China and Climate Politics

China and Climate Politics

To what extent can China’s position in international climate negotiations be

explained through classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism?

Research paper

Paul-Josse Zaman (10674667)

The Rise of China in International Relations

Word count: 4876

28/01/2015

1

Introduction

In an increasingly globalized world climate change

is becoming an ever-pressing matter. A 2007 report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states that

climate changes threatens to destabilize ecosystems,

weaken food security and precipitate severe water

shortages (IPCC, 2007). Because of this and the effects

of globalization, environmental issues have become

increasingly prominent on the international agenda over

the last fifty years. As environmental problems transcend

national boundaries, they come to be a feature of

international politics. This situation is rendered all

the more unsustainable by the rise of new pollutants,

like China and India (Vogler, 2011, p. 348).

China has experienced a remarkable period of

economic high growth over the last decades. Even though

this is generally seen as a good thing, the rapid

2

economic development also has its downside. In recent

years a serious degradation of the environment took place

in China (Wang, 2007). China is the biggest emitter of

carbon emissions in the world. Emissions transcend

national boundaries, which makes this a global problem.

However, China has been very reluctant to sign treaties

or make any form of concessions. Therefore I will analyze

the position of China in international climate politics

through various theoretical frameworks.

In order to explain the position of China two

theories are used: classical realism and neoliberal

institutionalism. The way I would like to conduct my

research has led to the following research question: To

what extent can China’s position in climate negotiations be explained through

classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism?

I will use the variable treaties to give my research

more focus. I will first map the climate treaties and

earlier compliances by China. I will focus on the Kyoto

protocol and the Copenhagen summit. Afterwards I will

analyze them through a realist and neoliberal

institutionalist perspective. However, before I can

3

answer my research question it must first be identified

what the effects are of the Chinese position to

international climate negotiations. Therefore a sub-

question needs to be answered first: What are the effects of the

Chinese position on climate negotiations? In this sub-question

there is an independent and a dependent variable. The

independent variable is the Chinese position in climate

negotiations, the dependent variable are the effects.

After answering this sub-question and examining the

variables I can proceed to answer my general research

question. The hypothesis to my research question is: the

current position of China in international climate

negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal

institutionalism than for classical realism.

In order to answer this question I have divided this

article in various sections. Firstly I will provide a

description of China’s position in the area of climate

politics. I will also look at the effects of china’s

position on international climate negotiations.

Afterwards I’ll examine the effects, and thirdly I will

give a brief description of the theoretical framework of

4

classical realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I will

apply these theories to climate treaties, in particular

to the Kyoto protocol and the Copenhagen protocol and the

effect of these treaties.

In this article I argue that the current position of

China in international climate negotiations is more of a

puzzle for neoliberal institutionalism than for classical

realism. This is because climate negotiations take the

form of a zero-sum game. Most countries will pursue

relative gains. The most important effect of China’s

position on international climate negotiations is that

they are hindering a solid agreement, but they do however

have the capacity to contribute in knowledge and

innovative factors. But let’s first move to an analysis

of China’s position in climate negotiations.

China’s position in international climate politics

The urgency of climate change has become

increasingly pressing over the last fifty years. Rising

5

temperatures, mountain floods, droughts and typhoons have

hit the land and are an ominous sign of climate change

(NDRC, 2013). New polluting actors in the environmental

sphere have led to the over-use of resources and

increased emissions of effluents and waste gases. China,

being the biggest emitter, has an annual average of 24%

of the world’s carbon emissions. Over 100.000 square

kilometers of China’s cultivated land is polluted and

they produce over 300 million tons of waste per year

(PBL, 2007). The second and third biggest emitters are

the United States and the European Union.

