1 CHINA’s S&T CATCH-UP AND SINO-U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL DECOUPLING: THE CASE FOR 5G Guilhem Fabre * Université Paul Valéry, Montpellier3 / BRICS Seminar, FMSH-INALCO Underlying the trade war, technological competition has moved to the center of the U.S.-China relationship. The U.S. leadership in world innovation, research and technology development since World War II has allowed it to win the Cold War, and to gain economic and military advantages over potential rivals. But that leadership is now at risk. On one side, there is a widespread belief in the U.S. that the post-war world order no longer benefits the country as much as it used to, and that the best way to regain its freedom and competition is to move away from multilateralism in favor of an international order based on bilateral relations 1 . U.S. leadership on S&T is now mainly based on private sector investment and multinational corporations, while there is a decade-long stagnation in federal support and funding for R&D, directed at national economic, strategic and social concerns 2 . On the other side, the rise of Chinese power and influence felt on the five continents and the U.N., since the 2008 global crisis and the ascent of Xi Jinping in 2013, is coupled with an unprecedented national support in S&T, R&D, at a time where the next wave of breakthrough innovation will generate economic and military advantages for the countries that develop and deploy these technologies first 3 . This explains the actual technological decoupling, of which best example is the rivalry over 5G. After an evaluation of China’s R&D catching up in frontier technologies relative to the USA and Europe, this paper will focus on the 5G implementation, its geopolitical dimensions and its consequences in terms of technological decoupling. I. CHINA’s R&D CATCHING UP To “catch up and surpass” ( 赶超) the USA has been in the gene of the Chinese communist leadership of Mao Zedong in the 1950s, who took over this slogan from the Soviet grand brother, to Xi Jinping 4 . But, in 2018 for the first time, a majority of European firms responding to a survey, report that Chinese firms were equally or more innovative than them despite Internet restrictions which cast doubt on China’s ambitions to become a global R&D center 5 . This new perception shows that innovation has become a key resort of the competition between Chinese and foreign MNCs. This is the result of a long-term 1 Francois Delattre, France’s Ambassador to the U.N., New York Times, June 13, 2019. In a few years time, China has taken the lead of four U.N. Agencies: UNIDO, ITU, ICAO and FAO (Le Monde, 15-16/09/2019). 2 James Manyika, William H Mac Raven, Adam Segal, Innovation and National Security: Keeping our Edge, Council of Foreign Relations, September 2019. 3 Ibidem, p.75. 4 Julian Baird Gewirtz, “China’s Long March to Technological Supremacy: The Roots of Xi Jinping’s ambition to catch up and surpass”, The New York Times, August 27, 2019. 5 European Business: European Confidence Survey, China-European Chamber of Commerce , 2019.
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CHINA’s S&T CATCH-UP AND SINO-U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL ... · rapidly catching up with the U.S. (Fig. 0 & 1). Figure 0. Research and Development spending China’s 2007 investment in
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Underlyingthetradewar,technologicalcompetitionhasmovedtothecenteroftheU.S.-Chinarelationship.TheU.S.leadershipinworldinnovation,researchandtechnologydevelopmentsinceWorldWarIIhasallowedittowintheColdWar,andtogaineconomicandmilitaryadvantagesoverpotentialrivals.Butthatleadershipisnowatrisk.Ononeside, there is awidespread belief in theU.S. that the post-warworld order no longerbenefitsthecountryasmuchasitusedto,andthatthebestwaytoregainitsfreedomandcompetitionistomoveawayfrommultilateralisminfavorofaninternationalorderbasedon bilateral relations1. U.S. leadership on S&T is nowmainly based on private sectorinvestmentandmultinational corporations,while there is adecade-long stagnation infederalsupportandfundingforR&D,directedatnationaleconomic,strategicandsocialconcerns2. On the other side, the rise of Chinese power and influence felt on the fivecontinentsandtheU.N.,sincethe2008globalcrisisandtheascentofXiJinpingin2013,iscoupledwithanunprecedentednationalsupportinS&T,R&D,atatimewherethenextwaveofbreakthroughinnovationwillgenerateeconomicandmilitaryadvantagesforthecountries that develop and deploy these technologies first3 . This explains the actualtechnologicaldecoupling,ofwhichbestexampleistherivalryover5G.
