China’s Environmental Challenge and Its Implications for International Policies on Global Warming

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The 25th Taiwan-European Conference

December 2-3, 2008 - Institute of international Relations at National Chengchi

University -

China’s Environmental Challenge and Its Implications for International Policies on Global

Warming

Benoit Vermander

In March 2006, the Chinese National Popular Assembly ratified the Eleventh Five-Years Plan of the country. The document was signaling a turning point that had been in preparation for several years: China was officially intending to take the path of sustainable development. The Chinese government was still fostering and foreseeing a high growth rate between 2006 and 2010. However, the document was largely focusing on the nature of the projected growth: from now on, in theory, the revenues of the poorest should increase faster than those of the richest; basic consumption, and no longer investment, should draw growth. An extra share of national wealth needs to be devoted to making social services accessible to all. Industrial recycling, investments in the fields of waste management and water cleaning, the raising of environment protection standards should receive special attention. All public policies must concur towards the creation of a « harmonious society » with special concern for the poorest part of the population, underdeveloped areas and the needs of future generations. From March 2006 on, a number of measures have been taken or announced which coincide with this general orientation. However, it is obvious that such a policy change requires time before being truly implemented and that it is periodically threatened by vested interests, changes in economic conjuncture and inner contradictions within the political system and the ranking of national top priorities.

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This paper focuses on the ecological dimension of China’s overall challenge and strategy, with special emphasis on the positioning of China when it comes to the international debate on climate change. The release by the State Council of a much awaited white paper titled “China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change” on October 28 2009 highlights the importance of the issue. The declaration on "sustainable development" issued by the 7th ASEM summit in Beijing a few days before the said declaration brings this policy focus into regional and international perspective. - I - Environmental assessment

a) Overall situation

With 22 percent of the world’s population, China possesses only 7 percent of the cultivated land, 5 to 6 percent of water resources and 4 to 5 percent of the forests of the planet. This scarcity of resources partially accounts for the environmental challenge it must confront. However, these natural resources are also ill-managed. Here is what Pan Yue, deputy director of the State Environmental Protection Administration, had to say in April 2005 : “Five of the ten most polluted cities worldwide are in China; acid rain is falling on one third of our territory; half of the water in China’s seven largest rivers is completely useless; a quarter of our citizens lack access to clean drinking water; a third of the urban population is breathing polluted air; less than a fifth of the rubbish in cities is treated and processed in an environmentally sustainable manner. Because air and water are polluted, we are losing from 8-15% of our gross domestic product. This does not include the costs for health and human suffering: in Beijing alone, 70-80% of all deadly cancer cases are related to the environment. Lung cancer has emerged as the number one cause of death.”1 Pan Yue has also described the year 2006 as “the grimmest for China’s environmental situation”, with 161 serious environmental accidents and failure to meet the target of reducing pollution emission by 2%.2

1 Interview in the English edition of Der Spiegel, reproduced on

http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article-6-129-2407.jsp

2 AWSJ, January 12-14, 2007. Air and water pollutants were supposed to be reduced by 2 per cent in 2006 but they instead rose

by 1.8 per cent and 1.2 per cent.

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In 2006, China ranked 94 out of 133 countries listed in the Environmental Performance Index (Yale University).3 Meanwhile, China rose four places in UNDP’s annual Human Development Index in 2006, ranking 80 out of 175 countries listed.4 The national “Green GDP Accounting” confirms most indicators used in these two reports. “Green GDP Accounting” refers to an accounting system deducting natural resources depletion costs and environmental degradation costs, so as to assess the quality of economic development in real sense. The project was launched in March 2004 jointly by the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) and National Bureau of Statistics. According to the conclusion (published in September 2006), economic loss caused by environmental pollution is 511.8 billion yuan, accounting for 3.05% of national GDP in 2004. Environmental costs by water pollution, by air pollution and by solid wastes and pollution accidents account for 55.9%, 42.9% and 1.2% of the total costs, respectively.5

b) Water

The per capita share of fresh water in China, which stands at 2,200 cubic meters, is only one-quarter of the world average. By 2030 when China's population reaches 1.6 billion, per capita water resources will drop to 1760 cubic meters; close to 1700 cubic meters, the internationally recognized benchmark for water shortages:6 42% of China’s population, or 538 million people, in the northern provinces (60% of its cultivated land) have access to only 14% of the country’s water.7 If northern China were counted as a separate country, its water availability—757 cubic meters per person—would be comparable to that of parts of North Africa: lower, for example, than 3 http://www.yale.edu/epi/2006EPI_AppendixC.pdf. The composite index draws on 16 indicators designed to illuminate six

‘policy categories’—environmental health, biodiversity, sustainable energy, water quality, air quality, and natural resources.

