers to those CIMIC activities that help local communities to improve and normalize their lives. Community support operations are aimed at building confidence in the peace process and creating a positive relationship between the peacekeepers and their host community.

CIMIC officers at the sector and battalion level are likely to become involved in identifying, planning and overseeing mission support operations whilst those in force headquarters level are likely to be involved in setting policies and guidelines for community support operations.

UN mission Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are funded by the peacekeeping budget and are intended to provide, at short notice, a flexible disbursement facility to support local level, non-recurrent activities in the areas of health, education, public infrastructure and social services. These services are designed to promote and facilitate the UN peace support effort in the given country.

In some UN missions, CIMIC officers are responsible for managing some of the QIPs, whilst in others CIMIC officers will work closely with Civil Affairs or Humanitarian Affairs Officers to implement these projects. It is thus important that CIMIC officers understand what QIPs are and how they work.




5.1 What is Mission Support?

We refer to mission support whenever a military unit provides support to a civilian component or agency that operates alongside it in a peace operation context, for instance:

• When the military component provides an armed escort for a humanitarian relief convoy;

• When a military unit provides transport and participates in a joint civil-military assessment mission; or

• When the military component supports the component/agency responsible for organizing an election with security, logistical and communication support.

The Four Stages of Mission Support

1. Identifying the Common Objective

It is important that all the components and agencies that may participate in a joint action have a common understanding of the objectives they want to achieve. Often, this means that there needs to be agreement on identification of the problem, as well as what needs to be done to address it. Each component or agency is likely to have different interests, priorities and entry points because of their different mandates and responsibilities, but if they have a clearly identified common objective it will be easier to establish a cooperative relationship.

2. Joint Planning

The second step is to plan the intended action together. It is important to do the planning together because the planning process will assist in developing greater understanding among the participating partners for their respective mandates, roles, strengths and weaknesses.

It is important to plan for contingencies before they happen. For instance, in the case of an armed escort for a convoy, it is important to discuss beforehand and agree how the convoy will respond to different eventualities, e.g. attack, breakdown of vehicles, or road-blocks. There is often no time to discuss the principles at stake in the midst of an incident, so in joint actions of this nature it is important to discuss the various principles, SOPs, and other issues beforehand.

Arrival of an Antonov 124-100 aircraft carrying a helicopter for Burundi humanitarian relief operations. (Source: UN Photo #34471, Martine Perret)


For the same reason, it is necessary to clarify the respective roles of the partners beforehand. For example, in the case of a convoy, it is generally agreed that the commander of the military escort is responsible for security-related decisions whilst the most senior humanitarian agency representative is responsible for all decisions relating to goods, vehicles and personnel. However, there are circumstances where these two persons may have directly opposing views on what action to take, and it is thus necessary to discuss such contingencies as far as possible in the planning phase.

3. Operational Coordination

During the execution of the joint action, there will be a need for ongoing operational coordination. It is unlikely that CIMIC officers will be involved in operational coordination in relatively small joint actions, like a convoy, so it is important that those that will carry out the task are part of the planning and are fully briefed on how to ensure smooth coordination during the operation. It should be clear from the outset who the persons are that are responsible for coordination and what communication channels will be used.

At battalion HQ level and higher, it is likely that the CIMIC officers themselves will play an important role in operational coordination. In most cases, the same coordination mechanisms will be used as were discussed in Lesson 4 (CMOC, UNHOC, UNJLC, etc.), but the intensity of the coordination is likely to be higher when a specific joint action is being planned and executed. For instance, during the run-up to an election, the frequency of coordination meetings is likely to increase, and on Election Day there are likely to be several meetings.

4. Joint Evaluation

It is important that joint actions be concluded with some form of joint evaluation or “After Action Review” (AAR). The evaluation should make an assessment of whether the common objective was achieved, identify problem areas that need to be improved on in future, and identify best practices and lessons learned so that they can be captured and shared with others that may undertake similar joint actions in future.

Coordination Principles

One of the key aspects of any coordination initiative is educating each other about your mandates, role, and operating procedures, as well as the principles that determine your operational space.

Tactical Units

While Sector-level and Battalion-level CIMIC officers will coordinate events leading up to the execution of mission support operations, these activities are typically carried out at the tactical level by soldiers who have not been specially trained in CIMIC. CIMIC officers will thus have to make a special effort to ensure that such tactical units are briefed on the principles and guidelines they need to uphold during mission support operations.


Principles and Guidelines

Mission support operations need to be guided by the principles and guidelines for CIMIC, (such as those in the appendices of this course). The specific circumstances of each operation need to be taken into consideration. If the military peacekeepers are in an operational environment where force is being used to maintain peace and security in a given area, it is unlikely that there will be much room for mission support outside of the security realm. However, in situations where the fighting has stopped and where the use of force is infrequent and exceptional, mission support operations are likely to be a daily operational reality.

The key to successful mission support operations is respect among the components and agencies for each other’s mandate and role; such respect can only flow from a thorough understanding of each other’s mandate in the context of the larger peacebuilding mission. In some cases, the partners would have been working together for a while, and they would have learned from each other in the process. In most cases, however, the partners will need to make a special effort to educate each other about their respective mandates, roles and operating procedures. One of the most common mistakes in the field is that people assume that their counterparts understand their role, constraints and principles. The reality is that most people have a very vague understanding of the work of the other components and actors in peace operations. As a result, one of the key aspects of any coordination initiative is educating each other about your mandate, role, operating procedures and the principles that determine your operational space.

An important factor in this process is the unfortunate reality of continuous personnel changes. Most military units rotate every six months, and some companies and platoons are likely to move around within their area of operations during this period. Military observers and UN Police will normally be in the mission for a year, but in most missions they go on a special leave every three months; they are also often moved around during their deployment. Many civilians may stay longer in a specific area, but it is not uncommon for the civilians to also experience frequent personnel changes. For any specific mission support operation, it is thus unlikely that the same group of people will go through the whole planning, execution and evaluation process together. The implication of this is that the process of building trust and respect among the players on the basis of an understanding of each other’s mandate and role in the peace operation is not a one-time activity but an ongoing process.

Building Trust

The process of building trust and respect among players on the basis of an understanding of each other's mandate and role in the peace operation is not a one-time activity but an ongoing process.


Challenges and Opportunities

It is easier to exchange information than to undertake mission support operations. Liaison typically involves people who have been tasked with coordination, and as a result of their frequent interaction, they are likely to develop an empathy with each other and the organizations they represent. The people who will execute mission support operations at the tactical level will not necessarily have had the same level of exposure to their counterparts, and their level of understanding for each other’s mandates, roles and operating procedures is likely to be limited. CIMIC officers will thus have to make a special effort to brief tactical units on the role and mandates of their civilian partners as well as on the principles and guidelines they need to observe during any given mission support operation. This is one of the reasons why it is important to involve key tactical staff in the planning and evaluation process.

The overall command, management and decision-making structure of a mission support operation is a potential problem area that needs to be clearly defined. In some cases, it may be useful to have a lead agency approach where one agency clearly has an over-arching responsibility and role – for example, the UNHCR in a refugee-related crisis. In most cases, however, it would be advisable to keep coordination separate from command or management. Coordination should be achieved through the four stages of mission support operations set out above. If there is a clear common objective and plan, each partner will carry out its own actions accordingly. Through operational coordination, the partners will share information about progress and setbacks and synchronize and adjust their actions accordingly.

Types of Mission Support

There are essentially three types of mission support: security, logistical support, and joint initiatives.

Security

Providing security is one of the most common forms of support that the military component will render to its civilian counterparts. It will typically be mentioned in the mandate of the mission and in the Rules of Engagement. This occurs most frequently in the form of armed escorts or through the provision of area security. Only in exceptional cases will the military component provide static security (guarding) for facilities (e.g. a warehouse or office complex).

The most common form of security provision is the armed escort – for example when a military unit provides an armed escort for a humanitarian convoy. The UN has developed specific guidelines for this type of mission support operation. Refer to the “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys” in Appendix E. In some complex emergencies, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) would have

Types of Mission Support

Security • Armed Escorts • Area Security • Static Security

Logistical Support

• Transport • Recovery • Engineering • Roads • Water • Electricity • Construction • Communication

Support • Specialized Support • Weather Forecasting • Air Traffic Control

Joint Initiatives

• Joint Assessments


developed specific policies and procedures for military or armed escorts, and the CIMIC officer needs to familiarize him or herself with the generic and mission-specific policies and principles that apply in their specific case.

Logistical Support

Logistical support typically occurs in the form of providing transport (road, air or water); making recovery or other specialized equipment available to civilian agencies; or cooperating with the coordination of logistical services. The military component will normally not use all of its transport capability because it would have been deployed with some excess capacity in anticipation of unforeseen developments. It can make this unused capacity or excess cargo space on its aircraft, ships and vehicles available to others. This is one of the most used support activities that takes place within a peace operation.

The military component usually also has an engineering capability with some additional capacity factored in, for the same reason. Again, this capacity can be used under certain conditions to assist with the emergency provision or maintenance of roads, water and electricity, or construction services. In some cases, a military unit may accompany a humanitarian convoy to assist it with recovery services through bad patches in the road. Although the military personnel involved are likely to be armed, this kind of support

should not be confused with an armed escort. The purpose of the escort is not to counter any perceived threat but to assist with the recovery of vehicles. However, the CIMIC officer needs to be aware that from the perspective of the humanitarian agencies being escorted, the cooperation with the military unit involved will have the same implications as if it were an armed escort.

The military component will have its own independent means of communication, and it will be able to provide communication services to others in an emergency when their normal telecommunications systems are inoperative. The military component is also often the only institution with the capacity to provide specialist services, such as weather forecasting and air traffic control.

The UN has developed specific guidelines for the use of military assets in support of humanitarian activities. Refer to the “Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Activities” in Appendix F.

Peacekeepers from Bangladesh doing road construction work in Juba, Sudan. July 2005. (Source: UNMIS Photo/John Charles)


Joint Initiatives

Joint initiatives refer to any instance where military personnel participate in, and support, a joint activity with civilian agencies – such as a joint assessment. In these types of activities, the military unit responsible is likely to provide security, transport and specialist personnel (for instance, medical personnel in the case of a health assessment, or engineers in the case of a construction or related type of assessment).

Convoy Escort Terminology

Escort: An escort is the force detailed to accompany and protect a column of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured. It typically consists of an advance group that roves ahead of the vehicle column and proves the safety of the route. It can warn the close protection group of trouble, and it can explore detours. Helicopters can greatly increase the effectiveness of the advance group. The close protection group provides immediate security to the vehicle column. The escort is led by the escort commander, and he or she is typically located with the close protection group. The reserve group provides a rear guard, reserve, recovery resources and perhaps medical resources. The escort is typically provided by a platoon or section and may be led by a platoon commander or senior non-commissioned officer like a Warrant Officer. Vehicle Column: This is the group of vehicles to be escorted, carrying humanitarian supplies, refugees, IDPs, ex-combatants participating in a DDR programme, civilian agencies, or VIPs. The vehicles could be grouped in packets (e.g. groups of ten), with escort vehicles in between each packet. The vehicle column should have one person acting as the column leader; typically this is the most senior civilian agency person responsible for the movement of the cargo or passengers. Convoy: This is comprised of the escort and the vehicle column organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement. A small convoy would typically consist of 10 vehicles or less, whilst a large convoy would consist of 30 vehicles or more. Convoy Commander: The escort commander is responsible for security, whilst the column leader is responsible for all matters pertaining to the column vehicles and cargo. Security concerns override column concerns; hence, the escort commander is normally appointed as the convoy commander. Contingencies and desired responses should be discussed between the escort commander and the column leader prior to departure, as they are unlikely to have time to discuss and coordinate each situation they encounter en route. Once en route, the Convoy Commander has command and control until the convoy reaches its final sage destination (or prior agreed to alternative destinations).



5.2 What is Community Support?

Community supports are activities undertaken in support of the local community with the aim of (1) improving their conditions and (2) building their confidence in the peace process. When carried out according to the principles and guidelines highlighted in this course, community support operations are likely to build a positive relationship between the local community and the peacekeepers. The primary aim of community support activities, however, is to support the efforts of the local population to improve and normalize their lives in a post-conflict peacebuilding context.

It is normal for communities emerging from years of civil war and conflict to be hesitant to rebuild their community infrastructure and to start normalizing their cultural and social activities, because they may be fearful that the conflict will flare-up again. Community support initiatives are aimed at supporting local communities in this effort and boosting their confidence by supporting their efforts with the resources available to the peace operation.

In most post-conflict settings, one can also anticipate that local communities have had negative past experiences with soldiers. They will typically associate armed men and women with the violence they have experienced or witnessed, and they are therefore likely to mistrust and/or be fearful of the presence of the peacekeepers. It is in the interest of the peace operation to develop a positive relationship with the communities where military, civilian and police peacekeepers are deployed. Community support projects are one of the vehicles that can be used for this purpose.

Six Phases of Project Management

1. Identification 2. Planning 3. Consultation & coordination 4. Approval 5. Implementation 6. Monitoring & evaluation

Community Support Challenges

1. Assessment 2. Evaluation and Monitoring 3. Local ownership 4. Sustainability

Community Support Projects and Humanitarian Space

CIMIC projects must be carried out according to the principles and guidelines presented in this course. In particular, CIMIC officers need to give attention to the differences between direct, indirect and infrastructure support in the MCDA Guidelines. CIMIC projects in support of humanitarian action will typically fall into the “indirect” and “infrastructure” categories. It is only in exceptional circumstances and as an option of last resort that the military component will engage in direct assistance. When such situations emerge, it is advisable that the intended support should be cleared first with the HC, except of course when immediate action is required to save lives. CIMIC projects should never be reported as humanitarian projects or activities. It is the CIMIC officer’s responsibility to protect humanitarian space by ensuring, amongst other things, that military units do not use the word “humanitarian” in this context.


Examples of Community Support Initiatives

The following list of examples of community support activities is not exhaustive. Each mission is unique, and the types of community support projects that can be undertaken is a factor of the needs and priorities of local communities, as well as the ability and resources available to the mission.

a. Infrastructure projects: • Rehabilitation of buildings, e.g. a school, church or clinic; • Reconstruction or critical maintenance of roads and bridges; • Reconstruction of water and sanitation services; or • Rehabilitation of electricity supply.

b. Support to social services: • Training of medical personnel; or • Training of providing teachers and trainers.

c. Support to economic activity: • Rehabilitation of a market; or • Training, or other support, in certain sectors, e.g. agriculture.

d. Socio-cultural and sport activities: • Support for cultural activities like traditional ceremonies; • Support for sport activities; and • Support for environmental initiatives.

The rehabilitation of a

school, church or clinic is probably one of the more common activities one may expect to find under community support projects, but it may actually be quite a complex undertaking. The rehabilitation of a school is dealt with in more detail in the example at the end of this section. Another project that is quite common is soldiers volunteering free time to teach a language or other subjects at a local school. Another common problem is lack of employment and other meaningful activities for youths; organizing sporting events, like soccer tournaments, has often been found to be useful in channelling people’s energy into meaningful activities. Similarly, supporting the celebration of traditional holidays and ceremonies may be a powerful symbol of normalization and peace for many communities.

Children playfully chase balloons as part of the 'Sport for Peace' soccer tournament jointly launched by the President of Liberia, and the Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace, aimed at encouraging Liberians, especially the youth, to embrace and use sport in promoting peace, reconciliation, and development. (Source: UN Photo #140234, Eric Kanalstein)


Principles of Community Support

Although it may be difficult to imagine how community support activities may have negative outcomes, many in fact do have negative unintended consequences. In order to avoid unintended consequences and in order to ensure a coherent and well-coordinated peace operation, it is necessary to observe the following principles.

Community Needs Rule

Community support projects must be carried out based on the needs of the community, as identified by the community – not by the CIMIC officer or any other external actor – and according to the priorities determined by the community.

Coordination and Synchronization

Ensure that all initiatives are coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities so that:

• The community support projects do not replace or fulfil a function that should have been performed by an appropriate civilian authority or agency; and

• The activity that is undertaken is coordinated with, and supportive of, the larger programmes and initiatives underway in that sector.

All community support projects must be undertaken in support of local communities and their authorities. Proper coordination will also ensure that your community support initiatives will benefit from any existing independent programmes that can support your initiative, such as Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and “Work for Food” initiatives.

Principles and Guidelines

CIMIC Projects undertaken according to the UN principles and guidelines and carried out professionally are likely to result in force protection, positive sentiments towards the military unit concerned and the peace operation in general, and may generate positive media coverage. However, CIMIC projects undertaken solely for the sake of force protection, winning hearts and minds, and to attract media coverage – that is contra to the UN principles and guidelines (e.g. assistance on the basis of need and according to the priorities identified by the community) – are likely to have the opposite effect and may cause short, medium and long term negative consequences.

Principles of Community Support Projects

1. Needs of the community 2. Coordination 3. Joint ownership 4. Option of last resort 5. Avoid reliance on the military 6. Do no harm


Joint Ownership

All community support projects should be jointly owned and managed by the community or local authority it intends to support. There should be a project committee or some form of joint decision making body that oversees and manages the project.

Option of Last Resort

Remember that the use of military assets in support of humanitarian assistance must be the option of last resort. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need. Community support projects should not be undertaken in situations where the peacekeepers are engaged in ongoing hostilities with one or more factions, as such projects may endanger the local communities and other civilian actors that choose to participate in the community support projects. Community support projects are best suited to the post-conflict or peacebuilding phase when all hostilities have come to an end.

Avoid Reliance on the Military

Civilian authorities and agencies must not become dependent on the resources or support of the military component. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale, and provide an exit strategy that defines clearly how the function undertaken could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian means.

Do No Harm

All community support projects must be guided by the commitment to “do no harm.” That is, they should not further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of the assistance, nor create dependency on the military.

Community Support Projects and Humanitarian Action

CIMIC Projects are not humanitarian projects, and CIMIC officers should ensure that they are not reported as humanitarian activities, so that the distinction between independent and neutral humanitarian action and CIMIC projects carried out by the military can be maintained. It is in the interest of the peace operation to protect humanitarian space.

10 Elements of Project Management

1. Clear goal and objectives 2. Target audience 3. Stakeholders 4. Timeframe 5. Inputs 6. Outputs 7. Outcomes 8. Benchmarks 9. Management & coordination 10. Monitoring & evaluation


If community support actions are undertaken according to these principles, that is, in support of (and preferably directed by) the local community, and well coordinated with all the other stakeholders, then they are likely to result in:

• Good relations with the local community; • Confidence in the peace operation and the peace process; and • Good publicity for the military unit in question and the peace operation in general.

However, when such projects are undertaken by a military unit without proper

consultation with the beneficiaries and community leaders, without proper coordination with all the civilian stakeholders, and for the wrong reasons (e.g. to generate publicity), then they are unlikely to have long-term, sustainable positive benefits.

Avoid Conflict with Relief Agencies

CIMIC community support projects can potentially cause tension between the military unit involved, and NGOs and other relief agencies. The tension is caused because humanitarian agencies are concerned about their independence, and they may feel that it may cause confusion if the military becomes involved in CIMIC projects that seem similar to the projects they undertake. Military units must refrain from undertaking or referring to their activities as “humanitarian.” CIMIC officers should consult all possible stakeholders to identify problem areas, and to avoid appearing in competition with relief agencies. Community support projects should be complimentary to the service provided by relief agencies and should be of a developmental rather than a humanitarian nature. Relief agencies, as the appropriate civilian agencies, should be given first choice of projects and their actions complimented by those projects that are out of their reach (outside their scope or resources; inaccessible to their vehicles; etc.), or that are otherwise complimentary to their service (e.g. don’t provide the same medical service as the local clinic, but offer specialized services not available at the local clinic, on referral by the clinic).

Direct, Indirect and Infrastructure Support

CIMIC projects should not engage in any form of direct humanitarian assistance, except in exceptional cases when this has not been requested or cleared with the HC. CIMIC projects may be involved in indirect or infrastructure support, if appropriate as per the “Military and Civil Defence Assets Guidelines,” but should be closely coordinated with the appropriate civilian authorities under all circumstances.

(See CIMIC Response Matrix in Lesson 1)


An example would be choosing to support a school because of its proximity to the unit’s location, regardless of the needs of the surrounding community or the school rehabilitation plan of the education authorities. Another example would be offering free medical services regardless of the fact that an NGO may be trying to assist the local clinic to establish a sustainable service based on a cost-recovery model. These kinds of uncoordinated and supply-driven CIMIC actions are likely to create tension between the military unit, the local community and other stakeholders (such as local authorities, NGOs and UN Agencies) who have not been consulted in the process.

Practical Example: The Rehabilitation of a School

The points raised above can be illustrated in a fairly common example, such as the rehabilitation of a school. Let us assume, for instance, that the CIMIC officers – through their interaction with teachers or local community leaders – have been informed that there is a need to rehabilitate a local school. The school could have been damaged during the conflict, and part of the building may, for instance, have been destroyed by fire.

The CIMIC officer must first ensure that rehabilitation of the school is indeed a priority for the community. This must be confirmed by some committee or traditional leadership structure that is recognized by the community to speak on their behalf. Once it is confirmed that the community regards the rehabilitation of the school as a priority, the CIMIC officer should find out from the appropriate local and regional/provincial authorities what their plans are for the rehabilitation of schools and, in general, for supporting the education sector. The CIMIC officer should also consult with the local or sector-level UN Civil Affairs officer and/or UN Humanitarian Affairs officer to determine what projects and initiatives they are aware of in the education and related sectors,

Participation

Participation in CIMIC community projects will boost morale of the troops because it gives them an opportunity to get out of the compound and to interact with the local population in a meaningful way. It will make them feel good about the contribution they are making to rebuild the country where they are deployed.

Views of East Timor during the transition to independence. The first day of school at Fatu-Ahi. The building, which was burned by rebels following the referendum, has desks and benches made by Portuguese peacekeepers with UNTAET, who will also be repairing the roof. March 2000. (Source: UN Photo #31571, Eskinder Debebe)


and which may have a bearing on whether the rehabilitation of this particular school should be supported or not.

Once the CIMIC officer is satisfied that the rehabilitation of the school is indeed a priority for the community, and that the local civil authorities and community have no other means to assist them with the rehabilitation of the school, the CIMIC officer should consult with agencies and NGOs active in the education sector – probably UNICEF and NGOs such as Save the Children. Sometimes, agencies like the UNHCR may be involved in the rehabilitation of schools, as part of a programme to assist with the reintegration of refugees into their communities of origin.

The consultations must be aimed at finding out:

• If there are other initiatives underway to rehabilitate schools, and, if so, if this school is included in those plans;

• If there are any existing policies or guidelines that will have an impact on the project, e.g. the number of classrooms per school of that size;

• If there are any other initiatives that can support the project – for instance, UNICEF often has projects whereby it distributes school kits (a box with stationary and basic teaching aids) to schools.

Once the CIMIC officer

is satisfied that the proposed project has been identified by the community as a priority, and that the various internal and external agencies involved in education are supportive of the project, he or she should help the community to develop a project proposal and to submit it to the appropriate body that may be able to assist them (e.g. Civil Affairs or Humanitarian Affairs in the case of a Quick Impact Project (QIP); the engineering battalion or the unit to which the CIMIC officer belong, if they have the capacity to assist with the rehabilitation project; or perhaps a combination of these). It is especially important to confirm that the appropriate authorities will support the operation of the school once it has been rehabilitated – that is, who will pay the teachers, who will provide teaching materials like books and stationary, and so on.

Once all the necessary approvals are in place, the CIMIC officer should facilitate the appointment or selection of a project management or steering committee that will oversee the project. This may include an engineering officer, the company or platoon commander responsible, community leaders, the principal of the school, the UN Civil Affairs officer or Humanitarian Affairs officer, and other stakeholders.

Children of St. Joseph's school playing on new playground equipment funded by one of the UNMEE Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Senafe, Eritrea. August 2005. (Source: UNMEE Photo/Helena Mulkerns)


In most cases, the military unit will supply only technical expertise, tools and equipment not readily available in the market place – for example, nails and roof sheeting. All materials that can be locally procured, such as timber, should be obtained locally, and all labour should be organized locally. If such a project is properly coordinated with others, the military unit will be able to leverage support from other elements in the mission. For example, the project may be able to make use of the resources available under the QIPs schemes, and it may be able to make use of a “Food for Work” scheme, under the auspices of the World Food Programme, or one of its implementing NGOs, to reward the labourers with food.

The project management or steering committee should monitor progress on the project, deal with unforeseen developments, and evaluate the project upon completion, to assess if the project has achieved its objectives – and to identify best practices or areas that can be improved on in the future.

