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OCTOBER 2017
ISSUE NO. 201
ABSTRACT is hardly arguable. This brief describes the scope and
extent of the modernisation undertaken by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) in recent years. It provides an overview of China’s
current efforts to modernise its armed services and traces the
weaknesses and strengths of such undertakings. It demonstrates, in
historical and conceptual terms, the basis of China’s drive to
modernise its military forces.
The emergence of the People’s Republic of China as a major
military power
INTRODUCTION
The consequences of the modernisation of the People’s Republic
of China’s (PRC) military forces over the last three decades have
created challenges for the Asia-Pacific. Chinese forces have
experienced cumulative improvements in their capabilities.
Modernisation begins with doctrinal and strategic changes and
continues with organisational transformation and, simultaneously,
equipment acquisitions. China has pursued all these elements
simultaneously, albeit unevenly. For decades, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) was wedded to a ‘People’s War’, which
emphasised “active defence”, as originally conceived by Mao
Tse-tung. The PLA has since moved away from “active defence” to
an
emphasis on “military art” and “operations” 1[campaigns]. China
realised that attrition and
manpower intensive "peoples war" was too costly, evident in
their campaigns in the 1930s and 1940s and starting in the late
1970s defence against the Soviet Union. While still important, it
was no longer as critical a priority as successfully waging a
limited, yet "intense" local war within
2other parts of its neighbourhood. As the Chinese Defence
Minister Zhang Aiping observed in 1983:
“The principle of war is to achieve the greatest victory at the
smallest cost. To achieve this we should depend not only on
political factors, but also on the correct strategy and
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China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
KARTIK BOMMAKANTI
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tactics of the war’s commander, the sophisticated nature of our
military equipment, the quality of
3our personnel who use the equipment etcetera.”
Therefore, at least post-1985, gaining superiority against
immediate foes and potential state threats around the Chinese rim
land formed a critical basis of China’s military
4modernisation. The PLA recognised that warfare in the 21st
century was more technologically intensive; it also placed demands
on transcending single-service missions to multi-service operations
– i.e., the essence of
5combined arms warfare.
Since the 1990s the PLA and its supporting air, naval, nuclear,
and conventionally armed ballistic missile forces have made
reasonably impressive strides. To begin with, military capabilities
evolve according to a doctrine and plan. Doctrine and military
planning are also determined by events. Two events catalysed the
accumulation of capabilities that the PRC possesses today. The
first was the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 and the second was the
Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1995-1996. The first event is most
pertinent for China’s quest to acquire the strength and flexibility
to execute combined arms warfare. Yet the maintenance of
“ideological and political purity” meant that the PLA was expected
to demonstrate unflinching
6loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A centralised
military command structure was inflexible and unsuited for the
conduct of future wars.
The PLA’s higher military leadership since the 1980s ruled out
the possibility of a World
7War, “…for a relatively long period of time.” Flowing this
premise, the purpose for the PLA was to avoid major war and exploit
the advantages allowed by the duration of peace for
8the PRC to modernise its capabilities. In this
regard, China has made good on this era of relative peace by
developing a range of capabilit ies; the consequence of this
modernisation is greater assertiveness in regional disputes.
The four core areas of capability development and deployment are
the PLA’s land, air, naval, nuclear cum ballistic missile forces.
The phases of modernisation were first doctrinal, then
organisational – the PLA had then to be entirely restructured in
the late 1980s and thereafter made equipment acquisitions beginning
in the early 1990s, along with the transformation of the entire
Force (PLA). Since the early 1990s, the PLA’s force planners and
strategists have recognised the importance of developing and
deploying capabilities for theatre-level military contingencies.
Indeed, its capabilities are potent today largely because of the
fact that they are geared to manage potential conflicts around the
Chinese periphery such as a cross-straits one
9with Taiwan and that along the Sino-Indian border. China is yet
to develop the kind of unlimited force projection capabilities that
the United States possesses, at least for the medium term.
This brief concentrates only on a select list of the latest
Chinese military capabilities that are evolving and deployed for
regional warfighting. It is noteworthy that the PLA’s modernisation
drive displays some weaknesses that relate to the organisational
changes that have taken place in the PLA. This is important because
these vulnerabilities of the PLA matter as much as its strengths.