However, China’s willingness to agree a binding

carbon emissions treaty remains a critical question for

the international community, as China is extremely

reluctant to sign treaties. (Gong, 2011). According to a

White Paper by the National Development and Reform

Commission of China, the rise of carbon emissions is

inevitable and goes hand in hand with economic rise

(2013). China’s economic growth and industrial

development is indeed breathtakingly rapid which is

connected to persistent environmental degradation and

6

rising pollution (Gong, 2011). In fact, the only treaty

that the People’s Republic of China has ratified is the

Kyoto Protocol. However, under the Kyoto Protocol, China

was classified as a non-Annex I country, meaning that it

is still considered a developing nation. So, like the

other distinct non-Annex I countries, China was not

forced to cut emissions or set emissions caps on any

greenhouse gases. This was likely a vital factor in

signing the treaty for China. To recapitulate, the UN-

rights allow them to free ride without having to bind to

any agreement. I will elaborate more on the Kyoto

protocol in a later section of this paper.

So what is China’s position in the issue area of

climate politics? Even though China is at this point the

biggest emitter of carbon emissions, it is very reluctant

to cut back on emissions. The argument made by officials

of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is: “We are a

developing country. You polluted when you where

developing, we have the right to do the same”. China, and

other Less-Developed Countries, argue that the current

level of Greenhouse Gases are overwhelmingly due to

7

emissions made by now developed countries, and that

forcing the PRC to truncate their growth to pay for the

emissions of the first world is unfair. (Gong, 2011).

Moreover the PRC officials make the argument of the

per capita emissions. Because the People’s Republic of

China is a vast country with over 1.3 billion

inhabitants, the average per capita emission is lower

than that of other countries. Chinese officials state

that China is the world’s largest developing country with

a large population. This is also the reason China is

indexed as a non-Annex I country. Chinese officials are

keen to point out the difference in per capita emissions

between developed and developing countries. They often

mention the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change, which refers to assigning developed

countries the responsibility to take the lead in

combating climate change and the adverse effect thereof

(United Nations, 1992). Chinese officials even state

that, in former times, capitalist countries were

responsible and socialist or communist countries did not

contribute to the pollution of the earth (NDRC, 2013).

8

However, since the mid-2000s there has been a

growing public concern of domestic pollution and energy

security in China. The inhabitants of China have grown

more aware of climate change. Since 2012, China has

suffered from frequent extreme weather conditions,

mountain floods, landslides, typhoons and droughts (NDRC,

2013). These factors have led to a change in the mindset

of domestic political elite. The gap between the domestic

environment norm and the global environment norm has

shrunk in size over the last few years (Foot & Walter,

2013). That is why China is promoting green technologies

and is focusing on a low-carbon emission development more

and more. At the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC)

National Congress it was decided that is essential to

raise ecological awareness and focus on green, cyclical

and low carbon development (NDRC, 2013). After the CPC’s

national congress, China is more willing to commit itself

to binding climate arrangements, like the most recent

agreement between the United States and China, in which

China promised to reduce carbon oxide emission in 2030.

President Xi Jin Ping set the goal for emissions to fall

9

after 2030 (The Guardian, 2014). The goal for emissions

to fall after 2030 is however criticized. Professor Tao

Wang from the Tsinghua-Carnegie center for Global policy

argues that this target is not ambitious enough.

Stabilizing emissions only by 2030 means that the amount

of carbon emissions will raise until 2030, resulting in

enormous climate damage (The Guardian, 2014).

The effects of China’s position on international climate

negotiations

Now that a little more insight on China’s position

in international climate negotiations is acquired, I will

move to analyzing the effects of China’s position on

international climate negotiations. In this paragraph the

sub-question what are the effects of the Chinese position on climate

negotiations will be answered. I will analyze distinct

perspectives from distinct authors.

China has been part of international climate

negotiations as from the first summits in 1990. However,

according to historical research by Fuzuo Wu (2013) China

10

has, for a long period of time, consistently blocked

climate negotiations. China rejected to make any

commitments to binding emission cuts (Wu, 2013).