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index

5 The environmental pollution costs should include costs of over 20 items while the current Chinese Green GDP accounting only

covers costs of 10 items (health, agricultural and materials losses caused by air pollution; health, industrial and agricultural

production losses, and water shortage caused by water pollution; economic loss caused by land occupation of solid wastes and

etc.) http://english.gov.cn/2006-09/11/content_384596

6 China Daily, May 20, 2005. Groundwater depletion in northern China is an important concern. Water table beneath Beijing has

dropped 37 m. over the past 4 decades. North China's region of groundwater overdraft covers 15,000 km2.

7 In order to address China’s northern water shortage, the government is spending almost 500 billion yuan on a three canals

project to divert some 38-48 billion cubic meters of flow northward from the Yangzi River to the Yellow, Huaihe, and Haihe River

systems.

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the water resources of Morocco.8 In central Gansu, some areas get less than 300 millimeters of rain a year. More than half of China’s 660 cities suffer from water shortages, affecting 160 million people. By 2010, it is expected that, of the 600 larger cities in the country, 550 will be subjected to water shortages. 90% of cities’ groundwater and 75% of rivers and lakes are polluted.9 Every year, about 25 billion tons of sewage and pollutants, 42 percent of all generated in China, is piped into the Yangtze River, making it one of the ten most endangered rivers in the world to face drying up, according to a report released by the World Wildlife Fund.10 China produces as much organic water pollution as the United States, Japan and India combined.11 The most significant figure might be the following one; In 2006, it was estimated by SEPA that nearly 80 per cent of China’s 7,555 more heavily polluting factories were located in rivers or lakes or in heavily populated areas.12 China also lags behind in sanitation coverage, which was 48% in 200413, the same as Nigeria and Papua New Guinea, but less than China’s neighbor, Vietnam, whose GDP per capita is only about half of China’s.14 In 2006, the percentage of treated urban sewage and safely handled urban household waste reached 56% and 54% respectively, 4 and 2.3 percentage points higher than the year before.15 The water problem is in no way limited to urban areas. According to the WHO, acid rain, polluted rivers and inadequate sewage treatment have left nearly half of China’s rural population without access to clean drinking water. As a result of widespread water pollution, around 340 million people drink contaminated water every day, with

8 http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/

9 In 2004, the Yangtze River and Zhujiang River enjoyed relatively good water quality; the Liaohe River, Huaihe River, Yellow

River and Songhuajiang River had relatively poor water quality and the Haihe River suffered from poor water quality. Major

pollutants in water were ammonia nitrogen, BOD５, permanganate index and petroleum compounds.

10 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/22/content_834288.htm

11 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EH26Ad01.html

12 SEPA, August 2006, quoted in International Herald Tribune, 5 September 2006.

13 8% in 1993.

14 http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/

15 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/19/content_830762_5.htm

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an additional 350 million drinking poor quality water.16 Over 26 million people in China suffer from dental fluorosis due to elevated fluoride in their drinking water, and over 1 million cases of skeletal fluorosis are thought to be attributable to drinking-water.17 In 2005, in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, at least 150 epidemics of typhoid, dysentery and diarrhea were reported, with more than 80 percent identified as a result of people drinking polluted water.18 Between November 2005 and January 2006, three major accidents occurred, stopping water supply for millions of people and raising awareness of the challenges ahead. The ecological effects of large dams are also hotly debated. Of the 45,000 large dams in the world, 22,104 are in China. And China is planning a series of giant dam cascades across rivers such as the Mekong19, the Salween and the Bramaputra.20 Finally, if presents trends are not reversed, experts forecast that by 2020 there will be 30 million environmental refugees in China due to water stress.21 It is no wonder that a World Bank expert has declared: “The struggle for water will lead to a fight between rural interests, urban interests and industrial interests on who gets water in China,”22

c) Air Pollution

It has become a much publicized fact that China’s air pollution is one of the worst in the world: The country is leader in sulfur emissions and ranks as the second largest producer of greenhouse gases 70% of Chinese monitored cities are moderately to severely polluted (i.e., they do not meet the World Health Organization Air Quality

16 The figures on this issue remain fuzzy. The WHO states: “However, with development strategies water supply and sanitation

coverage continues to improve. 75 per cent of China's population now have access to safe drinking water.

“http://www.wpro.who.int/china/sites/ehe/overview.htm. Several reports and documents state that 700 million people drink

“low quality water.”

17 http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/publications/facts2004/en/

18 http://english.gov.cn/2006-09/12/content_385722.htm

19 China is planning to build six dams along its half of the 4,840-km. (3,025-mile) Mekong river.

20 http://home.alltel.net/bsundquist1/ir6.html

21 See Norman Myers, “Environmental refugees: an emerging security issue”, 13th Economic Forum, Environment and Migration,

Prague, 23-27 May 2005.

