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DF-31A ICBMs pass the Tiananmen Gate, Beijing, during a military parade on 3 September 2015. The DF-31A is a main candidate for future deployment as part of China's road-mobile nuclear deterrent. (PA)
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Distant threats
China's land-based nuclear deterrent is credited by the US as currently employing various cruise and
ballistic missile types. If this assessment is correct, these systems would permit a range of targeting options
across the theatre and intercontinental levels of operation. All of China's land-based nuclear-armed missile
systems are operated by the Second Artillery Corps, which also operates the majority of China's
conventionally armed land-based missile systems.
Estimates in the 2013 report, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat , by the US Department of Defense's
National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), suggest that the total Chinese ICBM force (see Table)
has no more than 60 operational launchers. In contrast, the report suggests that the Second Artillery Corps
operates nearly 400 shorter-range ballistic missile launchers. Although the NASIC report uses missile
launchers to benchmark relative strength, it should be noted that a substantial number of reload missiles
are potentially available for use.
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Nonetheless, this disparity strongly suggests that Beijing has traditionally focused on its perceived regional
threats, such as conflict with Taiwan or Japan. Although the bulk of the shorter-range missile force is
conventionally armed, it is possible that the DF-21 ballistic missile and DH-10 cruise missile have also been
equipped with nuclear warheads.
Although China is carrying out missile modernisation, its original design parameters resulted in the
commissioning of four missiles in the Dong-Feng (East Wind) series to meet strategically designated
targets: the DF-2 was to target Japan; the DF-3, the Philippines; the DF-4, Guam; and the DF-5, the US.
Many of China's older missile systems have already been retired - for example, the last unit operating the
roll-out DF-4 missile, the 805th Missile Brigade, is undergoing conversion to use the road-mobile DF-31A.
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Defence and Space imagery of Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center captured four days prior to the 25
September 2014 flight test shows a towed TEL virtually identical to that used by the DF-31A deployed on a
missile test pad (see Airbus Defence and Space imagery). If the Washington Free Beacon website, which
has a good track record of reporting on Chinese modernisation efforts, is correct, the vehicle may be
associated with the DF-31B trials programme. Although not supporting theories of a new TEL, it does not
preclude the possibility, as it may be indicative of a test launcher, rather than an operational one.
Airbus Defence and Space imagery shows an apparent DF-31B ICBM mounted on a TEL undergoing pre-launch preparations at Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center, also known as Wuzhai Missile and Space Test Center, in China, four days before a 25 September 2014 test launch. (CNES 2014, Distribution Airbus DS / 2015 IHS)
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Changing operations?
Chinese ICBM forces differ in their operational practices depending on the basing mode. Silo-based missile
systems may be kept in an alert status, whereas mobile ICBM forces are reactionary systems intended for
dispersal during hostilities. During peacetime, TELs are contained within garrison complexes usually found
close to metropolitan areas for access to utilities and other amenities. Neither missiles nor warheads are
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DF-5B ICBMs presented during a military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015. The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)-equipped DF-5B system is likely to have entered service in 2014-15, and is the country's only known operational MIRV-equipped ICBM. (PA)
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Conclusion
China's ICBM modernisation efforts have ramifications regionally and globally. MIRVs imply a level of
miniaturisation in the associated warhead, often corresponding to a reduced yield or amount of energy
released. Reduced yield results in a less-effective system unless there is a corresponding increase in
accuracy.
From this perspective, the addition of MIRVs to the DF-5B and other systems possibly indicates a
developing counterforce capability. Previous Chinese ICBMs relied on large 'city buster' warheads less
suited for attacking pinpoint targets such as ICBM launch control centres or individual silos. The
development of a system including smaller, more accurate warheads able to target such sites may increase