According to Wu, China took this position because they

think that developed countries should take the lead in

fighting climate change and provide help to developing

countries. Another argument is that, in order to address

climate change, all must obey the principal of common but

differentiated responsibilities: A general principle of

equity. However, China has shown a more compromising

stance over the last years. This was a very clever thing

to do, because of this China has maintained its unity

with the G-77, which in turn has facilitated China’s

bargaining power with developed countries (Wu, 2013).

China used this tactic of compromise and reservation very

effectively to extract concessions from developed

countries, in particular the United State. Concessions

like technological and financials assistance. However, Wu

finds it unlikely that China will accept any binding

emissions cut commitments in international climate change

negotiations in the short and medium terms. Nonetheless he

11

argues that ‘it is reasonable to conclude that China will

strongly influence the course of future international

climate change negotiations’ (Wu, 2013).

It is exactly because of this influence that I will

analyze the effects of China’s position on climate

negotiations. But even though China has indeed hindered

climate negotiations, there is also a potential for

contribution from China. Jost Wübbeke (Wübbeke, 2013)

argues that China is developing a specialized expert

knowledge on climate change. A tiny, but extremely

specialized research community of institutes and

universities has formed around Chinese policy-making

institutions. These climate experts are important actors

to the Chinese domestic process of policy making.

They can also provide in valuable knowledge for the

international climate community. Chinese leaders often

ask advice to these expert institutions and universities

and draw on their substantive conclusions (ibid.). The

Chinese expert community can influence policy making by

raising awareness of climate vulnerability with

scientific research and facts. They can contribute to

12

international climate negotiations by helping define

international emission targets. Even though the

community of influential experts is rather small, they

have proven to be of value to the Chinese officials. The

small expert community had a significant impact on

climate policy in China; The National Program on

Addressing Climate Change (NPACC) draws on the scientific

evidence by the research community. The flux lies now in

distributing the climate knowledge to the international

community.

Another positive effect of China’s position in

international climate negotiations might be the

contribution to an innovative policy. ‘Geo-engineering’

technologies could decrease some of the impacts of global

warming by reducing absorption of solar energy. Another

form of geo-engineering is by using other innovative

techniques to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere

(Edney & Symons , 2013). Chinese scientist and policy

makers are keenly aware of the potential benefits of geo-

engineering. However there are many risks and downsides

to geo-engineering. Edney& Symons (2013) researched the

13

matter of geo-engineering in China: ‘some western

scholars have expressed concern that China may already be

working on unilateral research. Although we cannot

discount this possibility, we have found no evidence

supporting this contention [.]. While there are reasons

to fear the possibility of future unilateral action by

China, it seems likely that international regulatory and

research efforts in which the Chinese state and Chinese

scientists are recruited as equal partners offer the best

path to fore- stall such undesirable outcomes’

So China might be in a very early stage of research,

one still should remain cautious for the effects.

Nonetheless, íf China decided to cooperate its research

might be beneficial to global search to finding a

solution for climate problems.

It is important to look at the way the interaction

works both ways between China and the involved parties in

international climate negotiations. Miriam Schroeder

investigated in what way the NGO cooperation can

influence the Chinese stance on climate change politics

(Schroeder, 2008). By using the constructivist ‘spiral

14

model’ to the field of environmental politics she

analyzed the roles and impacts of different actors in

several distinct phases of norm internalization and NGO

campaigns in China. Schroeder argues that NGO’s have an

influence on Chinese climate policies. But the matter of

norm internalization cannot be completely affirmed.

Schroeder states that the NGO’s should not be too

pressing in their methods, but that certain matters of

sharing information are more effective in changing

Chinese climate policies (ibid).

To recapitulate; the answer to the question what the

effects are of China’s position on climate negotiations

consists of multiple parts. Wübke and Edny&Symons (2013)

argue that China’s position might have some beneficial

effects on the negotiations. China has a specialized

knowledge community and is conducting research to geo-

engineering. Both types of knowledge might be beneficial,

but are in very preliminary stages. Furthermore China

still has a very reserved position in climate

negotiations, and refuses to bind to short term and

medium term commitments. With this reluctant position

15

China is hindering climate negotiations. However, China

has made some careful compromises in exchange for

concessions like technological and financial assistance.