22 Yukon Huang, World Bank, January 2005, http://www1.cei.gov.cn/ce/doc/cen1/200501102748.htm

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Standards).23 An aggravating factor resides in the doubts that surround the monitoring of air quality in Chinese cities24. According to the World Bank (2004) Chinese cities make up 16 of the world's 20 most polluted. (A 1998 World Health Organization report on air quality in 272 cities worldwide concluded that seven of the world's 10 most polluted cities were in China.)25 33% of urban dwellers breathe toxic air, equivalent to smoking two packs of cigarettes a day.26 According to various estimates, air pollution is responsible for 100,000 to 400,000 premature deaths a year. Restricted activity caused by illness, cost China 25 billion US$ a year, 8 to 12% of its annual GDP. Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease occurs at a rate twice the average for other developing countries. Polluted air also causes less rainfall in mountainous areas, with direct effects on big rivers, which receive much of their water supply from mountainous precipitations. The main factors causing air pollution are (a) China’s breakneck development27; (b) the fact that 70% of China’s industry and domestic energy is supplied by coal-burning; (c) construction industry that generates suspended particles, soot and dust. Reliance on coal poses a special problem. China is using 42 per cent of the world's 23 Other figures: In September 2006, according to China’s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), China’s

air quality in:

58% of cities was classified as more than slightly polluted

19% of cities was classified as moderately polluted

12% of cities was classified as moderately-to-highly polluted and

18% of cities was classified as highly polluted.

24 See ANDREWS, Steven Q., « Playing Air-Quality Games », Far Eastern Economic Review, July-August 2008, 171 (6),

pp.53-57. 25 In 2004 the list of the 10 Chinese cities with the worst air pollution was: Linfen, Yangquan, Datong, Shizuishan, Sanmenxia,

Jinchang, Shijiazhuang, Xianyang, Zhuzhou and Luoyang. The top three cities are coal-producing cities in Shanxi Province.

http://www.china.org.cn/english/en-sz2005/

26 http://www.itdg.org/docs/smoke/itdg%20smoke%20report.pdf.

Furthermore, while the government is getting huge tax profits from the smoking habit of Chinese people, it is also worried about

the exploding healthcare costs of tobacco. A few figures show the amplitude of the problem: 1 of every 3 cigarettes consumed

worldwide is smoked in China. There are more than 300 million Chinese smokers. About 3,000 people die every day in China due

to smoking. Smoking will kill about 33 percent of young Chinese within the next thirty years. Presently, 67 percent of men smoke,

and 4 percent of women do. http://www.wpro.who.int/media_centre/fact_sheets/fs_20020528.htm

27 Detailed analysis of the nature of the relationship between China’s industrial growth and atmospheric pollution in

http://are.berkeley.edu/~dwrh/Slides/China_Energy_Env_DRH.pdf

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thermal coal for power and 48 per cent of its coking coal for steel. Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi, where much of the country's coal is mined, has the world's worst air pollution.28 In 2002, the Chinese government vowed to cut sulfur emissions by 10 percent by 2005. Instead, they rose 27 percent. 2.2 billion tons of coal were extracted in 200529, and the central government’s (conservative) estimate puts the output at 2.6 in 2010. Private analysts estimate that this figure will already be reached in 2007.30 Private car ownership in Chin rose from one million vehicles in 1994 to 16 million in 2004. The continuation of the trend would mean 170 million private cars on China’s roads by 2020, requiring 100 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) per year and producing 102 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions.31 In 2005, China had 32 million operative vehicles of four or more wheels, plus 57 million two- and three-wheelers . According to the Asian Development Bank, over the next 20 years, China’s vehicles will grow to 183 million, plus 194 million two- and three-wheelers. By 2010, China’s cars will consume 138 million tons of oil each year, and this will grow to roughly 430 million tons by 2030. China has overtaken the United States as the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. If China maintained strong growth for the next quarter of a century its emissions alone until 2030 would be double that of all other industrialised countries combined. Still, it is fair to recall that the average American still consumes more energy and is responsible for the release of much more carbon dioxide than the average Chinese. And while China now generates more electricity from coal than does the United States, America's consumption of gasoline (which also releases carbon dioxide) dwarfs China's.

28 China has unveiled ambitious plans to cut its reliance on coal to about 55% of its energy needs. By 2030 coal is expected to

provide 62%, oil 18%, natural gas 8%, hydropower 9%, and nuclear power 3% of China's energy consumption. By 2050, Chinese

planners believe coal consumption should be down to 35% of consumption, with oil and natural gas accounting for 40-50% and

primary energy sources such as nuclear, hydro, solar and wind power accounting for 15-20%.

29 Let us note also that the official figures estimate that two deaths occur for every million ton extracted (China Daily, January

23, 2007)

30 SCMP, January 23, 2007.

31 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/

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d) Soil

Over the last ten years, China has lost almost 8 million hectares of farmland, and the process is continuing at a pace of 200,000 to 300,000 hectares a year. Some studies even expect that ten additional million of arable lands could be lost by 2030.32 The ecology of 60 per cent of the country's territory is considered fragile. A national study in 2000 rated the ecological quality of one-third of the country's territory as good and another third as bad. About 90 per cent of natural pasture land, which accounts for more than 40 per cent of the country's territory, is facing degradation and desertification to some extent. Desertified pastures have become the major source of sand and dust storms.33 Acid rain falls on 30% of the country; affecting the quality of soil.34 With 38% of its territory affected, China faces the world’s biggest soil erosion problem. Deserts already occupy 20% of the surface and continue to spread at the pace of 2,500 km2 a year. A good part of the northern arid lands are entering the first stage of desertification.