The successful completion of a project of this nature is likely to have achieved much more than just the rehabilitation of a school. It should have:

• Contributed to the development and identification of community leaders; • Created a process through which several people, both local and international, get to know

each other and develop relationships that will be of use in future projects – even if they do not involve the military;

• Created the opportunity, for instance through some formal opening or unveiling ceremony, for the community to celebrate a positive development in their community; and

• Strengthened the relationship between the peacekeepers and the community. 5.3 What are QIPs?

The United Nations developed the QIP concept when it realized that there was often a need for peace operations to support short-term, local-level, small-scale projects. QIPs are not unique to peace operations and were in fact first introduced by UN agencies such as UNHCR. In the peace operations context, however, it was realized that by supporting these small projects, the peace operation could make an impact on the ability of communities to cope with the immediate post-conflict transition, thus contributing greatly to the overall momentum of the peace process.

However, in the past, such initiatives could only be funded if they were part of a larger humanitarian or development programme, and such programmes typically take months between the original proposal and eventual implementation. DPKO then obtained approval to include an amount for QIPs in the peacekeeping budget of most new missions for the first year, and in some cases DPKO has facilitated the creation of trust funds that are open to voluntary contributions. As a result, the SRSG now has at his or her disposal an amount of money that can be used to support small deserving projects.


Funding for QIPs is not intended to provide for large infrastructure projects. The focus is rather on low-level, non-recurrent improvements that can be completed in a couple of months and make an easily identifiable difference in the standard of living at village or local level. On average, a peacekeeping mission may have between US$300,000 and US$1.5 million available for this purpose per year. In 2005, UNMIL had a QIP budget of approximately US$1.3 million, ONUCI approximately US$1 million, and UNMEE about US$1.2 million. In the case of the latter, the source is trust funds as opposed to the assessed budget in the two former examples. Such projects include, but are not limited to, the following examples:

• Provision of potable water, sanitation, shelter and health services in areas that may not be covered by humanitarian agencies;

• Assisting with repairing medical facilities (such as local clinics) and schools, and provision and maintenance of critical equipment and supplies;

• Modest refurbishment of local police stations and government buildings, and provision of critical equipment (such as a generator for the Ministry of Justice in Liberia);

• Support for small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry; • Urgent repairs to bridges and roads; • Restoration of electricity supply in critical areas; • Activities that promote women’s rights and other gender-related goals; • Activities that promote HIV/AIDS awareness; • Emergency repairs to domestic shelters where residents are exposed to the elements –

thereby preventing illness; and • Publication of mine and UXO awareness posters/leaflets.

Procedures for Identifying, Approving and Implementing QIPs

Military contingents are encouraged to identify potential projects in their Area of Responsibilities (AOR), in close consultation with the beneficiaries, community leaders and their Civil Affairs and/or Humanitarian Affairs colleagues. Any mission component or section, (e.g. military units, military observers, UNPOL, political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, public information, humanitarian affairs, DDR, or electoral affairs) may identify and propose QIPs, and such proposals should ideally be the result of a multi-functional team effort. Once such a project has been identified, a project proposal should be prepared and submitted for approval. In most

Under its Quick Impact Projects, UNOCI has helped to refurbish many public buildings including this one which houses a sewing classroom in the Foyer Notre Dame, a vocational school for vulnerable girls. Man, Côte d'Ivoire, October 2006. (Source: UNOCI Photo/Ky Chung)


UN missions, QIPs are managed by the Humanitarian Affairs section or the Civil Affairs section on behalf of the SRSG. In some cases, CIMIC officers may be involved in assisting with the identification, facilitation and monitoring of QIPs.

The procedures for submission and implementation of QIPs differ slightly from mission to mission, but the procedures, as they applied to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, are given here as an example of how the process works:

a. All projects will be implemented under the authority of the SRSG. The SRSG may approve and subsequently authorize expenditures for such projects, up to US$15,000 per project, on the basis of written recommendation made by the UNAMSIL Project Approval Committee (PAC).

b. The Director of Administration (DOA) shall be the only Certifying Officer for all projects being implemented, unless he or she decides to delegate the responsibility in writing to one of the approved Certifying Officers in the mission.

c. The SRSG delegates the responsibility for the management of the QIPs to an office within the mission, and in the case of UNAMSIL, this was the Civil Affairs branch. Civil Affairs Field Officers assist the contingents in the identification of projects, ensuring that the proposed projects are in line with the priorities of the communities concerned and that they had been identified as such by the local community or District Councils. In a bid to avoid duplication and enhance the streamlining of resources, Civil Affairs Field Officers also consult with the relevant Line Ministries or government agencies, and other donors and NGOs, to ascertain that the proposed project has not been earmarked for funding by these institutions. In the case of educational, health or agricultural projects, Civil Affairs Field Officers should ensure that an explicit letter of support is obtained from the relevant line ministry. Civil Affairs Field Officers should also ensure that the relevant UNAMSIL Engineering Section review all project proposals from an engineering/construction perspective.

d. Once the project is identified, Civil Affairs Field Officers, in cooperation with the contingent’s team, take on the responsibility of formulating the proposal and putting it in the requisite project format. It should then be sent to the Trust Fund Secretariat in Freetown for review and presentation to PAC for consideration.

e. The Trust Fund Unit will ensure that all project proposals presented to PAC are accompanied by the relevant supporting documents and are made available to all members of the committee at least two days prior to the PAC session charged with considering these project proposals.

f. PAC will deliberate on the project proposals and make recommendations for the improvement thereof, or provision of further information, if necessary, before approval of the project.

g. Once projects are approved, the minutes of PAC meetings approving the projects will be sent to the SRSG under whose authority QIPs are implemented.


h. Since all projects are to be implemented by UNAMSIL contingents in their entirety, there will be no Memorandum of Understanding to be signed.

i. Once the SRSG approves the minutes of PAC, the Trust Fund Unit shall, in writing and attaching the relevant project documentation, request the finance section to disburse funds to a Civil Affairs Officer-in-Charge of the area where the project is to be implemented. The Officer-in-Charge will work hand-in-hand with the contingent commander to ensure that the project is implemented as scheduled.

j. In line with the terms of reference for implementation of QIPs – as established by the controller – an amount equivalent to 80% of the total cost of the project shall, as a rule, be paid as an advance to the Civil Affairs Officer-in-Charge of the area where the project is to be implemented. The Civil Affairs Officer will take full responsibility for the money advanced to them, and failure to account for the money advanced will result in recovery of the money from the officer. The balance of 20% shall be paid following the submission of a progress report on the project. The Civil Affairs Officer shall be responsible for preparing all reports, which shall include a statement of income and related expenditure.

k. The Trust Fund Unit, in conjunction with the Assistant Chief of Staff-Logistics, shall ensure that the implementation of the substantive and financial aspects of the projects are adequately monitored and that periodic visits to such projects are undertaken, as appropriate.

l. The UNAMSIL Trust Fund Unit, together with Assistant Chief of Staff-Logistics, will certify that the project has been completed as planned.

Generic QIPs Procedures

1. PAC recommends, SRSG authorizes 2. COA/DOA acts as Certifying Officer 3. HA or CA Officers, with assistance from CIMIC officers in some cases, are

responsible for identification of projects 4. HA or CA Officers prepare project proposals and submit them to the Secretary

of the PAC 5. Secretary of PAC/QIP Unit distributes proposals to members of the PAC 6. PAC meets and makes recommendations to the SRSG 7. Minutes of the PAC meeting to be endorsed by the SRSG for authorization 8. MOUs entered into with implementing partners, where applicable 9. Finance to distribute start-up funds as per QIP SOPs and approved project

documents and MOU 10. HA or CA Officers prepare progress reports and request additional payments

when due 11. Projects to be monitored by QIP Unit 12. QIP Unit to report and CAO/DOA to certify completion


1. Mission support refers to:

a. CIMIC activities that help local communities; b. Support extended to civilian agencies by the military component of a peace operation; c. Operations that aim at building confidence in the peacebuilding process; d. Support provided to the military by the administration component.

2. Community support refers to:

a. CIMIC activities that provide public information to local communities; b. Cooperation extended to any civilian component by the military component of a

peace operation; c. Actions that are aimed at building confidence in the peace process among local

communities; d. Military providing humanitarian assistance to local communities.

3. The four stages of mission support are:

a. Joint planning, coordination planning, joint coordination and common objectives; b. Operational coordination, joint planning, objective commonalities and evaluation; c. Evaluation, identify common objectives, joint planning and operational coordination; d. Identify the common objective, joint planning, operational coordination and joint

evaluation. 4. Types of logistical support include:

a. Armed escorts; b. Mobile patrols; c. Static security; d. Construction or rehabilitation of buildings like schools and clinics.

5. Which of the following would not be considered mission support?

a. Providing transport assets; b. Undertaking a joint evaluation; c. Providing a local community with potable water; d. Providing a water purification plant to an international NGO.



6. Which of the following are not phases of project management? a. Planning; b. Approval; c. Monitoring and Evaluation; d. Public Information.

7. Infrastructure projects cannot include:

a. Rehabilitation of markets; b. Rehabilitation of electricity supply; c. Rehabilitation of water and sanitation projects; d. Rehabilitation of ex-combatants.

8. QIPs stands for:

a. Quality impact projects; b. Quick initiation projects; c. Quick impact projects; d. Quality initiation projects.

9. QIPs are aimed at supporting:

a. Small, random projects; b. Small, selected projects; c. Large, random projects; d. Large, selected projects.

10. Which of the following are not part of the generic steps for implementing QIPs?

a. The CIMIC officer identifies the projects; b. The Project proposal is submitted for approval; c. The Force Commander approves the proposal; d. The QIP unit monitors the implementation.

ANSWERS: 1b, 2c, 3d, 4d, 5c, 6d, 7d, 8c, 9b, 10c



LESSON 6

NEGOTIATIONS AND FACILITATIONS

6.1 Why are Communication and Negotiation Skills Necessary?

6.2 Preparing for a Facilitation Meeting

6.3 Cross-Cultural Communication Regarding Negotiations

6.4 Basic Communication Techniques

6.5 Preparing for Negotiation

6.6 Some Important Guidelines

6.7 Further Reading for Negotiations

Lesson 6 / Negotiations and Facilitations 114

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Understand the importance of effective communication, negotiation and mediation skills;

• Explain the issues relating to preparing for, conducting, and reporting on negotiations in the peace operations context; and

• Conduct the various aspects of facilitation, including preparation, managing meetings, guidelines for facilitators, and dealing with difficult areas in meetings.

INTRODUCTION

Communication in a peace operation environment is much more challenging than one is used to under normal circumstances, and the end result can be far more important than one would imagine at first glance. As a CIMIC officer you will be communicating on a daily basis with people from other cultures, most likely without a common first language, and often under threatening, stressful or tense situations. Successful communication can often make the difference between saving lives and losing them.

In this environment, every individual CIMIC officer needs more communication and negotiation skills than they would have needed if they were carrying out the same duties in their own country, or under peaceful circumstances. After this, being able to facilitate meetings between parties is seen as a core skill of a CIMIC officer.

The key to successful communication and negotiation in the peace operation context is awareness and preparation. Every minute spent on planning and preparation will influence the outcome of the negotiation. The CIMIC officer’s ability to communicate and negotiate will improve with experience and practice, as will their ability to facilitate a successful meeting.




6.1 Why are Communication and Negotiation Skills Necessary?

Peace operations differ from war (which is the primary role all soldiers are trained for) in a number of critical ways.

1. In war, you are one of the warring parties; in peace operations, you are a neutral third party. You are not part of the conflict, and you are required to stand above it.

2. In war, your aim is victory (which implies defeat of the enemy). In peace operations, your aim is to assist the parties to achieve peace. You have no enemies or opponents in peace operations. You work with the warring parties to build trust and achieve peace.

3. In war, you want to surprise the enemy, hence you wear camouflage and try to conceal your presence, strength and movements from the enemy. In peace operations, your visible presence emphasizes your role as a neutral third party and helps to instil confidence in the peace process among the parties and local people. Typically, you want the parties to know your strength, and you will inform them of your movements. Your presence and movements are transparent. There is no secrecy or stealth – your visibility is your strength. This is why you wear blue helmets in UN operations and move around in white vehicles.

4. In war, you achieve victory by defeating your opponent through combat. In peace operations, you achieve peace through managing the conflict (containing it at manageable levels and preventing it from becoming violent again). The primary tools you will use to manage the conflict are communication and negotiation.

This is especially true in the case of the CIMIC officer because you will be the designated

focal point for communication on behalf of your unit or headquarters, with your host community, civil society, government representatives and fellow external actors – such as UN humanitarian and development agencies, and NGOs. You will be communicating with these internal and external actors on a daily basis. This will involve both informal conversations and informal, as well as formal, negotiations, often in the form of meetings. Sometimes you will have to chair or facilitate these meetings.

You will also have to report on the outcome of these meetings to your own unit or headquarters. This involves effective communication because you will have to ensure that they understand the importance of maintaining an appropriate supportive relationship with their civilian counterparts and the host community.


Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation is not capitulation. Some people, especially soldiers, associate negotiation with “giving in” to the demands of the party you are negotiating with. For instance, we will often hear people say: “We will not negotiate with terrorists.” What they mean is that they will not give in to their demands, but in most cases the authorities do negotiate with the terrorists to secure the release of hostages, and so on.

Negotiation describes a process, not an outcome. Negotiation is communication with the aim of reaching an agreement. Any communication with the aim of reaching an agreement is a negotiation. Every time you, as a CIMIC officer, are communicating with one or more people with the aim of reaching an agreement, you are negotiating.

Mediation is the intervention into a dispute by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power. This person assists parties to voluntarily reach their own mutually acceptable agreement. If you, as a CIMIC officer, are called upon to assist two parties to reach an agreement, you are, in a way, mediating between the two parties and creating an atmosphere of trust.

Negotiation in the Peace Operations Context

Whenever CIMIC officers negotiate with other parties in a peace operations context, the subject of the negotiation is likely to fall into one of the following categories:

• Negotiating freedom of movement of CIMIC officers, NGOs, or members of the local population through an area controlled by one of the parties – for example, at a roadblock.

• Discussing relationships or roles between the peace operation and the parties, or local authorities – for example, a patrol moving through a village.

• Resolving disputes with, or between, parties and local people, villages, or communities (depending on the mandate).

• CIMIC officers meeting among themselves or with parties, the local authorities or community leaders to coordinate a specific event – for example: a marriage or other traditional ceremony in a sensitive area; making arrangements for a vaccination campaign; coordinating the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees; or, coordinating humanitarian relief distribution.

Negotiation

Negotiation is communication with the aim of reaching an agreement.

Mediation

Mediation is the intervention into a dispute by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party, that has no authoritative decision making power.


6.2 Preparing for a Facilitation Meeting

As a CIMIC officer, before you facilitate a meeting, make sure that all appropriate stakeholders have been identified, consulted about the meeting, and invited to the meeting. If the meeting will bring two or more parties together to discuss a dispute, ensure that all parties to the dispute have confirmed that they will attend.

Stakeholders

How do you identify the appropriate stakeholders? All parties who will be potentially affected by the outcome (positively or negatively) have a stake in the process. Those who will be directly responsible for implementing the outcome will be crucial to the process. Those parties that can block the implementation of the outcome should also be included in the process.

Confirm your list of stakeholders through consultations with those already on your list. They are likely to alert you to any stakeholders you may have omitted.

Consult all the stakeholders to make sure all the participants have a common understanding of the purpose of the meeting before they arrive at the meeting. Prepare an agenda based on the input received by the various stakeholders to the meeting. Make sure the venue is acceptable to all and that it has been prepared before the meeting.

Opening the Facilitation Meeting

As a CIMIC officer, you must:

1. Welcome all the participants and let everyone introduce him or herself. Be sensitive to the local culture and integrate the appropriate local cultural protocols into the introduction and opening session.

2. Establish ground rules, such as a timeframe for the meeting, methods for taking decisions, the role of the facilitator, and means of recording decisions.

3. Re-state the purpose of the meeting and finalize the agenda.

Conflict Management Cycle

• Identify potential violent disputes • Make an appraisal of the situation • Design a response • Undertake the intervention • Evaluate the outcome/feedback

Liaison and Information Management

Liaison and coordination is about the exchange of information. Meetings can be one of the most useful forms of exchanging information among more than two people because they are more time-efficient than if parties had to meet separately. As a result, CIMIC officers are likely to spend many hours in meetings during their deployment. In some cases they may chair meetings. At the same time, there are few things more frustrating than a poorly run or managed meeting. It is thus crucial for CIMIC officers to master the skills necessary to effectively manage meetings, if they are to discharge their responsibility successfully.


Managing the Facilitation Meeting

Once the process is in place, start moving through the agenda. The skill in facilitating a meeting lies in balancing the need to move through the agenda within the agreed timeframe with the need of participants to feel that they have had enough of an opportunity to participate and have their say. If the pace is too fast, participants may feel that they are being manipulated. If they are not comfortable with the process, they are unlikely to take ownership of the outcome.

The facilitator’s skill lies in ordering the discussion and steering the meeting towards a constructive outcome. Ask people who have placed items on the agenda to speak on that point. Prevent interruptions. First allow questions of clarification and then open debate.

If the issue is too complicated, consider how it can be broken down into smaller, more manageable parts. If you do break the issue up into smaller parts, consider how they should be ordered and grouped. Tackle the issues one by one. Make sure everybody knows when a point has been concluded by providing a summary of the discussion and the outcome. Make it clear when a new issue is being introduced. Ensure that everyone is heard. It is often useful to start with a couple of easier issues to build momentum for cooperation. This will help the facilitator to identify and build on areas of commonality.

If the issues at stake are emotive, the facilitator should not try to formulate agreements too soon. Let the parties wrestle with their own problems so that they can take ownership of the process. Allow the parties to vent their emotions, within reason, and without losing control of the meeting, before steering the discussion towards seeking solutions.

Make use of short breaks when the meeting is deadlocked or when the discussion is no longer conducive to settlement. Agreements are more easily reached over tea than in plenary. Remember that the process often matters more than, or is at least as important as, the outcome.

All the participants must feel comfortable enough with the process to abide by and implement agreements reached at the meeting.

Once the meeting has reached agreement, ensure that it is captured in writing. Take a small break, if necessary, and allow the persons involved to formulate the agreement on paper. Make sure that the agreement covers points relating to its implementation, roles and responsibilities, and monitoring and evaluation.

Use the appropriate protocols to close the meeting once all issues have been dealt with to everybody’s satisfaction. Agree on a date and venue for the next meeting if one is required.

AU/UN mediation team meets with the delegation of the Government of Sudan in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. October 2007. (Source: UN Photo #159557, Fred Noy)


Factors that Influence the Outcome of a Negotiation

Successful communication and negotiation depends on your understanding of the following three factors.

Understanding your Commander’s Interests

You need to have a clear understanding of your own commander’s interests, that is, what he wants to achieve out of the negotiations. In the peace operations context, his interests, and in turn your interests, will derive from the mission’s mandate, the policies of your unit, and the instructions you have received.

Understand the Interests of Other Parties

Secondly, you need to anticipate and understand what the other parties’ interests are and what they want to achieve out of the negotiations. You can do so to a large degree by studying their previous statements and actions to detect any changes in policy. Your focus should be on identifying their real underlying interests, not their stated positions, and advising your commander on what you perceive the other parties might actually want.

Understand the Cultural and Historical Context within which you Operate

Thirdly, by being sensitive to the cultural and historical context in which you operate, you can avoid critical cultural mistakes, improve your credibility and acceptability, and build trust.

Military-Specific Meeting Skills for the Facilitator

1. Sanitize your meeting space, as well as routes in and out; 2. Ensure that there are no maps, troop identification materials, or

stray documents lying about; 3. Provide security for visitor’s weaponry; 4. Provide security for your own weaponry; 5. Search visitors (at what level?); 6. Decide on the use of recording devices; 7. Identify cultural differences of a military nature.

If You Host the Negotiation

1. Ensure facility appearance is professional; 2. Rehearse pick-up of partner at the gate; 3. Sanitize the negotiation location (no operational graphics, etc.); 4. Plan snacks and drinks; 5. Eating up front can lighten the partners mood.


Guidelines for the Facilitator

Fair Process

The facilitator should be an advocate for the principles that underlie collaborative decision-making processes, including structuring and managing the process to ensure maximum representation, and effective participation by all key stakeholders. Don’t dominate. An effective facilitator is like a good referee, he or she is invisible during the play and only steps in when it is necessary to stop or start the play. A poor referee breaks the momentum of the game.

Neutrality and Impartiality

The facilitation process should be neutral and impartial. In this context, neutrality means not taking sides and impartiality means freedom from bias. The facilitator should not become an advocate for any particular point of view or position. If it is necessary to advance a particular UN or AU policy guideline, let a colleague make the point. You cannot be a credible facilitator and a party to the process.

Informed Consent

The facilitator has an obligation to ensure that all the parties understand the nature of the process, the procedures and the role of the facilitator.

Confidentiality

In some cases, one or more of the parties may confide in the facilitator. Maintaining confidentiality in these situations is critical for the credibility of the facilitator, especially in a dispute resolution process.

Dealing with Problem Situations

Even under the best circumstances, problems may occur. There are a number of things you can do when you recognize that a problem may be emerging. One is to do nothing. It is not always necessary to intervene, and a premature intervention may actually worsen the situation. On the other hand, if it is potentially a serious problem, then dealing with it as early as possible is advisable. You will have to make a risk assessment and judgment call yourself, and act accordingly.

The key to dealing with problem situations is to change the dynamics of the meeting. Sometimes, dealing with a problem situation yourself is an option. You can do so either by taking the individuals involved aside for a private discussion, by changing your facilitation style, or by calling for a break. Another option is to involve the whole group in seeking a solution. You can do this by making the group aware of the problem and by asking their advice on how to deal with it.

Facilitator Guidelines

• Fair process • Neutrality and impartiality • Informed consent • Confidentiality


One of the most difficult situations to handle is when an argument breaks out in the group. Discourage a back-and-forth exchange between two people by moving the discussion away from personalities and by reminding participants of the problem they need to solve collectively.

6.3 Cross-Cultural Communication Regarding Negotiations

Culture is the collective world-view a group of people have developed over many years to make sense of the world around them and to order their society accordingly. Your own culture may be different from that of the community in which you serve as a peacekeeper, but you should understand it in the context of that community’s history and environment. Guard against judging another culture as right or wrong, as good or bad, using your own as a yardstick.

The foundation for effective cross-cultural communication is respect built on trust. The golden rule is to do nothing that will offend the other culture. If you are professional, humble, friendly and respectful, your chances of not offending anybody are very good.

Take note that every culture has developed customs and traditions to regulate formal communications like negotiation and mediation. Find out what these cultural expectations are, and try to shape the way in which you conduct negotiations so that it reflects local customs and traditions. Your translator is a good source of cultural information.

However, you should maintain UN, AU and REC standards and guidelines. If these are in conflict with local culture and tradition, follow UN, AU and REC standards and guidelines, and explain to your local interlocutors why this is being done.

6.4 Basic Communication Techniques

The following basic communication techniques are useful in most communication and negotiation situations.

Emphatic Listening

Listen actively and with understanding, even if you do not agree with what is being said. Be alert and focused on the person speaking. Do not speak to your colleagues when the other person is speaking, even if you are waiting for interpretation. Actively listening to the other party is an important communication

technique. (Source: UN Photo #99349, Evan Schneider)


Paraphrasing

Listen and restate in your own words what another person is saying. For instance: “So, what you are saying is...?”

Communicating Openness

Be open to hearing the perceptions and needs of others, even if you disagree with what they are saying. For instance, by exploring their ideas: “How would that work if...?”

Reframing

Shift the focus from positions to interests, encouraging flexibility and expressing something in a different way. For instance: “In other words, what you want is...?”

Non-Verbal Communication

Acknowledge non-verbally that you are willing to listen (eye contact when culturally appropriate, body focused on the person); pay attention (do not look away); hear what is being said (nod); smile when appropriate; and show genuine interest in solving the problem at hand. It is important to remember that non-verbal communication is culture-specific. Make sure you know what your non-verbal communication means in the local context, and avoid taboos. Once again, ask your interpreter for guidance in this area.

6.5 Preparing for Negotiation

Preparations are crucial to successful negotiations. The more prepared you are, the better your chances of successfully calming and managing a potential violent conflict situation. Take time, even if only a few minutes, to make sure you have a clear understanding of your mission’s interests, the interests of the other parties, and the context within which the negotiation is taking place.

