CIA Pyschological Operations

8/14/2019 CIA Pyschological Operations

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Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare

Central Intelligence Agency

Preface ~

Guerrilla warfare is essentially a political war. Therefore, its area of operations exceeds the

territorial limits of conventional warfare, to penetratethe political entity itself: the "political animal" that Aristotle defined.

In effect,the human being should be considered the priority objective in a political war. Andconceived as the military target of guerrilla war, the human

being has his most critical point in his mind. Once his mind has been reached, the"political animal"has been defeated, without necessarily receiving bullets.

Guerrilla warfare is born and grows in the political environment; in the constant combat to dominatethat area of political mentality that is inherent to

all human beings and which collectively constitutes the "environment" in which guerrilla warfaremoves, and which is where precisely its victory or failure is defined.

This conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns Psychological Operations into thedecisive factor of the results. The target, then, is the

minds of the population, all the population: our troops, the enemy troops and the civilian population.

This book is a manual for the training of guerrillas in psychological operations, and its application

to the concrete case of the Christian anddemocratic crusade being waged in Nicaragua by the Freedom Commandos.

Welcome!


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Introduction ~

1. Generalities ~

The purpose of this book is to introduce the guerrilla student to the psychological operationstechniques that will be of immediate and practical

value to him in guerrilla warfare. This section is introductory and general; subsequent sections willcover each point set forth here in more detail.

The nature of the environment of guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated psychologicaloperations, and it becomes necessary for the chiefs of groups, chiefs of detachments and squadron

leaders to have the ability to carry out, with minimal instructions from the higher levels,psychological action operations with the contacts that are thoroughly aware of the situation, i.e. the

foundations.

2. Combatant-Propagandist Guerrillas ~

In order to obtain the maximum results from the psychological operations in guerrilla warfare, every

combatant should be as highly motivated to carry out propaganda face to face as he is a combatant.

This means that the individual political awareness of the guerrilla of the reason for his struggle willbe as acute as his ability to fight.

Such a political awareness and motivation is obtained through the dynamic of groups and self-

criticism, as a standard method of instruction for the guerrilla training and operations. Groupdiscussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla training and operations.

Group discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla squads andexercise social pressure on the weak members to carry out a better role in future training or in

combative action. Self-criticism is in terms of one's contribution or defects in his contribution to thecause, to the movement, the struggle, etc.; and gives a positive individual commitment to the

mission of the group.

The desired result is a guerrilla who can persuasively justify his actions when he comes into contact

with any member of the People of Nicaragua, and especially with himself and his fellow guerrillasin dealing with the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare. This means that every guerrilla will be

persuasive in his face-to-face communication -- propagandist-combatant -- in his contact with thepeople; he should be able to give 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant should give

him cloth, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves in this manner, enemypropaganda will never succeed in making him an enemy in the eyes of the people. It also means that

hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity will have a meaning, psychologically, in the cause of thestruggle due to his constant orientation.

3. Armed Propaganda ~

Armed propaganda includes every act carried out, and the good impression that this armed force

causes will result in positive attitudes in the population toward that force; ad it does not includeforced indoctrination. Armed propaganda improves the behavior of the population toward them, and

it is not achieved by force.

This means that a guerilla armed unit in a rural town will not give the impression that arms are their

strength over the peasants, but rather that theyare the strength of the peasants against the Sandinista government of repression. This is achieved


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through a close identification with the people, asfollows: hanging up weapons and working together with them on their crops, in construction, in the

harvesting of grains, in fishing, etc.; explanations toyoung men about basic weapons, e.g. giving them an unloaded weapon and letting them touch it, see

it, etc.; describing in a rudimentary manner its operation; describing with simple slogans howweapons will serve the people to win their freedom; demanding the requests by the people for

hospitals and education, reducing taxes, etc.

All these acts have as their goal the creation of an identification of the people with the weapons andthe guerrillas who carry them, so that thepopulation feels that the weapons are, indirectly, their weapon to protect them and help them in the

struggle against a regime of oppression. Implicit terror always accompanies weapons, since thepeople are internally "aware" that they can be used against them, but as long as explicit coercion is

avoided, positive attitudes can be achieved with respect to the presence of armed guerrillas withinthe population.

4. Armed Propaganda Teams ~

Armed Propaganda Teams (EPA) are formed through a careful selection of persuasive and highly

motivated guerrillas who move about within the population, encouraging the people to support theguerrillas and put up resistance against the enemy. It combines a high degree of political awareness

and the "armed" propaganda ability of the guerrillas toward a planned, programmed, and controlledeffort.

The careful selection of the staff, based on their persuasiveness in informal discussions and theirability in combat, is more important than their degree of education or the training program. The

tactics of the Armed Propaganda Teams are carried out covertly, and should be parallel to thetactical effort in guerrilla warfare. The knowledge of the psychology of the population is primary for

the Armed Propaganda Teams, but much more intelligence data will be obtained from an EPAprogram in the area of operations.

5. Development and Control of the "Front" Organizations ~

The development and control of "front" (or facade) organizations is carried out through subjectiveinternal control at group meetings of "inside cadres," and the calculations of the time for the fusion

of these combined efforts to be applied to the masses.

Established citizens -- doctors, lawyers, businessmen, teachers, etc. -- will be recruited initially as

"Social Crusaders" in typically "innocuous" movements in the area of operations. When their"involvement" with the clandestine organization is revealed to them, this supplies the psychological

pressure to use them as "inside cadres" in groups to which they already belong or of which they can

be members.

Then they will receive instruction in techniques of persuasion over control of target groups tosupport our democratic revolution, through a gradual and

skillful process. A cell control system isolates individuals from one another, and at the appropriatemoment, their influence is used for the fusion of groups in a united national front.

6. Control of Meetings and Mass Assemblies ~

The control of mass meetings in support of guerrilla warfare is carried out internally through a


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covert commando element, bodyguards, messengers, shock forces (initiators of incidents), placardcarriers (also used for making signals), shouters of slogans, everything under the control of the

outsidecommando element.

When the cadres are placed or recruited in organizations such as labor unions, youth groups agrarianorganizations or professional associations, they will begin to manipulate the objectives of the

groups. The psychological apparatus of our movement through inside cadres prepares a mental

attitude which at the crucial moment can be turned into a fury of justified violence.

Through a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses this can be carried out; they willhave the mission of agitating by giving the impression

that there are many of them and that they have a large popular backing. Using the tactics of a forceof 200-300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in which 10,000-20,000 persons take part.

7. Support of Contacts with Their Roots in Reality ~

The support of local contacts who are familiar with the deep reality is achieved through the

exploitation of the social and political weaknesses of the target society, with propagandist-

combatant guerrillas, armed propaganda, armed propaganda teams, cover organizations and massmeetings.

The combatant-propagandist guerrilla is the result of a continuous program of indoctrination andmotivation. They will have the mission of showing the people how great and fair our movement is

in the eyes of all Nicaraguans and the world. Identifying themselves with our people, they willincrease the sympathy towards our movement, which will result in greater support of the population

for the freedom commandos, taking away support for the regime in power.

Armed propaganda will extend this identification process of the people with the Christian guerrillas,

providing converging points against the Sandinista regime.

The Armed Propaganda Teams provide a several-stage program of persuasive planning in guerrilla

warfare in all areas of the country. Also, these teams are the "eyes and ears" of our movement.

The development and control of the cover organizations in guerrilla warfare will give our movement

the ability to create a "whiplash" effect within thepopulation when the order for fusion is given. When the infiltration and internal subjective control

have been developed in a manner parallel to otherguerrilla activities, a comandante of ours will literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure,

and replace it.