These vulnerabilities and weaknesses can take two forms, which are
specifically relevant to the following analysis. The first form of
weakness is the total inability to perform a mission. It manifests
itself by way of non-performance in pre-planned missions, as well
as an inability to respond to surprises that
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China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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mandate rapidity, flexibility and effectiveness. The second type
of weakness that could prove constraining, if not outrightly
debilitating, is the incompetent use of military capabilities to
secure mission goals. This secondary weakness may result, if not
exclusively, from “processes, personnel, equipment, leadership,
force
10structure etc.” Unlike the first weakness, which can be
unforgiving, the second type of weakness
11still leaves room for success.
This brief documents both the strengths and the weaknesses of
PLA’s modernisation. The following sections use open-source
material and draw from Indian analyses on the growth and trajectory
Chinese military power.
The PLA was an obsolescent combat fighting force in the mid- to
late 1990s. Its nadir was the Vietnam War in 1979. Indeed the 1979
Chinese military campaign against Vietnam exposed some critical
weaknesses in the domains of
12 command, logistics and communications. The denial and the
absence of close air close support for the Chinese land offensives
against Vietnam, forcing the PLA to rely more on artillery fire
support as a substitute, exposed a critical weakness in the PLA’s
effective prosecution
13 joint operations. Since the mid-1980s, however, the PLA
ground forces have undergone significant transformation. This
effort, sustained through double-digit increases in military
spending, has yielded gains in the form of a leaner fighting
force.
First, the operational structure of the PLA has undergone change
and the Chinese defence ministry has experienced reorganisation.
The seven military regions in China have been reorganised into five
theatre commands, which include North, South, East, West and
middle
1 4c o m b a t c o m m a n d z o n e s . S e c o n d ,
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
3
accompanying this shift is a reduction in the total manpower of
the PLA, reflecting an improvement in the Teeth-to-Tail Ratio
(TTR). The TTR is an expression of the relationship between the
forces and resources dedicated to missions and the resources and
infrastructure
15 necessary to support and manage those forces.China has made
significant improvements at the tail-end of the TTR. Admittedly,
the tail-end improvements are not only confined to improved
logistics and force transportation, giving PLA ground forces
considerable mobility, but also in enhanced cyber, electronic and
space warfare capabilities. The latter three sets of capabilities
serve as critical force multipliers to secure specific mission
objectives.
Technological obsolescence was one of the core vulnerabilities
of the PLA. Senior officers and the CPC’s leadership has recognised
this deficiency since the mid-1980s; that it needed to be addressed
if China is to successfully pursue a military campaign that meets
the demands of 21st century warfare. Since then the PLA’s ground
combat equipment has improved, and today the PLA’s land forces are
equipped with an array of new equipment. These capabilities are
diverse and include the PLA’s standard infantry weapon—the QBZ-95-1
and the QBZ-95B-1 5.8mm carbine assault rifle. The PLA is expected
to field shortly a new 5.8-mm gun dubbed the ‘Type 05’ with a 20-mm
grenade launcher. In service in the PLA’s armoured corps are two
tanks, ZTZ-99A and ZTZ-96A. The latter is an upgraded
second-generation tank.
A critical component of the PRC’s military 16modernisation is
digitisation. Since the mid-
1990s, PLA writings clearly indicate that they plan to emulate
the US Army’s efforts in this regard. When facing a strong fighting
force, the PLA recognises the importance of the enemy’s capacity
for information suppression. Against weaker foes, information
superiority enables a
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17 large victory at low costs. The PLA’s latest Infantry
Fighting Vehicle (IFV) is the ZBD-04. It plays a critical role in
the PLA’s conduct of joint arms operations, giving it the
capability of both operating with other tanks and performing
18missions independently of the other arms.
