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Human Ecology, Vol. 32, No. 4, August 2004 ( C 2004)
Chronicle of a Foreseeable Tragedy: Birds NestsManagement in the
Niah Caves (Sarawak)1
Quentin Gausset2
The number of birds nests harvested in the Niah cave today is
only a fractionof what it used to be. This article focuses on the
socioeconomic causes of thedecline. It argues that the present
situation is not directly linked to the tragedyof the commons,
since the ownership of cave and nests is private. The tragicaspect
is, rather, linked to an attitude of free riding which was
threatening theprivate system of ownership in the 1980s, and which
forced Penan ownersto lease their caves to the former free riders
(thereby diluting managementresponsibility), and to harvest nests
as soon as possible (before the birds canlay eggs and reproduce).
It is therefore the tragedy of a management systemwhose rules,
intended to avoid open access and free riding, lead to
unsustain-able behavior. Since the birds cannot be privatized, it
is also the tragedy ofa system in which actors are unable to reach
a consensus on how to managesustainably a de facto common property
resource.
KEY WORDS: birds nests; tragedy of the commons; common property
resource manage-ment; Malaysia; Sarawak.
INTRODUCTION
The exploitation of birds nests as food has a long history,
dating backto the sixteenth century. Its trade from Borneo to China
was already in
1The research was conducted during AprilJune 2000, October 2001,
and JulyAugust 2001and based mainly on semistructured interviews.
All kinds of actors in birds nest manage-ment were interviewed in
Niah, including 7 traders (mainly Chinese), 11 owners of parts
ofthe cave (mainly Penan who have Malayized), more than 20 workers
and collectors of nests(mainly Iban), and 6 government officials
dealing with the management of birds nests. Aquestionnaire was
conducted in Rumah Ranggong, an Iban community living close to
thecave whose members are heavily involved in collecting nests.
2Institute of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen,
Frederiksholms kanal, 4, DK-1220Copenhagen K., Denmark; e-mail:
[email protected].
487
0300-7839/04/0800-0487/0 C 2004 Springer Science+Business Media,
Inc.
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488 Gausset
existence when Dutch merchants began operating in the Malaysian
andIndonesian region (Cranbrook, 1984, p. 150; Koon and Cranbrook,
2002,pp. 6465). The nests are made out of the saliva and feathers
of swiftlets.Once processed to remove the feathers, the nests are
consumed in soupsthat are believed by many people (mainly Chinese)
to have rejuvenatingand cosmetic virtues. In Malaysia there are two
main species of birds thatproduce edible nests: Aerodramus
fuciphagus (producing the highly valuedwhite nests) and Aerodramus
maximus (producing black nests) (Koon andCranbrook, 2002, pp. 216).
They inhabit limestone caves, such as the Niahcaves, which are the
object of this study. In the Niah cave, the exploitationof black
nests began fairly recently, less than 200 years ago (Harrisson
andJamuh, 1956; Koon and Cranbrook, 2002, p. 68; Medway, 1958). It
soon be-came a major center of black nest production, which peaked
at 18,500 kgper year in 1931 (i.e., 70% of the total production of
black nests in the stateof Sarawak; Cranbrook, 1984, p. 155). The
fame of the Niah cave owes a lotto this huge production of nests,
and also to the archeological discovery ofthe oldest human remains
in South-East Asia (Harrisson, 1958). To protectthis unique
archeological site, the caves were made into a national
heritagesite under the authority of the Sarawak Museum, and later
into a nationalpark under the authority of the National Parks
administration. Recently,the swiftlets have become a protected
species.
The exploitation of birds nests in the Niah cave sustains the
livelihoodsof hundreds of people, and has been one of backbones of
economic devel-opment of Niah town. However, for several reasons,
the number of swiftletsand nests has sharply declined during the
past 15 years (it is estimated to bebetween 5 and 10% of what it
was 70 years ago). It is widely believed thatone of the causes of
this decline is the overexploitation of the nests. Thisis very
unfortunate, as birds nests are a renewable resource which
couldvery well be managed sustainably. Since theAerodramusmaximus
has threebreeding periods per year (Koon and Cranbrook, 2002, pp.
3739), it wouldsuffice to practice selective harvesting and refrain
from harvesting the nestsuntil the young chicks can fly away, to
have a sustainable management ofthe resource combined with a high
yield. Yet, today, nests are generallyharvested as soon as they are
big enough to be sold, regardless of whetherthey hold eggs or
immature chicks. The aim of this paper is to review thecauses of
the overexploitation, and to discuss the way in which the
presentmanagement system relates to the model of the tragedy of the
commonsdeveloped by Hardin (1968).
EVIDENCE OF BIRDS NEST DECLINE
It is difficult to know exactly the number of birds living
inside the cave,and how this number has evolved over the course of
time. Estimates of
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 489
birds nests numbers have been made for the past 70 years, and
show areduction of 90% of the original population.3 But these
estimates are ques-tionable because they are based on different
methods, ranging from eye-balling to systematic counting. Even
counting birds flying in and out of thecave has been problematic,
as it sometimes concentrated only on the mainmouths of the caves,
which left many birds unaccounted for. Moreover, thecounting has
been based on the assumption that each bird comes in and outof the
cave twice per day, and that the number of swiftlets constitutes
70%of the total population of birds in the Niah cave. Yet, despite
the inpreci-sion of the data, everyone in Niah recognizes that
there has been a drasticdecline. People remember that not so long
ago (1015 years), they wouldnot visit the cave without a plastic
bag on their head and shoulders to pre-vent bird droppings from
falling on their hair and clothes. People wouldbe white with
droppings when leaving the cave. The noise made by thebirds
prevented people from talking to each other if they were some
dozenmeters apart. Tourist guides praised the extraordinary sight
of millions ofbirds and bats flying in and out of the cave. Today,
all of this is gone. Thecaves look empty and are quiet. So despite
the fact that the exact number ofbirds is difficult to establish,
everybody agrees that there has been a majordecline.