You may often find yourself forced to respond to an impromptu situation where there is no time for preparation. For instance, you may come across a village dispute on a patrol; you may be forced to deal with a situation at a checkpoint or at your post; or you may come across a roadblock whilst on convoy escort duty. However, if you have gained enough generic knowledge of the history, culture and nature of the conflict, if you are well briefed on your own mandate and orders (e.g. convoy protocols), and if you use the start of the negotiations to gather information about the specific problem you are facing, you will be armed with enough knowledge to deal with most impromptu situations.

The point is that if you are generally well prepared, you will be in a much better situation to deal with impromptu negotiations. Remember, in the real world not all negotiations are conducted at the very highest levels, nor by senior diplomats or general officers. Negotiations


can be conducted from the highest level down to, and including, the “Strategic Corporal” at the checkpoint or on patrol.

In early 2004, at the request of U.S., Canadian and British Brigade Level, and below, Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Joint Readiness Training Center, at Fort Polk, Louisiana, began the design of a new negotiation process that did not use the traditionally formal, and heavily academic, approach to negotiations. The U.S. Brigade Commanders, in particular, wanted a negotiation process that could be taught in a shorter period of time, that was less cumbersome to use, and far more versatile in who could use these skills. The U.S. process was spearheaded by Lt. Col. Steven P. Heidecker and Captain Jon K. Sowards, and was first published in the U.S. Army’s major publication, “The Magazine of the Association of the U.S. Army,” in 2004. Since 2004, this new process has been expanded to encompass joint use outside of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The original concept in 2004 specifically addressed a staff officer’s role in the preparation for what is termed a “bilateral negotiation.” Like all negotiation methods, it shares the same three stages – the introduction (start), the substantive negotiations (discussion) and the closing session (end) – but also includes responsibilities during a bilateral negotiation meeting and post-negotiation follow-through. While intended for the staff officer of the army leader who conducts the negotiation, it is just as valuable to the squad leader or the army leader him or herself.

Bilateral negotiation is defined as affecting “reciprocally two nations or parties; to arrange or bring about through conference, discussion, and compromise.” Under this definition, bilateral negotiations happen from the squad leader to general officer level. Each leader interacts, meets, and coordinates with the other nation’s partners on a regular basis. Each bilateral negotiation requires intelligence preparation of the battlefield or “of the bilateral negotiation” in order to reach the intended outcome. Deliberate preparation by both the leader and the staff officer, focused toward an intended outcome, provides the pathway to success. While prior preparation is vital toward reaching success, the post-bilateral negotiation effort provides the rewards of that success by synchronizing the follow-up actions to seal the agreement or further press the effort.

MONUC peacekeepers escort the members of the Ituri-based Patriotic Force of Resistance (FRPI) militia to the negotiation meeting with the representatives of the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to pave the way for the disarmament and integration of FRPI combatants into the national army. November 2006. (Source: UN Photo #133052, Martine Perret)


The original designers simply provided a template for the science of bilateral negotiations preparation and follow-through. Staff officers are not charged with being experts in the art of discussion, but they must be thorough in their preparation and follow-through. Being aware of the science of preparation is key to concluding a successful bilateral negotiation.

For the sake of clarity, an explanation of terms will assist the reader in understanding the science of bilateral negotiation preparation:

1. The leader is defined as the Army representative participating in the bilateral negotiation.

2. The partner is defined as any coalition partner, foreign military officer, or regional person of influence with which the leader is conducting a bilateral negotiation. The partner has influence, and the Army leader wants to harness that influence to reach an intended outcome.

3. The staff officer is defined as a bilateral negotiation preparation staff expert, process observer, or liaison officer. This staff officer is responsible for preparing the leader for the event and coordinating the post-negotiations effort.

In the following paragraphs, we will provide both battalion and division level examples.

Pre-Negotiation Preparation

Before a political candidate enters into a live debate during an election campaign, his staff thoroughly prepares him on campaign issues, tests his response to tough questions or criticisms by his rivals, and coaches him on presence and composure. The staff officer charged with preparing a leader for a bilateral negotiation must complete the preparation of his boss with the same vigour and attention to detail as a political campaign advisor. Thorough preparation provides the opportunity of success in political races and bilateral negotiations.

The staff officer’s duties and responsibilities in the preparation phase of the bilateral negotiation include preparation of the target folders (which includes photographs, biographies and summaries of previous negotiations), determination of intended outcomes, a strategy to achieve the intended outcomes, media coordination, translator selection and preparation, rehearsals, and site selection and set-up. In other words, the preparation phase is a deliberate process that the staff officer is responsible for managing.

Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) drives a manoeuvre operation, it also drives the bilateral negotiation preparation process. Once a bilateral negotiation has been requested or scheduled, the staff officer should begin his preparation by conducting an IPB of the bilateral negotiation as shown in the box below.


Key Preparation Tasks

Of all the preparatory tasks, there are three important tasks the staff officer should pay close attention to. Those tasks are identifying the intended outcomes, developing a strategy to achieve the intended outcomes, and conducting a thorough rehearsal for the leader.

Every meeting must have an intended outcome; otherwise the bilateral negotiation will have been a wasted effort. Identifying the intended outcome is initially a joint effort between the leader and the staff officer following the IPB phase. Once identified, the staff examines the suitability and feasibility of the intended outcomes.

Because negotiating means attempting to advance the leader’s interests with the partner’s agreement, the staff officer must examine the intended outcomes in relation to the partner’s position and determine a minimum threshold the agreement must exceed. In other words, identify a “bottom line” the leader is willing to accept. The “bottom line” serves as an acceptable alternative outcome to the intended outcome. For example, a leader’s intended outcome of a bilateral negotiation with a town police chief is to maintain five random security patrols per day; the leader’s bottom line is three security patrols per day. If the negotiated agreement exceeds three presence patrols per day, then the bottom line (minimum threshold) has been met and both parties will be satisfied with the agreement. Identifying intended outcomes and their respective bottom line facilitates bilateral negotiation strategy development (think of this as “course of action development”).

The next step involves developing a strategy to reach the intended outcomes. Intelligence preparation of the bilateral negotiation makes developing the scheme of manoeuvre/bilateral negotiation strategy a logical process. By understanding the partner’s background position on issues and your leader’s bottom line, the strategy development is putting the pieces together. Whether strategy development requires field-grade or lower analysis, the strategy is the scheme of manoeuvre to reach the intended outcomes. The strategy for

Conducting an IPB of the Bilateral Negotiation

• Biography and photograph of partner; • Identify/anticipate the partner’s objectives; • Personal similarities between leader and partner; • Information operations pillars, consisting of:

− Higher HQ information, operations, messages and themes; and − Current unit information, operations, messages and themes;

• Welcome remarks and familiarization discussion points; and • Transition talking points to move from social to business discussions.

Other strategy considerations: • Wargaming the Leader’s intended

outcome and the partner’s likely response;

• Wargaming impasses; • Wargaming the partner’s likely

requests and leader’s response; and • Recommendations for moments to

“move away from the table” and work toward intended outcomes in the margins of a break.


reaching the intended outcomes must be reviewed and approved by the leader. Additionally, the staff must address the position the leader should take with the partner’s anticipated or historic issues. By frame-working the “bottom line” on these issues, the staff officer will ensure that the leader is prepared to address them with the power to make decisions and will ensure that the partner sees the bilateral negotiation as fruitful.

Final Preparation and Rehearsals

Final preparation for the bilateral negotiation involves final approval by the leader of the strategy and intended outcomes, rehearsal of the leader and preparation of the location. If possible, the staff officer should include the translator in the final bilateral negotiations approval briefing to the leader. This familiarizes the translator with the language and issues to be discussed. Rehearsing with the translator ensures that verbal cues and army-specific vocabulary are properly understood and translated. It is also a good time to review customs and courtesies. The leader and the staff officer should develop and rehearse signals to use during the bilateral negotiation. Signals keep the discussion on track and should be discreet. Additionally, the staff officer needs to assess the meeting location and venue. At the location, the staff officer should ensure that the physical set-up of the chairs and room lead to an open flow of communication between the two parties. Providing a small snack and beverage at the opening of the meeting allows the parties to begin the initial small talk, allows the partner to get comfortable with the settings, and settles his or her frame of mind so that the bilateral negotiations can be successful.

The preparation phase has been successful if the leader is adequately prepared, rehearsed and comfortable, and if the location and set-up lends itself to open discussion. The observation of the bilateral negotiation and the art of discussion are left to the leader and should be observed by the staff officer. Remember, often major points of agreement are reached away from the negotiation table, on breaks or over a meal.

During the Bilateral Negotiations

The staff officer’s role during the bilateral negotiation is to take notes and assist in keeping the leader on track. The staff officer must be aware of all aspects of the meeting to include changes in tone, discussion impasses, translator disposition, and the mood of the partner. In doing so, the staff officer can signal the leader to change tact or recommend a break. The staff officer’s goal is to allow the leader to focus on the bilateral negotiation without distraction. Proven techniques that have worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and in many other bilateral negotiations include:

• Sitting to watch the leader more than the partner and where he/she can provide signals to the leader outside of the partner’s field of view;

• Using a template of notes to fill in the blanks (see the table below);

• Helping keep the leader on the pathway to the intended outcomes through use of signals;

• Scheduling adequate breaks to keep the translator fresh as interpretation is a difficult task;

• Alternating translators as the bilateral negotiation transitions from one phase to the next;


• If the partner is a smoker, providing him/her a break once an hour; and

• Ensuring appropriate refreshments are available. Post-Bilateral Negotiations Efforts

A leader’s credibility is directly linked to the follow-through on agreements made. As a result, bilateral negotiations staff work is a continual process and does not end with the completion of the bilateral negotiation. The bilateral negotiation was just one of the steps on the pathway to reaching the intended outcomes. Reaching the intended outcomes requires the completion of a hotwash (review) immediately following the bilateral negotiation so that agreements or outcomes can be captured and outstanding issues can be identified and staffed. A leader’s credibility is directly linked to the follow-through of the agreements made. Before a bilateral negotiation leader parts company with his partner, he should make a full review of the points of agreement and disagreement discussed during the meeting, and at least attempt to get the partner to initial, if not sign, the major points of agreement. This will be helpful at future meetings, because successful conclusions usually do not happen at one meeting. It takes time to build trusting relationships.

Immediately following the bilateral negotiation, the leader and staff officer need to conduct a hotwash. In this hotwash, the staff officer briefs agreements made, issues discussed, and the recommended next steps. The leader listens and provides clarity and guidance for the next steps. Together, the leader and staff officer brainstorm linkage of bilateral negotiation to other partners, current events, information operations themes or implications. All results and recommendations are properly staffed for follow-up. Outstanding issues are revisited as necessary.

Post-Bilateral Negotiation Report and Hotwash Template

Capture

• Agreements made • Leader’s issues discussed • Partners issues discussed • Intended outcomes • Measures of effectiveness • Atmosphere/cordiality • Timeline of the event • Further details of the bilateral negotiation

Follow-up • Link to other partners, current events, or future implications • Further research required to complete the bilateral discussion of issues• Tasks as a result of the bilateral negotiation


Dissemination of the Results

Bilateral negotiations are conducted at all levels, everyday, in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, and many other areas of the world. Dissemination of the pre-bilateral negotiation products and the post-bilateral negotiation reports is critical to the success of each campaign. A recommended procedure for information distribution involves posting all of the bilateral negotiation staff work on the intranet with a web search engine available for cross-reference. In this manner, a staff officer developing talking points for a bilateral negotiation concerning “smuggled goods” can cross-reference the topic on the intranet and link the topic to bilateral negotiations already completed. The archaic method of posting the products on the server only allows other staff officers to randomly read the staff work, under the heading of the bilateral negotiation partner’s name. This is slow and counter-productive. While many of the subjects are sensitive in nature or classified, the intranet allows the staff officers to maintain a cross-referenced database of both names and key words in a secure fashion.

These paragraphs have addressed a staff officer’s role in preparing a leader for a bilateral negotiation, in the conduct of the bilateral negotiation and his role in the post-negotiation effort. Following the methodology provided here, the staff officer can prepare his leader in a deliberate and thorough manner. Developing intended outcomes is the key to successful bilateral negotiation preparation. The intelligence preparation of the bilateral negotiation and the development of the bilateral negotiation strategy are the supporting efforts to achieve the intended outcomes. This science of preparation gives the leader the best opportunity to know the plans of his or her counterpart and to perform the art of discussion.

Summary

The most important points in this section include:

1. Respect the local culture;

2. Plan and prepare according to the three factors that influence negotiations (your interest, their interest and the context);

3. Approach negotiation from the perspective of the three stages (start, discussion, end) regardless of whether the negotiations are impromptu or planned;

4. Use common sense and apply guidelines as appropriate to your situation (not all the guidelines will apply to impromptu situations – you don’t have to prepare a press release after an exchange at a checkpoint); and

5. Report to ensure implementation beyond the few people who participated in the meeting.

Remember, negotiation just to achieve a one-time goal may cost you greater in the long run. Look at each negotiation as a long-term process to build trust and to create a basis for long-term cooperation between all of the parties.


6.6 Some Important Guidelines

Pre-Negotiation Rehearsal Reminders

• Rehearsals are key to negotiation success; • Include the interpreter in the rehearsal – ensure he/she understands your issues, the

intended outcome, military jargon, etc.; • Establish leader/interpreter signals (e.g. tap on arm to stop talking); and • If you host the negotiation:

− Ensure facility appearance is professional; − Rehearse pick-up of the partner at the gate; − Sanitize the negotiation location (no operational graphics, etc.); − Plan snacks and drinks; and − Remember that eating up front can lighten the partner’s mood.

Actions During a Negotiation: Leader Do’s and Don’ts

• Don’t agree to any first offer at the table; • Don’t ever lie, bluff or make threats; • Avoid discussion of politics, religion, or policy; • Avoid excessive side-bar conversations; • Don’t tell jokes – they do not translate well; • Don’t look at your translator – look at your counterpart when you speak to them, and

maintain eye-to-eye contact; • Don’t rush off to the next meeting – make them feel this meeting is the most important

event in your day; • Don’t promise anything beyond your ability to control; • In Muslim communities, don’t schedule meetings between 1300-1500; • Do speak clearly and slowly without acronyms; • Do know if the partner is a decision-maker; • Do stay in your lane; • Do finish on time; • Do have a note taker/recorder; and • Finish with a review (hotwash) of agreements made.

Post-Negotiation Follow-Up Reminders

• A leader’s credibility is directly linked to the follow-through on agreements made; • The leader and staff must conduct a post-negotiation hotwash (the sooner the better); • The recorder briefs on the:

− Review of agreements made; − Outstanding issues captured; and − Recommended next steps.

• The leader listens and provides clarity and guidance for next steps; and • At the conclusion of the hotwash:

− Results and recommendations are reported back up the chain of command; and − Target folders for the met-with partners should be updated.


Negotiation Reminders

• Stay in your lane; • Be prepared and alert; • Be aware of your facial expressions; • Appearance matters because perceptions are everything; this also applies to all with you; • Manage your time:

− 25% casual, develop “professional relationships”; − 50% business; and − 25% closure and “relationship” time;

• Avoid slang, off-colour humour, jokes, and acronyms; • Emphasize win-win solutions; • Only shift to “win-lose” if all else fails; • Remember that 90% of all progress occurs away from the table; • Never make threats, unless you are prepared to follow through; • Treat translators as pacing items; • REHEARSE, REHEARSE, REHEARSE – you can never over-prepare; • Remember that every aspect of the meeting is deliberate, even small talk; • Do not let a confrontational person cause you to get off topic; • Watch your body language; • Always separate the person from the problem – attack the problem; • Be a good listener; • Be able to say “I don’t know” when you don’t have the answer; and • Remember that informal conversation helps fill in the blanks on the biographies.

A Power Tool to Help the Meeting Organizer (Facilitation)

Prepare the following information in advance, and it will save you time during and after your meeting.

MODEL AGENDA For Meeting in Relation To _______________________________. To Be Held On ___/___/___ at ______ am/pm in the _________. 1. Welcome, Purpose and Introduction 2. Apologies 3. Previous Minutes/Action Notes 4. Matters Arising 5. Progress Reports 6. Agree courses of action 7. Any Other Business 8. Date, Time and Venue of Next Meeting


MODEL ACTION NOTES/ MINUTES 1. Notes of meeting No: ____ in relation to _________________ held on ___/___/___

at _________ commencing at ______ am/pm in the _________ . 2. PRESENT Name Appointment/Organization 3. APOLOGIES Name Appointment/Organization 4. The notes of the previous meeting were: a) *agreed as accurate b) *agreed with the following changes 5. The current position with respect to the following matters arising were confirmed: Issue Action By Whom At Date 6. Issues discussed during the meeting: 7. The following actions were agreed: Issue Action By Whom By Date 8. Any Other Business: 9. Date and time of next meeting: Meeting to be held on ___/___/___ commencing at ______ am/pm. Venue: _____________________ / to be arranged 10. Circulation a) Action Addressees - Those present/apologies b) Information Addressees - CO - Bde CIMIC - Others (specify) 11. Post Meeting Actions and Bookings: a) Book meeting room and waiting rooms b) Order *Tea & Coffee/*Biscuits/*Sandwiches to be delivered to ___________ for _____ persons at ______ am/pm on ___/___/___. c) Prepare and distribute agenda and action notes: * within 7 days * within 14 days * for next meeting * delete as appropriate


For further reading on facilitation, please refer to:

• ACCORD Handbook in Collaborative Decision Making • ACCORD Handbook in Facilitation

6.7 Further Reading for Negotiations

You cannot become a negotiations expert in a couple of minutes. The aim of this lesson was to give you a solid overview of the process and issues at stake. It is important that you seek further opportunities to improve your negotiation skills. Negotiation is a practical skill and is ideally gained through participating in a practical negotiation course.

If you did not have an opportunity to attend a practical course, or if you want to learn more about negotiations, you can read some of the following books:

• Roger Fisher and William Ury, “Getting to Yes: Negotiation Agreement Without Giving In,” Penguin, New York, 1981.

• Deborah Goodwin (ed), “Negotiation in International Conflict: Understanding Persuasion,” Frank Cass, London, 2002.

• Deborah Goodwin, “The Military and Negotiation,” Frank Cass, London, 2004.

• Lt. Col. Steven Heidecker and Capt. Jon Sowards, “Bilateral Negotiations: The Best Offense is ---, Army,” The Magazine of The Association of The United States Army, July 2004.

• Stephen E. Henthorne, Bye Bye BATNA & Asta La Vista ZOPA. The “Muddy Boots Guide to Effective First Contact and Negotiation Skills” (Single authored, refereed monograph) (RUSI), London, April 2007 (forthcoming).

• Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre, October, 2001, “Negotiations During Peace Support Operations,” Volume 8, Number 2 (www.army.dnd.ca/allc).


1. When CIMIC officers are called on to facilitate a community support project, they must

ensure that all ___________ are consulted. a. Local contractors; b. Stakeholders; c. Community leaders; d. Humanitarian organizations.

2. The guidelines that CIMIC officers should follow when called upon to facilitate a meeting

include: a. Fair process; b. Cooperation; c. Coordination; d. Information management.

3. A facilitator’s skill lies in:

a. Steering the meeting towards the outcome the strongest party desires; b. Steering the meeting towards the outcome the weakest party desires; c. Steering the meeting towards a constructive outcome; d. Steering the meeting towards the outcome the UN desires.

4. The key to dealing with a problem within the meeting is to:

a. Ask the problematic person to leave the meeting; b. Change the dynamics of the meeting, e.g. by calling for a break; c. Move the meeting to another venue; d. End the meeting.

5. Negotiation is:

a. Communication with the aim of reaching an agreement; b. Not giving in to unreasonable demands; c. Talking with others in order to make compromises; d. Continuing the struggle by other means.



6. Mediation is: a. Intervention by the UN into a dispute; b. Negotiation with more than three people; c. Intervention by a neutral third party to a dispute; d. Intervention by a neutral force.

7. Successful negotiation starts with:

a. Good debating techniques; b. Understanding the mandate and role of the peace operation; c. Anticipating the approach of the other party; d. Getting the other party to reveal their bottom-line.

8. Which of the following factors are not likely to have a major influence on the outcomes of a

negotiation? a. Understanding the demands of the parties; b. Understanding the interests of the parties; c. Understanding the cultural and historical context of the conflict; d. Understanding the relationships of the parties.

9. Basic communication techniques include:

a. Talking actively; b. Emphatic listening; c. Brainstorming; d. Caucusing.

10. The skill in facilitating a community meeting lies in:

a. Keeping to the time; b. Keeping to the agenda; c. Generating community participation; d. Limiting the number of participants.

ANSWERS: 1b, 2a, 3c, 4b, 5a, 6c, 7b, 8a, 9b, 10c

LESSON 7

INTERPRETERS AND MEDIA RELATIONS

7.1 Cultural Awareness

7.2 Working with Interpreters

7.3 Media Relations

7.4 Interview Guidelines

Lesson 7 / Interpreters and Media Relations 136

LESSON OBJECTIVES


• Discuss the importance of cultural awareness and the role of a cultural framework in an operation;

• Provide specific tools and techniques on how to communicate and conduct a negotiation through an interpreter in another language; and

• Explain the role of the public information component in UN peace operations, as well as the role that the CIMIC officer can play in support of the mission’s public information units.

INTRODUCTION

Due to the multi-national nature of peace operations, many CIMIC officers are not able to communicate with the local people of the host country in their own language. The United Nations typically employs local people as language assistants to help CIMIC officers with translation and interpretation. This lesson provides some guidance on how to work with interpreters and how to make use of an interpreter in a negotiation.

Media relations affect communication with the host community. The people of the country within which the peace operation takes place need to be informed about the peace process and about the mandate and role of the peacekeepers.

Most recent peace operations include a public information component that is responsible for both liaison with the international and local media, and for managing the public information campaign directed towards the host community. The kind of work that emanates from the CIMIC branch is likely to attract positive media attention. The CIMIC officer should work closely with military and civilian public information units to ensure that their activities are communicated to the host population and to local and international media.

Media coverage of a tragedy is able to increase the attention the crisis receives from donors, UN agencies, NGOs and international and regional bodies. The media is also an important partner for peace operations, and constructive media coverage can complement and support a fragile peace process.




7.1 Cultural Awareness

Culture is acquired through the process of socialization. We learn relative values and appropriate behaviours from our community members. One level of culture deals with obvious or observable aspects – clothing, language, food and so on.

There is another level, which we cannot always see, and which includes our shared ideas, beliefs and values. These usually become apparent when people from different social systems interact.

Our modern world is increasingly multi-cultural. Individuals do not embody a single culture but have often been influenced and formed by multiple cultures. Underlying group identity also has a strong impact on the way we experience culture – age, gender, class, profession and religion all affect who we are as human beings. Culture colours everything we see or do. It is impossible to leave our cultural lenses behind during our interactions. Our perspective and experience are filters through which we interpret events.

Making Judgements

Human beings frequently make generalizations about, and attribute characteristics to, people. We create stereotypes. When we do this with cultural groups, there is a danger of developing negative stereotypes, which leads to prejudice.

Cultural Framework

Everyone involved in a peace operation – from those planning the mission, to the military and civilian peacekeepers deployed to carry it out, to the local population in whose territory it is carried out – is part of a cultural framework. This framework provides the context within which the actors’ belief and actions are constructed, expressed, interpreted and understood.

A South African peacekeeping soldier with locals in Bujumbura, Burundi. Cross-cultural interaction between peacekeepers and the locals should be expected on missions. (Source: UN Photo #NICA19271, Eskinder Debebe)


A cycle of prejudice begins when we start judging other cultures by our own set of standards to define the world around us. Lack of knowledge, or unwillingness to learn, can result in an unintentional conflict or misunderstanding. The prejudices are often based on imperfect information and are normally filtered through an individual’s background and experience. The only way to break this cycle is to be aware of cultural differences and try to understand their origins.

When working in an environment as culturally diverse as peacekeeping, we have to carefully question our own cultural expectations to avoid stereotyping or forming prejudices against other groups.

Communication

Language is culturally specific. Any language contains cultural undertones. You may not be aware of a specific meaning or always understand an example or idiom that another person uses. In such cases, it is always advisable to ask the person to repeat him or herself, or express him/herself in a different way. Idiomatic language should be avoided as much as possible when you communicate with someone from another culture.

Humour can be good, but be aware that humour does not easily cross cultural boundaries. What is considered humorous in one culture can easily cause offence in another.

Body language, or non-verbal communication, is very important, as it conveys many things that you do not say. Different gestures have different meanings in different cultures. However, a smile will never be misunderstood. A polite handshake between people from the same sex is accepted in most cultures.

