CHIGBO ANAYO CLEMENT - University of Nigeria, Nsukka€¦ · CHIGBO, ANAYO CLEMENT PG/M.SC/14/69703 A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL ... Northern Feudalism Voters’ Mobilization,

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CHIGBO, ANAYO CLEMENT

PG/M.SC/14/69703

NORTHERN FEULDALISM AND VOTERS MOBILIZATION IN

THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Godwin Valentine

Digitally Signed by: Content manager’s Name

DN : CN = Webmaster’s name

O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka

OU = Innovation Centre

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NORTHERN FEULDALISM AND VOTERS MOBILIZATION IN

THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

BY

CHIGBO, ANAYO CLEMENT

PG/M.SC/14/69703

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF

MASTER’S DEGREE (M.SC) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF

NIGERIA, NSUKKA.

SUPERVISOR: PROF. OBASI IGWE

MARCH, 2016.

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TITLE PAGE

NORTHERN FEUDALISM AND VOTERS MOBILIZATION

IN THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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APPROVAL PAGE

This project has been approved for the Department of Political Science, University

of Nigeria, Nsukka.

__________________________ _______________________

PROF. OBASI IGWE PROF. OBASI IGWE

SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

Date: ______________________ Date: _________________

________________________ ________________________

DEAN OF THE FACULTY EXTERNAL EXAMINER

Date: ___________________ Date: ____________________

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my mother Ezinne Chigbo Caroline Nwanyibuaku

(Utaligwe) and my lovely wife Lolo Obika – Chigbo Chinenye (Ononakpeze).

And to my God given Angels;

Adaeze Ifunanya (Mamah),

Odibeze Ifeadigo (Pokom) and

Nkemdilim Odinchezo (Nukwu Nwanyi).

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

All praises to the Almighty God who made this scholarly treatise a success. I thank

in a special way Prof. Obasi Igwe for his fatherly guide during the supervision of this

work. I thank immensely the scholars whose work I consulted in the course of writing this.

In a special way, I thank all my lecturers Prof. Okolie, Prof. Ifesinachi, Dr. Ben

Nwosu, Dr. Ike, Dr. Agbo and other academic staff of the department who in one way or

the other contributed to my success like Dr. Adibe, Dr. Onah, Dr. Ugwueze.

My heartfelt gratitude goes to my course mates especially the closets ones like

Nathaniel Wisdomm Onuma Paul, and Ayi for their support and encouragement.

I am indebted to my mother Mrs. Caroline Chigbo, Mrs. Ngozika Chigbo-

Emetuche, Mrs. Oby Uzobuike, Mrs. Ekeagwu, Mr. Ugbede Noah, Barr. Amaka and a

host of others for their financial and moral support. My bosom friends Dr. Isaac (JUPEB),

Engr. Meche, Kato, Mallam John, God’s Time and many others whose names I cannot

mention here because of space, I say thank you. I thank Barr. Ugwulor in a special way

for all his efforts at transforming my life. Prof. Ben Okpukpara thank you for helping me

stay on. I cannot conclude this without mentioning the name of a dear friend, the one who

is like me - Omemuko Sunday Ogbonna (Oga Sunny). You are a great man. Ugwu

Chidera thank you immensely for typesetting this work. To my colleagues, friends, well

wishers and all others, I say thank you very much, thank you very much and thank you

very much indeed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE - - - - - - - - i

APPROVAL PAGE - - - - - - - - ii

DEDICATION - - - - - - - - iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT - - - - - - - iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - - - - - - - v

ABSTRACT - - - - - - - - - vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION - - - - - 1

1.1 Background of the study - - - - - - 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem - - - - - - 7

1.3 Objectives of the study - - - - - - 10

1.4 Significance of the study - - - - - - 10

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW - - - - 11

2.1 Gap in Literature - - - - - - - 42

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY - - - - - 43

3.1 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - 43

3.2 Hypothesis - - - - - - - - 49

3.3 Research Design - - - - - - - 50

3.4 Methods of Data Collection - - - - - - 51

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3.5 Methods of Data Analysis - - - - - - 51

3.6 Logical Data Framework - - - - - - 53

CHAPTER FOUR: FEUDAL CHARACER OF NORTH AND VOTER’S

MOBILIZATION IN THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION- - 56

4.1 The People of Northern Nigeria and the 1804 Legacy - - 56

4.2 Religion and Identity Politics - - - - - - 62

4.3 North-South Divide, Violence and Terrorism - - - 71

CHAPTER FIVE: MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC FORCES IN THE 2015

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION - - - - - - 79

5.1 Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (From Pre-Independence till Date) - 79

5.2 Ethnicity and Voting Behaviour in Nigeria - - - 89

5.3 Nigerian Presidential Election Result - - - - 90

5.4 The 2007 Election Result. Find online - - - - 94

5.5 2011 Nigerian Presidential Elections Result - - - - 99

CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 107

6.1 Summary - - - - - - - 107

6.2 Conclusion - - - - - - - 108

6.3 Recommendations - - - - - - 109

Bibliography - - - - - - - - 112

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ABSTRACT

The study was designed to investigate the attributes of Northern Feudalism in relation to

the mobilization of voters’ in the just conclude 2015 presidential election. In this study, an

application of the theory of Marxian political economy relating to a society at the feudal

stage of development reveals the kind of relationship that exist between the Northern

leaders and the masses. Also, the dependency theory as applied explains what the scenario

is like in the north especially between the leaders who have it all and the masses who seek

after better life and the abidance to religious doctrine (s). Lastly, the theory of ethnic

mobilization as espoused by Peter Veermesch (2011) explains why in their state the voters

in northern Nigeria are easily mobilized by the whipping-up of ethno-regional and

sometimes religions sentiments for the so called good of the region. The work applied a

historical design technique which helped in the tracing of the origin of northern feudalism

from the Usman dan Fodio legacy of 1804. It was found that the structuring of the north

into several emirates with supervisory powers in Gwandu and especially Sokoto paints a

clear picture of feudalism. The oligarchy this has established and its ability to mobilize

voters during elections is remarkable. In view of this, the work sought to answer whether

the feudal character of the north is responsible for the effective mobilization of voters in

the 2015 presidential elections and the role of ethnicity in this mobilization. Bearing this

in mind, the research adjudged the hypotheses positive. Hence, there is need for power-

sharing formulae to be adopted to moderate the possible exclusiveness and lopsidedness of

unfettered democracy and a need for political statesmanship capable of dousing tensions

generated from ethno-regional diversities, thereby developing a political community

where equality and justice prevail.

Keyboard: Northern Feudalism Voters’ Mobilization, 2015 Election, Ethnic

Mobilization, Nigeria.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

The history of elections in Nigeria generally has afforded us the golden

opportunity to assess the divergent roles of the electorates, those standing to be elected

and those who sponsor candidates in the Nigerian political process within the framework

of our national political goal. The issues and questions of education, information,

mobilization and monitoring according to Aghamelu (2013) has become a very crucial

factor in the realization of the national objectives in the context of the electoral process.

Stressing the need to achieve political progress Agba (2007) pointed out that the

attainment of democratic governance in a society is contingent on the psychological

readiness and positive mental state of the citizens.

Considering Nigeria’s politico-economic position in Africa it is obvious that the

success or failure of democracy, rule of law, ethnic and religious reconciliation will be a

bellwether for the entire continent. With a population of more than 177 million evenly

divided between Muslims and Christians, Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy and most

populous country. For this reason and many more, how she conducts her election, how

power is taken or given in the country will surely attract the interest of all and sundry.

Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, transitional elections in 2003, 2007, and

2011 were won and lost under conditions in which electoral malpractice, rigging and

violence pronounced (George-Genyi, 2015) a phenomenon described by Dauda as “The

Slippery site of landside” (Dauda, 2007. p. 102).

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All these go to show the level of peoples’ consciousness and knowledge of the

political power play in the country. The activities of power brokers are not unknown to the

people of Nigeria but committedly they go about discharging their civic responsibilities in

terms of elections and voting which are indispensable aspects of political engagement.

“The most common form of political participation is exercising the right to vote in

elections” (Flanigan and Zingale 1998, p6). Election itself being a basic component of a

liberal democratic political system. This assertion is underscored by the fact that

democratic representation is built on elections. It is in concert with this assertion that

Flannigan and Zingale, further conceptualized election as the formal mechanism by which

citizens maintain or alter the existing political leadership.

For these scholars therefore, two observations are necessary. First, periodic and

competitive elections give ordinary citizens the power to offer continued support, or

rejection of their elected leaders. Election therefore, provides the electorate with the

opportunity to evaluate or make an assessment of leaders’ political performance and to

consequently pass their verdict. Secondly, elections and democratic representation are

irrevocably lubricated with, and as a matter of fact, operate within the context of

prevailing political values and beliefs that constitute the society’s political culture (George

– Genyi 2015, p5).

In a paraphrase of Gwimn and Norton, Oddih (2007) describes election as the

formal process of selection of persons for public office or accepting or registering a

political proposition by voting. He states that election serves as a means by which a

society may organize itself and make specified formal decisions, adding that where voting

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is free, it acts simultaneously as a the power relation in a society and as a method for

seeking political obedience with a minimum of sacrifice of the individual freedoms.

Voting on its part is one of the most commonly used terms in contemporary

democratic politics concerning leadership recruitment? Zahida and Younis (2014) see

voting as a function of electing representatives by casting votes in a election, in addition to

the fact that citizens use voting as a means of expressing their approval or disapproval of

government decisions, policies and programmes. The policies and programmes of various

political parties and quality of candidates who are engaged in the struggle to get the status

of being representatives of the people.

Rose and Massaavir (2014) on their part have provided a conceptualization of

voting that is broad encompassing in nature. For them, voting covers as many as six

cardinal functions:

a. It involves individuals’ choice of governors or major governmental policies.

b. It permits individuals in a reciprocal and continuing exchange of influence with the

office-holders and candidates.

c. It contributes to the development or maintenance of an individual’s allegiance to the

existing constitutional regime.

d. It contributes to the development or maintenance of voters disaffection from the

existing constitutional regime; and,

e. It has emotional significance for the individuals; and for some individuals it maybe

functionless that is devoid of any significant personal emotional or political

consequences. Voting therefore give rise to the related issue of voting behaviour.

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Scholars studying political behaviour have identified a plethora of ways in which

political participation is important in a democratic polity (Verba and Nie 1972, Sehgson

1980; Powell 1992; Flanigan and Zingale 1997; Nwankwo 2002: Dahl and Stinebrickner

2005). Powell for instance, recognizes that participation by citizens in competitive

elections is a distinctive feature of democratic politics, noting that substantial citizens’

involvement in meaningful elections both reflect and encourage a sense of democratic

legitimacy that will help to contain violence and encourage regular competition. This

usually starts with electioneering campaign and generally, political campaigns are an

organized effort which seek to influence the decision making process within a specific

group or environment. This is because it provides that mobilization of forces either by an

organization or individuals to influence others in order to effect an identified and desired

political change. The import of this is that it shows people and particularly candidates

ability to sensitize the political community in relation to making the community consider

them as potentials and better representatives of the people (Lynn, 2009).

Having seen the theoretical provisions of some terminologies that are associated

with political behaviour like election, voting, campaign let us now take a look at the 2015

election in Nigeria. According to George-Genyi (2015) the 2015 General Election in

Nigeria which held on March 28th (for Presidential and National Assembly) and on April

14th (for the governorship and State Houses of Assembly) represent a renaissance in the

democratic and electoral travelogue of the country. In sharp contrast to the electoral

practice of machine politics (Ibeanu, 2007) experienced in previous elections in which the

ruling party had always won ‘land slide victories’ under perfidious and obnoxious

circumstances to perpetuate itself in the corridors of power, this time around, there was a

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radical departure. In the new experience, the electoral firmament underwent a profound

pleasant metamorphosis as the nation witnessed the occurrence of something unusual in

the political playing field with the opposition party gallantly clinching a decisive victory,

or to put it bluntly, resoundingly defeated the ruling party to formally bring to an end its

sixteen years of stay in power.

Indeed, for the first time, transition election made it possible for power to change

hands at the federal level from the People Democratic Party (PDP) to All Progressive

Congress (APC) with the defeat of the incumbent, Goodluck Jonathan, by Gen.

Muhammadu Buhari (rtd). The APC presidential candidate scored a total of 15, 424, 921

votes to beat the PDP presidential candidate who scored, 12, 853, 162 votes. The APC

won for the first time, majority seats in both chambers of the National Assembly – Senate

and House of Representatives to eclipse the PDP’s sixteen years dominance. The APC

also won the Governorship election in sixteen states of the Federation, more than PDP’s

13 states. In a display of statesmanship, the incumbent conceded defeat and congratulated

the President – Elect (Jonathan 2015; Soyinka 2015). This helped to douse the political

anxiety that had gripped the nation before and during the elections thereby bringing to

futility, the “hypothesis of political Armageddon” regarding the impending political

instability and breakup of the country in 2015, with the elections serving as a primary

catalyst.

A survey of the activities of northern feudalism or feudal lords which in this

context is a discussion of the political class of Northern Nigeria – the aristocracy that

controls affairs in the North is the primary concern of this work. Going down memory

lane we have to appreciate that what we truly call Nigeria, is a product of the

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amalgamation by Lord Lugard in 1914. This was a forceful bringing together of peoples of

various cultures and traditions and in some cases irreconcilable cultures. So far Nigeria

has made it to this point through the era of regionalism (Northern, Western and Eastern)

and later (Northern, Western, Easter and Mid-Western) to the present period of thirty six

(36) states and a federal capital territory.

What inspired, the writing of this work is that in spite of the shorter duration of

regional practice (1946-1967) and a change of regional practice to the creation of states

since 1967 till date, the Northern part of Nigeria still share some common political

affinity and actually make use of such whenever the time arises. This was exemplified in

the just concluded 2015 presidential election. To some extent, the pre-colonial and

colonial periods in the history of northern Nigeria is answerable to this.

We must also appreciate that the Northern Nigeria is an ethnically, and religiously

diverse region with the Hausa, Fula and Birom peoples dominating much of the North-

Western and Central parts of the region. The Legacy of 1804 Sokoto Jihad led by Sheik

Usman Dan Fodio united the Hausa states into the Sokoto Caliphate. During the colonial

era, the Royal Niger company’s territory did not represent a direct threat to much of the

Sokoto Caliphate or the numerous states of Northern Nigeria under her control. This

changed when Frederick Lugard and Tanbman Goldie laid down an ambitious plan to

pacify the Niger interior and unite it with the rest of the British Empire (Dudley, 1968).

The protectorate of Northern Nigeria was proclaimed at Ida by Frederick Lugard

on January 1, 1897. The then Governor, Frederick Lugard, with limited resources, ruled

with the consent of local rulers through a policy of indirect rule which he developed into a

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sophisticated political theory. It is important to point out here that indirect rule worked

more effectively in the North than in any other part of Nigeria and that unlike the radically

different Southern protectorate, Northern Nigeria was granted internal independence on

the 15th of March 1957 with Sir Ahamdu Bello as its first Premier.

Development in the broader Nigerian society during the colonial period tended to give

security to the ruling elite of Northern Nigeria. Not only were they protected by the

British, but the British also convinced them that they were of a superior race, with a more

advanced civilization than that of Southern Nigeria. This view was clearly expressed by

Flora Lugard (Lugard, Flora, 1929. Quoted in “Great Britain and France in Northern

Africa”, The Round Table Volume 19, No. 76). In addition, the alliance established by the

British colonial masters with the aristocracy in the North involved the protection of the

traditional Islamic institution of the Northern societies (Dudley, 1968). This is the

genealogy of the approval for the dominance of religion in the politics of Northern

Nigeria. And as Fox and Sandler (2003, pp. 567-568) pointed out that religion represents a

strong social force in the politics of the state given its capacity for effective political

mobilization.

1.2 Statement of Problem

Voting and election are various features of modern democratic society. To

appreciate the connection between voting and election, eligible voters must be enlightened

and sensitized about their rights and obligations, the modus aperandi of the electoral

process, the informed and non-prejudicial choices they make during election, amongst

others. In the words of Prof. Sam Egwu, one assumption that will be tested in the 2015

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general elections is that given the regional undertones of political mobilization and the

power of incumbency, both PDP and APC will significantly share northern votes with the

later having a little edge.

Discussing the 2011 election and the political violence that ensued after it,

Hakeeem Onapajo, (2012: 58) pointed out that in an already charged atmosphere

following bombings and political intrigues, the April 16, 2011 presidential election was

staged with Jonathan of PDP and General Buhari of CPC as the major contenders of the

highest office in the country. When the news was filtering in via a live broadcast of the

elections that Jonathan was already maintaining a clear lead in the South, the Muslim

supporters of Buhari in the North, who had earlier complained of massive rigging in the

elections, went on rampage. Defying the earlier sermon in several mosques in their

enclave against bloodshed and unlawful destruction of property. The protesting youths

visited their anger on the INEC staff, members of PDP, Christians and the Northern elites

mostly of the PDP whom they perceived to have conspired with the ruling party to

perpetuate fraud in the elections.

By the time the final results would be announced, which clearly suggested that

Jonathan had overwhelmingly won in 23 states, the violent protest that started in Kaduna

had spread speedily to other parts of the North. In what seems unprecedented in the

history of revolts in the 1North, the traditional rulers who hitherto enjoyed absolute loyalty

from the people were one of the major victims of the crisis (Weekly trust outline, 23 April,

2011. Tell, 27 April 2011; Daily Sun, April, 27: The News, 2 May, 2011).

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To validate Chiluwa’s (2011:87-88) report in his “Discursive Pragmatics and

Social Interaction in Politics” that there was something explicit about the Northern

leaders’ action in favour of Jonathan’s 2011 presidential ambition, at least to an outsider to

the Nigerian politics. But to an insider, the approval of the Northern political class has a

huge implication to the Nigerian politics. One of his reports (P21) reads; Jonathan is said

to receive ‘a green light’ to run for 2011 general elections. To the average Nigerian, this

approval by the Northern leaders, implies that Jonathan has won the election even before

the official general elections.

Ifukor (2008 cited in Chiluwa, 2011) noted that the heated debate about zoning the

presidency (in order to rotate the office of the president, means that candidates are not

necessarily elected by the people on merit) has generated a lot of controversy. According

to him, Northern political class has dominated the presidency for a long time and would

vacate the presidential seat only on condition that they rule by proxy, while the president

(from the South) becomes a stooge. It is with this understanding that Jonathan was perhaps

given approval. Again, this implies that political offices in Nigeria are largely manipulated

fraudulently. Election winners are in actual fact ‘selected’ by the political class.

This informs the research questions for this study which are stated viz;

- Is the feudal character of the North responsible for their ability to mobilize voters in

the 2015 presidential election?

- Is the mobilization of ethnic forces helpful to the capture of state power by the North

in the 2015 Presidential election?

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1.3 Objectives of the study

This work has both broad and specific objectives. Broadly, it is aimed at making

an enquiry into the influence of Northern feudalism and voters mobilization in the 2015

Presidential elections in Nigeria. And specifically the work hopes seek out;

a. To find out if the feudal character of the North was answerable to their ability to

mobilize voters in the 2015 presidential election.

b. To find out as well whether the mobilization of ethnic forces helped to ensure the

capture of state power by the North in the 2015 presidential election.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The theoretical significance of this work is that it will add to the existing literature

in its area of research and serve as a veritable tool for researchers, in the future.

The practical significance of this work is also not farfetched as it will help to make

readers especially Nigerians to know or understand what leadership attributes Northern

political elites and statesmen posses that is lacking in political leaders from other parts of

the country.

The research work will equally throw open the influence the Northern political

oligarchy have over the minority groups in the North which on the other hand will account

for the successful manner with which Northerners influence Southern minorities.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Northern Feudalism

The Marrian Webster Dictionary of English language put the definition of

feudalism as the system of political organization prevailing in Europe from the 9th to about

the 15th centuries having as its basis the relation of lord to vassal with all land held in fee

and as chief characteristics homage, the service of tenants under arms and court, warship

and forfeiture”. Feudalism is a term that was invented in the sixteenth century by royal

lawyers. Primarily in England – to describe the decentralized and complex social, political

and economic society out of which the modern state was emerging.