Establishing the causes of bird decline has proved equally
problem-atic. Various hypotheses have been proposed. It has been
suggested thatthe collection of guano in the cave was disturbing
the cave ecosystem andreducing the population of insects on which
birds feed (Leh and Hall, 1996,pp. 2526). But the collection of
fossil guano has been forbidden since1985, mainly to protect the
archaeological potential of the cave, and therehas been no increase
in the population of birds. It has also been suggestedthat the use
of pesticides has had a negative impact on the bird popula-tion
(Vardon, in Sim, 1997, p. 91). However, DDT-type pesticides have
nowbeen forbidden for many years, and this argument too is losing
its relevance.Many local people suspect that the use of
insecticides has both reduced theamount of insects on which birds
feed, and poisoned the birds who ate thoseinsects. This seems to be
confirmed by the finding of insecticide residues inswiftlets from
Niah cave (Cranbrook, 1984, p. 160). This argument is of-ten linked
to the fact that most of Niah area has been transformed into
oilpalm plantations in the past decade, which is likely to have had
a significantimpact on the ecosystem of insects and birds (Koon and
Cranbrook, 2002,p. 135). Moreover, many people claim to have
witnessed a major drop in thebird population due to the forest
fires and haze which hit the region in 1997
3The number of Aerodrama maxima in the Niah cave was estimated
to be 1.5 million in the1950s (Medway, 1957), 1.3 million in 1978,
less than 500,000 in 1993 (Leh and Hall, 1996), and180,000 in 1997
(Sim, 1997).
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490 Gausset
(El Nino). Some also blame smoke for the drop in bird numbers in
the bigmouth of the cave after a house standing there burnt down
and the smokekilled thousands of birds. Finally, a recent invasion
of green algae is alsoblamed for spoiling the reproduction grounds
of swiftlets (Sim, 1997, p. 91;Leh, 2001, personal
communication).
Apart from these physical causes of decline, most people agree
thathumans have also had a negative impact on the population of
birds. Somebelieve that the noise made by people in the cave, the
smoke of their cook-ing fires or petroleum lamps, and the fact that
they wave torchlight at thebirds at night in order to deter thieves
from stealing the nests, disturbthe birds, who fly away and look
for quieter caves. This seems to be sup-ported by the observation
that new caves have indeed been recently col-onized by swiftlets
(Leh, 2001, personal communication), although thereare no good data
describing this change and the influence of climate andother
physical factors might play a role. Finally, most actors involved
rec-ognize that the overexploitation of nests is partly responsible
for birdsdecline.
This article will focus on the issue of overexploitation, but it
is impor-tant to keep in mind that it is not the sole factor
responsible for the decline,and that physical aspects do have an
impact on the bird population. Thiscan be seen in the fact that the
populations of bats and of mossy swiftletshave also fallen
dramatically, despite the fact that the reproduction of
thesespecies is not disrupted (mossy nests are not harvested). Big
clouds of batsused to be seen coming out of the cave at dawn, but
this is no longer thecase, as the bats are no longer so numerous.
The production of guano, whichcomes not only from edible nest
swiftlets but also from mossy swiftlets andbats, has declined so
sharply (Leh and Hall, 1996) that the extent of thedecline cannot
be accounted for only by the decline in edible-nest swiftlets,but
implies also a decline in the bat and mossy swiftlet populations.
Al-though mossy swiftlets and some species of bats are occasionally
eaten bypeople staying inside the cave, especially when their
access is easy, this canprobably not account for a major drop in
their populations. The decline inmossy swiftlets and bats therefore
requires explanation in terms of physicalcauses. Moreover, it
should be noted that in 1978 (i.e., before the
seriousoverexploitation of nests began), people exploiting the
nests were alreadycomplaining about a decline of 60% in yields
(Koon and Cranbrook, 2002,p. 107).
In short, we must be very careful not to consider
overexploitation asthe only cause of edible nests decline. It is
still unknown how much bet-ter management of the nests would do to
stabilize or raise the populationof birds, or how many birds could
be sustained in the present state of theenvironment.
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 491
ACTORS IN BIRDS NEST MANAGEMENT
A great number of people are involved in the exploitation of
birdsnests. One can distinguish actors by their role in the
management of nests(i.e., by the different aspects that they
control). The owners are generallydescended from the Penan who
discovered the cave and started exploit-ing it in the nineteenth
century.4 The cave is subdivided into several hun-dred holes, which
are all individually owned by more than 100 owners.Ownership is
private, and is recognized by a title which was given underthe
Brooke administration,5 and which can be sold or inherited.
Althoughthe Penan were the original owners, a certain number of
Chinese or Malaytraders now own some holes, either through
matrimonial alliances withPenan or through purchase.
Although those who own a cave might exploit it themselves, most
own-ers lease their cave to somebody else. I will refer to those
who rent a caveas leasers. Some leasers exploit the cave
themselves, especially if the holeis small and difficult to access.
Those leasers who exploit the cave them-selves are usually Penan or
Iban (sometimes Kenyah). But most leasers aretraders in nests
(although not all traders are leasers) who seldom go in thecave
themselves and prefer to sublet the cave to other people who will
takecare of the exploitation.
