‘Church Law’ and Ottoman-Greeks in the Second Constitutional Politics, 1910

“Church Law” and Ottoman­Greeks in the Second Constitutional Politics,1910

«“Church Law” and Ottoman­Greeks in the Second Constitutional Politics, 1910»

by Nobuyoshi Fujinami

Source:Balkan Studies (Etudes balkaniques), issue: 1 / 2007, pages: 107­132, on www.ceeol.com.

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ACADÉMIE DES SCIENCES DE BULGARIEINSTITUT D’ÉTUDES BALKANIQUESÉTUDES BALKANIQUES, 2007, No 1

NOBUYOSHI FUJINAMI (University of Tokyo)

“CHURCH LAW” AND OTTOMAN–GREEKS IN THE SECOND CON-STITUTIONAL POLITICS, 1910

INTRODUCTION

In recent years we witnessed increasing concern for non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman-Greeks are no exception in thisregard. Contrary to the nationalist discourses that have dominated both academicand non-academic fields for years, which tend to see non-Turkish subjects as “trai-tors” (in Turkish view) or “unredeemed” co-nationals oppressed under “Turkish yoke”(in non-Turkish view), recent works on Ottoman-Greeks shed new light on their roleand participation in “Ottoman” modernization project1.

The Second Constitutional Period was unique in the history of Ottoman-Greeksin at least two regards; first, the Young Turk revolution brought about many funda-mental changes both in logic and institutional framework of the Ottoman politicalarena. No matter how little were their actual participation in the Young Turk move-ment2, Ottoman-Greeks were inherent element of the empire and so they had to

1 Dimitri Gondicas & Charles Issawi (eds.), Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism, Princ-eton, The Darwin Press, 1999, was the turning point for this new tendency. For the recent achievementson the transition in the Ottoman-Greeks’���������������� ����������������������� ����������� ������– 1919:����������������������������� ������ ������� ��!"#$$���, 1998; Eadem, The Pas-sage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States: a Long and Difficult Process, the Greek Case,Istanbul, Isis, 2004; and Haris Eksertzoglou, Osmanlı’da Cemiyetler ve Rum Cemaati: Dersaadet RumCemiyet-i Edebiyesi, 1861-1912, Istanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999. See also Vangelis Kechri-otis, “Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath ofthe Young Turk Revolution,” Études balkaniques, 41 (1), 2005, 51-71. I would like to thank VangelisKechriotis, who kindly gave me invaluable materials and made a comment on the earlier version of thisarticle.

2 A. J. Panayotopoulos, “Early Relations between the Greeks and the Young Turks,” BalkanStudies, 21 (1), 1980, 87-95.

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adapt themselves to this new environment. Especially with the re-introduction of theparliamentary system, Ottoman-Greek political actors shared with their Muslim andnon-Muslim compatriots the same political procedure on the empire-wide level. Sec-ond, with these changes now Ottoman-Greeks felt themselves freer to act in order toachieve their version of modernization project, which had been argued and con-structed from the Tanzimat to the Hamidian periods. Although the irredentist nation-alism or “Megali Idea” of the Hellenic state is better known than any other ideolo-gies, in these days Ottoman-Greeks faced a couple of theories which in one way oranother tried to coordinate the relationship among the ethnicity, religion and state;and most of these ideologies had the Ottoman Empire as their important factor. Littleworks, however, examine the political background on which these ideologies wereconstructed and put into practice, especially under the new political climate of thesecond constitutional period. Consequently, the relationship between one’s ideo-logical stance and political behavior in these turbulent years was left unclear3.

It is essential, then, to inquire how the ideologues of these theories acted in thenew era of the Ottoman constitutional politics, and in what way their political activi-ties influenced the ideological stance of them, and vice versa. In this paper muchattention would be paid to the details in the actual procedure of the Ottoman consti-tutional politics. This, I hope, would help us to have clearer idea on the question as tohow new “rules of game” were applied to the Ottoman-Greek political actors andhow they tried to put their ideologies into effect in the process of the day-to-daypolitics of the empire. In other words, the main questions to be asked here are; whatwere the norms of behavior of Ottoman-Greeks and what were their priorities in thereality of the Ottoman politics? Church Law and enactment process of it provide usa good example in this respect. The law attracted attention both inside and outsidethe empire most from spring to fall of 1910 and left a profound and lasting impact onthe Ottoman-Greek political sphere. This issue gives us many keys for understand-ing the Ottoman-Greeks’ position in the late years of the empire.

I think it is useful to explain the use of the term “Greek” in this paper, beforemoving into the main subject. The word “Rum” had begun to designate all the ortho-dox subjects of the empire at least until the end of the 18th century4. In the nextcentury the situation changed, especially after the establishment of the BulgarianExarchate. Ethnic consciousness gradually replaced the religious identity, both inGreek and non-Greek Orthodox peoples, though it does not mean that their religioussentiment ceased to exist. As a result, eventually the word “Rum” began to mean

3 Catherine Boura, “The Greek Millet in Turkish Politics: Greeks in the Ottoman Parliament(1908-1918),” Gondicas & Issawi, Ottoman Greeks, 193-206; and Thanos Veremis, “The HellenicKingdom and the Ottoman Greeks: The Experiment of the “Society of Constantinople”,” Ibid., 181-191, provide us only general overview.

4 The word Rum was not used in this sense in the classical era. Paraskevas Konortas, “FromTâ’ife to Millet: Ottoman Terms for the Ottoman Greek Orthodox Community,” Gondicas and Issawi,Ottoman Greeks, 169-179. See also Salih Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı Kimliği: 14.-17. Yüzyıllarda Rûm/Rûmi Aidiyet ve İmgeleri, İstanbul, Kitap Yayınevi, 2004.

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narrower entity than before, that is, ethnically “Greek” people. The Patriarchate triedto hold its ecumenical tradition as firm as possible, and continued to claim to be thereligious institution of all Orthodox subjects. In this paper the word “Rum” is trans-lated as “Greek.” All dates are rendered into Gregorian calendar.

SETTINGS:

What was the Church Law? Church Law was enacted in 3 July 1910, with thepurpose of settling the ethnic/religious conflict between Greeks and Bulgarians inMacedonia5. As a matter of fact, the law did not bring completely new provisions tothe Greco-Bulgarian ecclesiastical strife. It was only a reconfirmation of the condi-tions made in 1870, when the Bulgarian Exarchate was created. If all the villagersbelonged to either the Patriarchate or the Exarchate, all the churches were to begiven to that community (article 2). If there were only one church in the village andthe population was divided into disciples of both the Patriarchate and the Exarchate,existing church was to be given to the side which fulfilled the provisions we will seelater. In this case the government was responsible to provide all the money requiredfor the other side to build new one (article 3). If there were more than two churches,same criteria were adopted to give the priority to choose any one of the existingchurches for their use (article 4). The law covered only those who belonged to theGreek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate (article 1).

Enactment process of the Church Law (from January 1909 to June 1910)

From the very first days of the Second Constitutional Period the Greco-Bul-garian strife attracted attention. The necessity to settle this problem by legal act wasfirst considered when, from 30 January to 3 February 1909, some deputies ques-tioned the Minister of Interior as to how the government tried to put brigands inMacedonia into control. The Minister of Interior Hüseyn Hilmi Paşa, the formerinspector-general of the Ottoman Macedonia, who would become grand vizier twoweeks later, indicated that the church problem was at the core of this conflict andasked the chamber to set up a special commission to compose the bill for the settle-ment. After three days of hot argument the chamber voted in favor of this proposition6.

5 Rumeli’de kain münazaaün-fih kilise ve mektepler hakk ında kanunu, or “Kiliseler Kanunu”in short. Takvim-i Vekayi, No 575, 6 July 1910, 1-2; Düstur, tertib-i sani, cilt. 2, İstanbul: Matbaa-iOsmaniye, 1330, 431-433. For this law and later development see also Gülnihâl Bozkurt, “II. Meşruti-yet Osmanlı Meclis Zabıtlarında Bulgar Azınlıklarının Kilise ve Okul Sorunları,” OTAM, 4, 1993, 99-119; and Bülent Atalay, Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi’nin Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1908-1923), İstan-bul, Tatav, 2001, 50-69.

6 For the whole discussion consult Takvim-i Vekayi, Nos 110-118 (Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Ce-ridesi, Devre 1, Sene-i İçtimai 1, İçtima 20-22). Hereafter TV, Nos 110-118 (MMZC D.1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 20-22). Proposition of Hüseyn Hilmi Paşa is found in TV, No 110 (MMZC D.1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 20), 7-8. See also����#�%�&�����%'��&()% ���*+�& ������������������������ ���� �,#��&�-."/$�&�0�1��."���2���"�, eds.,������,�3�+'��, 1984, p. 89.

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As early as 13 March, a subcommittee for drafting the bill was formed in theCouncil of State (Şura-yı Devlet). Two Greeks and two Bulgarians took seat in thissubcommittee7. Until the end of June the subcommittee finished its work8, and thefirst bill of the Church Law was presented to the chamber on 7 July. The chamberimmediately set up a special commission and sent it the bill for study9. On 19 Augustthe chamber began to discuss the bill in plenary session, but only the first threearticles had been finished until the end of the first parliamentary year10. After thelong interval discussion on the bill began on 8 March 1910 again in the secondparliamentary year and on 14 March the first round discussion on the bill finished11.The chamber discussed the bill for the second time in 122nd and 123rd sessions on 25and 26 June. Since some important clauses had been already amended and approvedin the first round discussion, there remained little work to be done. Greek deputiesboycotted the last session to express their opposition, only to see the bill duly passthe chamber12. Next day the law passed the senate13.

PATRIARCHATE’S OPPOSITION TOWARD THE CHURCH LAW:

Opposition of Ottoman-Greek deputies in the parliament(March and June 1910)

At first Greek deputies were against the necessity of the law itself. Greco-Bulgarian church problem was nothing but an ordinary conflict over property. Suf-fice it to bring the issue to court14. Even after the discussion on the bill started some

7 “Rumeli’de Kiliseler Meselesi,” İkdam, No 5316, 14 March 1909; “Kilise Mesaili,” Yeni Gazete,No 204, 14 March 1909. Damat �erif Paşa, a member of the Council of State, was nominated chair ofthis committee. “Kilise Mesaili: Komisyon Teşkili,” Yeni Gazete, No 206, 16 March 1909.