Among the most crucial areas of Chinese military modernisation
is the expansion of its naval capabilities. The PLAN has gone about
developing capabilities methodically, and in three phases. First is
coastal defence—a “brown water defensive capability” of the
immediate shoreline; second is to dominate upto the First Island
Chain; and the third is a blue water navy
19going beyond the second island chain. It is today in the third
phase of its naval expansion even as it continues to further
strengthen its Anti-access
20and Area Denial (AAAD) capabilities. The other role of the
Navy is to provide the deep-sea defence and “secure second strike
nuclear
21capability” at sea. The Chinese navy has made progress in both
the surface and subsurface segment of its fleet. In the subsurface
domain, the PLAN acquired 12 Russian-made Kilo Class conventional
submarines since the mid-1990s and added four indigenously
developed submarines. These include a Jin Class ‘Type 094’ nuclear
powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and a new Shang Class
‘Type 093/093’ nuclear attack submarine (SSN).The latest addition
to the PLAN is the SSN dubbed the Song
22Class ‘Type 039/039G’. Each of the Jin Class submarines will
be equipped with 7,400-kilometre range JL-2 nuclear-armed submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Notably, Chinese gains in the
submarine domain are the
23 by-product of Russian designs. While these capabilities
reflect an advancement in the
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN)
4
PLAN’s subsurface nuclear fleet, one cannot help but infer that
a crucial weakness is China’s dependence on Russia for critical
subsystems and design engineering, if not entire platforms.
The Chinese navy’s surface fleet has also witnessed
improvements. The latest addition is the first Chinese aircraft
carrier Liaoning ‘Type 001’ design vessel to the PLAN’s surface
fleet. It is a conventionally powered carrier with a displacement
of approximately 60,000 tonnes. A second carrier, the Shandong, is
under
24 construction and a third carrier is on its way.The air arm of
the Liaoning could potentially consist of a combination of 36 fixed
wing and rotary wing aircraft including 24 J-15 fighters, six
anti-submarine warfare helicopters, four airborne early warning
helicopters, and two
25rescue choppers. China expects to induct four to six aircraft
carriers. The current and follow-on Shandong carrier might be
limited by operating range, though not so, if reports are to be
believed. The PLAN’s long-term ambitions include the acquisition of
nuclear-powered carriers, resulting in two carrier strike groups
operating in the Western Pacific and an
26 additional two groups in the Indian Ocean. The potential
Chinese nuclear powered carriers will inevitably use
electromagnetic catapult systems
27for the launch of carrier-based fighter aircraft.
Notwithstanding an absence of experience in operating carriers, the
PLAN’s introduction of aircraft carriers provides additional weight
to the Chinese navy’s surface warfare capabilities.
The PLAAF, too, has witnessed significant improvements in its
capabilities. Changes in the PLAAF’s fighter fleet have been
evident since the 1990s. The Chinese Air Force started
THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF)
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5
acquiring a small number of fourth-generation fighters in 1996.
However, weaknesses are also evident from internal PLA’s
assessments of some platforms of its fighter fleet.
Beginning in the mid-1990s and for a decade and a half, the
PLAAF’s numbers swelled to 30 percent of the force. By 2015, the
size increased to roughly 51 percent of the fighter fleet of the
PLAAF and will grow further to 62 percent by the
28current year. It is estimated that the Chinese
fourth-generation fighter fleet increased from 383 to 736 jets
between 2010 to 2015 – a 92
29percent jump in fighter air combat power.
Today China operates roughly 1,200 short-range fighters. In
service in the PLAAF’s fleet are approximately 400 J-7 fighters,
which are reasonably efficient aircraft. Yet the J-7 fighter
strength will decrease in numbers, replaced, as noted earlier, with
more advanced fourth-generation jets. The PLAAF’s current fleet
strength stands at approximately 1977
30aircraft.
The PLAAF is also driven to developing stealth capabilities for
a segment of its fighter fleet. As of July 2014, the PLAAF has
tested four prototypes for the J-20 and has undertaken a flight
test of a second prototype of the J-31 with stealth features. Yet
none of these jets has
31 entered the production stage. J-20’s AL-31 engine is Russian
built, and the Chinese have sought to substitute the AL-31 with
their own engine called the Taihang. Yet they are still unsure of
the Taihang’s reliability as compared to its Russian counterpart.