In July 2006, Zhou Shengxian, head of SEPA (SEPAS has since become the ministry of Environmental Protection), said that 2.2 million hectares of farmland have been irrigated by polluted water, that a total of 10 million hectares China’s farmland is polluted, and that that 12 million tons of food annually is polluted by heavy metal,

e) Forest and Biodiversity

In 1998, China suffered the worst floods in its history, causing 3,600 deaths and destroying 5 million homes. It consequently changed its forest policy. China is home to 4.5% of the world’s forests. With only 18.2 % of forested land (2004), compared to the world average of 34%, China is poor in forest resources.35 Virgin forests account for

32 Soil conservation policy such as summarized by NRDC: “Integrate water conservation with development, anti-soil erosion

efforts with efforts to fight poverty and develop the local economies; introduce an integrated approach to fight soil erosion by

treating large river systems as backbone and small river valleys as components, so as to prevent man-made soil erosion in the

course of massive development and construction..” http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/n

33 SEPA study. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-06/05/

34 Moreover, a 1999 study calculated that reduced sunlight due to sooty air may be depressing yields on 70% of China’s farms

by 5%-30%.

35 In 2004, the per capita forest area ranked the 134th and per capita forest reserves the 122nd in the world (the forest area per

capita is only 0.12 ha in China, 12% of the world average. Forest stock per capita is less than 13% of the world average). The

geographical distribution of China's forest resources was rather uneven with only 5.86% of forest coverage in the five northwest

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1% of its total territory. Its wood stock per inhabitant is around one sixth of world average. The proportion of young and middle-aged forests is of 70 per cent of all secondary growth forests, and the growth stock per forest unit is low.36 China aims at bringing its forested land to 20 per cent by 2010. In the last 50 years China has undergone three major deforestations: > 1958-1961: The Great Leap Forward Entire forests were depleted to fuel backyard furnaces for smelting steel. > 1966-1971: The Cultural Revolution Hectares of forested sloping lands were converted into arable land, meant for corn and wheat cultivation. > Early 80s: Beginning of the Economic Reforms Allowed increased responsibility and fearing the policy might change again, farmers fell down all the trees on their contracted land. 20% to 40% of the forest cover was lost during these three episodes. 0lder forests are still disappearing (740,000 hectares of forest have disappeared in 2004) and the quality of newly planted surfaces is far inferior to that of older forests. In China the wooded area per inhabitant is four times inferior to world average. Since the quality of Chinese forests is very weak, the ratio of wood quantity per inhabitant is even weaker: only one sixth of world average. National regulations are still often disregarded, and the rise of paper consumption makes things worse.37 Forests affected by illness accounted for less than one million hectares in 1950. They account for around 10 millions hectares nowadays. China's biodiversity ranks eighth in the world and first in the northern hemisphere.38 The country has 15%-20% of the world’s endangered

provinces (autonomous regions) that accounted for 32.19% of the national territory.

http://www.zhb.gov.cn/english/SOE/soechina2004/forest.htm

36 http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20china.htm. See also Shen Xiaohui, « China’s forests : their quality and sustainable

management », Chinese Cross Currents, 2005, 4, pp.100-129

37 Main goals of the forestry policy according to the National Development and Reform Commission: “Focus on the protection of

natural forests in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, the middle and upper reaches of the Yellow River, and the natural

forests in northeast China. Curb soil erosion, alleviate damages done by sandstorm, strengthen protection of biodiversity, build

fast-growing and high-yield timber production bases, and gradually meet demands for ecological soundness and forest products.”

http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/

38 More than 32,800 species of higher plants and about 104,500 species of animals have been identified.

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species, higher than the world average of 10-15%.39 Simple conifer forests comprise two thirds of China’s planted forests, with four great conifers accounting for 80 per cent of the total. In 1998 the government imposed a logging ban on 17% of forested areas in the upper reaches of major rivers.40 At the same time, massive reforestation effort and biodiversity conservation projects were implemented. As a result from 1982 to 2005 China has recorded a net gain of 20% in forest cover. As the world’s largest importer of wood and covering half of its domestic demand, China is driving deforestation to South East Asia & West Africa.41 China is nowadays the first world importer of wood and imports from countries that manage very badly their own wood resources (Burma, Cambodia, Congo, Eastern Russia.) In other words, China is exporting its wood problem.

f) Global Warming

On October 29 2008 the country has released its national program to mitigate and adapt to climate change. A 2006 official report said that temperatures would keep rising through this century as a result of increased energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, with warmer winters in North China being the most obvious features. The report predicted that the average annual temperature would rise 1.3-2.1 C by 2020, and 2.3-3.3 C by 2050. Another report released by the State Oceanic Administration beginning of 2007 also warned of a rapid rise in sea levels. It said that the country had witnessed an average annual sea-level rise of 2.5 mm in recent years, and predicted that in the next 3-10 years, the sea level would continue to rise by 9-31 mm over the 2006 level.42 Tibet's 46,000 glaciers are shrinking fast. In some areas, average loss 39 China probably contains around 10 percent of all species living on earth. It has an especially high number of plant species

(about 30,000), including 3,116 genera, of which 243 are endemic. China is also one of the eight original centers of crop diversity

in the world. It is the original source of approximately 200 of the world’s 1,200 species of cultivated crops. It contains nearly 600

varieties of domesticated animals and poultry.