Leasers usually pay a fixed rent per year to the owner of the
hole inthe cave, and they usually sublet the hole to others for a
monthly rent andthe monopoly of trade on the birds nests harvested
in the holes. Again,those who rent a cave from leasers can either
work themselves in the cave,especially if it is small and difficult
to access, or they can hire laborers totake care of and harvest
nests, especially when the hole is big. In what fol-lows, those who
hire laborers will be called team leaders (mandur in Iban),as they
are in charge of finding labor, controlling the collection of
nests,selling them to traders (usually the leaser), and
distributing salaries to theworkers.
Among the workers, one should distinguish the cave caretakers
(tukangjaga in Iban), who usually stay in rotation in the cave to
look after thenests and prevent theft, and the collectors, who can
be divided into climbers(tukang julok in Iban: those who make the
nests fall from the walls of thecave) and gatherers (ngumpul in
Iban: those who collect the nests fallen tothe ground).4The persons
who are called owners in the present article are in fact considered
by theSarawakian state as licensees or right-holders, who do not
own the cave as such, butrather the right to harvest the nests
(see, for example, Koon and Cranbrook, 2002, p. 104).However, the
local Penan perceive themselves as the rightful owners since time
immemorial,and I will refer to them as such in what follows.
5Some of the original documents are preserved at the Sarawak
Museum.
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492 Gausset
Another important actor is the trader, who buys raw nests. The
chainof traders is very long. It can start among the collectors,
who can buy nestsfrom other collectors and try to sell them for a
profit to traders in town.Some traders in Niah also give money to
local people in the communitiesharvesting nests, to buy nests for
them. But local people usually sell theirnests directly to the
traders themselves, since they have to sell the nests tothe trader
from whom they rent a cave. Local traders then sell the neststo
traders in Kuching who sell them to traders in Singapore or
sometimesdirectly to traders in Hong Kong. At the end, the
processed nests fetch avery high price and end up in the soup of
rich consumers, who are usuallyChinese.
Finally, there are different government agents, who try to
secure therespect of nest ownership (or harvest rights), prevent
theft, control immi-gration (many workers staying in the caves are
illegal immigrants from In-donesia), crime (illegal gambling and
selling of drugs takes place inside thecaves), regulate the harvest
of birds nest collection so that it is sustainableand does not
threaten the population of birds, and collect export taxes onthe
birds nest trade.
It is analytically important to distinguish these different
actors as theycontrol very specific aspects of birds nest
management. The owners con-trol ownership (the right to harvest
nests). The leasers control the capitalwhich is needed by owners
and lacking among team leaders or workers. Theteam leaders control
labor, something which is very difficult for owners andleasers
alike. Caretakers control the assets the nests and prevent
theirtheft. The collectors control the harvest. The traders control
trade (the buy-ing and selling of nests). The government agents
control legislation and itsenforcement. And finally, consumers
control demand. Finally, it should beremembered that some actors
play several different roles at the same time(most leasers are
traders, some are team leaders, and a few are workers;some owners
and team leaders can be workers at the same time, etc.)
In most cases, Penan owners lease their cave to a Chinese trader
ona yearly basis. Chinese traders sublease the hole to an Iban team
leaderwho pays either a monthly rent or one third of the nests
harvested thisusually covers the yearly rent that the trader pays
to the owner. On top ofthis agreement, the trader has the monopoly
on trade of the nests harvestedin the cave (usually bought at a
price which is lower than if the nests weresold freely). The team
leader hires Iban or Indonesian workers to take careof the cave and
harvest nests, and shares about two thirds of the harvestwith
them.
The benefits derived from the management of nests are
distributed asfollows: owners can get between 10 and 30% of the
profit, traders between
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 493
50 and 30%, and workers have around 40%, but much less if one
countsper person (see Gausset, 2002a and 2002b). The owners have
almost nocosts (they usually do not work), the leasers/traders bear
the financial riskof the trade, and the workers risk their lives
and health to establish a 24-hguard of the nests and climb poles to
harvest nests often situated 3050 mabove ground level. They are
also the ones who risk being pursued by theauthorities when they
harvest nests outside the legal periods.
SHORT HISTORY OF THE BIRDS NEST MANAGEMENT
All actors usually recognize that the management of birds nests,
as itis practiced today, is not sustainable, and that the resource
might becomeexhausted if nothing is done within a few years. The
management problemis very recent. No longer than 2025 years ago,
the birds were still plentifuland the exploitation of nests was
well managed and under government con-trol. It is therefore
important to look at the recent history of birds nest man-agement
to identify the turning points at which things began to go wrong
ifone wants to identify the causes of the present
mismanagement.
Before 1980: Low Price, Equilibrium, Clear Ownershipand Sound
Management
The exploitation of nests in the Niah cave began at the
beginning ofthe nineteenth century. It soon came under the
supervision of the Brookeregime and of the Sarawak museum, which
issued licenses to the differ-ent owners and enacted various
ordinances to control the collection. Onlytwo harvests were
allowed, in December and June, which lasted for twomonths (Medway,
1958, p. 467). Most owners and collectors were Penan,while traders
were first Malay, and then later on local Chinese. The ownerseither
worked in their cave themselves or hired Penan workers who werepaid
a fixed price per harvest, as well as a share of the harvest
(Cranbrook,1984). During harvest time, workers stayed overnight in
the cave. Tradersestablished a whole village in an adjacent cave
(the so-called trader cave),to barter goods for raw nests, or buy
nests with money. As many workerscontracted debts with traders,
they often repaid the debt in kind. In theearly 1930s, the state
established auctions to secure a better price for theworkers and
owners (through traders competition) and to prevent tax eva-sion
(Banks, 1937). The state also tried to outlaw the repayment of debt
inkind with nests. At the end of the 1950s birds nest collection
was a dyingbusiness (Medway, 1957, 1958). In 1958, only five Penan
were still working
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494 Gausset
as professional birds nest collectors. The price was so low that
it was uneco-nomic to exploit nests, especially due to the
concomitant risk. Exploitationbegan to pick up again in the 1970s
when the price increased significantly(see Koon and Cranbrook,
2002, p. 86).