Theoretical framework

This being said, it is essential to analyze China’s

position from several theoretical approaches. I will

first look into the issue area and China’s stance from a

classical realist and neo-liberal institutionalist

perspective. I will briefly elaborate on the theories and

then apply them to the issue area of climate treaties and

agreements.

Classical Realism

In the classical realist perspective the most

important actors are states. These states exist in a

system in which there is no governing actor that controls

them. Because of the lack of a governing actor, the

states will seek self-reliance and will aim to maximize

power and security (Mearsheimer, 2002). Power and

security are key words in classical realism. In the

classical realist school, cooperation is seen as

16

difficult, if not impossible. This is because of the

states’ endeavor for power and security. In international

cooperation the nations will go for their own gains, the

so-called relative gain (Levy, 2013). A relative gain is

when a decision will only contribute to the relevant

state, and none of the other involved parties. The

relative gain is related to the zero-sum game, which

states that if one party gains some, the other will lose

some. The school of realism can be, amongst others,

divided in classical realism and modern (neo) realism.

Essentially classical realism has a focus on the

political leaders and the way they act based on emotions

(Morgenthau, 1948). Neorealism has a more structural

perspective with a focus on structural state decisions.

But even though the focus of these sub-theories might be

different, the general idea is the same: sovereign states

act rational to increase security and power in an

anarchical state system (Levy, 2013; Morgenthau, 1966).

The foreign policy of states is focused on defending the

country’s interests and it’s people according to realism.

Another important matter is that classical realism sees

17

states as unequal. Some states are more powerful than

others, which creates a power hierarchy between large and

small states. An important aspect of the classical

realist state system is that countries will never be able

to trust each other fully. Every nation pursues its own

interests, which makes international agreements very

difficult.

Neoliberal institutionalism

Liberalism is a theory situated opposite of

classical realism. Unlike realism, liberalists believe

that actors can work together towards a mutual goal, the

harmony of interests. The general interest strokes with

the general idea of the other actors’ interests.

Cooperation is the way to go for liberalists;

international actors only reach their goals through

cooperation. Unlike realism, the liberalist perspective

is a positive-sum game. This means that there are

absolute gains where all actors can gain interest out of

an interaction. For this paper the liberalist theory

18

neoliberal institutionalism is used. Neoliberal

institutionalism focuses on values of order, liberty and

justice (Dunne, 2011). The institutions’ job is to

maintain and protect these values. Obviously,

institutions are key actors in neoliberal

institutionalism. Neoliberal institutionalism agrees to a

certain extent with realists that states are important

and that they will pursue only their own interests. But

they argue that pursuing your own interests does not have

to hinder cooperation (Keohane, 1984). Institutions and

norms facilitate international cooperation by converging

preference. I will use these institutional factors and

norms to analyze certain climate treaties.

Treaties

In this empirical section I will analyze certain

factors of earlier treaties and agreements made in

international climate negotiations. I will do this

through neoclassical realism and (neo) liberal

institutionalist’ perspectives. The treaties and summits

19

I will look at are mostly part of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

The first climate treaty I will analyze is the Kyoto

Protocol, dating from 1997. In this protocol, the developed

countries agreed on reducing the emissions of several

gases by average of 5.2% in comparison with 1990. However

the reduction percentages differed per country, depending

on economic capacity. Economically weaker countries had a

lower reduction percentage.

The Kyoto protocol included that the participating

countries could transfer their obligatory reduction to

measures in other countries abroad. Some measures to

reduce carbon emissions are cheaper to realize in other

countries. Moreover participating nations could sell or

buy emission rights of other countries. By doing this the

purchasing countries can avoid transgressing the rules

and their set reduction goals. The local forests in a

country also count as reduction (United Nations, 1992).

The treaty was ratified in 2002 by the European

Union. However the United States never ratified the Kyoto

20

protocol. The US senate claimed to be afraid for economic

damage to the American economy. The administration of

George W. Bush the 2nd therefore did not ratify the Kyoto

protocol.