Negotiating in Another Language

Our languages are extensions of our cultures. It requires great cultural sensitivity and knowledge of both culture and language to be able to correctly translate not only the words but also the content, emotion and meaning of the words when interpreting a conversation between two people with different languages and cultures.

Sender

Idea Transmit message Channel

Possible ‘noise’

Own idea

Receiver

Receive message


Most interpreters in peace operations are not professionally trained as interpreters. They are people with some knowledge of the mission language (which in most cases is English) and the local languages and have been hired by the UN as language assistants. Very few language assistants will have received any formal training in interpretation. This does not mean that they are not dedicated to their role, just that they are not professionally trained interpreters.

It is thus quite possible that much of what you are saying to the other party is not being conveyed and understood in the same way that you said it or meant it. Much of what you understand about what is being said by the other party may also not be very accurate.

Assume, therefore, that there may be a lot of misunderstanding and misinterpretation. If something sounds out of context or does not make sense, double-check it for accuracy by paraphrasing or repetition. Remember to allocate twice the expected amount of time when conducting a meeting, negotiation or mediation with interpretation.

7.2 Working with Interpreters

To avoid miscommunication, you should make the work of the interpreter as easy as possible by:

1. Using short sentences and encouraging others to do the same;

2. Not using technical terms and abbreviations (where this is unavoidable, discuss the terms with the interpreter beforehand so that they can look them up in a dictionary and prepare an appropriate word or phrase in the local language);

3. Not using culturally specific idioms; and 4. Not using jokes/humour. (Humour does not translate well.)

Negotiating with an Interpreter

It is unlikely that the language assistant assigned to your section will have received any formal training as an interpreter. It will thus be helpful to tell the interpreter what you want them to say, and how you want them to act.

Do not show disrespect towards the local country, religion, people, leaders, culture, or food in front of your interpreter. Also, do not show disrespect to any of the parties in the conflict situation in front of your interpreter. Think of the interpreters and other local staff as your

Brief the Interpreter on How You Want to Have Things Done

• Short sentences; • Physical position of the interpreter; • Look at the other party, not the

interpreter; • Interpret word-for-word what is

said; • Do not analyse – the interpreter

may explain the culture or context where necessary to you, in addition to interpretation; and

• Confidentiality issues.

Issues to Consider

• Language reflects culture; • Expect misunderstandings; • Position of the interpreter in

society (at home); and • Dangers for the interpreter.


ambassadors to the local community. Interpreters are normally influential in their communities because they are educated. Interpreters and other local staff stay within their own communities; one can thus expect that they will be asked about their experience of working with the UN, AU or REC peace operation by family and friends. One should also take this into account in terms of their personal safety and not expose them to situations that may result in reprisals against the interpreter.

Practical Steps

Brief the interpreters on the physical position you want them to take, for example, half a foot behind you, on your right hand side when standing, talking or sitting down. You may have occasion when your partner is of the Muslim faith, where position of the hands and feet often have a meaning of their own. It should become a consistent practice to work out the seating and standing plans in advance. To keep confusion down, make it a standard practice to always sit or stand with your interpreter immediately behind you, and slightly to your right, as if you were placing him in your right rear pocket.

There are several reasons for this positioning.

1. If you have worked out hand signals with your interpreter in advance, you will not be seen touching your interpreter with an inappropriate hand during the negotiation.

2. By having your interpreter slightly off your right shoulder, it will force your partner to maintain eye contact with you. Your interpreter is a tool and should not be given more importance than that. Allowing your partner to maintain eye contact solely with the interpreter de-emphasizes your importance as the lead negotiator.

Look at the person you are speaking to, not the interpreter, and keep eye contact or show

that you are focused on the other person in whatever way may be culturally appropriate under the circumstances when the other person is talking, even if you do not understand the actual words.

Brief the interpreter to repeat verbatim what is being said, not to give a summary or evaluation. Brief the interpreter not to analyse, clean up, value-judge or edit what is being said. What the interpreters can do is to explain the culture or context, where necessary. They should make a clear distinction between the interpretation and the contextualization.

In addition, it is most beneficial to the outcome of the meeting or negotiation if you take a note-taker with you. A note-taker would usually be someone from your unit that you work with on a daily basis and who is subordinate to you in rank. The purpose of the note-taker is to record the points of agreement and disagreement during the meeting or negotiation.

However, he has other functions as well. He can be your timekeeper. If you have set time parameters for this meeting or negotiation, he can update you on the progress. The note-taker can also observe the meeting room and report later on the physical presence of others in the room.

The placement of the note-taker should be to your left, and slightly behind your left shoulder, as if you were placing him in your left rear pocket. This position establishes him as


subordinate to you but also places him in a position that he can lean forward and whisper into your ear, or pass you notes, without making a great show of doing so.

At the conclusion of the meeting or negotiation, you can use the note-taker to read back the points of agreement only. You do not want to get bogged down rehashing the points of disagreement. If possible, always attempt to get your partner to initial the points of agreement as a record for future meetings.

What You Should Expect of Interpreters

You should expect your interpreter to:

• Translate your message word for word; • Use the same tone and inflection you use; • Speak in the first person; • Present a professional appearance (well groomed); • Speak for approximately the same length of time as you; • Understand and translate military jargon; and • Be prepared and know the general subjects/topics.

Ensure the interpreter will be on time and at the right location. Rehearse them, make

them part of your team, invest your time in them, and know his/her religion, background, and history of hostilities.

The interpreter will practice with you to think before you speak and group your words in short bursts and to see that you speak succinctly and simply. It may take extra time to get your message across. Make sure you plan for it.

Be aware that interpreters get tired, so plan periodic breaks. If the meeting will be lengthy, take more than one interpreter, and rotate them every 20 minutes or so. The placement of the reserve interpreter will be just behind the first interpreter, or behind your note-taker, in case he needs the use of an interpreter.

Also, remember to maintain eye-to-eye contact. Look at your counterpart, not at the interpreter or off in space. Act normally and speak as if the interpreter is not there. Your interpreter should work with you

With the help of an interpreter, Mrs. Nane Annan, wife of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, talks with one of the mothers at a child feeding centre in Zinder, Niger. August 2005. (Source: UN Photo #85803, Evan Schneider)


to establish leader/interpreter signals (e.g. a tap on arm to stop talking). Constantly rehearse and interact with your interpreter, and make sure your commander and fellow staff officers are familiar with how to work with interpreters.

Choose your interpreter for the specific occasion. Do not use a woman when it is likely the presence of a woman might not be appreciated by your partner. Do not use a much younger person when your partner is older and holds a respected rank in the community, tribe or sect. Try not to use an interpreter from a community, tribe or sect that your partner may find offensive. Try to be culturally aware at all times.

For a comprehensive review of how to effectively communicate with a translator, reference the U.S. Centre for Army Lessons Learned “CALL” article at http://call.army.mil/products/NFTF/novdec03/Interpreter/how-to.htm.

7.3 Media Relations

The Role of the Media in Peace Operations

We have all heard of the so-called CNN factor, that is, how the political will to intervene in a conflict is amplified by international media attention, or how media coverage of a tragedy is able to increase the attention such a crisis receives from donors, UN Agencies, NGOs and internal and regional bodies. The media can play a significant role in conflict situations. Their reporting can generate international attention that may result in increased political will to support the peace process and may result in an increase in the flow of humanitarian and development assistance. Within a country recovering from conflict, the media can also play an important role in keeping the public informed of progress and setbacks in the peace process.

Unfortunately, the news media has a very short attention span and a preference for dramatic stories. They are present in large numbers when there are battle scenes, significant numbers of deaths and dramatic human suffering, but their interest wanes considerably once the situation has been stabilized. Peacekeepers always complain that the media is not interested enough in “good news” stories.

It is thus important for the peace operation to keep the international and local media’s attention focused on the peace process and to generate information that will be useful to the media.

The UN and the Press

"The United Nations is committed to being open and transparent in its dealings with the press. However, we must sometimes keep confidences – not to mislead or conceal, but to protect a diplomatic process. Our media policy must, therefore, balance the need to be open and the need to respect confidentiality.

Former Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, 28 April 1999


The Public Information Component in the UN Peace Operations

The UN has established a public information department at its secretariat in New York to deal with the media and to generate information to inform various constituencies about the work of the United Nations. Each multidimensional UN peace operation will also have a public information office that will be responsible for handling media relations with both foreign and local media.

The public information office will develop and manage the mission’s communications strategy, assist the foreign and local media, and ensure that the local population is informed about the mandate and the peace process. The public information office may operate its own radio station or broadcast on local stations, produce video material for television, and publish information brochures, posters and pamphlets, all in a number of local languages. In some missions, the peace operation has made use of theatre groups to explain the DDRR process through comedy sketches using local storytelling techniques and traditions. The public information office employs local staff (usually journalists) who have good knowledge and understanding of local customs and traditions.

Objectives of Public Information

1. Ensure the peace operation’s mandate and responsibilities are fully and widely understood;

2. Promote all aspects of the work of the peace operation to the national and international community;

3. Implement a communications strategy that actively supports the peace operation’s objective;

4. Advance the peace process through the creation of timely and relevant information products;

5. Defend and protect the peace operation from unjustified criticism and misinformation; and

6. Counter propaganda, false information and hate messages that are harmful to the objectives of the peace operation and peace process.

MONUC public information officer hands out MONUC magazines as part of an outreach campaign in Butembo, DRC. November 2004. (Source: MONUC Photo/Daniel Wangisha)


In most cases, the peacekeeping force also has a military public information unit, with a military spokesman and military public information officers attached to sectors and contingents. If so, there needs to be a close working relationship between the civilian and military public information units to ensure that the operations have a coherent communications strategy.

The Role of CIMIC in Support of Public Information

CIMIC operations, especially those that are aimed at supporting and assisting local communities – such as rebuilding a school or a bridge – could be of media interest. CIMIC officers should keep the public information unit informed of any activities that may be newsworthy.

Because of the nature of CIMIC work, CIMIC officers should anticipate that there might be journalists present whenever they are engaged in meetings with community leaders, CIMIC operations or liaising with their civilian counterparts in the humanitarian and development community. CIMIC officers should thus get used to the idea of doing their jobs with the media watching. In fact, CIMIC officers are likely to have more contact with journalists than the average soldier, and they should thus prepare themselves to manage media relations.

This means they must be careful to project the right image at all times. Positive behaviour reinforces the ability of the peace operation to help to move the peace process forward, and it creates bonds of trust with the local population. Negative behaviour undermines the reputation of the peace operations and its parent body, thus weakening the peace process. Parties to the conflict can exploit negative behaviour and use it to delay the peace process.

Although media coverage is important, CIMIC operations should not be undertaken solely for the purpose of generating media coverage. CIMIC operations should always be undertaken to serve the mandate and objectives of the mission. CIMIC operations undertaken in support of humanitarian agencies should always be carried out according to humanitarian principles.

7.4 Interview Guidelines

CIMIC officers are a likely source of information for the media, and they should keep the following interview guidelines in mind whenever they talk to the media. In UN operations, take note that the UN Secretary-General encourages transparency and openness with the media. This means that CIMIC officers, and all peacekeepers for that matter, may talk to the media about their own work or area of responsibility in a factual manner.

Nobody is obliged to speak to reporters if they do not want to. Peacekeepers may decline, politely, if they wish. However, in UN operations, they should understand that they are authorized to speak within the limited area of their work and personal responsibility. Past experience shows that peace operation troops who talk to the media about their work can be very effective in conveying positive messages. If you are in an AU or REC peace operation, you should seek guidance on the policy of the mission on media relations.


When talking about their work, CIMIC officers should convey a sense of pride in what they do. They should be positive about their role in the peace process. They should always be factual and impartial in the way they convey information. CIMIC officers should talk respectfully about the local population.

Interview Technique

The basic rules for handling an interview are few and simple.

• The camera or the reporter should not intimidate you. If you are speaking to a reporter, look directly at the person interviewing you, not the camera.

• To avoid making mistakes or losing face with a wrong answer, listen carefully to each question. If necessary, ask the reporter to repeat themselves, and take the time to compose your response.

• Speak naturally and focus on the facts, avoiding exaggerated movements with hands and face.

• Decline to answer questions you are not authorized to, or you may not be sure of. • If you say “No comment,” the reporter and the public will have the impression that you

are trying to hide something. It is much better to answer “I don’t know” or to refer the question to someone who may know more about the issue.

• Answering with only “yes” or “no” can give the same impression. Use small sentences. For example, answer the question “Do you like your work?” with “Yes, I enjoy my work with the UN,” or a similar short and clear answer.

• The expression “off the record” may suggest that what you say is only for the reporter and will not be published or transmitted. However, this is professional terminology and it applies basically to professionals of the media. If you say something of interest, the reporter may decline to use it. If you are unsure whether you can say something, then it is better not to say.

UNMIS Spokesperson Radhia Achouri being interviewed. April 2005. (Source: UNMIS Photo/John Charles)


As a peacekeeper on a mission, remember that you represent the peace operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Your behaviour and anything you say may be perceived as the opinion of the peace operation. Thus, take care to provide information as authorized, and do not give your opinion on matters that you are not directly responsible for.

Because of the technology utilized by the international media, an interview with you or news coverage of an event you are involved in may be broadcasted to millions of viewers across the world before your own immediate superiors receive information about it. In emergency situations, be mindful of your regulations not to divulge information about people who have been injured or have died before their next of kin has been informed.

Media Do's

• Speak to the media about your work. Don’t try to give information about something you are not directly responsible for.

• Plan beforehand what you will say to the media. Focus on three or less key messages that you want to convey.

• Always use the facts. They cannot be refuted. • Refer reporters to the public information unit if they ask you any questions

that you are unable or unauthorised to answer. • Always be polite with the media, even if they appear rude or unfriendly.

They may be under pressure to get the news. You should always keep your professionalism and maintain a calm and polite attitude.

• Be brief and precise. If your answers are too long or unclear, the message you want to convey will be lost.

Media Don'ts

• Don’t offer you personal opinion about the peace process or about the peace operation.

• Don’t answer questions that are speculative, such as “What will happen if…?” Speculations are just that.

• Don’t give any information about the operation’s security plans or procedures, and don’t give any information on incidents that are under investigation or that will require an investigation, such as a car accident.

• Don’t give names of persons who have been injured or have died until their next of kin has been informed.

• Don’t appear to support or favour one side over the other; remember at all times that you are impartial.


Press Release Guidelines

Under normal circumstances, the military or civilian public information units will be responsible for specific media actions, such as press releases. In some cases, however, you may be on your own. In the event that you need to prepare a press release, here are some basic guidelines:

• When structuring a press release, make sure you have an angle that is likely to be of interest to the media.

• Step into their shoes and ask yourself what would be interesting from their perspective. • Come up with a short and clear title that is descriptive of the event and the angle from

their perspective. • Present the key information in the first paragraph and then follow up with the rest of the

information. • Finish with contact details and the date. • A press release should rarely be more than one page. • Background information can be attached or provided in a briefing pack, if necessary. • Keep in mind that the people who will read the information you have provided do not

work with these issues on a daily basis. Thus, don’t assume that people will know what you are talking about. Explain everything in everyday language. Don’t use abbreviations and acronyms; if you have to, write it out in full the first time you do. Don’t use technical or professional terminology like “vulnerable populations.”

Case Studies

Here is an example of a poorly composed press release:

KENBAT CIMIC Patrols: During September KENBAT will undertake a number of CIMIC Patrols in the north-eastern sector of their AO. The patrols will make an initial CIMIC assessment of the beneficiary population with a view to developing a comprehensive CIMIC campaign plan in support of Operation X-ray. This operation will commence after the rainy season.

Here is an example of a better version of the same information:

‘UN Peace Operation Prepare’ to assist Kalimu Province over the next few weeks: Starting on 10 September, people in the Kalimu Province can expect to meet members of the Kenyan Battalion (KENBAT) on patrol. They will be visiting most villages in the province to make an assessment of the living conditions and needs of the community. KENBAT has been working closely with the UN agencies and NGOs in the province to prepare their support and assistance to the local communities when the rainy season comes to an end. For more information, contact Major Simba Hambari, KENBAT Headquarters, Kalimu: Tel/Fax/Mobile.


1. Culture cannot be right or wrong; however, we often tend to create stereotypes. Which of the

following are ways in which we tend to create stereotypes? a. We judge other cultures by our own set of standards; b. We respect cultural differences; c. We recognize that different cultures have different values; d. We make an effort to learn more about the cultures of the host country where a peace

operation is deployed. 2. When negotiating with someone who uses a different language from your own, it is

important to understand which part of your own language is _________, and thus difficult to translate into another language.

a. Easily understandable; b. Common to all cultures; c. Respectful in all cultures; d. Culturally specific.

3. Which of the following things would you not brief an interpreter on?

a. Physical position you want the interpreter to be in; b. The need to use short sentences; c. The need to interpret word-for-word what is being said; d. Confidential information available to the UN.

4. The media plays a(n):

a. Small role in conflict situations; b. Significant role in conflict situations; c. Insignificant role in conflict situations; d. Neutral role in conflict situations.

5. Community operations are aimed at:

a. Achieving force protection; b. Generating good publicity for the UN; c. Supporting local communities; d. Winning the support of local politicians.



6. Which of the following would not be a good media interview technique? a. Trying to intimidate the journalist; b. Speaking naturally and honestly; c. Focusing on facts; d. Behaving in a friendly and respectful manner.

7. Do not _________ during interviews.

a. Be friendly; b. Give facts; c. Offer personal opinions on the peace process; d. Speak about your own work and responsibilities.

8. Press releases should be:

a. Clear and descriptive; b. Long and detailed; c. Short, to the point, and contain information on many different items of interest; d. Unsigned, so that the journalist cannot trace its origin.

9. Which of the following is good advice for a press release?

a. Use as few acronyms as possible, and explain all acronyms used; b. Use as many acronyms as possible, so that the press release does not become too long; c. Use lots of technical language so that the journalists can be impressed with your

professional knowledge; d. Give as much information as possible in the press release.

10. The UN mission’s public information office is responsible for:

a. Generating messages that can be used for psychological warfare; b. Generating disinformation; c. Generating the mission’s communication strategy; d. Generating news on the destabilizing actions of the rebel forces.

ANSWERS: 1a, 2d, 3d, 4b, 5c, 6a, 7c, 8a, 9a, 10c

Appendix A / List of Acronyms 150

APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym Meaning AAR After Action Review ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes ACDS African Chiefs of Defence Staff AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia AO Area of Operation AOR Area of Responsibility ASF African Standby Force AU African Union CA Civil Affairs CAP Consolidated Appeals Process CC CIMIC Centre CCA Common Country Assessment CCC CIMIC Coordination Centre CHAP Common Humanitarian Action Plan CIG Civil Information Grid CIM Civil Information Management CIMIC Civil-Military Coordination CMA Civil-Military Affairs CMCoord UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination CMO Civil-Military Operations CMOC Civil-Military Operation Centre CMR Civil-Military Relations COMPOL Commissioner of Police COP Common Operating Picture DACO Development Assistance Coordination Office DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DOA Director of Administration DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations D-Sitrep Daily Situation Report


Acronym Meaning DSRSG Deputy SRSG EC European Commission ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EU European Union FAO Food and Agricultural Organization FC Force Commander FHQ Force Headquarters HC Humanitarian Coordinator HIC Humanitarian Information Centre HOC Humanitarian Operations Centre HoS Head of Sector IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development IMIP Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan IMPP Integrated Mission Planning Process IMTF Integrated Mission Task Force IOM International Organization for Migration IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield IPTF Integrated Planning Task Force JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Cells LO Liaison Officer MAC Mission Analysis Cell MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets MILOBS Military Observers MNF Multi-National Force MOC Mission Operations Centre MOU Memorandum of Understanding MPEC Mission Planning and Evaluation Cell NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization OAU Organization of African Unity


Acronym Meaning OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PAC Project Approval Committee PCF Planning Consultation Forum PLANELM AU Planning Element PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSC Peace and Security Council PSO Peace Support Operation QIPs Quick Impact Projects RC Resident Coordinator RECs Regional Economic Communities RFTF Results Focused Transitional Framework RIMCO Implementation and Monitoring Committee RR Resident Representative RWO RFTF Technical Working Committees SADC Southern African Development Community SHQ Sector Headquarters SOPs Standard Operating Procedures SRCC Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General SSR Security Sector Reform T/PPCs Troop/Police Contributing Countries UNCT UN Country Team UNDAF UN Development Assistance Framework UNDG UN Development Group UNDP UN Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNFSCO UN Field Security Coordinator UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIFEM UN Fund for Women UNJLC UN Joint Logistical Centre UNPOL UN Police WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization

Appendix B / List of UN Peacekeeping Operations 153

APPENDIX B: LIST OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

BINUB* United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi DOMREP Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic MINURCAT* United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad MINURSO* United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH* United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti MIPONUH United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola MONUC* United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador UNAMA* United Nations Mission in Afghanistan UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia UNAMID* African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNASOG United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation UNDOF* United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNEF United Nations Emergency Force UNFICYP* United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan UNIFIL* United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIIMOG United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission UNIOSIL* United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone UNIPOM United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission UNMEE* United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti UNMIK* United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMIL* United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMIS* United Nations Mission in the Sudan UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor UNMIT* United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste UNMOGIP* United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

Appendix B / List of UN Peacekeeping Operations 154

UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan UNOCI* United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UNOGIL United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon UNOMIG* United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force UNPSG United Nations Civilian Police Support Group UNSF United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti UNTSO* United Nations Truce Supervision Organization UNYOM United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

* Ongoing operations, as of December 2007.

For more information on these operations, visit UN DPKO’s website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.

Appendix C / Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions 155

APPENDIX C: SECRETARY-GENERAL’S NOTE OF GUIDANCE ON INTEGRATED MISSIONS

Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/

Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (9 December 2005)

1. The December 2000 Note of Guidance provided directions on the relations between Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Representatives of the Secretary-General (RSG), Resident Coordinators (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinators (HC) and, specifically, called for the RC/HC to serve as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. As peacekeeping operations have further increased in complexity and scale since that time, a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the different actors is required in order to ensure effective coordination between the mission, UN agencies1 and other external partners.

2. Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, including the national authorities and the local population, in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to assist countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The UN’s presence must therefore be based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities and a willingness by all actors to contribute toward the achievement of common objectives.

3. This updated Note of Guidance applies to all integrated missions in which the SRSG is supported by a RC and HC serving as the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG/RC/HC). Provisions relating to the presence of a non-resident SRSG or RSG, as stipulated in the 2000 Note of Guidance, remain in force. It is acknowledged that ‘integrated missions’ is an evolving concept and that further guidance will be required. This Note of Guidance will, therefore, be updated at regular intervals to reflect these and other emerging considerations.

4. Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner. This Note of Guidance is primarily intended to clarify institutional relations and to facilitate communication and coordination between the mission and the UN system already present in the country.

1 In this Note, the term “agencies” includes all UN Departments, Programmes, Funds and Specialized Agencies.


Role, responsibility and authority of the SRSG

5. The SRSG is the senior UN Representative in the country and has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations. He/She represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country. The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the UN Country Team and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach. The SRSG reports to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

6. The SRSG is supported by two Deputies, one of whom performs the function of DSRSG/RC/HC. The SRSG will devise effective coordination mechanisms among the security, political, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian and development components of the mission.

7. In devising effective coordination arrangements, the SRSG will make use of existing humanitarian and development coordination mechanisms and the expertise of the UN Country Team. The SRSG will also establish appropriate coordination mechanisms between mission-run support services and humanitarian common services.

8. In order to ensure effective coordination of respective planning processes, as well as regular reviews of the implementation of the mission’s mandate, the SRSG should establish a planning cell in the mission to engage the UN Country Team, the international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other relevant actors.

9. Those parts of the UN that need to retain a public advocacy role should ensure that such advocacy is conducted in full coordination with the SRSG and in a manner that does not undermine the mandate of the mission.

10. The SRSG will uphold humanitarian principles (as outlined in GA resolution 46/182) in the implementation of the mission’s mandate and support the creation of an effective humanitarian operating environment.

11. The SRSG will engage with the UN Country Team, through the DSRSG/RC/HC, to ensure that mission planning and operations management are compatible with long-term national development goals and that mission exit strategies clearly articulate the hand-over of ongoing activities to the UN Country Team and other relevant actors.

12. Where mission activities have a close bearing on the humanitarian or development response, such as ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns, quick impact projects or disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, the SRSG, through the DSRSG/RC/HC, will establish effective approval and coordination mechanisms to ensure maximum coherence and prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and development operations.