8 “Makedonya’da Kiliseler Meselesi,” Tanin, No 293, 26 June 1909; “Kiliseler Meselesi,” YeniTasvir-i Efkar, No 29, 28 June 1910.

9 TV, No 280 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 107), p. 5. Members of this special commission were asfollows: Emanüel Karasu (Salonica, Jew), Vartkes (Erzurum, Armenian), Seyyit (İzmir), Filibeli RızaPaşa (Karahisar-ı Sahip), Gümülcineli İsmail (Gümülcine), Mustafa Arif (Kırkkilise), Abdullah Azmi(Kütahya). Pandelaki Kozmidi, a Greek deputy from İstanbul, was also elected but refused to join thecommission. TV, No 352 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 136), p. 3.

10 In the first parliamentary year the bill was discussed in 136th and 138th sessions.11 In the second parliamentary year the bill was discussed in 50th, 51st and 54th sessions for the

first round discussion.12 MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 122, 2477-2482; MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 123, 2488-2489.13 Greek senators in vain tried to obstruct the procedure. MAZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 94, 890-913.14 Yorgi Huneyos, a deputy from Salonica, disapproved of the Hüseyn Hilmi Paşa’s proposition

asserting that the church problem was not a religious but a property problem. This problem should besettled within the realm of existing laws. TV, No 114 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 21), p. 2. The Patriarchateadopted the same logic. “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Sada-yı Millet, No 114, 24 March 1910; “Kiliseler Mese-lesi,” Sada-yı Millet, No 178, 27 May 1910; “Kiliseler Meselesi,” Sada-yı Millet, No 180, 29 May1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Sada-yı Millet, No 183, 1 June 1910.

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Greek deputies tried to persuade their colleagues since there was no necessity forsuch a law it was better to disregard the bill altogether15.

Greeks’ voices were not heard by the majority and the chamber began to dis-cuss the bill article by article. Both Greeks and non-Greeks talked in the most con-troversial way on 3rd and 4th articles because these articles would determine the crite-ria by which churches be delivered from one side to another. Church should be givena) to the side in the name of which it was built, or b) to the numerical majority of thevillage. Original draft of the government adopted the first option, while the specialcommission of the chamber preferred the second. Obviously the first option was ofbenefit to Greeks. Since the Greek Patriarchate had long been the only religiousinstitution of all the orthodox subjects of the empire, almost all orthodox churcheswere built in the name of it. Of course Bulgarians tried to convince their colleaguesto adopt the second option, claiming that principle of majority is a natural conse-quence of the constitutional regime. Finally the 3rd article was modified as follows:“church would be given to the side in the name of which it was built, but in case lessthan one third of the population belong to that side, church should be given to theother side”16. Same criterion was applied to the 4th article too17.

Patriarchate’s tactics to oppose the law (July 1910)

Soon after the Church Law passed the parliament the Patriarchate began con-sidering how they should react against the law. On 29 June, the day after the secondparliamentary year ended, two councils (the Holy Synod and the mixed council) ofthe Patriarchate met together and decided to send the sultan a petition not to sanctionthe law18. The Patriarchate’s wish was submitted to the cabinet meeting, and twodays later, on 1 July, Baha, head of the religious affairs in the Ministry of Justice andReligious Affairs, visited the Patriarchate and told the view of the cabinet: the sultan,as a constitutional monarch, could not but sanction the law which passed the parlia-ment. The councils of the Patriarchate insisted on their opposition against the lawand sent a note to the palace and the government to let them know about their wish tohave an audience with the sultan19. Nevertheless the law was duly sanctioned by thesultan on 2 July20. The Patriarch Joachim III was told when he visited the grandvizier on 4 July that the law had been already sanctioned and sooner or later would

15 For example Huneyos and Pavlo Karolidi, a deputy from İzmir, claimed that there was nonecessity to make such a law, before the chamber moved to discuss the bill article by article. TV, No 359(MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 138), p. 4.

16 TV, Nos 361-364 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 138); MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 122, 2479-2482.17 MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 123, 2488-2489.18 “Makedonya’daki Kilise ve Mektepler Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 109, 30 June 1910; “Kilise

ve Mektepler Kanunu,” Yeni İkdam, No 110, 1 July 1910.19 !������, 2 July 1910, cited in “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 667,

3 July 1910; and “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 660, 3 July 1910.20 Yeni Gazete, No 667, 3 July 1910.

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be put into force. Joachim replied that he would like to postpone his visit to thepalace since he had to consult with the councils for this new situation. On the sameday the two councils reconfirmed their early decision to have an audience with thesultan and to protest the law21.

On 8 July the councils of the Patriarchate for the first time considered thepossibility to summon the “national council” (meclis-i milli, .������/�.���). Thisbody, which would be composed of the members of the both councils of thePatriarchate and representatives elected from every diocese, was considered to bethe highest echelon of the Orthodox community to express its will. At that time thecouncils postponed the final decision on this matter after Joachim’s visit to the pal-ace, but a special committee was founded in order to determine the principles thePatriarchate would follow22. On 12 July Joachim, accompanied by Kozmidi, made avisit to the palace. The Patriarch protested the Church Law and proposed anotherplan; existing churches should remain in the hands of the Patriarchate, and in com-pensation, new churches were to be built for the Exarchate. On the rejection of thisproposition Joachim even resorted to his usual tool of pressure; he expressed hisdesire to resign. But he gave up the idea when the sultan persuaded him not to do so23.

Patriarchate’s decision and insistence to summon the “national council”and reaction from the government (July-September 1910)

Next day Joachim reported his meeting with the sultan to the councils. Theycontemplated about their next action and examined a report submitted by the specialcommittee which said as follows; first, the Patriarchate would use all the meansbestowed by international treaties and international law in order to defend its rights.Second, the Patriarchate would summon the national council without requesting per-mission from the government. Third, the Patriarchate would explain its flock thecourse of the events and its stance in it. Fourth, in case the government would notgive permission to summon the national council the Patriarch and members of thetwo councils would resign altogether and all churches would be shut down as a signof protest24. Two days later, on 15 July, these four points were approved by the coun-cils. The Patriarchate would send letters of protest to the Great Powers, summon thenational council, and explain its conduct to its flock. For these aims the two councilselected from their members two commissions, one of which would draw up the

21 “Rum Patriği Efendi,” Yeni Gazete, No 669, 5 July 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhane-si,” Yeni İkdam, No 114, 5 July 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 116, 7July 1910. !������, cited in “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 663, 6 July 1910; and “KiliselerKanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 664, 7 July 1910.

22 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 667, 10 July 1910.23 “Rum Patriği’nin Huzura Kabulü,” Yeni İkdam, No 122, 13 July 1910; “Rum Patriği Efendi’nin

Huzura Kabulü,” Yeni Gazete, No 677, 13 July 1910; “Rum Patriği’nin Kabulü,” Tanin, No 670, 13 July1910.

24 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 672, 15 July 1910.

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program of the national council and memorandum to the flock, the other wouldcompose the letters of protest to the Great Powers25.

The government let the Patriarchate know through informal channels that theywould not permit and recognize the national council26. However, since at this stage thePatriarchate informed neither the government nor its flock of its decision to summonthe national council officially, seemingly there was no obstruction for the implementa-tion of the law. From 1 to 9 August the Minister of Interior Talat made a trip to Mac-edonia, apparently with the purpose of inspecting the preconditions for the imple-mentation of the Church Law27. On returning Talat explained that less than 45 churcheswere to be delivered from the Patriarchate to the Exarchate according to the law28.

On 5 August the two councils approved a note by which the Patriarchate wouldinform the Ministry of Justice about its intention to summon the national council.They also approved the memorandum to the flock29. Next day the Patriarchate sentthis memorandum all over the country30. As was apparent from the comment of theMinister of Justice Necmettin Molla to Tanin, the government took a wait-and-seeattitude towards this memorandum and considered it nothing but a private corre-spondence between the Patriarchate and local metropolitan bishops31. But the notefor the government was another thing. On 6 August the Minister of Justice refused toaccept the note because of some inappropriate terms in it. The Minister also in-formed orally that the government would not allow the Patriarchate to summon thenational council32. On 8 and 10 August the two councils of the Patriarchate mettogether twice and discussed what measure should they take against this refusal.They decided not to give in, and in case their note would be refused a second time,all the members of the councils would resign as a gesture of protest33. On 11 Augustthe Patriarchate presented a new note but it was rejected again. In this second note

25 !������, cited in “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 673, 16 July 1910; and “KiliselerKanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 674, 17 July 1910.

26 "��# reported the government’s view in this way, cited in “Kiliseler Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam,No 138, 30 July 1910.

27 Yeni İkdam, No 141, 2 August 1910; Yeni İkdam, No 149, 10 August 1910.28 S., “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında, Rum Patrikhanesi – Doğru Yanlış Sözleri,” Yeni Gazete, No

703, 9 August 1910.29 “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 145, 6 July 1910; “Rum

Patrikhanesi’nde,” Yeni Gazete, No 700, 6 August 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 701, 7August 1910. "��#, cited in “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 694, 7 August 1910.

30 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 695, 8 August 1910. Text of this memorandum isfound in “Rum Patrikhanesi’nin Tahrikatı: Bir Tahrirat-ı Umumiye,” Tanin, No 696, 9 August 1910.

31 “Patrikhanenin Mahut Tahrirat-ı Umumiye: Sadrazam Vekili ile Mülakat,” Tanin, No 699, 12August 1910. "��# also reported this stance of the government, cited in “Kiliseler Meselesi,” Yeniİkdam, No 138, 30 July 1910.

32 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 456 �7�89�9��:7:5;�����%'��&()% ���*+�& p.112. For the text of this note see “Patrikhanenin Red Olunan Takriri,” Yeni İkdam, No 153, 14 August1910.

33 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 703, 9 August 1910; “Kiliseler KanunuEtrafında: Rum Patrikhanesi’nin Harekatı,” Yeni Gazete, No 705, 11 August 1910; “Patrikhane NeKarar Verdi?” Tanin, No 698, 11 August 1910; and “Patrikhane Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 150, 11August 1910.

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the Minister found an expression of regret for the rejection of the previous one, andaccording to him, the government could not accept such an expression of personalfeelings34.

