China in the Indian Ocean: From Junk Ships to Effective Naval Presence

China in the Indian Ocean: From Junk Ships to Effective Naval

PresenceMohammed Khalid*

Indian Ocean had been a centre of vibrant trade andcommerce from the time immemorial and has seennurturing of great civilizations in the past. China,though touching the shores of North Pacific Ocean, hasbeen deeply interested in the Indian Ocean. China hasshown its presence in the Indian Ocean in myriad waysfor a couple of centuries. After 1403 China sent itsfleets consisting of trading ships, warships, andsupport vessels, to embark on major voyages to theIndian Ocean. These voyages continued till 1431 andtraversed the waters of Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea.During this time Chinese fleets visited all the majorports of India, the African continent, Persian Gulf andthe Red Sea. After the death of Emperor Zhu in 1424 andadmiral Zheng in 1431, Chinese forays in the IndianOcean receded and China lost track of the waters of theIndian Ocean. During the Colonial period, Chineserulers surrendered their powers and responsibilities tothe colonial masters. After the Second World War as theCold War set in, China remained busy and confined toitself and its immediate vicinity and could not show

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any kind of effective presence in or around the IndianOcean littoral.

Economic reforms were introduced in China inDecember 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. Its thrust in thebeginning was decollectivization of agriculture, theopening up of the country to foreign investment, andpermission for entrepreneurs to start-up businesses. Inthe late 1980s and early 1990s China privatised andcontracted out the state-owned industry, lifted pricecontrols, protectionist policies, and regulations whichled to the remarkable growth of private sector.China's economy surpassed that of Japan in 2010 asAsia's largest economy and became the second largestafter the United States and is projected to become theworld's largest economy by 2025.

The rapid industrialization has forced China toensure uninterrupted supplies of raw materialsespecially oil which come from the littoral of*Professor of Political Science, Department of Evening Studies,Panjab University Chandigarh.

Indian Ocean. With 28 littoral states and six islandrepublics Indian Ocean region offers coveted marketsfor Chinese products. To protect its interests, Chinais steadily spreading its presence in the Indian OceanRegion on two fronts –economic and strategic. It hassought and successfully established economic-diplomaticrelations with the countries of the Indian Ocean regionespecially from Africa. China has set up its network of

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military and commercial facilities and relationships --referred as the String of Pearls-- along its sea linesof communication which extend from the Chinese mainlandto Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several majormaritime choke points such as the Bab al-Mandeb, theStrait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the LombokStrait, as well as other strategic maritime centers inPakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives andSomalia. This is indicative of China’s growinggeopolitical influence to increase access to ports andairfields, expand and modernize military forces, andfoster stronger diplomatic relationships with thecountries of Indian Ocean. India has reasons to worryand has to counter pose as the presence of China isdetrimental to its economic and strategic interests.The paper is an attempt to elaborate on the issue ofincreasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean regionand Indian response to it.

China is geopolitically so located that on the east it hasvast Pacific Ocean. Historically, its lands on the Pacificlittoral were barren, sparsely populated, and without anycommercial activity. China considered the China South Sea andcountries of Southeast Asia as its natural sphere of influenceand the area was devoid of any noticeable trade and commerce.1 Onthe other hand, Indian Ocean had been a centre of vibrant tradeand commerce from the time immemorial. Some of the world’s greatcivilizations –the Babylonian, the Egyptian and the Indus-- haddeveloped on its coasts. Apart from the commercial activity, themigrations of the people generating a cultural amalgam has been asignificant trait of the lands and peoples of the Indian Oceanregion.