Now that we took a general look at the Kyoto

protocol, I’d like to put a more in-depth analysis on

several aspects: the fact that the Kyoto protocol

concerns only developed countries, the selling of

emission rights, and the non-ratification of the United

States.

The fact that the Kyoto protocol only concerns

developed countries was mentioned earlier in this paper.

A distinction is made between Annex I and non-Annex I

countries. The idea is that the now developed countries

emitted a lot in earlier history when they where still

developing. Therefore the developed countries now have a

leading role in fighting climate change and the

developing countries still have the right to emit more.

This is the principle of common but differentiated.

21

This is a typical realist perspective. China argues

that it is still a developing country. It has the same

right to develop into a wealthy industrialized country as

Western countries did before. The way China sees it,

investing in ecology equals less economic growth. If the

economic growth decreases, so will China’s competitors

position. China will do anything in its power to avoid

making any concession concerning their growing economy

and they will pursue their economic growth. In doing so,

the Chinese aim for relative gains. As long as China does

not have to make concessions and can continue its

economic growth. In this situation we speak of a zero-sum

game.

If we look at this matter from a neoliberal

institutionalist it would not make sense to make a

distinction between developed countries and developing

countries. It is in all the countries best interest to

work together, developed or developing country. This is

because climate problems are not bound to one singular

country but transcend national boundaries. All the

countries should contribute their part, however the

22

amount of contribution can depend on the size and economy

of a country.

Secondly, there is the matter of trade in emission

rights. If we analyze this matter through realism we can

conclude that treaties are no guarantee for a better

climate. Countries will try and sell and buy emissions as

much as they can. Reasoned out of a classical realist

perspective, without global governance, each state

including China will pursue its own preferences.

From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective the

international climate agreements are a positive sum game,

with absolute gains for everyone. As opposed to classical

realism, in which all the countries would go for relative

gains thus creating a zero-sum game. In a neoliberal

perspective the trading in emissions can be beneficial,

but it should be regulated strictly. By uniting in

several institutions, either regional or international,

it becomes less costly and thus more plausible for

distinct countries to reach a mutual goal. The response

at the international level is to attempt to provide

global environmental governance. In a system of sovereign

23

states this involves international cooperation (Vogler,

2011, p. 349).

Thirdly, there is the United States, which refuted

to ratify the Kyoto protocol. The fact that the United

States refused to sign the treaty brings the negotiations

in a rather peculiar situation. The Bush-administration’s

main point for not signing the treaty was the fear of

damage to the American economy. But the second point was

that China was classified as a non-Annex 1 country and

that it did not have to contribute anything.

Again, here the aspect of an anarchic state system

comes up. As environmental problems transcend national

boundaries, they come to be a feature of international

politics, with as a result countries trying to free ride.

Because there is no governing entity to regulate rules on

the field of climate problems, these countries cannot be

forced to join or be punished if they don’t. Because the

Chinese didn’t have to do any concessions, the U.S.

feared it would lose economic ground to China and

therefore did not ratify the protocol.

24

However, the same boundary-transcending aspect that

makes an anarchical state system plausible also makes it

a collective action problem. In this case all countries

would benefit from the solving of climate problems, but

the associated cost makes it implausible that one state

can or will solve it all alone. A more plausible solution

is to handle it as a collective action of which the cost

is shared by multiple nations. The key to this is a

governing institution. The most obvious institution would

be the United Nations. The fact that all nations share

the same goal is often referred to (by neoliberalists) as

a harmony of interests. In this case the common goal of

all nations is the reduction of climate problems in order

to protect the well being of citizens. When countries

work together in harmony, the likelihood of achieving the

goal increases.

Now that we have examined the Kyoto protocol I will

take a brief look at the Copenhagen 2009 summit. The

Copenhagen summit was there to replace the outdated Kyoto

protocol. The Copenhagen treaty was ratified in 2012 and

it contains concrete targets to reduce emissions and

25

reduce global warming before 2020. Also the deforestation

of the planet was a topic. Furthermore financing

developing countries in their struggle with the effects

of climate change was talked about.