Things began to change from 22 August. On hearing the news that election forthe national council had started, the Minister of Justice sent a note all over the countryto declare its definite prohibition on the national council35. Next day, on 23 August,the Patriarchate discussed how to react to this declaration. Joachim asked the coun-cils to apply to the government for permission beforehand on such condition thatthe national council discuss only “general problems” and the program of the councilalso be drafted accordingly. He added he had already written his private draft for theagenda of the national council for this purpose. In Joachim’s opinion the Patriarchateshould reconcile with the government so long as the interest of the Patriarchate wasnot hurt. But the two councils rejected the Patriarch’s proposition and decided unani-mously that the Patriarchate should adhere to their first decision36. On 25 Augustfive Greek deputies visited þeyhülislam Musa Kazım and submitted five-point notefor “reconciliation” in which they criticized the government in very strong words37.

The government responded38. On 31 August the Ministry of Justice reiteratedin an official circulation that those who participate in the national council would bejailed. The logic in it held the Patriarchate responsible for the use of police, in case itdares to continue its illegal act, since the government had already alarmed severaltimes to get back to the constitutional norm; it did not listen to these reasonable andmoderate advise, finally the government was obliged to use force to keep the order39.

34 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 706, 12 August 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi’ninProtestosu: Redd-i Takrir Bi-Defa-i Sani,” Tanin, No 699, 12 August 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi’ninTeşebbüsat-ı Garibesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 151, 12 August 1910.

35 Text of the note is found in “Taşralara Tebligat,” Tanin, No 710, 23 August 1910; and “RumPatrikhanesi’nin Hilaf-ı Salahiyet Teşebbüsatına Karşı,” Yeni İkdam, No 162, 23 August 1910.

36 $�������, 24 August 1910, cited in “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No164, 25 August 1910; and “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 712, 25 August 1910.

37 “Rum Mebuslarının Müracaatı,” Yeni Gazete, No 721, 27 August 1910; “Osmanlı RumMebuslarının Şeyhülislam Efendi’yi Ziyareti,” Yeni İkdam, No 166, 27 August 1910; “Rum MebuslarınınBir Teşebbüs-i Acibi: Yeni Tedbirler!,” Tanin, No 714, 27 August 1910. For the full text see “RumMebuslarının Muhtırası,” Yeni Gazete, No 722, 28 August 1910; “Rum Mebuslarının Muhtırası,” Yeniİkdam, No 167, 28 August 1910; “Rum Mebuslarının Takriri,” Tanin, No 715, 28 August 1910. Greektext is found in ����%'��&()% ���*+�& �112-117.

38 Halil Menteşe, head of the Party of Union and Progress, and Baha, head of the religiousaffairs in the Ministry of Justice, said that the national council was absolutely prohibited. “RumPatrikhanesi: Meclis-i Milli İnikat Edemeyecek,” Yeni İkdam, No 165, 26 August 1910. Furthermore,the Minister of Justice told the secretary of the Patriarch that the government would employ everymeasure in order to prohibit the national council. “Patrikhanenin Meclis-i Umumisi,” Yeni İkdam, No169, 30 August 1910. Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice Nedim also confirmed in the interviewwith Osmanischer Lloyd that the government did not change its stance on this issue. “Rum Patrikhane-si,” Yeni İkdam, No 170, 31 August 1910.

39 For this circulation see Yeni İkdam, No 171, 1 September 1910; “Münazaaün-fih Kilise veMektepler: Beyanname,” Yeni Gazete, No 726, 1 September 1910; and “Hükümet Men Edecek: Beyan-name,” Tanin, No 719, 1 September 1910. See the same logic in “Bir Adım Geri,” Tanin, No 730, 12September 1910.

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This circulation was followed by the similar statement made by the undersecretaryof the Ministry of Justice Nedim, and both the Ministers of Interior and Justice40. Butthe Patriarchate did not give in. On 4 September Greek electors in İstanbul electedtwo representatives (Kazanova and Pançeri) for the national council and on 6 Sep-tember the two councils of the Patriarchate met together and elected twelvemetropolitans as representatives for the national council and worked on the programof the national council41. On 4 September when Greek electors met, Joachim made aspeech on the significance of the national council and accused the behavior of thepresent government, by making a comparison with the sultan Abdülhamit who, ac-cording to him, had acted in fairer manner towards his non-Muslim subjects42. Thisstatement instigated harsh criticisms against the Patriarch. In spite of the refutationmade by some43, his speech was unfavorably received even among Greeks44.

Indeed some Greeks complained about the militant stance of the Patriarchate.Among other things it was condemned that the Patriarchate summons the nationalcouncil on the same day the Hellenic parliament was to be summoned. It seemed thatdecision makers of the Patriarchate had to comply with and/or tried to make use ofthese complaints. The Patriarchate circle launched several trial balloons especiallyduring this stage. They might have hoped the government would soften its attitudein response to the Patriarchate’s “conciliatory” behavior and/or this would improvetheir position vis-à-vis the Ottoman “public opinion.” Just around this time rumorspread that the government would allow the national council if the Patriarchate post-pones the prearranged date45. It was also reported that the Patriarchate decided to put

40 See Nedim’s comment to �%����� ���, cited in “Rum Patrikhanesinde Meclis-i Umumi,”Yeni İkdam, No 177, 7 September 1910; and “Adliye Müsteşarı’nın Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 725, 7 Sep-tember 1910. The Ministers of Interior and Justice made similar statement to Moniteur, cited in “RumPatrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 732, 7 September 1910.

41 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 726, 8 September 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,”Tanin, No 727, 9 September 1910.

42 “Rum Patrikhanesi’nde İntihabat,” Yeni İkdam, No 175, 5 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi:İntihabatı Yapmışlar,” Yeni Gazete, No 730, 5 September 1910.

43 Souliotis-Nicolaidis refuted the claims of Turkish periodicals and said the true meaning of thePatriarch’s speech was different. According to him the Patriarch said: “today metropolitans met greatdifficulties which had not been seen even under the despotism. This is not to say that we praise thedespotism. Contrary, the Patriarchate did every effort to make the egalitarianism and rights of thenation a real one, although these words remain fictitious to date.” See <=%�>?��%�����@��"%#"A�� B!������#�� ���&�����, No 19, 11 September 1910, cited in�����%'��&()% ���*+�& �:CC(:CDE

44 “Patrik Efendi’nin Sözleri,” Tanin, No 728, 10 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeniİkdam, No 180, 10 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi Meclis-i Millisi,” Yeni Gazete, No 735, 10September 1910. An anonymous writer with an initial “C.” said that Joachim should have thoughtabout the oppression Armenians had suffered in the Hamidian era. C., “Ermeni Vatandaşlarımız veRum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 738, 13 September 1910.

45 Rumors quoted Kozmidi saying that Minister of Justice told him if the Patriarchate postponesthe date the government would give permission. !���, 10 September 1910, cited in “Evamir-i Hükümetve Patrikhane,” Yeni İkdam, No 181, 11 September 1910. Tanin also quoted !��� and denied thereport. “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 729, 11 September 1910. Interestingly, Kozmidi him-self denied these rumors and said the Minister never promised such possibility openly. He only specu-lated from the words of the Minister. “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 183, 13 September1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 738, 13 September 1910.

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off the national council46. A certain metropolitan who was a member of the HolySynod said he did not think the government would dare to jail the participants. Headded that it was within the authorities of the Patriarchate to summon the nationalcouncil47. One Greek deputy anonymously told that the government did not have tooppose the national council so harsh since it would have little significance politicallyanyway48. A Greek paper '(& reported that there were two currents in the govern-ment circle concerning the national council, one of which asserted that the govern-ment should prohibit the national council by every possible means, while the otherwas critical about the harsh measures from the side of the government which wouldhurt the position of the Patriarchate49. On 12 September Joachim expressed his hopethat the issue would be settled by mutual concessions, since the government alsowanted that50. On this day the councils of the Patriarchate drew up the answer to thecirculation of the government dated 22 August. This might be another attempt of thePatriarchate to put things into more “conciliatory” atmosphere, as some newspapersinterpreted51. On receiving this answer, however, the Minister of Justice repeatedthat there was no change in the government’s stance52.

How was the issue settled?

A day before the scheduled date the government began to take action. Polisobstructed and prohibited those who came to the Patriarchate entering it. Next day,14 September, 11 representatives were arrested on their way to the Patriarchate.They gave written oath not to participate in the national council and were released inexchange. In the afternoon at the Patriarchate Joachim declared the national councilopen with 63 participants. They were members of the Holy Synod and the mixedcouncil, and those representatives who were already in the Patriarchate or could

46 “Rum Patrikhanesi Meclis-i Millisi,” Yeni Gazete, No 735, 10 September 1910. OsmanischerLloyd, 11 September 1910, cited in “Patrikhane - Meclis-i Milli Meselesi,” Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar, No 352,12 September 1910.

47 Osmanischer Lloyd, cited in “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 167, 28 August 1910; and“Fener Meclis-i Millisi Meselesi,” Tanin, No 715, 28 August 1910.

48 La Turquie, 5 September 1910, cited in “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 176, 6 Septem-ber 1910; and “Patrikhane Meselesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 731, 6 September 1910.

49 Yeni İkdam denied this claim, though. “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni İkdam, No 154, 15August 1910.

50 “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 183, 13 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi,”Yeni Gazete, No 738, 13 September 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 731, 13 September1910. On this occasion Joachim told that former undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice Kostaki Vayani,a Greek, was sent to the Patriarchate by the Ministry of Justice to talk about the possible way of settle-ment. This might be one of the trial balloons the Patriarchate employed to find a way of compromise.Kostaki Vayani denied this news. “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 183, 13 September 1910.

51 Tanin considered this as a right though rather delayed step of the Patriarchate to get back toconstitutional norm. See “Bir Adım Geri,” Tanin, No 730, 12 September 1910.

52 “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 183, 13 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhane-si,” Yeni Gazete, No 738, 13 September 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 731, 13 Sep-tember 1910.