The mass assemblies and meetings are the culmination of a wide base support among thepopulation, and it comes about in the later phases of the operation. This is the moment in which theoverthrow can be achieved and our revolution can become an open one, requiring the close

collaboration of the entire population of the country, and of contacts with their roots in reality.

The tactical effort in guerrilla warfare is directed at the weaknesses of the enemy and at destroying

their military resistance capacity, and should beparallel to a psychological effort to weaken and destroy their sociopolitical capacity at the same

time. In guerrilla warfare, more than in any other type of military effort, the psychological activitiesshould be simultaneous with the military ones, in order to achieve the objectives desired.


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Combatant-Propagandist Guerrilla ~

1. Generalities ~

The objective of this section is to familiarize the guerrilla with the techniques of psychological

operations, which maximizes the social-

psychological effect of a guerrilla movement, converting the guerrilla into a propagandist, inaddition to being a combatant. The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permitsophisticated facilities for psychological operations, so that use should be made of the effective

face-to-face persuasion of each guerrilla.

2. Political Awareness ~

The individual political awareness of the guerrilla, the reason for his struggle, will be as important

as his ability in combat. This politicalawareness and motivation will be achieved:

- By improving the combat potential of the guerrilla by improving his motivation for fighting.

- By the guerrilla recognizing himself as a vital tie between the democratic guerrillas and the people,

whose support is essential for the subsistence ofboth.

- By fostering the support of the population for the national insurgence through the support for theguerrillas of the locale, which provides a psychological basis in the population for politics after the

victory has been achieved.

- By developing trust in the guerrillas and in the population, for the reconstruction of a local and

national government.

- By promoting the value of participation by the guerrillas and the people in the civic affairs of the

insurrection and in the national programs.

- By developing in each guerrilla the ability of persuasion face-to-face, at the local level, to win the

support of the population, which is essential forsuccess in guerrilla warfare.

3. Group Dynamics ~

This political awareness-building and motivation are attained by the use of group dynamics at thelevel of small units. The group discussion method andself-criticism are a general guerrilla training and operations technique.

Group discussions raise the spirit and increase the unity of thought in small guerrilla groups andexercise social pressure on the weakest members to better carry out their mission in training and

future combat actions. These group discussions will give special emphasis to:

- Creating a favorable opinion of our movement. Through local and national history, make it clear

that the Sandinista regime is "foreignizing,"


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"repressive" and "imperialistic," and that even though there are some Nicaraguans within thegovernment, point out that they are "puppets" of the

power of the Soviets and Cubans, i.e. of foreign power.

- Always a local focus. Matters of an international nature will be explained only in support of local

events in the guerrilla warfare.

- The unification of the nation is our goal. This means that the defeat of the Sandinista armed forces

is our priority. Our insurrectional movement is apluralistic political platform from which we are determined to win freedom, equality, a better

economy with work facilities, a higher standard of living, a true democracy for all Nicaraguanswithout exception.

- Providing to each guerrilla clear understanding about the struggle for national sovereignty againstSoviet-Cuban imperialism. Discussion guides will

lead the guerrillas so that they will see the injustices of the Sandinista system.

- Showing each guerrilla the need for good behavior to win the support of the population.

Discussion guides should convince the guerrillas that the attitude and opinion of the population play

a decisive role, because victory is impossible without popular support.

- Self-criticism will be in constructive terms that will contribute to the mission of the movement,

and which will provide the guerrillas with theconviction that they have a constant and positive individual responsibility in the mission of the

group. The method of instruction will be:

(a) division of the guerrilla force into squads for group discussions, including command and support

elements, whenever the tactical situation permits it. The makeup of the small units should bemaintained when these groups are designated.

(b) Assignment of a political cadre in the guerrilla force to each group to guide the discussion. Thesquad leader should help the cadre to foster study and the expression of thoughts. If there are not

enough political cadres for each squad or post, leaders should guide the discussions, and theavailable cadres visit alternate groups.

(c) It is appropriate for the cadre (or the leader) to guide the discussion of a group to cover a numberof points and to reach a correct conclusion. The

guerrillas should feel that it was their free and own decision. The cadre should serve as a privateteacher. The cadre or leader will not act as a lecturer, but will help the members of the group to

study and express their own opinions.

(d) The political cadre will at the end of every discussion make a summary of the principal points,leading them to the correct conclusions. Any seriousdifference with the objectives of the movement should be noted by the cadre and reported to the

comandante of the force. If necessary, a combined group meeting will be held and the team ofpolitical cadres will explain and rectify the misunderstanding.

(e) Democratic conduct by the political cadres: living, eating and working with the guerrillas, and ifpossible, fighting at their side, sharing their living

conditions. All of this will foster understanding and the spirit of cooperation that will help in thediscussion and exchange of ideas.


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(f) Carry out group discussions in towns, and areas of operations whenever possible with the civilianpopulation, and not limit them to camps or bases.

This is done to emphasize the revolutionary nature of the struggle and to demonstrate that theguerrillas identified with the objectives of the people

move about within the population. The guerrilla projects himself toward the people, as the politicalcadre does toward the guerrilla, and they should live, eat and work together to realize a unity of

revolutionary thought.

The principles for guerrilla and political-cadre group discussions are:

- Organize discussion groups at the post or squad level. A cadre cannot be sure of thecomprehension and acceptance of the concepts and conclusions by guerrillas in large groups. In a

group of the size of a squad of 10 men, the judgement and control of the situation is greater. In thisway, all students will participate in an exchange among them; the political leader, the group leader,

and also the political cadre. Special attention will be given to the individual ability to discuss theobjectives of the insurrectional struggle. Whenever a guerrilla expresses his opinion, he will be

interested in listening to the opinions of others, leading as a result to the unity of thought.

- Combine the different points of view and reach an opinion or common conclusion. This is the most

difficult task of a political guerrilla cadre.After the group discussions of the democratic objectives of the movement, the chief of the team of

political cadres of the guerrilla force should combine the conclusions of individual groups in ageneral summary. At a meeting with all the discussion groups, the cadre shall provide the principal

points, and the guerrillas will have the opportunity to clarify or modify their points of view. Tocarry this out, the conclusions will be summarized in the form of slogans, wherever possible.

- Face with honesty the national and local problems of our struggle. The political cadres shouldalways be prepared to discuss solutions to the problems observed by the guerrillas. During the

discussions, the guerrillas should be guided by the following three principles:

- Freedom of thought.

- Freedom of expression.

- Concentration of thoughts on the objectives of the democratic struggle.

The result desired is a guerrilla who in a persuasive manner can justify all of his acts whenever he is

in contact with any member of the town/people, and especially with himself and with his guerrillacompanions by facing the vicissitudes of guerrilla warfare.

This means that every guerrilla will come to have effective face-to- face persuasion as a combatant-

propagandist in his contact with the people, to thepoint of giving 5-10 logical reasons why, e.g. a peasant should give him a piece of cloth, or a needleand thread to mend his clothes. When behaves in this manner, no type of propaganda of the enemy

will be able to make a "terrorist" of him in the eyes of the people.

In addition, hunger, cold, fatigue and insecurity in the existence of the guerrilla acquire meaning in

the cause of the struggle due to the constantpsychological orientation.

4. Camp Procedures ~


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Encamping the guerrilla units gives greater motivation, in addition to reducing distractions, andincreases the spirit of cooperation of small units, relating

the physical environment to the psychological one. The squad chief shall establish the regularcamping procedure. Once thy have divested themselves of their packs, the chief will choose the

appropriate ground for camping. He should select land that predominates over the zone with two orthree escape routes. He will choose among his men and give them responsibilities such as:

- Clean the camp area.

- Provide adequate drainage in case of rain. Also build some trenches or holes for marksmen in case

of emergency. In addition, he will build a stove, which will be done by making some small trenchesand placing three rocks in place; in case the stove is built on a pedestal, it will be filled with clay

and rocks.