40 See also The Forest Law of the People's Republic of China (1984, revised 1998).

http://www.enviroinfo.org.cn/LEGIS/Laws/la015_en.htm#1

41 http://news.mongabay.com/2005/0420x-tina_butler.html

42 China Daily 02/16/2007 page1 and 05/10/2007, p.1. See also synthesis of the IPPC report of November 2007 (UN

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.)

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has been well in excess of 10 per cent since measurements began in the 1960s and 70s. The United Nations Development Program has published even more dramatic figures, saying the plateau's glaciers could have almost entirely disappeared by the end of the century. As average temperatures continue to rise, 50 square miles are lost each year.43

g) Sustainability

A March 2006 survey by the Chinese Academy of Sciences ranked China 56th out of 59 countries surveyed in terms of resource-use efficiency. China uses over four times as much energy per unit of GDP than the G-7 average. Energy consumption per unit of GDP fell by 1.23 percent in 2006, instead of 4.0 per cent as planned. China’s consumption of resources is higher than its growth rate. In 2003, for a growth rate comprised between 9 and 10 per cent, steel consumption rose by 28 per cent, and oil’s by 13.6 per cent. The annual growth of crude-oil consumption ran between 10% and 15% in real terms during 2003-05. China is still importing vast quantities of grain, soybeans, iron ore, aluminum, copper, platinum, potash, oil and natural gas, forest products for lumber and paper, and the cotton needed for its world-dominating textile industry. China’s consumption of steel has soared and is more than twice that of the United States: 258 million tons to 104 million tons in 2003. In addition to steel, China also leads in the use of other metals, such as aluminum and copper. In another key area, fertilizer—essentially nitrates, phosphates, and potash—China’s use is double that of the United States, 41.2 million tons to 19.2 million tons in 2004.44 The production of energy-intensive industries in the first quarter expanded rapidly. Rolled steel production was up on last year by 26 per cent, alumina by 54 per cent, aluminium by 43 per cent and ferro-alloys by 44 per cent. The low-price policy encourages the above-described trend. For instance, China’s water is priced “at 20 per cent of replacement.”45 Overuse of water resources has caused the ground to sink in around 43 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

44 http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/Update45.htm

45 Elizabeth Economy, quoted in IHT, August 23, 2006.

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50 cities.46 "Should investment continue to run at more than 20 percent a year, what has been a source of growth for many years could turn out to be a curse, if it leads to a further buildup in excess capacity and deflation." (Asian Development Bank report, March 2007)47

h) Environment and Social Tensions

A related problem deserves to be mentioned: Observes agree on the fact that social discontent and movements have increased on a much larger scale than previously reported, not only in the countryside but also on the poorer parts of the cities (notably in Beijing). The main reasons for discontent are well identified: - land expropriation; - extent of pollution due to dissemination of polluting industries, especially of water pollution, with health effects beyond control; - anxieties of poor people about costs of education and health This increase in social problems, exemplified by consecutive grave occurrences of rivers’ accidental pollution, coincides with a much more active role of NGOs and civil society in general. This increased role has been prepared by the government itself in so far as it has relied in the last years on NGOs for the care of some portions of society (sick people in poorer parts of the country for instance). In the last years, membership in associations caring for women, orphans, AIDS patient or environmental problems has grown very markedly. Also, information is disseminated more rapidly and quickly than before. What is of importance for us here is that environmental degradation (including reduced access to land and subsequent conflicts around its use) and social tensions are more and more closely related. - II – Analysis and Prospects The somber assessment sketched above has its bright side: the problem is now well publicized and directly addressed. Environmental