13. When appointed as Designated Official, the SRSG is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under Secretary-General of the Department of Safety and Security, for the security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the UN system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area. The SRSG will also ensure that the goals of the United Nations security management system are met, that a Security Management Team has been constituted and that the DSRSG/RC/HC is appointed as the Deputy Designated Official.

14. While recognizing that UN agencies are responsible for the implementation of their mandated activities, the SRSG may request a given agency to re-orient its planned interventions in line with the broad strategic objectives of the mission, subject to the agency’s mandate and available resources.

15. The SRSG will ensure that optimal use is made of existing capacities in the implementation of the different elements of the mission’s mandate. Where such elements are best implemented through the combined capacities of the UNCT and the mission, the SRSG will provide overall guidance and encourage the design and implementation of joint programmes and operational partnerships between UN agencies and the mission. Where several agencies could conceivably implement a given programming component, the selection of the appropriate agencies will be made through existing coordination mechanisms, on the basis of their comparative advantage.

16. Human Rights are a cross-cutting concern for both the mission and the UN Country Team and they need to be fully integrated into peace operations2. The SRSG will uphold human rights law in the implementation of the mission’s mandate. All human rights functions should be co-coordinated by one component of the mission and the head of the human rights component should report to the SRSG, either directly or through one the of the two DSRSGs, as appropriate. A secondary reporting line to provide guidance and functional support is retained between the head of the human rights component and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. As representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the head of the human rights component should be a full member of the expanded UN Country Team. Separate public reporting by the mission and/or the High Commissioner on issues of human rights should be routine.

2 Given its overriding importance as a cross-cutting concern, the role of human rights in integrated missions was

reviewed at a special session of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee (see decision 2005/24).


Role, responsibility and authority of the DSRSG/RC/HC

17. The principal reporting line of the DSRSG/RC/HC is to the SRSG who provides direct supervision and overall strategic direction.

18. In his/her capacity as RC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of the UN Country Team and the planning and coordination of UN development operations. He/She is also responsible for donor coordination in the areas of recovery and development and will maintain links with governments, donors and other development partners for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UNDP Administrator, as the Chair of the UNDG. UNDP will continue to provide support for the RC function.

19. Similarly, in his/her capacity as HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the planning and coordination of humanitarian operations and will maintain links with governments (and other parties), donors and the broader humanitarian community for this purpose. The DSRSG/RC/HC retains a secondary reporting line to the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Where the HC is supported by an OCHA office, it will serve as the humanitarian coordination office. Where appropriate, the OCHA office may be located separately from the mission to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community.

20. These two secondary reporting lines are essential to provide guidance and functional support to the DSRSG/RC/HC but do not constitute a day-to-day supervisory relationship. In fulfilling the respective roles of RC and HC, the DSRSG/RC/HC retains existing accountabilities in accordance with prevailing Terms of Reference for these roles.

21. The DSRSG/RC/HC will inform the SRSG of all policy communications with the UNDP Administrator and the ERC respectively. The SRSG will, in turn, keep the DSRSG/RC/HC informed of all relevant substantive communications with Headquarters.

22. Whereas the SRSG has the overall authority for the coordination of UN activities, the DSRSG/RC/HC is expected to serve as the principal interface between the mission and the UN Country Team, to lead the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activities and to bring concerns raised by the UN Country Team to the attention of the SRSG. The DSRSG/RC/HC also engages with non-governmental organizations (NGOs).


Resolution of Differences

23. The SRSG will resolve any issues related to the co-ordination of different mission components represented by the two DSRSGs, in his/her capacity as their immediate supervisor. Where differences related to the role of RC and HC have not been resolved effectively, the UNDP Administrator (as Chair of UNDG) or the ERC may raise the issue with the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, in an effort to assist with the resolution.

24. All policy differences related to the interpretation of mandates should be resolved in a timely manner at field level. Should the issue involve a UN agency represented on the Country Team, the DSRSG/RC/HC is expected to assume a leading role in the mediation effort. Where disputes cannot be resolved incountry, the SRSG is required to jointly review the matter with the executive head of the agency in order to seek a formal agreement, while keeping the USG for Peacekeeping informed. In the event that good faith efforts to resolve disagreements do not produce results, the SRSG and/or the executive head of the agency concerned may approach the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

25. Where agreement cannot be reached, the matter may be referred to the Secretary-General or his Policy Committee, as appropriate.

Appendix D / DPKO Civil-Military Coordination Policy 160

APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION POLICY

September 2002

Introduction

1. The response to conflict that has resulted in military or civilian police capability being deployed as part of UN peacekeeping operations has changed considerably in the past decade. The military and civilian police are now normally part of a multidimensional response also involving, among others, political, governance, electoral, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and developmental programmes. This has resulted in far more interaction between the military, civilian police and various other civilian elements in areas not directly related to security. Examples of this type of interaction include:

a. Use of military and civilian police resources to provide, support, or complement the provision of emergency humanitarian relief, particularly in situations where life and property are immediately threatened.

b. Military and civilian police participation in development projects, in particular reconstruction and rehabilitation.

2. If properly managed, this interaction can result in effort that meets UN objectives, in particular those related to multidimensional UN peacekeeping. To facilitate this management and to enhance common understanding on this issue there is a need for DPKO policy.

Scope and Purpose

3. This document provides DPKO policy on Civil-Military1 Coordination in UN peacekeeping operations. The policy defines the term Civil-Military Coordination, outlines principles for the conduct of the coordination, describes a training system to support effective coordination, and assigns responsibilities. The coordination of military and civilian police capability in non-security related tasks, which is covered by the policy, includes that which is internal to a mission, as well as that which takes place with external actors.

4. The purpose of coordination covered by the policy is to achieve UN objectives. This is aimed at ensuring that the military and civilian police components can concentrate on their primary task of security but, where needed, can contribute in the most effective manner to non-security tasks, in particular those related to humanitarian and development activities.

1 For the purposes of DPKO policy the term “Civil-Military Coordination”, (which is widely used in organizations

and militaries external to DPKO) includes civilian police. For other elements of the UN system it can include civil defence elements.


Definition

5. For some time the term “Civil-Military Coordination” has been used by elements deployed as part of UN peacekeeping operations, in other military operations, and by the humanitarian community, among others. There are differing interpretations as to what the term means. A common theme, however, is that it refers to concepts and mechanisms to effect some level of interface between military and civilian elements deployed in the field, particularly those from the humanitarian and development community.

6. Given the nature of this interaction there is a clear need for mutual understanding of terms and concepts. The following definition is to be used in UN mandated peacekeeping operations:

UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, joint planning and exchange of information, between military2

elements and humanitarian organizations, development organizations or the civilian community to achieve UN objectives3.

Principles for Civil-Military Coordination

Complementarity and Avoidance of Duplication

7. The United Nations normally uses military or civilian police capability or authorizes military action only in situations directly related to peace and security. Civilians are normally responsible for all other tasks. Only in the most extreme situations, which are beyond civilian capacity, will military or civilian police capability be used for other tasks, for example to deliver emergency humanitarian relief or recovery/rehabilitation assistance. Prior to requesting military assistance in humanitarian tasks, humanitarian agencies will generally follow the principles that:

a. the capability required must be unique,

b. that it cannot be provided in a timely manner by civilians, and

c. that use of military and civilian police is a last resort.

8. The military and civilian police components of UN peacekeeping operations are structured and resourced by the UN in accordance with Security Council Mandates. For these components, tasks are normally directly related to security, either observation and reporting the situation, or actually providing security. This said, military and civilian police contingents may possess the capacity to assist in non-security related areas. In some Member States, military doctrine advocates targeted use of this capacity for a number of reasons, including recovery/rehabilitation tasks motivated towards building trust and, ultimately, assisting in protection of the contingent. If left uncoordinated, this type of activity can be wasteful and

2 Includes civilian police and civil defence 3 In this instance “UN objectives” are those related to peace and security, humanitarian assistance and

reconstruction and rehabilitation aspects of development.


possibly detrimental to longer-term programmes. It should fit the existing humanitarian and recovery/rehabilitation strategy that maybe formulated by the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), often through a Consolidated Interagency Appeal as part of the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

Civilian Task - Civilian Led Coordination – Normal Command and Control

9. If military and civilian police capability is used in tasks not directly related to security, civilian authorities must coordinate all effort. Humanitarian agencies assume that control of humanitarian activity will remain with the humanitarian community. This is also DPKO policy.

10. Coordination does not imply any status in terms of command. Military and civilian police assets serving with UN peacekeeping operations will remain under their established command and control status. This is also true of civilian elements in the mission area.

Mutual Understanding

11. UN agencies and programmes have agreed on certain key principles for the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance. These are humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. This can cause conflict with UN peacekeeping missions, particularly where tasks are mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition, the humanitarian community defines impartiality in a different manner to that used by DPKO in the conduct of peace operations4. Despite this, military and civilian police elements deployed by the United Nations will avoid compromising the operations of the humanitarian community that are undertaken using these humanitarian principles.

12. On the other hand, DPKO expects that UN RC/HC will coordinate activities with the Civil-Military Coordination system of the UN peacekeeping mission. UN agencies and programmes operating in areas where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed should also coordinate their activities with the peacekeeping mission.

Coordination at the Highest Possible Level

13. To ensure all issues are given adequate attention and to facilitate timely direction, coordination should take place at the highest possible level. Responsibility for overall mission coordination rests with the Head of Mission. If a mission is divided into geographic sectors, the UN official appointed to take charge of a sector is responsible for coordination within the area assigned. Civil-Military Coordination follows this principle. It should not be relegated to one of the components. Civil-Military Coordination can involve interaction with elements internal and external to the mission, e.g. parts of a mission humanitarian pillar and external actors such as NGOs. As a result, at both the Mission and Sector HQ level, staff allocated to Civil-Military Coordination should be placed organisationally inside the staff element tasked with wider

4 The humanitarian community regards impartiality to mean: To make no discrimination as to nationality, race,

religious beliefs, class or political opinions: to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress. For DPKO impartiality refers to the impartial execution of the Mandate.


coordination issues. The exact structure, as well as military and civilian police representation within it, will vary depending on mission circumstances. Given that coordination of humanitarian activity is under civilian lead, in some cases, particularly at mission HQ level, an integrated civil-military staff will be dedicated to the issue.

14. The concept outlined in paragraph 13 does not prevent mission components possessing staff capacity that is dedicated to the civil-military interface, e.g. liaison officers and information centres. Nor does it prevent the military and civilian police components from undertaking tasks. The key issue, however, is that overall effort should be coordinated to meet UN objectives.

Resources and Reporting

15. Coordination does not imply any change in ownership of resources or availability of UN peacekeeping mission funding. In many instances peacekeeping mission budgets will not cover use of resources in support of activities that are not included as specific tasks in the mission Mandate. In particular, military and civilian police contingents are structured, and Member States are reimbursed by the UN, based on the operational requirement for the tasks they will perform as part of the Mandate. In addition, military and civilian police personnel are often provided by Member States for very specific tasks, normally only directly related to peace and security.

16. If the mission budget does not cover a task, funding must normally be provided by external sources, such as a troop or civilian police contingent parent Member State. There is some scope for the UN official charged with mission finance management, normally the Chief Administrative Officer, to reallocate funding in accordance with UN Financial Rules and Regulations. As with other issues, the Head of Mission may also provide written direction to the Chief Administrative Officer.

17. If funding for humanitarian assistance and development related activity is included in the mission budget, DPKO and the Mission HQ will coordinate funding issues closely with the relevant UN authorities to ensure there is no duplication or waste. This includes coordination with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and those UN officials responsible for field level coordination of humanitarian and development activity.

18. For these reasons, and a need for proper coordination within a mission, the Mission HQ must approve use of military or civilian police capability for non-mandated tasks. In addition, use of military and civilian police capability in non-security related tasks must be coordinated through the mission Civil-Military Coordination structure. In some cases the Mission HQ will need to seek approval of troop and police contributing countries through DPKO. As financial resources may be involved, the UN official responsible for mission financial management, normally the Chief Administrative Officer, will also be closely consulted.

19. The only exception to the requirement for prior approval of the type of activity covered by this policy is provision of immediate assistance in extreme situations to prevent loss of life,


serious injury or loss of property. In these cases all assistance must be reported to the Mission HQ as soon as possible.

Training

20. The focal point for Civil-Military Coordination doctrine and training within the UN humanitarian community is the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) within the UN Secretariat’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)5. The training requirement for UN peacekeeping operations, both in terms of content and who will be trained, will be determined by DPKO. The responsible unit within DPKO for military and civilian police training issues is the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the Military Division. The focal point for policy and doctrine is the Office of the Military Adviser. These three areas maintain close contact.

21. Civil-Military Coordination training is delivered through a mix of direct training by the UN and by Member States, normally using UN training packages. MCDU coordinates the actual delivery of senior level Civil-Military Coordination training. At the lowest level it is delivered by Member States using a Standardised Generic Training Module. For peacekeeping operations it is delivered at four levels:

a. On Call Mission HQ Civil-Military Coordination Staff. Subject to availability of training spaces, civilian, military and civilian police Civil-Military Coordination staff officers placed on the Mission HQ On Call List will complete the OCHA conducted Civil-Military Coordination Basic and Staff Officer Courses, preferably on joining the List, but certainly prior to deployment. This training will be funded by normal UN staff development funds or funds available for rapid deployment.

b. Civilian Civil-Military Coordination Staff Officers. Subject to availability of training spaces, civilian staff to be deployed to established field missions as Civil-Military Coordination staff officers will complete the OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Basic and Staff Officer Courses prior to taking up their posts. Funding for this training will be provided by normal UN staff development funds or mission budgets.

c. Mission and Sector HQ Military and Civilian Police Civil-Military Coordination Staff Officers. These will be military and civilian police officers provided by Member States to established peacekeeping missions in the same manner as other military staff officers. Subject to availability of training spaces, prior to deployment they will complete an OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Basic Course. Again, subject to availability of training spaces and if they are identified in sufficient time, they will also complete the OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Staff Officer Course. Funding for this training will be provided by mission budgets.

5 MCDU also acts as the focal point within the UN humanitarian community for Civil-Military Coordination policy

and for advocacy regarding the relationship in a wider sense as it relates to humanitarian operations.


d. Unit Level Civil-Military Coordination Staff Officers. Formed unit level Civil-Military Coordination staff officers will complete nationally conducted Standardized Generic Training Modules on Civil-Military Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance immediately prior to deployment. These modules, which are developed by DPKO with advice from MCDU OCHA, are available from TES within the Military Division of DPKO.

Responsibility for DPKO Policy

22. Overall responsibility for DPKO Policy on Civil-Military Coordination rests with the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Responsibility for drafting and maintaining the policy rests with the Military Division, which will consult fully with various other DPKO offices, including the Civilian Police Division.

Appendix E / Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys 166

APPENDIX E: USE OF MILITARY OR ARMED ESCORTS FOR HUMANITARIAN CONVOYS

Final 14 September 2001

Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines

Introductory note: OCHA was requested by the Deputy Secretary-General’s Task Force on security policy to prepare draft guidelines on the use of military and armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. The following text was elaborated in collaboration with IASC member bodies, UNSECOORD, DPKO, academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations. They were approved for implementation by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group meeting of May 2001. The text as approved by the IASC Working Group was then submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs for review, after which a number of additional modifications were made. Part I reviews the broader policy context. It concludes that, due to changes in the nature of conflict and in the nature of humanitarian assistance, military or armed escorts are, in a limited number of cases, necessary. In these cases, they should be used sparingly, and only in accordance with clear guidelines. Part II consists of two sets of non-binding guidelines: one on when escorts might be used, the other on how they might be used.

Part I Introduction: Efforts to sustain humanitarian operations in an environment characterized by the erosion of humanitarian space One important assumption of humanitarian operations in war has been that military forces have more to gain by focussing their efforts on military targets than they do by focussing on non-military ones.1 Parties to many conflicts have been willing to accept humanitarian operations in the belief that such operations do not represent a significant obstacle to the achievement of their own military goals and that humanitarian organizations are not a party to the conflict. International humanitarian law has sought to build on this distinction between the military domain and the non-military domain, seeking to create what is now sometimes referred to as ‘humanitarian space’.2 In seeking to consolidate this humanitarian space, the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys has generally not been appropriate. 1 Claude Bruderlein, Towards a New Strategic Approach to Humanitarian Protection and the Use of Protected

Areas, 2. New York and Geneva: United Nations (OCHA), 2000. 2 Ibid, citing Jean Pictet, Development and principles of international humanitarian law. Geneva, Henry Dunant

Institute, 1985.


The distinction between military targets and non-military targets, however, has often been problematic. Military and political leaders have frequently seen the entire population of the adverse party as the enemy, and as an appropriate object of military operations. The suffering of ‘enemy’ populations is not, in these cases, an incidental consequence of military operations, it is often the object of those operations.3 Even when there has not been a deliberate attempt to target civilians, civilians have increasingly been the victims of ‘area weapons’, including the aerial bombardment of populated areas. By the time of World War II, the distinction between combatants and civilians was seriously strained.4 Thus, despite the expansion and further codification of international humanitarian law and the laws of war, the number of civilians killed as a percentage of total mortality has risen during the past century.5 Within the humanitarian community there is an ongoing debate as to how to deal with this process. One viewpoint stresses that the appropriate response to this blurring of the military and non-military domains is to reassert the impartiality, neutrality and independent identity of the humanitarian community, and to take all reasonable steps to reinforce the distinction between military actors and humanitarian ones.6 The emphasis here is on strengthening negotiated access to beneficiaries. A somewhat different view asserts that, with the erosion of consensual premises on which international humanitarian action is based, a new emphasis must be placed on the enforcement, including the enforcement by military means, of certain minimum standards.7 In this context, the use of military or armed escorts is seen as a response to changed circumstances – as a new means to achieve a long-standing humanitarian goal.

This debate is made more urgent by two other processes. First, humanitarian workers are increasingly the victims of harassment and armed attack. Sometimes, this is part of a deliberate effort to thwart the delivery of humanitarian aid and services to ‘enemy’ populations, or a function of the extent to which ‘humanitarian’ organizations are no longer seen as impartial, neutral and independent. Sometimes, it is merely a function of the gangsterism, criminality and general fragmentation of authority that are associated with many modern conflicts, particularly in ‘failed states’.8

3 See, for example, Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, eds, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of

William T. Sherman, 1860-1865 (University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 4 See, for example, Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total War, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1989),

512. 5 Estimates of the civilian percentage of total mortality are unreliable. Estimates in the following conflicts have

been advanced within the United Nations (A/C/3 SR 1780), cited in Esbjorn Rosenblad, International humanitarian law of armed conflict, (Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1979), 55-6.

World War I, 5 %; World War II, 48 %; Korean War 84 %; Vietnam War 85+%. 6 See, for example, Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop in ‘Civil-Military Cooperation in the Wake of Kosovo: A

Humanitarian Perspective’, Conference on Civil-Military Cooperation, Copenhagen, 1-2 September 2000. 7 See, for example, the Brahimi report (A/55/305), paras. 50, 63. 8 General Assembly resolution 54/192 (17 December 1999) deplores the increasing loss of life to United Nations

humanitarian personnel in the field and the “continuous erosion of respect for the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.” The Report of the Secretary-General on Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel (A55/494, 18 October 2000) provides a more detailed account of the rising level of insecurity.


The second process driving the debate on the relationship between the military and humanitarian communities is the evolution of military thinking in regard to the provision of humanitarian aid and services. In NATO and elsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrine of military-civilian operations, with an increasing tendency for military forces being used to support the delivery of humanitarian aid, and sometimes even to provide this aid directly.9

Preparation of guidelines – five preliminary questions:

In an effort to address some of these issues, the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations convened a Task Force on policy issues associated with staff security. This Task Force met in New York on 17-18 November 1999, and made recommendations in a number of areas.10 One of those recommendations was that guidelines should be developed regarding the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. OCHA was asked to draft the guidelines. The number of missions in which this issue arises is relatively small. United Nations humanitarian convoys move without military or armed escorts in 15 of the 22 complex emergencies with which OCHA is closely involved at the present. Nevertheless, the issue speaks to wider issues of humanitarian-military relations. In seeking to prepare guidelines on the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, five sets of questions can be asked:

i. Does the nature of modern conflict present risks to humanitarian workers that

were not present in the past? ii. If so, is military or armed protection for humanitarian convoys an appropriate

response, or would association with military actors compromise the impartiality of humanitarian organizations?

iii. If humanitarian convoys are at greater risk, and if association with the military

would not compromise their principles or operations, would the provision of military or armed escorts actually be of use? Would it increase security or diminish it? Would it pass the threshold of the United Nations Minimum Operating Security Guidelines or fall below it? Would it increase the amount of assistance that could be delivered, or reduce it? Would it increase the security of beneficiary populations or compromise it?

iv. What would be the consequences of not using armed or military escorts for

humanitarian convoys? v. What policies and practices have already been put in place with respect to the use

of armed or military escorts and how effective have these been?

9 See, for example, Jean-Daniel Tauxe, ‘The ICRC and civil-military cooperation in situations of armed conflict’,

45th Rose-Roth Seminar, Montreux, 2 March 2000. 10 ‘Report of the Task Forces on Policy and Legal and Operational Issues’, circulated by a note of the Deputy

Secretary-General dated 28 March 2000.


i. Growing threat to humanitarian workers Modern warfare tends to offer increased risk to humanitarian workers. Three principal reasons can be identified for this. (a) The increasingly irregular nature of warfare During the period 1900-1950 the overwhelming bulk of military activity was conducted by regular forces. The forces were characterized by strong command, control and communication, strong internal discipline and a clear distinction between the use of force for military purposes and the use of force for private or criminal purposes. During this period, humanitarian workers – principally from Red Cross Movement – operated with the consent of the belligerents, and were rarely under any significant degree of physical threat. The Red Cross symbol provided a protective value that was almost universally recognized.11 During the period 1950-2000 the bulk of military activity was conducted by irregular forces. Inter-state warfare, which had accounted for most military activity in the previous half-century, was largely replaced by wars of national liberation, wars of insurgency, wars of secession and, in the last years of the century, a sort of gangster warfare that was part-ethnic, part-political and part-criminal. Command, control and communication was often weaker than in the preceding period, as was internal discipline. The increasing use of child soldiers, and of soldiers operating under the use of drugs, may have exacerbated this trend, as may have the criminalization and ‘privatization’ of conflict.12

(b) Erosion of perception of impartiality of humanitarians: The increasing number of humanitarian organizations

Prior to 1950, the Red Cross Movement was overwhelmingly dominant in the provision of humanitarian services in armed conflict. Its impartiality and neutrality were generally accepted. By the end of the 20th century hundreds of non-governmental organizations were active in major conflict areas.13 Many of these had religious, ethnic or national affiliations which made them the objects of suspicion in conflicts which themselves had a religious or ethnic character. In some cases, the suspicions were well founded, and other organizations – genuinely committed to humanitarian principles – suffered by association.14

11 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Principles and response in international humanitarian

assistance and protection (C. The use of armed escorts)”, Presented at the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 15 September 1995.

12 A/55/494, Annex II. 13 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 3,000 people from over 250 humanitarian organizations carrying valid UNHCR

ID cards in 1995. Mark Cutts, ‘The Humanitarian operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992-95: Dilemmas in negotiating humanitarian access,’ (Geneva: UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research – Working Paper No. 8, 1999), 7. In Kosovo, at least 180 NGOs were operating in 1999. Suhrke, Barutciski, Garlock and Sandison, ‘The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: And independent evaluation of UNHCR’s emergency preparedness and response,’ (Geneva: UNHCR, February 2000), 65.

14 See, for example, Cutts above, 7, 23-4. See also, ICRC, above, “Principles and response.”


(c) Erosion of perception of impartiality of humanitarians: The changing role of humanitarian organizations

During the major conflicts of the period 1900-1950, humanitarian organizations tended not to undertake activities that might have affected the outcome of the conflict. No humanitarian organization, for example, provided food to the general population of Leningrad during the 1941-1944 siege of that city. Indeed, there seemed to be a general acceptance that the German policy of starving Leningrad into submission was a legitimate war aim.15 There was, therefore, no conflict in that case between the actions of the besiegers and those of the humanitarian community. Fifty years later, there is increasingly a clash of purposes. The use of hunger as a weapon of war is one example. The resurgence of this practice in recent conflicts has been met by a growing insistence by the humanitarian community that food aid must be brought to those in need. When one or more belligerents has made active use of hunger for military purposes in conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Somalia, southern Sudan, northern Uganda and elsewhere, humanitarian organizations have put themselves in harm’s way by attempting to provide food.16 The humanitarian community has sometimes responded, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by associating itself with military actors which are (or are seen to be) party to the conflict.17 ii. Impartiality and the use of force including armed escorts There are many cases in which the use of force, including armed escorts, would compromise the impartiality of humanitarian organizations. There are also circumstances, however, in which the use of armed or military escorts for humanitarian convoys would increase the capacity of such organizations to provide assistance in an impartial manner, that is, “regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients … and on the basis of need alone.”18 The example of siege situations has already been given, and could be expanded to cover other situations in which one belligerent, controlling access to areas controlled by another belligerent, might seek to reduce the amount of aid flowing to what they see as an enemy population. During the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian organizations were unable to deliver aid on the basis of need due to the lack of cooperation of those military factions controlling access to the most needy populations. Only when military

15 Just as the Lieber Code (Art. 17) states that, “It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so

that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy,” so the Military Tribunal at Nurenberg stated that, in respect of the siege of Leningrad, “the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legitimate.” War Crimes Reports Vol. 12, 84.