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History of Chinese voyages in the Indian Ocean

Annals of history indicate that Chinese envoyssailed into the Indian Ocean from the late 2nd centuryBC, reaching Kanchipuram (Tamil Nadu), even up toEthiopia. During the late 4th and early 5th centuries,Chinese pilgrims and monks travelled by sea to India.In 674 the private Chinese explorer Daxi Hongtong wasamong the first to end his journey at the southern tipof the Arabian Peninsula, after traveling through 36

countries west of the South China Sea. China had neverbeen a maritime power but to consolidate the tributarysystem it extended its maritime thrust towardsSoutheast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Chinese junk shipswere even described by the Moroccan geographer Al-Idrisi in his Geography of 1154, along with the usualgoods they traded and carried aboard their vessels.2 AsChina became internally week, it had to suffer manyinternal wars and it gradually became overly dominatedby the outside powers, it did not think of havingpresence in the Indian Ocean for a long time.

To explore new territories and expand commercialand diplomatic relations with the states of South andSoutheast Asia and to demonstrate the power of the MingEmpire, China sent its fleets consisting of tradingships, warships, and support vessels in 1403 onwards.In 1414-15 a Chinese fleet called at the ports ofChampa (now part of Vietnam), Java and Sumatra(Indonesia), reached the Strait of Hormuz and entered

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the Persian Gulf. Chinese voyage went to Bengal, coastof Malay, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. This voyagemarked the height of Chinese presence in the IndianOcean. From 1417 to 1419 Chinese sent another massivevoyage which sailed to the Indian Ocean and called atthe ports of Indonesia, India, Malacca Straits, SriLanka and Maldives. Ships from this fleet exploredfurther the Arabian coast from Strait of Hormuz to Adenand the east coast of Africa. Similarly a voyage wassent in 1421-22 to explore more of the coast of Africa.In 1424 Emperor Zhu died and was succeeded by ZhuZhanji. Continuing the tradition, the new Emperor toosent voyages --the seventh voyage-- in 1431 whichremained at sea for two years when admiral Zheng –themain architect of these voyages—died in 1433.3 After hisdeath China lost track of the waters of the IndianOcean. By the time Vasco da Gama arrived at Calicut onMay 20, 1498 --the most important turning points in thehistory of the Indian Ocean region-- the Chinese hadalready retreated from the Indian Ocean.

Chinese absence from Indian Ocean till the end of ColdWar

In the 15th century the Europeans armed with newtool and techniques of sea faring, escaped theirmedieval “prison” --that Christian Europe was in theMiddle Ages-- by adventuring out upon the tracklessoceans. Subsequently, the nations of Western Europe, withtheir superior ships and guns, opened the new “Oceanic Age” bytheir daring and ingenuity.4 Before the arrival of the Portuguese

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in the Indian Ocean no littoral power had attempted tomonopolize the sea lanes that connect the ports of theIndian sub-continent with the Middle East and EastAfrica on the West, and the ports of Southeast Asia andChina to the east. The British East India Companyentered the Indian Ocean and initially sent two smallships in December 1602 to the port of Bantam (Java,Indonesia). Slowly under a design, first the Companyand later the British established trading posts aroundthe Ocean followed by occupation of many littoral landsincluding India. Though other European powers, theDutch, and the French followed but could not be assuccessful as the British who effectively convertedIndian Ocean into a ‘British Lake’.5 To maintain itstrade links with China the East India Company foughtthree wars --called the Opium Wars-- and after thevictory in Opium War of 1842, Chinese imperial powerdeclined and was forced to cede the barren island ofHong Kong. The British also opened Guangzhou (Canton)and four other ports for trade in China. Then on, tradein the Indian Ocean and from the Chinese ports becameexclusive domain of the British till the Second WorldWar.

After the war with Japan in 1937 till the end of SecondWorld War and a four year long civil war till October 1949, theCommunist forces emerged triumphant and Mao Tse-tung declared thePeople’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. China at that timewas week, had little industry, with high population growth, andwas facing high unemployment and food shortages. As the Cold Warset in and manifested itself in Korean Crises in 1950, China

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faced formidable challenges. United States military presence inthe region, challenge of US protected Taiwan, denial ofmembership of United Nations thus Veto Power in the UnitedNations Security Council, presence of other colonial powers inSoutheast Asia and build up of US backed military alliances likeSEATO and ANZUS were a headache for China’s Communistestablishment. A closed economy, China had neither intention norcapacity or capability to show its presence in the Indian Oceanand its littoral.