In every day speech, “feudal” can mean “aristocratic”. A form of socio-political

organization dominated by a military class or estate, who are connected to each other by

ties of lordship and honourable subordination (vassalage) and who in turn dominate a

subject peasantry. The classic Francois – Louis Ganshof described feudalism as a set of

reciprocal legal and military obligations among the warrior nobility revolving around the

three key concepts of lords, vassals and fiefs. A lord was in broad terms noble who held

land, a vassal was a person who was granted possession of the land by the lord, and the

land was known as a fief. In exchange for the use of the fief and the protection of the lord,

the vassal would provide some sort of service to the lord.

Historically, in the 18th century, Adam Smith, seeking to describe economic

systems, effectively coined the forms “feudal government” and “feudal system” in his

book wealth of Nations (1776). According to Richard Abels, Adam Smith used the term

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“feudal system” to describe a social and economic system defined by inherited social

ranks, each of which possessed inherent social and economic privileges and obligations. In

such a system, wealth derived from agriculture, which was arranged not according to

market forces but on the basis of customary services owed by serfs to land owning nobles.

In the views of Igwe (2005) the basis of wealth and power under the feudal system

was essentially land, granted by the king to his supporters among the feudal lords, who

rented them to the vassals in exchange for military and other services. The feudal system

according to him was a complex exploitative division of labour in which the big absolute

monarch of the large kingdom or hereditary prince of the small principality theoretically

owned all the land, the feudal nobility or lords possessed it, each granted a fief or territory

according to the king’s estimate of his importance. The renowned scholar went further to

point out that though feudal system systematically manifested itself more in Europe, some

variants of it appeared in many places like Africa and elsewhere, with religion always

handy as a legitimizing instrument.

There is no better way of understanding feudalism especially as it is practiced in

Northern Nigeria than the work of Prof. Ikenna Nzimiro – feudalism in Nigeria, where he

gave a description of feudalism in Nigeria and went as far as tracing the origin. According

to him the history of feudalism in Nigeria can be divided into four periods, with distinctive

characteristics: (1) the period which might be termed the distant past, relating, to the myth

of the founder of the kingdom who settled at a particular place; (2) a period of

disturbances when the founder and his people began a series of conquests, characterized

by migration following wars, and the absorption of the conquered people; (3) the period of

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consolidation and (4) the period of expansion into distant lands in order to enlarge the

empire.

The modern history of these feudal societies began with the period of European

conquest and colonialism. The entire kingdom was disrupted in the attempt to resist the

colonial power; the latter possessing better weapons of war conquered the kingdoms and

then, after subduing it, utilized its feudal system and certain key officials to maintain

imperial domination. At this point, particular functions of the system were redefined.

Further in his narrative, two outstanding encroachments characterized the history of

northern feudal kingdoms. The first is the Fulani conquest; Fulani influence dated as far

back as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and erupted in the 1802 jihad led by Usman

dan Fodio; the Fulani ultimately absorbed the Habe dynasties and redefined the base of

political power. The second encroachment was the British conquest and absorption of the

Fulani rulers. The British, utilized the Fulani rulers and the system they had created from

the Habe dynasties for their own (British) colonial ends.

Of importance is the point made here that at the early stage of the chiefdoms’ so

emerged, distinctive rank orders began to emerge and the royal dynasties and the nobility

formed a leisure class which began to assume great importance in the affairs of the

kingdom. The rest of the society was gradually made subordinate to this ruling class and

emerged as the economic mainstay of the developing Hausa/ feudal states. Further

stratification among the common people gradually evolved because of the complexities of

the economic services that developed in the society itself. Free peasants, serfs and slaves

began to emerge as substrata within the laboring class. This was followed by a system of

occupational grouping involving, the peasants, as their craft came under the control of the

14

kings and the nobility. Society was ranked again according to occupation and craft

organization crystallized as a distinctive feature of all Hausa feudal states.

Feudal system in Northern Nigeria according to Nzimiro (1988) posses certain

characteristics. The feudal kingdoms evolved into large territorial units; the capitals were

centers of political activity and the residence of the kings and “nobles” or administrative

personnel. Each kingdom was divided into administrative units or fiefs and placed under

the command of vassal lords, whose representatives acted as over lords. The hierarchical

nature of the administration represented a well-defined structural order which the king

manipulated to his advantage. The assignment of duties to the various officials enabled the

administration to function effectively. On receipt of their honorific titles embodying the

duties of office, the recipient swore an oath of fealty to the king to administer their areas

to his satisfaction. The entire feudal system according to him was a huge bureaucratic

network governed by the principles of prebend and patrimony. The entire society,

hierarchically demarcated, was split into two social ranks, the ruling class – the Isarakin

and the commoners – talakawa.

Karl Marx sought to place feudalism among the stages in the historical

development of human society. He used the term in the 19th century in his analysis of

society’s economic and political development, describing feudalism (or more usually

feudal society or the feudal mode of production) as the order coming before capitalism.

For Marx, what defined feudalism was the power of the ruling class (aristocracy) in their

control of things. This more importantly is where the author hinged the discussion of this

work on Northern feudalism and voter’s mobilization in the 2015 Presidential elections.

Northern feudalism in this case being the activity of the aristocracy that rule the northern

15

part of Nigeria. These northern elite or political class have manifested themselves in the

politics of Nigeria right from the pre-colonial era through the colonial to the present post-

colonial Nigeria. And the work is a short review of their efforts in mobilizing voters in the

2015 presidential election which saw to a return of political power of Nigeria to the North.

Ethnicity and Voter’s Mobilization

Tracing the history of ethnicity in Nigeria, the erudite scholar Okwudiba Nnoli in

his Ethnic Violence in Nigeria: A historical Perspective, (2003) pointed out that the first

type of ethnic conflict in Nigeria is the product of the political or administrative policy of

divide and rule that mobilized and manipulated ethnic consciousness. The first to do so

were the colonialists. They manipulated ethnic consciousness that emerged from the

violence of the colonial state. As a political line, the colonial policy of divide and rule first

used ethnic and regional sectionalism to curb Nigerian nationalism and to maintain

colonial power. For example according to the scholar, in 1920, Sir Hugh Clifford

effectively dampened the emergent West African nationalism by preying on the ethnic

sentiment of the Nigerian members of the National Congress of West Africa when they

called for the reform of the colonial order. The impact of this colonial machination was

disastrous for the nationalist movement. A local Nigerian faction emerged that repudiated

the Congress Movement in Nigeria and organized a pro-government reform club. As a

result by 1934 the movement in Nigeria was dead. Nigerians channeled their political

attention and sentiment toward their own ethnic groups and organizations.

In fact, the colonial state seized every available opportunity to spread the

propaganda that Nigerians did not have a common destiny with respect to political

independence because they were separated by differences of history and tradition. Its

16

policy was to secure the right of each ethnic group to maintain its identity, individually,

nationality and chosen form of government, and the peculiar political and social

institutions that were presumed to have evolved from the wisdom and accumulated

experiences of its previous generations (Nnoli, 1978: 120-122). In the words of the

colonial Governor in 1920 Sir Hugh Clifford: “I am entirely convinced of the right, for

example, of the people of Egbaland . . . of any of the great Emirates of the North . . . to

maintain that each of them is, in a very real sense, a nation . . . It is the task of the

government of Nigeria to build and fortify these national institutions (Coleman, 1958:

194).

In 1910 the colonial state promulgated the Land and Native Rights Ordinance. The

Act formally proclaimed all land in the North (with certain exceptions) as native land to be

controlled and administered by the colonial Governor. He manipulated this law to limit the

number of Southern Nigerians migrating to the North. The colonist believed that the

Southerners were capable of undermining the alliance between them and the Fulani ruling

class that they deemed crucial for colonial enterprise in Nigeria. Those Southerners who

crossed this legal barrier faced the policy of “sabon gari”. This was a policy of segregating

Southerners from Northerners. In Zaria, for example, this policy led to several different

settlements: (a) the walled city, housing non-indigenous population (b) Tudun Wada,

housing non-indigenous northerners, and (c) Sabon gari for southerners whom the

colonialist referred to as “native foreigners”. This ethnic polarization of northern towns

facilitated ethnic mobilization and manipulation (Nnoli, 1`978: 115-116) and still does

same till date.

17

In his work Media Narratives on Power Relations in Nigeria: A Critical Discourse

Analysis of three National Newspaper Columnists, (2015), Sunday Onifade employing the

critical discourse analysis for the study because of the nature of the topic and issues

treated in the research found that even the newspaper publishers in Nigeria contribute to

the ethnic and religion division of Nigeria through their writings on the upcoming

presidential election and the Boko Haram insurgency. This is why to him, politics is a

fundamental feature of every society (Ademilokun & Taiwo, 2013, p. 436) and it has a

peculiar operation in Nigeria. It is characterized by ethnic, regional and religious

divisions. And the division has led to continuous tension among the various groups. The

current political developments in Nigeria is better understood when one considers the

events that led to the “fabrication” of Nigeria by Great Britain. In fact, Ray Jacob (2012)

traces the history of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria to the colonial transgressions that forced

the ethnic groups of the northern and southern provinces to become an entity called

Nigeria in 1914” (Jacob: 2012).

According to him Nigeria is the most populous country on the continent of Africa.

It came into existence in 1914 when Britain amalgamated the Northern and Southern

protectorates across the River Niger (historyworld.net, 2014). The name “Nigeria” was

coined from the two words “Niger” and Area”. The politics and power relations in Nigeria

have largely been based on the dichotomy between the two original regions in 1914 to

create the colony of Nigeria. It is important to note that the British colonial amalgamation

of the kingdoms that constitute Nigeria was done for the benefit of the colonial

government (Ugwu, cited in; Murumba, 2014).

18

The outline above provides a picture of the likely causes of tension within and

amongst the ethnic groups. There are numerous serotypes and negative beliefs prevalent

within each ethnic group about the others. There are also generally held derogatory beliefs

about speakers of other dialects even within the same ethnic group. Therefore, it is not

surprising to see a low rate of inter-cultural or inter-ethnic marriages as most people prefer

to marry within their ethnic group or clans. They mostly live and make friends with people

of their ethnic or religious groups.

In the years following the amalgamation, the leaders of the many tribes that

constituted the colony demanded independence for the country. Their demands were made

both collectively and individually. While they agreed that Great Britain should grant

independence to Nigeria, they however disagreed on who should be the leader of the

nation at independence. So deep was this disagreement that the Northern Region opposed

the call for independence by 1953 as moved by a Southern legislator, Anthony Enahoro

(Usang, Ikpeme & Elemi, 2014, p. 45). The north threatened to secede if independence

was granted by that year. The reason for the northern opposition was disparity in

development and exposure between the north and the south. While the South was

relatively advanced in Western education and infrastructure, the North had not achieved

much in terms of Western education. The North had feared that independence by 1953

would lead to Southern domination of the country.

The history of democratic experience in Nigeria since independence has been

bedeviled by ethnicity and religion. The current democratic phase in Nigeria which

commenced in the year 1999 is called the Fourth Republic. Following the death of the

military dictator General Sani Abacha on June 8, 1998, the new helmsman, General

19

Abdulsalami set up and implemented a speedy democratic transition process. He

unbanned political activities and released all political prisoners. Consequently, three

political parties were formed; they are Alliance for Democracy (AD), All People’s Party

(APP) and People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Ethnic coloration is perceivable in the

formation and running of these political parties. The Alliance for Democracy (AD) was

filled with politicians from the Yoruba ethnic group and it won all the states in the South-

West geo-political zone which is predominantly a Yoruba Zone. Interestingly, the Alliance

for Democracy did not win any seat outside the Yoruba – speaking states. The All

People’s Party (APP) was formed by groups and individuals from the North-West zone

and it won three states in the zone (Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara) and our state in the

North- Central Zone (Kwara) as well as two states in the North-East Zone (Gombe and

Borno). The party (APP) failed in the other geo-political zones. The People’s Democratic

Party (PDP) was the only political party with a national pasture as it won elections in all

the geo-political zones with the exception of the South-West. It swept the polls in the

South-South and South-East geo-political zones. The wider reach of the PDP (which is

described as the largest political party in Africa) perhaps explains why the party has

controlled the presidency since 1999.

The 1999 presidential election was clearly directed at appeasing the Yoruba tribe

for the perceived injustice of the past. As a result, the candidates of the three political

parties were from the Yoruba tribe. A former military ruler-General, Olusegun Obasanjo

(a Christian) who had returned the country to democratic rule in 1979 was elected as

president with a northern-Muslim vice-president. He ruled for eight years and handed over

to Umar Musa-Yar’Adua (a northern Muslim) who ruled and died in office in 2010. This

20

paved way for the vice-president (Goodluck Jonathan) to emerge as the president because

the Nigerian constitution prescribes that in the death of a president (While in office), the

vice-president takes over the mantle of leadership. However, there were calls in some

quarters for him to step down after completing the tenure of his late boss in 2011. They

argued that the “North” had a right to two presidential terms of four years each and that it

was imperative for another northerner to complete the term of the North: they based this

argument on an alleged zoning agreement earlier reached by the ruling party.

The new president Goodluck Jonathan, went ahead to win his party nomination

and eventually the presidential election of 2011. As usual, there were allegations of

electoral fraud and protest erupted in many northern states and many southerners were

killed (by northerners) and their properly destroyed. In the build up to the elections, some

northern leaders had vowed to make the country ungovernable if presidential power did

not return to the north by 2015. Since then, terrorist attacks by the Islamist group Jamaatul

Al-Sunnah Lidawati Wal Jihad popularly called Boko Haram, have put Nigeria under

great strain with many calling for the disintegration of the country.

Another round of the general elections were scheduled for March 2015, and the

incumbent president has been nominated by his political party set to run for another term

in office despite the obvious links between his ambition and the security challenges faced

by the country. Some sections of the country articulate that Boko Haram is a militant wing

of the political opposition to the president: therefore, they predict that the attacks by the

terrorist group would only increase if the president wins another term in office. Similarly,

there have been threats by other armed groups especially from the oil-rich. Niger-Delta

region have threatened to cripple the Nigerian economy by disrupting the flow of oil from

21

the region if the president (who is from their ethnic group) fails to win the 2015

presidential election.

According to Onifade (2015) there is a high probability of violence after the

presidential election of 2015 which ever direction the pendulum of victory swings and

there are fears that the country may not survive beyond 2015 because there are real threats

of violence by militant groups in both the northern and southern Nigeria. In fact, a

prominent militant leader from the Niger-Delta region Asari Dokubo has clearly stated

that there would be violence if President Goodluck Jonathan does not get a second term.

He said that “there would be bloodshed in the streets if Dr. Jonathan is not re-elected

president in the 2015 election (Udo, 2013) such unguarded comments could lead to ethnic

crises and civil war which could herald the end of Nigeria’s Corporate existence.

Such statements are offshoots of ethnic rivalry as Nwachukwu, Aghemalo E,

Nwosu (2014), pointed out that ethnicization of politics in Nigeria manifests in long series

of inter and intra-ethnic conflicts, election violence and civil war. Just as Ake (1981) has

said that ethnicity becomes the ideology for economic survival in the midst of scarce

resources. In Nigeria, the control of state power by a particular ethnic group means more

wealth, more employment, more government establishments and more government

appointments for members of that ethnic group at the expense of others (Ezeibe, 2015).

Politics assumes a zero-sum nature, whereby gains and losses are fixed and

absolute. The winner takes all at the expense of the complete loss of other actors and vice-

versa. (Von Nnemann & Morgenstern, 1944). Jega (2002) corroborated the above position

and argued that elections in Nigeria have zero-sum character. This zero-sum character of

22

elections leads to native mobilization of communal (ethnic) feelings by politicians. This

negative mobilization of the populace by political parties and politicians is based on the

message that if the elections are free and fair then ‘our party’ should win. The converse

then is that if ‘our party’ fails to win the election then the elections were not free and fair.

It is this negative mobilization and hateful language with which it is done that leads to

electoral violence in Nigeria. What Ezibe (2015) is saying is that political leaders in

Nigeria use hate speech to divide and rule the people already divided along ethnic and

religious lines. This according to him was the case in the colonial and immediate post-

colonial era but has been reawakened since May 2010 after the death of President Umaru

Musa Yar’Adua and the abandonment of PDP’s zoning arrangement between the North

and South.

Ethno-regional cleavage is the division or polarization of voters into voting blocks

along the line of ethnic identities and regional affiliations. Ethno-regionalism relies on

both claims of regional identity and ethnic distinction as basis for political mobilization

and participation. Ethno-regional cleavages are the national, ethnic, linguistic, and

religious divisions that affect political allegiances and policies. Ethnic nationalism is the

mobilization of ethnic groups by using language, ethno-history, religion, traditions and

customs for political purposes. In other words, through the rediscovery of an ethnic past,

national identity could inspire ethnic communities to claim some political rights as nations

within a nation-state. (Isiksal 2002:9). A belief in common historical and confirms the

social identities for separating both insiders and outsiders hierarchies and confirms the

social identities for separating both insiders and outsiders (Ake: 2000;93). Ethno-

nationalism is defined in this study as people’s loyalty to and identification with a

23

particular ethnic nationality groups within a nation state for the purpose of mobilization

for collective social, political and economic interests.

Traditionally, political mobilization is often understood as closely tied to elections

( Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993); studies of political mobilization for example focused on

the effects of electoral campaigning (e.g. Shanto and Simon, 2000) or seek to explain

fluctuations in voters’ turnout (e.g. Franklin, 2004). Mobilization in this sense is seen as

consisting of those actions that elites undertake in order to garner a growing group of

supporters and persuade them to express their affinity through the ballot box. For

Vermeersch (2010), political mobilization is the process whereby political actors

encourage people to participate in some form of political action. In its concrete

manifestations, this process can take on many different shapes. Political mobilizers

typically persuade people to vote, petition, protest, rally or join a political party, trade

union or a politically active civic organization.

Voter’s mobilization refers to mobilization of the masses as part of contentious

politics. Mass mobilization in this sense is often used by grass root- based social

movements including in some cases revolutionary movements, but can also become a tool

of the elites and the state itself. Voters’ mobilization therefore could be seen as a process

that engages and motivates a wide range of partners and allies at national and local levels

to raise awareness of and demand for a particular development objective through face-to-

face dialogue. Members of institutions, community networks, civic and religious groups

and others work in coordinated manner to reach specific groups of people for dialogue

with planned message. In other words, social mobilization seeks to facilitate change

through a range of players engaged in interrelated and complementary efforts. This is why

24

we can rightly say that the engagement of citizens in public affairs is the benchmark of the

liberal democratic system.

2015 Presidential Elections

Tracing the history of presidential elections in Nigeria, Onifade, S. (2015), pointed

out that Nigeria’s history of presidential elections dates back to 1979 when the military

government of General Olusegun Obasanjo returned the country to democratic rule after

thirteen years of military rule. Nigeria operated a parliamentary system of government at

independence in 1960 but adopted the presidential system in 1979. The election was

conducted on August 11, 1979.

Following the conduct of the election, Alhaji Shehu Shagari of National Party of

Nigeria (NPN) scored 5, 668, 857 votes while Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Unity Party of

Nigeria (UPN) polled 4,916,651 votes and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigerian People’s

Party (NPP) had 2,822,523 votes. Also, Alhaji Aminu Kano of People’s Redemption Party

(PRP) scored 1, 732, 113 votes and Alhaji Waziri lbrahim of Greater Nigeria People’s

Party (GNPP) got 1,686,489 votes (Nigeria’s 1979 Presidential election, 2001). The result

of the elections showed that the electorates voted along ethnic lines. Shehu Shagari’s NPN

won most of the states in the north, Awolowo’s UPN won all the South-Western states and

Nnamdi Azikiwe’s NPP had a strong showing in the South-East. Waziri Ibrahim of the

GNPP won his home state of Borno and the neighbouring Congola state while Aminu

Kano also won in his state (Kano) and the neighbouring Kaduna state.

The voter turn-out for the presidential election was low. The total number of

registered voters was 48,499,091 but only 17,098,268 voters turned out; this represents

25

35% voter turn-out (Nigeria’s 1979 Presidential election). The Unity Party of Nigeria,

(UPN) alleged irregularities in the conduct of the elections and called for a re-run because

the winner did not score the constitutionally required two-third majority of the votes as

required by law. Despite this, the military handed over power to Shagari.