In terms of talents, China performsmuchworse fordoctoraldegrees per capita,relativetotheU.S.,butcomputerscienceandengineeringdoctoratesreached35%ofthepercapitaU.S.level.(Figure5)Thus,inabsoluteterms,thenumberofChinesedoctoraldegreesiscatchingupveryquicklyandevensurpassestheU.S.incomputerscienceandengineering.
articlesreached68percentoftheU.S.levelandmorethanhalfareaslikelyasU.S.articlesto be among the top 1 percentmost cited articles in their field, surpassing the globalaverage(Figure7). AsforIntellectualPropertyRights,theChinesepatentsfiledundertheInternationalCooperationTreatyrosefrom10to80percentoftheU.Slevel(Figure8).ChinahasbecomethelargestproducerandexporterofICTgoods,exportingovereighttimesthenumberofAmericanICTexports,andICTvalue-addedwentfromabouthalfofUSlevelsin2006toaround50percentmoretenyearslater(Figure9).
Intelligenceandaerospace.InAI,apartfromTsinghua,threeotherChineseuniversitiesandresearchcentershaverisenintermsofpublication intopAIconferencesbetween2014 and 2018, Beijing University, the Academy of Sciences and Nanjing University(Figure 10). The impact of Chinese scientists publications on AI has been growingcomparedtoEuropeanandU.S.ones(Figure11).Butthatisonlyonepartofthestory.Ifwerefertotheattendeestothe2018ConferenceoftheNeuralInformationProcessingSystem (NIPS) as the top AI researchers, 60 percent (or 68 scientists) are currentlyworkinginAmericaninstitutions(Figure12).Butmorethanhalf(38outof68)oftheAItalentpool inAmerica, iscomposedof foreignnationalswhochosetowork intheU.S.(Figure13)andthelargestsupply(10)comesfromChina,justbeforeIndia(Figure14).
ThustheattractivityofU.ScampusesforforeignscholarsisthemainassetforthequalityofAIresearch8.Thecurrentadministration’sexecutiveorderonestablishingAIleadershipandanti-immigrationpoliciescouldbeself-defeating,asitwouldallowBeijingto catch up by building a strong talent pool, according to a top Chinese technologyinvestor9 . New visa limitations only aid Beijing’s ambitions10 . And besides, ChinesescientistsmayalsogotoCanada…
China’s catch-up in the aerospace industry is also particularly impressive. It has
surpassedRussiaandtheU.Sin2018forthenumberofsuccessfulspacelaunches(Figure15).According toa2019USChinaEconomicandSecurityCommissionreport,China’sspaceprogramismoreconnectedtothe“leversofpower”,meaningitsgoalsmoreoftendrawsupportfromtopleadersandareconnectedtothecountry’sprioritiesinindustrialandforeignpolicies.ThisisparticularlythecasefortheChina’sBeidousatellitenavigationsystem,whichisavitalcomponentoftheBeltandRoaddigitalSilkRoad.ItpromotestheuseofBeidouandothersatellitesamongBRIparticipants,includingformilitaryuse,inthecaseofPakistan11(Figures16,17,18,19).Chinaaimstohave35Beidousatellitesinorbit by 202012 . Apart from its dual dimension, the growth of China’s satellite datapositioninghasprofoundimplications.ChinesesmartphonesandcarnavigationsystemsareBeidoucompatiblebydefault.Forcompanieswithglobalambitions,makingBeidoucompatibleproducts isanecessity,becauseproductsandservicesthatuseBeidouareavailable in many countries. More than 30 countries in the Middle East, Africa andelsewhereuseBeidou.Ifitbecomesthestandardinthesecountries,Chinawillhaveanadvantage in introducingtechnologiesandproducts.USchipmakerQualcommwasthefirst to supply chips for Beidou-capable smartphones. Leading American smartphonemakersotherthanAppleusethechipsintheirdevices.13.
China’snewsatellitesinfrastructureisparticularlyimportantinthecontextofthenew5thGenerationofmobile,(5G),whichisabreakthroughinnovationcomparedwiththepreviousones,becauseitsintentionistoservebothconsumersandmachinesthroughtheInternetofThings(IoT)(Figure20). Although5Gremainsinafairlynascentstageandwill fully develop between 2020 and 2030, it will deeply disrupt transport, withdriverlessvehicles,energy,manufacturingwiththe4thindustrialrevolution,healthcare,smartcities,smarthomes,andentertainmentwithvirtualrealityetc.(Figure21).