Economic upsurge of China

After the death of Mao in 1976, his successor DengXiaoping decided to build the Country’s economy on thelines of its Asian neighbours. In China "Reform andOpening up" also referred to as the "Socialism withChinese characteristics", were initiated in December1978.6 In 1979 foreign investment was legalised andChina began to set up Special Economic Zones (SEZ)along the south-east coast and Yangzi (Yangtse) River.During this period government controls in theindustrial sector

were decentralized. As power passed to third generationof leadership under Jiang Zemin in 1989, first Stockexchange was opened in 1990 in Shanghai. Fast economicgrowth took place in mid-1990s. State owned industrieswere phased out committing to liberalization in everysector of industry and in 2001 China became a member ofWTO. China did not venture into the Indian Ocean anddid not show any naval presence in the region, in thebetter part of the Cold War. Indian Ocean was a theatre

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to demonstrate the strength of US and Soviet navalfleets.7 Trade and commerce was conducted primarily inthe North Atlantic and the Pacific during this periodand the Indian Ocean Region was a peripheral backwaterin this regard.

After the end of Cold War, as the globalisatin andliberalisation made their way, China began to increase its sphereof influence in the Indian Ocean Region. It coincided with fasteconomic growth in the country. Industrial growth and increasedproduction made China increasingly dependent on resources andmarkets accessible only via maritime routes. Markets to itsproducts and source of raw material especially oil, have been onthe Indian Ocean shores. Safeguarding its trade routes and toensure the flow of resources made China to show more than thenormal interest in Indian Ocean affairs. Chinese naval plannersdevised the ways to secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS). Tomeet these demands, China started naval modernization in 1980's,and launched an ambitious futuristic weapons developmentprogramme including high energy microwave beam-weapons, ship-based laser cannon and space-based weaponry to destroycommunication and reconnaissance satellites. Ever since, China istrying to give its Navy a greater visibility, operability andrapid action capability in the Indian Ocean Region.

Chinese expansion in Indian Ocean after the end of ColdWar

China’s expansion towards Indian Ocean had twoaspects --economic and military. In the recent yearsChina has steadily spread its wings in the Indian OceanRegion with its rapidly-growing well equipped Navy withall logistic support. China has established several

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access points through a series of arrangements forrefueling, replenishment, crew rest and low-levelmaintenance facilities. By doing so, China is mainlytrying to ensure protection of its sea lanes forcritical energy needs. To assume a role beyond itsnatural geographic and historical maritime boundaries;China began to set up a series of bases in order toproject its power. Its secure land borders helped tobuild a strong navy and increasingly concentrate

on South China Sea and Indian Ocean where supplies ofoil, natural gas, and other commodities critical toChina's economic growth pass through. China hasdeveloped naval out-posts in Bangladesh, Maldives,Pakistan, Sri Lanka and other countries of the Oceanlittoral.8

China has made serious attempts to wean Bangladeshand has supplied it arms and other defence equipment.Bangladesh’s Armed Forces today are predominantlyequipped with Chinese military hardware. China signedDefence Co-operation Agreement with Bangladesh inDecember 2002, --first such agreement ever signed byBangladesh in its history. China sold missiles, missileguided frigate in 1988 and later torpedo boats toenhance striking capability of Bangladesh Navy. Chinais building port in Chittagong by funding thetransformation of its coastline at an estimated cost of$8.7 billion.9