The 1983 presidential election featured almost the same aspirants except that the

People’s Redemption Party (PRP) replaced Aminu Kano with Hassan Yusuf and a new

party National Advanced Party (NAP) fielded Dr. Tunji Braithwaite. Shehu Shagari won

by a wider margin than in 1979 amid widespread claims of irregularities. The total number

of votes cast was 25,4230,096 although the number of registered voters was 65,304,818.

This gives a voter turn-out of 39% (Elections in Nigeria, 2011). The alleged rigging of the

election was one of the reasons given by the military when it sacked the government of

Shagari on December 31, 1983.

The 1993 presidential election was contested by Moshood Abiola of the Social

Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Covention (NRC)

Approximately, there were about 39, 000,000 registered voters: this was a sharp decrease

from the number registered in the 1983 election. Although the military annulled the

election just before the full result was released, insiders attributed 8,341,309 votes to

Moshood Abiola and 5,952,087 votes to Bashir Tofa (Elections in Nigeria, 2011).

The election that ushered in the current democratic dispensation was conducted on

February 27, 1999. It was between Olusegun Obasanjo of the People’s Democratic Party

(PDP) and Olu Falae a consensus candidate of Alliance for Democracy (AD) and All

People’s Party (APP). The number of registered voters was 57, 938, 945 and the number

26

of those that turned out to vote was 30,280,052. This represents a voter turn-out of

52.23%. Olusegun Obasajo had 18,783,154 votes while Olu Falae polled 11,110,287

(Elections in Nigeria, 2011).

From years later, Nigerian electorates had a very long list of presidential aspirants

to choose from. Twenty political parties fielded candidates for the contest, but only nine

candidate polled more than 100,000 votes, and only three of them had more than one

million votes. Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP had 24, 456, 140 votes, Muhammadul

Buhari of All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) scored 12,710,022 and Chukwuemeka

Ojukwu of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) polled 1,297,445 votes to come a

distant third (Elections in Nigeria, 2011).

The 2007 presidential election presented the electorates with a longer list of

aspirants than the 2003 presidential election; there were twenty-five aspirants in all. The

election is widely regarded as the worst in Nigeria’s post independence history. In some

states, the number of votes recorded votes that were higher than the number of register

voters. Similar to the 2003 election, only six aspirants scored more than 100, 000 votes

and only three of them had more than one million votes. Umar Musa Yar’Adua of

People’s Democratic Party scored 24,638,063, while Muhammadu Buhari of All Nigerian

People’s Party (ANPP) polled 6,605,299 votes and Atiku Abubakar of Action Congress

got 2,637,848 votes. The number of registered voters was 61,567,036 and 57% of them

turned out to vote (Elections in Nigeria, 2011).

Nigerians returned to the polls in 2011 and twenty political parties fielded

candidates. Just like the 2003 and 2007, only three candidates polled more than one

27

million votes and only one other candidate scored more than one hundred thousand votes.

There were 73,528,040 registered voters and 39,469,484 (53.7%) of them turned out to

elect the president Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP scored 22,495,187 votes to win the

election. Muhammadu Buhari of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) came second

with 12,214,853 votes and Nuhu Ribadu of Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) came third

with 2,079,151 votes. (Elections in Nigeria; 2011).

Although there are thirteen presidential aspirants for the 2015 presidential election

(Olokor, 2015), it is likely to be a close battle between the incumbent President

Goodluck Jonathan and Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of All People’s Congress. Truly, it was

a duel between these two grants.

Nigeria is a country in transition to democracy which is still striving to nurture a

democratic political culture after many years of military rule, and amidst the anti-

democratic tendencies that rule has fostered. Our electoral system is therefore work-in-

progress, desirous of un-seizing, continuous improvements through reforms (Jega, 2015).

Also, given the fact that elections are the major pillars of leadership selection and

governance legitimation in liberal democracies, constant and un-seizing effort for the

reformation of the electoral process is an imperative in all countries that are

democratizing. It is especially necessary in countries in transition to democracy, such as

Nigeria, where there is long history of badly conducted elections; where elections have

been bastardized, and where many voters have become despondent and have virtually

given up hope of their votes counting in choosing their elected executives or

representatives in legislatures.

28

In his work Electoral Reforms in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects (2015) Jega,

gave a clear analysis of what elections have been like in Nigeria especially as the election

management body was a very weak institution. He shared his experience as to how the

institution has been raised from hitherto moribund to effective status. More importantly,

he discussed the how the preparation put on top gear for the 2015 elections were carefully

nursed to fruition. And suggested some measures that need to be put in place to make the

conduct of elections in Nigeria free, far, credible and peaceful which in his opinion will go

a long way at curbing the problem of political apathy in Nigeria.

In the views, of Jega (2015), a series of badly conducted elections could create

perpetual political instability and easily reverse the gains of democratization. If adequate

care is not taken, badly conducted elections can totally undermine democratization and

replace it with authoritarian rule of the civilian or military varieties. At best, they can

install inept and corrupt leadership that can herald, if not institutionalize bad governance.

There are many illustrations or manifestation of this throughout Africa. But nowhere is

this as amply illustrated as in the Nigeria case, especially between 1999 and 2007.

He went further to argue that the consequences of badly conducted elections and

poorly managed electoral processes are major contributory factors to military interregnum

in Nigeria’s political history. At inception of the fourth republic, the 1999 elections were

conducted under military rule. There were fundamental flaws in the elections, but

Nigerians wanted to get rid of military rule and have power transferred to civilians. They

tolerated and accommodated the outcome, and hoped for future improvements. The 2003

elections, unfortunately, did not represent a substantive improvement over the 1999

elections, in terms of transparency and credibility. Rather, the elections at best represented

29

“business as usual” in terms of inflation of votes fraudulent declaration of results use of

aimed things to scare away or assault voters and cart away election materials and many

other irregularities and illegalities, which were committed with impurity.

According to Jega (2015) the 2007 elections were manifestly the worst in Nigeria’s

history, as declared by both domestic and international observers. The EU observer

mission, for example, noted that the elections fell “short of basic international standards”,

and were characterized by violence and crude use of money to buy votes. There were

reckless mobilization of ethno-regions cleavages and heightened use of money and thugs

to influence results. The pre-electoral processes, such as party primaries were conducted in

grossly undemocratic fashion. In many cases, the results were said to have gone to the

highest bidder.

The winner of the election, late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, himself

admitted on the day of his inauguration, that there were serious flaws in the election that

brought him to power. Arguably, in order to preempt a major crisis of legitimacy, he

pledge to embark on electoral reforms and subsequently inaugurated the Electoral Reform

Committee (ERC), with the mandate to make wide ranging recommendations for electoral

reform in Nigeria. The modest effort at electoral reform following the submission of the

report of the Justice Muahmmadu Uwais Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), as

represented by the introduction of new legal and administrative reform measures, the

inauguration of a new Chairman and Commissioners, paved way for remarkable

improvements in the 2011 and especially the 2015 general elections.

30

Jega, (2015) pointed out that some of the major challenges faced during the

preparation and conduct of the 2015 general elections relate to the cynicism and

skepticism of the Nigerian voters and citizens generally; the peculiar attitudes and mindset

of the typical Nigerian politicians; those associated with the use of technology in our

infrastructure-challenged environment; the constraints imposed by the extent legal

framework and those emanating from the prevalence of the phenomenon of weak

institutions and other systemic peculiarities of the Nigerian polity.

According to Olayode (2015), among the various attributes of democracy,

competitive election is the feature most easily identifiable and most widely recognized

around the world. The core institution of modern liberal democracy whereby the right of

the people to self-government can be exercised is competitive and participatory election.

The extent to which elections fulfill that mission is to a significant extent dependent on

citizen’s rationale for how they behave at the polls. If voters’ behaviour is determined by

non-evaluative rationales, then the purpose of self-rule by representative government is

defeated. Competitive elections are arguably a precondition for the political benefits that a

democratic system may confer on its citizens and they are a valuable yardstick for

analyzing and distinguishing a democratic polity.

Although elections and democracy are not synonymous; nonetheless, elections

remain fundamental, not only for the installation of democratic governments, but also for

broader democratic consolidation (Olayode 2004:87). The regularity, openness, and

acceptability of elections signal whether basic constitutional, behavioural and attitudinal

foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic rule. Recording the occurrence of a

31

second competitive election can at least confirm that democratic gains have not been

completely revered by military coup.

The thesis of democratic consolidation advanced by Huntington (1991: 266-267)

adopted a procedural minimalist definition using a ‘two-turn over test’. This in effect

means the successful handing over of power by the winner of the first election to the

winner of later elections. Although, Nigeria had already passed the ‘two-turn over test’ by

the successful democratic transitions experienced in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011

respectively; the 2015 general elections would mark the first time in the nation’s turbulent

political history that a relatively peaceful transition from an incumbent president to an

opposition candidate would take place.

The results of the 2015 general elections clearly revealed the preponderance of

ethno-regional sentiments as determinants of voting behaviour and political participation

across the country. From the presidential through gubernatorial, national and state

assemblies’ elections, aspirants were largely chosen on the basis of ethno-regional

identities. In the presidential election, the president and vice president elect received

almost 90 percent of their votes on the basis of ethno-regional identity. Similarly, the

incumbent president received en-masses votes from his ethno-regional zones.

In addition to being the most competitive election in Nigeria since independence,

the 2015 general elections were held amid rising tensions on account of terror attacks by

the Boko Haram Insurgent group. Ahead of the elections, there had been increasing

tension between the north and the south due to what the northerners perceived as their

‘lost opportunity’ to reclaim the presidency and reverse the continued economic

32

marginalization of the region. All these factors exacerbated the traditional ethnic, regional,

and religious cleavages that have defined Nigerian politics since independence (Olayode,

2015).

The knowledge of ethno-regional cleavages and voting behaviour in the 2015

general elections is significant, not just for analyzing political participation, but also for its

potential consequences for democratization and nation building. This paper argues that

where ascribe ethno-regional loyalties are strong, they “generate party systems reflecting

rigid group boundaries and tend to exacerbate ethic conflict” (Horowitz, 1985:291).

Horowtiz regards ethnicity as a particular problem for the usual process of bargaining and

compromise that characterize normal politics in representative democracies because

ethnicity is “ascriptive, and therefore more segmented, pillorized and rigid than social

identities which are more flexible and fluid, or even self-selected, such as those based on

class or shared ideological beliefs” (Horowitz, 1985:293). This tendency has hindered the

development of national parties, national identity and democratic culture. Ethnic groups

competing for political positions could easily evoke ethnic-focused conflicts with dire

consequences for democratic stability and national survival.

Elections are essential in a democracy, and they are at the core of citizens’

democratic rights. Since the end of the cold war, the reintroduction of multiparty

democracy and the gradual reopening of the political space have ensured that holding

elections is now the main acceptable means of political change in African countries. In

addition, credible competitive elections have become a necessary, albeit sufficient, source

of behavioural, if not attitudinal legitimacy in Africa’s emerging democracies’ (Mozaffar

2002).

33

The centre for public policy alternative publication; 2015 Presidential Election

Outcome: Analysis and Implications holds that March 28th through April 1st 2015 marked

another turn in Nigeria’s democratic history as registered voters took to the polls to elect

the next set of leaders into the presidential and National Assembly positions. The

elections, conducted in the thirty six states of the country and the Federal Capital

Territory, witnessed the emergence of the opposition party – the All Progressive Congress

(APC) and its candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari (retd) – as the new President of the

Federal Republic. This outcome was also the first time an opposition party would unseat

the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) since Nigeria’s transition into civil rule in

1999.

A total of 14 political parties contested this election. Below is a table showing the

results of the election.

APC 15,424,921 53.96

PDP 12,853,162 44.96

APA 53,537 0.19

ACPN 40,311 0.4

CPP 36,300 0.13

AD 30,673 0.11

ADC 29,666 0.10

PPN 24,475 0.09

NCP 24,455 0.09

AA 22,125 0.08

34

UPP 18,220 0.06

KOWA 13,076 0.05

UDP 9,208 0.03

HOPE 7,435 0.03

Source: http://www.inecnigeria.org/?page_id_31

It is good to point out that this publication consulted the 2015 General Election

Security threat assessment (website) and discovered that 11 of the 37 states were in high

possibility of violence, 20 states plus the FCT were in possibility of escalating tensions

and 5 states were relatively peaceful. Some of the indicators of violence according to the

site include hate and inciting speech, communal violence and other localized conflict,

militant groups, vigilantes and youth thuggery, performance of security institutions and

fear of electoral manipulation.

In the views of Adibe (2015), the 2015 presidential election will stir up the fault

lines of region, ethnicity and religion which already run deep in Nigeria. According to

him, virtually every part of the country has an institutionalized memory of injury or

feeling of injustice, which they often feel will be best addressed if one of their own wields

power at the center, preferably as the president. Similarly, there is a pervasive fear that the

president of the country will abuse the powers of his office to privilege his region,

ethnicity or religion if not to punish or deliberately disadvantage others.

Of great importance in this work is the report that Nigeria is sometimes described

as a country that runs on two unequal wheels. In 2013, the Russian investment bank

Renaissance Capital, produced a report titled, “Nigeria Unveiled”, which painted the

35

picture of Nigeria’s economy as moving on two wheels – a thriving South with rising

income, lower unemployment and better educated citizens, and a much poorer, less

educated and struggling North (Atuanya, 2013). Based on this economic imbalance, the

North’s dominance of power before 1999 was justified as a lever to balance the South’s

economic advantage. Thus, for some, since the South has held the presidency for 12 out of

the 15 years of civilian rule since 1999 means that the North has lost its leverage in the

North-South equation. For this reason the author citing the country’s electoral history

opines that the outcome of the 2015 elections will be contentious, irrespective of opinion

of election observers.

The council on Foreign Relations in their February 2015 release on the Nigeria’s

2015 presidential election pointed out that since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, political

power has alternated between the predominantly Muslim North and predominantly

Christian South. This they saw as the country’s polarization. It was pointed out that

Jonathan assumed the presidency when President Umaru Yar’Adua, a Northern Muslim,

died in 2010. Jonathan gave private assurances that he would finish Yar’Adua’s term and

wait until 2015 to run for presidency because it was still the North’s turn. But Jonathan ran

for re-election in 2011, thereby violating the system of power alternation. Following the

announcement of Jonathan’s victory, the North made accusations of election rigging.

Rioting broke out across the North resulting in the greatest bloodshed since the 1967-1970

civil war. According to the release, the 2015 election may again precipitate violence that

could destabilize Nigeria.

36

In the work of George-Genyi(2015), political participation and voting behavior in

Nigeria: A study of the 2015 general election in Benue State, the author made expositions

as to what elections has been in Nigeria particularly that of 2015. In this study that

adopted a survey methodology involving about 300 respondents covering three local

governments in the three senatorial districts of the state. The study found that political

participation and voting behaviour serve as critical ingredients in a democracy. And that

apart from guaranteeing the life expectancy of a democratic system, these democratic

elements enable individual and or groups to select their leaders at elections.

In a similar work by Aghamelu, (2013) the study restricted itself to the role of the

media in the electoral process with particular reference to Nigeria. The paper used the

method of comparative phenomenological analysis to examine the performances of the

media in Nigerian electoral process with regard to its fundamental roles to inform,

educate, entertain and monitor in the electoral process. In doing so, the paper examined

the various obstacles that have affected the performance of the electoral process viz-a-viz

the media. While some improvements have been recorded by Nigerian media in the

critical area of electioneering campaign since 1999, however, from what we have seen so

far a lot has to be improved upon.

Political Class (Northern Aristocracy)

Members of the political class, who comprise power-brokers and those governing,

represent the soul of any country as they are the building blocks of leadership recruitment.

Political class or political elite is a concept in comparative political science originally

developed by Italian political theorist theory of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). It refers to

37

the relatively small group of people that are highly aware and active in politics and from

whom the national leadership is largely drawn. As Weber (1958: 84) noted, they not only

live “for politics” – like the old notables used do – but make their careers “off politics” as

policy specialists and experts on fields of public administration. Mosca approached the

study of the political class by examining the mechanism of reproduction and renewal of

the ruling class; the characteristics of politicians and the different forms of organization

developed in their wielding of power.

Studying the political class in Nigeria, Lucas (1998) examines despotic versus

infrastructural powers in terms of relations between the military leaders and the civilian

political class. He concludes that weak states experience a conflict between these two

types of power. Despotic power in, sociologist Michael Mann’s definition, refers to the

state’s repressive capacities while infrastructural power refers to its ability to penetrate

society and implement its decisions. Whereas leaders cultivate alliances with powerful

social groups to realize their infrastructural power, the exercise of despotic power can

undermine such pattern of collaboration.

Military leaders according to Lucas rely on a number of despotic strategies to

extend their control over the political class as part of a promised transition to democracy.

The military reliance on despotic strategies led to a long term decline in the integrity and

infrastructural capacity of a state. Horowitz (2013) in discussing American politics

pointed out that the term political class has recently been used as an epithet by

conservatives, such as the editors of National Review. The theme is that the political elite

is undemocratic and has an agenda of its own-especially aggrandizement of its own power

– that is hostile to the larger national interest, and which ought to be opposed by grassroots

38

of populist movements. Our puzzle here is that if the political class is considered

undemocratic and the military known to make use of despotic power, what will the

northern political class be like with all the military and para-military officers who hail

from the North?

Tracing the origin, nature and activities of Nigerian political parties and the

dominance of the north in the Nigerian politics, Mohammed Salih in his ‘Environmental

politics and Liberation in Contemporary Africa found that other larger, dominant ethnic

groups (Igbo and Yoruba) their political parties were subsumed or swallowed by the

political powers of the north. He found that the National party of Nigeria (NPN) was

successful in rallying the support of some nine northern ethnic groups, under terms

mostly, dictated by the Hausa-Fulani alliance. Opposition from other Northern political

parties was insignificant and did little to weaken the NPN which won the presidential

elections of 1978 and 1983 respectively. According to Salih, several Nigerian authors

have described how Northern dominance over Nigerian politics has antagonized the two

major political parties that existed then; (The Nigerian People’s Party of the Igbo and

Unity Party of Nigeria of the Yoruba). Nnoli (1996: 194) then argued that:

By 1983, as in the 1964 elections, two broad alliances faced each other,

the Progressive Parties Alliance (PPA) made up of UPN and its allies and

the Progressive People’s Party (PPP) made up of the NPN and its allies.

The five party political systems had narrowed down, to two grand

alliances in response to the dynamics between the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and

Yoruba ethnic groups.

In Salih’s views some conclusions can be drawn from the Handendowa and Fulani

cases as regards the relationship between identity politics, and the environment. In both

cases, identity politics can be used to explain how and why group identity could be

39

mobilized for collective action or resistance vis-à-vis the dominant ethnic groups. Since

identity politics is determined by the politico-history of the competing ethnic groups, it

takes different forms in different societies. For instance, the Hadendowa case reveals that

in some circumstances, identity politics is used to reinforce identity boundaries

(Hadendowa and non-Hadendowa), while in others it seeks to break down these

boundaries and resort to organizational forms atypical of ethnic identification. Among the

Fulani similar patterns can be seen in the form of the Northern People’s Movement

(Hausa-Fulani Alliance) and NPN. Secondly, political mobilization for collective action

often focuses on resources commonly used by the majority of the ethnic group (land,

water, public amenities, infrastructure and services) and from which the group derives its

main sources of subsistence (pasturalism or agriculture). Such environmental resources are

perceived by the ethnic group as ‘theirs’, regardless of whether they are used by every

individual member of that group. Thirdly, identity politics and its potential role for

controlling natural resources have been successfully manipulated by the Hadendowa and

the Fulani political elite in their struggle for power in the respective regions and states.

Again, in Islamic reforms and political change in Northern Nigeria by Roman

Loimeier, the author traced the establishment of political parties in Northern Nigeria and

how the North was able to control their bases (that is population) mostly in Kano under

the charismatic leader of Aminu Kano and the religions networks that existed in the north.