An important point is that Penan had developed a very close and
re-spectful relationship to the cave. Myths describe, for example,
how the caveis believed to be the remnants of a former village
which was flooded due toa breach of taboos (Husain, 1958; Sandin,
1958). The cave was believed tobe inhabited by various spirits,
including some of the most important Penanheroes. It was the object
of numerous taboos (for example, it was forbiddento shout and make
noise inside the cave), as well as important annual ritualsaimed at
securing peace, fertility, and good luck.
In short, before 1980, the local system of birds nest
management,which involved mainly Penan and some local traders, was
still sustainableand well controlled. It was taking place at a low
scale; the number of birdsand nests was very high, but the price
was low.
The 1980s: Rising Price, Theft, and Illegal Trade
Things began to change in the early 1980s when the price of
birdsnests increased sharply (Borneo Bulletin, 1982; Koon and
Cranbrook, 2002,pp. 8687; Leh, 1998, p. 25). The price of raw black
nests passed from1050 MYR/kg in the late 1970s to 350500 MYR/kg in
the late 1980s(Koon and Cranbrook, 2002, p. 86). More and more
people got interestedin birds nests: neighboring Iban began to
harvest nests illegally, outside ofthe harvesting season and
without asking permission from the Penan own-ers, encouraged by new
Chinese traders. Officially, there were still only twoharvests per
year, and this rule was followed by most Penan owners andworkers.
But nests were being stolen on a larger and larger scale, and itwas
difficult to control as, at that time, no people stayed in the cave
toguard the nests and prevent theft (the Iban village is situated
at 30-minwalking distance from the cave, while the Penan villages
are much fur-ther away, on the other side of the Niah river). On
one hand, the right-ful owners were being prevented from harvesting
their nests outside of thelegal season; on the other, the nests
were being stolen on a large scaleby unlawful encroachers. Even
when caught red handed when harvest-ing nests illegally, thieves
escaped punishment and continued to operate.This period was thus
characterized by a sharp rise in the price of nests,followed by the
development of illegal harvesting of and trade in birdsnests.
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 495
19892001: Bans on Collection, and Breaking Down of the
OldManagement System
Alerted by the situation, the Sarawak Museum declared two total
banson the harvest of nests from 1989 to 1991, and again from 1993
to 1996, toreplenish the stock of nests (Sim, 1997). However, since
the cave is verybig with many entrances, it was impossible to
enforce the bans success-fully. As the price continued to rise,
reaching a peak of 1600 MYR/kg in1996 (Koon and Cranbrook, 2002, p.
87), theft continued and expanded. Asno Penan were harvesting
anymore they were gradually losing control oftheir resource. First,
it was being stolen by neighboring communities. Sec-ond, they were
prevented from harvesting their resource under a total ban(which
lowered cave surveillance by Penan and enhanced theft). To
retainactual ownership and profit, many owners decided that it was
better to leasetheir holes either to Chinese traders, or directly
to the very thieves whowere exploiting their resources. Thus, many
owners disengaged from themanagement of their cave and rented it to
get at least something out of aresource which would in any case
have been harvested, with or without theirconsent. Instead of
reinforcing Penans ownership, the total ban weakenedit further,
giving thieves a free hand to operate. Other owners convinced
theauthorities (sometimes with bribes) that they should be allowed
to harvesttheir own nests before they were stolen. The local
authorities, acknowledg-ing their powerlessness vis-a`-vis theft,
would have had difficulties prevent-ing the rightful owners from
harvesting their own resource when they wereunable to protect it
from being harvested by others. All the workers (bothPenan and
Iban) then began to organize a 24-h guard of their holes to
pre-vent theft. The nests began to be harvested more and more
frequently tolower the risk of them being stolen. With the workers
staying overnight inthe cave (cooking, eating, sleeping,
defecating, listening to music, etc.), theold taboos lost ground,
as well as the old rituals that required a total clo-sure of the
cave for a few days once a year (this became very difficult
aspeople would not leave their nests unguarded for fear of theft,
and as itis difficult to close the cave with tourists visiting in
ever greater numbers).The cave became a haven for illegal
activities such as gambling and drugtrafficking.
This period also saw a progressive disengagement of the
SarawakMuseum, first in the enforcement of collection rules
(involving Police FieldForces at some point), then in the actual
management of the cave. Althoughthe Sarawak Museum remains in
charge of the archaeological site, the man-agement of the cave and
of its wildlife (bats, birds, insects, etc.) has beenofficially
transferred to the Forestry Department. This transition created
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496 Gausset
confusion and tensions, not just between civil servants
belonging to dif-ferent administrations, but also between people
involved in birds nest ex-ploitation and government officials. For
some years, people were unsurewho was in charge and who they had to
negotiate with. Moreover, peopleworking for the Forestry Department
did not have the long experience andknowledge of the local people
and context that the Sarawak Museum hadaccumulated over the years.