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China is the most important supplier of military aid andmaintains extensive strategic and military cooperation withMyanmar. Since 1989, China has supplied Myanmar with jetfighters, armoured vehicles and naval vessels and has trained itsarmy, air force and naval personnel. China has access to Burma'sports and naval installations providing it with strategicinfluence in the Bay of Bengal. China has developed a deep-waterport of Kyaukpyu (western Myanmar) in the Bay of Bengal. It hasalso built an 85-metre jetty, naval facilities and majorreconnaissance and electronic intelligence systems on the GreatCoco Island, located 40 km off the northern tip of the AndamanIslands, giving China capabilities to monitor India's militaryactivities, including missile tests at Wheeler Island off theOdisha coast on the Bay of Bengal.10 China has assisted inconstruction of a naval base in Sittwe (Akyab), a strategicallyimportant sea port of Myanmar just 542 km flight distance awayfrom port of Kolkata. China has funded the construction of China-Burma road to the ports of Yangon and Sittwe, providing theshortest route to the Indian Ocean from southern China.11

Sri Lanka's geographical location in the IndianOcean has prompted China to develop strategicrelationship with Colombo. China intends to use thepartnership with Sri Lanka to enhance its influenceover strategic sea lanes from Europe to East Asia andoil tanker routes from the Middle East to the MalaccaStraits. China has entered into the oil explorationbusiness in Sri Lanka, and has built bunker facilitiescreating an oil tank farm at Hambantota, Chinese insistis a purely commercial move.12 Or that it is beingcreated --as Sri Lanka claims-- to develop itsimpoverished southern region. China’s help is likely to

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boost Sri Lanka’s annual cargo handling capacity from 6million containers to some 23

million. Hambantota also will have factories producingcement and fertilizer for export. This makes Sri Lankawelcome the Chinese investment. Sri Lanka has alsoallocated a block in the Mannar Basin to China forpetroleum exploration.13 This provides presence to Chinajust a few kilometers from India's southern tip. Thesenew initiatives are aimed to augment its powerprojection in the Indian Ocean.

Marao is one of the largest of the 1192 coralislands grouped into atolls that comprise Maldives andlies 40 km south of Male, the capital. In May 2011, WuBangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of theNational People’s Congress visited Maldives. Thatunderscored the increasing importance of the Maldivesto China’s regional strategic calculations. Thoughthere is no evidence that suggests a Chinese militarypresence of any kind in Marao but the Atoll is regardedas a potential Chinese military base of operations.14

Two years back, Maldivian government had cancelled a$511 million contract to expand Male airport signedwith India’s GMR Infrastructure. The contract has nowbeen given to a Chinese firm and the agreement wassigned on September 15, 2014, as Chinese President XiJinping toured Maldives. It should be a matter of greatconcern for India.

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In Pakistan's western province of Balochistan, Gwadar islocated about 533 km from Karachi and 120 km from the Iranianborder and 380 km northeast of the nearest point in Oman acrossthe Arabian Sea. Gwadar Port is located at the mouth of thePersian Gulf, about 600 km outside the Strait of Hormuz, near thekey shipping routes in and out of the Persian Gulf. China isdeveloping the port as its military-commercial base.15 For bothPakistan and China, the Gwadar port offers a number of keybenefits. For the Pakistani government, the Gwadar port is seenas having the potential of hedging against a possible Indianblockade of the port of Karachi, which currently handles 90percent of Pakistani seaborne trade. For the Chinese, who havefunded much of the US$1.2 billion construction, Gwadar representsan important strategic foothold. China has set up electroniceavesdropping posts at Gwadar to monitor ship traffic through theStrait of Hormuz.

Chinese companies have also constructed a railwaylink between Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and PortSudan --country’s major port on the Red Sea. It hasinvested over $10 billion in infrastructure projects inthe country to take advantage of its substantial oilreserves. China has also financed to build a US$10billion port in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, which is expectedto be completed in 2017 to handle 20 million shippingcontainers annually.16 Some analysts suggest thatChinese Indian Ocean

bases are purely commercial because they would benearly indefensible in wartime. It is also argued thata large component of China’s efforts to establish portsand bases in the Indian Ocean is the result of a needto formalize logistics support agreements for Chinese

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naval forces conducting anti-piracy operations off ofthe Horn of Africa.