He also narrated how the competition between the political parties and religious networks

was won, by the religious networks and how these networks grew in political weight and

therefore extended their facet such that their leaders were no longer, ordinary, spiritual

leaders of their networks, but they also took over the political task of mobilizing the

40

people of the north for whatever common front. Again the author showed how Jam’iyyar

Tijaniyya (congress of the Tijaniyya brotherhood) on the model of Jamiyyar Mutaren

Arewa, was employed by the Northern People’s Congress as instrument of political

mobilization (Tahir 1975: 428).

To drive home the importance of religion in political mobilization in the north, the

author narrated how Abubakar Gumi a key player in the northern religious cum political

mobilization and leader of the sunni brotherhood, having lost his relevance and backing

after the death of Ahmadu Bello, was still concerned about the political power of the

Muslims. In view of this Gumi supported the political mobilization of even women to

ensure a second victory for the president and NPN in 1983. In conjunction with his

followers, he saw to such political mobilization in 1986 just before the local government

election of December 1987 and headed the campaign that Muslim women should not only

vote in the next federal elections in 1992 but also take part in the political game playing.

In his work, Northern Nigeria: The Political Economy of Backwardness, Samuel

Zalanga made a compare of the political class or elite in Northern Nigerian and Malaysia.

Northern Nigerian and Malaysia having being colonized by Britain and some British

colonial officers having served in both places makes it worth comparing. According to

Samuel, Malaysia emerged with a better political class who can mobilize her citizens

whenever the need arises especially against corrupt practices, misrule or bad policies,

these they could do based on Islamic inspirations because they started early enough to

tolerate and even call for change so as to be able to meet the challenges of modernity. This

position contrasts with the situation in Northern Nigeria. By and large, good number of the

political class in Northern Nigeria validated the future by using the sanctity of their past

41

heritage as a legitimizing discourse. This was attributed to the legacy of 1804 Sokoto

Jihad which produced absolute rulers in the North.

Some of the ruling elites in the North became as powerful as the British residents

such that the British resident could not accomplish anything without their co-operation.

Samuel opined that the native authority system during the colonial era was very successful

in Northern Nigeria owing to the pre-existing structure of government established after the

Islamic Jihad of 1804. But he lamented that these political elites have carried their

unquestionable style of administration into the post colonial Nigeria and this has a

negative effect on the society and the ‘talakawas’.

Another point to note is the intellectual orientation that is given to the Malaysian

Muslim intelligentsia, leaders and believers which according to him contradict with what

is obtainable in northern Nigeria. That while in Malaysia, Muslim believers see the

possibility of social, political, economic and cultural reforms based on Islamic inspirations

and that the traditional Malays society adopts history as an epistemology for positive

reasoning and elevated it to the centre of human discourse. But in Northern Nigeria, many

political elites validate the future by using the sanctity of their past heritage as a

legitimizing discourse. Though he pointed out that the part of the north that are exception

to this situation are places that have been gifted with political elites who are more

strategic, inclusive and progressive in their thinking and actions.

42

2.1 Gap in the Literature

Concerning the frequency with which elections occur and the mundane quality of

most of the contests, those who write about elections in Nigeria especially with reference

to the ways voters are mobilized and scholars who have written about the 2015

Presidential elections in Nigeria, hinge their argument around the North-South dichotomy,

party politics hate speech and ethnicity. But this work is an in-depth research stemming

from the historical acquisition of the attribute that today define the northern political class

and work for their success in political contests in Nigeria. This and a clear analysis of the

historical operation of ethnicity as a virile means of voters mobilization were thoroughly

explored in this work.

43

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Theoretical Framework

Now politics is changing in Nigeria and the ethnic nationality of power is changing

also. That in a republic ought to be a normal occurrence. However, in our ethnocracy,

disguising as a democracy, with its roots in the traditional feudal aristocracy of the Hausa-

Fulani, legitimate opposition has been pushed so much to the wall that it had to use all of

politics chicanery, militancy etc with a little help from providence to force a well deserved

change.

For us to properly understand the role of northern feudalism in the just concluded

2015 presidential election, our theories of analysis has to be anchored on the Marxian

political economy theory from where we will better appreciate the kind of relationship that

go on between or amongst the various classes that are at play in terms of production,

distribution and survival generally in the north as a feudal society. Also important in this

analysis is the dependency theory and the theory of ethnic mobilization.

Marxian analysis we must appreciate begin with an analysis of material conditions

and the economic activities required to satisfy society’s material needs. It is understood

that the form of economic organization, or mode of production, gives rise to, or at least

directly influences, most other social phenomena – including social relations, political and

legal systems, morality and ideology. The Marxian political economy theory is a method

of socio-economic analysis, originating from the mid-to-late 19th century works of the

German philosophers Karl Marx and Friederich Engles, that analyzes class relations and

44

societal conflict using a material interpretation of historical development and a dialectical

view of social transformation.

From the foregoing we can see that the Marxian political economy theory starts

from relations between people and classes and tries to understand the economy not as a

perfect clockwork mechanism but as a dynamic system full of contradictions and doomed

to be replaced. This aspect of political economy is concerned first and foremost about

people and the social relationships between them –about the owners of wealth and how

they use it to exploit others; about what is produced and how. In this sense Marxian

political economic theory tend to be political, social and historical in its approach.

An overview of what political economy is very important in this respect. A far

more general and ambitious definition of political economy will put it as the study, control

and survival in social life. Control refers specifically to the internal organization of

individual and group members, while survival takes up the means by which they produce

what is needed to reproduces themselves. Control processes are broadly political in that

relationship within a community. Survival processes are also fundamentally economic

because they concern the production of what a society needs to reproduce itself.

According to Igwe (2005) political economy is the scientific study of the

reciprocal influence of economics and politics, of the basis and the political element of the

superstructure which inevitably involves attentions to relations of production and the

iniquities and imbalances in the national and global distribution of economic and political

power. In his view, it is both an approach in social research and a theory seeking to

45

explain the system of economically influenced political relations at the domestic and

international levels.

Our interest rests more on Igwe’s further explanation that the principles and

problems of political economy had been evolving since the earliest emergence of

organized society in the form of the primitive communalism with every subsequent socio-

economic and political system developing the type of political economy most appropriate

to it. drawing from the above and from the characteristics of feudalism as one of the stages

of socio-economic development according to Marx and preceding capitalism, we now

weigh the area under study to find out if it meets or has the characteristics of a feudal

system which in my view and the views of some other scholars like Nzimiro (1988) and

Ejiofor (2007), Northern part of Nigeria can pass as a feudal society. Just as Mbengo

pointed out that Karl Marx proved that the apportioning of wealth in the sphere of

distribution is the product of the distribution of ownership in production. If the slave-

owning and, in the feudal order, the economic foundation of class distribution was

observed by non-economic factors (the division into estates etc) and in the case of

northern Nigeria the division into emirates.

Mbengo went further to opine that the consequence of the distribution of

ownership is the power distribution in society. This brings us face to face with what is

obtainable in a feudal order. The economic superiority of the owners of the means of

production conditions their political superiority. The class which owns the means of

production and which has economic power usurps political power as well. They hold, in

the first place, state power and all the means of political power which go with it. Thus, it

can be said that the domination of production produces also all other types of domination

46

of society. This is better understood when we appreciate that a consequence of the

economic division of society and the supremacy of owners is the fact that the ideas

prevailing in a given period are the ideas of the class holding economic power. This

simply is the explanation of why the interest of the feudal lords in northern Nigeria always

holds way.

On the other hand, dependency theory which will be applied in the analysis of our

findings in this work originated with the publication of two papers in 1949- one by Hans

Singer and the other by Raul Prebisch. Though originally applied in international

economic relations discourses as a tool for explaining the reasons or causes of under-

development in some countries. Our interest in this theory was roused by the views of

Igwe (2005) when he defined dependency as “a situation in which the policy or life of a

state and its citizens are exploitatively determined by an outside power or powers, usually

through the simultaneous application of unequal socioeconomic, political and cultural

measures, and it often occurs either as a successor policy to past unequal (e.g. colonial)

ties, or through the acquiescence of the local agents of the foreign power who for various

reasons become willing tools of such a policy”.

When this theory is applied to the case at hand and inspiration drawn from the

Marxian definition of feudalism which is primarily based of economic characteristics one

begin to see how imperative it is that this theory be used in this work. For in the views of

Karl Marx feudalism is the power of the ruling class (the aristocracy) in their control of

arable land, leading to a class society based upon the exploitation of the peasants who

farm these lands, typically under serfdom and principally by means of labour, produce and

47

money rents. From the foregoing we can picture the kind of relationship that exists

between the ruling class (aristocracy) in the north and the masses.

Also to be applied in the analysis of the findings of this work is the theory of

ethnic mobilization. Talking about the theory of ethnic mobilization Wolff (2007:6)

pointed out that even though violent ethnic conflicts often look like highly, organized and

spontaneous outbursts of popular anger, planning, organizational effort and strategic

deliberation. An ethnic conflict only occurs when a critical number of people have made

the calculated decision to pursue their goals with violent means. Such a decision is part of

a longer history of political organizing along ethnic lines. Furthermore, leaders decide to

speak for their ethnic group, thereby making the abstract idea of ethnic belonging a

somewhat more tangible reality and engage the members of this group into political

action. This according to him does not mean that such mobilization inevitably leads to

violence; as Brubakar and Laitin (1998:424) have argued, ‘measured against the universe

of possible instances, actual instances of ethnic and nationalist violence remain rare’. In

many cases, ethnic mobilization firmly remains within the limits of peaceful democratic

political competition (Habyarimana, 2008). Neither does it mean that the grievances

invoked by such political action are not deeply felt by the population prior to the process

of mobilization or that the population is not genuinely or spontaneously angered by the

‘ethnic other’.

This is why Vermeersch (2011:3) is of the opinion that ethnic mobilization is far

more than electoral campaigning on the basic of ethnicity. In his view ethnic mobilization

occurs not only at the time of election but also during other points in time, most likely at

the time of particular events that can form a basis of mass action be it in the form of

48

collective street protests or less visible forms of petitioning. This is made clearer in the

definition of ethnic mobilization proffered by Olzak (1983:355) as the process by which

groups organize around some features of ethnic identity (for example, skin colour,

language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends’.

Vermeersch (ibid) pointed out roughly four different theoretical perspectives on

ethnic mobilization and in the views of the researcher every avid observer of Nigerian

politics will agree that Vermeersch’s theoretical perspectives of ethnic mobilization are

effectively, applicable to the Nigerian context.

- First is the ‘culturalist’ perspective, which emphasizes the significance of strong

subjective bonding and values within ethnic groups for shaping the lines of ethnic

mobilization.

- Second is the ‘reactive ethnicity’ perspective which uses an economic perspective to

argue that the primary cause of ethnic mobilization lies in the coincidence of ethnic

bonding and relative deprivation.

- Third is ‘competition’ perspective, which focuses on ethnic leaders making rational

calculations about their identity and invoking ethnicity in their struggle for resources

and power.

- Fourth is the ‘political’ perspective, which emphasizes the role of the macro political

context consisting (1) the institutional environmental and (2) the dominant political

discursive context.

49

We have seen how imperative it is that a combination of the three theories espoused

above be applied in the analysis of our research findings. A clear understanding of the

Marxian political economic theory, the different stages of economic development and

particularly the feudal stage and all the characteristics inherent in this stage plus the type

of socio-political relationship that could exist in a society at this stage of development will

help us in understanding what this research work aims of achieve.

Again the dependency theory as was developed by Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch and

giving meaning to by Igwe (2005) but now applied to local politics will equally go along

way at helping to see what there is in the kind of relationship that go on between the lords

and the peasants in northern Nigeria. This relationship to an extent has risen to the level of

becoming a judiciary relationship such that a breach of it brings about crisis in the society.

This also paved way for the application of ethnic means of mobilization in the 2015

presidential election in Nigeria.

3.2 Hypotheses

Having anchored the scholarly analysis of this work on very wonderful theoretical

frameworks, it is high time we posit the hypotheses which read viz.

HO1: The feudal character of the North is answerable to its ability to mobilize voters in

the 2015 Presidential election.

HO2: The mobilization of ethnic forces helped to ensure the capture of state power by

the north in the 2015 Presidential election.

50

3.3 Research Design

According to Leege and Francis (1974), a research design is a detailed plan

outlining how observations i.e. who will be studied, how these people will be selected and

what information will be gathered from or about them. Planning for the specification and

manipulation of variables constitute the logic of a research design. The research design is

like a blueprint that tells us how to reach plausible answers to research problems. It spells

out the relationship between and among variables clearly and unambiguously. It shows the

functions of each variable in the statement of problems whether it is intended to be an

independent variable, a dependent variable, antecedent variable, an intervening variable.

Moreover, research design must not only develop careful measurement of all

variables but must specify the pathways to be followed among all the variables. As

different levels of explanations are sought, the variables are manipulated and their location

change. Other research design has to do with the sampling of objects and subjects needed

decisions about method and techniques for gathering data about the measurement

instrument and how data gathered will be analyzed. Leege and Francis (1974: p 66)

identify three questions we may ask of the research design:

1. Will the design provide plausible answers at the desired level of explanation and in

highly sensitive way?

2. Does the design permit control over extraneous source of variable? Does it allow for

the test of plausible rival hypotheses that an observed finding is really the result of

some substantive factor other than the one we have hypothesized (Extrinsic factor) or

51

an observed finding is simply an artifact of the research design and measurement

method we have used (Intrinsic factor)?

3. Is the design, practical and ethical? Does it lead us to the appropriate data in an

efficient and morally acceptable manner?

For the purpose of our study, a type of research design called historical design will

be more appropriate for analyzing our data since it involves critical and objective method

of inquiry with generalizations drawn from organized knowledge. Since this research is

also a scientific work, the distinctive features of a historical design such as the use of

quantitative hypotheses, critical analytical method and interpretation of findings will help

us to arrive at and verify empirical generalizations as well as explain and if possible

predict future events.

3.4 Method of Data Collection

The technique of observation was used to collect data for this work from secondary

sources. secondary sources of data refers to a set of data gathered or authored by other

persons either in the form of official document, survey result, books, etc collected for the

purpose other than the present (Asika,2006). This study will rely heavily on the secondary

sources of data like books, official documents, journals, internet materials on the subject

matter.

3.5 Method of Data Analysis

For the purpose of analyzing our data, we adopted the qualitative descriptive

method of data analysis. According to Asika (1991), qualitative descriptive analysis is

used to verbally summarize the information gathered in the research. Though in qualitative

52

descriptive analysis, descriptive explanation is given to statistical tables gathered on our

research work in order to establish the relationship between the variables under study.

Thus, the use of this method of analysis is informed by the simplicity with which it

summarizes, exposes and interprets relationship implicate in a given data by providing a

qualitative description or explanation to a qualitative information.

53

3.6 Logical Data Framework

NORTHERN FEUDALISM AND VOTERS MIOBILIZATION IN THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN

NIGERIA

LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK

RESEARCH

QUESTION 1

HYPOTHESES VARIABLES EMPIRICAL INDICATORS SOURCE OF

DATA

METHOD OF

DATA

COLLECTION

METHOD

OF DATA

ANALYSIS

- Is the

feudal character

of the North

answerable to

their ability to

mobilize voters

in the 2015

presidential

election?

(HYP1) The feudal

character of the

North is

answerable to its

ability to mobilize

voters in the 2015

presidential

election.

X

Character of the

feudal

North(aristocracy

)

- Northern territories are divided into autonomous

Emirates controlled mainly by hereditary local Emirs

who dictate the political behavior of their subject.

- The British Colonialists adopted the feudal system

which the Fulani oligarchy established to introduce

indirect rule which they used to effectively

administer indirect rule. This colonial structure has

continued to be a source of strength to the North in

political contests and processes.

- The use of Islamic religion as legitimizing

instrument for political loyalty and mutual

obligation.

- Colonial agreement between the colonial

administration and Northern emirates barred

Christianity from the North thereby consolidating its

feudal character.

- Decision by many of the Northern states to adopt

the Islamic legal principles of “al – Shari ah” which

is an embodiment of Sharia and its divine will

content instead of secular laws strengthens its feudal

character and political bond.

- The rulership of northern territories are usually the

exclusive right of the caliphate and the emirate.

- Following the adoption of landed gentry and

Islamic religion by the Hausa/Fulanis influenced

from the Mali Empire in the 11th century CE and by

- Journals

- INEC official

publications

- 2010 electoral

acts and the

1999

constitution

- Conference

and seminar

papers

- Government

gazette and

official

publications

- Internet

sources

- Textbooks

- Project reports

and unpublished

works.

Qualitative and

documentary

method of data

collection were

adopted hence we

relied on

documentary

sources like the

internet, journals,

official

publications,

textbooks etc.

Qualitative

method of data

collection

- Ex-post

factor

method of

analysis.

- Descriptive

and

explanatory

methods and

- The

Marxian

political

economy

theory and

the

dependency

theory were

used.

- Ethnic

mobilization

theory.

54

the 12th century CE the Hausa became one of

Africa’s major powers and a leading political force in

Nigeria.

Y

Account for the

Quest for state

power and the

mobilization of

voters in the 2015

presidential

elections.

-Threat by the north to make Nigeria ungovernable if

state power was not returned to the north during

2011 and 2015 elections

- Nigerians and northerners in particular believed to

mobilize the forces needed to defeat the menace of

Boko Haram and this lied in bringing in a northerner

and rallying support around him.

- The enlisting of the professional services of the

campaign manager of Obama to design the campaign

of APC led by the north strengthens northerners’

quest for state power.

- Alleged manipulation of the imported election card

reader and underage voting by the north indicate the

intense quest for state power.

55

RESEARCH

QUESTION 2

HYPOTHESES VARIABLES EMPIRICAL INDICATORS SOURCE OF

DATA

METHOD OF DATA

COLLECTION

METHOD OF

DATA

ANALYSIS

Did the mobilization

of ethnic forces help to

ensure the capture of

state power by the

north in the 2015

presidential election?

The mobilization

of ethnic forces in

the 2015

presidential

election helped to

ensure the capture

of state power by

the north.

X

Mobilization of

ethnic forces in

the 2015

presidential

election.

- The use of Islamic and Christian religion as a

unifying factor for the north and the west and of

course other regions of Nigeria respectively.

- The use of Arabic language as the Lingua Franca

of the north was a major source of strength in the

2015 presidential election..

- The colonial partitioning of Nigeria where one

region – the North is disproportionately and

unjustifiably larger than the others put together.

- The use of Boko Haram and its foreign allies as

intimidating forces to ensure the return of state

power to the north was an blatant deployment of

force to secure state power.

- Journals

- INEC official

publications

- 2010 electoral

acts and the 1999

constitution

- Conference and

seminar papers

- Government

gazette and

official

publications

- Internet sources

- Textbooks

- Project reports

and unpublished

works.

Qualitative and

documentary

method of data

collection were

adopted hence we

relied on

documentary

sources like the

internet, journals,

official publications,

textbooks etc.

- Ex-post factor

method of

analysis.

- Descriptive

and explanatory

methods and

- The Marxian

political

economy theory

and the

dependency

theory were

used.

Y

Helped to ensure

the capture of

state power by

the North in the

2015

Presidential

election.

APC epitomized by Buhari and Osinbajo won over

60% of states in the three main regions- 53.96%

while PDP had only 44.96% with a margin of

2,571,759.

- Northern and non-northern states voted massively

for the combination of religious forces.

- PDP conceded defeat even before the 2015

Presidential election results were announced by

INEC.

- Absence of petitions from any quarters in any

court or electoral tribunal in Nigeria by the erstwhile

ruling party is a clear indication of a clear cut

victory of the North.

56

CHAPTER FOUR

FEUDAL CHARACTER OF NORTH AND VOTER’S MOBILZIATION IN THE

2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

4.1 The People of Northern Nigeria and the 1804 Legacy

The history of Nigeria’s regions and states is complex and can be confusing.

Nigerians frequently use the term the “North” to designate the old Northern Region,

inherited from colonial powers and in place until the creation of new states in 1967. This

region cover over half the country, going as far South as the current capital, Abuja. The

North is home to numerous ethnic groups and religious communities. Largely rural, it also

includes historically important urban centres such as Kano, Sokoto, Zaria, Maiduguri and

Kaduna. These cities have been famous centres of learning in the Islamic world for

centuries.