Finally, people working for the Forestry andWildlife Department had
a more pronounced ecocentric perspective focus-ing on conservation,
while all other actors had a clear anthropocentric viewof birds as
a valuable resource to be exploited. Unfortunately, the transi-tion
happened at the time when the old system had broken down, and
whenintervention from the state, despite the best of intentions,
was unable tocontrol abuses and actually made things worse.
When the ban was lifted in 1996 the Forestry Department helped
tocreate (or rather to make official) a birds nest committee, which
includedall cave owners. This came about partly in response to a
real demand fromcave owners to regain control of their resources,
and partly because localparticipation in the management of
resources had become a global trendat the end of the 1990s. But the
committee has never really been in chargeof the management of the
collection, which remains vested in the handsof the Forestry
Department, the traders, and the workers. Moreover, thiscommittee
does not receive any funds and is totally powerless when deal-ing
with the huge interests at stake and with the great complexity of
theproblem.
To sum up, one can distinguish seven trends that characterize
thechange of management in the Niah cave in the past three decades.
First,the price of nests skyrocketed from less than 20 MYR in the
1970s to apeak of 1600 MYR in 1996. Second, more and more actors
(Chinese traders,Iban and Indonesian workers) became involved in
the business. Third, thePenan gradually lost the control of their
resource through theft and caveclosure, although they succeeded in
retaining some recognition throughrenting their caves to non-Penan
traders and workers. Fourth, leasing andsubleasing has left all
actors interested only in making money in the short-run, instead of
long-term management of the resource. Fifth, when the tra-ditional
system of two harvests per year broke down completely, peoplebegan
to stay overnight in the caves and to harvest the nests as soon
aspossible so as to preempt-thieves. Sixth, with people staying
overnight inthe caves, traditional systems of beliefs, taboos, and
rituals were ignoredand making money became the paramount concern
of the people involvedin birds nests exploitation. Finally, the
level of violence was raised on alllevels. Thieves did violence to
the Penan rights, the new leasers and work-ers (the ancient
thieves) raised the level of violence to deter others from
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 497
stealing their nests, and the state had recourse to violence to
try to imposetwo total bans on harvests (19891991 and
19931996).
MAIN PROBLEMS AND CAUSES OF MISMANAGEMENT
Following this description of historical changes in the
management ofbirds nests, I return to some of those aspects that
constitute major causesof the present management problems. It is
important to recognize that mostof the time, these problems are
interrelated in a complex web of causalrelations.
High Price and Free Market
Clearly, problems started when the price for birds nests
skyrocketed.A high price is something positive when a management
system is sound, asit provides a higher income to workers and
owners (we should rememberthat nest harvesting was a dying art in
the 1950s and 1960s). But the prob-lem is that a high price is
often the trigger to the breakdown of traditionalmanagement systems
and can lead to overexploitation.
A free market also has advantages, such as the optimization of
costsand benefits among the different actors. However, in Niah the
market isnot very free. There exist many trade monopolies (workers
have to sell theirnests below the market price to the trader from
whom they rent the cave);workers and owners of caves are bonded to
the traders from whom theyborrow money, and there exist a lot of
illegal trade and tax evasion, all ofwhich are biasing the free
market. A second problem is that people, whenthey are free to do
whatever they want and when there is big money atstake, have a
tendency to maximize profit, avoid regulations (i.e., harvestany
time, evade tax), and disregard any ownership system (i.e., steal
thenests of others). This then puts pressure on whatever regulatory
system isin place (both the state and the traditional Penan
management systems).For example, the Sarawakian state has tried to
regulate the trade of nests;at one point it forbade the
reimbursement of debts in kind (with raw nests)and imposed auctions
of birds nests so that local collectors would get afairer price for
their resource, and the state would get a better control ofthe
trade and collection of taxes. But, the auctions disappeared in
1986, andeach collector reverted to choosing his own trader to sell
his nests to. Since itwas at a time when the price was increasing
sharply, competition was fierceand the price paid to the owners and
workers remained high. But it becameeasier to buy and sell stolen
or illegally harvested nests, a practice whichwas seriously
threatening the traditional management system. Moreover, it
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498 Gausset
became easier to evade export taxes, as the sales were not
controlled by thestate. This new opacity of the trade made it
difficult for anybody to controland regulate it.
To sum up, a market economy which is tamed and regulated can
pro-vide long-term benefits for all, but a market economy which is
a war ofeveryone against everyone else is one of the primary causes
of short-termprofit maximization and of the breakdown of any
existing managementrules.
Theft
One of the main causes of the short-term maximization strategy
is un-controlled theft, which makes it very difficult to manage a
resource fora long-term benefit. Those people who have sound
management prac-tices and refrain from harvesting too much and too
often run a seri-ous risk of seeing all their long-term efforts
ruined within an hour by athief.
Theft started when the price of nests began skyrocketing and was
madeeasier by the fact that new ethnic groups became involved.
People interact-ing with other ethnic groups do not always
recognize their forms of socialcontrol. Illegal gambling and drug
trafficking inside the cave also createdacute needs for quick money
and therefore encouraged theft inside thecave.