- Build a windbreaking wall, which will be covered on the sides and on the top with branches and

leaves of the same vegetation of the zones. This will serve for camouflaging and protecting it fromaerial visibility or from enemy patrols around.

- Construct a latrine and a hole where waste and garbage will be buried, which should be covered

over at the time of abandoning the camp.

- Once the camp has been set up, it is recommended that a watchman be positioned in the places of

access at a prudent distance, where the shout of alarm can be heard. In the same moment thepassword will be established, which should be changed every 24 hours. The commander should

establish ahead of time an alternate meeting point, in case of having to abandon the camp in ahurried manner, and they will be able to meet in the other already established point, and they should

warn the patrol that if at a particular time they cannot meet at the established point, the should havea third meeting point.

These procedures contribute to the motivation of the guerrilla and improve the spirit of cooperation

in the unit. The danger, sense of insecurity, anxiety and daily concern in the life of a guerrillarequire tangible evidence of belonging in an order for him to keep up his spirit and morale.

In addition to the good physical conditions in which the guerrilla should find himself, good

psychological conditions are necessary, for which groupdiscussions and becoming a self-critic are recommended, which will greatly benefit the spirit and

morale of the same.

Having broken camp with the effort and cooperation of everyone strengthens the spirit of the group.

The guerrilla will be inclined then towards the unity of thought in democratic objectives.

5. Interaction with the People ~

In order to ensure popular support, essential for the good development of guerrilla warfare, theleaders should induce a positive interaction between the civilians and the guerrillas, through the

principle of "live, eat , and work with the people," and maintain control of their activities. In groupdiscussions, the leaders and political cadres should give emphasis to positively identifying

themselves with the people.

It is not recommendable to speak of military tactical plans in discussions with civilians. The

Communist foe should be pointed out as the number one enemy of the people, and as a secondary


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threat against our guerrilla forces.

Whenever there is a chance, groups of members should be chosen who have a high political

awareness and high disciplinary conduct in the work to be carried out, in order to be sent to thepopulous areas in order to direct the armed propaganda, where they should persuade the people

through dialogue in face-to-face confrontations, where these principles should be followed:

- Respect for human rights and others' property.

- Helping the people in community work.

- Protecting the people from Communist aggressions.

- Teaching the people environmental hygiene, to read, etc., in order to win their trust, which will

lead to a better democratic ideological preparation.

This attitude will foster the sympathy of the peasants for our movement, and they will immediately

become one of us, through logistical support, coverage and intelligence information on the enemy orparticipation in combat. The guerrillas should be persuasive through the word and not dictatorial

with weapons. If they behave in this way, the people will feel respected, will be more inclined toaccept our message and will consolidate into popular support.

In any place in which tactical guerrilla operations are carried out in populous areas, the squadshould undertake psychological actions parallel to these, and should proceed, accompany and

consolidate the common objective and explain to all the people about our struggle, explaining thatour presence is to give peace, liberty and democracy to all Nicaraguans without exception, and

explaining that out struggle is not against the nationals but rather against Russian imperialism. Thiswill serve to ensure greater psychological achievements which will increase the operations of the

future.

6. Conclusions ~

The nature of the environment in guerrilla warfare does not permit sophisticated facilities forpsychological operations, and the face-to-face persuasion of the guerrilla combatant-propagandists

with the people is an effective and available tool which we should use as much as possible duringthe process of the struggle.

Armed Propaganda ~

1. Generalities ~

Frequently a misunderstanding exists on "armed propaganda," that this tactic is a compulsion of the

people with arms. In reality, it does not includecompulsion, but the guerrilla should know well the principles and methods of this tactic. The

objective of this section is to give the guerrilla student anunderstanding of the armed propaganda that should be used, and that will be able to be applied in

guerrilla warfare.

2. Close Identification with the People ~


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Armed propaganda includes all acts carried out by an armed force, whose results improve theattitude of the people toward this force, and it does not include forced indoctrination. This is carried

out by a close identification with the people on any occasion. For example:

- Putting aside weapons and working side by side with the peasants in the countryside: building,

fishing, repairing roofs, transporting water, etc.

- When working with the people, the guerrillas can use slogans such as "many hands doing small

things, but doing them together."

- Participating in the tasks of the people, they can establish a strong tie between them and the

guerrillas and at the same time a popular support for ourmovement is generated.

During the patrols and other operations around or in the midst of villages, each guerrilla should berespectful and courteous with the people. In addition he should move with care and always be well

prepared to fight, if necessary. But he should not always see all the people as enemies, withsuspicions or hostility. Even in war, it is possible to smile, laugh or greet people. Truly, the cause of

our revolutionary base, the reason why we are struggling, is our people. We must be respectful to

them on all occasions that present themselves.

In places and situations wherever possible, e.g. when they are resting during the march, the

guerrillas can explain the operation of weapons to the youths and young men. They can show theman unloaded rifle so that they will learn to load it and unload it; their use, and aiming at imaginary

targets. They are potential recruits for our forces.

The guerrillas should always be prepared with simple slogans in order to explain to the people,

whether in an intentional form or by chance, the reason for the weapons.

"The weapons will be for winning freedom; the are for you."

"With weapons we can impose demands such as hospitals, schools, better roads, and social servicesfor the people, for you."

"Our weapons are, in truth, the weapons of the people, yours."

"With weapons we can change the Sandino-Communist regime and return to the people a true

democracy so that we will all have economic opportunities."

All of this should be designed to create an identification of the people with the weapons and the

guerrillas who carry them. Finally, we should make the people feel that we are thinking of them and

that the weapons are the people's, in order to help them and protect them from a Communist,totalitarian,imperialist regime, indifferent to the needs of the population.

3. Implicit and Explicit Terror ~

A guerrilla armed force always involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it

aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be used against them. However, if the terror does notbecome explicit, positive results can be expected.


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In a revolution, the individual lives under a constant threat of physical damage. If the governmentpolice cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities,

the population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission ofguaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an

explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.

In the words of a leader of the Huk guerrilla movement of the Philippine Islands: "The population is

always impressed by weapons, not by the terror that they cause, but rather by a sensation of

strength/force. We must appear before the people, giving them the message of the struggle." This is,then, in a few words, the essence of armed propaganda.

An armed guerrilla force can occupy an entire town or small city that is neutral or relatively passive

in the conflict. In order to conduct the armed propaganda in an effective manner, the followingshould be carried out simultaneously:

- Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to a "public place."

- Cut all the outside lines of communications: cables, radio, messengers.

- Set up ambushes in order to delay the reinforcements in all the possible entry routes.

- Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace them in "public Places"with military or civilian persons of trust to our movement; in addition, carry out the following:

- Establish a public tribunal that depends on the guerrillas, and cover the town or city in order togather the population for this event.

- Shame, ridicule and humiliate the "personal symbols" of the government of repression in thepresence of the people and foster popular participation

through guerrillas within the multitude, shouting slogans and jeers.

- Reduce the influence of individuals in tune with the regime, pointing out their weaknesses and

taking them out of the town, without damaging thempublicly.

- Mix the guerrillas within the population and show very good conduct by all members of thecolumn, practicing the following:

Any article taken will be paid for with cash.

The hospitality offered by the people will be accepted and this opportunity will be exploited in order

to carry out face-to-face persuasion about the struggle.

Courtesy visits should be made to the prominent persons and those with prestige in the place, such

as doctors, priests, teachers, etc.

The guerrillas should instruct the population that with the end of the operative, and when the

Sandinista repressive forces interrogate them, they mayreveal EVERYTHING about the military operation carried out. For example, the type of weapons

they use, how many men arrived, from what direction they came and in what direction they left, inshort, EVERYTHING.