46 Ibid.

47 http://www.wtopnews.com/?nid=111&sid=1098813

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protection has finally become a major, if not the major concern for Chinese leaders, intellectuals and ordinary citizens alike. For a long time, it was thought that China’s economic development required sacrifices regarding air quality, natural resources or urban cultural artifacts among others. The prevalent idea was that, in the trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection, Chinese people would prefer to secure a steady increase of their income and economic potential rather than adhering to traditional ways of living. The debate is now about the final result of the trade-off. Maybe, the cost of environmental destruction is higher than the benefits in terms of growth or income that supposedly result from it. Even more important is the fact that many people have started to challenge the very notion of a trade-off between growth and environmental protection. The wide acceptance of the notion of “sustainable development” and the cultural and philosophical debate at large are changing the way the question is asked. Should not environmental protection be included from the start within our concept of development? Such questions are asked all throughout the world, but they have become especially acute in the Chinese context. During the last twenty years, economic liberalization has increased the riches and potential of Chinas in a tremendous way. But the time has come for defining anew models of development. When defining this model, it is impossible to distinguish between “material” and “spiritual” civilizations as the Chinese State is prone to do. All dimensions have to be fulfilled in the course of development. Sure enough, there are priorities, and some material needs have to be satisfied first. But the experience shows that considering ecological concerns as secondary ones makes China run the risk to undermine the very basis of its riches, its soil, its air, its water. Throughout the ages, China has developed a rich body of thought on the relationship between humankind and nature, and one certainly needs to mobilize these intellectual riches for tackling the environmental problems of China today. However, part of the problems that China meets when dealing with environmental issues today comes from the permeating influence of two kinds of

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utopianism that can be found in its social and cultural tradition. First, a strain of Promethean utopianism can be found within the Chinese tradition - a fact that has not often been recognized by Chinese intellectuals themselves. However, they enthusiastically embraced this mode of thought when they met it in foreign garb. Typical is the case of Yan Fu, at the turn of the twentieth century, propagating the works of Spencer throughout China. Spencer, for Yan Fu, epitomizes the Promethean spirit of the West, that is the mobilization of physical, intellectual and moral energies for ensuring the wealth and the power of the national community. Yan Fu was able to accept and interpret Spencer’s thought because this vision was somehow akin to the metaphysical cosmological vision of the Chinese classics. This mixture of Chinese and Western Promethean utopia is still at work today, and it is even reinforced by the technological and economic dynamics induced by the policy of reforms and opening. Even if a greater concern for environmental protection is shown today, the underlying assumption is that China’s development and greatness ultimately rely on its mastery and transformation of nature. On the other hand, one finds in China a trend towards “nostalgic utopianism.” Dreams about an imaginary past where humankind lived in full harmony with the myriad things gave ground to Chinese intellectuals for venting their complaints and lamenting natural and social degradation. However, it did not provide them with an alternative model of development that could have checked the excesses of the political mobilization of human and natural resources. “Returning to one’s nature” was seen not only as a philosophical but also as a political imperative. This was an art of government based on yin whereas the “Promethean” art of government was a yang based art of government. Unfortunately, these two philosophical-political styles could not be reconciled. They remained contradictory, not complementary. The problem that Chinese intellectuals face nowadays is to mobilize resources that would help social communities to reach a new awareness of the regulations that govern the relationship between humankind and nature. What is at stake nowadays is to assess

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community values as tools for devising incremental models of development. A structural answer to the environmental crisis that China faces requires us to rely on answers provided by “community cultures.” Community culture emphasizes communication, promotes equality among the participants and takes advantage of their diversity. Furthermore, promoting community culture generates more diversity from one community to another and, consequently, more creative and flexible answers to the various environmental challenges. The reinterpretation of the Chinese cultural tradition actually sometimes amounts to rebuilding communities, when community networks are non-existent. Most neighborhoods or villages in China are presently “communities under construction”, and the focus on environment-friendly models of development is inseparable from this task of social building. The environmental crisis that China has to face reactivates timeless debates. Once more, Chinese thinkers find themselves at a crossroads. Will they promote a dogmatic and orthodox model through which the natural and social environment can be controlled and pressured, or will they confidently rely on the seeds of flexibility, diversity and creativity than can be found somewhere in their own tradition? - III – China’s international position on environmental cooperation and climate change Efforts by China to become a player in global governance, including in the environmental field, should not be underestimated. The country has signed more than fifty international conventions and treaties related to environmental protection and natural resources48. The review of implementation by China of the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer, has shown gradual compliance by China to the Protocol and its willingness to fulfill its contractual obligations (it had completed in 1999 the targets set for 2002), but also conflicts of interest adversely affecting its ability to

48 List available on http://en.chinabroadcast.cn/1702/2004-11-19/[email protected]

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act49. China is also aware of the strategic role played by NGOs in environmental diplomacy50. However, China implicitly refuses to engage positively in the management of environmental resources, contributing to the unbridled exploitation of tropical forests of Southeast Asia or hydro-electric resources in the Amazon Basin. More generally, China’s position in international forums is constant: national responsibilities in this area are "common but differentiated"; climate change and sustainable development must be thought as a whole; technology transfer play a key role in meet the climate challenge; the "Clean Development Mechanism" and other similar programs should be continued and encouraged. The cautious attitude of China has been confirmed by its recent white paper on climate change policy (see Annex 2.) When it comes to international cooperation, China basically stresses that it wants to keep the present system untouched (no binding commitment on its part), while asking for more financial resources made available for its internal environmental policies: “The UNFCCC and the Tokyo Protocol are the main programs for addressing climate change. The two documents lay the legal foundation for international cooperation in dealing with climate change, and reflect the common understanding of the international community. They are the most authoritative, universal and comprehensive international framework for coping with climate change. Their status as the kernel mechanism and leading programs should be unswervingly upheld, and other types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be supplementary.”51 - IV – International Margin of Action

49 See HEMPSON-JONES, Justin S., « The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International Governmental Organizations.

Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy? », Asian Survey, September-October 2005, pp. 702-721. 50 See LIU, Qingcai, ZHANG, Nongshou, « Analyzing the role of NGOs in World Governance », Guoji wenti yanjiu, 1, 2006, pp.

48-52. (in Chinese)

51 Xinhua, 28 October 2009, http://www.zibb.com/article/4260355/. See declarations of Chinese leaders cited by YU, Honguyan,

« In the Belly of China’s Diplomacy : Global Warming and Its Implications », in Shaping China’s Energy Security, the Inside

Perspective, edited by Michal Meidan, Paris, Asia Centre, 2007, pp.165-193.

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The recent ASEM Summit held in Beijing shows at the same time the present limits and possible openings for international cooperation on climate change, and the role that Beijing plays in that respect. Although it was foreseen that sustainable development should be a top priority of their 7th summit, the 45 ASEM partners have quite logically focused their discussions on the international financial crisis However, the leaders of ASEM countries did agree on the wording of a separate declaration on "sustainable development". This statement is a real breakthrough in the sense that it acknowledges the existence of a topic of common interest that goes beyond the traditional scope of cooperation: discussions within ASEM are traditionally divided into three separate pillars (economic, political, social / cultural). This time, ASEM partners have shown that sustainable development is a major concern beyond the strictly political, economic and social divide. The ASEM declaration on sustainable development (see Annex 1) encompasses topics ranging from energy security to climate change, through social cohesion and the price of raw materials. On the issue of climate change, partners, in line with the 6th summit reaffirmed that the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol are the main vectors of international cooperation in this field. However, no target is specified, in particular when it comes to the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases. What conclusions can we draw from the joint examination of China’s internal environmental challenge, of the country’s basic international posture on related issues and of strategic developemnts presently taking place? China may moderate its demands but will hardly abandon its basic positions. However, a change in the level of quotas could be acceptable to China, with a passage to a non-binding commitment level higher and stronger. China will probably evolve towards the linkage of more pressing international agreements with a regime that would facilitate practical cooperation projects and would thus be releasing more funds for promoting research and development in the field of new energies. At present, external pressures, as influential as they are, are still weaker than internal resistance.

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However, Hu Angang, a renowned economics professor at Tsinghua University, advisor to the government on environmental and social issues, has publicly called for China to accept to be bound by an international pact to reduce emissions. He acknowledged that his point of view remains in the minority but emphasizes the seriousness of the problems encountered by China. It envisages a sharp increase in Chinese emissions until 2020, but feels that implementation of drastic reductions in the following decade is quite feasible, so that Chinese emissions may go down to their 1990 level by 2030, and be reduced again by half over the next twenty years. China, he insists, will be the first victim of climate change, and has a strong economic and diplomatic interest to transform itself into a "green power.52” China therefore has the potential to play a positive international role, if it dares to tackle the speculative and risky nature of its present model of development. It will thus contribute to a better management of "global public goods". Making the turn towards sustainable development is without doubt the best way to assert its global contribution. Yet the Chinese response seems hesitant, often contradictory. Because the debate on its own model of governance remains severely limited, China finds it difficult to play a more active role in reforming global governance. For now, we can just bet that China will carry out its ecological reform at its own pace but that it still refuses to be bound by a priori international agreements. The Chinese reticence should not block the commitments of other partners: Global governance, when it comes to climate change, must be one of "variable geometry" rather than based on the principle of "everything or nothing." In other words, the WTO model, (based on the search for consensus without offering viable alternative if unanimity is not achieved), model strongly challenged in recent months with the failure of the Doha Round, is not directly exportable in the field of environmental diplomacy. It remains possible that, faced with bold initiatives of other nations, starting with the ones that the European Union must take in any case,

52 Reuters, September 8, 2008.

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53 http://www.asem7.cn/download/bdsd.pdf

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twenty-seven member states of the European Union, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of ASEAN, gathered in Beijing on 24 and 25 October 2008 for the Seventh Asia-Europe Meeting. 2. Recognizing that challenges posed by increasing global population, environmental degradation, rapid resource depletion and weakening ecological carrying capacity have become more prominent in many countries and regions, and that it is a grave challenge as well as pressing task for humanity to achieve sustainable development. ASEM partners are willing to strengthen cooperation in a mutually beneficial manner and work towards win-win solution so as to make positive contribution to sustainable development; (…) 6. Recalling that ASEM 6 has identified sustainable development, in particular the MDGs, climate change, environment and energy as key policy areas of ASEM for action of the next decade. Decide to issue the following declaration: (…) II. Climate Change and Energy Security 12. We reaffirm that the issue of climate change should be dealt with within the framework of sustainable development. We reaffirm that in order to achieve sustainable development, it will be necessary to combat global climate change in accordance with the ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). We recognize the importance of the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in particular its fourth Assessment Report. 13. We emphasize that the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are the main channels for international negotiations and cooperation in climate change, reaffirm the commitment to the objectives, purposes and principles of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. We recognize that ASEM partners share a mutual commitment to finding a long-term multilateral solution to climate change under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol framework. We welcome the decisions of the Bali Action Plan, containing all the elements for an ambitious, effective and comprehensive agreed