Theft is very quick and very easy (a thief just climbs and
harvests whathe finds), and very difficult to prevent (the cave is
huge, has many entrancesand cannot be securely closed; it is
difficult to see a thief operating 30 mabove ground, and even if
you see him, it is difficult to stop and appre-hend him). Park
rangers are underfunded, unable, and unwilling to risktheir lives
to control nest collection (at least one government official
hasbeen killed inside the cave). They therefore leave this task to
the caretak-ers working in the cave. But it is difficult for
caretakers who catch a thiefto deliver him to the police or the
Forestry administration, since rightfulcaretakers and workers are
themselves breaking regulations through har-vesting outside the
legal periods. This being said, even if a thief was de-livered to
the police, he would likely get away with a fine (a fraction ofwhat
he would make by selling nests) or, at worst, a few weeks in jail.
Thisis not serious enough to deter him from committing the same
crime againonce he is freed. In short, theft gives an extremely
high return at a very lowrisk.
Different strategies have been developed to deter thieves.
First, thestate enacted two total bans on harvest which in fact
proved to be counter-productive; instead of supporting the existing
management structures, the
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 499
bans helped destroy them. As the rightful owners were prevented
from go-ing into the cave, the only forms of local management and
control that ex-isted disappeared, paving the way for the operation
of thieves. Moreover,as the police field force was unable to
prevent theft, the rightful ownerspreferred to engage in harvesting
their own nests illegally before they werestolen, or to directly
rent their caves to the people who were stealing them(or to Chinese
traders who sublet the cave to the former thieves). The sec-ond
strategy was thus to turn former thieves into legal workers
throughrenting the cave to them or to traders. However, this did
not prevent newkinds of thieves from starting to operate (illegal
immigrants, etc.), the newvictims being the old perpetrators. A
third strategy was to establish a 24-hguard of the nests. This
raised the operating cost of exploiting birds nests,and is not 100%
successful (the nests can be quickly harvested when a care-taker
falls asleep for one or two hours). A fourth strategy was to raise
thelevel of violence and to develop mob justice inside the cave:
thieves whoare caught are beaten on the spot. As all these
strategies failed to some de-gree, a last strategy has been
employed, which consists in harvesting nests assoon as they can be
sold, without waiting for the chicks to mature. Withoutefficient
control of theft (ideally in cooperation with government
authori-ties, coupled with sufficient dissuasive incentives),
overharvesting is likelyto continue.
Many Actors: Insecurity and Unclear Responsibility
The breaking down of the old system of management was caused
bythe involvement of new actors who did not respect traditional
managementrules. As we argued earlier, social control is much more
difficult when peo-ple with different ethnic identities interact.
An important part of moral-ity and solidarity often ends at the
border of the village or of the ethnicgroup.
The involvement of different actors brings many problems. First,
whendifferent groups specialize in different aspects of production
(which isbroadly the case here, the Penan being owners and
collectors, the Chinesetraders, and the rest collectors),
professional interest tends to be mixedwith the community interest.
The situation is perceived in terms of azero-sum game (what is
taken by some is lost for others). The moredifferent actors are
involved, the more different perceptions, interests,strategies, and
the more difficult it is for them to agree on the manage-ment of
the same resource. There is today no supraethnic organizationwhich
can take decisions based on a broad consensus among the
differentcommunities.
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500 Gausset
Second, the more different kinds of people are involved, the
more com-plex the management of a resource becomes, but the less
people will feelresponsible for it. Even if there was a supraethnic
organization to negotiatemanagement, it would be very difficult to
reach an agreement, as every-body feels helpless and insecure.
Insecurity is an important concept if onewants to understand
problems of management. Almost all actors involvedin birds nests
feel insecure today. The Penan owners were the first to
feelinsecure, when their management system was threatened both by
thievesand by the state, which enacted a total ban on harvest and
prevented themfrom harvesting their nests. Their reaction was to
rent their cave to Ibanworkers or Chinese traders (who sublet to
the workers). In this way, theywere able to secure their ownership
through having others recognize it, tosecure their income through a
yearly rent, and to get rid of all exploitationproblems.
The traders feel insecure because they bear the financial risk,
bothin renting the cave and commercializing the nests. Moreover,
they haveto renegotiate contracts each year. Their strategy to
lower the risk is tolend money to owners and workers, to bind them
to longer term agree-ments. They also try to establish monopolies
through subletting their cavesto workers on the condition that they
sell the entire harvest through them(at a price which is less
competitive). The traders/leasers do not get involvedin the
management of the cave, and transfer exploitation problems onto
theworkers who rent the cave from them.
Workers feel insecure because they also have to renegotiate
their con-tract every year with the trader. They risk their lives
and health to ex-ploit the nests, but they are the ones who get the
lowest share per per-son. Moreover, they are breaking the law by
harvesting nests outside of thelegal period. They try to raise
their income through selling their nests tounauthorized traders.
They also engage in the exploitation of unregisteredsmaller caves,
which have no traditional owner, and which gives them all
theprofit.
Finally, the state also feels insecure. It is torn between the
will to savethe swiftlets (which are defined as a threatened
species) and to secure thelivelihood of the local population. The
management of the cave is not easyas it involves different
administrations (forestry and wildlife, archaeology,agriculture,
local development, customary law of indigenous people, po-lice,
etc.) which defend different things, based on different premises
andstrategies that are at times contradictory. The credibility of
the state is thusthreatened. It has to do something to improve the
management of the Niahcave, but it has so far failed to do so
convincingly. The strategy that it de-veloped to assert its
authority was to enact a total ban and to use violenceto deter
people from exploiting nests; this has been a failure.
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 501
In short, all the actors feel insecure and helpless. All feel
that they can-not do anything without the collaboration of others,
and have no idea abouthow to organize this collaboration. Everybody
blames others as responsi-ble for the degradation of the resource.