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In addition, indicate to the population that at meetings or in private discussion they can give thenames of the Sandinista informants, who will be

removed together with the other officials of the government of repression.

When a meeting is held, conclude it with a speech by one of the leaders of guerrilla political cadres

(the most dynamic), which includes explicitreferences to:

The fact that the "enemies of the people" -- the officials or Sandinista agents -- must not bemistreated in spite of their criminal acts, although the

guerrilla force may have suffered casualties, and that this is done due to the generosity of theChristian guerrillas.

Give a declaration of gratitude for the "hospitality" of the population, as well as let them know thatthe risks that they will run when the Sandinistas return are greatly appreciated.

The fact that the Sandinista regime, although it exploits the people with taxes, control of money,grains and all aspects of public life through associations, which they are forced to become part of,

will not be able to resist the attacks of our guerrilla forces.

Make the promise to the people that you will return to ensure that the "leeches" of the Sandinistaregime of repression will not be able to hinder our guerrillas from integrating with the population.

A statement repeated to the population to the effect that they can reveal everything about this visitof our commandos, because we are not afraid of

anything or anyone, neither the Soviets nor the Cubans. Emphasize that we are Nicaraguans, that weare fighting for the freedom of Nicaragua and to establish a very Nicaraguan government.

4. Guerrilla Weapons Are The Strength of the People over an Illegal Government ~

The armed propaganda in populated areas does not give the impression that weapons are the powerof the guerrillas over the people, but rather that the weapons are the strength of the people against aregime of repression. Whenever it is necessary to use armed force in an occupation or visit to a town

or village, guerrillas should emphasize making sure that they:

- Explain to the population that in the first place this is being done to protect them, the people, and

not themselves.

- Admit frankly and publicly that this is an "act of the democratic guerrilla movement," with

appropriate explanations.

- That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of theinsurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary.

- The force of weapons is a necessity caused by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when

the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control.

If, for example, it should be necessary for one of the advanced posts to have to fire on a citizen who

was trying to leave the town or city in which theguerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following is

recommended:


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- Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy that is near thetown or city, and they could carry out acts of reprisal such as rapes, pillage, destruction, captures,

etc., it this way terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having given attention and hospitalities tothe guerrillas of the town.

- If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an enemy of the people, and thatthey shot him because the guerrilla recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.

- The command tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like all Christian guerrillas,espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista informant, although it is against his own will, was

necessary to prevent the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.

- Make the population see that it was the repressive system of the regime that was the cause of this

situation, what really killed the informer, and that the weapon fired was one recovered in combatagainst the Sandinista regime.

- Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended the repression, the corruptionbacked by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandos would not have had to brandish arms

against brother Nicaraguans, which goes against our Christian sentiments. If the informant hadn't

tried to escape he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the population, because not havetried to inform the enemy. This death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed inNicaragua, which is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.

5. Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects ~

It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, mesta judges,police and State Security officials, CDS chiefs,

etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to gather together the population affected, so thatthey will be present, take part in the act, and

formulate accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person should be chosen on the basis of:

- The spontaneous hostility that the majority of the population feels toward the target.

- Use rejection or potential hatred by the majority of the population affected toward the target,

stirring up the population and making them see all thenegative and hostile actions of the individual against the people.

- If the majority of the people give their support or backing to the target or subject, do not try tochange these sentiments through provocation.

- Relative difficulty of controlling the person who will replace the target.

The person who will replace the target should be chosen carefully, based on:

- Degree of violence necessary to carry out the change.

- Degree of violence acceptable to the population affected.

- Degree of predictable reprisal by the enemy on the population affected or other individuals in the


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area of the target.

The mission to replace the individual should be followed by:

- Extensive explanation within the population affected of the reason why it was necessary for thegood of the people.

- Explain that Sandinista retaliation is unjust, indiscriminate, and above all, a justification for the

execution of this mission.

- Carefully test the reaction of the people toward the mission, as well as control this reaction,making sure that the populations reaction is beneficial

towards the Freedom Commandos.

6. Conclusions ~

Armed propaganda includes all acts executed and the impact achieved by an armed force, which as

a result produces positive attitudes in the population toward this force, and it does not include forcedindoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective available instrument of a guerrilla

force.

Armed Propagnada Teams (APTs) ~

1. Generalities ~

In contact with the very reality of their roots, in a psychological operation campaign in guerrillawarfare, the comandantes will be able to obtain maximum psychological results from an Armed

Propaganda program. This section is to inform the guerrilla student as to what Armed PropagandaTeams are in the environment of guerrilla warfare.

2. Combination: Political Awareness and Armed Propaganda ~

The Armed Propaganda Teams combine political awareness-building with armed propaganda,

which will be carried out by carefully selected guerrillas(preferably with experience in combat), for personal persuasion within the population.

The selection of the staff is more important than the training, because we cannot train guerrillacadres just to show the sensations of ardor and fervor,

which are essential for person-to-person persuasion. More important is the training of persons whoare intellectually agile and developed.

An Armed Propaganda Team includes from 6 to 10 members; this number or a smaller number isideal, since there is more camaraderie, solidarity and group spirit. The themes to deal with are

assimilated more rapidly and the members react more rapidly to unforeseen situations.

In addition to the combination as armed propagandist-combatant each member of the team should

be well prepared to carry out permanent person- to-person communication, face-to-face.

The leader of the group should be the commando who is the most highly motivated politically and

the most effective in face-to-face persuasion. The position, hierarchy or range will not be decisive


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for carrying out that function, but rather who is best qualified for communication with the people.

The source of basic recruitment for guerrilla cadres will be the same social groups of Nicaraguans to

whom the psychological campaign is directed, such as peasants, students, professionals,housewives, etc. The campesinos (peasants) should be made to see that they do not have lands; the

workers that the State is putting an end to factories and industries; the doctors, that they are beingreplaced by Cuban paramedics, and that as doctors they cannot practice their profession due to lack

of medicines. A requirement for recruiting them will be their ability to express themselves in public.

The selection of the personnel is more important than the training. The political awareness-building

and the individual capabilities of persuasion willbe shown in the group discussions for motivation of the guerrilla as a propagandist-combatant

chosen as cadres to organize them in teams, that is,those who have the greatest capacity for this work.

The training of guerrillas for Armed Propaganda Teams emphasizes the method and not the content.A two-week training period is sufficient if the recruitment is done in the form indicated. If a

mistaken process of recruitment has been followed, however good the training provided, theindividual chosen will not yield a very good result.

The training should be intensive for 14 days, through team discussions, alternating the person wholeads the discussion among the members of the group.

The subjects to be dealt with will be the same, each day a different theme being presented, for a

varied practice.

The themes should refer to the conditions of the place and the meaning that they have for the

inhabitants of the locality, such as talking of crops, fertilizers, seeds, irrigation of crops, etc. Theycan also include the following topics:

- Sawed wood, carpenters' tools for houses or other buildings.

- Boats, roads, horses, oxen for transportation, fishing, agriculture.

- Problems that they may have in the place with residents, offices of the regime, imposed visitors,etc.

- Force labor, service in the militia.

- Forced membership in Sandinista groups, such as women's clubs, youth associations, workers'

groups, etc.

- Availability and prices of consumer articles and of basic needs in the grocery stores and shops of

the place.

- Characteristics of education in the public schools.

- Anxiety of the people over the presence of Cuban teachers in the schools and the intrusion ofpolitics, i.e. using them for political ends and not

educational ones as should be.


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- Indignation over the lack of freedom of worship, and persecution, of which priests are victims; andover the participation of priests such as Escoto and Cardenal in the Sandinista government, against

the explicit orders of his Holiness, the Pope.

Note: Members of the team can develop other themes.