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enter it somehow. The national council immediately gave decision to postpone laterdiscussion until the government gives permission. On returning 15 members of thenational council were arrested. On 15 September in response to the note from theMinistry of Justice which said as soon as the Patriarchate gives up summoning thenational council measures taken by the government immediately be lifted, two coun-cils decided to put off the national council “for a while53.” This decision becametarget of criticisms, since the Holy Synod and the mixed council, the councils withlower authority, decided to cancel off the national council, the council with the high-est authority, in spite of the latter’s decision to postpone its agendas for a week.However, the councils duly put their decision into effect and on 17 September, theypresented a note to the Ministry of Justice and communicated their decision to giveup summoning the national council “for a while,” in spite of the opposition of thePatriarch that they should persist in their first decision. On the same day Joachimexpressed his wish to resign, because of his disagreement with the two councils,only to take it back two days later54. After that date the national council issue nevercame back to the agenda of both the government and the Patriarchate.

ACTORS AND “RULES OF THE GAME”

Relevant actors and phases of development

Who were the participating actors in the Church Law issue? Of course themost active and most important actor was the Greek Patriarchate. Without doubt themost significant actor within it was the Patriarch Joachim III himself. Besides himthere were two councils in the Patriarchate. The Holy Synod (meclis-i ruhani) wascomposed of 12 metropolitans, while the other body, the mixed council (meclis-imuhtelit), represented the will of the “lay” flock, with the 4 cleric and 8 lay mem-bers55. Two councils met together when the situation was important; and the nationalcouncil issue was such a situation. Greek deputies and senators intervened too. It

53 For the course of the events in these three days see “Rum Patrikhanesi” and “Dünkü PatrikhaneVukuatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 184, 14 September 1910; “Fener Patrikhanesi’nde: Hükümet Kararını TatbikEdiyor,” Tanin, No 732, 14 September 1910; “Hükümetin Tedabir-i Musibesi, Patrikhanenin Protesto-su,” Yeni Gazete, No 739, 14 September 1910; “Patrikhane Meselesi ve Meclis-i Umuminin İnikadı,”Yeni İkdam, No 185, 15 September 1910; “Patrikhanenin Serkeşliği,” Tanin, No 733, 15 September1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi, Meclis-i Milli İnikat Etti mi?,” Yeni Gazete, No 740, 15 September 1910;“Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 741, 16 September 1910; “Meclis-i Milli Meselesi,” Tanin, No734, 16 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi ve Evvelki Günkü ve Dünkü Vukuatı,” Yeniİkdam, No 186, 16 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi: Son İçtimada,” Yeni İkdam, No 187,17 September 1910; and “Patrikhane Meclis-i Millisi,” Tanin, No 735, 17 September 1910. See also����%'��&-)% ���*+�&, p. 118.

54 “Patrikhane Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 189, 19 September 1910; “Rum Patrikhanesi Mesele-si: Patrik Efendi’nin Sebeb-i İstifası,” Yeni İkdam, No 190, 20 September 1910; “Patrik Efendi ileMülakat,” Tanin, No 738, 20 September 1910.

55 For these two councils see Gerasimos Augustinos, The Greeks in Asia Minor, Kent: KentState University Press, 1992, pp.122-137; and Athanasia Anagnostopulu, “Tanzimat ve Rum MilletininKurumsal Çerçevesi: Patrikhane, Cemaat Kurumları, Eğitim,” in Pinelopi Stathis, ed., 19.Yüzyıl

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should be borne in mind, however, that Ottoman-Greeks never became politicallymonolithic entity. Turkish periodicals were also aware of the disaccord among theOttoman-Greek political actors and sometimes tried to make use of it by cultivatingthe difference of opinions among them56. We observe two major sets of confronta-tions in the course of the event. One was the split among Ottoman-Greek deputies;the other was the dispute within the Patriarchate.

I think it would be useful for our purpose to classify the phases of develop-ment as follows: 1) Greeks’ activity in the parliament (to June 1910), 2) after the lawpassed the parliament (July), 3) after the Patriarchate’s decision to summon the na-tional council (from July to August), 4) after the note of the Ministry of Justice toprohibit the national council (from mid-August to September), and 5) the last phasebegan when the national council issue was over. Let us see the behavior of abovementioned political actors in each phase.

As Karolidi would write three years later, almost all Greek deputies and sena-tors were united against the common enemy of Bulgarians until the summer of 191057.At this stage Greek deputies took the leading part in opposing the bill. Even someGreeks like Aristidi Paşa�and Alexandre Mavroyeni, who would keep distance withthe Patriarchate’s action later, actively opposed the bill both in the chamber and thesenate58. The Patriarchate, and especially the Patriarch Joachim, who rarely enteredthe scene in the first stage, became the main actor to negotiate with the governmentin the second stage. Greek deputies and senators supported the Patriarch’s activityby visiting the leaders of the government59.

In due course difference of opinions among Greek deputies began to appear.On 11 July, on occasion of a public gathering in İzmir, Karolidi distinguished him-self by saying that the Church Law was not such a bad thing for Greeks and de-manded to act in a more decent manner. Greek mass accused him bitterly howeverand he had to quit his speech60. A Greek newspaper !������ even recommendedhim to resign61. After the Patriarchate decided to summon the national council, split

İstanbul’unda Gayrimüslimler, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003, 1-35. See also Alexis Alex-andris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974, Athens: Centre forAsia Minor Studies, 1992, 2nd ed, 32-34.

56 For example, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı referred to a report which said that the Patriarchate’sdecision to send a letter of protest to the Great Powers was made against the will of the Patriarch. Thisinterpretation, if the Patriarchate wanted, would allow Joachim an opportunity to retreat at that point.See Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Patrikhane Mukarreratı,” Tanin, No 674, 17 July 1910.

57 @����& 1�"���+�&, )���� �� * �%�#%�, �����: @. �. @.�"# ��, 1913, 242-243.58 See Karolidis’ account on their oppos���������F����E�1�"���+�& �242-243.59 On 29 June Greek deputies decided to send a telegram to the palace in order to protest the law.

“Makedonya’daki Kilise ve Mektepler Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 109, 30 June 1910. On 6 July AristidiPaşa, Boşo and Huneyos visited the Sublime Porte. “Rum Mebusların Ziyareti,” Yeni Gazete, No 671, 7July 1910. Again on 20 July five Greek deputies visited the grand vizier. Yeni Gazete, No 685, 21 July1910; Tanin, No 678, 21 July 1910.

60 “Kiliseler Kanunu,” Yeni İkdam, No 122, 13 July 1910; “Kilise Kanunu – İzmir Mitingi,” Yeniİkdam, No 125, 16 July 1910; “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 680, 16 July 1910; “PazarGünkü Miting ve Mebusa Hakaret,” Tanin, No 673, 16 July 1910.

61 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 669, 12 July 1910.

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became more apparent. On the one side, Aristidi Paşa, Karolidi and Mavroyeni werecritical of the Patriarchate’s militant behavior and took more moderate a position. Itmust be noted, however, that these Greeks did support the Greek cause in their ownway and indirectly aided the Patriarchate62. On the other side members or close asso-ciates of the Society of Constantinople, and its front organization the Greek PoliticalLeague (�����% ?& @��%�% ?& ���+.�$�&), intervened in the issue on behalf of thePatriarchate in a more uncompromising way. This split took definite shape whenfive Greek deputies who were the members of the Greek Political League submitteda note to şeyhülislam on 25 August, the very strong tone of which reduced the al-ready little, if any, chance of compromise63. Kostantin Savopulos, a deputy fromKaresi, accused his colleagues because they used his signature without consent inorder to show as if all Greek deputies agreed with this action. Aristidi Paşa andKarolidi, in their interview with Jeune Turc, admitted that not all the Greek deputiesapproved the note64. As we will see later this split became even broader when the“rapprochement” with Bulgarians took place, and would never be overcome untilthe Balkan Wars. In conclusion this split among Greek deputies was one of the mostimportant results of the Church Law issue. It represented the two different opinionson the question how to cope with the Ottoman government in particular; and withthe Ottoman nation in general.

Talking about the dispute within the Patriarchate, we have to bear in mind thatsince his first term of office there already had been a severe confrontation betweenpro- and anti-Joachim camps in the Patriarchate65. In the period under study, at first itseemed as if all the actors within the Patriarchate were united against the commonthreat. As new factors and then new political needs entered the scene, so changed thepriority and power balance among these actors. Especially in the later stages, therelationship between the Patriarch and the two councils in the Patriarchate, the HolySynod and the mixed council, was not necessarily a smooth one. Joachim and thetwo councils often opposed each other openly. One of the reasons of this confronta-

62 They defended the Greek cause and stood against the government both in the chamber andthe senate until the law passed the parliament. Even after that date, for example, Aristidi Paşa and theMinister of Forestry, Agriculture and Mining Dimitraki Mavrokordato visited the Ministry of Justiceon the very day when the Patriarchate informed its decision to give up summoning the national council.Both of these Greek politicians talked about the possible way of settlement with the Minister of Justice.“Patrikhane Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 189, 19 September 1910.

63 Turkish periodicals were offended and almost unanimously criticized Greek deputies’ action.In fact the note had almost nothing to do with the Church Law or the national council. Hüseyn Cahit,“İtilaf İçin,” Tanin, No 714, 27 August 1910. See also “Rum Mebuslarının Muhtırası: Hükümet-i Os-maniye ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 167, 28 August 1910; “Rum Mebuslarının Muhtırası,”Yeni Gazete, No 722, 28 August 1910. Greek deputies themselves admitted the note was stronglyworded. $�������, 26 August 1910, cited in “Osmanlı Rum Mebuslarının Şeyhülislam Efendi’yi Ziya-reti,” Yeni İkdam, No 166, 27 August 1910.

64 “İki Rum Mebusu ile Mülakat,” Yeni Gazete, No 728, 3 September 1910; “Takrirdeki İmzal-ar,” Tanin, No 722, 4 September 1910; “Aristidi Paşa’nın Beyanatı,” Yeni Gazete, No 730, 5 September1910.

65 Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul, pp.34-35; Veremis, “The Hellenic Kingdom andthe Ottoman Greeks,” 185-186.

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tion is Joachim’s strong and charismatic personality, with which in many cases heacted independently from the councils66. However, it was also among the Patriarch’stactics not to make his attitude clear, by putting the responsibility on the two coun-cils. He missed no chance to tell that only the two councils could determine the willof the Patriarchate67. He even said that he had no knowledge about what the mem-bers of the two councils wanted to do, when he expressed his desire to resign justafter the national council issue was over68.