Chinese naval outreach in Indian Ocean

Chinese naval presence though not substantial or threateninghas increased into the Indian Ocean Region in the recent times.It is understood that China aims at building a stronger Navywhich is able to project power across the greater Asia-Pacificand the Indian Ocean region. China is focusing heavily on itsnavy, and building an increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet.With its 26 shipyards, it has emerged as the world's fourthlargest shipbuilder and its naval expansion is aimed at assuredaccess and control over its adjacent oceans, especially theIndian Ocean. This has given roots to China’s naval diplomacyfrom Suez down the east coast of Africa. China’s naval build upis not only because of its phenomenal economic growth andmilitary power but also because of its ambitious and determineddrive towards achieving global power status.17 The Chinese,however, argue that their initiatives towards the Indian Oceanare guided by both strategic and economic compulsions andcapabilities, as about 85 percent of its sea borne trade passesthrough the Indian Ocean.

Rise of China as a sea power is one of the biggestdevelopments after the end of Cold War. Dominance ofSouth China Sea and the East Sea makes China a greatregional power but its presence in the Indian Oceanmakes it a great naval power. Being a state fromoutside the region, it is difficult for China to deployits naval forces permanently in the Indian Ocean. Tomeet this difficulty it has made Pakistan, Myanmar andother countries in the Region its allies. By increasing

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its presence in the Indian Ocean, China can alsocontrol its supplies and threaten to disrupt supplies,if need be, to its economic rivals such as India,Japan, South Korea and Taiwan etc. To expand its pangsin the Region through naval presence, China has pumpedmassive economic aid and assistance to many littoralstates of the Indian Ocean.

Of late Chinese nuclear submarines have made “frequentforays into the Indian Ocean.” By doing so Chinesesubmarines probably also try to determine the IndianNavy’s ability to detect undersea objects. UnitedStates Naval Institute has warned that these operationsare going to pose

a sub-surface (undersea) challenge to India in future.These submarines are believed to be from the South SeaFleet based at Sanya on Hainan Island, off China’ssouthern coast. These forays can be seen in the contextof the proposal made by President Xi Jinping during hisvisit to Southeast Asia in October 2013, to create aMaritime Silk Route (MSR) to foster cooperation andgoodwill between China and the ASEAN countries.18 It wasfurther extended to the entire Indo-Pacific region asChina’s outreach subsequently expanded to Sri Lanka,India and even to Africa. Though its finer details arestill unclear, the Maritime Silk Route is said toinvolve the construction of ports, logistical stations,storage facilities, and free-trade zones. The rationalebehind it is the leveraging of Chinese soft power and

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its ‘legitimate interests’ in the Indian Ocean region.It was reflected recently when following the MH370incident in March 2014, China was the most activeparticipant in the rescue effort, with more than elevennaval and Coast Guard ships scouring vast tracts of theSouthern Indian Ocean.

To curb piracy in the Gulf of Aden, China has beendeploying its Task Forces since 26 December 2008 eachforce comprising at least three ships includingdestroyers, frigates and replenishment ships. TillDecember, 2013, the Chinese Task Forces had escorted5460 ships including 2765 foreign ships and 7 ships ofWorld Food Program in cooperation with the EuropeanUnion EU's counter piracy mission and Command MaritimeForce ‘Team CTF- 465’.19 These counter-piracy operationsare helping PLA Navy to familiarize with the unchartedwaters in the Indian Ocean which is gettingincreasingly important for China’s maritime trade.