According to Bawuro Karkindo (cited in Louis Brenner ed. 1993). The

predominant groups are the Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri, but there are also about 160 smaller

groups. The three largest are predominantly Muslims, while many of the smaller groups

are Christian or animist. Muslims are the majority in most of the far Northern states, in

some cases (Sokoto, Borno) overwhelmingly so, while states such as Kaduna are more

mixed. Since British colonization in the early 1900s, these have crystallized into what are

commonly referred to as “majority groups” and “minorities”, with further complexity

added by the arrival of substantial numbers of mainly Christian immigrants from the

country’s South.

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Across much of the region, but not all (especially not the north east, where the

Kanuri dominate) the Hausa and Fulani are considered the majority group or groups,

which is a reflection of political hegemony as much as pure numbers. Neither the Hausa

nor the Fulani is a rigid lineage group – one can become Hausa by adoption or conversion

to Islam, altogether in doing so one enters at the bottom rung of a highly stratified society.

As large Islamized ethnic groups closely associated with the nineteenth – century Sokoto

caliphate, the Hausa and Fulani are often seen as dominant in the region and grouped

together as a single Hausa-Fulani group. This is encouraged by Nigeria’s politics of

communal rivalry and to some degree reflects their own political strategies. However,

Hausa and Fulani are distinguishable in terms of names and languages and consider

themselves distinct. While nearly all Fulani in the region speak Hausa, the region’s lingua

franca, not all Hausa speak Fulani.

In the words of Jemkur, (1992) the earliest peoples in the region consisted of many

smaller groups, organized in autonomous or community based politics. Most had

rudimentary state structures, no imperial rulers and apparently no expansionist ambitions.

The Hausa, who partly came from migrations and partly formed in-situ, became an

identifiable (and self identifying) group in roughly the twelfth century. Internal rivalries

inhibited the formation of a unified empire, but they established seven major city-states

and seven other associated-states-collectively now known as Hausa land-extending into

what is the present-day Niger Republic.

By the thirteenth century according to records by Hiskett (1984), these states had

gained control over much of the region incorporating some smaller groups into multi-

ethnic, Hausa-speaking politics. Initially surrounded by the Bornu Empire to the east and

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Songhai Empire to the west, it was not until the seventeenth century that the Hausa

Empire flourished, by gaining control of significant trans-Saharan trade in salt, gold and

slaves.

Falola and Heaton (2008) recorded that the Kanuri originated from the Kanem

Empire that emerged by the ninth century in what is now South-Western Chad. Internal

instability forced them Westward across Lake Chad. Subduing the local people, they

established the Borno Kingdom, distinct from the Hausa states, in around the eleventh

century. Assimilating and inter-marrying with local ethnic groups, they became the largest

ethnic group in the north east. Again, the Fulanis migrated from present-day Senegal,

through the Mali and Songhai Empires, to Hausa land in the thirteenth century and Borno

in the fifteenth. Though mostly nomadic herdsmen, the scholars among them found

appointments in the Hausa royal houses, as advisers, scribes, judges and tax collectors,

and gradually gained great influence among Hausa nobles.

Beyond migrations and early settlements, the initial interactions were also shaped

by wars, slavery, commerce and the spread of Islam. Many state waged wars to expand

territorial claims and acquire slaves for working feudal plantations or export to North

Africa. The Hausa states allied intermittently but occasionally fought each other; they also

suffered invasion, notably by the Borno king Idris Alooma, in the late sixteenth century.

Commercial transactions created other links. For instance, as Hausa merchants travelled

South-ward, they established mid-way bases that later became permanent Hausa

settlements amid other peoples. This led to the establishment of Hausa towns that often

became the focal points of economic, political and administrative life in their respective

areas. Moreover, as the capitals of the Hausa states and the Borno Empire were major

59

Southern entrepots of trans-Saharan trade, they served as conduits for spreading North

African and Arab ideas and culture in the region.

The most significant interactions, however, were forged by the spread of Islam,

which occurred in two broad phases. Between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries

Islam was introduced largely peacefully, by clerics and merchant (often the same

individuals) from North Africa and the Arab world, and from across West Africa. The

rulers of the Borno Empire were the first to covert, in the eleventh century. With the

coming of Wangarawa traders and scholars from Mali at the end of the fourteenth century

and increase in trade with the Songhai Empire in the fifteenth, Hausa kings followed suit.

Already by the fourteenth century, Muslim scholars from Mali occupied important

administrative posts in the Hausa city – states (Loimeier, 1997).

The second phase started as a revivalist revolution at the dawn of the nineteenth

century: a Fulani preacher, Sheik Usman dan Fodio, led a Jihad initially aimed at

purifying Islamic practices in the region and ultimately at installing a new righteous

leadership. With support from the nomadic Fulani and disgruntled Hausa peasantry, who

had all suffered under the despotism and corruption of the Hausa kings, the jihad overran

the by-then fourteen Hausa states between 1804 and 1808 and replaced their chiefs with

Fulani emirs. Only Borno, conquered for a limited period (1808-1812), was never fully

subdued by the new regime the Sokoto Caliphate.

The new empire (Sokoto Caliphate) derived cohesion from Islam but consisted of

autonomous emirates, each with its emir and administration. At the apex was the caliph,

based in Sokoto, who doubled as both political leader and religious guide. The caliphate

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retained the pre-jihad feudal system, replacing the Hausa aristocracy with royal Fulani

families. Communities paid tithes to the emirs, who in turn paid tribute to the caliph.

Between the capitals of the emirates, trade flourished, transport routes were relatively

secure, and the cities attained considerable wealth (Johnston, 1967, Harnischfiger, 2008).

In the words of Pierce, (2006, P. 902) the Fulani rulers entrenched Islamic values

and practices in most of the region. Although this was sometimes met with passive

resistance from sections of the population, it was crucial to fostering a common culture

that transcended ethnicity and held the caliphate together. Anderson (1955) pointed out

that Sharia was applied “more widely, and in some respects more rigidly . . . than

anywhere else outside Saudi Arabia”, and that indigenous religious practices, such as

traditional Hausa ceremonies (Bori), were suppressed, or at least became less visible.

However, the Fulani rulers also assimilated many elements of Hausa culture, thus creating

the basis for what some see as a progressively homogenous Hausa-Fulani identity. Bunza

(2004) observed that the caliphate promoted a culture of “knowledge and intellectualism”,

such that “education became the yardstick for all opportunities in the state and knowledge

a ladder for climbing heights of respect and dignity.

Yet, the caliphate was not an ideal kingdom. Resistance to Fulani rule, including

resistance from Fulani nobles who felt excluded from emerging power structures and more

general insecurity, especially along its periphery, continued through the nineteenth

century. While Islam helped to consolidate political rule, it also inspired revolts

particularly where people suffered more intensive taxation. Towards the end of the

nineteenth century, many communities, especially at the eastern margins of the caliphate,

had been devastated by revolts inspired both by economic grievances and differences over

61

religious doctrine. As the caliphates’ prosperity was based in part on plantation labour,

warriors from the emirates constantly raided and looted peripheral regions, regarded as

heathen territory, to capture slaves. (Curtin and Lovejoy: 1986).

In the late nineteenth century, the British government established its control of

Southern Nigeria as a protectorate (with Lagos as a colony). In 1900, it began extending

its holding northward, proclaiming that region also a protectorate. Frederick Lugard,

appointed High commissioner of Northern Nigeria, slowly negotiated with the emirs to

accept colonial rule. Most cooperated, their kingdoms already weakened by internal

dissent following the end of the once-lucrative Trans-Atlantic slave trade. Those who

resisted were defeated, from Bida in 1901 to Sokoto in 1903. The killing of the fleeing

caliph Attahiru I, in July 1903, marked the end of the caliphate as a sovereign political

formation.

In the Crisis Group African Report (2010) it was clearly pointed out that the

Sokoto caliphate occupies an important, but ambivalent, position in the consciousness of

Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Its history is a source of pride, and its legacy gives a sense

of community and cohesion. This includes, unusually for West Africa, an indigenous

African written text, Hausa, which is still widely used. It has also left behind a structure of

traditional governance, centered on the caliphate emirs and their inheritors. This pride is

reinforced by the fact that the caliph (Attahiru I) did not surrender to British rule, but

fought to the death. From the foregoing, we can see why from the Caliph down to all the

emirs in northern Nigeria, their word is law. Those traditional rulers occupy almost

unchallengeable position in the north hence their ease in mobilizing the people.

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4.2 Religion and Identity Politics

According to Falola (1998:1) religion and politics have been bedfellows

throughout Nigeria’s history. He went further to assert that consequently in Nigeria,

political arrangements are shaped in such a way that religion serves as the ideological

preference for national identity much more than any configuration along cultural or

historical lines. In the words of Komolafe (2012), a continuous history of socio-political

position of religion in Nigeria stretches back to pre-colonial times. In primordial,

homogenous Nigerian societies for example, religion was indissolubly linked to the

political system. For him, the manipulation of religion for wresting political control was in

a sense an alien structure.

What may be constrained as the beginning of the use of religion as an instrument

of political mobilization and legitimacy can be traced to incursion into of alien religion,

starting with the jihadist Islam of the Muslim Fulani scholar, Usman dan Fadio (1804-

1810), and then to the trailing civilizing humanism of the protestant missions. The

ostensible religious objectives of the jihad were to bring Islamic reforms to the state and

its populace and to oppose the oppression, corruption, self-indulgence, and technical

offences against the Islamic code by the ruling Hausa-Habe families of the time (Johnston

(1967, Abba 1979). Many of the Islamic reforms that dan Fodio set out to accomplish

were achieved. He successfully conquered Hausa land except for the Maguzawa, a large

Hausa community which resisted the jihadist in faithful deference to its traditional

religion. Other remarkable results of dan Fodio’s campaign were the geographic

expansion of Islam and the widespread adoption of its legal code, Sharia.

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However, it is a misnormer to interpret, dan Fodio’s jihad purely on religious

grounds. This, without doubt obscures the equally important political reasons behind his

Islamization campaigns. Although the Fulani scholar ostensibly wanted to create a ‘home

for Islam’, at issue was the dismantling of indigenous Hausa-Habe polities. It should not

come as a surprise therefore, that an important feature of his jihad was the overthrowing of

Hausa-Habe leadership. In its place, dan Fodio imposed a Fulani administration in

consonance with the vision of Islam. That is a constituent of emirates that would recognize

the religious and political leadership of the Caliph or Sultan of Sokoto. Under dan Fodio’s

theocratic structure, no socio-political, economic or religious decisions had legitimacy

without the sultan’s approval (Enwerem, 1995).

Komolafe (2012) pointed out that by the middle of the nineteenth century, Hausa

rule in Northern Nigeria had been subjugated. Except for the mountainous district of

today’s Plateau state, the TIV in Benue state and a few groups in southern Kaduna, much

of the North passed under Fulani hegemony, or at least political dominance by Islamic

structures. Dan Fodio’s vision to bring the entire country under Islamic rule and leadership

was only interrupted by British colonialism. Even then, his socio-political structure was

what the British colonial administration inherited and upon which they founded their

policy of “Indirect Rule”. The colonial system of “Indirect Rule” was predicated on the

assumption that the Fulani were the country’s natural rulers, and that it was through the

Fulani that Nigeria could be governed indirectly and moved to the highest level of

civilization. According to Frederick Luggard, the colonial Governor of Nigeria, “Indirect

Rule” means among other things; “To rule indirectly through native chiefs, and in the

North to maintain, strengthen and educate the Fulani and Kanembu ruling races, so that

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regenerations of Nigeria may be through its own governing class and its own indigenous

institutions”.

In deference to Fulani conquest and rulership, therefore, colonial policy was not

only unfairly skewed towards sensibilities. Two discrete factors, among others are worthy

of mention. First was the setting up of a Native Administration in which the traditional

and political power coalesced in the hands of the Muslim Emirs. The result was

installation of Fulani hegemonic political control. This led naturally to the second factor,

the “Pax Islamica” which promised the Emirs there would be no colonial interference with

Islam.

The intellectual position of “Pax Islamica” was more than a mere promise. The

axiomatic character of its benefits to Islam enabled the Emirs to monopolize the civil

sphere and religious territoriality. While the Emirs could operate freely in non-Muslim

areas, they could deny access to Christian missionaries from operating within their

emirates. In the race for the souls of Nigerians, therefore, the colonial administration

encouraged and promoted the territorial interests of Islam by effectively blocking

Christianization. In the words of Lamin Sanneh (1996: 135) “colonialism became the

Muslim shield and the guarantor of Islam as the public alternative to Christianity for

Africans”. Andrew Walls (2992: 102) put it well when he declares:

In Nigeria, the British maintained the emirates as the structure through

which to rule, even though so much of the population was not Muslim. As

a result, Islam spread far more effectively under colonial rule than it had

ever done under the Jihads. In general, the colonial powers were careful

about Islamic sensibilities and did their best to avoid provocation, not least

by damping down Christian missionary activity”.’

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The divide-and-rule policies of the colonial period have helped us to see the

underlying structure that conditioned the religious and political behavior of post colonial

Nigeria. Similarly, the colonial creation of two religious communities according to

Komolafe (2012) has had unmistakable consequences. Primarily, it has trapped the nation

in the labyrinthine religious politics of the North and the Hausa – Fulani resolve to

maintain an Islamic identity for modern Nigeria. Tracing the history of this especially

after independence Falola (1999) maintained that most of the political parties constructed

their manifestoes around issues of rapid development and distribution of power. For

example, the AG put forward a welfarist programme and the NCNC a socialist ideology,

both attempting to appeal to all the strata of society, especially the lower and middle

classes. The NPC had a totally different agenda. In the first place and true to its motto of

“one north, one people,” it maintained its northern Islamic parochialism and prejudice by

limiting membership only to Northerners. And unlike the AG and the NCNC, the party

made no pretense to socialism but conceived its programme in such a way as to benefit the

North. There is no better starting point in tracing this character of the feudal north than the

use of religion in the high politics of the First Republic (1960-1966) particularly at the

religious politics of Sir Ahamadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the first premier of

the Northern Region.

The place of Sir Ahmadu Bello in the history of the politicization of religion in

Nigeria is so well documented. However, one thing that must be emphasized is that an

important determinant of his political life was his self-consciousness of being a

descendant of Usman dan Fodio’s caliphate. This awareness doubly reinforced what he

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perceived as a mandate to broaden the territorial boundaries of the Hausa-Fulani/North

and Islam. He declared in no ambiguous way;

I have never sought the political limelight or a leading position in

(Nigeria). But I could not avoid the obligation of my birth and destiny. My

great-great grandfather built an Empire in the Western Sudan. It has fallen

to my lot to play a not inconsiderable part in building a new nation. My

ancestor was chosen to lead the Holy war which set up his Empire. I have

been chosen by a free electorate to help build a modern state. This, then, is

the story of my life. The attempt of a Northern Nigerian to do his duty by

his people and the principles of his religion [that is, Islam] (Falola,

1998:30).

Ahmadu Bello’s remarks were not mere rhetoric. He developed instruments for

carrying out his mission at the regional, national and international levels. At the regional

level, he adopted a form of “political ecumenism” which sought to bring northerners

together under an Islamic political ideology. There are at least two important political

implications of this. On one hand, it fostered an unbroken continuity and a unifying

Islamic identity for the North till date. On the other, it won his then party political

influence and consolidated its hold of power. The move to capture the political center at

the national level reflected Ahmadu Bello’s very subtle calculations. An interesting

feature of this scheme was the exaltation of the religion’s influence which was already at

work. Perhaps, it is fair to say that Ahmadu Bello’s theology and outlook on the

supremacy of Islam and the Hausa-Fulani/North were not different from those of Usman

dan Fodio who combined conversion and conquest. The difference, ingenious when we

consider the most restrained political climate of Ahmadu Bello’s time, was the methodical

way by which he embarked on his massive “conversion campaigns” to win over souls for

Islam and the Northern hegemony.

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Ahmadu Bello understood that the extent to which his campaigns succeed would

become the groundswell of his capacity to combine both religious and political powers at

the national level. Consequently, he instigated the founding of Jama’atu Nasri/Islam (JNI,

the society for the victory of Islam), and the council of Mallams. Both organizations were

supposed to bring together various elements of religious leadership in the North for the

purpose of discussion and general enlightenment (Paden, 1986: 557). It is perhaps not

without significance that modern commentators (Kukah, 1993, 1995: 225-238, Enwerem,

1995, Falola, T. 1998) interpret Ahmadu Bello’s initiatives, especially his 1961 founding

of JNI, in purely political terms. Although JNI had all the trappings of religious

organization, it was practically a political organ wearing a religious gab to serve a political

purpose (Enwerem, 1995: 55). The constituency of JNI, for one thing, included the cadres

of very influential people who were doyen of early post-colonial Nigerian politics:

traditional rulers, emirs, Mallams (religious leaders), top civil servants, prominent

businessmen and powerful northerners in the NPC of then and today.

In the words of Komolafe (2012), Ahmadu Bello was not naïve as to assume that

achieving his political ambition was self fulfilling. He understood the dialectical

interaction between religion and politics much more than that and he utilized it quite

effectively. Rather than allowing the JNI to simply forge a strong Islamic identity in the

north, he also found an important avenue in carving a political role for it. For example, a

characteristic feature of the conversion campaigns of the JNI throughout northern and

central Nigeria forced an acceptance of Ahmadu Bello’s Islamic political ideology. In this

way, the JNI became a de facto moral agent for an ideology that aimed inexhaustibly at

the creation of a political community that upheld Islam as its constitutive value. He went

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further to say that JNI remains a formidable Muslim pressure group that continues to

promote the interest of a unified north and Islamic cause to this day. This was evident

during the electioneering campaign in the north. It was especially members of the JNI that

went round virtually all the towns in the north with megaphones mounted on their vehicles

playing and replaying the sermons of Fr. Ejike Mbaka on the rejection of Goodluck

Jonathan by the Holy Spirit. This way the people of the north were effectively mobilized

to vote in the 2015 Presidential elections. Of importance here is the report by Vanguard

Newspaper of 31 January 2015, where it was stated that “like other core northern state, the

voting pattern in Kano, usually toe along ethno-religious lives.

A better understanding of identity politics in Nigeria, will give us a clue to how

and why Northern feudalism developed the political character it posses today. Identities

have historically been significant in the Nigerian political process, under colonial rule as

well as in the post-colonial dispensation. Under colonialism, administrative exigencies

warranted the nurturing and exacerbation of an “us” versus “them” syndrome Muslim

versus Christian; Northerner versus Southerner ; Hausa-Fulani versus Yoruba versus Igbo,

and so on. Religious, regional and ethnic differences were given prominence in conceiving

and implementing social, educational and economic development policies and projects

under the indirect system of colonial administration favoured by the British. Thus, the

differential impact of colonialism set the context of the regional educational, economic

and political imbalances which later became significant in the mobilization or

manipulation of identity consciousness in order to effectively divide and rule, as well as in

the politics of decolonization and in the arena of competitive politics in the post-colonial

era (Jega, 2000). Ethnicity and religion are some of the many forms of identity politics to

69

which large academic literatures attach in Nigeria. They are also the most critical identities

in the country (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005).

According to Onigu Otite, there are 374 ethnic groups in Nigeria (Otite 1990). The

population of these ethnic groups varies considerably; the three largest groups constitute

more than half of Nigeria’s entire population while the eight largest groups are almost a

two third (Nnoli: 1995). This population disparity coupled with the differences in the

political influence of the ethnic groups broadly divides the groups into two – the majority

and minority ethnic groups. The majority ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the north

(29%), the Yoruba in the southwest (21%) and Igbo in the southeast (18%) (Paden: 2008).

All the other ethnic groups fit into the minority category, with varying degrees of political

status, depending on their numerical size and political influence.

The Hausa-Fulani and other communities residing in Northern Nigeria are mainly

Muslims while the south-south minority areas and Igbo speaking areas in the southeast are

predominantly Christians. The Middle Belt (or north-central zone) is a mixture of

Christian and Muslim populations, while the Yoruba-speaking communities in the

southwest are about half Muslim and half Christian. This differentiation underlies the

North-South cleavage (in terms of the North being predominantly Muslim and the South

predominantly Christian) and sharpens ethnic cleavages in the country, especially in the

north where as Paden (2007) noted, “the all-consuming nature of Islamic identity does

eclipse other identities and religious differences play a major part in ethnic

differentiation.” This reflects the historical salience of Islam in the formation of the

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northern emirates in the early 19th century, and the continuing importance of emirs and

religious authorities in framing identities in the northern states (Lewis: 2007).