The target groups for the Armed Propaganda Teams are not the persons with sophisticated politicalknowledge, but rather those whose opinion are formed from what they see and hear. The cadres

should use persuasion to carry out their mission. Some of the persuasive methods that they can useare the following:

Interior Group/Exterior Group. It is a principle of psychology that we humans have the tendency toform personal associations from "we" and "the others," or "we" and "they", "friends" and "enemies,"

"fellow countrymen" and "foreigners," "mestizos" and "gringos."

The Armed Propaganda Team can use this principle in its activities, so that it is obvious that the

"exterior" groups ("false" groups) are those of theSandinista regime, and that the "interior" groups ("true" groups) that fight for the people are the

Freedom Commandos.

We should inculcate this in the people in a subtle manner so that these feelings seem to be born ofthemselves, spontaneously.

"Against" is much easier that "for." It is a principle of political science that it is easier to persuadethe people to vote against something or someone than to persuade them to vote in favor of

something or someone. Although currently the regime has not given the Nicaraguan people theopportunity to vote, it is known that the people will vote in opposition, so that the Armed

Propaganda Teams can use this principle in favor of our insurrectional struggle. They should ensurethat this campaign is directed specifically against the government or its sympathizers, since the

people should have specific targets for their frustrations.

Primary Groups and Secondary Groups. Another principle of sociology is that we humans forge or

change our opinions from two sources: primarily, through our association with our family,comrades, or intimate friends; and secondarily, through distant associations such as acquaintances in

churches, clubs or committees, labor unions or governmental organizations. The Armed PropagandaTeam cadres should join the first groups in order to persuade them to follow the policies of our

movement, because it is from this type of group that the opinions or changes of opinion come.

Techniques of Persuasion in Talks or Speeches:

Be Simple and Concise. You should avoid the use of difficult words or expressions and prefer

popular words and expressions, i.e. the language of the people. In dealing with a person you shouldmake use of concise language, avoiding complicated words. It is important to remember that we useoratory to make our people understand the reason for our struggle, and not to show off our

knowledge.

Use Lively and Realistic Examples. Avoid abstract concepts, such as are used in universities in the

advanced years, and in place of them, give concrete examples such as children playing, horsesgalloping, birds in flight, etc.

Use Gestures to Communicate. Communication, in addition to being verbal, can be through


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gestures, such as using our hands expressively, back movements, facial expressions, focusing of ourlook and other aspects of "body language," projecting the individual personality in the message.

Use the Appropriate Tone of Voice . If, on addressing the people, you talk about happiness, a happytone should be used. If you talk of something sad, the tone of the voice should be one of sadness; on

talking of a heroic or brave act, the voice should be animated, etc.

Above All, Be Natural. Imitation of others should be avoided, since the people, especially simple

people, easily distinguish a fake. The individual personality should be projected when addressingthe population.

3. "Eyes and Ears" Within the Population ~

The amount of information for intelligence that will be generated by the deployment of the Armed

Propaganda Teams will allow us to cover a large area without commandos, who will become theeyes and ears of our movement within the population:

The combined reports of an Armed Propaganda Team will provide us with exact details on the

enemy activities.

The intelligence information obtained by the Armed Propaganda Teams should be reported to the

chiefs. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the first mission of the Armed Propaganda Teamsis to carry out psychological operations, not to obtain data for intelligence.

Any intelligence report will be made through the outside contact of the Armed Propaganda Team, inorder not to compromise the population.

The Armed Propaganda cadres are able to do what others in a guerrilla campaign cannot do:determine personally the development or deterioration of the popular support and the sympathy or

hostility that the people feel toward our movement.

The Armed Propaganda Team program, in addition to being very effective psychologically,

increases the guerrilla capacity in obtaining and usinginformation.

In addition, the Armed Propaganda cadre will report to his superior the reaction of the people to theradio broadcasts, the insurrectional flyers, or any other means of propaganda of ours.

Expressions or gestures of the eyes, or face, the tone and strength of the voice, and the use of theappropriate words greatly affect the face-to- face

persuasion of the people.

With the intelligence reports supplied by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the comandantes will be

able to have exact knowledge of the popular support, which they will make use of in theiroperations.

4. Psychological Tactics, Maximum Flexibility ~

Psychological tactics will have the greatest flexibility within a general plan, permitting a continuous

and immediate adjustment of the message, and ensuring that an impact is caused on the indicatedtarget group at the moment in which it is the most susceptible.


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Tactically, an Armed Propaganda Equipment program should cover the majority and if possible allof the operational area. The communities in which this propaganda is carried out should not

necessarily form political units with an official nature. A complete understanding of their structureor organization is not necessary because the cadres will work by applying socio-political action and

not academic theory.

The target populations of the Armed Propaganda Teams will be chosen for being part of the

operational area, and not for their size or amount of land.

The objective should be the people and not the territorial area.

In this respect, each work team will be able to cover some six towns approximately, in order todevelop popular support for our movement.

The Team should always move in a covert manner within the towns of their area.

They should vary their route radically, but not their itinerary,. This is so that the inhabitants who arecooperating will be dependent on their itinerary,

i.e., the hour in which they can frequently contact them to give them the information.

The danger of betrayal or an ambush can be neutralized by varying the itinerary a little, using

different routes, as well as arriving or leaving withoutprevious warning.

Whenever the surprise factor is used, vigilance should be kept in order to detect the possiblepresence of hostile elements.

No more than three consecutive days should be spent in a town.

The limit of three days has obvious tactical advantages, but it also has a psychological effect on the

people, on seeing the team as a source of currentand up-to-date information. Also, it can overexpose the target audience and cause a negative

reaction.

Basic tactical precautions should be taken. This is necessary for greater effectiveness, as was

indicated in dealing with the subject of "ArmedPropaganda," and when it is carried out discreetly, it increases the respect of the people for the team

and increases their credibility.

The basic procedures are: covert elements that carry out vigilance before and after the departure and

in intervals. There should be two at least, and they should meet at a predetermined point upon a

signal, or in view of any hostile action.

The team's goal is to motivate the entire population of a place, but to constantly remain aware thatdefined target groups exist within this general

configuration of the public.

Although meetings may be held in the population, the cadres should recognize and keep in contact

with the target groups, mixing with them before, during and after the meeting. The method forholding this type of meeting was included in the topic "Armed Propaganda," and will be covered in

greater detail under the title "Control of Mass Meetings and Demonstrations."


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The basic focus of the Armed Propaganda cadres should be on the residents of the town,where theirknowledge as formers of opinion can be applied.

In the first visits of identification with the inhabitants, the guerrilla cadres will be courteous andhumble. They can work in the fields or in any other form

in which their abilities can contribute to the improvement of the living style of the inhabitants of theplace, winning their trust and talking with them;

helping to repair the fences of their cattle; the cleaning of the same, collaborating in the vaccination

of their animals; teaching them to read, i.e.,closely together in all the tasks of the peasant or the community.

In his free time, our guerrilla should mix in with the community groups and participate with them in

pastoral activities, parties, birthdays, and even inwakes or burials of the members of said community; he will try to converse with both adults and

adolescents. He will try to penetrate to the heart of the family, in order to win the acceptance andtrust of all of the residents of that sector.

The Armed Propaganda Team cadres will give ideological training, mixing these instructions withfolkloric songs, and at the same time he will tell stories that have some attraction, making an effort

to make them refer to heroic acts of our ancestors. He will also try to tell stories of heroism of ourcombatants in the present struggle so that listeners try to imitate them. It is important to let them

know that there are other countries in the world where freedom and democracy cause thosegoverning to be concerned over the well-being of their people, so that the children have medical

care and free education; where also they are concerned that everyone have work and food, and allfreedoms such as those of religion, association and expression; where the greatest objective of the

government is to keep its people happy.