At the same time, even though the two councils of the Patriarchate and theSociety of Constantinople acted together in the national council issue, it was onlybecause the government was their common enemy at that time. Despite the retro-spective account of Souliotis-Nicolaidis, it must be an exaggeration to say that theboth councils were in the hand of the Society of Constantinople69. When it came tothe questions like the Patriarch’s leadership over the Patriarchate or the “rapproche-ment” with Bulgarians, both sides did not hesitate to act on their own accounts. Thequestion was who the main enemy was and to what should the priority be given.Indeed, including the Patriarch Joachim, all these actors played different games.

Although at first two councils cooperated with Joachim against the commonenemy of the Ottoman government, after 23 August their positions departed fromeach other. Actually, after its decision to summon the national council, the two coun-cils were the central organs to determine the behavior of the Patriarchate. Membersof the both councils elected from themselves commissions to perform the actualtasks in preparation for the national council. In the fourth stage, despite the Patri-arch’s proposition to the opposite, the two councils persisted in their decision to actagainst the government70. As we saw it, Greek deputies who were in close collabora-tion with the Society of Constantinople supported the councils’ decision by present-ing a note to þeyhülislam. Joachim was fury when he saw the two councils surren-dering so easily even though they had opposed his proposition for a more “honorable”withdrawal71.

In his turn, Joachim cooperated with the Society of Constantinople in its at-tempt at the “rapprochement” by his own reasons72. The Society of Constantinopleconsidered Bulgarians at first and the Ottoman government later as their main en-

66 For the personality of Joachim see ����%'��&-)% ���*+�&, 69-71.67 See, for example, “Patriğin Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 720, 2 September 1910; and “Rum Patriği

Yuvakim Efendi’nin Beyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 172, 2 September 1910.68 !���, cited in “Patrik Efendi ile Mülakat,” Tanin, No 738, 20 September 1910.69 ����%'��&-)% ���*+�&, op. cit., p. 68.70 Some Greek periodicals even presumed Patriarch would resign at this moment because of

this stiff opposition from the both councils. “Rum Patrikhanesi: Meclis-i Milli İnikat Edemeyecek,”Yeni İkdam, No 165, 26 August 1910.

71 !���, cited in “Rum Patrikhanesi Meselesi: Patrik Efendi’nin Sebeb-i İstifası,” Yeni İkdam,No 190, 20 September 1910; and “Patrik Efendi ile Mülakat,” Tanin, No 738, 20 September 1910.

72 For Joachim’s view on the ecclesiastic schism with the Exarchate see Evangelos Kofos,“Attempts at Mending the Greek-Bulgarian Ecclesiastical Schism (1875-1902),” Balkan Studies, 25(2), 1984, 353-358, 363-366; and Evangelos Kofos, “Patriarch Joahim III (1878-1884) and the Irreden-tist Policy of the Greek State,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 4 (2), 1986, 115-118.

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emy. For the anti-Joachim members of the Holy Synod enemy might be the Ottomangovernment, Bulgarians, or even the Patriarch Joachim according to the circum-stances. In fact, from January to March 1910 the Holy Synod confronted with Joachimand the mixed council on occasion of the election of its members73. And as we willsee later it opposed the attempt of Joachim and the Society of Constantinople at the“rapprochement” with Bulgarians. Greek deputies who disliked the way of behaviorof the Society of Constantinople could and did cooperate with it so long as the Bul-garians were their common enemy.

As is apparent in all these developments, behaviors of the Greek political ac-tors were bound to their priorities at any given time; and their priorities changed a lotin such a short span of time, according to the circumstances. And the changes in thepriorities in turn brought about the change in the power balance and relationshipsamong these actors, namely, the Patriarch Joachim and the two councils, and theGreek deputies who were in themselves divided into two camps.

In the second constitutional period, as already mentioned, Ottoman-Greeksbegan to engage in the realization of their versions of modernization projects, whichin one way or another tried to coordinate the relationship among the ethnicity, reli-gion and state of Greeks. What political actors concerning the Church Law issue hadin their mind what kind of ideologies? The Patriarchate was one of the biggest oppo-nents against the famous “Megali Idea” or the irredentist nationalism of the Hellenicstate, since it contradicted the Patriarchate’s ecclesiastic traditions and claims. At thesame time, however, its “nationalized” ecumenicalism regarded its “Rum” flock in amore ethnical and less religious sense, though it did not cease to claim its ecumenicalauthority over the whole Orthodox community. Another theory, “Helleno-Ottomanism,” had less religious and more “lay” character, deeply influenced by theTanzimat egalitarianism and modernizing ideals. Its acclaimed goal was the gradualhellenization of the empire through the existence of prominent Ottoman-Greeks bothin the economic and administrative spheres. Ideologues of the “Eastern Federation”dreamed the new federative state where citizens from every ethnicity and religionshall be treated in a full equality, though in actuality their vision was heavilyHellenocentric. It is well known that the Society of Constantinople and its leaderswere the one of the most ardent supporters of the “Eastern Federation” idea74. TheChurch Law issue was the touchstone for above these ideas in the following way;confronted with the double objection of the government and the non-Greek ortho-dox subjects, “nationalized” ecumenicalism of the Patriarchate was obliged to defineits stance toward its “Rum” flock; ideologues of the “Eastern Federation” had either

73 1�"���+�&, op. cit., 176-200.74 For these ideologies and those who advocated them see Gerasimos Augustinos, Conscious-

ness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 1897-1914, Boulder, 1977; A. J. Panayotopou-los, “The “Great Idea” and the Vision of Eastern Federation: A Propos of the Views of I. Dragoumisand A. Souliotis-Nicolaïdis,” Balkan Studies, 21 (2), 1980, 331-365. See also ���������������, �������; Veremis, “The Hellenic Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks;” and Kechriotis, “Greek-Orthodox,Ottoman Greeks or just Greeks?”

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to comply with their year-old rival Bulgarians or to give in to the “oppressive” meas-ures of the government, in order to achieve at least one of its aims. “Helleno-Ottomanism” of some prominent Ottoman-Greeks sought a more realistic and mod-erate way of settlement, but their voice was obviously the least heard during thissummer. It must be an oversimplification to make one-to-one correspondence be-tween the political actors and these ideological stances, but their positions should beseen in this light in order to understand their way of behavior and priorities.

In contrast on the side of the government few actors participated in the issue.The Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs was the main counterpart of thePatriarchate throughout the events. Other governmental institutions rarely enteredthe stage. Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) as such did not play role at all. Inthis issue difference of opinions among the decision making circles were so limitedthat other institution had little reason to interfere directly. Let the government act, itwould seem more authentic and save CUP from somewhat risky political procedure.

In the first stage the government was not an active actor to defend its claimagainst Greeks, since the main battlefield was the parliament and non-Greek depu-ties did their work there. In the second and third stages the government took a wait-and-see tactics towards the Patriarchate so long as it did not inform the governmentabout its intention officially. In the eyes of the government situation changed whenthe election for the national council actually took place. The Minister of Justicedeclared officially its definite prohibition on the national council on 22 August, andthis introduced the new phase in the relationship between the government and thePatriarchate75. In retrospect this was the turning point which could have been the lastchance to settle the issue differently76. Turkish periodicals threw several signals for acompromise. Hüseyn Cahit [Yalçın] did this in a very delicate way by saying that ifthe Patriarchate would summon not in the name of the national council but as an“ordinary” gathering, the government had no reason to prohibit77. Tanin also inter-preted the reply of the councils to the Ministry of Justice was a sign of “retreat”78.Indeed, as we saw above, the Patriarch Joachim seemed to prefer “honorable” with-drawal at this moment, and the Patriarchate launched several trial balloons to softenthe attitude of both the “public opinion” and the government. But the two councils ofthe Patriarchate persisted in their opposition and the Greek deputies’ note was an-other factor to reduce the chance of compromise. In any case attempts at the compro-mise did not bear fruit and the national council was duly summoned.

75 It was also Hüseyn Cahit’s view that things changed after the note of the Minister of Justiceon 22 August. Hüseyn Cahit, “Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti’nin Teşebbüsatı,” Tanin, No 710, 23 August1910.

76 This is also the view of a Greek paper �%����� ���. It said though in retrospect that thePatriarchate should have retreated at this point. �%����� ���, 23 September 1910, cited in “PatrikhaneninSon Hareketleri,” Tanin, No 742, 24 September 1910.

77 Hüseyn Cahit, “Adliye ve Mezahip Nezareti’nin Teşebbüsatı,” Tanin, No 710, 23 August1910.

78 “Bir Adım Geri,” Tanin, No 730, 12 September 1910.

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In the last stage both the government and the Patriarchate preferred to settlethe issue by considering that all these events were only products of mutual misun-derstanding. The Minister of Justice expressed his hope that the Patriarchate wouldbehave according to laws since these misunderstandings had already been lifted.Secretary of the Patriarch confirmed the Minister’s view79. The Minister of Interioralso referred to the existence of misunderstanding80. This is a convenient logic forboth sides, and especially so for the Patriarchate, to close the issue without losingtheir faces81.

“Rapprochement” between Greeks and Bulgarians (from October 1910)

One of the most conspicuous results from the Church Law issue was, some-what ironically and paradoxically, the “rapprochement” between Greeks and Bul-garians, the Patriarchate and the Exarchate. From mid-October to early January Greekdeputies who were in close collaboration with the Society of Constantinople tookthe initiative in this attempt. Joachim first reported this attempt to the Holy Synod on18 October82. On 14 November Pançodoref, a Bulgarian deputy from Manastır, firstvisited the Patriarchate83. This seems very odd if we remind the fact that the originalreason why Ottoman-Greeks opposed the Church Law was their antipathy towardsBulgarians. No matter how it seems strange they had their reason for “rapproche-ment.” Exactly because the Church Law issue had ended with the Patriarchate’sdefeat, there remained the education and military service problems as their majorconcern. And these were the common concern for all Ottoman-Christians. At leaston these points they could form a joint front against the government and so didthey84. Especially after they got isolated in the course of the Church Law issue andlost face in front of both the government and Ottoman “public opinion,” those Greekdeputies might have thought they could not but ally with other Christians in order toachieve their goals85.