However, the climate conference of Copenhagen is

often referred to as a missed opportunity. This is

because of none of the original goals were met. Only

partial accords where reached and no concrete goals where

set for 2020. Only the Green Climate Fund was set up en

the world temperature could not rise more than 2 degrees.

However there was no baseline for this target, nor

commitments for reduced emissions that would be necessary

to achieve the target. These goals are far less ambitious

than originally intended. The original goal was to limit

temperature rises to 1.5 Celsius and have all emission

reduced by 80% in 2050. None of these was met.

But why did these climate negotiations fail? It is

said that the Chinese are to blame for the failed

Copenhagen summit. Mark Lynas, a Guardian reporter who

was actually there in the room during the summit, says

China’s strategy was to block the open negotiations for

26

two weeks, and then ensure that the closed-door deal made

it appear as if the West had failed the World’s poor once

again (Lynas, 2009). A significant amount of aid

agencies, civil society movements and environmental

groups also blamed the U.S. and the West. It was China

who insisted that the industrialized country targets,

previously agreed as an 80% cut, be taken out of the

deal. For the record, China is not considered an

industrial country. They where consciously blocking the

negotiations, knowing that the West would take the blame.

It also speaks for itself that China has not shown much

compliance with earlier made agreements (Lynas, 2009).

Lynas argues: “A 2020 peaking year in global

emissions, essential to restrain temperatures to 2C, was

removed and replaced by woolly language suggesting that

emissions should peak "as soon as possible". The long-

term target, of global 50% cuts by 2050, was also

excised. No one else, perhaps with the exceptions of

India and Saudi Arabia, wanted this to happen. I am

certain that had the Chinese not been in the room, we

would have left Copenhagen with a deal that had

27

environmentalists popping champagne corks in every corner

of the world. (Lynas, 2009)”

China was in an extremely strong negotiating

opposition; it did not need the deal. President Obama

representing the United States did need the deal however,

he was under strong political pressure by the senate to

demonstrate that he could deliver China in any global

climate regulation framework, so conservative senators

could not argue that US carbon cuts would further

advantage Chinese industry (Lynas, 2009).

So why did China take this position? An analyst

concluded that China want to weaken the climate

regulation regime now, in order to avoid the risk that it

might be called on to me more ambitious in a few years’

time (ibid).

Let’s analyze the position of China taken in the

Copenhagen 2009 summit through the glasses of a classical

realist. China had deliberately blocked the negotiations

to pursue it’s own relative gains. China’s growth and

global political and economic dominance is based largely

28

on cheap coal. If it had to make any concessions here,

the economy of China would have been damaged. Therefore

China’s position is very easily explained by a classical

realist; it is a zero-sum game and China wants to protect

it’s own interests no matter what.

The position taken by China is a puzzle to

neoliberal institutionalist. Any cooperation amongst

countries would, on the long-term, always lead to more

benefits. The next summit is in Paris, in 2015. Let’s

hope more solid agreements can be agreed on here.

Conclusion

In this paper I have analyzed the position of China in

international climate negotiations, looked at the effect

of China’s position, and I have examined climate treaties

through a theoretical framework.

It became clear that China’s position in international

climate negotiations is reserved and that China is

reluctant to bind to short and medium term commitments.

The effects of China’s position on international climate

29

negotiation are that, even though China might contribute

to knowledge and innovative climate factors, China is

hindering climate negotiations.

I examined the treaties of Kyoto (1997) and Copenhagen

(2009) through classical realism and neoliberal

institutionalism. It became clear that most countries act

upon their own interests and pursue relative gains. This

makes the international climate negotiations a zero-sum

game. Full cooperation is limited, and international

institutions do not have binding power, which makes it

more difficult for neoliberal institutionalists to

explain the framework of international climate

negotiations. My research question was: To what extent can

China’s position in international climate negotiations be explained through classical

realism and neoliberal institutionalism? The answer to this is that the

current position of China in international climate

negotiations is more of a puzzle for neoliberal

institutionalism than for classical realism. This was

also my hypothesis, which is hereby confirmed.