Figure20.TheInternetofThings(IoT)
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Figure21.What5Gisabout
Figure22.How5GCouldWork
With5G,wirelessconnectivityistransformingfromatraditionalmacronetworkbasedonlargetowerswithbroadcoverage,toanetworkofatleasthundredsofthousandof small cells strung closely together, which, because of spectral re-use, producessignificantlyhigherbandwidth(uptoamillionconnectionsversus4000connectionsthat4Gbase stations cancopewith)at amuchhigherdownloadspeed (600megabitspersecondandfasterinthefuture,comparedwith28megabitspersecondfor4G)andata
Concrete examples of 5G’s IoT applications range from the commercial to themilitary field, with integrated missile defense systems or 360 degrees battlefieldawareness(Figure23).
implications in terms of Cloud datamanagement and competition, a US $ 200 billionindustry dominated by Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft Azure and AlibabaCloud15 , marks a return of geopolitics to international relations, and is now at theforefrontoftheU.S-Chinatechnologicalrivalryanddecoupling.Forsomeanalysts,“Chinahasmadeitsdecision:ChinaisbuildingaseparatesystemofChinesetechnology:itsownstandards,infrastructureandsupplychainstocompetewiththeWest”16.Butintermsofcommunication,thingsarenotsosimple,asthestandardsneedtobeglobal.Ifwetaketheexampleof5G, themostpromisingand influential technology for thenextdecade,technical standards that will enable interoperability and facilitate widespreadcommercializationaretakingshapethroughthe3GenerationPartnershipProject(3GPP),aconsortiumoftelecomfirmsandassociationsundertheUnitedNationsInternationalTelecommunications Union (UNITU), which holds the World Radio Conference every
threeorfouryears.AsChinadidnothaveasayin2G,developedaninternalstandardfor3G, had a relatively small participation in the conception of 4G, 5G, as a new globalstandard, gives it a brand newopportunity to be a significant player. Thus China hassoughtleadershippositioninthetechnicalstandardsforumstoraiseitsinfluence,whichhasirritatedtheU.Sandotherincumbents.ThesecretarygeneralofITUisnowaChinese,Houlin ZHAO, and three Chinese firms, Huawei, CATT and China Mobile haverepresentativesinthethreetechnicalgroupsof3GPP(Figure24).Figure24.3GPPPlenaryLeadership2019-2021
The core technologyof amobilenetwork isRadioAccess (RAN). It is abouthowsignals (voiceordata)are transmittedbetweenabase stationand the terminal (i.e. amobilephoneorawearabledevice).Anotherkeyconsiderationistheamountofspectrumand frequency level that can be made available for 5G. This has an impact on theperformanceofthemobiletechnology.Finally,tosimplifyacomplextechnologicaltopic,theamountofStandardEssentialPatent(SEP)ownedbydifferentfirmsdeterminestheshare of IPR revenues, in an ecosystem where no single company controls thetechnology17.
U.S by around24 billion inwireless infrastructure, and 400 billion $US in 5G-relatedinvestmentinits5-yeareconomicplan.ChinaToweraddedapproximately460sitesperday,implyingUStowercompaniesandcarriersaddedfewersitesfrom2015to2018,duetostatutoryconstraints,thatChinaToweraddedinthreemonths.TheRANisdominatedbyHuaweiandtheScandinaviansEricssonandNokia,whosharealmost80percentofthemarket’srevenue(Figure25)18.
Huawei is building on its established presence in 4G networks, which alreadyamountstonearlyathirdoftheglobaltelecommarket(Figure26).Itisoneofthefewplayers that can provide mature and cost-effective equipment for 5G. It has shipped150.000basestationsasofJune2019,andsigned50commercial5Gcontractswith30countries,includingRussiaandasignificantproportioninEurope19.
Apart from its leadership in RAN, and its facility of spectrum allocation by
government’s decisions, instead of a longer process of auctions to operators madeelsewhere,Chinahasaclearadvantage in termsofscale,sincethenumbersofmobilesubscribersinitsmarketsurpasstheU.SandEuropealtogether(Figure27).Figure27.Largestmobilenetworkoperatorsbysubscribers
With a forward-looking industrial policy and huge enthusiasm among localgovernments, the forecasts for 5G capital expenditures and connections in China areimpressive,theyvaryfrom428to576millionin2025(Figure28).