79 “Rum Patriği Adliye Nezareti’nde,” Yeni İkdam, No 212, 14 October 1910.80 “Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 225, 27 October 1910.81 On this point see also “Sui-tefehhüm” Hükümet ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 768,

15 October 1910.82 $�������, cited in “Rumlar, Bulgarlar ve Vlahlar,” Yeni İkdam, No 218, 20 October 1910.83 “Patrikhane-Eksarhhane,” Tanin, No 794, 17 November 1910; La Turquie, cited in “Rum

Patriği – Bulgar Mebuslar,” Yeni Gazete, No 801, 17 November 1910; and “Rum ve Bulgarlar,” Yeniİkdam, No 246, 17 November October 1910.

84 On 22 May 1911 the Greek Patriarchate, the Armenian Patriarchate, the Armenian CatholicPatriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate submitted a note on education and military duty of Christiansubjects jointly to the Ministry of Justice. This was a fruit from their attempt at “rapprochement,” but itdid not necessarily mean Christian deputies were united against the government politically and perma-nently. We see the disagreement among Christian political actors in the later development.

85 This is the interpretation of Tanin. Hüseyn Cahit, “Anasır-ı Hıristiyaniye’nin İttihadı,” Tanin,No 855, 20 January 1911; and “Hıristiyan Mebuslarına Ziyafet,” Tanin, No 857, 22 January 1911.

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However, this move was not necessarily welcomed among the Ottoman-Greeks86. Many metropolitans at the Holy Synod opposed this attempt and blamedthe Patriarch for his arbitrarily act without consultation with them87. Voutyras Efendi,the editor in chief of the Greek paper $������� and a friend of the metropolitan ofKadıköy Germanos, Joachim’s arch-rival, criticized the Patriarch’s attempt and op-posed his “political” action which had nothing to do with his religious duty88. TrayanNali, a deputy from Manastır, was critical of “rapprochement” too, since, in his view,this would only benefit Pan-Slavists. Instead, the Patriarchate should have endeavoredto promote confidence between Greeks and Turks89. Karolidi most vehemently ac-cused the “rapprochement.” For him those Greek deputies acted so foolishly that Bulgar-ians could easily take advantage of this chance to achieve their goal in Macedonia byonly paying lip-service to their attempt90. As a matter of fact, non-Greek deputiesonly showed limited interest to this attempt and never cooperate with them fromtheir heart. Some even warned Greek deputies not to be too anti-government andanti-Unionists, and not to give it the color of an overall Muslim-Christian confronta-tion. Krikor Zohrab, an Armenian deputy from İstanbul, criticized those Greek depu-ties’ rather hasty and inappropriate way of behavior91. This attitude of fellow Chris-tian deputies might disappoint the Greek deputies who liked to describe this “rap-prochement” as a natural consequence of the oppression all Christians had suffered92.

Through these attempts difference of opinions among Ottoman-Greek depu-ties reached the point of no return. This became apparent, when, in November, someGreek deputies met several times and agreed on the need to act as an independentparty in the chamber. They decided to adopt their note to şeyhülislam dated on 25August as a program of their party called the Greek Political Party93 (�����% ?

86 We understand from the following article that some Greek papers criticized the attempt at“rapprochement.” See how Souliotis-Nicolaidis defended their position. <�%����.�����.%&������������-���.��'�B �!������#�� ���&�����, No 41, 12 February 1911, cited in�����%'��&()% ���*+�& �157-159.

87 !������ and $�������, cited in “Patrik Yuvakim Efendi ve Eksarhhane,” Yeni İkdam, No246, 17 November October 1910; and “Patrikhane – Eksarhhane,” Tanin, No 794, 17 November 1910.

88 $�������, 19 November 1910, cited in “Rum ve Bulgarlar Arasındaki İhtilaf-ı Mezhebi,”Yeni İkdam, No 249, 20 November 1910; $�������, 22 November 1910, cited in “Patrik YuvakimEfendi’nin Beyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 252, 23 November 1910.

89 “Trayan Nali Efendi Ne Diyor?,” Tanin, No 808, 1 December 1910.90 1�"���+�&, 248-250, 255.91 His comment in Azadamard, cited in “Rumca Gazeteler Tahrif Etmişler?,” Tanin, No 858, 23

January 1911. See also his remark in Puzantion, 21 January 1911, cited in Murat Koptaş, “ArmenianPolitical Thinking in the Second Constitutional Period: The Case of Krikor Zohrab,” MA DissertationPresented at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History, Bogaziçi Universıty, 2005, 83-84. Karoliditoo depicted this opposition by Zohrab and ridiculed�GH��I���J9���K����F��LE�1�"���+�& �JE 250.

92 They claimed that these “rapprochement” and cooperation among Christians was the firststep to realize true constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire. <=%�M"%��%�����-���.���� B�!������#� ���&�����, No 38, 22 January 1911, cited in�����%'��&()% ���*+�& �pp.149-150. See also DiogenisXanalatos, “The Greeks and the Turks on the Eve of the Balkan Wars: A Frustrated Plan,” BalkanStudies, 3 (2), 1962, p. 287.

93 For the first meeting on 12 November see “Rum Osmanlı Mebusları,” Yeni İkdam, No 242, 13November 1910; “Rum Mebusları,” Yeni İkdam, No 243, 14 November 1910; and “Rum MebuslarıFırkası,” Tanin, No 791, 14 November 1910. Original reason why they met was the fact that Greek

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@��%�% ? 1?$$�). On the other hand those Greek deputies like Aristidi Paşa, Karolidiand others, who did not consent to these activities, kept distance from them andeventually became more integrated within CUP. Trayan Nali, for example, declaredthat he could not approve those Greek deputies’ view, since, according to him, thesedeputies hurt the general interest of Ottoman-Greeks by their activities94. AristidiPaşa agreed with Nali’s idea and said it was not wise and appropriate to stand againstthe governmental party in such an excessive manner95.

Influential logic and discourses employed during the course of events

As we mentioned above, the government changed its attitude toward thePatriarchate from phase to phase according to the political need, but the logic anddiscourse it employed was almost consistent throughout the event; once the parlia-ment, or, the general will of the nation, approved and passed the law, there was noreason not to put the law into effect. Contrary it was responsibility of the governmentto duly implement the law. In fact the Church Law was the only possible way to settle theconflict, and on this regard the government acted in a very fair and impartial manner. ThePatriarchate misunderstood the “good will” of the government96. As long as the nationalcouncil was concerned simply it was out of the Patriarchate’s authority to summon sucha council without the permission from the government. And the government could notand would not give permission, if the purpose of the national council was to oppose theChurch Law, because of the reasons mentioned above97.

It is interesting that attention shifted from the Church Law itself to the na-tional council after the Patriarchate’s decision to summon it. Even though the aim of

deputies could not act collectively when the chamber voted on confidence for the grand vizier. For thesecond meeting on 19 November see “Rum Mebuslarının İçtimaı,” Tanin, No 797, 20 November 1910;and “Rum Mebusları,” Yeni İkdam, No 249, 20 November 1910.

94 See his letter to $�������, cited in “Rum Mebusları,” Tanin, No 795, 18 November 1910; and“Manastır Mebusu Nali Efendi’nin Beyannamesi,” Yeni Tasvir-i Efkar, No 417, 18 November 1910.

95 See his comment to �%����� ���, cited in “Rum Mebusları,” Tanin, No 796, 19 November1910.

96 These were the most strongly expressed views from the side of the government and Turkishpress. Halil Menteşe’s comment to Jeune Turc was a good example. “Kiliseler ve Mektepler KanunuHakkında Halil Bey’in Beyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 120, 11 July 1910; “Kiliseler ve Mektepler Kanunu:Halil Bey’in Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 675, 11 July 1910. See also Baha’s comment to "����, cited in“Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 659, 2 July 1910. Turkish periodicals used the same logic. Seefor example Hüseyn Cahit, “İyi Emareler,” Tanin, No 703, 16 August 1910; Hüseyn Cahit, “KiliselerKanunu ve Neticesi,” Tanin, No 708, 21 August 1910; “Makedonya Kelimesi Defn Edilmiştir!,” Yeniİkdam, No 111, 2 July 1910; and “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında: Bir Rum Mebusun Beyanatı ve PatrikEfendi,” Yeni Gazete, No 732, 7 September 1910.

97 This is the leitmotif in the note of the Ministry of Justice dated 22 August. Even before thatnote certain high official in the Ministry of Justice confirmed this point to "��#, cited in “RumPatrikhanesi Takririnin Esbab-ı Reddi,” Yeni İkdam, No 149, 10 August 1910. Undersecretary of theMinistry of Justice Nedim commented in a similar manner to Osmanischer Lloyd, cited in “RumPatrikhanesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 170, 31 August 1910. See also Hüseyn Cahit, “Adliye ve MezahipNezareti’nin Teşebbüsatı,” Tanin, No 710, 23 August 1910; and Hüseyn Cahit, “Patrik Efendi’nin Bey-anatı,” Tanin, No 724, 6 September 1910.

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the national council was to discuss and oppose the Church Law, already the law itselflost its importance as long as the political and journalistic discourses were concerned.Instead negotiation and mutual criticism between the government and the Patriarchatefocused on whether it was legal or not for the Patriarchate to summon the nationalcouncil98. In addition, the Patriarchate’s decision to make a petition to the GreatPowers was considered the best proof for its “unpatriotic” mentality. Turkish peri-odicals warned that such an attempt would only hurt the feelings of the Ottomannation and cause great disadvantages to Ottoman-Greeks99. Some papers found sourcesof such “unpatriotic” behaviors in the influences and instigations from the Hellenicstate to materialize the notorious aim of “Megali Idea100.” Jeune Turc criticized Greekperiodicals that their tone was not in accordance with the Ottoman patriotism anddemanded them not to attach to Megali Idea and Pan-Hellenism101. As might beexpected according to these papers the reason behind the “rapprochement” betweenGreeks and Bulgarians were also instruction of the Hellenic and Bulgarian states102.