16 See, for instance, Action Against Hunger (ACF), Geopolitics of Hunger: 2000-2001 – Hunger and Power. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000. See also, Catherine Bertini, “Statement to the United Nations Security Council Debate on Security of UN Humanitarian Personnel, New York, 9 February 2000,” (Rome: World Food Programme, 2000).

17 Larry Minear et al, ‘Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The U.N.’s Role, 1991-1993’, Watson Institute Occasional Paper Series #18, 1994, 83-103.

18 This formulation of the humanitarian imperative is that of Article 2 of the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’, 1994.


escorts were provided – and when a credible use of force projected by those providing the escorts – was the imbalance somewhat corrected.19

iii. Utility of armed or military escorts There are many cases – the great majority – in which the use of armed or military escorts would be counter-productive. The use of such escorts can compromise the security of humanitarian personnel and can reduce their capacity to provide assistance effectively on the basis of need and regardless of race, creed or nationality. For example:

. Cooperation with an outside military force – including cooperation with a UN-mandated force – can lead local actors to associate humanitarian organizations with the political and military objectives of that force.

. Cooperation with armed or military escorts which do not have the capacity to

prevail if attacked – and to keep routes open for further convoys – can make a convoy or convoy route more vulnerable than it would be without an escort.

. Dependence on support from a military or armed force – whether foreign or local

– often makes it impossible to operate without such force. . Cooperation with one belligerent can make it impossible or unsafe to operate in

territory controlled by another belligerent, unless there is an agreement on hand-over at the boundary.

These problems are exacerbated when, as is usually the case, humanitarian actors remain in a conflict zone after the departure of external military forces. iv. Consequence of non-use of military or armed escorts Regardless of their utility, there are some humanitarian organizations which – for reasons of broader principle – will not use military or armed escorts to protect their convoys. This position may contribute to a general trend towards direct provision of humanitarian services by foreign military forces. When humanitarian organizations are unwilling or unable to provide humanitarian services, foreign military forces are increasingly likely to fill the gap. This is true whether the reasons are military (e.g. when they are part of an effort to secure the good will of the population within which a force is operating), or narrowly institutional (e.g. when there is a need for military forces to be seen to be active during periods of low threat) or immediately political (e.g. as a part of a public relations effort directed towards constituencies in the sending state). The experience in Kosovo appears to be a further example of the extent to which bilateral and military actors can and will assume functions normally carried out by independent humanitarian

19 Cutts, 14-16.


organizations.20 Even if the Kosovo case is not repeated, however, “certain Western states, the EU and NATO are rethinking military doctrine, particularly in the field of security, and are seeking way of using some of their military capabilities and assets, which are presently under-utilized, for civilian purposes.”21 v. Policies and practices already in place Within the United Nations, the development of policies with respect to the use of armed and military escorts for humanitarian convoys, and with respect to related issues such as the use of armed or military security for fixed installations, has been fragmented. Broadly, however, members of the United Nations system have adopted policies which recognize the need for armed or military escorts in exceptional circumstances.22 The use of armed guards provided by security service companies to escort convoys would be governed by the Security Directive disseminated on 9 January 1996 on the use of armed guards by organizations of the United Nations system. Such use would be subject to the authorization of the United Nations Security Coordinator. With respect to the protection by United Nations forces, the authorization for the dispatch of such a force, whether in the case of peacekeeping or peace enforcement, falls within the competence of the Security Council, which shall also determine the mandate of such a force. Any protection expected from a military component of a UN peace operation to humanitarian convoys must be consistent with the mandate of the UN peace operation as established by the Council. Within the community of humanitarian organizations outside the United Nations there is a spectrum of policy. The Red Cross Movement holds that, “as a general principle, any armed protection for any component of the Movement is in conflict with the following Fundamental Principles: humanity, independence, impartiality and neutrality.”23 Some other organizations, including especially implementing partners of United Nations agencies, have no such policy objections.24 Some efforts have been made to establish a common policy for all humanitarian organizations, including both those members of the United Nations system with humanitarian mandates as well as humanitarian non-governmental organizations. In 1995, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group adopted the Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and

20 For more, see Larry Minear et al, ‘NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis’ in Watson Institute

Occasional Papers Series #36, 2000. 21 Tauxe, ibid. 22 Compare, for example, UNHCR, The Security and Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and

Settlements, EC/49/SC/INF.2, 1999 with UNSECOORD, United Nations Security Operations Manual, 1995. 23 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Report on the use of armed protection for humanitarian

assistance’, extracted from ‘Working Paper, Council of delegates, 1995’, presented at the ICRC and International Federation, Council of delegates, Geneva, 1-2 December 1995.

24 Cutts, 6-10.


Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations.25 The Report did not refer to the use of armed or military escorts in particular, but did establish six general ‘operating principles’ with respect to the use of all military assets in support of humanitarian operations. These stated that:

i. Decisions to accept military assets must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.

ii. Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian

alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in nature or timeliness of deployment, and its use should be a last resort.

iii. A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and

character. The operation must remain under the overall authority and control of the humanitarian organization responsible for that operation, whatever the specific command arrangements for the military asset itself. To the extent possible, the military asset should operate unarmed and be civilian in appearance.

iv. Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should

ensure that they respect the code of conduct and principles of the humanitarian organization responsible for that deployment.

v. The large-scale involvement of military personnel in the direct delivery of

humanitarian assistance should be avoided. vi. Any use of military assets should ensure that the humanitarian operation retains

its international and multilateral character.26 The broadest of these principles – points i and ii above – can clearly be applied to the specific case of armed and military escorts. Points iii-vi may be less applicable. Point iii, for example, might undermine the capacity of an armed or military escort to offer a credible deterrent to would-be attackers. In practice, the positions of the various humanitarian organizations are not far apart, though different criteria may be applied in the decision-making process.

25 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group, XIXth

Meeting, 27 September 1995, Geneva: Summary Record’. 26 United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of

Humanitarian Operations: Report of the Task Force’, 27 September 1995.


Conclusion: The generally restrictive practice of all major humanitarian organizations is appropriate. Whatever policy guidelines are put in place should reflect the broad aim of limiting the circumstances in which organizations will have to resort to the use of armed or military escorts. The convergence of practice among humanitarian organizations in the field is to be applauded, and should be reinforced, with a view, where possible, to having a common position among all humanitarian organizations in any given operation. Whatever guidelines are approved should reflect two levels of decision-making: first, when to use armed or military escorts and, second, having taken the decision to use such an escort, how to do so.

Part II

Non-binding guidelines on when to use military or armed escorts General rule As a general rule, humanitarian convoys will not use armed or military escorts. Exceptions (criteria) Exceptions to the general rule will be considered, as a last resort, and only when all of the following criteria have been met:

i. Sovereignty. The sovereign power or local controlling authority (‘the local authorities’) is unwilling or unable to provide a secure environment without the use of military or armed escorts.

ii. Need. The level of humanitarian need is such that the lack of humanitarian

assistance would lead to unacceptable human suffering, yet assistance cannot be delivered without the use of military or armed escorts.

iii. Safety. Armed or military escorts can provided in a way which would provide the

credible deterrent needed to enhance the safety of humanitarian personnel and the capacity to provide assistance to intended beneficiaries without compromising the security of beneficiaries and other local populations.

iv. Sustainability. The use of an armed or military escort would not compromise the

longer-term capacity of the organization safely and effectively to fulfil its mandate.


Exceptions (procedures) Within the United Nations system, the determination as to whether or not the criteria have been met will normally be made by the Designated Official. The Designated Official is accountable for matters concerning the security of United Nations personnel and property to the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Security Coordinator.

Note: In most cases, but not all, a single individual serves as Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator and Designated Official. The authority of the Resident Coordinator with respect to UN staff and property is stated in full in section V paragraph 20 of the UN Field Security Handbook.

Recognizing that a common position among humanitarian actors will increase the security of all, the Designated Official (or Humanitarian Coordinator, as appropriate) will consult widely within the humanitarian community before making a determination. The Designated Official will invite representatives of the non-UN humanitarian community to participate, either as members or as observers, in the work of the Security Management Team. With respect to the sovereignty criterion, the Designated Official will formally engage the local authorities to determine whether or not they are willing or able to provide the necessary secure environment and to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law. The Designated Official will formally advise members of the humanitarian community as to the role of forces operating under a Security Council mandate with respect to support to that community, and to the provisions of status-of-forces agreement that may be in force.

Note: There has been confusion in some cases as to whether or not a country agreement/SOFA/SOMA is in force, who is covered by it, and what it means in practice. The Designated Official will endeavour to clarify this issue for representatives of the wider humanitarian community as a basis for security planning.

With respect to the safety criterion, the factors to be considered by the Designated Official will include the following:

. Who is providing the escort? (E.g. UN forces conducting peace operations, whose actions shall be governed by decisions of the Security Council; other international forces; government forces; forces of non-state actors; armed guards provided by security service companies, whose use, for the UN community, is subject to the approval of the UN Security Coordinator.)

. What are their capacities? (E.g. Can they provide intelligence on the security situation? Will they represent an effective deterrent to attack? Will they be credible in the event of such an attack? What are their rules of engagement? What are the command and control arrangements? Do they have a capacity for extraction? Can they keep a route open and secure for future convoys once force has been used to move one convoy through?)


. How high is the protection of humanitarian convoys on the priorities of those providing the escorts? Are the escorts themselves a potential source of insecurity?

. Is there a choice? (E.g. Are those who are providing the escorts insisting –

for political, military, economic or criminal reasons – on their use? If so, what are the possible consequences of resisting?)

. Would the use of escorts in one area have a deleterious effect on the capacity of

the organization to fulfil its mandate in other areas? (E.g. If escorts are to be provided by a belligerent, would that affect the ability to operate in areas not controlled by that belligerent?)

With respect to the sustainability criterion, the Designated Official will consider whether the use of armed or military escorts might make it more difficult to provide aid later. (E.g. If escorts are being provided by an external military force, what will happen when, as is usually the case, that military force leaves, but humanitarian operations have to continue?)

Note: There are occasions when the safety or sustainability criteria will not be met, as determined by the DO. In these cases it may be appropriate to suspend operations or to withdraw. Persisting with operations in the face of unacceptably high risk is rarely an effective means of meeting humanitarian needs. On more than one occasion, political authorities have encouraged humanitarian actors to continue operations – under military and armed escort, and in the face of unacceptably high risk – as an excuse for not addressing the root causes of a humanitarian crisis.

Relations with forces operating under a United Nations mandate The role and mandate of forces operating under a United Nations mandate is defined by the United Nations Security Council, and is binding. The Secretary-General’s Note of 30 October 2000 will guide the relationship between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators in the execution of this mandate. The relationship between the political/military elements of the United Nations presence and the humanitarian presence – including on the use of military escorts for humanitarian convoys – will be determined by agreement between the SRSG/RSG and HC/RC, and will be congruent with the Security Council mandate. In accordance with paragraph 8 of the Secretary-General’s Note, the SRSG/RSG and the HC/RC should resolve policy differences at the field level. Where this is not possible, the issue will be brought to the Headquarters task force for resolution.

Note 1: The number of situations in which there is the possibility of escorts by U.N.-mandated forces is very few. At present, only East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Sierra Leone are possible examples, and in none of those are escorts actually used.


Note 2: The Brahimi report (Section II/E) proposes a notion of impartiality which would, in some circumstances, be quite distinct from the humanitarian principles that would govern the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In such circumstances, there would not be automatic identity of interest between United Nations elements reporting to the RSG/SRSG and those coordinated by the HC/RC.

Non-binding guidelines on how to use military or armed escorts Guiding principles for humanitarian-military relations In situations in which an external military actor is present, the relationship between the humanitarian community and the external military forces should be based on a number of guiding principles, including:

i. The primacy of the humanitarian organizations in humanitarian work. In the first instance, humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar as military organizations have an immediate role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should be in the provision of a secure environment and/or in the provision of logisitics support when requested by humanitarian organizations.

ii. Primacy of humanitarian criteria. Decision to request or accept the use of

military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria.

iii. Humanitarian identity. Humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and

character. Other than the vehicles, weapons and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian and armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles. In order to give visibility to the civilian character of humanitarian convoys, vehicles other than the ones used to transport armed escorts may be fitted with “No Weapons” stickers.

Note: Where external military actors are involved, the above guiding

principles should be agreed in advance. Representatives of the humanitarian community may wish to consider the preparation of agreements with major military establishments confirming these principles as a basis for cooperation and division of labour in the area of escorts for humanitarian convoys.

Collective action by the humanitarian community – Negotiation process Where possible, a single team – representing all humanitarian organizations seeking armed or military escorts for their convoys – should negotiate the escort arrangements. Prior to these negotiations, the team should have a common approach to the procedural elements to be negotiated.


Note: For example:

. Whether the humanitarian organizations will make a consolidated agreement on behalf of all interested organizations, or whether separate agreements with each organization will be necessary.

. With which parties the escort agreement will be negotiated.

. At what level the escort agreement will be negotiated.

. Whether the agreement will be a formal and written one, or whether it will

be an informal understanding.

. What terms and conditions will be accepted; whether or not the escort provider will be paid, and costs involved.

. What the political ramifications of the agreement are; what issues of legal liability arise, and whether or not the privileges and immunities of the United Nations can be invoked, and who will be covered by them.

. Whether or not the existence and contents of the agreement will be made

generally available.

Collective action by the humanitarian community – Negotiation substance Where possible, the humanitarian negotiating team should have a common position on the substantive elements to be negotiated. Note: For example:

. Procedures with respect to pre-movement security assessment (e.g. the role of the DO and SMT in assessing the threat level and making appropriate arrangements; whether or not there will be a formal determination of ‘phases’, each requiring an appropriate configuration).

. Procedures with respect to the composition of convoys (e.g. whether UN

and NGO vehicles be mixed; whether or not a consolidated manifest will be available, and to whom; whether passengers will be allowed and, if so, what categories of passengers.)

. Procedures with respect to convoy command and control (e.g. who will

have authority over the configuration of the convoy and over whether or not to abort a convoy, or to reroute it; whether or not escorted vehicles will have the authority to leave the convoy unilaterally).


. Procedures with respect to the carriage and use of weapons (e.g. humanitarian convoys must retain their civilian nature and character. Other than the vehicles, weapons and personnel providing the escorts, the convoys must remain exclusively humanitarian. Armed personnel should remain in separate vehicles).

. Procedures with respect to communication and liaison (e.g. how will the escorts communicate with those escorted, en route and at headquarters).

. Procedures with respect to demands for preapproved movement, checkpoints, stops, searches, payment, etc.

. Procedures with respect to interacting with persons encountered en route.

. Procedures with respect to security incidents.

Collective action by the humanitarian community – Codes of Conduct The humanitarian community will encourage the development of situation-specific codes of conduct, based on a common framework, to be elaborated by representatives of the UN and non-UN humanitarian community. Such codes of conduct should be consistent with the United Nations Minimum Operating Security Standards for that location.

Appendix F / Use of Military Assets in Support of Humanitarian Activities 180

APPENDIX F: USE OF MILITARY ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

Guidelines On

The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex

Emergencies

March 2003 This document has been developed with the collaboration of a broad representation of the international humanitarian community, through a Drafting Committee consisting of representatives of Austria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Sudan, Switzerland, UK, USA, DPKO, SCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP, as well as a Review Committee consisting of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey, Yugoslavia, COE, ECHO, EC, EUMS, ICDO, ICRC, ICVA, INTERACTION, IOM, NATO, OCHA, THW and WHO. This is a non-edited version. The document will undergo professional editing and will be translated into all UN languages.


Introduction Key Terms and Definitions: The following terms are essential for establishing a common understanding of the terminology used by the guidelines as set out in this document. 1. Complex Emergency: A complex emergency, as defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.” 2. Humanitarian Assistance: Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality. For the purposes of these guidelines, assistance can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources under different conditions, given that ample consultation has been conducted with all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance.

Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services. Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel. Infrastructure Support involves providing general services, such as road repair, airspace management and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

3. The Humanitarian Operating Environment: A key element for humanitarian agencies and organizations when they deploy, consists of establishing and maintaining a conducive humanitarian operating environment (this is sometimes referred to as “humanitarian space”). The perception of adherence to the key operating principles of neutrality and impartiality in humanitarian operations represents the critical means by which the prime objective of ensuring that suffering must be met wherever it is found, can be achieved. Consequently, maintaining a clear distinction between the role and function of humanitarian actors from that of the military is the determining factor in creating an operating environment in which humanitarian organisations can discharge their responsibilities both effectively and safely. Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.


4. Military and Civil Defence Assets: MCDA, as defined in the 1994 “Oslo Guidelines”, “comprises relief personnel, equipment, supplies and services provided by foreign military and civil defence organizations for international humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, civil defence organization means any organization that, under the control of a Government, performs the functions enumerated in Article 61, paragraph (1), of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949”. When these assets are under UN control they are referred to as UN MCDA. 5. Other Deployed Forces: These are all military and civil defence forces deployed in the region other than UN MCDA. For the purposes of these guidelines these forces are divided into four categories based on their missions. These missions are peacetime, UN commanded peacekeeping operations, other peace operation/peace support, and combat. The mission of a force is the primary factor that determines a military unit’s availability and appropriateness to humanitarian tasks, as it impacts on whether or not it will be perceived by others as neutral and impartial.

Peacetime missions include training and exercises in the region with no hostile intent. UN commanded peacekeeping operations include missions under the auspices of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. Other peace operation / peace support missions include a range of tasks undertaken by military forces that are not under UN command, including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building and other so-called peace support operations where forces are deployed under operational parameters that dictate a minimum necessary use of force. Combat missions are those where the primary purpose of the operation is the defeat of a designated enemy.

6. Civilian Control: A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets. 7. Last Resort: Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability. 8. Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator: The Resident Coordinator (RC) is the head of the UN Country Team. In a complex emergency, the Resident Coordinator or another competent UN official may be designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC). In large-scale complex emergencies, a separate Humanitarian Coordinator is often appointed. If the emergency affects more than one country, a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator may be


appointed. In countries where large multi-disciplinary UN field operations are in place the Secretary-General might appoint a Special Representative (SRSG). The relationship between the SRSG and the RC/HC is defined in a note issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000 (Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, dated 30 October 2000). 9. Emergency Relief Coordinator and Inter-Agency Standing Committee: The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and coordinates the international response to humanitarian emergencies and disasters. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is chaired by the ERC and has the membership of all UN operational humanitarian agencies, with standing invitation to ICRC, IFRC, IOM, UNHCHR, the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, the World Bank and the three NGO consortia (ICVA, InterAction and SCHR). It is important to note that the decision whether to and who to appoint as Humanitarian Coordinator is made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 10. UN Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord): The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. Aim: 11. This document provides guidelines for the use of international military and civil defence personnel, equipment, supplies and services in support of the United Nations (UN) in pursuit of humanitarian objectives in complex emergencies. It provides guidance on when these resources can be used, how they should be employed, and how UN agencies should interface, organize, and coordinate with international military forces with regard to the use of military and civil defence assets. The document may also be of value in other large-scale emergencies.

Scope: 12. These guidelines cover the use of United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) – military and civil defence resources requested by the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed under UN control specifically to support humanitarian activities – and military and civil defence resources that might be available. These other forces on other missions are referred to as other deployed forces. 13. Principles, concepts, and procedures are provided for requesting and coordinating military and civil defence resources when these resources are deemed necessary and appropriate, and for interfacing with international military forces who are conducting activities which impact on UN humanitarian activities.


14. These guidelines are primarily intended for use by UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators, UN MCDA commanders and commanders of other deployed forces performing missions in support of the UN humanitarian agencies and liaison officers coordinating UN humanitarian activities with international military forces. All humanitarian actors should also be familiar with the principles, concepts and procedures set out herein and encouraged to adhere to them, as appropriate. 15. They could also be used by decision-makers in Member States and regional organizations when considering the use of military and civil defence resources to provide assistance to civilian populations. They may also be of value to international military or civil defence commanders, including peacekeeping forces, in the pursuit of their missions. 16. This document focuses on the use of military and civil defence assets in complex emergencies. The foundation for effective coordination of military and civilian assistance during reconstruction and rehabilitation of a disaster or post-conflict society is often established during relief operations, however reconstruction and rehabilitation activities are beyond the scope of this document. 17. Guidelines for the use of international military resources in natural disasters and peacetime technological or environmental emergencies are provided in a separate document entitled: “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (May 1994), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”. Status: 18. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the UN humanitarian agencies have agreed to these guidelines. Implementing and operational partners are encouraged to follow this guidance. Member States and regional organizations engaged in relief or military operations in complex emergencies are also encouraged to use the principles and procedures provided herein. While a significant number of Member States have participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use, they are not binding on Member States. The guidelines are considered a living document and may be reviewed as appropriate in the future. 19. These guidelines will not, in any way, affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of States and individuals under international humanitarian law. This includes, but is not limited to, the obligation to allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded delivery of relief consignments, equipment and personnel, protect such consignments, and facilitate their rapid distribution. Nor will these guidelines affect the obligations of States that are parties to the United Nations Conventions on the Safety and Security of United Nations Personnel, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, or the United Nations Charter.


Organization: 20. The remainder of the document is divided into two parts. The first contains principles that guide the use of international military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies in complex emergencies and their coordination with international military forces. The second section describes the tasks and responsibilities of key actors in situations where UN MCDA are used and in situations when other deployed forces are requested by the United Nations to support humanitarian activities. Comments, Recommendations and Future Changes: 21. This document was prepared under the auspices of the UN MCDA Project. It complements the existing “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” (May 1994) also known as the “Oslo Guidelines”. The Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) provides the Secretariat for the UN MCDA Project and is responsible for maintaining these guidelines. Comments should be directed to the Chief, MCDU, Emergency Services Branch, OCHA (Geneva), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, or [email protected]. Proposed changes will be incorporated annually in the Consultative Group On The Use Of MCDA in consultation with the Advisory Panel to MCDU, and when necessary referred to the ERC and IASC.

Principles and Concepts Core Principles: 22. As per UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victims must be respected and protected. Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.


23. In addition to these three humanitarian principles, the United Nations seeks to provide humanitarian assistance with full respect for the sovereignty of States. As also stated in General Assembly Resolution 46/182:

“The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.”

24. The United Nations humanitarian agencies involved in humanitarian activities subscribe to these principles and have incorporated these concepts in their respective mandates and operational guidelines. 25. As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities.

Key Concepts For Use Of Military / Civil Defence Resources: 26. In addition and in the framework of the above-mentioned principles, the use of MCDA shall be guided by the six following standards:

i. Requests for military assets must be made by the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator on the ground, not political authorities, and based solely on humanitarian criteria.

ii. MCDA should be employed by humanitarian agencies as a last resort, i.e. only in

the absence of any other available civilian alternative to support urgent humanitarian needs in the time required.

iii. A humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and

character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organization. This does not infer any civilian command and control status over military assets.

iv. Humanitarian work should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar

as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, not encompass direct assistance, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders.

v. Any use of MCDA should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and

present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel.


vi. Countries providing military personnel to support humanitarian operations should ensure that they respect the UN Codes of Conduct and the humanitarian principles.