The cadres should not make mention of their political ideology during the first phase of

identification with the people, and they should orient their talks to things that are pleasing to thepeasants or the listeners, trying to be as simple as possible in order to be understood.

The tactical objectives for identification with the people are the following:

To establish tight relations through identification with the people, through their very customs.

To determine the basic needs and desires of the different target groups.

To discover the weaknesses of the governmental control.

Little by little, to sow the seed of democratic revolution, in order to change the vices of the regime

towards a new order of justice and collective well-

being.

In the motivation of the target groups, by the Armed Propaganda Teams, the cadre should applythemes of "true~ groups and themes of "false" groups. The true group will correspond to the target

group and the false one to the Sandinista regime.

For the economic interest groups, such as small businessmen and farmers, it should be emphasized

that their potential progress is "limited" by theSandinista government, that resources are scarcer and scarcer, the earnings/profits minimal, taxes

high, etc. This can be applied to entrepreneurs


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of transportation and others.

For the elements ambitious for power and social positions, it will be emphasized that they will never

be able to belong to the governmental social class, since they are hermetic in their circle ofcommand. Example, the nine Sandinista leaders do not allow other persons to participate in the

government, and they hinder the development of the economic and social potential of those likehim, who have desires of overcoming this, which is unjust and arbitrary.

Social and intellectual criticisms. They should be directed at the professionals, professors, teachers,priests, missionaries, students and others.

Make them see that their writings, commentaries or conversations are censored, which does notmake it possible to correct these problems.

Once the needs and frustrations of the target groups have been determined, the hostility of thepeople to the "false" groups will become more direct, against the current regime and its system of

repression. The people will be made to see that once this system or structure has been eliminated,the cause of their frustrations would be eliminated and they would be able to fulfill their desires. It

should be shown to the population that supporting the insurrection is really supporting their owndesires, since the democratic movement is aimed at the elimination of these specific problems.

As a general rule, the Armed Propaganda teams should avoid participating in combat. However, ifthis is not possible, they should react as a guerrilla unit with tactics of "hit and run," causing the

enemy the greatest amount of casualties with aggressive assault fire, recovering enemy weapons and

withdrawing rapidly.

One exception to the rule to avoid combat will be when in the town they are challenged by hostileactions, whether by an individual or whether by a number of men of an enemy team.

The hostility of one or two men can be overcome by eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective

manner. This is the most common danger.

When the enemy is equal in the number of its forces, there should be an immediate retreat, and thenthe enemy should be ambushed or eliminated by means of sharp-shooters.

In any of the cases, the Armed Propaganda Team cadres should not turn the town into abattleground. Generally, our guerrilla will be better armed, so that they will obtain greater respect

from the population if they carry out appropriate maneuvers instead of endangering their lives, oreven destroying their houses in an encounter with the enemy within the town.

5. A Comprehensive Team Program - Mobile Infrastructure ~

The psychological operations through the Armed Propaganda Teams include the infiltration of key

guerrilla communicators (i.e., Armed Propaganda Team cadres) into the population of the country,instead of sending messages to them through outside sources, thus creating our "mobile

infrastructure."

A "mobile infrastructure" is a cadre of our Armed Propaganda Team moving about, i.e., keeping in

touch with six or more populations, from which his source of information will come; and at thesame time it will serve so that at the appropriate time they will become integrated in the complete

guerrilla movement.


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In this way, an Armed Propaganda Team program in the operational area builds for ourcomandantes in the countryside constant source of data gathering (infrastructure) in all the area. It is

also a means for developing or increasing popular support, for recruiting new members and forobtaining

provisions.

In addition, an Armed Propaganda Team program allows the expansion of the guerrilla movement,

since they can penetrate areas that are not under the controll of the combat units. In this way,

through an exact evaluation of the combat units they will be able to plan their operations moreprecisely, since they will have certain knowledge of the existing conditions.

The comandantes will remember that this type of operation is similar to the Fifth Column, which

was used in the first part of the Second World War, and which through infiltration and subversiontactics allowed the Germans to penetrate the target countries before the invasions. They managed to

enter Poland, Belgium, Holland and France in a month, and Norway in a week. The effectiveness ofthis tactic has been clearly demonstrated in several wars and can be used effectively by the Freedom

Commandos.

The activities of the Armed Propaganda Teams run some risks, but no more than any other guerrilla

activity. However, the Armed Propaganda Teams are essential for the success of the struggle.

6. Conclusions ~

In the same way that the explorers are the "eyes and "ears" of a patrol, or of a column on the march,

the Armed Propaganda Teams are also the source of information, the "antennas" of our movement,because they find and exploit the sociopolitical weaknesses in the target society, making possible a

successful operation.

Development & Control of Front Organizations ~

1. Generalities ~

The development and control of front organizations (or "facade" organizations) is an essentialprocess in the guerrilla effort to carry out the insurrection. That is, in truth, an aspect of urban

guerrilla warfare, but it should advance parallel to the campaign in the rural area. This section has asits objective to

give the guerrilla student an understanding of the development and control of front organizations inguerrilla warfare.

2. Initial Recruitment ~

The initial recruitment to the movement, if it is involuntary, will be carried out through several

"private" consultations with a cadre (without his knowingthat he is talking to a member of ours). Then, the recruit will be informed that he or she is already

inside the movement, and he will be exposed to the police of the regime if he or she does notcooperate.

When the guerrillas carry out missions of armed propaganda and a program of regular visits to thetowns by the Armed Propaganda Teams, these contacts will provide the commandos with the names

and places of persons who can be recruited. The recruitment, which will be voluntary, is done


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through visits by guerrilla leaders or political cadres.

After a chain of voluntary recruitments has been developed, and the trustworthiness of the recruits

has been established by their carrying out smallmissions, they will be instructed about increasing/widening the chain by recruiting in specific target

groups, in accordance with the followingprocedure:

From among their acquaintances or through observation of the target groups -political parties,workers' unions, youth groups, agrarian associations, etc. -- finding out the personal habits,

preferences and biases, as well as the weaknesses of the "recruitable" individuals.

Make an approach through an acquaintance, and if possible, develop a friendship, attracting him

through his preferences or weaknesses: it might be inviting him for lunch in the restaurant of hischoice or having a drink in his favorite cantina or an invitation to dinner in the place he prefers.

Recruitment should follow one of the following guidelines:

- If in an informal conversation the target seems susceptible to voluntary recruitment based on his

beliefs and personal values, etc., the political cadreassigned to carry out the recruitments will be notified of this. The original contact will indicate tothe cadre assigned, in detail, all he knows of the

prospective recruit, and the style of persuasion to be used, introducing the two.

- If the target does not seem to be susceptible to voluntary recruitment, meetings can be arranged

which seem casual with the guerrilla leaders or withthe political cadres (unknown by the target until that moment). The meetings will be held so that

"other persons" know that the target is attending them,whether they see him arrive at a particular house, seated at the table in a particular bar or even

seated on a park bench. The target, then, is faced with

the fact of his participation in the insurrectional struggle and it will be indicated to him also that ifhe fails to cooperate or to carry out futureorders, he will be subjected to reprisals by the police or soldiers of the regime.

- The notification of the police, denouncing a target who does not want to join the guerrillas, can becarried out easily, when it becomes necessary, through a letter with false statements of citizens who

are not implicated in the movement. Care should be taken that the person who recruited himcovertly is not discovered.

- With the carrying out of clandestine missions for the movement, the involvement and handing overof every recruit is done gradually on a wider and

wider scale, and confidence increases. This should be a gradual process, in order to preventconfessions from fearful individuals who have been assigned very difficult or dangerous missions

too early.

Using this recruitment technique, our guerrillas will be able to successfully infiltrate any key target

group in the regime, in order to improve the internalcontrol of the enemy structure.