Greek periodicals refuted. There was no such thing like Pan-Hellenism amongOttoman-Greeks. If there was a great idea what they meant by that word was nothingbut the solidarity among all Greeks in the East with the Ottoman Empire as its center103.Moreover, contrary to the claims of the government and Turkish periodicals, thePatriarchate and Greek periodicals did not believe in the “good will” of the govern-ment in making the Church Law. According to some Greek papers this law was asubservient attempt of the government to ask the support of the Bulgarian state whenOttoman-Hellenic relationships was in critical terms because of the Cretan prob-lem104. Both the Turkish and Greek periodicals sought reasons of their opponent’sbehavior in foreign affairs and found a connection to the neighboring states. Here wesee how the Ottoman domestic politics could not but spread beyond its borders.

98 Tanin called attention to this fact. “Bir Adım Geri,” Tanin, No 730, 12 September 1910.99 Halil Menteşe accused the Patriarchate for their decision to make a petition to the Great

Powers. “Kiliseler Meselesi,” Yeni İkdam, No 138, 30 July 1910; and “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,”Tanin, No 686, 30 July 1910. The Minister of Justice Necmettion Molla commented in a similar way.“Necmettin Bey’in Beyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 156, 17 August 1910. See also Babanzade İsmail Hakkı,“Patrikhane Mukarreratı,” Tanin, No 674, 17 July 1910.

100 Hüseyn Cahit indicated the “connection” between the Patriarchate and the Hellenic state,and the influence employed by the latter to the former. Hüseyn Cahit, “Türkiye, Yunanistan ve Ahval-i Dahiliyemiz,” Tanin, No 717, 30 August 1910; and Hüseyn Cahit, “İki Meclis,” Tanin, No 734, 16September 1910. Tanin also ridiculed '(& for it tried to threaten “public opinion” by pretending as ifthere were alliances between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate, the Hellenic and the Bulgarian states.“İllet-i İttifak,” Tanin, No 726, 8 September 1910.

101 “Büyük Fikir,” Tanin, No 694, 7 August 1910.102 Hüseyn Cahit, “Rum ve Bulgar Uhuvveti,” Tanin, No 797, 20 November 1910; “Bulgarlar

ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeni Gazete, No 804, 20 November 1910; F., “Pançodoref Efendi’nin İzahatı,”Yeni Gazete, No 807, 23 November 1910.

103 See an article in ����������+(����%��, cited in “Bir Makale,” Tanin, No 695, 8 August1910; and “Hükümetin Kuvvetleri,” Yeni Gazete, No 702, 8 August 1910. This reminds us the famous“Eastern Federation” idea.

104 !������ quoted certain high official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintaining thisinterpretation and Tanin denied that. “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Tanin, No 661, 4 July 1910. Halil

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Both the Patriarch and the members of the two councils often announced theirintention to resign, as a sign of protest, in case their opponents did not hear theirdemand. This tactics had little effect, however, as a tool of pressure on the “publicopinion.” Because none of them really resigned from their posts, at least in the pe-riod under study, their announcement to resign could hardly be accepted at its facevalue. Turkish periodicals considered it only a gesture and did not hide their annoy-ance. They even wanted them to actually resign, since it would be of benefit toOttoman-Greeks105. It might be of some interest to note that Greek deputies andsenators never referred to resignation for this purpose. Another important feature inthe Patriarchate’s tactics was to show the existence of the public support behindthem. In many cities of the empire Greek population made protest meetings. To citejust a few examples, Greeks gathered in Siroz on 7 July and in İzmir on 11 July forprotest106. On 12 July in Salonica no less than three thousand Greeks participated ina demonstration107. It is significant that newspapers ceased to report this kind ofmass demonstrations after the Patriarchate decided to summon the national council.Obviously the reason d’être of these mass demonstrations ended when the higherechelon which was supposed to express the general will of the whole Greek-Ortho-dox flock entered the scene.

Greek deputies and the Patriarchate did use the same logic of constitutional-ism, but in a different way and from a different standpoint. They asserted that thepurpose of the government was nothing but to attack the ethnicities and creeds ofnon-Muslim subjects and they found it detrimental to the real constitutionalism. Statepolicies had to be based on “spiritual autonomy (muhtariyet-i maneviye)” ofethnicities, since constitutionalism was only possible when the government paysenough respect to the “historical rights” of ethnicities. But the government did theopposite. Although the government talked about the noble values like “egalitarian-ism” and “constitutional rights,” it had never tried to achieve these goals sincerely.Behind these flowery words the government strived hard to oppress non-Muslimsubjects and turkify them. In such a circumstance both the national council and “rap-prochement” among Ottoman-Christians were natural reactions for self-defense. Inother words, these Greeks described the situation as a confrontation between the

Menteşe also refuted this claim in his interview with Jeune Turc, cited in “Kiliseler ve MekteplerKanunu Hakkında Halil Bey’in Beyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 120, 11 July 1910; and “Kiliseler ve Mek-tepler Kanunu: Halil Bey’in Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 675, 11 July 1910.

105 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Patrikhane Mahafili,” Tanin, No 661, 4 July1910. See also “Rum Patrikhanesi İşinde Berdevam: Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 731,6 September 1910; “Patriğin İstifası Şayiaları,” Tanin, No 738, 19 September 1910; and “Rum Patriğiİstifa Ediyor,” Yeni İkdam, No 189, 19 September 1910.

106 For Siroz meeting see “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni İkdam, No 118, 9 July 1910. In İzmirabout five thousand people gathered for protest. “Kiliseler Kanunu,” Yeni İkdam, No 122, 13 July 1910.

107 “Kiliseler Kanunu Etrafında,” Yeni Gazete, No 678, 14 July 1910; “Kiliseler KanunuEtrafında,” Tanin, No 671, 14 July 1910; “Kilise ve Mektepler Kanunu ve Rum Patrikhanesi,” Yeniİkdam, No 123, 14 July 1910.

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government and Christian population who had suffered illegal oppression, but stilllonged for the real constitutionalism108.

However, no matter how Greeks tried to oppose the government by rallyingall the Christians on their side, they could not attract sympathies of non-Greek non-Muslim population so long as their main logic against the government was “histori-cal rights.” Non-Greek non-Muslim deputies criticized Greeks from the viewpointof constitutionalism, as their Muslim colleagues did. In the chamber of deputiesalmost everyone but Greeks, both pro- and anti-government and Muslims and non-Muslims alike, agreed on the necessity of the Church Law and criticized Greeks fortheir insistence to oppose it. For example, Rıza Tevfik [Bölükbaşı] said as follows: “Ihave shown many times that I am not a supporter of the government, but I have toadmit that on this issue the government shows great goodwill. All of us evaluate andapprove the government109.” Ahmet Ferit [Tek] was of the same opinion110. Vartkes,an Armenian deputy from Erzurum, said both Greeks and Bulgarians should paymore respect to the general interest of the Ottoman nation even though that mighthurt their particular ethnic interests111. Diran Kelekyan in Sabah wrote in favor of thelaw almost in an identical term to that of Vartkes112. Some even criticized openly thePatriarchate’s “yoke” on the ethnicities and conscience of non-Greek Orthodox sub-jects. Filip Mişe, a Vlah deputy from Göriçe, remonstrated Greeks that their aim wasto hellenize Christian population and said: “if you want to settle the church problemin a proper manner you must abolish the privileges of the Patriarchate and save allthe Christians from its despotism. Because this institution has political, and not reli-gious, aim which would do harm to Ottomans113.” Dimitri Vlahof, a Bulgarian andsocialist deputy from Salonica, accused the oppression the Patriarchate had made tothe orthodox subjects and added: “This is an orthodox patriarchate. It should notpursue Greekness”114.

After the law passed the parliament Greeks’ isolated position became muchmore obvious. Armenians were busy with their internal party struggle, and Bulgarianswho would gain most from the law were of course happy to see Greeks in trouble.There was no “third party” who would interfere to the benefit of Greeks. The Patriarchatehad to face the government alone without any reliable ally in the Ottoman political

108 Greek deputies put these claims most apparently in their note to �eyhülislam submitted on 25August. See also “@."� ����& @"? .%��%,” !������# � ���&�����, No 20, 18 September 1910; “N�������/�.��%&,” !������# � ���&�����, No 20, 18 September 1910; “=% M"%��%���� -���.����,”!������# � ���&�����, No 38, 22 January 1911, cited in ����%'��&-)% ���*+�&, 146-147; 147-148;and pp.149-150, respectively. Also consult a comment of Hari� Vamvaka, a deputy from Serfiçe andone of the leading members of the �����% ?�@��%�% ?�1?$$� � ���Jeune Turc, cited in “VamvakasEfendi’nin Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 843, 8 January 1911.

109 MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 54, p. 654.110 MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 54, 660-661.111 MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 54, p. 662.112 D. K. [Diran Kelekyan], “Kiliseler Kanunu,” Sabah, No 7464, 1 July 1910.113 TV, No 117 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 22), 7-8.114 TV, No 364 (MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 1, İçt. 138), p. 4.

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arena. Moreover, Bulgarians even utilized this opportunity and described the Greeks’opposition activity as an illegal and unpatriotic behavior vis-à-vis the Ottoman “publicopinion.” At the same time they missed no chance to show their loyalty to the empireand constitutionalism. For instance, the Bulgarian Exarch expressed his satisfactionfor the enactment of the Church Law when he visited the sultan on 14 July115.Pançodoref told �%����� ��� that Bulgarians in Macedonia were loyal to the consti-tution and surprised to see the meaningless opposition activity of the Patriarchate.Although the rapprochement between Bulgarians and Greeks might be possible itwas out of question and even inappropriate under such circumstances116.

In fact the Patriarchate resorted to every measure to keep the religious conno-tation of the word “Rum” as wide as possible, in the name of “historical rights” ofthe Orthodoxy, in order to hold their influence over non-Greek flock without recog-nizing their ethnic rights; while many among the Patriarchate gradually consideredthemselves with ethnically “Greek” identity. It was not without reason, therefore,that Turkish periodicals criticized the Patriarchate and those Greeks who collabo-rated with it for trying to give the issue a color of Muslim-Christian conflict. Inactuality, said these Turkish papers, the Patriarchate did harm to Ottoman-Greeks bypretending as if it was struggling to defend the rights of Ottoman-Greeks despite thefact that it only pursued its own particular interest at the expense of the broaderinterest of the Ottoman-Greeks117. It is important to note that these Turkish periodi-cals did not declare Ottoman-Greeks as a whole their enemies; contrary they tried toshow that the Patriarchate did not represent the “true” will of Ottoman-Greek popu-lation. These papers quoted some “intelligent” Greeks, who sincerely wanted to con-tribute to the unity of the Ottoman nation and live within that, accuse thePatriarchate118. For them the existence of these “intelligent” Ottoman-Greeks whocriticized the Patriarchate’s “unpatriotic” behavior was a good sign for the future ofthe Ottoman nation119.