27. Implementing and operational partners and members of international civil society, are expected to adhere to these core principles and have been encouraged to adopt the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. Avoiding Reliance on Military Resources: 28. The UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners rely upon States to guarantee their security and to respect the principle of full and unimpeded access to the affected population. When security cannot be assured by the host government (e.g. when areas are controlled by non state actors), and/or when there are difficulties accessing the affected people, the UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners must rely upon their neutrality for security and use negotiation as the primary means of gaining access to the affected population. Therefore, the use of military and civil defence resources should under no circumstances undermine the perceived neutrality or impartiality of the humanitarian actors, nor jeopardize current or future access to affected populations. 29. Furthermore, most military forces provided by Member States explicitly for UN MCDA or resources diverted from other missions by international military forces to support humanitarian assistance, are only temporarily available. When higher priority military missions emerge these forces are often recalled by the Member States or regional organizations. Therefore, as a general principle, UN humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on military resources and Member States are encouraged to invest in increased civilian capacity instead of the ad hoc use of military forces to support humanitarian actors. 30. However, there are circumstances when most requirements or security conditions are such that military resources provide the means of last resort for addressing the needs in a timely, effective way. In such cases, military resources, when available, may be appropriate for use. In general these resources can be divided into two categories: United Nations Military and Civil Defence Assets (UN MCDA) and resources from other deployed forces. 31. The principal distinctions between these two types of resources are that UN MCDA have been placed under the control of the UN humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis specifically to support UN humanitarian activities. Only a limited number of these resources are normally available for most emergencies. Other deployed forces are under the direction, and/or support of other entities, normally have security related missions, and may or may not be readily available. However, there may be occasions when support to humanitarian activities forms a specific part of the mandate.


When to Use Military and Civil Defence Resources to Support Humanitarian Activities: 32. The decision of whether or not to use military and civil defence resources in a complex emergency is one that must be taken with extreme care. The expedient and inappropriate use of military and civil defence resources can compromise neutrality, impartiality and other humanitarian principles of all humanitarian actors responding to the emergency. This loss of neutrality can result in relief workers becoming direct targets of the belligerents and being denied access to the affected population, not only in the current emergency, but also in future humanitarian crises. In addition, the loss of neutrality can result in the affected population becoming direct targets of the belligerents. Ultimately, decision-makers must weigh the risk to relief workers and their ability to operate effectively at the moment, and in the future, against the immediacy of the needs of the affected population and the need for the use of military and civil defence assets. 33. The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, provides the overall guidance for a particular complex emergency including parameters for the use of UN MCDA and other military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitarian activities. The UN Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator or the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will initiate the request for the use of military and civil defence resources in the field, within these parameters. Within the framework of the key principles listed in Paragraph 25 above, the following questions are provided to help guide these decisions:

• Are they the option of last resort, indispensable and appropriate? • Are the countries offering MCDA also parties to the conflict? • Based on the need, is a military or civil defence unit capable of the task? • How long will they be needed? • Can they be deployed without weapons or additional security forces? • How will this association impact the security of UN personnel and other humanitarian

workers? • How will this impact the perceptions of UN neutrality and/or impartiality? • What control and coordination arrangements are necessary? • How and when will transition back to civilian responsibility be achieved? • What are the consequences for the beneficiaries, other humanitarian actors, and

humanitarian operations in the mid to long term? 34. The start and duration of any support to UN humanitarian activities by UN MCDA should be determined by the Humanitarian Coordinator upon the request or consent by the affected sovereign State. Where such a request or consent can not be obtained, subject to the exceptional circumstances caused by the emergency situation, the decision to that effect must be taken by the Humanitarian Coordinator in strict conformity with the UN Charter and corresponding decisions by the UN Security Council. 35. The use of other deployed forces to support UN humanitarian activities is more problematic. Many international military forces provide assistance to the civilian population in their areas of responsibility. While motivation for this can be purely humanitarian and needs


based, assistance can also be motivated by a desire to legitimize missions, gain intelligence, and/or enhance protection of forces. Unilateral support of this nature can be inappropriate, lack longevity, and can disrupt assistance that forms part of a coherent immediate and long term programme. While there is a need for humanitarian activities to be divorced from political and military agendas, this must be balanced with a clear need for a level of consultation and coordination that ensures assistance provided by international military forces does not undermine the legitimacy and credibility of humanitarian efforts. 36. Nonetheless, other deployed forces often have resources that might be extremely useful in an emergency and, bearing in mind paragraph 24 above, should not be ignored. The primary considerations, which should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, will be the immediacy of the need, ability to fulfill needs with civilian assets, and the impact on the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the assistance effort. It must be also recognized that the availability of these resources is often depending on the mission, capability and discretion of the commander. Operational Standards for the Use of UN MCDA: 37. The following operational standards, in addition to the Guidelines Key Principles, are provided to ensure that when UN MCDA are used they are in concert with the core humanitarian and UN principles as well as international humanitarian law.

Civilian Control: Safety of UN MCDA is the responsibility of the designated military or civil defence commander. However, to be effective, direction and coordination of an overall humanitarian effort is a function requiring professional humanitarian staff. As such, UN MCDA should always remain under civilian control. Nevertheless, the degree of UN control of UN MCDA will be different than the UN direction of other deployed forces performing ad hoc support tasks. In the case of UN MCDA they will normally be in “direct support” of a UN humanitarian agency. The missions within the agreed Terms of Reference will be assigned by the Humanitarian Coordinator in consultation with the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). At No Cost: UN MCDA, like all UN humanitarian assistance, is to be provided at no cost to the affected State or receiving agency. This should not result in assisting States’ cutting or reducing other planned and programmed assistance, such as development aid resources, to recover the cost of UN MCDA or other relief support.

38. In principle, unarmed UN MCDA, accepted as neutral and impartial, and clearly distinguished from other military units, can be used to support the full range of humanitarian activities. However, their involvement in direct assistance should be weighed on a case-by-case basis and only if it satisfies the criteria of last resort. Their activities should focus on indirect assistance and infrastructure support missions.


39. Military and civil defence personnel employed exclusively in the support of UN humanitarian activities should be clearly distinguished from those forces engaged in other military missions, including the military component of peacekeeping missions, peace operations and peace support, and accorded the appropriate protection by the affected State and any combatants. 40. Acceptable means for distinguishing UN MCDA from security and forces engaged in military operations are the markings of the supported UN humanitarian agency or the use of civil defence markings accorded protection under the Geneva Conventions. When UN MCDA are from military organizations the appropriate white markings and UN symbols may be used. When civil defence assets are employed they should be marked in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Military forces cannot be marked as civil defence forces. In all cases, movement of UN MCDA, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters. 41. Military personnel providing direct assistance should not be armed and should rely on the security measures of the supported humanitarian agency. Guidelines for the security of UN personnel are set by the UN Security Coordinator. However, if military forces providing indirect assistance or infrastructure support missions must be armed, for their security and/or the safeguarding of their equipment, they will operate under strict rules of engagement based on the Law of Armed Conflict and should take account of advice and guidance by the Humanitarian Coordinator, Special Representative, or other appropriate UN official, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 42. Under no circumstance will the request for UN MCDA be construed as an endorsement of any military operations or be used as a justification for undertaking combat operations, resorting to the use of force, or the violation of State sovereignty. 43. Under no circumstance will UN MCDA be used to provide security for UN humanitarian activities. A separate security force may, however, be used to ensure security in areas where humanitarian personnel may be attacked while delivering humanitarian assistance. Such assistance, however, is not addressed in this document. Further reference can be found in the Non-Binding Guidelines on The Use of Military and Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (text of 14 September 2001 approved by the IASC Working Group). Operational Standards for the Use of Other Deployed Forces: 44. Bearing in mind paragraph 25, as well as paragraph 37 with regard to civilian control, in the case of other deployed forces, the Humanitarian Coordinator will determine what humanitarian tasks need to be done, what modalities must be respected, and request appropriate support. The supporting military or civil defence commander will determine whether he/she can complete the task within his/her means and capabilities given his/her primary mission requirements. Provided that the means indicated by the military or civil defence commander respect the principles of these guidelines, the Humanitarian Coordinator will then, or not, authorise the tasks to be undertaken by the designated unit.


45. Under the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, States have obligations under International Humanitarian Law. These include an obligation not to impede humanitarian activities as well as responsibilities to grant access to the affected populations and the safeguarding of relief personnel. 46. Military forces deployed by Member States or regional organizations whose primary missions are other than humanitarian support may also provide support to UN humanitarian agencies when requested by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or other designated officials. When these forces undertake activities in support of UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, this support will be on a case-by-case basis, subject to a request. The military resources will remain under the control of the military force commander. 47. Military or civil defence forces undertaking missions to support UN humanitarian activities should reconcile their modus operandi with the circumstances of the operating environment. Under these conditions only, and provided the modus operandi in question respects all appropriate humanitarian principles, should the Humanitarian Coordinator, or other responsible UN authority, authorise the mission. 48. Military forces, other than UN MCDA, performing assistance missions are in principle not granted any special protection nor are they authorized to display the emblems of the supported UN humanitarian agencies. 49. When other deployed forces are UN peacekeeping forces operating under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate, the degree to which these forces can be used to support humanitarian activity will be determined by the head of the UN mission, based on the mandate and capabilities of the peacekeeping force. The mechanisms for coordination between the UN humanitarian agencies and the peacekeeping force will also be established by this authority, with careful attention to the coherence of the mission. In all cases, movement of military and civil defence resources supporting humanitarian activities, including entry to the UN peacekeeping mission area, must be cleared by the UN peacekeeping mission headquarters. Further details are to be found in the DPKO Policy on Civil-Military Coordination of 9 September 2002, as well as the Note of Guidance on Relations Between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators, issued by the Secretary-General on 11 December 2000. United Nations Humanitarian Civil Military Coordination (CMCoord) in Complex Emergencies: 50. International civilian organizations providing humanitarian assistance to the affected population and international military forces, regardless of their missions, should maintain some level of interface to ensure that the civilian population does not suffer unnecessarily, that those in need receive the necessary assistance, and that relief personnel are safeguarded to the maximum extent possible.


51. Liaison in the midst of perceived or actual offensive military activity should nonetheless take place even when a cooperative arrangement cannot be reached with military forces. Even in the worst of situations a minimum amount of liaison is required in order to protect personnel and assets from unintended harm, limit competition for resources and avoid conflict. 52. In all cases, regardless of the mission or status of the military force, there will be a requirement for the sharing of information. Considerable humanitarian information can be gleaned by military forces going about their military business (e.g. state of the affected population, availability of key services and critical infrastructure). Operational security notwithstanding, military forces should endeavour not to classify this type of information and should make it readily available to appropriate UN humanitarian agencies through the civil-military coordination structure. Conversely, UN humanitarian agencies should provide necessary information regarding their activities in order that any military operations can be reconciled with those of humanitarian actors. Even this basic level of information exchange will help to avoid inadvertent damage, disruption and destruction of relief assets and preclude unnecessary risks to humanitarian personnel and the civilian population. 53. Military forces providing assistance to the affected population, for whatever reason, should in normal circumstances coordinate such action with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator. Military forces deployed as part of a UN commanded peace operation should coordinate all humanitarian assistance with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator through the missions’ civil-military coordination structure. Timely coordination of such actions will avert inappropriate action, allow, where necessary, appropriate military-humanitarian delineation and promote an increased impact for the affected population. 54. Critical areas for coordination include security, logistics, medical, transportation, and communications. In these areas the steady flow of timely information is essential for the success of humanitarian missions. Within these areas there will often be opportunities for task division and planning at both senior levels of the UN and the military and at the field level. 55. One of the effective ways to share information, and when appropriate share tasks and participate in planning, is through the exchange of liaison personnel from the appropriate UN humanitarian agencies and the military at the necessary levels. The United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) offers training to military and civilian actors in civil military coordination and liaison in a complex emergency. Several UN humanitarian agencies have built up cadres of personnel experienced in liaising with military personnel. Trained liaison personnel are also available through the MCDU to UN humanitarian agencies and other actors responding to complex emergencies.


Tasks and Responsibilities

Affected State and Transit States: 56. The affected State has primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to persons within its borders. Even though UN humanitarian agencies have been requested by the affected State or the UN Secretary General to provide additional assistance, the affected State has the right to decline the use of UN MCDA or the use of other military and civil defence resources by UN humanitarian agencies on a case-by-case basis. 57. States adopting a specific policy on the use of foreign UN MCDA within its borders may consider making this position known to the UN Resident Coordinator and/or UN Humanitarian Coordinator (if present), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 58. States that permit UN humanitarian agencies to call on external forces or forces already deployed by other nations within their borders should make any restrictions on the use of these forces known to OCHA and should include these restrictions in the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) established between their governments and the governments or responsible alliance/coalition which have forces stationed in their country. This does not preclude States from imposing restrictions on the use of military forces deployed within its borders on a case-by-case basis. 59. Affected States should provide security for UN MCDA operating in support of UN humanitarian activities in the same manner that they would provide security for other UN humanitarian personnel and resources. UN MCDA shall have at least the same freedom of movement, immunities, privileges, and exemptions afforded the UN humanitarian agencies when working in support of these activities, including when en route and returning to their units or stations. 60. Transit States are those States whose national borders, territorial waters, and airspace are crossed by UN MCDA moving to and from and conducting operations in the affected State. Transit States, especially those bordering the affected State, will facilitate the movement of requested UN MCDA in the same manner that they facilitate the movement of UN relief goods and personnel. Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator: 61. When a Humanitarian Coordinator has been designated, he or she is responsible for initiating requests for UN MCDA or approving the use of other military and civil defence resources. If a Humanitarian Coordinator has not been appointed, the decision to request UN MCDA or use other military and civil defence resources rests with the Resident Coordinator, after consultation with the UN Country Team. The individual charged with coordinating the UN effort will ensure that affected State clearance is obtained prior to processing the request at the country level.


62. Before requesting these assets the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will consult with the appropriate authorities of the affected State, the ERC, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Resident Representative, as appropriate. If the affected State is capable of and willing to provide the coordination structure for a complex emergency, this arrangement should be used. 63. In the absence of a Humanitarian Coordinator, Resident Coordinator, or SRSG the decision on whether or not to use UN MCDA to support UN humanitarian activities, will be made by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 64. The HC, RC or SRSG will ensure that the coordination mechanisms and specific guidelines are in place to effectively employ these by the UN humanitarian agencies responding to the complex emergency, to include means for the sharing of information and, where appropriate, the exchange of liaison personnel. 65. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will plan for the earliest possible release of UN MCDA and ensure that UN humanitarian activities do not become dependent on these or any other military and civil defence resources, once the complex emergency has passed. 66. In circumstances where there is likely to be a protracted complex emergency, or complex emergency conditions are likely to re-emerge, the supported UN humanitarian agencies will make arrangements for these needs to be met with resources available from the affected State or other civilian sources. 67. When MCDA are made available to UN humanitarian agencies or their implementing and operational partners, following a request from the cognizant decision-making authority, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that an appropriate system, consistent with these Guidelines and UN policies and regulations, is put in place to control the use of UN MCDA. 68. When other deployed forces are providing support on a case-by-case basis to UN humanitarian agencies and their implementing and operational partners, the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will ensure that the provision of humanitarian assistance by military forces does not compromise the humanitarian actors and that the military forces performing these missions understand the importance and humanitarian purpose of such missions. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator will also seek to ensure that assistance activities carried out by other deployed forces on their own behalf do not compromise UN humanitarian efforts. 69. The Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator or the designated UN authority requesting the military and civil defence resources, should review regularly, with MCDA and military or civil defence commanders, the modus operandi of supporting forces and offer appropriate advice and guidance. This review should include such considerations as: the types of task that can be performed, how the unit is armed and its rules of engagement, types of uniforms and equipment, the chain of command, use of liaison officers, exit criteria for the mission or task,


status of the forces to include privileges or immunities, claims and insurance matters such as damage compensation.

UN Humanitarian Agencies: 70. UN humanitarian agencies will request the use of UN MCDA through the Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator that has coordination responsibilities for the complex emergency. 71. Except in situations where there is imminent loss of life or acute suffering, UN humanitarian agencies will avoid ad hoc local requests for UN MCDA and the uncoordinated use of other military and civil defence resources. If in exceptional situations UN MCDA or other military and civil defence resources are used, UN humanitarian agencies will report this use to the responsible coordinator, including when they expect the assets to be released and how they intend to minimize their use in the future. 72. UN humanitarian agencies supported by UN MCDA will respect the integrity and chains of command of the supporting units. They will clearly state what they want the unit to accomplish and leave the unit commander as much latitude as possible in determining how he or she will accomplish the desired outcome, provided that core humanitarian principles are fully respected. 73. UN MCDA supporting UN humanitarian activities will normally not be used in the direct delivery of assistance. When possible the supported UN humanitarian agencies will try to use UN MCDA in a manner that limits their visibility and focus on tasks that do not call into question the neutrality or impartiality of the agency, implementing and operational partners or other humanitarian actors. 74. UN humanitarian agencies should acknowledge the UN MCDA support being provided, but avoid making any public statements on behalf of the UN MCDA units. 75. UN humanitarian agencies making use of UN MCDA will report the arrival, departure and status of these assets to the Military and Civil Defence Unit of OCHA, through the Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator, to ensure that the resources are properly tracked and the contribution is recorded and acknowledged by the United Nations.


Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): 76. Within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva, the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) has the primary responsibility for the mobilization of UN MCDA and civil-military coordination in a complex emergency. 77. MCDU will process the request for UN MCDA, make the necessary arrangements with the Member States, and track the use of these resources by the UN humanitarian agencies. 78. MCDU, with donor support, will maintain a training programme for those involved in the use of military and civil defence resources to support UN humanitarian activities, with special attention to the training of liaison personnel and the procedures and methods for Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) in complex emergencies. 79. On behalf of the Member States, and in accordance with the UN MCDA Project, MCDU will maintain a roster of UN CMCoord trained liaison personnel and assist in mobilizing these personnel to support the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator and the UN humanitarian agencies. 80. If a UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) is established, MCDU will coordinate the UN MCDA used to support logistics with the UNJLC. Likewise, MCDU will assist OCHA Humanitarian Information Centres (HIC) in obtaining relevant information from the military where a HIC or similar information-sharing activity has been established. 81. MCDU will maintain the necessary tools to facilitate and support civil-military coordination and the mobilization of UN MCDA in complex emergencies, to include database and communications capacity. Assisting State and International Military or Civil Defence Commanders: 82. States or regional organizations and peacekeeping forces involved in complex emergencies or other military operations beyond their borders should include in the guidance or orders issued to force or contingent commanders the parameters for the use of their resources to support UN humanitarian activities in a complex emergency. Commanders should establish their force modus operandi taking into account the operational circumstances, International Humanitarian Law, and core Humanitarian Principles and consult with the host nation, ERC and Humanitarian Coordinator or cognizant humanitarian authority, including the OCHA Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) for further technical advice, before deploying into the crisis area. 83. In a complex emergency, prospective assisting States with military resources deployed in the affected area, or in reasonable proximity, should facilitate coordination. This could include information on any assets available to support essential humanitarian functions including the transport of relief goods, the movement of persons at risk, and the reestablishment of basic human services, including medical care.


84. The commanders of UN MCDA assigned specifically to support UN humanitarian activities, and other deployed forces performing humanitarian support missions at the request of the UN, will avoid compromising the neutrality and impartiality of these agencies, their implementing and operational partners and other humanitarian actors responding to complex emergencies. Likewise, all supporting activities will be conducted in a manner that respects the dignity, culture, religions, and laws of the affected population. 85. Military or civil defence organizations dispatched to support complex emergency activities should be self-supporting for the duration of their mission in terms of transport, fuel, food rations, water and sanitation, maintenance and communications, in order to avoid placing additional stress on overburdened local authorities or the supported humanitarian actors. 86. Unless specifically exempted, UN MCDA will abide by the security and movements procedures set by the UN Security Coordinator to ensure the safety of UN personnel and be prepared to provide non-security related assistance in the relocation or evacuation of UN personnel should the need arise. 87. The States providing UN MCDA will not exploit these missions for the purpose of intelligence collection, propaganda, or psychological operations.

88. When military forces have assumed responsibility for vital civilian functions, such as delivery of water, provision of power, or the safe operation of an airfield, regardless of how this responsibility was acquired, they will facilitate a smooth transfer of these functions to the appropriate civilian authority, in coordination with the UN Humanitarian Coordinator or Resident Coordinator as soon as possible. This will be done in a timely manner, well prior to terminating this support, to ensure that any disruption of services will not have an adverse impact on relief and recovery activities.

Appendix G / IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies 198

APPENDIX G: IASC REFERENCE PAPER ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Introductory note:

This paper was endorsed by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG) as an IASC Reference Paper at its 57th Meeting of 16-17 June 2004. It complements the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. The paper was drafted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration with members of the IASC, the UN’s Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) and the Advisory Panel of OCHA’s Military Civil Defence Unit (MCDU-AP), as well as academic reviewers and field colleagues in a number of organizations. The paper will serve as a non-binding reference for humanitarian practitioners, assisting them in formulating country-specific operational guidelines on civil-military relations for particular complex emergencies. It will be updated as the environment in which we work changes and as new guidance on related issues becomes available. Part 1 of the paper reviews in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Part 2 lists the fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military, and Part 3 proposes practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN

COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

- AN IASC REFERENCE PAPER -

28 JUNE 2004


TABLE OF CONTENTS PART 1 INTRODUCTION

A. Initial Remarks B. The Goals and Purposes of this Paper C. Definition of Key Terms D. Background

PART 2 PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS

A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations C. Perception of Humanitarian Action D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination E. Civil-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel H. Do No Harm I. Respect for International Legal Instruments J. Respect for Culture and Custom K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict L. Option of Last Resort M. Avoid Reliance on the Military

PART 3 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements B. Information Sharing C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations D. Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff

Annex: Related Documents and Web-page Address


PART 1 INTRODUCTION A. Initial Remarks 1. Traditionally in complex emergencies, there has been a distinction between the military and the non-military domains: an approach built upon the principles of international humanitarian law that make a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, protecting the latter from armed attacks. In recent history, however, military forces have become increasingly involved in operations other than war, including provision of relief and services to the local population. At the same time, due to the changing nature of modern complex emergencies, the humanitarian community has faced increased operational challenges as well as greater risks and threats for their workers in the field, which at times have compelled some of them to seek the support or protection by military forces on a case-by-case basis1. Thus, practical realities on the ground have gradually necessitated various forms of civil-military coordination for humanitarian operations. 2. These developments, together with cases of military interventions claimed to be for ‘humanitarian’ purposes, have led to an erosion of the separation between the humanitarian and the military space2, and may threaten to blur the fundamental distinction between these two domains. It also raises significant concerns associated with the application of humanitarian principles and policies as well as operational issues. Furthermore these developments necessitate increased communication, coordination and understanding between humanitarian agencies and military actors, and require knowledge of each other’s mandates, capacities and limitations. 3. The humanitarian community therefore felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from civil-military relations, and to come up with a reference paper that extends beyond the individual guidelines already developed, which cover either particular aspects of civil-military relations3 or civil-military relationship in a specific complex emergency4.

1 In the last two years alone, military support and/or protection for certain humanitarian operations has been

provided in various complex emergencies, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone.

2 For an explanation on ‘humanitarian space’ or ‘humanitarian operating environment’, see paragraph 3 of the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.

3 Existing guidelines on particular aspects of civil-military relations include: “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003 and “Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys – Discussion paper and Non-Binding Guidelines” of September 2001.

4 Existing guidelines on civil-military relations in a specific complex emergency include: “General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq” of 8 May 2003 and “Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan – Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel” of 2002. “General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and the UN-Mandated Multinational Force in Liberia” and “Relations avec les Forces Armees en Haiti: Ligne de Conduite pour le Personnel des Nations Unies” exist in draft form as of 1 April 2004.


B. The Goal and Purpose of this Paper 4. This paper has thus been prepared, following the request of the Working Group of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)5, with the overall goal of enhancing the understanding of civil-military relations, including the difficulties and limitations of such relations. While numerous complicated questions arise out of this relationship, what remains vital for the humanitarian community is to develop a clear awareness of the nature of this relation, as well as a common understanding on when and how as well as how not to coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives. 5. The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, it attempts to highlight, in a generic manner, the nature and character of civil-military relations in complex emergencies. Secondly, it reviews some fundamental humanitarian principles and concepts that must be upheld when coordinating with the military. Thirdly, attention is given to practical key considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination. 6. The paper will serve as a general reference for humanitarian practitioners: a tool to which they can refer when formulating operational guidelines that are tailored specifically for civil-military relations in a particular complex emergency, such as the ones developed for Iraq and Liberia during 20036. Any situation-specific set of guidelines requires sensitivity to the special circumstances of the particular operation and hence has to be developed on a case-by-case basis. 7. The focus of this paper is the relationship between humanitarian organizations and official military forces (i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to a hierarchical chain of command), be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. Such military presence may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops. 8. The different mandates, characteristics and nature of these diverse military actors may necessitate that the humanitarian community relate to different groups with varying degrees of sensitivity or even with fundamentally different approaches at times. For example, interaction with an occupying force7 would have to entail different considerations from that required vis-à-vis national forces, unarmed military observers, or UN commanded peacekeeping operations. The most important distinction to be drawn is whether the military group with which humanitarians are interacting is, has become, or is perceived to be a party to the conflict or not. Separate specific papers will be required to address and advise on the particular circumstances and requirements of the relationships between humanitarians and any of these individual categories of military actors. Such policies may be formulated through various mechanisms. The present paper, however, is an attempt to address the subject of civil-military relations at a generic level. Therefore, it will not distinguish between the various military actors.