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outcome for long term cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012 for strengthening international cooperation on addressing climate change and are committed to the completion of negotiations by 2009. 14. Recognizing the importance of tackling climate change, we affirm that developed countries should continue to show strong leadership and take measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, including through sectoral approach, where appropriate, as a tool to implement them, and provide financial support and technology transfer to developing countries. Developing countries will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner, with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions. 15. We highlight the need for a shared vision for long term cooperative action, including a long term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and to enable its full effective and sustained implementation, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into account economic and social conditions and relevant other factors. We further stress that, for this shared vision to be credible, it requires all developed countries to take the lead by committing to ambitious and comparable legally binding emission reduction targets. We call upon the international community to consider most ambitious set of targets reflected in the 4th Assessment Report of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change. (…) 17. Recognizing that adaptation to climate change is vital to address the effects of inevitable climate change and adverse impacts of climate change that affect all countries, especially developing countries, and in particular the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing countries, we emphasize that ASEM partners should work together in accordance with their UNFCCC commitments to strengthen the ability of developing countries to adapt to climate

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change, including vulnerability assessment, prioritization and implementation of adaptation actions, financial needs assessments, technical assistance, capacity-building, risk management and strategies, and mainstreaming adaptation into development policies and strategies. 18. We affirm the critical role of technology, the need for technological cooperation and technology transfer to developing countries. We will work together on technology cooperation in specific economic sectors, promote the exchange of mitigation information and analysis on sectoral efficiency, the identification of national technology needs and voluntary, action-oriented international cooperation, and consider the role of cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, consistent with the Convention. We urge enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation, to accelerate development, deployment, diffusion, dissemination and transfer of affordable technologies for adaptation and mitigation. We welcome cooperation on research, development, demonstration and deployment of current, new and innovative clean technology, including win-win solutions. We stress that technology cooperation with and transfer to developing countries is a key enabling condition for them to tackle climate change. 19. Noting that addressing climate change requires greater mobilization of public and private financial resources, both domestically and internationally, we support efforts to scale up financial support to developing countries. We also support the creation of incentives for the developing countries to enhance implementation of national mitigation and adaptation strategies and action, and to promote public and private sector funding and investment. (…) 21. We underline the need to act with resolve and urgency during the Climate Change Conference in Poznan, Poland, in 2008 and work towards an ambitious, effective and comprehensive agreed outcome for long term cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012 at the Climate Change Conference to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark at the end of 2009. Annex 2

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China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (Xinhua, October 28, 2009)54 (…)

To address climate change, China adheres to the following guidelines: To give full effect to the Scientific Outlook on Development, adhere to the fundamental state policy of resources conservation and environmental protection, control greenhouse gas emissions and enhance the country's capacity for sustainable development, center on securing economic development and accelerate the transformation of the pattern of economic development, focus on conserving energy, optimizing the energy structure and strengthening eco-preservation and construction, and rely on the advancement of science and technology, increase international cooperation, constantly enhance the capability in coping with climate change, and make new contribution in protecting the world environment.

To address climate change, China sticks to the following principles:

- To address climate change within the framework of sustainable development. Climate change arises out of development, and should thus be solved along with development. It is necessary to promote sustainable development amidst efforts to address climate change, and strive to achieve the goal of win-win in both.

- To uphold the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities," which is a core principle of the UNFCCC. Both developed and developing countries are obligated to adopt measures to decelerate and adapt to climate change. But the level of their historical responsibilities, level and stage of development, and capabilities and ways of contribution vary. Developed countries should be responsible for their accumulative emissions and current high per-capita emissions, and take the lead in reducing emissions, in addition to providing financial support and transferring technologies to developing countries. The developing countries, while developing their economies and fighting poverty, should actively adopt

54 http://www.zibb.com/article/4260355/

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adaptation measures, reduce their emissions to the lowest degree and fulfill their duties in addressing climate change.

- To place equal emphasis on both deceleration and adaptation. Deceleration and adaptation are integral components of the strategy for coping with climate change. Deceleration is a long and arduous challenge, while adaptation is a more present and imminent task. The latter is more important for developing countries. The two must be well coordinated, and with equal stress placed on them.

- The UNFCCC and the Tokyo Protocol are the main programs for addressing climate change. The two documents lay the legal foundation for international cooperation in dealing with climate change, and reflect the common understanding of the international community. They are the most authoritative, universal and comprehensive international framework for coping with climate change. Their status as the kernel mechanism and leading programs should be unswervingly upheld, and other types of bilateral and multilateral cooperation should be supplementary.