The future of climate negotiations depends a great deal

on the position of China. The next climate summit is in

30

Paris in 2015. It depends very much on the willingness of

China to what extent this summit is successful and which

agreements can be made. For now it seems China will

pursue it’s own relative gains in a zero-sum game.

Bibliography

Baylis, J., Smith, S., & Owens, P. (2011). The Globalization of World

Politics (Vol. Environmental Issues). (J. Vogler, Red.) New York:

Oxford University Press

Dunne, T. (2011). Liberalism. In J. Baylis, S. Smith, & P. Owens, The globalization of World Politics (pp. 102-111). New York: Oxford University Press.

Edney, K., & Symons , J. (2013, July 2). China and the blunt temptations of geo-engineering: the role of solar radiation management in China's strategic response to climate change . The Pacific Review , 27 (3), pp. 1-10.

Foot, R., & Walter, A. (2013). Global norms and major state behaviour: The case of China and the United States. European Journal of International Relations , 19 (2), 329-352.

Gong, G. J. (2011). What China wants: China's climate change piorities in a post-Copenhagen world. Global Change, Peace & Security ,23 (2), 159-175.

IPCC. (2007). FOurth Assesment Report: Synthesis Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change . Geneva: United Nations.

31

Levy, J. S. (2013). Interstate War and Peace. In W. Carlsnaes,T. Risse, & B. Simmons, Handbook of International Relations (pp. 581-601). London: Sage publications Ltd.

Lynas, M. (2009, December 22). How do I know China wrecked theCopenhagen deal? I was in the room. The Guardian .

Martin, L. L. (2013). International Organizations and Institutions. In W. Carlsnaes, B. Simmons, & T. Risse, Handbookof International Relations (p. 327). London: Sage.

Mattoo, A., Subramanian, A., Van der Mensbrughe, D., & He , J.(2009). Reconciling Climate Change and Trade Policy. Working paper 189. Center for Global Development.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2002). Realism, the Real World and the Academy. In M. Brecher, & F. Harvey, Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies (pp. 23-33). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Newel, P. (sd). Climate Change. An introduction to International Relations

, 476-458.

NDRC. (2013). China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change. TheNational Development and Reform Commission. Beijing: The People's Republic of China.

PBL Netherlands environmental Assesment Agency . (2007). China now no. 1 in CO2 emissions; USA in second position. Retrieved 2015, from Press Release 2007: http://www.pbl.nl/en/news/pressreleases/2007/20070619Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition

Schroeder, M. (2008, December). The construction of China's climate politics: transnational NGOs and the spiral model of international relations . Cambridge Review of International Affairs , 21 (4), pp. 506-525.

The Guardian. (2014, November 12). US and China strike deal oncarbon cuts in push for global climate change pact. The Guardian

32

.

United Nations. (1992). United Nations Frameworkd Convention on Climate Change. United Nations. Rio de Janeiro: United Nations.

Vogler, J. (2011). Environmental issues. In S. S. John Baylis,The globalization of world politics (pp. 348-360). New York: Oxford University Press.

Wübbeke, J. (2013, March 2013). China’s Climate Change Expert Community—principles, mechanisms and influence . Journal of Contemporary China , pp. 2-10.

Wang, H. (2007). China's Changing Approach to Sustainable Development. Society for International Development , 50 (3), 36-43.

Williamson, J. (1989). What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Institute for International Economics. Washington: Washington.

Wong, J., & Chan, S. (2003). China-ASEAN Free trade Agreement. Asian Survey. Rsearch Library Core .

Wu, F. (2013, July). China’s Pragmatic Tactics in International Climate Change Negotiations: Reserving Principles with Compromise . Asian Survey , Vol. 53 (4).

33