5 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group (IASC-WG), at its 52nd Meeting in March 2003,

requested OCHA to prepare “…a concept paper on the issue of military and humanitarian interface upon analysing thoroughly the current state of interface.”

6 For details, see footnote 4 above. 7 For example, such as the Coalition Forces of the Occupying Powers currently deployed in Iraq.


9. The relationship between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups8, private military, security companies and mercenaries, as well as any national or international police presence, although highly relevant in today’s conflict situations, are excluded from the analysis of this paper to avoid dilution of focus. Issues of general security, including operational challenges faced under increasing threats of global terrorism, are also excluded for the same reason. C. Definition of Key Terms 10. In order to facilitate the understanding of the concepts elaborated herein and to avoid confusion arising out of a variety of possible definitions entailed in terminology, some key terms used in this paper are defined as follows:

Civil-Military Coordination:9 The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. Complex Emergency: A complex emergency, as defined by the IASC, is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.” Humanitarian Actor: Humanitarian actors are civilians, whether national or international, UN or non-UN, governmental or non-governmental, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and are engaged in humanitarian activities. Military Actor: Military actors refer to official military forces, i.e., military forces of a state or regional-/inter-governmental organisation that are subject to an hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental. This may include a wide spectrum of actors such as the local or national military, multi-national forces, UN peacekeeping troops, international military observers, foreign occupying forces, regional troops or other officially organized troops.

8 Field practices on engagements with non-state actors will be collected in the forthcoming ‘Manual on Field

Practices on Negotiations with Armed Groups’. The Manual will be published in summer 2004 and relevant conclusions and principles from the Manual may be used to update this paper as appropriate.

9 The definition of ‘Civil-Military Coordination’ is identical to that used in the “Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) uses a different definition of Civil-Military Coordination; see DPKO’s paper on ‘Civil-Military Coordination Policy’ dated 9 September 2002.


D. Background 11. The humanitarian and military actors have fundamentally different institutional thinking and cultures, characterised by the distinct chain-of-command and clear organisational structures of the military vis-à-vis the diversity of the humanitarian community. The two groups have different mandates, objectives, working methods, and even vocabularies. It is important for military actors to understand the complex network of humanitarian assistance, which includes international organizations and local, national and international NGOs that work with national staff and local partners. Humanitarian action is also largely dependent on acceptance by the parties to the conflict. Most of the local actors engaged in humanitarian work are present on the ground long before the arrival of international personnel and will continue their functions after their departure. Susceptibility towards local sensitivities and adherence to the actuality and perception of impartiality and independence are therefore pivotal assets of any humanitarian operation, and this should be made known to the military. For humanitarian actors, on the other hand, it is important to be aware of the varied reasons and motivations why the military may undertake actions that can encroach on humanitarian space. 12. Within the context of civil-military relations, there are a number of situations where some level of coordination between the humanitarian and military actors may become necessary. As defined in paragraph 10, civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. Such a relationship may be best described as one of co-existence, in which case civil-military coordination should focus on minimizing competition and conflict in order to enable the different actors to work in the same geographical area with minimum disruption to each other’s activities. When there is a common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, cooperation may become possible, and coordination should focus on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts to serve humanitarian objectives. 13. In any circumstances, however, it is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors, by distinguishing their respective spheres of competence and responsibility. This approach is implicit in and builds on the principles of international humanitarian law, and is crucial to maintaining the independence of humanitarian action. The need for the humanitarians to maintain an actual and perceived distance from the military is especially important with regard to belligerent forces or representatives of an occupying power10. Any coordination with a party to an armed conflict must proceed with extreme caution, care and sensitivity, given that the actual or perceived affiliation with a belligerent might lead to the loss of neutrality and impartiality of the humanitarian organization, which might in turn affect the security of beneficiaries as well as humanitarian staff, and jeopardize the whole humanitarian operation in a conflict zone. Thus, cooperation – the closer form of coordination - with belligerent forces should in principle not take place, unless in extreme and exceptional circumstances and as a last resort.

10 As an example of principles and practical considerations including specifics on permissible and impermissible

action when interacting with an Occupying Power, see the “General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq” of 8 May 2003.


14. However, the emphasis on distinction should not be interpreted as a suggestion of non-coordination between humanitarian and military actors. The particular situation on the ground and the nature of the military operation in a given situation will play a determining factor on the type of coordination that may take place. Possible features of civil-military coordination include the sharing of certain information, a careful division of tasks, and when feasible and appropriate, collaborative planning. 15. The military often have the capability to help secure an enabling environment on the ground in which humanitarian activities can take place in relative safety. The military may also have practical means to offer in the delivery of assistance, such as rapid deployment of large numbers of personnel, equipment, logistics and supplies. However, humanitarian expertise – including beneficiary identification, needs and vulnerability assessment, impartial and neutral distribution of relief aid, and monitoring and evaluation – will remain essential to an effective and successful humanitarian operation. 16. The nature of the relation between one or a group of humanitarian organization(s) and the military as well as the conduct of these actors in this relationship may also have an effect on other humanitarian agencies working in the same area and even beyond, possibly affecting the perception of humanitarian action in general. For example, the use of armed escorts by one humanitarian organisation may negatively influence the perception of neutrality and impartiality of other humanitarian organisations in the same area. Coordination amongst humanitarian actors, preferably leading to a common approach to civil-military relations in a given complex emergency, is therefore desirable.


PART 2 PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 17. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be in accordance with the overriding core principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. This section outlines these cardinal humanitarian principles as well as other important principles and concepts that must be respected when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination. A. Humanity, Neutrality and Impartiality11 18. Any civil-military coordination must serve the prime humanitarian principle of humanity – i.e. human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. In determining whether and to what extent humanitarian agencies should coordinate with military forces, one must be mindful of the potential consequences of too close an affiliation with the military or even the perception of such affiliation, especially as these could jeopardize the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. The concept of non-allegiance is central to the principle of neutrality in humanitarian action; likewise, the idea of non-discrimination is crucial to the principle of impartiality. However, the key humanitarian objective of providing protection and assistance to populations in need may at times necessitate a pragmatic approach, which might include civil-military coordination. Even so, ample consideration must be given to finding the right balance between a pragmatic and a principled response, so that coordination with the military would not compromise humanitarian imperatives. B. Humanitarian Access to Vulnerable Populations 19. Humanitarian agencies must maintain their ability to obtain access to all vulnerable populations in all areas of the complex emergency in question and to negotiate such access with all parties to the conflict. Particular care must also be taken to ensure the sustainability of access. Coordination with the military should be considered to the extent that it facilitates, secures and sustains, not hinders, humanitarian access. C. Perception of Humanitarian Action 20. The delivery of humanitarian assistance to all populations in need must be neutral and impartial – it must come without political or military conditions and humanitarian staff must not take sides in disputes or political positions. This will have a bearing on the credibility and independence of humanitarian efforts in general. Any civil-military coordination must also be mindful not to jeopardize the longstanding local network and trust that humanitarian agencies have created and maintained.

11 For example, the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are stipulated as guiding principles for

humanitarian assistance in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.


D. Needs-Based Assistance Free of Discrimination12 21. Humanitarian assistance must be provided on the basis of needs of those affected by the particular complex emergency, taking into account the local capacity already in place to meet those needs. The assessment of such needs must be independent and humanitarian assistance must be given without adverse discrimination of any kind, regardless of race, ethnicity, sex/gender, religion, social status, nationality or political affiliation of the recipients. It must be provided in an equitable manner to all populations in need. E. Civilian-Military Distinction in Humanitarian Action 22. At all times, a clear distinction must be maintained between combatants and non-combatants – i.e., between those actively engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others who do not or no longer directly participate in the armed conflict (including the sick, wounded, prisoners of war and ex-combatants who are demobilised). International humanitarian law protects non-combatants by providing immunity from attack. Thus, humanitarian workers must never present themselves or their work as part of a military operation, and military personnel must refrain from presenting themselves as civilian humanitarian workers. F. Operational Independence of Humanitarian Action 23. In any civil-military coordination humanitarian actors must retain the lead role in undertaking and directing humanitarian activities. The independence of humanitarian action and decision-making must be preserved both at the operational and policy levels at all times. Humanitarian organisations must not implement tasks on behalf of the military nor represent or implement their policies. Basic requisites such as freedom of movement for humanitarian staff, freedom to conduct independent assessments, freedom of selection of staff, freedom to identify beneficiaries of assistance based on their needs, or free flow of communications between humanitarian agencies as well as with the media, must not be impeded. G. Security of Humanitarian Personnel 24. Any perception that humanitarian actors may have become affiliated with the military forces within a specific situation could impact negatively on the security of humanitarian staff and their ability to access vulnerable populations. However, humanitarian actors operating within an emergency situation must identify the most expeditious, effective and secure approach to ensure the delivery of vital assistance to vulnerable target populations. This approach must be balanced against the primary concern for ensuring staff safety, and therein a consideration of any real or perceived affiliation with the military. The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers should be viewed as a last resort option when other staff security mechanisms are unavailable, inadequate or inappropriate.

12 A similar provision on needs-based assistance is articulated as Principle 2 in “The Code of Conduct for the

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. The principle of non-discrimination is expressed in a multitude of human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, etc.


H. Do No Harm 25. Considerations on civil-military coordination must be guided by a commitment to ‘do no harm’. Humanitarian agencies must ensure at the policy and operational levels that any potential civil-military coordination will not contribute to further the conflict, nor harm or endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance. I. Respect for International Legal Instruments 26. Both humanitarian and military actors must respect international humanitarian law as well as other international norms and regulations, including human rights instruments. J. Respect for Culture and Custom13 27. Respect and sensitivities must be maintained for the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries where humanitarian activities are carried out. Where possible and to the extent feasible, ways shall be found to involve the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and/or local personnel in the design, management and implementation of assistance, including in civil-military coordination. K. Consent of Parties to the Conflict14 28. The risk of compromising humanitarian operations by cooperating with the military might be reduced if all parties to the conflict recognize, agree or acknowledge in advance that humanitarian activities might necessitate civil-military coordination in certain exceptional circumstances. Negotiating such acceptance entails contacts with all levels in the chain of command. L. Option of Last Resort15 29. Use of military assets, armed escorts, joint humanitarian-military operations and any other actions involving visible interaction with the military must be the option of last resort. Such actions may take place only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military support can meet a critical humanitarian need. M. Avoid Reliance on the Military16 30. Humanitarian agencies must avoid becoming dependent on resources or support provided by the military. Any resources or support provided by the military should be, at its onset, clearly limited in time and scale and present an exit strategy element that defines clearly how the function it undertakes could, in the future, be undertaken by civilian personnel/means. Resources provided by the military are often only temporarily available and when higher priority military missions emerge, such support may be recalled at short notice and without any substitute support. 13 For example, see Principles 5 and 7 of “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent

Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief”. 14 For example, see UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. 15 For example, see Paragraphs 7, 26, 30, 33 and 38 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets

to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003. 16 For example, see Paragraph 29 of “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United

Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” of March 2003.


PART 3 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 31. This section outlines the main practical considerations for humanitarian workers engaged in civil-military coordination. A. Establishment of Liaison Arrangements 32. Liaison arrangements and clear lines of communication should be established at the earliest possible stage and at all relevant levels, between the military forces and the humanitarian community, to guarantee the timely and regular exchange of certain information, before and during military operations. However, these activities should be conducted with caution. Either mentioning or concealing to the public the existence of direct communication between the humanitarian and military actors could result in suspicion and/or incorrect conclusions regarding the nature of the communication. Due to its possible impact on the perception of humanitarian operations, at times, it may be reasonable not to disseminate or publicize the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military. Obviously, such a decision has to be balanced with the need to ensure accountability, transparency and openness towards the local population and beneficiaries. 33. There are a number of initiatives within the UN system that focus on preparing humanitarian personnel on civil-military issues and practical liaison arrangements in complex emergencies. This includes the UNCMCoord induction courses, organised by OCHA’s Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU). This unit also conducts pre-deployment training and workshops tailored to a particular content and mission. 34. In addition to UNCMCoord Officers deployed by OCHA, UN agencies may deploy Military Liaison Officers (MLOs) to focus on specific sectoral and operational civil-military issues and DPKO may deploy Civil-Military Liaison Officers (CMLOs). Where established, the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), an inter-agency facility, also provides a civil-military coordination function on an operational logistics level. Issues arising17:

• How should the liaison arrangements between the humanitarian community and the military be conducted: in confidence or in transparency?

• What would the implications be of public knowledge of such liaison arrangements on the perception of the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities?

• How can transparency of the civil-military liaison arrangements be ensured while maintaining the understanding of a clear distinction between the military and humanitarian actors?

• How can incorrect perceptions and conclusions be prevented regarding the nature and purpose of civil-military liaison arrangements?

• Which circumstances call for formal liaison arrangements? When is it better to maintain liaison on an ad-hoc basis?

• What is the appropriate size and structure of the civil-military liaison component?

17 These are questions to be addressed when drafting guidelines for civil-military relations in particular complex

emergencies.


• When, if ever, should the liaison officers of the humanitarian and military communities be co-located in the same facility?

B. Information Sharing 35. As a matter of principle any information gathered by humanitarian organisations in fulfilment of their mandate that might endanger human lives or compromise the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations should not be shared. 36. However, to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to populations in need, information sharing with the military forces may at times become necessary. In particular, information that might affect the security of civilians and/or humanitarian workers should be shared with appropriate entities. Information sharing between humanitarian and appropriate military actors may include:

• Security information: information relevant to the security of civilians and to the security situation in the area of operation;

• Humanitarian locations: the coordinates of humanitarian staff and facilities inside military operating theatre;

• Humanitarian activities: the humanitarian plans and intentions, including routes and timing of humanitarian convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations, to avoid accidental strikes on humanitarian operations or to warn of any conflicting activities;

• Mine-action activities: information relevant to mine-action activities; • Population movements: information on major movements of civilians; • Relief activities of the military: information on relief efforts undertaken by the military; • Post-strike information: information on strike locations and explosive munitions used

during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian relief and mine-action/UXO activities.

Issues arising:

• What kind of information should/could be shared, with whom and when? • How can information that may be important for humanitarian purposes be differentiated

from information that is politically, militarily or economically sensitive?

• How do we determine which information might serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian? For example, how do we ensure that information on population movements or aid beneficiaries will not be misused for military purposes?

• Should information that is shared with one military group be shared with all other military and/or political groups as well? How should we ensure that no side is favoured over another while being mindful of sensitivities involved in information?

• When and how should we verify information provided by the military? C. Use of Military Assets for Humanitarian Operations 37. The use of military assets in support of humanitarian operations should be exceptional and only on a last resort. It is recognized, however, that where civilian/humanitarian capacities are not adequate or cannot be obtained in a timely manner to meet urgent humanitarian needs,


military and civil defence assets, including military aircraft, may be deployed in accordance with the “Guidelines on the Use Of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies” (“MCDA Guidelines”) of March 2003.18 In addition to the principle of ‘last resort’19, key criteria in the MCDA Guidelines include: (1) unique capability – no appropriate alternative civilian resources exist; (2) timeliness – the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action; (3) clear humanitarian direction – civilian control over the use of military assets; (4) time-limited – the use of military assets to support humanitarian activities is clearly limited in time and scale. 38. As a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat shall not be used to support humanitarian activities20. While there are ongoing hostilities, it will be necessary to distinguish between operations in theatre and those outside. In theatre, the use of military assets for humanitarian purposes should generally not be undertaken. Only under extreme and exceptional circumstances would it be appropriate to consider the use, in theatre, of military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations. Specifically, this situation may occur when a highly vulnerable population cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Outside the theatre of operations, military assets of the parties engaged in combat operations may be used in accordance with the above-mentioned principles and guidelines. However, preference should first be given to military assets of parties not engaged in combat operations. 39. Any humanitarian operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character. While military assets will remain under military control, the operation as a whole must remain under the overall authority and control of the responsible humanitarian organisation. Military and civil defence assets that have been placed under the control of the humanitarian agencies and deployed on a full-time basis purely for humanitarian purposes must be visibly identified in a manner that clearly differentiates them from military assets being used for military purposes. Issues arising:

• Who defines last resort and what are the exact criteria for last resort? • How can we ensure the credibility and security for a humanitarian operation that uses

military assets and how can we maintain the confidence of the local population for such operations?

• How can we make sure that humanitarian actors retain the lead role and direction of humanitarian efforts even when military assets are used as the only means available?

18 For the full text of the MCDA Guidelines, see internet address in the Annex at the end of this paper. 19 Last resort is defined as follows: ‘Military assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian

alternative and only the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability.’ (See paragraph 7 of the MCDA Guidelines.)

20 See Paragraph 25 of the MCDA Guidelines.


D. Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys 40. The use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys or operations is an extreme precautionary measure that should be taken only in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis. The decision to request or accept the use of military or armed escorts must be made by humanitarian organizations, not political or military authorities, based solely on humanitarian criteria. In case the situation on the ground calls for the use of military or armed escorts for humanitarian convoys, any such action should be guided by the principles endorsed by the IASC in September 2001.21 Issues arising:

• Who should provide the escort (UN forces, other international forces, government forces, forces of non-state actors, armed guards provided by security services companies)?

• How can we ensure that humanitarian operations will not become dependent on military escort - to the extent that it becomes impossible to operate without them?

• How can the capability, credibility and deterrence of an escort be determined? • How do we determine if the escorts themselves are a potential source of insecurity? • How do we ensure that short-term gain in access by using armed escorts would not result

in long-term loss of losing actual or perceived neutrality, impartiality, independence and even credibility of the humanitarian operation?

E. Joint Civil-Military Relief Operations 41. Any operations undertaken jointly by humanitarian agencies and military forces may have a negative impact on the perception of the humanitarian agencies’ impartiality and neutrality and hence affect their ability to operate effectively throughout a complex emergency. Therefore, any joint civil-military cooperation should be determined by a thorough assessment of the actual needs on the ground and a review of civilian humanitarian capacities to respond to them in a timely manner. To the extent that joint operations with the military cannot be avoided, they may be employed only as a means of last resort, and must adhere to the principles provided in the above-mentioned “MCDA Guidelines”. 42. One must be aware that the military have different objectives, interests, schedules and priorities from the humanitarian community. Relief operations rendered by military forces could be conditional and could cease when the mission of the military forces changes, the unit moves or if the assisted population becomes uncooperative. Such action by the military can also be conducted primarily based on the needs and goals of the force and its mission, rather than the needs of the local population. Issues arising:

• How can the impartiality and neutrality of a humanitarian action be preserved when it is carried out as a joint civil-military operation?

• What are the implications of a joint civil-military operation regarding access to all civilians in need and the safety of humanitarian staff?

21 See IASC Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines on the “Use of Military of Armed Escorts for

Humanitarian Convoys” of September 2001. This paper was approved by the IASC and reviewed by the UN Office of Legal Affairs.


• What happens if the military is suddenly redeployed to another mission or location, after the start of the joint operation?

F. Separate Military Operations for Relief Purposes 43. Relief operations carried out by military forces, even when the intention is purely ‘humanitarian,’ may jeopardize or seriously undermine the overall humanitarian efforts by non-military actors. The other parties to the conflict and the beneficiaries may neither be willing nor able to differentiate between assistance provided by the military and assistance provided by humanitarian agencies. This could have serious consequences for the ability to access certain areas and the safety of humanitarian staff, not to mention the long-term damage to the standing of humanitarian agencies in the region and in other crisis areas if humanitarian assistance is perceived as being selective and/or partial. Assistance provided by the military is susceptible to political influence and/or objectives and the criteria used in selecting the beneficiaries and determining their needs may differ from those held by humanitarian organizations. 44. For these reasons, military forces should be strongly discouraged from playing the role of the humanitarian aid providers. Their role in relation to humanitarian actors should be limited to help create a secure operating environment that enables humanitarian action. If need be, diplomatic efforts should be used to explain and reiterate to political and military authorities the concern of the humanitarian community in this regard. 45. However, there may be extreme and exceptional circumstances that require relief operations to be undertaken by the military as a last resort. This might be the case when the military are the only actors on the ground or the humanitarians lack the capacity and/or resources to respond to critical needs of civilians. Issues arising:

• What are the means and possibilities of humanitarian agencies to discourage separate military operations for relief purposes?

• In what circumstances should exceptions be recognized? For example, if belligerent forces were the only ones who could reach vulnerable populations and therefore alleviate extreme human suffering? Should the humanitarian community advocate for the involvement of military forces in such cases?

• If the military engages in relief activities, what kind of coordination arrangement should be established with the humanitarian community?

G. General Conduct of Humanitarian Staff 46. The independence and civilian nature of humanitarian assistance should be emphasized at all times. A clear distinction must be retained between the identities, functions and roles of humanitarian personnel and those of military forces – i.e., travel in clearly marked vehicles, clearly mark offices and relief supplies, etc. Weapons should not be allowed on the premises or transportation facilities of humanitarian organizations. Humanitarian personnel should not travel in military vehicles, aircraft, etc., except as a last resort or for security reasons. Humanitarian workers should not wear any military-uniform-like clothing. Failure to observe this distinction could compromise the perception of neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian activities and thereby negatively affect the safety and security of humanitarian staff.


Issues arising: • How should differences of opinion regarding civil-military coordination be settled

between humanitarian and military actors? Who decides? • How should public appearances (TV, radio, ceremonies, events, social functions, events

sponsored by the military, etc.) be handled, in view of the sensitivity required in fostering the appropriate public images and perceptions?

ANNEX: Related Documents and Web-page Address Related Documents Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (March 2003) Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys - Discussion Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines (14 September 2001) General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (8 May 2003) Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan – Guidelines for UNAMA Area Coordinators and other UN Personnel (2002) Guidance On Use of Military Aircraft for UN Humanitarian Operations During the Current Conflict in Afghanistan IMTF (7 November 2001) Civil-Military Coordination Policy by Department of Peacekeeping Operation (9 September 2002) All the above documents as well as this reference paper, Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies, can be found at the following website address:

http://ochaonline.un.org/mcdu/guidelines

End-of-Course Examination Instructions 214

The End-of-Course Examination is provided as a separate component of this course.

The examination questions cover the material in all the lessons of this course.

Read each question carefully and follow the provided instructions to submit your exam for scoring.

End-of-Course Examination Instructions


INFORMATION ABOUT THE END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION Format of Questions

The End-of-Course Examination consists of 50 questions. Exam questions generally give you a choice of answers, marked as A, B, C, or D. You may choose only one response as the correct answer. Time Limit to Complete the End-of-Course Examination

Because your enrolment in the course is valid for one year only, the examination must be submitted before your enrolment expires. Passing Grade

A score of 75% is the minimum score required for a passing grade. You will be presented with an electronic Certificate of Completion when you pass your exam. If your score is less than 75%, you will be informed that you have received a failing grade. You will be provided with an alternate version of the End-of-Course Examination, which you may complete when you feel you are ready. If you pass the second version of the examination, you will be presented with an electronic Certificate of Completion. If you fail the second time, you will be informed and dis-enrolled from the course.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Cedric de Coning Cedric de Coning holds a joint Research Fellow appointment at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in Oslo, and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in Durban, South Africa. He is also contracted to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). He worked with the South African Foreign Ministry (1988-1997), ACCORD (1997-2000 & 2002-2007), the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999 and 2001, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York in 2002. Cedric holds a M.A. (Cum Laude) in Conflict Management and Peace Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal and is a DPhil candidate at the University of Stellenbosch.

Stephen E. Henthorne Stephen E. Henthorne is a Senior Subject Matter Expert in the areas of Civilian Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. In addition he has served various components of the U.S Department of Defense as a Consultant, and Subject Matter Expert, in the areas of Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management Operations (HAO)-(DMO), International Reconstruction Development, Post Conflict Stability and Resilience Operations, Refugee Conflict Mediation, and Alternative Dispute Resolution. In his capacity as a Subject Matter Expert he has served as a Visiting Professor of Civil-Military Relations with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, a Division within the U.S. Army War College, and a Professor of Civil-Military Operations at the U.S. Army Joint Readiness Training Centre. He has also worked extensively within NATO. He also holds the prestigious “Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations (COTIPSO),” and the “Diplôme en Médiation”.

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