While it is generally believed that ethnic identification is presumed to be the most

salient and consistent source of social identity in Nigeria (Lewis: 2007), this common

assumption is challenged by a research by the Pew Religious Forum which revealed that

religion, rather than ethnicity is the most salient identity in the country.

Of the three religious identities in Nigeria – Christian, Muslim and Traditional, the

latter is the least politically active; numbering several hundreds of ethnic groups and

subgroups, villages, clans and kin groups ; and, involving the worship of different gods

and goddesses (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). According to a 2003 Nigerian Demographic

and Health Survey which interviewed a nationally representative sample of 7,620 women

(between ages 15 and 59) and 2,346 men (ages 15 and 49), 50.5% of the population is

Muslim and 48.2% is Christian. Only 1.4% is associated with other religions (cf. PEW

Forum on Religious and Public Affairs, 2006). It is this unique religious divide that

prompted Archbishop Onaiyekan to describe the country as “the greatest Islamo-Christian

nation in the world” [5] by which he meant that Nigeria is the largest country in the world

with an evenly split population of Muslims and Christians, and “really the test case of the

‘clash of civilizations,’” (Paden, 2007).

Religion has always been important in Nigeria and in Nigerian politics (Enwerem,

1995). “The intensity of religious identity in Nigeria is regarded as one of the highest in

the world” (Paden, 2008). This claim is supported by the fact that Nigerians are more

likely to define themselves in terms of religion than any other identity. Indeed, according

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to the authoritative May-June 2006 survey on Religion and Public Life conducted by the

Pew Forum on “Religion and Public Life”, 76% of Christians say that religion is more

important to them than their identity as Africans, Nigerians or members of an ethnic

group. Among Muslims, the number naming religion as the most important factor is even

higher (91%). In effect, Christian and Muslim identities have been the mainstay of

religious differentiation and conflict, with Nigerian Muslims much more likely to evince

or articulate a religious identity than Christians (Lewis and Bratton 2000; Lewis, 2007). In

the case of Islam, “the rise of this dimension of fanaticism and intolerance has manifested

itself in a very dramatic manner over the past few years through the activities of the

Maitatsine, Izala and MSS movements” (Ibrahim, 1989).

Take Izala for instance. According to Ibrahim (1991), the Izala movement is a

powerful and orthodox ‘return to source’ group that emerged under the leadership of Sheik

Abubakar Mahmood Gumi, a former Grand Khadi of Northern Nigeria in the 1950s and

1960s, who became the inspirer of a major modern organisation of Islamic reform in

Northern Nigeria. The Movement, which has buses and public address systems, organizes

regular campaigns in many towns and villages in the north and their recorded cassettes are

sold throughout northern Nigeria. Gumi also has the support of a number of well- placed

intellectuals and administrators. The Izala Movement has a significant female membership

as it holds regular classes for married women (Loimeier, 2003). Yet as the movement

grew, so also its leaders became more and more intolerant. For instance in an interview in

This week Magazine (6 April 1987) Abubakar Gumi came out heavily against Christians:

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In addition, the political elites have always sought to manipulate the multifaceted

identities (ethnic, regional, minority-majority, and religious divisions) especially during

political competition and this has given rise to conflicts and instability in Nigeria (Nnoli

1978, Dudley 1973). This politicization of religious identities for the contest for political

power in Nigeria is often devoid of any sustaining unifying theme or ideology (Natufe,

2001). Rather, as Amadi (2003) noted, Nigerian politics is built on the appeasement of

religion. Religion then becomes a deity that proves difficult to be overpowered and

equally incapable of decisively breaking out of the constraints of liberal legality. In the

elite’s intense struggle for access to power and state resources, “patterns of political

domination are constantly being transformed. It is this constantly changing pattern of

domination that has produced the fears and anxieties that underlie increasing conflict and

intolerance” (Ibrahim and Kazah-Toure, 2003).

4.3 North-South Divide, Violence and Terrorism

To understand clearly this character of the northern aristocracy, we have to go

down memory lane. Historically, Babawale (1992) stated that not unconsciously, the

British colonial power left intact the feudal-aristocratic power structure it found in the

north, because it suited the British policy of indirect rule’. In fact, the British government

ordered the Christian Missionaries to restrict their evangelism to non-Muslim areas of the

north except they were specially permitted by the emir. For a long time therefore, a large

portion of northern Nigeria was to be shielded from western- type education as a

conscious British policy. The seed of suspicion of educated Southerners was also sown

and it was soon to germinate into a full-blown, North-South dichotomy in Nigerian

politics. In addition, the alliance established by the British colonial masters with the ruling

73

class involved their protection of the traditional Islamic institution of the northern

societies (Dudley, 1968). This is the genealogy of the approval for the dominance of

religion in the politics of northern Nigeria. And as Fox and Sandler (2003, pp. 567-568)

pointed out that religion represents a strong social force in the politics of the state given its

capacity for effective political mobilization.

Unlike in other parts of West Africa where the anti-colonialist bourgeoisie

possessed a national outlook, Babawale, (1992) observed that the Nigerian bourgeoisie of

the different regions, were locked in the world of their enclaves and contended themselves

with the local advantages accruing in their own regions. This selfish instinct of the elites

manifested itself in the form of slow-paced nationalist agitation in the North because the

feudal aristocracy enjoyed tremendous privileges and concessions, and saw no need to

disturb the status quo even though the vast majority of the peasants were marginalized

both politically and economically. The petty bourgeoisie that was known as the Maikataa

class or the few westernized elites had unexplored job opportunities and suffered little

discrimination unlike their Southern Counterparts, hence, their phlegmatic response to

nationalist agitations in the South.

In the same manner, in party politics, the AG’s base in the Western region did not

come as a coincidence. As Nnoli has revealed, most of its leaders lacked a credible

national appeal hence these “relatively obscure national leaders allied with natural rulers

and mobilized the peasantry to become big – time politicians in their small regional

enclaves”. The ethno-regional cabal (led by the Hausa-Fulani oligarchy) in the NPC was

no less guilty of this amplification of ethnic and regional differences for selfish political

and economic reasons. These leaders, given their feudal-aristocratic background, saw

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coalescence in their ambition to maintain their feudal privileges and that of the British to

maintain effective colonization of the people of Nigeria, most especially in the North.

Thus they will fully supported the British effort to create an unbridgeable gulf between the

north and south of the country, through the mobilization of prejudices against the South

and the heightening of the people’s fear of Southern domination.

Unfortunately, the fact that the South was more educationally advanced than the

north made the manipulation of people’s prejudices very effective for the northern feudal

aristocrats. The gains from such support for colonialism case to the leaders in the form of

an effective consolidation of their political power, even if as imperialist megaphones, and

secondly, it meant an easy access to wealth that clearly accompanied their positions as

spokespersons for the colonial power. Finally, it helped the northern elites to successfully

hide their inability to venture outside their enclaves for national support.

Contrary to the much publicized imbalance in educational opportunities between

the north and south, the plain truth is that such differences existed merely at the level of

access to western-type education. In fact the northern elites had been in contact with

Arabic education and civilization long before the Southern elites’ contact with Western

civilization. In other words, literacy in Arabic had been entrenched in the north and the

northern elites were not only well versed in it but were also extensively learned in the

intricacies and complexities of politics and governance in general. Islam, as widely

acknowledged Is not just a religion but a way of life. It was in a bid to make the ‘divide

and rule’ policy effective that the British colonial power found it expedient to preserve the

north in its pristine Islamic purity, restrict the movement of Christian missionaries in the

region, limit the spread of western education and minimize the contact with southerners.

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One must not fail to point out that the latter campaigns by the NPC for

Northernization of the civil service and the delay of independence for Nigeria were mere

shibboleths employed by the northern Feudal-aristocratic elites to enable them consolidate

their political and economic gains. Indeed, the NPC emerged as the most bankrupt and

most regional in outlook, of all the political parties that participated in Nigeria’s pre and

immediate post independence politics. Instead of employing the positive aspects of Arabic

influence i.e. literacy to forge a national identity, if only for the privileged classes across

regional boundaries, the Moslem religion was used to solidify the basis of emirate power.

In fact the privileged aristocratic class in the north maintained an arrogant aloofness from

their southern counterparts. It is no surprise that the NPC slogan was “north for

northerners, east for easterners, west for westerners and Nigeria for all”. No wonder

during the electioneering campaign 2014/2015, one could hear some northern elites

insinuating that what is good for the north is good for Nigeria. Socio-economically too,

we could observe that in the north whatever the feudal-aristocratic says, holds. Following

the not-contributing position of the masses, Chief Obafemi Awolowo in his book “Path To

Nigerian Freedom” asserted that:

The masses of the people in the north are at present not at all interested in

politics. They are ignorant and unspeakably poor . . . They have never been

known to grumble.

The position of the masses in the north is such that they have been orientated to

defend the opinion of their leaders (possibly with the last drop of their blood) without

questioning.

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On 11th August 2014, Northern Elders Forum (NEF) issued an ultimatum to

Jonathan that he rescue the Chibok school girls and end the insurgency in the north by the

end of October otherwise he should forget his 2015 presidential ambition. This is a clear

show of the nature or character of terrorism on the part of Northern leaders which also go

pari-pasu with violence.

A house of Representative Member in the second republic (1979-1983) Junaid

Mohammed boldly threatened that if Jonathan insists on running, there will be bloodshed

and that those who feel short-changed may take the warpath and the country may not be

the same again (Sun, 1 Dec. 2013). Similarly on 14th October 2014, Northern Elders

Forum (NEF) warned that those who vote for Jonathan and the PDP in 2015 will be

considered enemies of the north. On the same day, hundreds of thugs, armed with cudgels,

pickaxes, bows and arrows stormed the Bauchi residence of the PDP’s publicity secretary

in the north east, Sani Alamin Mohammed, intending to lynch him: he was not at home,

but the thugs, restrained by the police from burning his house, left a chilling warning that

any politician in the state who supports Jonathan should flee with his family or risk paying

with his life (Vanguard, 15 October 2014, Peoples Daily (Abuja), 15 October 2014). Good

or bad, none of the thugs was arrested.

This was the position of things as the northern leaders were mobilizing their people

to vote in the 2015 presidential elections. One could observe the high degree level of

confidence with which some leaders in the north were inciting their people. In January

2014, security operatives summoned and interrogated Nasir el-Rufai, an APC official who

had warned that the 2015 elections may be followed by violence if the polls are not free

and fair. Again in August 2014, the DSS questioned Joseph Waku, an APC leader over the

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same issue. One could also recall that in October 12, 2010, the Tribune newspaper

reported that former Kaduna State Governor, Alhaji Lawal Kaita threatened that the north

will make Nigeria ungovernable for President Goodluck Jonathan if he wins the 2011

elections. What followed the 2011 elections, one could say was enough precedence of

what the north is capable of doing in 2015. Again, the Punch Newspaper of May 16, 2012,

quoted Bamanga Tukur as saying that “Boko Haram is fighting for justice. Boko Haram

is another name for justice”.

After its members publicly threatened the nation that they would unleash activities

that will make “Nigeria ungovernable for Jonathan”, Osun Defender of March 16, 2012

reported that prominent members of the Northern Elders Political Forum met at the

Maizube farm house of General Abubakar in Minna, Niger State to deliberate on how to

save Nigeria from the lingering security challenges bedeviling the country. Probably as a

way of re-strategizing, Daily Sun Newspaper of 6th December 2014 reported that day by

day, more and more Northern leaders are buying into the suspicion spreading fast in the

region that the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan is fueling the Boko Haram

insurgency in parts of the North to enhance his chances of re-election in the 2015 general

elections.

From Katsina to Kaduna, Bauchi to Kano and so on, virtually all the leaders

Saturday Sun spoke to on the strong feelings spreading like wildfire that the FGN is

conniving with some factions of Boko Haram to wreck havoc in the north, gave the same

opinion. They accused President Jonathan of working clandestinely to use the insurgency

to depopulate the North ahead of the February 2015 elections. Infact, former

Commissioner of Police in Lagos, Abubakar Tsav accused the Presidency of using Niger

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Delta militants to carry out the previous week bombing of Kano Central Mosque. In the

words of Danmnsa (former Deputy Senate President in the Second Republic) “was it

Abacha or who that said any insurgency which lasts 12 hours without government quelling

it, government has a hand in it. So you do not need to go to school to believe that

government is responsible (for this insurgency)”.

In Bauchi, prominent Islamic Scholar, Shiek Dahiru Bauchi holds the same view.

According to him: “This bloodshed has gone beyond comprehension’’. There are claims

that they are occurring in this magnitude because some politicians want to cause insecurity

in the North so that there won’t be election. It is very disturbing. I don’t think these recent

bombings, especially the ones that happened in Kano Central Mosque are Boko Haram.

They know themselves. These are people in government that do not want the Boko Haram

crisis to end. That is why it went to this stage and now it is an open thing. The ones

carrying out these attacks are not Muslims. Their target is to kill Muslims, destroy the

north so that there won’t be elections in 2015. These politicians want the insecurity to

continue. That is what they are looking for. To destroy the North and our communities so

that they will remain in power . . .” This way the masses in the North were fed with a lot

of sentiments which paved way for their easy mobilization to vote in the 2015 Presidential

elections.

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CHAPTER FIVE

MOBILIZATION OF ETHNIC FORCES IN THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTION

5.1 Ethnic Politics in Nigeria (From Pre-Independence till Date)

As we have undoubtedly agreed that the seed of ethnicity was sown by the colonial

masters in Africa and Nigeria in particular in the pre-independence days for their

economic gains, germinated in the independence and First Republic and the products

started to spread during the 3rd and 4th republics. However, with coming of colonial rule,

the prevalent political environment was altered completely. Thus, most ethnic

nationalities were forcibly encapsulated into a political entity with a new name for

instance, apart from the three major ethnic groups (Igbo, Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba) more

than 250 other ethnic groups or nationalities were woven into what later became known as

Nigeria (Manesch, and Edet, 2005).

With respect to the above statement Emezie (1997) observed that the politicization

of ethnicity in Nigeria politics had its genesis in British colonial policies which through

the obnoxious “divide and rule policy” encouraged the use of different application of

colonial policies on traditional institutions and structures of the various ethnic groups in

Nigeria. The results of this impact of colonial policies have been the distrust, rivalry and

lack of co-operation that have characterized the relationship among three dominant ethnic

groups in Nigeria. Explicit in the above assertion is the fact that the political structures

which the colonial masters left behind were the major cause of ethnicity in Nigeria,

especially the federal political structure comprising three unequal regions engineered by

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Governor Bernard Bourdillion in 1939 and executed by Gov. Arthur Richard in 1946

made the struggle for the control of the Federal Government to be extremely vicious and

militant. Now, Nigeria for the past fifty-seven years has been engulfed with the fear of

secession by one ethnic group and the other in the body-politic, due to the threat of

domination by another ethnic group. Again, Bourgeoisies in the pre-independence era

played highly regional politics anchored on the regional nationalism that the division of

the country into two political entities North and South in 1914 by Lord Lugard and later

three unequal regions brought.

According to Lewis (2007), a set of common assumptions has governed the

analysis of ethnicity in Nigerian politics and society. First, ethnic identification is

presumed to be the most salient and consistent source of social identity in Nigeria.

Second, ethnicity is regarded as a central avenue for collective action. Third, ethnicity is

assumed to be a generally destabilizing influence, with particularly corrosive influences

on democracy. A number of implications follow from these premises. Since political

competition is organized along ethnic lines, both democratic and authoritarian regimes

presumably have an ethnic character. Civilian governments supposedly encourage ethnic

political parties, while military regimes are said to reflect a clear sectional ruling group.

Structures of political control are also constituted ethnically, through clientelist networks

and patronage systems. Ethnic identity, in a context of rivalry over scarce resources, is

viewed as fostering polarization and conflict (Lewis, 2007).

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In addition, the political elites have always sought to manipulate the multifaceted

identities (ethnic, regional, minority-majority, and religious divisions) especially during

political competition and this has given rise to conflicts and instability in Nigeria (Nnoli

1978, Dudley 1973). This politicization of religious identities for the contest for political

power in Nigeria is often devoid of any sustaining unifying theme or ideology (Natufe,

2001). Rather, as Amadi (2003) noted, Nigerian politics is built on the appeasement of

religion. Religion then becomes a deity that proves difficult to be overpowered and

equally incapable of decisively breaking out of the constraints of liberal legality. In the

elite’s intense struggle for access to power and state resources, “patterns of political

domination are constantly being transformed. It is this constantly changing pattern of

domination that has produced the fears and anxieties that underlie increasing conflict and

intolerance” (Ibrahim and Kazah-Toure, 2003).

In the 1920s and early 30s, the political landscape of Nigeria was dominated by the

Yoruba in Lagos, hence the formation of the first political party by Herbert Macaulay in

1923 when elective principles was incorporated first in Nigeria which gave Nigerians the

political right to vote and be voted for and to form political parties, then the NNDP saw its

appearances in the polity to champion the cause of the early nationalists and self-rule, self

determination and economic freedom from the British colonialism (Nwankwo, 1990). The

afore-mentioned era never saw unimaginable proportion of ethnic politics till the arrival of

Nnamdi Azikiwe in the late 1930s in Nigeria from America.

To start with, Nnoli (1989) asserts that by 1953, the major political parties in

Nigeria the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), the Action Group (AG)

the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) had became associated with the three major ethnic

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groups – Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani of the three regions of the East, West and North

respectively. In respect with the multicultural and multi-lingual nature of Nigerian state,

the leaders of the afore-mentioned political parties namely; NCNC, AG, NPC came from

Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani ethnic groups – in the persons of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an

Igbo from the East, Chief Obafemi Awolowo of AG from the West (Yoruba) and Ahmadu

Bello of NPC from the North. The said political parties emerged from the tribal/ethnic

unions. For example, the Igbo Union/Igbo Federated Union of 1936 metamorphosed into

NCNC in 1944 and then AG was an offspring of Egbe Omo Oduduwa Yoruba cultural

association of 1945 formed in London by Chief Awolowo, followed by the NPC, which

came out from Hausa/Fulani cultural group Jamiyyar Mutanen Arewa.

In this order, ethnic politics reared its head in Nigeria first in 1953 when a member

of the Action Group, Chief Anthony Enahoro, in the House of Representatives moved a

motion for self government to be granted the three regions come 1956, while the

politicians from the southern region welcome the motion of self rule in 1956, the Northern

elements in the House kicked against it with the counter-motion of “as soon as

practicable” by Ahmadu Bello, the leader of NPC, in the heat of the debate in the House,

the counter-motion by Ahmadu Bello fuelled the anger of the agitating Southerners who

wanted self-rule now or never, then crisis ensued in the House of Representatives in which

Northerners were jeered at by the angry mobs in Lagos ( Coleman, 1958).

Consequently, the total rejection of the motion for self-rule appeared to have been

the fact that Northerners believed that they were backward educationally and if such

policy should be implemented, the Southerners with their skills and certificates of higher

education which they had the advantages of gaining due to the arrival of European

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missionaries in the Southern region in the early 19th Century, would out compete

Northerners and take up public service in the North. The South had an edge over the

Northern indigenes in terms of western education that could equip them with the

knowledge and skills required for the civil service of the present political order due to

their (North) rejection of European Missionaries, who propagated Christianity and

Western education at the same time, because they believe in their Northern old order of

learning Islamic education which Western education to the Northerners was a rival

(Coleman, 1958).

In the heat of the exercise, the Chieftain of AG SL Akintola, with some members

of the NCNC carried their campaign to the Kano area of Northern Nigeria to sail their

self-government agenda of 1956 though after disgracing their Northern counter-parts in

the House of Representatives, then in the Sabongari area of Kano, fight ensured between

the stalwarts of NPC and the Southern politicians under the aegis of AG/NCNC which

resulted in the deaths of 15 Northerners and 21 Southerners and over 241 causalities. That

occurrence saw to the politicization of ethnicity in Nigerian politics and the attendant

solutions from persons, institutions and scholarly inputs of ethnic politics in Nigeria.