3. Established Citizens, Subjective Internal Control ~


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Established citizens, such as doctors, lawyers, businessmen, landholders, minor state officials, etc.,will be recruited to the movement and used for subjective internal control of groups and associations

to which they belong or may belong.

Once the recruitment/involvement has been brought about, and has progressed to the point that

allows that specific instructions be given to internal cadres to begin to influence their groups,instructions will be given to them to carry out the following:

- The process is simple and only requires a basic knowledge of the Socrates dialectic: that is theknowledge that is inherent to another person or the

established position of a group, some theme, some word or some thought related to the objective ofpersuasion of the person in charge of our recruitment.

- The cadre then must emphasize this theme, word or thought in the discussions or meetings of thetarget group, through a casual commentary, which improves the focus of other members of the

group in relation to this. Specific examples are:

Economic interest groups are motivated by profit and generally feel that the system hinders the use

of their capability in this effort in some way, taxes,

import-export tariffs, transportation costs, etc. The cadre in charge will increase this feeling offrustration in later conversations.

Political aspirants, particularly if the are not successful, feel that the system discriminates againstthem unfairly, limiting their capabilities, because

the Sandinista regime does not allow elections. The cadres should focus political discussionstowards this frustration.

Intellectual social critics (such as professors, teachers, priests, missionaries, etc.), generally feel thatthe government ignores their valid

criticism or censors their comments unjustly, especially in a situation of revolution. This can easily

be shown by the guerrilla cadre at meetings anddiscussions, to be an injustice of the system.

For all the target groups, after they have established frustrations, the hostility towards the obstacles

to their aspirations will gradually becometransferred to the current regime and its system of repression.

The guerrilla cadre moving among the target groups should always maintain a low profile, so thatthe development of hostile feelings towards the false

Sandinista regime seems to come spontaneously from the members of the group and not fromsuggestions of the cadres. This is internal subjective control.

Antigovernmental hostility should be generalized, and not necessarily in our favor. If a groupdevelops a feeling in our favor, it can be utilized. But the

main objective is to precondition the target groups for the fusion in mass organizations later in theoperation, when other activities have been

successfully undertaken.

4. Organizations of Cells for Security ~

Internal cadres of our movement should organize into cells of three persons, only one of them


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maintaining outside contact.

The cell of three persons is the basic element of the movement, with frequent meetings to receive

orders and pass information to the cell leader. Thesemeetings are also very important for mutually reinforcing the members of the cell, as well as their

morale. They should exercise criticism of themselves on the realization or failures in carrying outindividual subjective control missions.

The coordination of the three-member cell provides a security net for reciprocal communication,each member having contact with only an operational cell. The members will not reveal at the cell

coordination meetings the identity of their contact in an operational cell; they will reveal only thenature of the activity in which the cell is involved, e.g., political party work, medical association

work, etc.

There is no hierarchy in cells outside of an element of coordination, who is the leader, who will

have direct but covert contact with our guerrilla comandante in the zone or operational area. Theprevious diagram does not indicate which new operational cell is the limit, but it indicates that for

every three operational cells, we need a coordination cell.

5. Fusion in a "Cover" Organization ~

The fusion of organizations recognized by the Sandinista government, such as associations and

other groups, through internal subjective control, occurs in the final stages of the operation, in atight connection with mass meetings.

When the guerrilla armed action has expanded sufficiently, armed propaganda missions will becarried out on a large scale: propaganda teams will have clearly developed open support of the

institutions; the enemy system of target groups will be well infiltrated and preconditioned. At thepoint at which mass meetings are held, the internal cadres should begin discussions for the "fusion"

of forces into an organization -- this organization will be a "cover" source of our movement.

Any other target group will be aware that other groups are developing greater hostility to the

government., the police and the traditional legal bases ofauthority. The guerrilla cadres tn that group -- for example, teachers -- will cultivate this awareness-

building, making comments such as "So-and-so, who is a farmer, said that the members of hiscooperative believe that the new economic policy is absurd, poorly planned and unfair to the

farmers."

When the awareness-building is increased, in the sense that other groups feel hostility towards the

regime, the group discussions are held openly and our movement will be able to receive reports thatthe majority of their operatives are united in common, greater hostility against the regime. This will

be developed and the order to fuse/join will come about. The fusion into a "cover" front is carriedout thusly:

- Internal cadres of our movement will meet with people such as presidents, leaders, and others, atorganized meetings chaired by the group chief of our movement. Two or three escorts can assist the

guerrilla cadre if it becomes necessary.

- Publish a joint communique on this meeting, announcing the creation of the "cover" front,

including names and signatures of the participants, and names of the organizations that theyrepresent.


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After releasing this communique, mass meetings should be initiated, which should have as a goalthe destruction of the Sandinista control.

6. Conclusions ~

The development and control of the "cover" organizations in a guerrilla war will give our movement

the ability to create the "whiplash" effect within thepopulation, when the order for fusion is gives. When the infiltration and internal subjective control

have been developed parallel with other guerrillaactivities, a democratic guerrilla commander will literally be able to shake up the Sandinista

structure and replace it.

Control of Mass Concnetrations & Meetings ~

1. Generalities ~

In the last stages of a guerrilla war, mass concentrations and meetings are a powerful psychological

tool for carrying out the mission. This section has as its objective giving the guerrilla student

training on techniques for controlling mass concentrations and meetings in guerrilla warfare.

2. Infiltration of Guerrilla Cadres ~

Infiltration of guerrilla cadres (whether a member of our movement or outside element) in workers'

unions, student groups, peasant organizations, etc.,preconditioning these groups for behavior within the masses, where they will have to carry

proselytism for the instructional struggle in a clandestinemanner.

- Our psychological war team should prepare in advance a hostile mental attitude among the target

groups so that at the decisive moment they can turn their furor into violence, demanding their rightsthat have been trampled upon by the regime.

- These preconditioning campaigns must be aimed at the political parties, professional

organizations, students, laborers, the masses of the unemployed,the ethnic minorities and any other sector of society that is vulnerable or recruitable; this also

includes the popular masses and sympathizers of ourmovement.

- The basic objective of a preconditioning campaign is to create a negative "image" of the commonenemy, e.g.:

Describe the managers of collective government entities as trying to treat the staff the way "slaveforemen" do.

The police mistreat the people like the Communist "Gestapo" does.

The government officials of National Reconstruction are puppets of Russian-Cuban imperialism.

Our psychological war cadres will create compulsive obsessions of a temporary nature in places ofpublic concentrations, constantly hammering away at the themes pointed out or desired, the same as


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in group gatherings; in informal conversations expressing discontent; in addition passing outbrochures and flyers, and writing editorial articles both on the radio and in newspapers, focused on

the intention of preparing the mind of the people of the decisive moment, which will erupt ingeneral violence.

In order to facilitate the preconditioning of the masses, we should often use phrases to make thepeople see, such as:

The taxes that they pay the government do not benefit the people at all, but rather are uses as a formof exploitation in order to enrich those governing.

Make it plain to the people that they have become slaves, that they are being exploited by privilegedmilitary and political groups.

- The foreign advisers and their counseling programs are in reality "interveners" in our homeland,who direct the exploitation of the nation in

accordance with the objectives of the Russian and Cuban imperialists, in order to turn our peopleinto slaves of the hammer and sickle.

3. Selection of Appropriate Slogans ~

The leaders of the guerrilla warfare classify their slogans in accordance with the circumstances withthe aim of mobilizing the masses in a wide scale of

activities and at the highest emotional level.

When the mass uprising is being developed, our covert cadres should make partial demands,

initially demanding, e.g. "We want food," "We want freedom of worship," "We want unionfreedom" -- steps that will lead us toward the realization of the goals of our movement, which are:

GOD, HOMELAND and DEMOCRACY.