Consequently, they are currently undertaking developmental tests
for another engine dubbed the WS-15 as an
32indigenous replacement for the AL-31. More than the size of
the Chinese Air Force, the crucial strength of the PLAAF lies in
its establishment
33of a dense air defence network.
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THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY SECOND ARTILLERY FORCES (PLASAF)
REGIONAL NUCLEAR DETERRENT
The PLASAF is the custodian and end user of China’s nuclear and
missile forces. At its birth, the PLASAF was tasked primarily with
operating nuclear tipped missiles. For several years, China’s
nuclear-armed missile arsenal was saddled with a range of problems
such as poor accuracy, protracted launch schedules and a relaxed
alert posture. However, they were compatible with Beijing’s
declared No-First Use (NFU) policy and a doctrine enshrining
Credible
34 Minimum Deterrence (CMD). A combined CMD-NFU policy
necessitates only a small missile force that is capable of
surviving a first strike and retaliating against the enemy’s
counter value targets. However, the same restrictions are
inapplicable to conventional strike missions, a role the PLASAF was
ordered to perform. These technological advances of late have
significantly improved the PLASAF’s strength in terms of
survivability, accuracy and an invigorated capability for Chinese
conventional missiles. Indian experts also agree that China is
developing a strong second-strike
35nuclear capability, particularly vis-à-vis the US, despite the
limited size of its arsenal. Most independent analyses still
support China’s adherence to NFU and a limited arsenal. The focus
is entirely on security, accuracy, reliability and assured
delivery. However, important changes are taking place in these
areas as well.
The deployment of Chinese nuclear-armed ballistic missiles
continues apace in order for Beijing to maintain regional nuclear
deterrence. In the long term, its conventionally armed,
medium-range ballistic missile forces are undergoing rapid change
for the conduct of high-intensity regional military operations.
To
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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6 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 201 l OCTOBER 2017
sustain this effort, at present the missile component of China’s
regional military nuclear deterrent posture includes land-based
nuclear-
36armed CSS-6 Mod 2 missiles. Its conventional Medium Range
Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)
3 7consist of CSS -5 missi les. Bei j ing ’s conventional
missile capabilities are primarily directed against the adversary’s
logistical nodes, communication links, facilities, and regional
38 military sites such as air and naval bases.Complementing the
modernised expansion of its nuclear and missile forces, Chinese
space military capabilities have undergone significant
augmentation. Today China deploys and operates a proven Kinetic
Anti-Satellite capability. It is making significant investments in
ballistic missile capabilities to destroy satellites in
Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), its Satellite Navigation System, the
BEIDOU, is an integral part of its military planning, and it is
developing high-energy weapons systems,
39 lasers, and high-powered microwave systems.The ground nodes
of its space segment have also undergone significant expansion,
with China establishing satellite tracking stations within the
mainland and in states such as Pakistan,
40 Namibia and Chile. In December 2015, following the Central
Military Commission (CMC) reforms, the PLA reached a milestone
establishing new services by first converting the Second Artillery
into the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF), which it complemented with the
creation of PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) that blends
electronic, space and network warfighting capabilities into a
single
41 service. Integrating weapons and developing a networked
capability into a single service represents progress. However, the
question remains whether the PLA is capable of inflicting quick and
decisive blows against any potential adversary through joint
operations.
EVALUATIONS OF THE PLA DOCTRINE AND COMBINED ARMS WARFARE
CAPABILITIES
How do these Chinese capabilities fit into assessments (whether
Chinese, Indian or other), about the PLA’s emerging doctrine and
operational posture? What possibilities exist for jointness for the
PLA and its supporting arms? Indian assessments of the PRC’s
emerging order of battle correlates strongly with the preceding
sections on Chinese military strength measured in terms of actual
military capabilities. From an Indian standpoint, Chinese
modernisation since the initiation of military reforms is
concentrated in two areas.