115 “Bulgar Eksarhı’nın Huzura Kabulü,” Yeni İkdam, No 124, 15 July 1910; “Bulga Eksarhı’nınHuzur-ı Şahaneye Kabulü,” Yeni Gazete, No 679, 15 July 1910.

116 “Pançodoref Efendi’nin Beyanatı,” Tanin, No 719, 1 September 1910; “Pançodoref Efendi’ninBeyanatı,” Yeni İkdam, No 171, 1 September 1910.

117 Hüseyn Cahit, “Türkler ve Rumlar,” Tanin, No 701, 14 August 1910; Hüseyn Cahit, “Kilise-ler Kanunu ve Neticesi,” Tanin, No 708, 21 August 1910; Hüseyn Cahit, “İtilaf İçin,” Tanin, No 714, 27August 1910.

118 Tanin was especially eager to publish letters from “intelligent” Ottoman-Greeks: A.AndronikoZahariyadi, “Patrikhane ve Rumlar,” Tanin, No 702, 15 August 1910; “Patrikhaneden ŞikayetlerÇoğalıyor: Bir Mektup Daha,” Tanin, No 703, 16 August 1910; Vasilaki Hinçoğlu, “Rum Patrikhanesive Rumlar,” Tanin, No 706, 19 August 1910; Vasilaki Hinçoğlu, “Harfgirli ve Hamiyetli RumlarınÇektiği Dert,” Tanin, No 710, 23 August 1910; “Akıllı Rumlar Nasıl Düşünüyor?,” Tanin, No 722, 4September 1910; “Akıllı Rum Vatandaşlarımız Nasıl Düşünüyor?,” Tanin, No 723, 5 September 1910;“Akıllı Vatandaşlarımız Nasıl Düşünüyor?,” Tanin, No 732, 14 September 1910; “Vatanperver RumlarınPatrikhaneye Nefreti: Bir Mektup,” Tanin, No 735, 17 September 1910. Yeni İkdam also published aletter from an Istanbuliote Greek to his friend in Salonica which criticized the Patriarchate’s behavior.“Patrikhane-Rum Vatandaşlarımız,” Yeni İkdam, No 161, 22 August 1910.

119 Hüseyn Cahit, “İyi Emareler,” Tanin, No 703, 16 August 1910; “Patrik Efendi’nin Sözleri,”Tanin, No 728, 10 September 1910.

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According to the Turkish press, the real problem was a confrontation betweenthe law, the government and constitutionalism on the one side, and the Patriarchateon the other120. They eventually concentrated their criticism on the illegal interfer-ence of a religious institution, the Patriarchate, to the political sphere. For example,Babanzade İsmail Hakkı described the situation as follows: the Patriarchate wantedto keep up their vested interest in the name of the “historical rights,” many amongwhich were incompatible with the constitutional rights now every Ottoman citizenenjoyed irrespective of their race or creed. But the Patriarchate neither apprehendedthe importance of these newly acquired rights nor accepted the “equal” duties underthe constitution. They wanted a superior power over the authority of the parliament,or, the general will of the nation. But if we allow such an arbitrary interpretation of“historical rights,” then we were to introduce “a government within the govern-ment,” which we could hardly permit121. Actually in one occasion Joachim describedthe aim of the government in a following way: the government tried to separatereligion from politics. To put it differently the government attempted to disregardthe Patriarchate’s capacity as religious and national center122. Here in a rather candidmanner he confessed what the major concern was; the Patriarchate, according to its“nationalized” ecumenicalism, could not tolerate this separation and wanted to keepits position as religious and national center.

With above all said, now it became apparent where the confrontation lay. Thegovernment and the Patriarchate confronted with each other on the question whetherthe “historical rights” or constitutionalism be given priority; or, to put it more pre-cisely, interpretation of constitutionalism was at stake between them. For the gov-ernment and Turkish periodicals the Patriarchate’s version of constitutionalism whichrespects the “historical rights,” that is, the Patriarchate’s capacity as the religious andnational center, would do harm to the Ottoman nation; since this would ignore themeaning of the representative government, which was brought into existence by thevote of Ottoman citizens, being equal before the law, irrespective of their race orcreed. For the Patriarchate and Greek deputies who cooperated with it, the govern-ment’s version of constitutionalism was only a pretext of their real aim to “turkify”

120 Hüseyn Cahit, “İtilaf İçin,” Tanin, No 714, 27 August 1910; Hüseyn Cahit, “Türkler veRumlar,” Tanin, No 701, 14 August 1910.

121 Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Kiliseler Kanunu ve Patrikhane Mahafili,” Tanin, No 661, 4 July1910; Babanzade İsmail Hakkı, “Patrikhane Mukarreratı,” Tanin, No 674, 17 July 1910. For the similarreasoning see also Hüseyn Cahit, “Patrikhane mi Fitne Ocağı mı?,” Tanin, No 696, 9 August 1910;“Fener Patrikhanesi,” Tanin, No 698, 11 August 1910; and “Rum Patrikhanesi’nin Bir Hatası,” Yeniİkdam, No 127, 18 July 1910. Tanin also let “intelligent” Ottoman-Greeks to get on this bandwagon.See the above mentioned articles written by Greeks in Tanin. And these Greeks had their rights, if weremind the “laicization” process among Ottoman-Greeks from mid-19th century. In this regard seeAugustinos, The Greeks in Asia Minor, 111-144; and Vangelis Kechriotis, “The Modernization of theEmpire and the ‘Privileges’: Greek-Orthodox Responses to the Young Turk Policies,” in Touraj Ata-baki, ed., The State and the Subaltern. Society and Politics in Turkey and Iran, London: I. B. Tauris,2006 (forthcoming), p. 23.

122 $�������, cited in “Rum Patriği’nin Beyanatı,” Yeni Gazete, No 412, 19 October 1909.

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the Christian subjects by destroying the communal “privileges” of them. They claimedthat the real constitutionalism should be built on the basis of “autonomous” commu-nities123. But what the Patriarchate did not count and could not admit was the oppo-sition from the non-Greek non-Muslims. While Greeks accused the government thatthey pursued “turkification” of Christian subjects in the name of the Ottoman consti-tutionalism, non-Greek population criticized the Patriarchate in a similar manner bysaying that it pursued “hellenization” of its flock in the name of the Orthodoxy or“historical rights”124.

CONCLUSION

Although the Church Law and the national council problem attracted muchattention both inside and outside the empire, relatively few actors participated in thisissue. The government and CUP were almost monolithic and their position did notchange throughout the event. As a matter of fact this issue left little influence as longas it was concerned the Ottoman political arena as a whole.

As for Ottoman-Greeks, however, this same event left a profound and lastingimpact. In the period 1908-1912 the Church Law problem was the real turning-pointfrom the perspective of Ottoman-Greek politics. Despite the existence of disaccordwithin the Patriarchate, until the Church Law passed the parliament, almost all theGreek political actors were united against the common enemy of Bulgarians. In thecourse of the national council issue, they began to be divided into two opposingcamps. What division was that and why did that take place? The Church Law prob-lem compelled Ottoman-Greeks to decide their ways of behavior on two sets ofquestions; first, how should they act in front of the constitutional government whenits requirements contradicts their wishes; and second, how should they cope withnon-Greek non-Muslim subjects of the empire, while trying to keep their own “Rum”sphere of influence as firm as possible. Ottoman-Greeks could not find solutionsthat would satisfy both of these questions. Rather, they were divided into two campsin determining their priorities. On the one side the Society of Constantinople and theGreek deputies working with it became more and more hostile against the govern-ment. It must be noted that they did not want the Ottoman Empire to be collapsed,but at the same time they thought they should act against the “oppressive” measuresof the government firmly in order to defend the interest of Ottoman-Greeks, even incollaboration with Bulgarians. On the other side those who were critical and anxiousabout their excessive anti-government and sometimes anti-Muslim tone kept dis-tance with them. For them the interest of Ottoman-Greeks was in cooperating withthe government and their Muslim compatriots. It was indispensable to pay respect to

123 See also Kechriotis, “The Modernization of the Empire and the ‘Privileges’,” pp.10-11.124 Rıza Tevfik called the floor’s attention to this symmetrical structure of criticism in the cham-

ber of deputies. MMZC D. 1, Sİ. 2, İçt. 54, 654-655.

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the Ottoman order of things if they wanted to stand against the Bulgarian threat.Joachim stood in the middle of these two antagonizing camps with his strong per-sonality, while the bipolarization within the Ottoman-Greek political arena devel-oped increasingly. This bipolarization remained almost intact until 1912, when theBalkan Wars broke out, Joachim passed away, and the very term “Ottoman-Greekpolitical arena” lost most of its meanings.

None of these two camps could achieve its goal, at least from the viewpoint oftheir original intentions. Ideologues among Ottoman-Greeks could not prove them-selves capable of fulfilling their promises. Maybe they were not sufficiently adaptedand accustomed to the actual procedure of the Ottoman constitutional politics, orsimply their opponents had far stronger power for them to create appropriate envi-ronment for the realization of any one of their ideas. However, the fact remains thatthe Patriarchate, and those who sided with it, had already lost the game when theyresorted to the national council. What happened were as follows; Greeks did not, orcould not; enjoy the support of non-Greek political actors. Neither the oppositiondeputies interfered in the issue nor did non-Greek non-Muslim population sympa-thize with the Greek cause. The issue which brought about the biggest split amongOttoman-Greeks left such a little impact on any political actors other than Greeks. Inshort, Ottoman-Greeks were isolated in the broader Ottoman political arena throughoutthe event. Of course, this is not to say that any of the ideologies Ottoman-Greeks hadconstructed had little political or intellectual meanings in the Ottoman Empire as awhole. Contrary, so long as we want to assess the actual scope of these important andattractive ideologies, these facts show us the necessity to grasp the “rules of game”of the Ottoman political arena, since actors who participated in were not only thegovernment and Greeks, but also both Muslim and non-Muslim politicians from allover the country and with divergent ethnicities and multiple interests.