Chinacandemonstratetocarriersinotherbigmarketsthatlowfrequenciescandeliveron performance. Second, since 5Gwill enablewidespread use of IoT applications andupgrade toadvancedmanufacturing,China’s technologygiantswill capitalizeon thesenewtechnologiesandthenwillmoreeasilyexport5GsystemsalongtheBeltandRoadInitiative,asapartoftheDigitalSilkRoad.)21.Inthiscontext,firmsareexpectedtobethemainsourceofrevenuesfortheoperators(Figure29).Figure29.Sourcesofnewoperatorrevenuesfor5G
Thus, with firm governmental support, facilities of investment and frequenciesallocation,aleadershipinRANandthescaleofitsmarket,Chinaisinthebestpositioninthe5Grace(Figure30).
The U.S administration has been conscious of this situation early on. In January 2018, a senior National Security Council official floated the idea of rivaling Beijing with a government led effort to build a national wireless network, but regulators and elected officials rejected this proposition as ”overly expensive and unrealistic”22.Sincethen,Washingtonhasadoptedadefensive tactic, with American officials pushing allied countries to ban Huawei frombuildingtheir5Gnetworks,citingconcernsoversecurityandthecompany’sunclearlinkstotheChinesestate23.
mandatingandcoordinatingeffortsbyprivatefirmsinnetworkinfrastructure,U.Sisstilltheleaderinadvanced5Gtechnologies.CarrierssuchasVerizonandAT&Thavebeenthefirsttolaunchexperimentsof5GnetworksinselectedU.Scitiesin2019.U.Sfirmsarestill dominant in key telecommunications technologies like Ethernet switches, which
22JohnD.McKinnonetal.,“OfficialsRejectIdeaforGovernmentTakeoverof5GWirelessBuild-Out”,WallStreetJournal,January29,2018.23ChristopherBalding&DonaldClarkhaveshowedthat99%ofHuaweiisofficiallyownedbya“TradeUnionCommittee”,asurprisingownershipstructureinChina,where“tradeunionmembershavenorightto assets held by a trade union”, China File, April 19, 2019: http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/who-owns-huawei
to connect to telecom networks. In 2016, China imported $US 295 billion in semi-conductors,or2,8timesthevalueofallthecrudeoilitimportedthatyear.Only16percentof thesemi-conductorchipsconsumedinChinaareproduceddomestically24. In2017,Qualcommcontrolled59,6percentoftheUS$15billionmarketfor4Gmodemchips,and42percentof the$US8billionglobalsmartphoneSystemonChip(SoC)market,whichintegratesallthememoryandcomponentsandenablesmanagementofallsmartphoneequipment(Figure32).
China still reliesonanumberofAmericancomponents, including softwareandchips.Chinahasinvestedheavilytocatchupthisdisadvantageinsemi-conductors,whichhasbeen among the priorities of the Made in China 2025 plan, promoting indigenousinnovation.Inaddition,atthestartof2018,theChinesegovernmentunveiledapackageof incentives to attract specialists and students from Taiwan, which appear to besuccessful.Inthefirstninemonthsof2018,morethan300seniorengineersworkingatsemi-conductorcompaniesinTaiwanmovedtoChina.Intotal,morethan1.300Taiwanengineers have relocated to China since 2014, in search of higher paying jobs andsubsidized living expenses 25 . Despite the blacklisting of certain Chinese firms byWashington, Beijing’s push for technological sufficiency is on the verge of a majorbreakthrough,with the country’s nascent chip industryon track to produce around5percentoftheworld’smemorychipsbytheendof2020fromvirtuallyzeroin201826.