If a lack of organization and command is noted in the enemy authority, and the people findthemselves in a state of exaltation, advantage can be taken of this circumstance so that our agitatorswill raise the tone of the rallying slogans, taking them to the most strident point.

If the masses are not emotionally exalted, our agitators will continue with the "partial" slogans, andthe demands will be based on daily needs, chaining them to the goals of our movement.

An example of the need to give simple slogans is that few people think in terms of millions ofcordobas, but any citizen, however humble he may be, understands that a pair of shoes is necessary.

The goals of the movement are of an ideological nature, but our agitators must realize that food --"bread and butter," "the tortilla and red beans" -- pull along the people, and it should be understood

that this is their main mission.

4. Creation of Nuclei ~

This involves the mobilization of a specific number of agitators of the guerrilla organization of theplace. This group will inevitably attract an equal

number of curious persons who seek adventures and emotions, as well as those unhappy with thesystem of government. The guerrillas will attract sympathizers, discontented citizens as a

consequence of the repression of the system. Each guerrilla subunit will be assigned specific tasksand missions that they should carry out.


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Our cadres will be mobilized in the largest number possible, together with persons who have beenaffected by the Communist dictatorship, whether their possessions have been stolen from them, they

have been incarcerated, or tortured, or suffered from any other type of aggression against them.They will be mobilized toward the areas where the hostile and criminal elements of the FSLN, CDS

and others live, with an effort for them to be armed with clubs, iron rods, placards and if possible,small firearms, which they will carry hidden.

If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selected "jobs."

Our agitators will visit the places where the unemployed meet, as well as the unemployment offices,

in order to hire them for unspecified "jobs." Therecruitment of these wage earners is necessary because a nucleus is created under absolute orders.

The designated cadres will arrange ahead of time the transportation of the participants, in order totake them to meeting places in private or public

vehicles, boats or any other type of transportation.

Other cadres will be designated to design placards, flags and banners with different slogans or key

words, whether they be partial, temporary or of the most radical type.

Other cadres will be designated to prepare flyers, posters, signs and pamphlets to make theconcentration more noticeable. This material will contain

instructions for the participants and will also serve against the regime.

Specific tasks will be assigned to others, in order to create a "martyr" for the cause, taking the

demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities, inorder to bring about uprisings or shootings, which will cause the death of one or more persons, who

would become the martyrs, a situation that should be made use of immediately against the regime,in order to create greater conflicts.

5. Ways to Lead an Uprising at Mass Meetings ~

It can be carried out by means of a small group of guerrillas infiltrated within the masses, who will

have the mission of agitating, giving the impression that there are many of them and that they havepopular backing. Using the tactics of a force of 200-300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in

which 1,000-2,000 persons take part.

The agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means of sociopolitical objectives.

In this action one or several people of our convertmovement should take part, highly trained as mass agitators, involving innocent persons, in order to

bring about an apparent spontaneous protest demonstration. They will lead all of the concentration

to the end of it.

Outside Commando. This element stays out of all activity, located so that they can observe fromwhere they are the development of the planned events. As a point of observation, they should look

for the tower of a church, a high building, a high tree, the highest level of the stadium or anauditorium, or any other high place.

Inside Commando. This element will remain within the multitude. Great importance should be givento the protection of the leaders of these elements. Some placards or large allusive signs should be

used to designate the Commando Posts and to provide signals to the subunits. This element will


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avoid placing itself in places where fights or incidents come about after the beginning of thedemonstration.

These key agitators of ours will remain within the multitude. The one responsible for this missionwill assign ahead of time the agitators to remain

near the placard that he will indicate to them, in order to give protection to the placard from anycontrary element. In that way the commander will know where our agitators are, and will be able to

send orders to change passwords or slogans, or any other unforeseen thing, and even eventually to

incite violence if he desires it.

At this stage, once the key cadres have been dispersed, they should place themselves in visibleplaces such as by signs, lampposts, and other places which stand out.

Our key agitators should avoid places of disturbances, once they have taken care of the beginning ofthe same.

Defense Posts. These elements will act as bodyguards in movement, forming a ring of protection forthe chief, protecting him from the police and the army, or helping him to escape if it should be

necessary. They should be highly disciplined and will react only upon a verbal order from the chief.

In case the chief participates in a religious concentration, a funeral or any other type of activity inwhich they have to behave in an organized fashion, the bodyguards will remain in the ranks very

close to the chief or to the placard or banner carriers in order to give them full protection.

The participants in this mission should be guerrilla combatants in civilian clothes, or hired recruits

who are sympathizers in our struggle and who areagainst the oppressive regime.

These members must have a high discipline and will use violence only on the verbal orders of theone in charge of them.

Messengers. They should remain near the leaders, transmitting orders between the inside andoutside commandos. They will use communication radios, telephones, bicycles, motorcycles, cars,

or move on foot or horseback, taking paths or trails to shorten distances. Adolescents (male andfemale) are ideal for this mission.

Shock Troops. These men should be equipped with weapons (Knives, razors, chains, clubs,bludgeons) and should march slightly behind the innocent and gullible participants. They should

carry their weapons hidden. They will enter into action only as "reinforcements" if the guerrillaagitators are attacked by the police. They will enter the scene quickly, violently and by surprise, in

order to distract the authorities, in this way making possible the withdrawal or rapid escape of the

inside commando.

Carriers of Banners and Placards. The banners and placards used in demonstrations orconcentrations will express the protests of the population,

but when the concentration reaches its highest level of euphoria or popular discontent, our infiltratedpersons will make use of the placards against the

regime, which we manage to infiltrate in a hidden fashion, an don them slogans or key words will beexpressed to the benefit of our cause. The one responsible for this mission will assign the agitators

ahead of time to keep near the placard of any contrary element. In that way, the comandante willknow where the agitators are, and will be able to send orders to change slogans and eventually to


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incite violence if he wishes.

Agitators of Rallying Cries and Applause. They will be trained with specific instructions to use tried

rallying cries. They will be able to use phrase such as "WE ARE HUNGRY, WE WAND BREAD,"and "WE DON'T WANT COMMUNISM." Their work and their technique for agitating the masses

is quite similar to those of the leaders of applause and slogans at the high school football or baseballgames. The objective is to become more adept and not just to shout rallying cries.

6. Conclusions ~

In a revolutionary movement of guerrilla warfare, the mass concentrations and protest

demonstrations are the principle essential for the destruction of the enemy structures.

Massive In-Depth Support Through Psychological Operations ~

1. Generalities ~

The separate coverage in these sections could leave the student with some doubts. Therefore, all

sections are summarized here, in order to give a clearer picture of this book.

2. Motivation as Combatant-Propagandist ~

Every member of the struggle should know that his political mission is as important as, if not moreimportant than, his tactical mission.

3. Armed Propaganda ~

Armed propaganda in small towns, rural villages, and city residential districts should give the

impression that our weapons are not for exercising power over the people, but rather that the

weapons are for protecting the people; that they are the power of the people against the FSLNgovernment of oppression.

4. Armed Propaganda Teams ~

Armed Propaganda Teams will combine political awareness building and the ability to conductpropaganda for ends of personal persuasion, which will be carried out within the population.

5. Cover ("Facade") Organizations ~

The fusion of several organizations and associations recognized by the government, through internal

subjective control, occurs in the final stages ofthe operation, in close cooperation with mass meetings.

6. Control of Mass Demonstrations ~

The mixture of elements of the struggle with participants in the demonstration will give the

appearance of a spontaneous demonstration, lacking direction, which will be used by the agitators ofthe struggle to control the behavior of the masses.

7. Conclusion ~


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Too often we see guerrilla warfare only from the point of view of combat actions. This view iserroneous and extremely dangerous. Combat actions are not the key to victory in guerrilla warfare

but rather form part of one of the six basic efforts. There is no priority in any

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