China and seabed resources of Indian Ocean

In August 2011, the China Ocean Mineral Resources Researchand Development Association announced that the Country hasobtained approval to explore a 10,000 sq km poly-metallicsulphide ore deposit in an international seabed region of thesouthwest Indian Ocean. Subsequently, Chinese research vesselssurveyed poly-metallic deposits in the Indian Ocean and steppedup efforts to extract minerals from the seabed. It has deployedresearch vessel "Dayang-1" under China's State OceanicAdministration (SOA) which has discovered four hydrothermalanomaly areas. China has made successful attempts to explore for

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hydrothermal sulfide a seabed deposit containing copper, zinc andprecious metals such as gold and silver. Approval fromInternational Sea Bed Authority (ISA) in 2012 toexplore poly-metallic sulphide ore

deposit in the international seabed region of thesouthwest Indian Ocean ridge is an important Chineseinroad in the Indian Ocean.20 Apart from this China hasalso got exclusive rights for exploration of poly-metallic nodules over 75,000 sq km area in the eastPacific Ocean in 2001.

China’s trade and commerce with Indian Ocean region

Apart from the naval presence, China hassubstantially expanded its trade with the countries ofthe Indian Ocean. It is estimated that trade betweenChina and African countries, reached US$166.3 billionin 2011, an increase of 31 per cent compared with the2010. Exports from China to Africa were 73.1 billion(an increase of 22 per cent), and imports from Africawere 93.2 billion (an increase of 39 per cent).Similarly, China invested in 2013 more than US$40billion in Africa, where more than 2,000 Chinesecompanies are operating and providing countless jobopportunities to the local population.

Among the African littoral states of the IndianOcean, China is South Africa’s largest trading partner,making up over 14 percent of all imports (excludinggold) and almost 12 percent of all product exports.China’s trade with Mozambique was almost a billion

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dollars in 2011, which was a 37 per cent increase onthe 2010. Mozambique was China’s 23rd most importanttrade partner. Trade between China and Tanzania reachedover US$2.5 billion at the end of 2012 making China asTanzania’s single biggest trading partner accountingfor 15 percent of its trade. China is second largesttrade partner of Kenya with bilateral trade amountingto US$2.8 billion in 2013. China had good tradingrelations with Somalia that have suffered due tocontinuous violence in that country. In 2009, thevolume of trade between China and Djibouti reachedUS$197 million, an increase of 55 percent over the sameperiod of 2008. In 2002, the value of trade betweenChina and Eritrea came to US$ 6.029 million, of whichthe export from China was US$ 6.025 million. China isSudan's largest trading partner mainly due to its oilimports from Sudan. China’s bilateral trade with Egyptreached from US$4 billion in 2007 to 7 billion in 2010.In 2011 Egypt was the 5th largest trading partner ofChina in Africa and in the first 8 months of 2012 itwas the 4th.21

China’s is aware that its future depends on thecapacity of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)countries to provide a steady flow of oil for thecoming decades. Among the countries of ArabianPeninsula, China

considers Jordan as its gateway to Middle East and in2013, organized its 10th annual China Fair the “LargestChina Fair in the Near East.” The exhibition featuredover a thousand Chinese suppliers displaying 12,000made-in-China products for customers from across the

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Middle East. In June 2014 China organized China-ArabStates Cooperation Forum in Beijing and called upon itsArab counterparts to upgrade their strategicrelationships, by deepening bilateral cooperation inareas ranging from finance and energy to spacetechnology. China’s trade volume with Arab countrieshas been growing stronger for more than a decade. Tradehas increased from US$25.5 billion in 2004 to 238.9billion in 2013. China is now the Arab world's second-largest trading partner, and within ten years, thevolume of China-Arab trade is expected to reach US$600billion.22 China's "march west" into the Arab world is abold effort to translate its economic might intoenduring regional -- and, ultimately, global--influence.