The long chain of actors dilutesresponsibility. Owners rent to
traders and delegate management problemsto them. They give the
contract to the highest bidder, not to the sound-est manager. The
contract does not mention anything about the numberof harvests,
despite the fact that the rent is fixed and is independent of
thenumber of harvests (owners have therefore a greater interest in
sound man-agement than traders or workers, who all get a benefit
which is proportionalto the number of harvests). Traders rent to
team leaders or workers anddelegate management problems to them.
The workers are not motivated tohave a sound management since they
do not own the right to harvest nests,have an insecure contract,
and since sound management two harvestsper year is relatively risky
(the nests might be stolen). Moreover, it is be-lieved that the
birds might go elsewhere and reproduce in places which arenot well
managed. If the cost of sound management is individual while
thebenefit is communal, there is no incentive for individual
responsible behav-ior. Therefore, everybody engages, reluctantly,
in overexploitation of thenests.
To sum up, the uncontrolled market, the theft of nests and break
downof the traditional management system, and the high insecurity
and lack ofresponsibility of all actors in the new systems, are the
major causes of thepresent unsustainable management. At present,
all actors recognize that thenumber of birds nests is declining
every year, and that if nothing is donesoon, the business will die.
Everybody has an interest in adopting a long-term perspective and
in changing their own individual behavior. Yet peo-ple feel
powerless, as sustainable management requires a collective changeof
behavior, and as too many loosely connected and uncontrolled actors
areinvolved in the exploitation. While the definition of new and
better rules forharvesting nests (for example, establishing a
selective harvest which wouldleave 25% of nests undisturbed every
month for breeding and reproduction,see Koon and Cranbrook, 2002,
pp. 137144) is always welcome,6 it shouldbe clear from what
precedes that those rules are unlikely to be applied un-til the
socioeconomic problems of theft, insecurity, and lack of
consensusand collective behavior are addressed. What is needed
today, is a consensusamong the different actors on a common and
sound system of managementwhich would address these problems.7
6One important aspect of this new management rule would be to
legalize the currently illegalpractice of harvest out of the
official period. This simple thing would already be a great helpin
recreating confidence between the state and most major actors in
birds nests management.
7A first draft of such a strategy can be found in Koon
(2000).
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502 Gausset
WHAT TRAGEDY AREWE TALKING ABOUT?
In an article which has become extremely influential, Hardin
(1968)argues that common property resources are doomed to be
overexploitedand exhausted by selfish individuals who always try to
maximize their pri-vate profit while they communalize the
environmental and economic costsof raising production. He then
advocates either state intervention in regu-lating selfishness
(coercion which is mutually agreed upon by the majorityof the
people affected) or, better still, privatization of the resources
so asto privatize both the cost and the benefit of environmental
management(Hardin, 1968) private property holders are believed to
possess the nec-essary information and incentives to take
responsibility for environmentalresources (Eckersley, 1995). The
model of the tragedy of the commons isclosely related to other
models of behavior, such as game theory and theprisoners dilemma.
The crux of the problem is that whenever one personcannot be
excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person
ismotivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free ride
on the effortsof others. If all participants choose to free ride,
the collective outcome isnegative (Ostrom, 1990, p. 6).
The theory of the tragedy of the commons has been severely
criticized.One criticism opposes to Hardins concept of homo
economicus (the ideathat individuals always try to maximize their
own benefit) the view that manis social, acting according to the
behavior of neighbors and kin, and able tosacrifice private
interest for the common good of the group. Another crit-icism is
the idea that capitalism (which includes private ownership,
alongwith a frenzied consumption style) is the problem rather than
the solution toenvironmental degradation (see for example
Colchester, 1994; Joekes et al.,1994, p. 140). Although the authors
holding this view tend to agree withHardin that individuals, when
left to themselves, cannot work for the com-mon good, they cannot
follow him when he advocates privatization sincethis puts the
individual person at the center of the management, and since ithas
just been argued that individuals cannot been trusted in their
behavior.They then advocate stronger communal rules. Another
criticism, which isprobably the most common, has been to show that
common property re-sources (CPR) are not the same as resources
which are open to anybody.CPR are systems of property; they thus
regulate access to, and the manage-ment of the resources
(Brockington and Homewood, 1996, p. 102; Casimir,1998; Colchester,
1994, p. 81; Cousins, 2000; Feeny et al., 1990; Horowitz,1998;
Leach and Mearns, 1996, p. 13; Leal, 1998; Little and Brokensha,
1987;McCabe, 1990; Sather, 1990; Swift, 1996, p. 90; Vivian, 1992,
p. 5960, 1994,pp. 17980). Therefore, Hardins suggestion that CPR
systems should bereplaced by either privatization or state control
is most unwelcome when
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 503
the traditional CPR systems function well and secure equal
redistributionof the resources to all. Moreover, as we have seen
with the Niah case, aprivate system of ownership can make room for
numerous types of leas-ing arrangements, which can create much
insecurity (see also Vivian, 1992,p. 61). Ownership insecurity
comes from alienation (often from the state)rather than from
communal systems of ownership (Lane, 1992, p. 99; Leachand Mearns,
1996, p. 13). Finally, to reduce the field of alternatives to
onlythree possibilities (state control, privatization, or
chaos/CPR) is too simplis-tic. It is important to recognize that
most systems of management combinestate control with some forms of
private ownership and some forms of cus-tomary or communally agreed
upon rules (Berkes and Farvar, 1989, pp. 910). Many different kinds
of environmental management are possible, andwe should take all
variables into account if we want to get the institutionsright
(Ostrom, 1990, p. 15).