Amidst speculations in the heat of the 1953 impasse which marked the beginning

of ethnic politics in Nigeria, the Chieftain of NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bellow remarked “the

Amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 by Lord Lugard was a

regrettable mistake” (Coleman, 1958). In the discussions that followed, it was agreed to

make Nigeria federation of three regions Northern, Eastern and Western, with resident

powers vested in the regions.

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As the Nigerian politics continued on ethnic times, Oliver Lyttleton’s constitution

came in place and answered the quest of the ethnic minded Nationalities by granting true

residual powers to the regional councils from which the founders of the three major

political parties- NPC of North by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, NCNC of East by Dr. Azikiwe

and AG of West by Chief Awolowo came who became the premiers of the three

respective regional councils as they won massively in 1954 elections from their respective

ethnic groups where, there parties had root. By 1960, when the country gained

independence, the idea of fair representation of all the regions in the federal appointments

has become accepted, although without specific quotas. However, in recruitment into

officers corps of the armed forces and the police, a quota system was applied which

continued till 1967 when states were created to replace the three regions, and the formula

was reviewed and applied on the basis of equal numbers from each state.

In the wake of independence in 1960, most activities in Nigeria that seemed to be

National affairs were ethnically politicized and at the end, the court would be equally used

to end such ensuing conflict. Nigeria had its first census count in 1962/63 after

independence and the whole exercise ended in a deadlock because of ethnic sentiments

which seemed to override the National interest of the politicians. At the first head-count,

the North had the highest number which was 22.5 million, being the largest most

populated which had been dominating majority seats in the House of Representatives

which politically implied that the NPC would continued to determine the nature of

legislations to be passed into law. Infact, NPC was in control of the country’s politics,

then the census figure of the East was 12.3 million and this showed a rise of 70% in ten

years. That of the North showed a rise of 30% in ten years which sent a wrong signal that

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the East would come to dominate in the House of Representatives over and against the

densely populated Hausa – Fulani and Benue – Plateau people (Nwnakwo, 1990).

It was difficult to get the results of the West because of the political unrest there.

Ethnic legal fight came into the census result when the Chairman of census Mr. Wairen

ordered that the census be conducted again that it seemed the East inflated their result, but

Dr. Michael Okpara the premier of Eastern region declared that that result was correct

then, the prime minister took over the matter and a second count was conducted which

saw the result of East Maintained the same figure but that of the North increased to 31

million against 22.5 million earlier obtained. The then Premier of Eastern region rejected

the figure, and the third count was conducted in November 1963 which saw the East in the

same level but that of the North reduced a little to 29, 986. It was only the North that

accepted this figure while other regions didn’t. It appeared that it was due to ethnic

Nationalism and identity politics carried by the Peti-Bourgeoisie from the pre-

independence Nigeria to the first republic that is still lingering till this day in Nigerian

politics, which gave credence to the words of Gowon (1967) that “there was no Nigerian

unity” and that of Awolowo (1947) that “Nigeria was a mere geographical expression”.

Again, it was in eh census-count of 1962/63 that ethnic politics blurred the

National Consciousness of Nigerian leaders that threatened the unity of Nigeria in the first

republic of 1963, ethnic politics engulfed the entire nation and retarded the effort of some

Nationalists like Dr. Azikiwe who kept chanting his slogan of ‘one Nigeria’ till the

military saw him, Ahmadu Bellow, Awolowo, S.L. Akintola and Balewa off on the 5th

of January 1767 in a military coup. What’s more, the general election of 1964 was a

significant land-mark in the political history of Nigeria due to ethnic politics that

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cumulated into massive rigging in the election, arson and kidnapping of parties chieftains

in the heat of the voting. There was merger of political parties as the general election of

1964 was drawing by the light of these; Chief S.O. Akintola formed NNDP – Nigeria

National Democratic Party which was a resuscitation of the defunct NNDP of Dr. Herbert

Marcaulay of 1923. Then he Akintola allied his NNDP with Northern People’s Congress

(NPC) of Ahmadu Bello of North. The Igbo dominated political party of Zik and Michael

Okpara for the first time in Nigeria Political History merged/allied with Awolowo’s

Action Group (AG) and were called UPGA and the allied political party of NNDP and

NPC was called Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). As voting started, it followed ethnic

lines where the UPGA – controlled place of Eastern Region declared fifteen of its

candidates unopposed, whole NNDP announced a return of sixty-six candidates

unopposed; in the same way Michael Okpara and his UPGA members boycotted election,

in protest against alleged irregularities in the nomination of candidates by NNA which the

Chairman of election failed to handle before the voting day (Nwankwo, 1990).

Infact, the whole election in the first republic was a satire due to ethnic

consciousness of the party leaders against Nigerian Nation which at this crucial period, it

was evident that Nigeria was a ship in the sea without a captain because even the Prime

Minister and eh Head of State were ethnic – minded instead of thinking and acting in line

of Nation-building. The story of Nigerian Nationalism has always been told against a

background of strong ethno-regionalism and intrea-ethnic conflict which was exemplified

by the rift between S.L. Akintola the Premier of Western region from Egba land and the

opposition leader in the House of Representatives and the Chieftain of AG, Chief

Awolowo from Ijebu-Yoruba over whose political ideology would control Yoruba

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politics. In the heat of this intra-ethnic rivalry between Akintola and Awolowo in the

politics of Yoruba land in 1965, fight broke out which made federal government to

declarea state of emergency in the West. That crisis in the West was the last straw that

broke the Carmel’s back and first republic ended in the hands of the January Majors Coup

of 1966.

It has been argued that the ethnic orientation of the political party’s regional

politics and regional Nationalism caused the 1967-1970 civil war which took almost two

million lives and was one of the reasons for the collapse of the first republic (Abubakar,

1997). However, it was in the second republic, that ethnicity seemed to have played down

a bit. The 1979 constitution stipulated that for a political party to be registered, it must be

National in outlook i.e. having wide geographical spread cutting across all the ethnic

groups in its membership formation. But the newly formed political parties in eh 1979

second republic jettisoned the acclaimed effort of the constitution Drafting Committee

trying to see that the force of constitution would direct the mindset of our leaders in the

form in which the emergent political parties would take. For example, the Unity Party of

Nigeria was the new self of the old AG and it was formed by Chief Awolowo who was the

founder of Action Group in 1951, the political party that dominated the politics of Yoruba

land from 1951 till the military proscribed political parties in 1967 the newly formed UPN

was ethnic because in the general election of 1979, the party won election in the entire five

states in the western region. In the same vein, the Nigeria People’s Party formed by Dr.

Azikiwe was a new self of the defunct NCNC and the NPP had its major following from

Anambra and Imo and won massively in the two states in the old eastern Nigeria and in

the Plateau state of middle belt in the 1979 general election (Nwankwo, 1990).

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Then they said National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which was the acclaimed

detribalized National Party was equally seen as Hausa/Fulani political party in spite of its

purported National outlook in the leadership formation, for the flag-bearer of the party

was a Fulani, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, while his running mate was an Igbo man, Dr. Alex

Ekwueme, and the national chairman Chief Akinloye was a Yoruba. Despite the political

arithmetic, ethnic and identity politics appeared to have controlled the minds of the voters

because Northerners voted in mass to NPN and Alhaji Shagari and that saw him become

the winner of the general election of 1979. Campaigns, followed ethnic lines as were in

the pre-independence and after first republic era. Again the other political parties in the

second republic like the Great Nigeria People’s Party (GNPP) of Waziri Ibrahim

controlled the Kannri-speaking area of North and the party won in Gongola and Borno

states which were its ethnic base and in the same way, the People’s Redemption Party

(PRP) of Balarabe Musa won massively in Kaduna and Kano States which were home

states of the guber national candidates of PRP. It was due to ethnic and identity politics

that led Balarabe Msua-led PRP win him governorship slot while the UPN controlled

Kaduna state Assembly. This unresolved political imbalance led to Musa’s 18 months

administration without commissioners before he was impeached (Lawal, 1982). There was

no era in the politics of Nigeria that any political analyst could say that ethnicity didn’t

shape the minds of Nigerians but the magnitude of it called for this study.

In a bid to infuse National consciousness in the minds of Nigerians so that an Igbo

man or woman, an Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Tiv, Ijaw and rest of ethnic groups of about 250

would think of Nigeria first, NYSC was introduced in 1973, Federal Character principle

followed suit in 1979 before 1999 and in 1999 zoning arrangement an off-shoot of quota

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system came on board but ethnic politics has never reduced during campaign and voting in

Nigerian election period. Again disparity in education between the South and North

equally contribute to this age long problem of unequal representation and the quest for

federal character principle in the politics of Nigeria.

Finally, in a current political dispensation of fourth republic Nigeria – the voting

exercise has not been going without the epileptic hands of ethnicity affecting the nascent

democratization process in the polity. The fourth republic gave birth to North/South

politics weared on ethnic sentiment but hidden under the cloak of zoning principle that

had no constitutional back. The Northern elite having known know that they had rule for

quite a long time decided to give power to the Yoruba – born military Gen. turn politician-

Olusegun Obasanjo to placate the Yoruba who had been threatening secession due to the

annulment of June 12 1993 election allegedly won by their son Abiola.

5.2 Ethnicity and Voting Behaviour in Nigeria

The presidential election of 2007 in Nigeria witnessed some elements of ethnic

voting during the election. The informal and unconditional zoning arrangement of the PDP

played itself out in the election result, because the INEC was hyacked by the elite to

inflate the result of the ruling people’s democratic party candidate Alh. Yar’Adua, who

was the candidate of the Northern Elite that chanted the slogan of ethnicity in the struggle

that the South –divide had ruled for 8 years and that it was their turn to produce the next

president. The massive rigging embraced presidential election to ensure that the Northern

ethnic group godson- Umaru Yar’Adua emerged as the winner was awesome (Jarstard:

2008).

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On the final note, ethnic inclination highly influenced the voting pattern in the

north and the outcome of the result of the election was fraught with irregularities due to

the avid determination of the Northern elite to have control of the presidency in 2007. The

acclaimed winner of the election Yar’Adua publicly stated that the general election that

produced him was not free and fair (Yar’Adua, 2007).

The INEC, led by Prof. Maurice Iwu was ethnically politicized to rig election to

the PDP Northern candidate which led credence to the assertion of European Union

Election Observers that 2007 election was the worst in the history of elections in Nigeria

(Daily Sun, June 19, 2008).

5.3 2011 Nigerian Presidential Elections Result

The table shows the statistical figures of votes cast by the voters in each state in

the 2011 presidential elections which are ethnic-oriented and affected the political parties

and their candidates.

This table contains the indicators of ethnicity in the voting patterns in the North-

South states for the presidential candidates in the 2011 election.

The outcome of the presidential election result that produced the incumbent

president Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was not without ethnic effects on the voters. The

president-elect overwhelming victories in the two geopolitical zones that were formally

known as Eastern Region, but divided during the military rule to be South-East and South-

South geo-political zones which are still seen as units in Igbo-speaking ethnic group which

is one out of the ethnic arithmetic in Nigerian politics. Moreso, it appeared that the SE and

SS which is the ethnic home of the PDP candidate Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan recorded

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highest voting turn-out in the 2011 presidential election. For example Rivers State

recorded the highest voting turn-out to the Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan led PDP with the

figure of 1, 817, 762 voting results, followed by Abia State with the 1, 175, 984: Akwa-

Ibom PDP had equally the highest votes among the political parties in her state for her

presidential candidate Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan with the figure of 1, 165, 629. The

same overwhelming victory was recorded in the voting-turn-out in Anambra state for the

PDP flag-bearer Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, whom they see as their half-brother

(conference of Nigeria Political Parties, 2011).

Consequently, ethnic sentiment blurred the rational choice of the voters in the 2011

general elections in the entire Southern and Northern regions of Nigeria, for the Southern

based-ethnic groups made sure that the Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan led PDP in the

presidential election won overwhelmingly over the Buhari-led CPC who was the

presidential flag bearer of the CPC and the closet rival of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari

being a Northern element was seen by the core Northerners as their man in the 2011

presidential election and that ethnic sentiment highly influenced voting behaviour of the

voters, who voted enmasse to CPC against PDP. For example, in Bauchi which is a state

in the North-East geopolitical zone where Gen. Buhari belong politically, had the highest

voting turn-out for the CPC flag-bearer than the PDP. Bauchi CPC had voting result of

1,315,209 for their ethnic man-Gen. Buhari and had the voting figure for Dr. Goodluck

Ebele Jonathan – led PDP which was enough evidence to tell Dr. Gooluck Ebele Jonathan

that no matter his political parties programmes on National Development, they will never

leave their man (Buhari). PDP had this figure in Bauchi presidential election voting result:

258,404, CPC of the Northern man Buhari in Knao had PDP presidential candidate, Dr.

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Goodluck Ebele Jonathan who had this figure 440,666. Knao being a state in the North-

West geo-political zone of the old Northern region saw nothing good in PDP flag-bearer

Dr. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and decided to leave him with hundreds of votes while their

ethnic man had millions of votes under CPC.

Finally, despite the AU election monitoring group and the EU election observers

who rated the 2011 election results as free and fair, the election itself was not devoid of

ethnic voting which undermines the principles of democratization that flourishes in a

political society where voting are based on party-ideology and policies which will enhance

the greatest happiness of the greatest number of the citizenry. Dr. Goodluck Ebele

Jonathan greatest success in the Southern part of the country was as a result of the

politicization of ethnicity in voting behaviour, and that of Gen. Buhari’s CPC success in

most states in the North- East and North-West was due to ethnic politics in Nigeria. The

victory of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan over Buhari was as a result of ethnicity of ethnicity

and the strong party (PDP) affiliation to the states in the North-Central in the old Northern

region.

Talking about the power of the Northern leaders, Chiluwa (2011: 87-88) reported

in his “Discursive Pragmatics and Social Interaction in Nolitics” that there was something

explicit about the Northern leaders’ action in favour of Jonathan’s 2011 presidential

ambition, at least to an outsider to the Nigerian politics. But to an insider, the approval of

the Northern political class has a huge implication to the Nigerian politics. One of his

reports (P21) reads: Jonathan is said to receive ‘a green light’ to run for 2011 general

elections. To the average Nigerian, this approval by the Northern leaders implies that

Jonathan has won the election even before the official general elections.

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According to Ifukor (2008, cited in Chiluwa, 2011) “Northern political class has

dominated the presidency for a long time and would vacate the presidential seat only on

condition that they rule by proxy” might sound vague to someone who does not

understand that regional power play in Nigerian politics. But credence was given to this

statement in a communiqué issued in October 2013. Arguing that power shift in 2015 to

the north was not negotiable, Northern Elders Forum (NEF) declared that the North

MAGNANIMOUSLY conceded power to the South in 1999 and this was to compensate

the Yoruba in the South West after the 1993 elections won by their Kinsman (Moshood

Abiola) was annulled by a northern – dominated military government.

Talking about the issues that will drive the election in 2015, Adibe, (2015) pointed

out that the North-South, Christian-Muslim divide will play a major role. According to

him, eh fault lines of region, ethnicity and religion run deep in Nigeria. Virtually every

part of the country has an institutionalized memory of injury or feelings of injustice, which

they often feel will be best addressed if one of their own wields power at the centre

preferably as the president. Similarly, there is a pervasive fear that the president of the

country will abuse the powers of his office to privilege his region, ethnicity or religion – if

not to punish or deliberately disadvantage others.

Similarly, Campbell (2015) pointed out that just like in the 2015 elections, the

2015 elections equally stand the chances of having campaigns that will be disfigured by

appeals to ethnic and religious identities. In his contribution to ‘The News’ of Wednesday

6th January 2015, Gen. Abdulrahman B. Dambazau pointed out that a serious issue

rocking Nigeria today is that of recognition and ownership, and that one may not be far

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from reality to assume that Nigeria still struggle to be recognized, as a nation by those

who reside in her territory.

Furthermore, we identify ourselves on the basis of our religion and ethnicity, and

the only time we are Nigerians in when we identify ourselves at international borders

holding the travelling passport. He went further to opine that although there are number of

differences between the current situation leading to the scheduled 2015 elections and those

relating to past however is the fact that at no time in the history of this country, did we

find ourselves so divided along religious and ethnic lines than now. Most politicians rely

on the strength and efficacy of using religion and ethnicity as tools for political

mobilization by taking advantage of the strong religions and ethnic sentiments among

Nigeria’s populace.

Writing in the Vanguard of 26th April 2015, Bishop Ighele lamented that the

politics we left in eh 1960s is what we have returned to. According to him, 2015 election

was about the worst election we have had in Nigeria. One of the unfortunate fall-outs of

the polls was that the Muslim cleargy played serious religious politics up North and

nobody talked about it. In his opinion what made the 2015 elections the worst is because

they were a combination of tribal and religious politics. This combination according to

him is too dangerous to sustain a nation.

5.4 Ethno-Regional Cleavages in Nigerian Politics

Nigeria is a plural society made up of over 250 groups with many sub-groups.

Three major ethnic groups – Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo – dominated the political landscape

while other ethnic groups are regarded as minorities. This has created sub-nationalism.

95

Ekeh (1973) has argued that ethnicity has flourished because the Nigerian elite who

inherited the colonial state have conceptualized development as transferring resources

from the civil public to the primordial pubic. Nigerian electoral choice is largely based on

ethnic considerations as successive electrons from the colonial era through the post-

independence period to the current Fourth Republic election have been seriously

undermined by ethno-regional cleavages. Party politics in Nigeria during the colonial era

was based on ethnic factor and one an asset that the seed of ethnic politics was sown at

this period, germinated in the First Republic and the products started spreading during the

3rd and 4th Republics. For example, the Action Group (AG) as a party developed from a

Yoruba Cultural Association, Egbe Omo Oduduwa; the National Council of Nigeria and

Cameroon (NCNC) was closely allied with the Igbo Union while the Northern People’s

Congress (NPC) developed from Jamiyyar Arewa. The leadership of the aforementioned

political parties was along ethnic cleavages. The A.G. was led by Chief Obafemi

Awolowo, a Yoruba; the NCNC leadership fell on Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo while

NPC was led by Sir Ahmadu Bello, an Hausa-Fulani.

Even to a large extent, the colonial administrative arrangement in Nigeria during

the colonial period encouraged ethnic politics. The 1946 Richard Constitution had divided

Nigeria into three regions for administrative convenience, directly associated with the

three major ethnic groups- Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. It is not surprising therefore that the

first political parties were formed along ethnic lines. During the first republic, politics was

organized in the same way as during the pre-colonial era. The three political parties that

existed during the pre-independence era also came into lime right and dominated the

landscape; although other parties sprang up. These included Northern Elements

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Progressive Union (NEPU) by Aminu Kano; and the United Middle Belt Congress

(UMEC) led by Joseph Tarka. There was no radical department from those of the pre-

colonial era as the parties had ethnic coloration in terms of leadership and regional

affiliations. However, it was in the second republic that regionalism was played down a

bit. The 1979 constitution stipulated that for a political party to be registered, it must be

national in outlook i.e. wide geographical spread across the country.

Table 1: Political Parties and their Ethno-regional Bases (1951-1966).

Political Party Political Leaders Regional Base Ethnic

Support

Northern People’s Congress

(NPC)

Sir. Ahmadu Bello North Hausa/Fulani

Action Group (AG) Chef Obafemi Awolowo West Yoruba

National Council of Nigerian

Citizens (NCNC)

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe East Igbo, Edo and

Yoruba

Northern Elements Progressive

Union (NEPU)

Alhaji Aminu Kano North Hausa/Fulani

(Poor People)

United Middle Belt Congress

(UMBC)

Joseph Tarka Middle Belt Tiv, Biron

Dynamic Party (DP) Dr. Chike Obi East Igbo

Nigeria National Democratic

Party (NNDP)

Chief Samuel Akintoal West Yoruba

Source: Adapted from Nanbuihe, Aghemalo and Okebukwu (2014)

During the second republic, the new political parties that were registered had their

leadership replicated along ethnic lines like the first republic. Thus, A.G. metamorphosed

into UPN under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo; Nnamdi Azikiwe NPN

dominated the Hausa/Fulani areas; PRP in Hausa speaking while GNPP led by Ibrahim

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Waziri controlled the Kanuri speaking area. Therefore, ethnic collection and affiliation

played out in political parties’ formation and electoral behaviour during the second

Republic as voting patterns followed ethnic lines in the elections.