Among the countries of South Asia on Indian Oceanlittoral, China’s trade with Pakistan has reached aboutUS$15 billion; with India it has crossed 49.5 billionand both have pledged to increase bilateral trade to100 billion dollars by 2015. Trade between China andSri Lanka reached US$3.6 billion in 2013 from US$1.1billion in 2006. China-Bangladesh trade reachedUS$6.778 billion in 2012-13. Bangladesh importedUS$6.32 billion of goods from China and exported goodsworth $458.12 million in that period. In Southeast AsiaChina had US$4.46 billion trade with Myanmar in 2013-2014 and was largest trading partner of Singapore andMalaysia in 2013 with bilateral trade of US$91.4billion and US$106 billion respectively. It is second

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largest trading partner of Indonesia with bilateraltrade standing at $66.2 billion in 2014, four timesthat of 2005. China’s trade with Australia reachedAUD$150.9 billion in 2013. China has free tradeagreements with Pakistan, Thailand and Singapore andits companies have heavily invested in almost all thecountries of the Indian Ocean Region. To develop closerelations with these countries, China has funded manywelfare projects including building parliament houses,super markets, school buildings, stadiums, railwaylines and other infrastructure in these countries.

China has been working for quite long to ensure it is notleft out of the regional equations in the Indian Ocean. Itintends to be a major player in the Indian Ocean, alongside Indiaand the US. There are deep worries in India over increasingChinese presence in the Indian Ocean, where India’sgeographical edge is being chipped away by billions ofdollars in

aid from China and big Chinese construction projects.China’s initiative expressed by its Prime Ministerduring his recent visit is creation of the maritimeSilk Road through a series of agreements that wouldlink China to Europe by sea. But if China heralds theSilk Road as a vision of international cooperation,many in India think it is a Trojan Horse to hideBeijing's expanding influence in the Indian Oceanregion.

Conclusion

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India needs to focus more on the littoral countriesof the Indian Ocean region by way of promoting tradeand commerce with these countries. India needs torealize that it not only has geographical advantage dueto its location centrality but also has huge benefit ofconnectivity with each one of the littoral statesthrough its Diasporas. This must be encashed throughcultural diplomacy. India needs to make special effortsto attract tourism, including religious tourism fromthese countries in a big way. India may not be able toinvest in these countries but can export affordableintermediate technologies for various infrastructureprojects, IT connectivity and by helping them processtheir resources. Indian companies governmental orprivate need to further increase their presence in thelittoral states. With fifth largest navy is fifthlargest in the world, India needs to flex its navalmuscle across the Indian Ocean by more port calls,offering training to the naval personnel from thesecountries and play a pro-active role in fight againstpiracy, protect SLOCS and frequently organize navalexercises with the navies of these countries. Indiamust broaden and sharpen its look east policy to ropein the countries of Southeast Asia. India needs tobuild economic alliances involving Japan, the UnitedStates and Australia to counter Chinese growingeconomic might in the region. India has strongchallenges ahead and needs to take a host of suchmeasures to checkmate China’s growing naval presence inthe Indian Ocean Region.

References:

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1. For details see, Wang, Gungwu (2003): The Nanhai Trade:Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea, Hong Kong,Marshall Cavendish International. ISBN 9789812102416

2.Ahmad, S. Maqbul, ed. and translators (1960): India and theneighbouring territories in the "Kitab nuzhat al-mushtaq fi'khtiraqal-'afaq" of al-Sharif al-Idrisi, Leiden, E.J. Brill; UbaydAllāh ibn ʻAbd Allāh Ibn Khurradādhbih et al (1989): ArabicClassical Account of India and China, Indian Institute ofAdvanced Study in association with R̥ddhi-India, Calcutta.

3. Deng, Gang (2005): Chinese Maritime Activities andSocioeconomic Development, c. 2100 BC-1900 AD, SantaBarbara,Greenwood Press. ISBN 0-313-29212-4; Dreyer, EdwardL. (2007): Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming,1405–1433, London, Longman. ISBN 0-321-08443-8.

4. See, Headrick, Daniel R (1981): The Tools of Empire, NewYork, OUP, pp. 17-42 & 83-95.

5. Saji Abraham, “Maritime Strategy and Indian Ocean”, April 9,2014, available at http://www.security-risks.com/security-trends-south-asia/indian-ocean/maritime-strategy-and-indian-ocean-2605.html; Robert D. Kaplan (2010): Monsoon: TheIndian Ocean and the Future of American Power, Random House,New York, 2010.