It is clear from this discussion that the mechanism described by
Hardin(the free rider or the open-access) can exist and is a
tragedy. But itis equally clear that this tragedy has no direct
relationship with the com-mon property resources, and that
privatization is no universal solution. Inthe present case,
although the Niah cave has been privatized for a longtime, this did
not prevent the tragedy of the free rider from happeningin the
1980s, when the traditional system of ownership was challenged
bythieves and illegal harvesters. The tragedy of the free rider can
in facthappen in any system of ownership (whether state controlled,
private, orCPR), when this system is unable to enforce its rules
and is breaking down(see also Colchester, 1994; Feeny et al.,
1990). What is lacking, when thetragedy happens, is a lack of
mutually agreed upon management rules. Asystem of private ownership
can be threatened by people encroaching onthe private property,
just as much as a system of CPR can be threatenedby individuals who
do not follow the common rules. In each case, the crit-ical aspect
is not whether the system is private, or communally owned, orstate
controlled, but whether the system works and is widely accepted by
allactors as legitimate. If not, then the free rider can operate
with impunity,as in the Niah cave during the 1980s. The tragedy was
that the Penan wereunable to enforce their rights of private
ownership on the cave and on thenests; these rights were challenged
by the state, by non-Penan workers, andby the traders. As a result,
the situation was close to an open-access system.
The Penan strategy has then been to lease the cave to the
workers andtraders. Although this saved the system of private
ownership from totallybreaking down, it has diluted responsibility
and lowered interest in sustain-able harvests. Moreover, this has
not prevented other people from threaten-ing the new leasing system
through continuing theft of nests (free ridingon the workers
efforts). The strategy to counter this trend and prevent free
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504 Gausset
riding (open-access) has been to harvest the nests as soon as
they are bigenough. So in this case, the tragedy is not even a
tragedy of free riding, orthe tragedy of a system unable to enforce
its management rules, but it israther the tragedy of a private
system of ownership whose strategy to en-force its rule is to
delegate responsibility to others who then harvest theresource in
an unsustainable manner.
It is important here to distinguish different aspects of
property. Prop-erty can concern a resource per se (nests, meat,
fish, crop), or a certainenvironment or territory (cave,
pasture/forest, lake/sea, field), or the vectorwhich reproduces the
resource (swiftlets, cattle/game, fish, seeds). Althoughsome of
these aspects are obviously closely linked (the vector is almost
thesame as the resource but situated at an earlier stage; the
control of the ter-ritory usually aims at controlling the resource
and its vector), they shouldnevertheless be distinguished, since
they have different impacts on manage-ment. In Niah, for example,
the vector (the swiftlet) is very different fromthe resource (the
nest). The private property system concerns the resourceand the
territory but not the vector. The nests belong to the owner of
thecave where they are found (although, in practice, they belong to
the firstperson who harvests them, whether he is the rightful owner
or a thief), butthe birds belong to nobody. They are free to fly
away and establish them-selves elsewhere.8 Since the vector cannot
be privatized, there is a needto communalize its ownership and to
create a system of common propertyvectors (CPV instead of CPR).
To summarize, there is a tragedy in the past and present
managementof birds nests in Niah. Although the resource is
renewable, it is exploited inan unsustainable way. It is important
here to distinguish between the 1980sand the present period. In the
1980s, the tragedy had nothing to do with thecommons (since the
resource was already privatized), but it was a tragedy offree
riding or open-access (with thieves operating almost freely in the
cave).It was thus the tragedy of a management system that was
unable to enforceits own rules. At present, the only free riding
left concerns the vector (thebirds) and not the nests or the cave.
Since the benefits of good manage-ment and the costs of bad
management are shared by all, individuals havelittle incentive to
change their behavior except if others engage themselvesin the same
way. However, since the birds cannot be privatized, there is a
8This is also true in the case of house-farming of swiftlets
(see Leh, 2000; Koon and Cranbrook,2002). Here too, it is the
territory (the house) and the resource (the nests) which are
private,the birds being free to fly away and reproduce elsewhere.
While house farming might bea profitable and sustainable business
(it does not have the same problem of theft, tenureinsecurity, and
a long chain of irrresponsible actors as in the Niah cave), it is
unlikely to solvethe management problem of the Niah cave, or even
to reduce the harvest pressure. As longas there is big money to be
made in the Niah cave, the pressure will remain high.
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Birds Nest Management in Niah Caves (Sarawak) 505
need to create or reinforce a system of common property which
would enactsound rules of management to counteract the free riding
attitude concern-ing the vector. When it comes to the present
management of territory andresource (cave or nests), whose
ownership is private, the tragedy is neithera tragedy of the
commons, nor that of free riding (since theft is relativelyunder
control). It is rather the tragedy of a system whose strategies to
avoidfree riding (i.e., leasing, harvesting the nests as soon as
possible) lead to un-sustainable management. Ultimately, the
tragedy of birds, nests, and cavemanagement in Niah is the tragedy
of a system in which the actors are un-able, although willing, to
reach a consensus, to change their strategies andmake them more
sustainable.
ACKNOWLEGMENTS
I am very grateful to SLUSE for its financial support, and to
the StatePlanning Unit of Sarawak for giving me the authorization
to do research inNiah, providing me with a research permit, and
putting me in contact withgovernment officials dealing with birds
nests management. I am also verythankful to Dr Lim Chan Koon and Dr
Leh for their extremely qualifiedhelp and friendly support.
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