Secure Cities II Initiative Countering Improvised Explosive Device Networks Chris Hunter QGM FIExpE GCGI MCMI Kratos Enterprises Ltd Counter-IED Consultants
Secure Cities II Initiative
Countering Improvised Explosive Device Networks
Chris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMI
Kratos Enterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultants
Counter-Terrorist Bomb Disposal
Assault IEDD
• Assault IEDD is the process in which an operator uses speedy render-safe techniques to maintain the momentum of an assaulting force in a potentially hostile environment.
Nov 26th Mumbai Attacks
C-IED Operations Northern Ireland, Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombia
Scope
• The Structure of a Terrorist Network
• Methods of attacking the network
• Challenges• Final Considerations
Leadership
• Provides direction and
policy
• Approves Goals and
Objectives
• Overarching guidance for
Operations
• Generally rise from within
ranks or establish their own
splinter groups
Operators
• Plan and execute operations
• Manage and acquire intelligence, finance, logistics and comms
• Includes bomb making and surveillance expertise
• Bomb emplacers generally not bomb makers
Operators: Cellular Foundation
• Tactical level• 3 – 4 people• Security• Difficult to infiltrate• Unaware of other cells and
their membership• Provide emotional and
social support• Leader is often only contact
with outside world
Active Supporters
Active in:• Political/Ideological
Indoctrination• Fund Raising• Information gathering• Provision of safe houses,
transportation and medical assistance
• Do not normally commit violent acts
Defeating the Terror Network at the Strategic and Operational Level
Profiling those at high risk of becoming radicalised
Targeting the Training Camps
• Assassination• Arson• Bombing• Hijacking• Hostage Taking• Kidnapping• Maiming• Raids• Seizure• Sabotage• Hoaxes• Use of CBRN weapons
Global not Regional Trend Analysis
Ramzi Yousef
Project Bojinka - 1995
Airline Bomb Plot
Money Laundering
Global Logistics and Procurement Chains (Land, Sea and Air)
Covert Operations – Letting an operation run
Disruption of Component Chain
Technical & Forensic Exploitation
Social Network Analysis
Correctly Trained Debriefing Personnel
Other Considerations
Analysis and Testing of Likely Targets
Intelligence must be multi-source:
Booby-trapped Safe-houses
Prepare for the Future: CBRN
Prepare for Future Threats: London & Glasgow Bombings 2007
Investing in protection: The Cost of Terror vs Defence Spending
• Sept 11Twin towers New York: Cost to terrorist $500,000; Cost to America $600bn
• Madrid Bombings: Cost to terrorist 10,000 euros; Cost to Spain 212 million euros
• 2002: Yemen French oil tanker Limburg: Cost to terrorist <$50,000. Cost to Yemen $3.8m per month
The war on terror has only two outcomes: Win, or lose…and we can only win, if we stay alert…and look for
absence of the normal, and presence of the abnormal
Questions?
Chris Hunter QGMFIExpE GCGI MCMI
Director Kratos Enterprises LtdCounter-IED Consultants
www.kratosenterprises.com