6. Allen, Franklin et al., "China's Financial system: Past,present and future", in Brandt, Loren (2008): Rawski, G.Thomas, China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press.

7. Harrison, Selig S and Subrahmanyam, K (1989): SuperpowerRivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and AmericanPerspectives, OUP; Rasul B. Rais (1987): The Indian Oceanand the Superpowers, New Delhi, Barnes & Noble Books-Imports, (Division of Rowman & Littlefield Pubs.).

8. Pehrson, Christopher J., “String of Pearls: Meeting theChallenge of China's Rising Power Across the AsianLittoral”, Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy, Washington,July 2006. Consulted on 20 October 2014; Eshel, David,"'String of Pearls' is Securing China's Sea Lanes." DefenseUpdate, 20 December 2010.

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9. Mukul Devichand , “Is Chittagong one of China's 'string ofpearls”, Indian Defense Forum; “China offers to developChittagong port”, The Hindu, March 15, 2010.

10. “India's lone missile test-firing range Wheeler Islandface sand erosion”, Times of India, May 11, 2013; “Indiatest-fires nuclear-capable strategic missile Agni-IV”, Timesof India, Sep 19, 2012.

11. Lixin Geng, “Sino-Myanmar Relations: Analysis andProspects”, The Culture Mandala, Vol. 7, no. 2, December2006; “Myanmar shows India the road to Southeast Asia”,Asuia Times, February 21, 2001.

12. Sirimane, Shirajiv, "Hambantota port, gateway toworld". Sunday Observer, 21 February, 2010; Namini Wijedasa,“China gets controlling stake at Hambantota port”, TheSunday Times, available at,http://www.sundaytimes.lk/141019/news/china-gets-controlling-stake-at-hambantota-port-123262.html

13. Srilatha, V, India-Sri Lanka maritimeCooperation in Indian Ocean –Prospects”, in, SiddaGoud, R and Mookherjee, Manisha ed. (2013): India-SriLanka Relations Strengthening SAARC, Hyderabad,Allied Publishers, pp. 102-122.

14. “China-India rivalry in the Maldives”, JakartaPost, 17 June, 2011.

15. Zafar Bhutta, “Gwadar Port: Pakistan, Chinaall set to develop master plan”, The ExpressTribune, February 15, 2014; "China ConfirmsTakeover of Pakistan's Gwadar Port", The Times ofIndia. September 4, 2012.

16. “With $11bn Bagamoyo port, Tanzania preparesto take on EA hub Mombasa”, The East African, May11, 2013, retrieved on 18.10.2014 from,http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Tanzania

17. See, Kliman Daniel M, “Is China the Fastest-Rising Power in History?, dated May 16, 2014,

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retrieved fromhttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles; DingdingChen, “China Is a Different Kind of Global Power”,available at, thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-is-a-different-kind-of-global-power/

18. Singh Abhijit, “China’s Maritime Silk Route: Implications for India”, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), posted on July 16, 2014, see at, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments; “China subs ‘pose worry’ for India”, The Tribune Chandigarh, 23.10.2014.

19. Zhou Bo, “Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Implications for PLA Navy”, posted on December 30, 2013. Available at www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security

20. Saibal Dasgupta, “China gets first-ever chanceto enter Indian Ocean for exploration”, Times ofIndia, August 2, 2011; “China speeds up IndianOcean exploration for minerals”, The EconomicTimes, February 26, 2014.

21. Collected from different sources from officialand non-official and media websites.

22. Minghao Zhao, “China’s Arab March”, ProjectSyndicate, The World’s opinion page, available at,http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/minghao-zhao-lauds-china-s-efforts-to-deepen-its-ties-to-arab-countries

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