Despite improvements in the TTR discussed earlier, important
challenges continue to face the PLA in the areas of jointness and
efficiency. Optimising the fighting force to undertake combined
arms warfare is a hurdle and remains a critical weakness. Command
and Control (C2) for the conduct of joint is a universal problem
in
42 modern warfare. A change in the PLA’s warfighting doctrine
stands in contradiction to the structures within which it is
being
4 3 operationalised. The doctrine stresses decentralisation,
whereas the operational culture of the PLA focuses on
centralisation. Two factors of vulnerability undermine the PLA’s C2
structure. First, the narrow or individual service interests of the
PLA’s fighting arms denude effective coordination and cooperation
in joint
44 operations. The second constraint and vulnerability is the
primacy of ground-based
45officers assigned to critical command billets, who could
potentially constrain effective coordination and synchronisation in
joint operations. Compounding these woes is the absence of Joint
Command and Personnel and the necessary means for the training,
planning,
46 and execution of combined arms warfare.
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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7ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 201 l OCTOBER 2017
Nevertheless, these reforms have also emphasised the
reorganisation of the Group Army divisions and brigades. The PLA
has undertaken significant manpower reductions to an estimated 30
divisions and introduced a new ranking system due to the
incompatibility with the older ranking system with armies around
the
47world.
The future trajectory of the PLA could include a fully
modernised Chinese armed force with an improved and well-integrated
operational structure. These improvements could potentially spell
danger to the Central Asian Republics, which border China and
strengthen Beijing ’s power projection
48capabilities into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
A second Indian perspective assesses that China’s military
modernisation dovetails Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign
policy, a
49pattern that has been evident since 2008. The PLA is gearing
its forces for new military missions and goals. Modernisation also
serves the purpose of safeguarding Chinese interests and protecting
Chinese expatriates living and working in countries that are part
of the Belt and
50Road Initiative (BRI). Stretching from the Eurasian region to
the Western Pacific, the C h i ne s e , t h ro u g h m i l i t a r
y e xc h a n g e programmes are increasing interoperability with
the BRI countries, which field Chinese weapons
51systems. The Chinese have modernised their forces to win
informationised local wars. For this brand of warfare, the PLA
emphasises network centricity of all weapons systems at sea, air
and land connected in real time for the effective use of its
weapons to service mission objectives and
52the protection of military assets.
The thrust of the PLA’s modernisation is on non-contact wars
which rely on psychological operations that compel the enemy
into
submission without an actual military engagement. This is
reinforced by the PLA’s development of a strong navy, air force,
army and the prosecution of special warfare
53operations at far seas. There is evidence to suggest that the
PLA is deliberating the creation of a strategic support force to
sustain out-of-area operations and missions. Joint command at the
highest combat level is mandatory for the
54PLA. A corollary to this assessment of the PLA’s order of
battle is the separation between its conventional and nuclear chain
of command. Of particular relevance to India is the PLA’s
establishment of the Tibetan Military
55Command (TMC). A two-front war might no longer be relevant for
New Delhi’s military and strategic planners as they should be
evaluating and preparing for a one-front war. Beijing also seeks to
engage in non-contact conflict which places a high premium on
political and
56psychological dimensions of warfare.
A third Indian perspective is generally consistent with the
first two, since the PRC’s Central Military Commission (CMC)
reforms that there will be a flattening of the higher military
command to the extent it will be more streamlined with potentially
considerable delegative power to lower echelon commanders
57 in the PLA’s newly instituted combat zones.This is consistent
with recent non-Indian assessments as well as internal Chinese
reports that there is an ongoing effort at improving the PLA
command performance in joint operations
58through training courses. This implies that proficiency in C2
operations is still a work in progress. It is a critical
requirement and remains a benchmark of the PLA to emulate the
successful American conduct of joint operations in the 1991 Persian
Gulf War.
Yet this perspective on the ultimate goals of Chinese foreign
policy diverges with the
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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preceding two. The thrust of Chinese foreign policy will be on
increasing its political
59influence, presumably also with those with whom it has
disputatious relations such as India and the other states around
the Chinese rim land. In contrast to the second perspective, China
is progressively moving away from informationised war to a war
driven by Artificial
60Intelligence (AI). To sustain the latter, China has been
making ceaseless efforts to develop AI
61that it aims to surpass that of the US. It is possible that
China is planning and pursuing a combination of both
informationised, and AI-based wars for the successful prosecution
and conduct of C2 operations.