technologies that enable connectivity will increasingly rely on patented technologystandardssuchas5G.Inthiscontext,theracefor5GStandardEssentialPatents(SEP)isdecisive. In2018,Qualcommwasstilldominatingwith15percentof the5GSEP,withotherU.SfirmslikeInterdigital(9%)andIntel(7%).ButtheChinesefirmsHuaweiand
Source:LexnnovoQualcomm, which was the clear winner in terms of 4G patents finds itself in a
paradoxicalposition:theChinesemarket,thattodaycontributesmorethan60percentofits global revenues, with intellectual property and the production of 4G chips, alsohappenstobethemostlikelytochallengeitsdominantposition27.Huaweihaslearnedthe lesson: ithasspent15percentof itsannualrevenue,61billion$US,overthepastdecade, to develop technologies that have the potential to become global 5G telecomstandards.ThefirmplanstoincreaseitsR&Dto15billion$USperyear,andcouldreach
In November 2019, Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, has unveiled a plan to“repatriate”numerousexperiencedscientists,specialistsandengineersinordertofillinthetechnologicalvacuumduetoWashington’ssanctions,andatransferofitsR&DfundingpolicyfromtheU.StoCanadianinstitutions30.Huaweihasbeenparticularlyactiveinthe5Gstandardizationinstitutions,ifwerefertothenumberof5Gofficeapplicationsandgrantstatus,tothenumberoftechnicalcontributionsto5Gstandards,andtothenumberofengineersattendingGPPmeetingson5G(Figures35,36,37)31
patents are of equal value. Companies may overestimate and thus over-declare thenumber of patents they own. But it is clear that China has changed from a relativelypassiveposition in4G toa contender in theglobal technological race. InMarch2018,WashingtondetectedHuawei’sinfluencebehindthefailedattemptofthethenSingapore-basedBroadcom tobuy theU.S chipgiantand5G leaderQualcommInc. inaUS$117billiondeal.AndinJuly2018,BeijingpreventedQualcomm’splannedacquisitionofDutch
Thesameyear,theU.ShastakentheleadontheglobalstagetobanChinesetelecomandequipmentcompanies,byemphasizingtheirthreatonnationalsecurity.Afteritwascutoff from theU.Smarket, theEuropeanmarketbecamea strategicone forHuawei,which aims to clear doubts about its reliability and has established a center forcybersecuritynotonlyinBonn,butalsoinBrussels.InBrussels,Huaweiisoneofthemostactiveplayerswithanannualbudgetof2,2billionEurosandeightlobbyistswithaccesstotheEuropeanParliament33.
countriesthataccept,refuseordiscussHuawei’sequipment(Figure38).Thebanextendsto U.S allied countries in other continents (Figure 39). The debate is complex, as therelianceof5Gnetworksmakeeconomyandnationalsecuritymorevulnerable.As“thereisnoability toprovetheabsenceofmaliciouscodeorbackdoor in interconnectedICTsystem (for any manufacturer not just Chinese), society, government and mobileoperatorshavetotrustthemanufacturertofixvulnerabilities,andthistrustdependsonthelegalandpoliticalsysteminwhichthemanufactureroperates”»34.But,accordingtothesameanalyst,“muchofthecurrentdebateisdrivenundertheassumptionthatonlythedevelopmentofChinesenetworkequipmentbearsriskfornationalsecurity,whichisnaïve”. Snowdendocuments revealed for instance that theNSAhada special team tointerceptcertainCISCOsoftwareandhardwaretypesofdevices(routerandservers)inordertospychosentargets35.
The “politicization of the supply chain”, while almost 80 percent of 5G related spending
would be used for hardware, may delay 5G implementation and generate important geopolitical implications. Japan and South Korea, which have already banned Huawei, are estimated to be the closest followers of the two giants. Emerging countries may prefer China’s lower costs and equal or higher performance 5G offering, especially as partof theDigital Belt andRoadInitiative36.ThusChineseinfluencewillexpand,intheSouth,South-EastAsia,aswellasinAfrica.InmanycountrieswhereHuaweiactuallyoperateandmanagetheequipmentofthehosttelecomcompanies,abackdoorisnotneededifyoualreadyhaveakeytothefrontdoor.HuaweiandZTEarealreadyexportingfacerecognitiontechnologiesfuelledby5Gconnectivitytorepressiveregimesglobally,suchasMongolia,Ethiopia,Zimbabwe,MalaysiaandEcuador37.
32JoshChinetal.“The5Grace”,WallStreetJournal,September9,2018.33XuewuGu et al.,Geopolitics and theGlobal Race for 5G, CGSGlobal Focus, Center forGlobal Studies,UniversityofBonn,May2019.34Jan-Peter Kleinhans, 5G vs. National Security: A European Perspective, Stiftung NeueWerantwortung,February2019:https://www.stiftung-nv.de/sites/default/files/5g_vs._national_security.pdf35Ibidem.36XuewuGuetal.,op.cit.,p.33and69.37CharlesClancy,TestimonybeforetheSenateCommitteeoftheJudiciary,Hearingon5G:Theimpactonnationalsecurity,intellectualpropertyandcompetition,USCongress,May14,2019:https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Clancy%20Testimony.pdf;
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Figure38.DiscussionofHuaweiBansinEurope
Figure39. “14 Eyes”– Countries’ Loyalty to the United States RegardingHuaweiBans
As5Gwillbeacriticalcomponentofnewinfrastructure,acyber-attackonthesesystemsmaynotonlycausedatatheftbutalsodamagepublicsafetyandcriticalindustries.Thequestionofcybersecuritybecomescentral,astheconsequencesofinsecuritycouldbe far graver than before its implementation. Apart from the physical dimension ofswitchesandrouters,5Gisbuiltonlayersofcomplexsoftwarethatarefarmoreadaptingandconstantlyupdatingwithout theuser’sknowledge.Whoevercontrols thenetwork,controls the information flow, and may be able to change or copy data. In case ofgeopoliticaldisagreementorconflict,thismayleadtoa“winwithoutfightingsituation”,theidealofSunZi’sstrategy,inhisArtofWar. Nevertheless,U.Sattemptstodissuadenations that are considering working with Huawei are perceived as excessive or
TherearesomanypotentialvulnerabilitiesoftheInternetofThings(IoT)(Figure40) that some countries like Russia (Figure 41), in the name of security and digitalsovereignty,areplanningtofollowChina’s“splinternet”model,wherethenationalaccesstotheWorldWideWebisundergovernmentcontrol.RapidproliferationofIoTdevicesisworsening global security risks. Themajority of these devices aremanufactured inChina,whichthroughastateledapproach,istryingtosetIoTinternationalstandards,aspartofitsoverallstrategytobecomeascienceandtechnologypowerhouse,andmoveupthevaluechain,whileencouragingcivil-military fusion39.Bycomparison,U.S firmsarecurrentlymarketleadersinindustrialIoT,bymarketvalue,andIoT-enablingtechnologiessuchassemi-conductorsandcloudcomputing40.ButhereagaintheU.SadvanceissubjecttothecompetitionofAlibabaCloud,whiletheEuropeansdonothavecompetitivecloudplatformssuchasAmazonWebServices,GoogleorMicrosoftAzure.
As underlined by Elsa Kania, China has challenged the American leadership ininnovation through investing heavily in 5G, avital platform to realize the potential offrontier technologies like artificial intelligence, with its multiple and unexpectedapplications.Ithasseizedahistoricopportunity,whichcouldallowittosurpassitsmainrival in this decisive technology where the U.S may not be able to achieve decisiveleadership.Inthecurrent5Gcompetition,neithertheDepartmentofDefensenortheU.Sare inaposition todictate the contentand integrationof the5Gsupply chain, inpartbecausenoAmericancompaniesmanufacturetheequipmenttotransfersignalsbetweenmobilephonesandthetowerandsitesthatmakeupthenetwork.AccordingtotheU.SDefenseInnovationBoard,thismismatchmaycreateserioussecurityrisksiftherestoftheworldacceptsChineseproductsasthecheaperandsuperioroption41.
ThetechnologicaldecouplingbetweentheU.SandChinacontinuesinareaswhereitis most difficult to distinguish between commercial and military applications. AfterHuaweiandZTE,theTrumpadministrationblacklistextendsto200Chinesecompanies,includingfacialrecognitionstart-upsSenseTime,MegviiandYitu,threeofChina’sfourdragonsofartificialintelligence42.Atthesametime,thePrague5Gsecurityconferencewithparticipants from32countries, announced in its recommendations that the«riskassessmentsofsupplier’sproductsshouldtakeintoaccountallrelevantfactors,includingapplicable legal environment and other aspects of supplier’s ecosystem” while theEuropeanAgencyforCybersecurity(ENISA),identifiesNation-Statesasthemainthreatagentin5Gnetworks43.Inthistensecontext,the5GandIoTdevelopmentmayleadto
SomecountriesarealreadyrespondingtoChina’sdigitalunilateralismbyfollowingthesamepath:inAsiaalone,India,Cambodia,Myanmar,Thailand,Indonesia,BruneiandVietnamhaverestrictedpublicInternetandsocialmediaaccess44.In2017,Chinacalledforamultilateralapproachtogoverningcyberspace,withtheU.Ntakingtheleadingrole.In2018,thelaunchofthenewDigitalSilkRoadisanotherwaytoimpactglobalInternetgovernance through Chinese trade and investment policy45 . All these developmentsexplainthereactionofTimBernersLee,bestknownastheinventoroftheWorldWideWeb,wholaunchedanewinternationalcontract46sothat“theWebremainsopenandaglobalpublicresource,forpeopleeverywhere,nowandinthefuture”.