Table 2: Ethnic Voting Pattern in the First and Second Republics (1979-1983)

State Victorious

Party 1979

Election

1983

Election

Ethnic Base Party

Leader

First

Republic

Party

Party Leader

Anambra NPP NPP East Dr. Azikiwe NCNC Dr. Azikiwe

Bauchi NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahamdu Bello

Bendel UPN UPN West Obeafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awolowo

Benue NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahmadu Bello

Bornu GNPP NPN North Waziri BYM Waziri

Cross River NPP NPP East Dr. Azikiwe NCNC Dr. Azikiwe

Gongola NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahmadu

Bello

Imo UPN UPN East Obafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awolowo

Kaduna NPN NPN North Ajhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahmadu Bello

Kano PRP PRP North Aminu Kano NEPU Aminu Kano

Kwara NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahmadu Bello

Lagos UPN UPN West Obafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awolowo

Niger NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagri

NPC Ahamdu Bello

Ogun UPN UPN West Obafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awolowo

Ondo UPN UPN West Obafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awolowo

Oyo UPN UPN West Obafemi

Awolowo

AG Obafemi

Awollwo

Plateau NPN NPN North Alhaji

Shagari

NPC Ahmadu Bello

Source: Adapted from Nnabuihe, Aghemalo and Okebukwu (2014).

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It should be pointed out that political party formation had a different dimension in

the aborted third republic, midwivd by President Ibrahim Babangida. Two political parties

were formed and funded by the government. These were the Social Democratic Party

(SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). Even though these parties were

established by government, ethno-religious cleavages were visible in the membership and

composition of the two parties. While the SDP favoured the southerners, NRC was a party

for the Hausa Fulani North as could be observed from their operation. In the political

dispensation of the Fourth Republic ethnic coloration as also reared its ugly head, with the

ANPP considered as a party predominantly populated by the Hausa/Fulani and AD as

direct successor to Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group and Unity Party of Nigeria.

The AD dominated the six Yoruba speaking states of Lagos, Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and

Oyo until 2003 when it lost all the states except Lagos. The People’s Democratic Party

(PDP) was perceived to have deviated a bit from the usual ethno-religious dominated party

politics of the past with their membership and formation cutting across the clime of

Nigeria.

However in the 2011 general elections, ethnic and regional politics also played

itself out. With the demise of Alhaji Umar Musa Yar’Adua, some people in the North felt

power should not shift to the south and they started kicking against the presidency of Dr.

Goodluck Jonathan. The new parties on contest like APGA is seen as Igbo party; CAN as

a re-incarnation of A.G. or UPN which is Yoruba based, CPC and ANPP are seen as the

party of Hausa/Fulani affiliations. While PDP, to some extent seems to have national

outlook but the insistence of the Northerner to produce the 2011 presidency had shown

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that ethno-regional cleavages have continued to plague the politics and unity of Nigeria as

a sovereign state.

5.5 Ethno-Regional Cleavage and Voting Behaviour in the 2015 General Election

The 2015 Nigerian general elections turned out to be as acrimonious, bitter and a

hateful play of brinkmanship as that of the first republic. Ahead of the elections, ethno-

regional and religious sentiments were stirred up across the country, threatening the very

survival of the Nigeria state itself. The incumbent president rallied around himself ethno-

regional supports of his minority kinsmen and the larger Igbos. Dangerous provocative

and unguided statements were released, which heightened the tension across the country.

Some of the rehabilitated ex-warlords of the Niger-Delta threatened to ‘burn up the

country’ and returned back ‘to the creeks to take up arms struggle’ against the state,

should their own son lose out of power. The incumbent presidents also sought supports

from various ethno-regional groups like OPC, Afenifere, Egbe Igbimo Agba Yoruba,

among others. The former president equally paid several visits to many Christian’s

organizations across the country to mobilize faithful voters to ‘identify with their Christian

brother’. In all these presidential campaigns and mobilization, huge amount of money was

alleged to have been used to induce voters’ supports for his re-election.

The 2015 general elections was seen as a golden opportunity for the Northerner to

wrestle back power, which they felt had been unjustly, denied them after the untimely

demise of late President Yar’Adua. The South-South minority groups also rallied behind

the incumbent president to secure a second term of office for him. The Yoruba of the

South-west who felt marginalized under the incumbent president were quick to rally

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behind the opposition party that adopted their own son as the vice-presidential candidate.

Across the length and breadth of the country, ethno-religion sentiments flared up and the

presidential candidates of the leading political parties were prevailed upon to sign an

accord (Abuja Peace Accord), committing themselves to maintaining peace before, during

and after the elections. The leading presidential aspirants periodically kept returning to

their ethno-regional bases for support and solidarity. The ember of ethnic sentiment was

fanned out with dangerous misguided provocative statements. A famous one was recorded

in Lagos where the paramount traditional ruler (Oba of Lagos) summoned the Ndigbo

leades to his palace and directed to ‘vote for his anointed candidate’ in the gubernatorial

election or ‘perish in the Lagos Lagoon’!

The general perception a head of the 2015 general election was that the incumbent

president was going into the electoral battle in a deficit and, therefore, disadvantaged

position with regards to national security, corruption perception and indecisiveness. And

the fact that the presidential election had to be postponed by one and half months to enable

the government confront the Boko Haram menace that late, even with the success it

achieved, only helped to cement the perception and charges of weakness on national

security, which the success of the military campaign did little to change. The damage had

been done and it takes an awful long time for political wounds to heal. The 2015 election

was not just about opposition party strategizing for election victory, which would be

legitimate but something much deeper than that. This is about geo-political ethnic power

grab at the expense of another or others that are otherwise entitled to it by virtue of extent

power sharing tradition instituted by the PDP in the zoning of the Nigerian presidency

rotationally amongst the six zones or alternately between North and South. By this

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arrangement, Jonathan or another Southerner would be entitled to another four years in

office, adopted as a necessary adjunct to the nation’s democratic tradition. However, this

arrangement had already been compromised by the denial of the northerner’s opportunity

to complete the unfinished terms of late president Yar’Adua presidency. (Olayode, 2015).

Nigeria’s political history would readily attest to the fact that the Yoruba ethnic

groups in the South/Western geo-political region or zone in Nigeria have always shunned

the mainstream of Nigerian politics preferring instead to cling tenaciously to ethnic

politicking and luxuriate in the comfort zone of its exclusive ethnic enclave in the Western

region. Their aversion toward participation in Nigeria’s mainstream politics and therefore

fixation on regionalism is indeed legendary, and to a large extent, definitive of the broader

Nigerian political history. All efforts in both pre and post-independence Nigeria to lure

and even coax the Yoruba into the mainstream at the center was violently repelled by

mainstream Yoruba political elites in each and every general elections right up to the 2007

presidential election. It’s no secret that they have been fighting for regional autonomy

rather than moving to the center.

The 2015 general election can therefore be analyzed in geo-ethnic conspiracies and

betrayals between the South/West and the core north executing a strategic alliance to

disrupt and upend the nation’s political calculus. And this was helped in no small way by

the historical ethnic cleavages between the Igbos and the Yorubas, making it a whole lot

easier for the Yorubas to turn their backs on the Igbos. The reported outbursts of the Oba

and Lagos threatening Ibos in Lagos to vote APC or else jump in the Lagos Lagoon and

perish lends credibility to this conspiracy theory.

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Table 3: Results of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Leading Political

Parties

State APC PDP

Abia 13,394 368,303

Adamawa 374,701 251,664

Akwa-Ibom 58,411 953,304

Anamba 17,926 660,762

Bauchi 931,598 86,085

Bayelsa 5,194 361,209

Benue 373,961 303,737

Bornu 473,543 25,640

Cross-River 28,358 414,863

Delta 48,910 1,211,405

Ebonyi 19,518 373,653

Edo 208,469 286,869

Ekiti 120,331 176,466

Enugu 14,157 553,003

Gombe 361,245 96,873

Imo 133,253 559,185

Jigawa 885,998 142,904

Kaduna 1,127,760 484,085

Kano 1,903,999 215,779

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Katsina 1,345,441 98,937

Kebbi 567,883 100,972

Kogi 264,451 149,987

Kwara 302,145 132,502

Lagos 792,460 632,327

Nasarawa 236,838 273,460

Niger 657,678 273,460

Ogun 308,290 149,222

Ondo 298,889 207,950

Osun 383,603 251,368

Oyo 528,620 249,929

Plateau 429,140 303,379

Rivers 69,238 1,487,075

Sokoto 671,929 152,199

Taraba 261,326 310,800

Yobe 446,265 25,526

Zamfara 612,202 144,833

FCT 146,399 157,195

Source: INEC Website

The analysis of results of the 2015 presidential election clearly reveals the

dominance of ethno-regional cleavages in the voting patterns. From the above table, it is

evident that the president and vice president elect received almost 90 percent of their votes

104

on the basis of ethno-regional identity. Similarly, the incumbent president received en-

masses votes from his ethno-regional zones.

A review of the voting pattern in the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections by

Ezeibe (2015) show that ethnic cleavages re-emerged to play a major role in the outcomes

of the polls. General Buhari’s victory in North-West and North-East states as well as

President Jonathan’s victory in South-East and South-South during the 2011 and 2015

presidential elections did not come as a surprise, considering the rise in religious and

ethnic polarization since 2010, following the death of President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua

and the collapse of PDP zoning arrangement. Recall that PDP adopted the zoning

principle to counteract the problem of political inequality among ethnic nationalists. In

line with the zoning arrangement, President Olusegun Obasanjo (a Southerner and

Christian) was massively voted into power in 1999 and 2003 elections. Agreeably, at the

expiration of a double four year tenure on 29 May, 2007, President Olusegun Obasanjo

handed over to President Musa Yar’Adua (a Northern Muslim) who was massively voted

across ethnic, regional and religions divides.

Unfortunately, the death of President Yar’Adua in May 2011, and the swearning in

of the then Vice-President, Goodluck Jonathan (a Southerner and Christian) as president in

2010, escalated the problem of national security. Meanwhile, the Northern elites had

expected that President Jonathan would not contest the 2011 election to enable the

northern region complete their double four year tenure. As soon as President Goodluck

won the PDP primary election for the 2011 presidential election, the obituary of zoning

arrangement was announced and mutual suspicion between religions and ethnic poles

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heightened. No wonder Campbell (2010:2) noted that a divided PDP poses problem to the

security and stability of Nigeria.

Nonetheless, religion is another social institution that promotes social cohesion and

solidarity by upholding social values and norms (Ezeibe, 2015). Meanwhile, Karl Marx

sees it as opium of the masses, a tranquilizer that dulls the senses and hulls them into

passive acceptance of the injustices of a capitalist economy (McGree, 1980). Although the

colonial administration introduced and nurtured the religions that later began to block

democratization due to their strong hierarchical structure and dogmas, Huntington (1993)

observed that the religions bombs did not denote during the colonial period. It was the

First Republic political elites in Nigeria that began to manipulate these religious divides to

serve their personal interests (retain political power for personal enrichment) (Coleman,

1986). For instance, in the 1970s, Northern political elites promoted the Sharia law to give

natural elevation to Islam over and above Christianity (Kukah, 1994).

Significantly, there had been a lot of religious crises since the 1980. Some of these

religions crises since the 1980. Some of these religious crises include the 1987,1993 and

2000 crises in Kaduna; 1989 crisis in Ilorin; 1991 and 1992 crises in Bauchi, 1980, 1982

and 1991 crises in Kano and the 2001 crisis in Jos (Lateju and Adebayo, 2006). In 2003,

the Nigerian Taliban emerged in Yobe and Borno states and by December 2004, the

Taligan group had clashed 200 times with the police. Between 2006 and 2009, the

Taliban group re-emerged, primarily in Borno State, under a new banner, ‘Boko Haram’.

The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic state where orthodox Islam’ is

practiced. Orthodox Islam according to Mohammed Yusuf (leader of the sect), frowns at

Western education and working in the civil service because there are sinful. Hence, for

their aim to be achieved, all institutions representing the West such as the police, military,

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school and Christianity ‘should be crushed’. Since 2009, Boko Haram has attacked over

100 public institutions in Nigeria, killing thousands of civilians and destroying property

worth millions of dollars (Eme, 2014).

Hence, Nigeria has been bedeviled by ethno-religious conflicts with devastating

human and material losses from the 1980 Maitasine not to 2009 Boko Haram insurgency

(Ezeibe, 2010). Infact, ethnicity and religiousity are the major impediments to the

democratization in Nigeria as they initiate and sustain the culture of intolerance. Despite

the prevalence of these vices, Nigerian politicians notoriously introduce their speeches

with the following phrase. “this great country of ours”, even when it is obvious that

Nigeria is not a great country (Hudgens and Trillo, 19991:914).

We can even observe ethno-regional sentiments from some of the statements of

President Buhari like; those who didn’t vote for me should not expect equal treatment and

in his appointment of public officers. Pitiably, we are still faced with the same question –

which, way Nigeria? No wonder Olayode (2015) pointed out that ethnic and regional

politics had been nurtured since colonial era with new trends and dimensions taking place

in the contemporary era. Political parties and candidates are easily perceived as

representatives of a particular ethnic or religious group and voting pattern in Nigeria

largely mirrors the various cleavages in the country – North-South, Christian-Muslim,

among others. The dominant role of ethnicity in Nigerian democratic and partisan politics

and the struggle for political power has been reflected through the results of previous

elections from the first republic to the recently concluded 2015 general elections. Thus,

ethno-regional cleavages have continued to remain a major determinant of electoral

outcome and related political issues with attendant implications for democratization and

nation building in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

The discussion above is an illumination of the political behavior of northern

Nigeria. The north having been favoured by the British during and after independence

paved way far on extension of the political economic influence of the north to the wider

Nigerian society. The organization of the into various emirates with supervisory

headquarters in Sokoto and Gwandu made the administration of north much easier for the

northern leaders and made the region to possess the qualities that made it fit for

classification as a feudal society.

The descriptive method of data analysis as was applied in this work helped to give

a vivid description of the nature of the northern political class the influence it wields and

how it has been harnessed into establishing an oligarchy that has been ruling this country

till date. In the present day democratic Nigeria as was exemplified in the 2015 presidential

election, we could see how the feudal character of the northern political elites was

employed in the mobilization of voters’ which eventually paid-off in favour of the region.

Again, historical evidence as gathered shows how ethnicity was upgraded from not

merely propaganda to almost becoming an ideology in the political game play of the

northern political class in Nigeria.

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6.1 Conclusion

What is seen happening in the North is simply a cue from eh reasons given by

Dahl and Stinebrickner (2005) on why people participate in politics. The ranges from; the

value people attach to the rewards to be gained; when they think the alternatives are

important; when they are confident that they can help to change the outcome; they believe

the outcome will be unsatisfactory if they do not act; when they have knowledge or skills

that bear on the question at hand; they must overcome fewer obstacles to act; and are

mobilized by others to participate. These I believe are applicable to the voters in the North

especially considering the culture of feudal practice that is characteristics of the society.

Also, as Obafemi Awolowo in his ‘Path to Nigerian Freedom’ has pointed out that ‘they

have never been known to grumble’.

It has become evident now that the orientation given to the people of the North

from the onset makes it very easy for the feudal- aristocrats in the North to mobilize them

towards a common front. A good example being the 2015 presidential election not

minding that the choice of the feudal- aristocrats has contested and lost for three

consecutive times. What we saw in the 2015 election that is the tempo of mobilization and

the level of response agrees with the assertion of Igwe(2005) that “people are much easier

to mobilize if they perceive the activity as conforming to their best interests, and their

advocates as men of high integrity who they can rely upon to successfully lead them to the

desired destinations”.

This was made possible by the character of the feudal aristocrats ranging from the

ability of their ancestors to have been able to foster unification in their administration

which made it possible for the so called northern elites to forge a common front during

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and after colonialism. Like we have noted elsewhere the gains of such were so enormous

that it has been a driving force to the present day Nigeria. Other traits exuded by the

northern political class include the building of what might be attributed as a special

identity for the north, religion and ethnicity. We can also see how the political economic

setting in the north has made it pertinent that the masse depend on the feudal aristocrats.

6.3 Recommendations

Ethno-regional and religious cleavages as discussed in this paper are partially a

colonial legacy that has consistently defined Nigeria’s political landscape since

independence. Following Olayode(2015), I insist that ethnic groups competing for

resources, positions and political dominance could easily evoke ethnic-focused conflict

with dire consequences for democratic stability. Thus, there is a need for political vision

and statesmanship, capable of dousing tensions generated from ethno-regional diversities,

and thereby developing a political community where equality and justice prevail.

One way of ensuring stability in multi-ethnic politics according to Olayode(2015),

is to introduce accommodation and power-sharing formulae to moderate the possible

‘exclusiveness and lopsidedness of unfettered democracy. An arrangement that would

open up opportunities to disadvantaged communities ought to be designed in this case, all

nationalities, religious, social and cultural groups should have a stake in the system and

work together for its preservation. Constitutional measures and provisions should be made

to resolve the nationality question. Such issues as minority rights, religious status of the

state, equality of rights, citizens’ duties and obligations to the state should be clearly spelt

out in the constitution.

110

One major change that should be effected in Nigeria is the stopping of people

especially job seekers from getting letters of recommendation from their traditional rulers.

This is mostly the case among young Nigerians who wish to join the military outfits in

Nigeria. So, if you do not obey what the traditional ruler wants as is usually the case in

northern Nigeria or your father in a meeting of elder kicks against the views of the

traditional ruler, the job seeker stand chances of being victimized.

One has to admire the feudal nature of Northern Nigeria. Their effective dominance of

Nigeria’s political power and control of re-services, since independence, is almost

comparable (even if it is on a smaller scale) to Britain’s governance of the world in the

18th to early 20th century. Today, many of the top Emirs in the north are ex-soldiers with

knowledge of both camps. It is a good opportunity for the northern ruling class to sit down

with the rest of the county and reinforce the responsibility of army generals, to kings and

presidents and to the country’s democracy.

The North has made little pretence of the fact that they do not intend to share

political power at the centre with any other bloc. They have defended that position with

blood and guts and everything else they have. Leaders all over the world exploit ethnic

and religious differences to advance interests and Nigeria’s North and their cohorts are no

exception. And they have had immense success. So much success that Nigeria became like

a kingdom where the princes and their favoured friends played. Even when in 1999 they

were forced to install Olusegun Obasanjo as president, it was obvious as early as 2002 that

they merely expect him to keep the throne warm for the next Northern Feudal King of

Nigeria. However, the constitution of Nigeria gives the president enormous powers. In

addition to a few nuts and bolts already loosened by Babangida and Abacha, Obasanjo

used those powers fully to upset Nigeria’s political apple cart and to make serious dents in

the power stronghold of the north. It is largely thanks to such dents that we had an law

111

Ijaw president. With the same constitution in force, it is only wise that the Northern

political class should seat and decide the course of things for the north and for Nigeria.

That is to say that the Maxim ‘what is good for the north is good for Nigeria should be

revisited’.

Monopoly of political power in multinational republic has always been bad for

development, bad for peace and bad for stability and examples abound – Northern Ireland,

Kashmir, Rwanda and USSR, to mention a few. There is no doubt that the emergence of

Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 threw the north into an understandable panic, pushing them to

desperate measures like infant voting in the 2015 presidential election, [Northern, Elders

Forum] threats of war and secession and what not. The time has come for re-evaluation. If

the monopoly of power has been working in the past and all of a sudden was thwarted

along the line, chances still abound that it could still be thwarted in the future therefore,

there should be a change of ideology and re-orientation of the musses in Northern Nigeria

to ideas and practices that will help democracy to thrive and gain deep root in this country

especially in Northern Nigeria.

Agreed, the northern political class may possess the attributes that make things

happen in their favour but we should bear in mind that history is replete with leaders that

pushed ideology beyond reason. For this reason, our leaders should bear in mind that

irrespective of the politico-economic ideology that is prevalent at any point in time, that

change is constant. Therefore, the political class in northern Nigeria just as any other part

of Nigeria, grumbling, never complaining, loyal to a fault and/or unorganized should

beware of change as the only thing that is permanent.

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