Over the last 25 years, Chinese military strength has undergone
a quantum jump. This expansion has occurred not only relative to
its most formidable foe – the United States of America, but most
significantly it helped China surpass some its immediate neighbours
such as India. This brief has provided a snapshot of China’s
growing military power. China’s double-digit economic growth rates
for three decades have given the PLA, PLAN, PLAAF AND PLASAF, the
military wherewithal to inflict, at a minimum, heavy losses against
its adversaries and, at a maximum, a defeat in the event of war. In
the context of India’s modernisation of its own forces, the
country’s military planners and decision-makers have to address
trade-offs between firepower and manpower; this, the PLA has
addressed to a considerable degree. They also
CONCLUSION
have to deal with making hard choices in enabling the Indian
armed services to effectively undertake joint operations. Here the
PLA, notwithstanding some weaknesses, has made progress.
The cumulative increases in Chinese defence spending have
enabled it to surmount obstacles in the indigenous research and
development of a range of conventional, missile, space and nuclear
capabilities. Its capacity to prosecute four-dimensional warfare is
substantial around its periphery and growing. Two critical
conclusions can be derived from the PRC’s military modernisation.
Firstly, the PRC has amassed significant military strength since
the 1990s and continues to modernise its forces, allowing it to
project menacing military strength, without the PLA having to
actually resort to a force of arms. This allows the PRC to win a
contest without fighting a war. It is compatible with the age-old
Chinese strategic emphasis on subduing the enemy psychologically
and morally, without recourse to force. At the same time, if the
PLA cannot compel its foe to do its will psychologically, the
secondary conclusion is that the PLA is well-positioned—accruing
from the impress ive accumulat ion of mi l i tar y capabilities—if
put to test, potentially fighting and winning a war with
overwhelming force, at low cost, against any one of its adversaries
on its periphery. Yet China’s military modernisation exhibits
important weaknesses. To begin with, Chinese military strength
remains untested in real battle for decades.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Kartik Bommakanti is an Associate Fellow with ORF's Strategic
Studies Programme.
8 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 201 l OCTOBER 2017
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ENDNOTES
1. Paul H.B. Godwin, “Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy
and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-1987,
The China Quarterly, No. 112, December, 1987, p. 575.
2. Paul H.B. Godwin, "Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local
and Limited War", The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. 519, China's Foreign Relations, January
1992, p. 193.
3. Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and
Operations in the People's Liberation Army 1978-1987", p. 576.
4. Paul H.B. Godwin, “Chinese Military Strategy Revised: Local
and Limited War”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, Vol. 519, China's Foreign Relations, January,
1992, pp. 193-194
5. Godwin “Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and
Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army”, pp.
573-574.
6.
7. General Zhao Nanqi, “Deng Xiaoping's Theory of Defense
Modernization”, in Michael Pillsbury (ed.), Chinese Views of Future
Warfare, (Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 1997),
p. 13
8. Ibid.
9. Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L.
Heim, Jeff Hegen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki,
Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird,
Kyle Brady, Lyle J. Morris,The U.S.-China Military Scorecard:
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, RAND
Corporation (Santa Monica: CA, 2015), p. 4
10. Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen
A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, and Samuel K.
Berkowitz, China's Incomplete Military Transformation, (Santa
Monica: CA, RAND Corporation), 2015, p. 3
11. Ibid.
12. Xiaonming Zhang, “China 1979 War with Vietnam: A
Reassessment”, The China Quarterly, No. 184, December, 2005, p.
864
13. Ibid.
14. Presentation by Gen. S.L. Narsimhan, 'China's Military
Modernisation: Recent Trends', Workshop: "On 'China's Military
Modernisation: Recent Trends', Observer Research Foundation (ORF),
New Delhi, 16 March, 2017 available at
[http://www.orfonline.org/research/china-on-course-to-a-strong-military-power/].
15. Ibid.
16. Ben Lowsen, “Overview: China's People Liberation Army
Equipment at a Glance”, The Diplomat,
[http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/overview-chinas-peoples-liberation-army-equipment-at-a-glance/]
17. See particularly Appendix for views on Information Warfare
and Digitization expressed by PLA Major General Wang Pufeng in
William T. Hagestad II, 21st Century Chinese Cyberwarfare,
(Cambridge, IT Governance Publishing 2012), pp. 289-290.
18. Ibid.
19. The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for this point.
p. 2, Dennis J. Blasko, Philip T. Klapakis and John F. Corbett
Jr., "Training Tomorrow's PLA: A Mixed Bag of Tricks", The China
Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: China's Military in Transition,
June 1996, p. 491
9ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 201 l OCTOBER 2017
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ronald O'Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications
for U.S. Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress”,
Congressional Research Service, p. 10, 6 June, 2017, available at
[https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf].
23. Ibid, p. 18.
24. Ibid, p. 18-26
25. Ibid, pp. 18-19
26. Robert Farley, “China's Under Construction Aircraft Carrier
Isn't the One to Worry About, It's the One that Comes After”, War
Is Boring, 5 November 2016.
27. Ibid.
28. Heginbotham et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard:
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, p. 75.
29. Ibid.
30. “World Air Forces:2016”, Flight International, p. 15
31. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014
Report to Congress, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2014, p. 311.
32. “China's J-20 Fighter Jet May Get a Homemade Engine”, China
Military Online, 8 September, 2017,
[http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/08/content_7747590.htm].
33. Robert Farley, “China's Military Has Nearly 3000 Aircraft”,
The Diplomat, 17 May, 2016,
[http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/chinas-military-has-nearly-3000-aircraft-heres-why-that-matters/]
34. Eric Heginbotham, Michael Chase, Jacob Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark
R. Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan,
Michael Nixon, Christina L. Garafola and Samuel K. Berkowitz,
“Domestic Factors Could Accelerate the Evolution of China's Nuclear
Posture”, Research Brief, Document No. RB-9956-AF, RAND
Corporation, (Santa Monica: CA, 2017), p. 3
35. Manoj Joshi, “China on course to a strong military”,
Workshop On 'China's Military Modernisation: Recent Trends',
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, 16 March, 2017
available at
[http://www.orfonline.org/research/china-on-course-to-a-strong-military-power/].
36. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, Defense Intelligence
Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (NASIC), 2017 p.22 accessible
at [http://www.nasic.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F2VLcKSmCTE%
3d&portalid=19]
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Manoj Joshi, 'China on Course to a Strong Military'.
40. Section 2: “China's Space and Counterspace Programs”,
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commisssion, 2016,
[https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/
Chapter%202,%20Section%202%20-%20China's%20Space%20and%20Counterspace%20
Programs.pdf]
41. Dean Cheng, 'Evolving Chinese Thinking About Deterrence: The
Nuclear Dimension', Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation,
http://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/BG3240_0.pdf p.
4
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
-
42. Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese Joint
Operations”, China and the World Program, 3 March, 2017,
[https://cwp.princeton.edu/news/%E2%80%98-brave-new-world-chinese-joint-operations%
E2%80%99-cwp-fellow-joel-wuthnow]
43. Gen. Narsimhan, “China on Course to a Strong Military”,
Workshop On 'China's Military Modernisation: Recent Trends',
Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, 16 March, 2017
available at
[http://www.orfonline.org/research/china-on-course-to-a-strong-military-power/].
44. Wuthnow, “A Brave New World For Chinese Joint Operations”,
pp. 2-11
45. Ibid.
46. Gen. Narsimhan, “China on Course to a strong Military”..
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid
49. Pravin Sawhney, 'Çhina's Military Modernisation: Recent
Trends', Workshop On 'China's Military Modernisation: Recent
Trends', Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, 16 March,
2017 available at
[http://www.orfonline.org/research/china-on-course-to-a-strong-military-power/].
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Manoj Joshi, “China on Course to a Strong Military”.
58. “PLA aims to cultivate commanding talents for joint
operations”, China Military Online, 7 September, 2017,
[http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/07/content_7747234.htm]
59. Manoj Joshi, 'Çhina on Course to a strong Military”.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
11ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 201 l OCTOBER 2017
China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends
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China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends