Chieftaincy and the State in Abacha's Nigeria: Kingship, Political Rivalry and Competing Histories in Abeokuta during the 1990s

Chieftaincy and the State in Abacha's Nigeria: Kingship, Political Rivalry and CompetingHistories in Abeokuta during the 1990sAuthor(s): Insa NolteSource: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2002), pp. 368-390Published by: Edinburgh University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3556724Accessed: 28/05/2010 04:56

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Africa 72 (3), 2002

CHIEFTAINCY AND THE STATE IN ABACHA'S NIGERIA: KINGSHIP, POLITICAL RIVALRY AND

COMPETING HISTORIES IN ABEOKUTA DURING THE 1990s

Insa Nolte

In recent years, traditional and neo-traditional institutions have gained power and influence in many African states. Several writers have associated this phenomenon with the administrative and political problems of many African states, arguing that the 'traditional' realm expands or maintains its authority to the detriment of the 'modern' state apparatus. Mamdani (1996) links the perceived dichotomy between the modem and the traditional with the urban-rural divide. He suggests that, while Africa's urban centres are part of an emerging civil society, rural power continues to be represented by the decentralised despotism of the local rulers whose legitimacy is entrenched by notions of community and culture.

In more general terms, Herbst (2000: 173-97) asserts that the traditional control over the allocation of land reflects the inability of African states to project power to the rural areas. Correspondingly, van Rouveroy (1999: 21-47) maintains that traditional authority inevitably poses a challenge to the political and administrative process in Africa. Believing that the state is losing ground in the conflict with the traditional, von Trotha (1996: 91) even suggests that traditional authorities' are the ideal candidates to preside over the 'political tribalisation' of the social order in Africa.

However, the increased role given to traditional authority even in successful or 'strong' states like South Africa would suggest that the perceived dichotomy between traditional and state authority does not characterise all of Africa. Bayart (1993) argues that, in many African nations, the state bureaucracies do not exist in opposition to traditional authority, but as spaces for the assimilation, mediation and collabora- tion of elites. In this process, those whose social positions are legitimised by tradition try to establish or widen their access to the state, while the 'modem' power holders attempt to utilise what is perceived as traditional legitimacy for their own ends. As Rathbone's (2000) and Vaughan's (2000) studies of traditional authority in Ghana and Nigeria respectively illustrate, this process is often conflictual. However, as revealed by Hameit-Sievers's (1998) analysis of modem

INSA NOLTE lectures on African religion and popular culture at the Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, where she obtained her Ph.D. in 1999. Her research interests include chieftaincy and politics in Nigeria.

1 The term 'traditional authority' is used as a general technical term only. It refers to any form of authority which is based on recourse to the principle of tradition.

CHIEFTAINCY IN ABEOKUTA 369

forms of traditional authority among the Igbo of eastern Nigeria, the traditional represents not only an important political arena within state politics, but also one which is characterised by local interests, historical reinterpretations and cultural creativity.

In Nigeria successive military governments since 1983 have relied on traditional support for their own legitimacy. Many traditional rulers2 exercise great influence on local politics in their domains, but rely on the state for stipends and business opportunities. Meanwhile, successful administrators and politicians have sought traditional status, usually through obtaining chieftaincy titles themselves. Through this, they become associated with certain localities and are often expected to champion local interests. Therefore the ties between traditional rulers, politicians and administrators reflect and create local political identities as well as constituting access to the political and administrative sphere.

During the Abacha regime (1993-98) many other forms of political expression became dangerous, and the economic opportunities associated with access to the state were increasingly concentrated in the hands of northern Nigerian groups. However, traditional authority remained one way in which individuals and groups from western Nigeria could negotiate access to the state without directly challenging the military government. As a result of these developments, competition between traditional rulers became a significant area of politics in Nigeria during the 1990s.3 As much of this competition was based on rulers' mythical histories, local identities and hierarchies were often questioned or redefined.

This article focuses on the role of traditional authority in the Yoruba4 city of Abeokuta, Western Nigeria, during the 1990s. The conflicts between the traditional rulers of Abeokuta were closely linked with local interests and expressed within the wider discourse on traditional legitimacy in Yoruba culture. However, while the reinterpretation of mythical histories expressed local notions of legitimacy, the urgency of the conflict was to a great extent illustrative of a more general political trend in Nigeria.

2 In this article, the term 'traditional ruler' refers to any holder of authority who bases his legitimacy primarily on tradition (see note 1) and who acts as a source of traditional legitimacy for others. Traditional rulers (regent chiefs or obas in most Yoruba towns) can bestow chieftaincy titles on their supporters or allies.

3 A historic rivalry over local supremacy between the obas of Ile-Ife and Modakeke re- erupted in 1997, and in the following war several thousand people on both sides were killed and a whole quarter of Ile-Ife was burnt to the ground. Other rivalries existed between Ile-Ife and Oyo.

4 In this article, Yoriibi (below: Yoruba) names and titles are not spelt in English, but in Yoruba without tone or diacritical marks. On average, this is how they were found most often in the sources. Owing to this, some inconsistencies occur. Thus Oba Tejuoso's name would be spelt as on the covers of his books, but the 1993 interim President, usually referred to as Shonekan, appears as Sonekan. Isolated Yoruba words and titles are italicised, with the exception of words like 'Oba' (king) which have become an integral part of Nigerian English and are used in the plural and the possessive with an added 's' or a Saxon genitive respectively. Quotations in Yoruba are presented with diacritical and tone marks.

370 CHIEFTAINCY IN ABEOKUTA

The article focuses on Abeokuta for several reasons. First, Abeokuta is, like Ibadan, a nineteenth-century Yoruba city, which was founded and dominated by warriors. Traditional rulers (called obas, or kings) were only (re-)introduced to Abeokuta after its foundation and in response to pressures associated with the European penetration of Africa. Therefore the changes and innovations which affected local kingship tend to be more visible than those in cities where traditional authority is imagined as an unchanged link with the pre-colonial past. Second, owing to Abeokuta's particular history of migration, settlement and political organisation, the city has four kings, each of whom claims superiority over a section of townships within the city. Therefore royal competition takes place with considerable intensity, which is com- pounded by the fact that supporters-many of whom have ties with more than one section of the town-can shift their allegiances quickly and easily. And, third, the in-depth documentation of the conflict in local newspapers provides excellent source material.

The article starts with a short introduction to Abeokuta history and then describes in detail the conflict over superiority and control that dominated Abeokuta politics in the 1990s, concentrating on the dispute between the thrones of the Alake and the Osile. This section also illustrates the economic and political importance attached to the different aspects of superiority debated in the feud. The third section examines the way in which both parties had recourse to mythical history to support their claims in the present, while the fourth section illustrates the ideological construction of the royal persona, which makes this argumentation possible. In Yoruba discourse a king literally is all his predecessors, and therefore all the attributes he claims must have been present in his persona from the very beginning. To understand why this originally pre-colonial political ideology continued to carry such weight in the 1990s, the fifth section studies the role of traditional power in the Nigerian state-with the focus on Abeokuta-from the introduction of colonial rule to the Abacha years. Traditional status is associated with local control, access to the state and political competition and legitimacy. The conclusion points out that in Nigeria traditional politics are an integral part of state politics. Therefore, traditional status continues to be of political importance in Nigeria even after the return to democratic rule in 1999.

A SHORT HISTORY OF KINGSHIP IN ABEOKUTA

Abeokuta was founded in 1830 by Owu and Egba refugees. From the 1820s onwards, many Yoruba-speaking polities were involved in wars over local hegemony, and both the Owu kingdom and many Egba towns were destroyed early on.5 Before its destruction, Owu was one of

5 For more detailed accounts of the wars that affected the Yoruba-speaking areas during the nineteenth century cf. Johnson (1921). For Egba and Abeokuta history cf. especially Ajisafe ([1924] 1964) and Biobaku ([1957] 1991).


the oldest Yoruba-speaking kingdoms. Egbaland did not constitute a united kingdom but a federation of towns in which several groups of towns each recognised their own oba. The Alake, Oke-Ona and Gbagura groups are the three Egba groups recognised today. In the seventeenth century, the Egba came under Oyo rule, but during the late eighteenth century they successfully asserted their independence. However, disunity and distrust between the individual towns in the early nineteenth century contributed to their defeat and destruction (Atanda, 1980: 10-13).

While kingship in Owu was traditionally a relatively centralised and powerful institution, the Egba towns had a different political heritage. Political power in the towns lay with the Ogboni, a representative town association. The Ogboni constituted the civic court, the town executive and they also selected any candidate for the kingship (Lloyd, 1971: 28). In the nineteenth century, both Egba and Owu were affected by the rise of a military aristocracy in their societies (Adediran, 1987: 66), and no oba was installed after the refugees' move to Abeokuta. The eventual reintroduction of kingship to Abeokuta was a result of European influence. In 1846, CMS minister Henry Townsend arrived in Abeokuta as a missionary and pastor of the local Christian community.6 Townsend soon became an influential man in Abeokuta and he hoped to stabilise town politics-dominated by competing war leaders and traders-by reintroducing kingship.

However, Townsend's candidate, himself a powerful man, was opposed by most chiefs, who had nothing to gain from a centralisation of power. Eventually, in 1854, a much weaker candidate was crowned as the Alake, previously the king of the Egba Alake group of towns. A year later the Owu section of Abeokuta installed an Olowu (Biobaku, [1957] 1991: 52-4), and in 1870 the first Agura (king of the Egba Gbagura section) in Abeokuta was installed. However, neither of these kings had great power, and competition between different warriors and traders continued to dominate Abeokuta politics (Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 31-2).

When British authority expanded from Lagos, a British-influenced Egba United Government (EUG) was instituted in Abeokuta. To fill all vacancies in the EUG, the first Abeokuta Osile, king of the Egba Oke- Ona section, was crowned in 1897 (Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 150-1). All four Abeokuta kings were given certain duties in the EUG and, as its ex- officio president, the Alake finally gained some of the authority that Townsend had once envisaged for the throne: his representatives oversaw the revenue collection at the gates of the town and organised its division between the leading chiefs and kings. The Alake was also the chief judge in Abeokuta. The three other obas shared in this power, albeit to a lesser degree (Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 151, 166, 187-95).

6 According to Lloyd (1971: 29), there were more than 2,000 ex-slaves in Abeokuta by 1850. Many of these ex-slaves had been liberated by the Royal Navy and later converted to Christianity.


As his authority was based on British support, the Alake became a representative of the British to his townspeople as much as a representative of his town to the British. In 1914 an Abeokuta chief disagreed with a British officer over the use of communal labour and was imprisoned. After his death in custody, a group of his townspeople rebelled against the British, and the Alake approved the massacre of the rebellious party by British-commanded troops. He also signed the treaty that included Abeokuta in the Protectorate of Nigeria (Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 187-95). Under colonial rule, the Alake and the other obas were made responsible for tax collection.7 In the following decades, royal authority-especially that of the Alake-reached unprecedented heights. While for several decades the Alake was the Sole Native Authority of Egbaland, all kings held ex-officio posts in the administration, received stipends and controlled or influenced police activities as well as matters relating to jurisdiction, taxation and sanitation.

The end of the Alake's-and by extension the other Abeokuta obas'-position of supreme power was heralded by the activities of the Abeokuta Women's Union (AWU) in 1947, which demanded a reduction of royal powers (Mba, 1992: 138-43). Most AWU leaders were supporters or members of the emerging nationalist movement in Nigeria, and as the country prepared for political independence from Britain, kings lost much of their official authority. The Western Region of Nigeria gained internal self-government in 1954. In the same year, obas lost their presidencies of the Native Courts and their numbers in most administrative councils were also reduced.

However, in order to win popular support, the emerging political parties often appealed to kings and made them prominent party members. As kings remained dependent on the state for their stipends and status, they sometimes even supported parties despised by their communities. Thus when in 1964 the NNDP-a party extremely unpopular in Abeokuta-came to (regional) power, Alake Gbadebo II (1963-71) accepted the post of a Minister without Portfolio in its government. This offended Abeokuta's citizens, and consequently Gbadebo II's reign was marked by tension, crises and sharp divisions between the king and his townspeople, who felt that their traditional ruler should have expressed their political ambitions (Gbesan et al., 1992: 35).

While military rule restrained competitive politics, most kings continued to act as representatives of the administration. Thus when new farming tenancy rates were introduced in 1975 and the population of Abeokuta rebelled, Alake Lipede (1972-present) helped the police to arrest the ringleaders. However, kings also continued to act as representatives of their communities to the state. Thus the Alake was

7 People in Abeokuta and the outlying villages opposed this change, and when soldiers were sent to arrest the leaders of the movement the kings were seen by the rebels as representatives of British power and punished: Osile Karunwi II (1904-18) was killed and Alake Gbadebo (1898-1920) had to flee his palace. However, the rebellion was eventually put down by the British, cf. Ajisafe ([1924] 1964: 198-202).


TABLE 1: Traditional hierarchies in Abeokuta

Sectional Sections of Selected 'All Egba' chieftaincy titles

kings townships Male Female

1 Alake Egba Alake Oluwo lyalode 2 Osile Egba Oke-Ona Otun Egba Otun lyalode 3 Agura Egba Gbagura Osi Egba Osi lyalode 4 Olowu Egba Olowu Ekerin Egba Ekerin lyalode

SOURCE: Tejuoso (1991: 141).

involved in making Abeokuta the capital of the newly created Ogun state in 1976, a decision which brought infrastructure and employment to his town (Gbesan et al., 1992: 80-5).

When the sectional kings had first been brought together in 1898, a hierarchy between them and the sections they represented was established, which was refined during later years. While the Alake was the principal oba, the Osile held the second place, the Agura third and the Olowu fourth. Although each oba could install sectional chiefs, those chiefs representing all Egba were only installed by the Alake. The general or 'all Egba' chieftaincy titles were also distributed according to the hierarchy between the sections or, in other words, zoned to certain sections. Thus, for example, the title Iyalode-the highest female chief-was zoned to Egba Alake, the Otun Iyalode-the second in command to the Iyalode-to Oke-Ona, etc. (cf. Table 1).

Despite this arrangement, competition between the kings and their sections became more pronounced when the benefits of kingship increased under British rule. Thus, while the main charge against the exiled Osile Adedamola (1918-32) was that he had tried people by ordeal (Coker, 1990: 4), the anti-Osile faction in Oke-Ona at the time was supported by Egba Alake notables who resented the fact that he- and not one of them-had been made the regent of Abeokuta after Alake Gbadebo I's demise in 1920. Similarly, accusations of usury against the Alake Ademola II were launched by Oke-Ona chiefs and the Osile himself (Tejuoso, 1991: 17-18).

After independence, competition between the kings was often mirrored by the competition between political parties, and vice versa. When state politicians of the Second Republic (1979-83) suspected that the current Alake Lipede (1972-present) did not support them, they made another king the official traditional representative of Abeokuta.8

8 Cf. Gbesan et al. (1992: 113) and Ogun State Ministry of Information (1984: 8). During the twentieth century Abeokuta expanded across the river Ogun and encroached on the town of Ibara to the west. Its ruler, the Olubara (who had allied himself closely with the UPN, the party in power at the state level), was included among the obas of Abeokuta and for a time became the city's official traditional representative.


Although the Alake was later reinstated, this case illustrates that kingship in Abeokuta-while mediating between communal interests and the government-mainly functions within the logic of state politics. In Abeokuta, kingship and chieftaincy exist in opposition to the state only in a very limited sense, namely the basis from which they draw their legitimacy. In this sense, 'traditional' and 'modern' politics remain opposed, the one referring to mythical origins and the locality, while the other-in the widest sense-exists in relation to relations of power at state, regional or even national level. However, instead of weakening or replacing the state, the political competition of Nigerian traditional leaders is aimed at access to the state.

Traditional politics in Abeokuta were created and restructured to legitimise the colonial state's administrative processes and, after independence, traditional politics continued to exist in relation to the state. While political power clearly remained with those who had taken over the state administration, kings and chiefs could partake in this power if they used their traditional legitimacy to support those controlling the administration. The fact that, in doing this, kings could-with the support of the state-turn against their own communities exposes the hierarchy in the relationship between the state on the one hand and the local-cum-traditional on the other. The supremacy of the state is also clearly illustrated by the fact that when the Alake challenged the ruling party during the Second Republic, he could not prevent his replacement by a traditionally 'junior' but more politically astute candidate.

As the following section-outlining the clash between the Alake and the Osile-will illustrate, state politics have continued to inform royal politics during the second extended period of military rule in Nigeria (1984-99) and especially under Abacha (1993-98).

ROYAL RIVALRY DURING THE 1990S

In 1989 Dr Tejuoso was crowned as the Osile of Oke-Ona, one of Abeokuta's four sectional kings. After the Osile had been on the throne for several months, he grew increasingly dissatisfied with his status as 'junior' to the Alake. In 1990 he published a book, entitled So Far So Memorable, in which he questioned the seniority of the Alake over the other three obas in Abeokuta.

In his book, Oba Tejuoso compared the supremacy of the Egba Alake section in Abeokuta to apartheid rule in South Africa.9 The king complained about the fact that the Alake officially represents all Egba groups and that he alone bestows all 'all Egba' chieftaincy titles (see previous section). The Osile also remonstrated that instead of a king, a high Egba chief-Apena Toye Cokerl0-was the town's regent during

9 Tejuoso had met Nelson and Winnie Mandela privately during their visit to Nigeria in 1990 and subsequently published several pictures of himself with the Mandelas.

10 Apena is a high chieftaincy title within the Ogboni hierarchy and is associated with control of a town's ritual instruments.


the Alake's annual leave, and he demanded rotation of the chairmanship in the Egba Chieftaincy Council among the kings. Moreover, he alleged that the Alake had encouraged some Oke-Ona townships to switch their allegiance to Egba Alake. Apart from these points, the Osile questioned why that the community of Orile Oko did not officially belong to Egbaland, although it was built on the site where the Oke- Ona capital had been before the migration to Abeokuta. Oba Tejuoso also strongly objected to the fact that Abeokuta's income was shared fifty-fifty between the Alake section on the one hand and Oke-Ona, Gbagura and Owu together on the other (Tejuoso, 1990).

Oba Tejuoso's last criticism illustrates the existence of financial motives behind the rebellion against the status quo. While traditional rulers were still being paid state stipends during the late 1980s and early 1990s, these stipends were not lavish. However, kings derived a substantial income from other sources, based on their control of local affairs. First, many of the outlying communities subjugated by the Abeokuta army during the nineteenth century continue to send regular amounts of money to Abeokuta. These premiums are supplemented by further payments when important dignitaries are traditionally installed. Of this income, the Alake and the Egba Alake section of Abeokuta received 50 per cent, while the other kings and town sections received less than 17 per cent each.

Second, each Abeokuta king controlled large tracts of his community's land both within and outside Abeokuta. This land was leased or rented and the income was normally shared with several chiefs and other town groups. These practices explain the Osile's anger about the defection of Oke-Ona townships to Egba Alake-their desertion implied a loss of income as well as status. The Osile's desire to include the Orile Oko community within Egba territory reflected the same motive.

Third, in Nigeria, a chairmanship or presidency often translates into a considerable degree of control over a council's affairs and agenda. A chairman can influence the allocation of the resources administered by his council or pass on building or management contracts to his own or his friends' businesses. Kings' income from land is closely connected with state politics as well: when in 1914 the Alake was made the district head of Abeokuta city, each of the three sectional kings was put in charge of an administrative area outside Abeokuta-the Osile in Obafemi Owode, the Agura in Odeda and the Olowu in Ifo. The kings had official control over local government and land and could use their positions to enforce rent and other payments. The association of the Abeokuta kings with certain outlying areas was upheld during decolonisation, when the obas were made presidents of 'their' respective local government authorities between 1952 and 1955. Officially or unofficially, all kings have maintained this association ever since (Nigerian Tribune, 24 June 1996).

Thus Osile Tejuoso demanded an increase not just in status, but also in political power and monetary income vis-a-vis the Alake, a claim in which the other sectional kings and their chiefs were potential beneficiaries and supporters, whereas the Alake and his chiefs were


potential opponents. Unfortunately for the Osile, the Alake, as chairman of the Chieftaincy Council, could formally dismiss most of his demands.11 During the failed political transition process of 1991-93, Osile Tejuoso turned to party politics to ensure being heard. He associated himself with the SDP, the party which dominated local politics and won the Ogun state elections. Meanwhile the Alake and his advisers tended to be closer to the NRC, the party associated with the past military rulers.12

Even after Babangida had annulled the presidential election of 12 June 1993, presumably won by SDP candidate and fellow Egba man Chief Mosood Abiola, Oba Tejuoso remained in politics. While he had refused to pay a state visit to military dictator Babangida in 1990 (Tejuoso, 1990: 108-9), he now hosted a reception dinner for Babangida's stooge, interim President Ernest Sonekan-again, an Egba man (Guardian, 6 July 1996). After General Sani Abacha took over government, the Osile became a member of the National Constitutional Conference, which produced the 1995 draft constitution (This Day, 10 December 1996).

In 1996 the Osile's improved political standing paid off and contributed to the formation of an organised opposition against the Alake by all other three sectional kings of Abeokuta. The feud first erupted over the throne of Ifo, a town south of Abeokuta and for many years under the Olowu's sphere of influence. In 1991 the Governor of Ogun state had made the Olowu the consenting authority for Ifo, which meant that the Olowu had to officially agree to every royal installation in the area (Nigerian Tribune, 24 June 1996). Five years later, the Alake legally contested the Olowu's consenting authority in the name of the Egba Traditional Council (formerly Egba Chieftaincy Council). However, the Alake did not inform the other three obas-senior members of the same council-about this fact (Nigerian Tribune, 8 July 1996). The other obas then started a press campaign against the Alake, and questioned his authority and integrity (cf. Guardian, 6 July 1996). The Osile's leading role in this political challenge was clearly noted: in an attack presumably aimed at the Osile himself, his mother was murdered on 19 September 1996 (Guardian, 10 October 1996).13

11 Tejuoso (1991: 186-7). The Alake promised his support regarding the matter of Orile Oko, the community including an Egba Oke-Ona homestead but not administered within Egba territory.

12 Chief Femi Coker, the NRC gubernatorial candidate for Ogun state, was a wealthy poultry farmer and the son of Chief Toye Coker, the Apena of Egbaland, a prominent lawyer and adviser to the Alake. Although Apena Coker had entered politics as a follower of the (locally supported) Action Group in Nigeria's First Republic, he later stood as a candidate of the (more northern-oriented and locally opposed) NPN between 1979 and 1983.

13 I was very kindly invited by the Alaiye Ode of Ode Remo to attend the homily on 9 October 1996. Dr Tejuoso's mother, Bisoye Tejuoso, had been installed as the lyalode of Abeokuta in 1982. This title, zoned to the Egba Alake, was open to Bisoye Tejuoso because her own mother hailed from an Egba Alake township and is illustrative of the townspeople's ability to shift sectional allegiances. Cf. Tejuoso (1989: 40-2).


More than a dozen chiefs associated with Egba Alake-including Oba Tejuoso's main opponent, Apena Toye Coker-were arrested by the police and held for two days (National Concord, 29 October and 1 November 1996; Guardian, 29 October 1996). In January 1997 an unsuccessful attempt on Apena Coker's life was made, and sides were reversed, with the three sectional Obas now 'helping' police investiga- tions (This Day, 12 January 1997; Vanguard, 16 January 1997). However, neither side was powerful enough to have the leaders of the other camp charged or even detained.

In April 1997 supporters of the two factions clashed again, this time over the building of a statue on Sapon roundabout. This conflict points to the material significance of the conflict between the kings, each of whom attempted to establish himself as Abeokuta's paramount ruler. While the Egba Alake section claimed the place had been designated for a statue of Lisabi, the warrior who had led the rebellion of the Egba against Oyo, the other group planned to erect a statue of Iyalode Tejuoso, the Osile's mother (cf. Punch, 25 April 1997, and This Day, 9 May 1997).

Further unrest was caused when the Alake, despite a restraining order, installed the first oba of Ifo.14 The three other obas now demanded that all crowns and general chieftaincy titles under Abeokuta jurisdiction should be awarded jointly, and that each of them should be made the paramount ruler and consenting authority in 'his' outlying domain (Guardian, 17 May and 5 August 1997). This would have implied a major loss of power and influence for the Alake.

To demonstrate that he remained the paramount ruler of all of Abeokuta, the Alake toured the whole town during his silver jubilee on the throne in August 1997. Despite protection by magical charms, his entourage was attacked and the king himself was humiliated by the sight of Egungun masquerades (National Concord, 7 and 11 August 1997).15 Discord between the two factions continued to dominate Abeokuta politics until shortly after Abacha's death in 1998.

After the death of Chief Mosood Abiola on 7 July 1998, the Osile and the Alake suddenly found themselves on the same side of the fence. In Abeokuta an angry mob burnt down both royal palaces, took away the Alake's beaded crown and shouted, A d ff Qba m;n, 'We no longer want kings' (Post Express, 9 and 10 July 1998). This anger was directed at the kings as representatives of the state. In their dispute both kings had drawn on their political connections, and thus they were believed to share in the guilt of the administration which had imprisoned the presumed election winner. When Abiola died as a result of that imprisonment, the kings were held responsible by proxy.

14 The Alake had won support for his influence in Ifo by conferring a beaded crown-the symbol of a king-on Gabriel Oluomo, the ruler-elect of Ifo, during the installation. Previous to this episode, Ifo had only had an uncrowned ruler or baale (Punch, 11 May 1997).

15 It is taboo for the Alake to see Egungun masquerades.


However, while the demand to abolish the kingship in Abeokuta expressed popular opinion in the aftermath of Abiola's death, it does not appear to have been indicative of a deeper-rooted, anti-royalist attitude, expressed in categories of 'people' versus 'elite' or 'youth' versus 'elders'.16 After all, the royal politics of 1996 and 1997, especially in the months following the death of Oba Tejuoso's mother, mobilised their own mass demonstrations on behalf of both kings. These were accompanied not only by the looting and burning of cars and property-a feature similar to the 'mass resentment' of kings after Abiola's death-but also by masquerades, which indicates that an element of 'youth' was deeply involved.

THE USE OF HISTORY IN ROYAL POLITICS

As illustrated above, during the 1990s royal politics in Abeokuta were concerned with access to power and money. Yet the ideologies referred to by the pro-Alake and the pro-Osile camps do not reflect this directly. The arguments broadly refer to the relations of power among two groups, namely Abeokuta's citizens and the obas. It is mostly with regard to the first group-the people of Abeokuta-that ideas drawing on the concept of equal rights and democracy apply. The two parties presented different visions of town life. According to the Osile, Egba Alake citizens were first-class citizens, Egba Oke-Ona second-class citizens, Egba Gbagura third-class citizens and Egba Olowu fourth- class citizens (Tejuoso, 1991: 2). Meanwhile, representatives of the Alake tended to stress the unity of all Egba and projected the image of a harmonious community where each group was rewarded for its contribution. Thus the dominance of the Egba Alake was justified by the argument that they consisted of three sub-groups and constituted over half of the town's population (Coker, 1990: 6; Adegbite, 1990: 2- 3).

Whereas these arguments appear as straightforward agendas for popular support, drawn on notions of individual or collective rights, the arguments concerning the relationship between the kings are based on Yoruba mythical history. In this context, Oduduwa is generally accepted as the first ancestor of the Yoruba-speaking peoples (cf. Johnson, 1921: 3-10, 143). He represents a group of conquerors or innovators who introduced urbanism and kingship to the city of Ile-Ife (Adediran, 1992: 75-86). This cultural innovation is associated with the development of Ile-Ife into a key commercial centre between A.D. 900 and 1450, which soon expanded its influence to outlying areas. When Ile-Ife later declined in power, other kingdoms became independent, but Ile-Ife remained an important political and spiritual reference point (cf. Horton, 1979). To this day, most Yoruba obas claim that their ancestors brought their crowns from Ile-Ife. It is

16 I am grateful to David Pratten for drawing my attention to this question.


implied that the closer the relation to Oduduwa, the higher the status (cf. Davis, 1981; Law, 1973).

In the dispute over relations of power between the obas in Abeokuta, both the pro-Osile and the pro-Alake camps supported their claims with references to the mythical relationship of the first Alake or Osile to Oduduwa.'7 Apart from traditional historians, each camp even had its own university professor to provide it with reference material and documents to shore up its case.'8 Supporters of the Alake tended to argue that relations of power in Abeokuta only mirrored those before the migration (cf. Coker, 1990: 5; Adegbite, 1990: 2; Benson, 1990: 3). The superior position of the earlier Alake was, according to his supporter, Saburi Biobaku, in turn due to their 'direct descent from Oduduwa, the legendary founder of Ile-Ife, [which gave them] a prestige that raised [them] above the rivalry of municipal kings' (Biobaku, [1957] 1991: 4).

According to several historians, the first Alake's relation to Oduduwa was that of either a son or a grandson, and before moving to the Egba forest he had settled in Ketu with the first Alaketu, who may have been his father or brother (Ajisafe, 1957 [1924] 1964: 9-10; Biobaku, 1952: 37, 1957 [1991]: 3).

The Alake's supporters generally refrained from directly referring to the mythical origin of the first Osile, or any of the other sectional obas in Abeokuta, except to indicate that their titles were associated with civil discontent (cf. especially Coker, 1990). However, the Osile ascribed a lower mythical origin to the first Alake. According to his sources, the first Alake was only a brother of one of the early (not the first) Alafin of Oyo, and thus a junior member of the Yoruba royal family (Tejuoso, 1991: 63 explicitly refers to Johnson, 1921: 9, 18).

Moreover, in all publications of the pro-Osile camp, the status of the first Osile was described as higher than that of the first Alake. Oba Tejuoso argued that the first Osile had been Oduduwa's grandson. According to him, Oduduwa's grandson Oranyan and first ruler of Oyo also ruled in Oko, a town which later became part of the Oyo kingdom. People from Oko later migrated to Ijebu, then to Orile Oko, the former capital of the Egba Oke-Ona, and eventually to Abeokuta (Tejuoso, 1991: 63, 209). Consequently Oranyan was the predecessor of the first Oloko of Oko, and the rulers of the Egba Oke-Ona were called Oloko until after they had settled in Abeokuta. To summarise, Oba Tejuoso argued that Oranyan, the grandson of Oduduwa and first king of Oyo, was also the first Oloko, and thereby the first Osile. In 1996 he suggested that 'Among the four obas in Egbaland, Osile is the closest to

17 The debate also included references to the mythical history and status of the Agura and the Olowu titles. However, in the interests of brevity they will not be referred to in detail here.

18 Professor Saburi Biobaku, the first Nigerian Pro-vice-chancellor of the University of Ile- Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), supported the Alake's camp, while Professor Ayo Banjo, the then Vice-chancellor of the University of Ibadan, assisted the Osile.


Oduduwa.... If things were normal, the Osile should be the paramount ruler in Egbaland' (Guardian, 6 July 1996).

Even without this assertion, it appears obvious that both camps believed that the status of the first incumbent of a throne should determine the status of the current incumbent. But while the Osile's questioning of the Alake's status in 1990 had led to no more than breaches of protocol, personal snubs and symbolic absences among both his and the Alake's supporters,19 in 1996 the dispute regarding the Alake's authority-in terms of the mythical origin of the first Alake-led to murder, attempted murder and outbreaks of mass violence. To explain why mythical history was such an emotive and powerful part of politics in Abeokuta during the 1990s, and especially the Abacha years, two questions have to be examined in greater detail. These are, first, the relationship between a king and his (first) predecessor or the persona of the king and, second, the relationship between royal and state politics.

TRADITION IN YORUBA POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In their use of mythical history, both supporters and opponents of the Alake seem to suggest that the social relations of the past are essential for an understanding of the present. Little depth is ascribed to the time which has passed since the first three or four generations after Oduduwa, and if references to this time are made, they tend only to refer to the fact that 'natural' relations of power, i.e. those which reflect mythical social relations, have been (wrongly) altered. Thus Oba Tejuoso argues that

Available evidences show however that it was the British authorities . .. that influenced the catapultation of the Alake over and above all the three other senior Sectional Obas in the city of Abeokuta in 1898.... the Osile was swindled out of his rightful place in the Yoruba and Egba history. [Tejuoso, 1991: 88-9]

Thus the Osile views his demands to change the status quo as 'setting aright the injustices of the past' (Tejuoso, 1991: 89). However, these 'injustices' are remembered as affecting not so much groups of people as royal titles. Oba Tejuoso has a complaint only because the current Osile is seen as essentially the same as the first Osile.

In Yoruba discourse, the continuity between past and present is maintained through the establishment of a royal persona, which allows the discussion of present relations of power and legitimacy as a discussion of historical facts.20 It is for this reason that Apena Coker (1990: 5) insists-literally-that the 'Alake has been the head of

19 Several of these conflicts are documented in Tejuoso (1991). 20 For a discussion of the establishment of royal personae in the context of Remo politics cf.

Nolte (1999: chapters 1-2).


Egbaland since when we were at Egba Forest', although obviously the current Alake, Oba Lipede, was not even born then. However, as the reigning Alake he embodies all his predecessors. All incumbents of the throne share the same fate and particulars, including their relation to Oduduwa and other obas. Oba Tejuoso fully shares this understanding when he writes that:

the Osile is a continuum. The Osile never dies. I, as the Osile, personify all the Osiles of old, even those from our days at the Orile [original settlement of the town] ... and the Oloko of the old Oko in Oyo province. [Tejuoso, 1991: 1]

The legitimacy of a king both depends on and influences the perception of his whole persona. When the rightful existence of the current Alake is doubted, his royal persona is attacked. His opponents attack him not only by saying that he governs them unjustly, but by maintaining that his real status-the status inferred from his predecessors-has been elevated wrongly. The challenge to the king is formulated in terms of his persona's origin.

The continuity of a Yoruba royal persona is ritually constructed through several beliefs and practices. Important among them is the worship and manipulation of on'or on'imi, the (inner) head or personal fate of a person. It has been described as 'head, fortune, destiny. . .. It is one's On'that allows one to navigate successfully between unknown forces: deities, ancestors, and human beings, whose intentions can never be fully known, even when they are close blood relatives' (Barber, 1995: 217). The on'of individuals is not generally believed to continue to exist in unaltered form after a person's death. As a practice of individual on' worship, Johnson describes the making of a crown from cowries. The crown is kept in a large coffer called ile on' (on"s house). Both items are destroyed when their owner dies (Johnson, 1921: 27).

In contrast, the royal crown is never destroyed when its bearer dies. A crown is considered to contain and transfer royal power. Because of this quality, the crown itself is considered a deity. Any crown must be propitiated and honoured. The crown connects its bearer's on'with the on' of his predecessors and thus merges his personal fate with the trajectory created by his predecessors. This is often done through a small package containing magical items, which is placed in the top of the crown so that it touches the head of the king-where his on' is situated. While an oba possesses the crown, the crown also possesses him (cf. Pemberton and Afolayan, 1996: 92).

An oba-elect is prepared for the powerful connection of on'during the initiation, which precedes the royal installation. The initiation trans- forms the royal candidate, a normal man, into a king able to bear the crown. During the period of initiation, the oba-elect stays in a little hut erected for the purpose. Traditionalists, chiefs and other dignitaries visit the future king and tell him about his persona's particular rights and obligations, and about the behaviour expected from him. Without this knowledge the candidate cannot become the king, because he would


not know how to be the king. In 1972 many chiefs at first refused to visit Alake-elect Lipede during his initiation, to demonstrate their opposition to his installation. If it had not been for the diplomatic abilities of Apena Coker, who convinced these chiefs to accept the candidate, Lipede might not have become the Alake (Gbesan et al., 1992: 56-61).

The royal candidate must also allow his predecessor to become one with him physically. He often eats part of his predecessor's body. Through this he ingests all his predecessors, since it is assumed that this custom has been practised since the death of the first incumbent. Another important part of the initiation concerns the predecessors' skulls. As the head is the seat of orn the actual worship of previous rulers' heads through sacrifice unites them with the candidate's head. Only after these preparations can the royal candidate actually be crowned. These practices are referred to by historian Ajisafe when he explains the 1854 reintroduction of the alakeship:

When Chief Okukenu was about to be made King he was in search of the head of Okikilu, his immediate predecessor; for according to native customs the King elect must first obtain and perform certain ceremonies with the head of his immediate predecessor before his accession to the throne. [Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 103]

The rituals used in making the royal persona are so powerful that they can (or could in the past) supersede blood ties: Okukenu, the first Alake at Abeokuta, had no royal blood (Ajisafe, [1924] 1964: 103).

It is quite possible that, before colonial rule, the institution of royal personae may have been a contribution to the internal stability and cultural coherence of the kingdoms descended from Ile-Ife. In an oral culture, the mythical social relations ascribed to royal personae could express relations of power and political aspirations between kingdoms. The interaction between these kingdoms could have been based on codes borrowed from the kinship system, i.e. political superiority may have been expressed as ritual seniority. However, while the system may have been useful and adequate before the introduction of writing or the Nigerian state, it must be asked why it has retained its political significance to the present day.21

TRADITION IN THE STATE'S POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In Abeokuta, kingship and European interests were closely related from the installation of the first Alake in 1854. From Townsend's day, Western powers hoped that having a central authority in the town would make dealings with the town and, later, its administration, easier. However, several factors combined to prevent the emergence of such an

21 Lloyd (1955: 21) explicitly refers to the role played by myths of origin in the pre-colonial political system, but on p. 28 also mentions their use under colonial rule.


authority until after the incorporation of Abeokuta into the Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. First, the majority of Abeokuta's townships represented Egba towns, and the relations among these towns were characterised by competition. Second, even in the pre-colonial Egba towns, the kings had not held much power and day-to-day decisions were normally made by the representative town association, the Ogboni. And third, in both Egba and Owu society, the social status of kingship had declined with the rise of a warrior elite in the early nineteenth century, which continued to control affairs in Abeokuta. The traditional institution of kingship-as envisaged by Townsend and other Europeans-had very little to sustain it in terms of unified appeal, traditional support structures and control of resources.

Under British influence and, later, British rule, support structures for the Alake and the other sectional kings in Abeokuta were invented and implemented. After the introduction of direct taxation in 1918, the colonial state required kings to collect taxes, to settle disputes and to make decisions with regard to the local administration. As a result of the British desire to rule through kings at the local level, royal administration or the traditional sphere of politics related to the state in three important ways.

First, the kings controlled the police, the courts, taxation and the local administration. With the help of chiefs, township representatives or other assistants, they created local systems of coercion which enabled them to fulfil their duties. Thus structures of coercion belonged to the so-imagined traditional realm and were rarely controlled by the state. A whole realm of modem traditional power evolved, based on control of the police, the courts, taxation and the local administration (cf. Mamdani, 1996: 57-137). However, contrary to what Mamdani suggests, in Abeokuta this realm of traditional power was not limited to the rural areas or even directly associated with a historical community. Instead it characterised the colonial take-over of a politically fractured nineteenth-century city founded and ruled by a warrior elite.

Second, because the British made royal-cum-administrative power dependent on what they recognised as traditional status, traditional status became a political asset in colonial Nigeria. Consequently, political competition over access to structures of local control was a contest over traditional status, and the claim to status derived from mythical history remained an important political tool. Recognised traditional status was the most visible way in which access to that state apparatus could be negotiated by colonial subjects. In this way, traditional status became a state ideology, not in the sense of a conscious formulation but in the sense of a charter for the competition for power. The colonial state not only integrated the traditional sphere as an ideological state domain, it also entrenched the use of traditional status in the quest for power.

Third, as long as the British administration was the power that was asked to put things 'right', the sphere occupied by traditional competition indirectly supported the existence of the British adminis-


tration. Whenever a ruler appealed to government or utilised his connections with it, British rule was validated. Thus the integration of royal power into the state became more organic, and British hegemony became more securely entrenched. However, in one important aspect, royal politics appeared distinct from the interests of the British rulers. The British administration and British administrators were not normally part of the networks created by royal power in the traditional sphere of politics.

During the preparations for independence and the First Republic kings' official powers declined, and financially they became increasingly dependent on political goodwill. Moreover, political competition was no longer confined to the traditional sphere. As other avenues of power began to open to ambitious men and women, kingship or chieftaincy became only one of many ways in which local power could be attained.

However, the ties between the kings and the state administration became closer at the personal level. The big political parties relied on the continuing local influence of kings and chiefs to make them popular, and kings became major players in the emerging party political competition. Traditional and political competition often reflected each other. As a result, the mythical relations of seniority, which had influenced the status of kings during colonial rule, continued to be of political importance. As traditional status had become an indicator of being a power-holder in the state administration, many Nigerian politicians obtained traditional status and thus associated themselves with certain kings and their localities. Reflecting his support in Abeokuta, nationalist leader Obafemi Awolowo held the Egba Alake chieftaincy title of Lisa of Ijeun. Thus the political status of Awolowo's party reflected the traditional status of Ijeun/Abeokuta, and vice versa.

During the first extended period of military rule (1966-79), reforms of land holding and local government were introduced which aimed at finally transferring local power to elected politicians or administrators. Kings' influence was officially reduced to an advisory role. However, in many communities, these reforms succeeded only in so far as they firmly reintroduced state control to the local administration. Local networks of power and authority were seldom destroyed and often remained connected with state institutions or officials. A dual form of local administration evolved, in which applicants had to deal both with a public/official and with a traditional/unofficial bureaucracy, often closely linked.

Intimate private ties between kings and politicians continued to dominate party politics in the Second Republic. After the 1983 military take-over, the regime acknowledged that it did not have the resources to control all matters of local administration in Nigeria exclusively (Daily Sketch, 16 December 1984). From 1986 onwards, traditional rulers could also influence development questions. States were divided into zones, each of which received an equal amount of infrastructural support. The distribution of resources would be discussed with the paramount ruler responsible for the zone, i.e. the Alake for Egba zone (Daily Times, 1 June 1986). As a result, traditional status--based on


mythical history-again translated into officially sanctioned political power beyond the realm of grass-roots and personal politics.

After the military coup in 1993, the Abacha government relied more and more on good relations with traditional rulers to increase its legitimacy. Traditional rulers were called upon to mediate government policy nationally and internationally: after the execution of human rights activist Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues, a committee of 'Fifty Wise Men' was set up to deal with the crisis. More than forty members of the committee were traditional rulers (Punch, 3 December 1995). As the involvement of Osile Tejuoso demonstrates, traditional rulers were well represented in the Constitutional Conference of 1993-94, and their advisory presence was permanently instituted in the National Elders' Committee in 1994, later called the Traditional Rulers' Forum, a government think-tank on matters of a socio-political nature (This Day, 10 December 1996). The (never implemented) 1995 draft constitution even ensured the presence of traditional rulers at all levels of government (This Day, 1 February 1998).

The Yoruba obas as a group were called to support General Abacha after an alleged coup against him in December 1997, which led to the exclusion of the highest-ranking Yoruba-speaker, General Diya, from government. The privileged relationship between the rulers and the government had finally been acknowledged financially in the same year. In 1997, 5 per cent of the central government's income was allocated to the traditional rulers as stipends. That was usually about a quarter of the local government budget (National Concord, 13 December 1996), and an estimated overall sum of about US$300 million.22

Meanwhile, economic and political opportunities outside the traditional sphere were increasingly concentrated in the hands of men from northern Nigerian and military backgrounds.23 When strikes and demonstrations took place in several major Nigerian cities throughout 1993 and 1994 the military were deployed, and the resulting confrontations often led to death, injury and the arrest of demonstra- tors. Competition over political and economic opportunities became very difficult and dangerous for those without links with central government-except in the traditional sector.

While political opposition leaders-real or imagined-were imprisoned or killed, and civil rights and environmental groups suffered government persecution, the disputes over seniority among traditional rulers became increasingly heated. As in colonial times, such disputes had become an important way in which political conflict could be expressed.

22 This estimate is based on the assumption that the federal government's share of GDP- more than US$30 billion in 1997-is around 20 per cent and does not consider losses through corrupt practices.

23 By the end of Abacha's rule an estimated 25 per cent of Nigeria's export revenues was being skimmed off illegally by groups associated with his government (cf. Lewis, 1999: 51-3).


Unlike under British rule, however, politicians and state administrators had become closely associated with certain kings and their communities over many decades of political independence. Conse- quently the elevation of a king was no longer the policy or even personal whim of an administrator, but a demonstration of the political sponsor's own status. Thus when in 1996 the Ijebu and Remo communities of Ogun state failed to achieve state status and the king of Odogbolu, the proposed capital and home town of General Diya, an important supporter of this case, failed to be elevated to the kingship of a state capital, observers realised that Diya's career was nearing its end. The spurned oba himself asked, 'Does this mean that these people [in the capital, Abuja] do not recognise his [Diya's] presence there?' [National Concord, 5 October 1996]. Fourteen months later, when Diya was arrested for allegedly plotting an anti-Abacha coup, the question appeared prescient.

Under Abacha the ties between kings and political cliques became so close that many political aspirations were expressed in the traditional discourse of royal status. In turn, the defeat of a king's effort to establish a different version of his mythical history indicated the loss of power of his political sponsor. This explains not only the continued use of mythical history but its political importance: both the Osile and the Alake were closely associated with local political sponsors. These included, most visibly among others, Apena Coker and Otun Egba M. A. Majekodunmi, both leaders of powerful political dynasties in Abeokuta, on the Alake's and the Osile's side respectively.

When the mythical history of the Osile became widely narrated and popularly validated, the Alake was threatened with a loss of local control and landed income. Moreover, his supporters and especially Apena Coker were confronted with a loss of political credibility themselves. When the Osile failed to force official recognition of his higher mythical status, he not only failed to increase his power and income: his supporters also had to concede that-for the time being-Apena Coker and the political group associated with him remained the town's most important power brokers. The mythical history of a royal persona was, in this instance, no longer just relevant to the worldly status and aspirations of a king or his community. It became the political tool of military men and state administrators, and thus came to express the status and aspirations of political cliques.

CONCLUSION

This article has illustrated that traditional status-based on Yoruba mythical history-has been associated with political power since the introduction of a colonial administration to Nigeria. However, the role of traditional status within the state's networks of power has constantly evolved. The degree of local control associated with traditional status was high during colonial rule, declined in the decades following the Second World War and has increased again since the mid-1980s. The degree to which political competition was fought over and through


traditional titles underwent the same decrease in the 1950s and also increased again over the last two decades.

Meanwhile the integration of traditional control with the state administration has increased steadily since independence. While under British rule the state appeared as a 'neutral' arbiter of traditional status, private ties between politicians, administrators and traditional rulers today make a demarcation between the traditional and the public sphere increasingly difficult. Traditional status no longer just informs the hierarchies of the local administration but is closely associated with political power at the state and federal level as well.

Thus, Mamdani's (1996) suggestion of a bifurcated state-along the lines of rurality and tradition versus urban areas and modernity-has little explanatory value for Nigerian politics. Traditional and state politics are not opposed to each other (cf. van Rouveroy, 1999) but form an organic political system, albeit one in which the state ultimately has greater power. That notwithstanding, the traditional sphere remains able to mobilise political support for the expression of local aspirations, including-at least at times-mass support from 'youth' and non-elite groups. While the ability to mobilise such groups is fluid, and even turned into hostility in the aftermath of Abiola's death, the response of 'youth' and non-elite groups to the activities of traditional rulers in itself reflects the importance of the traditional as a sphere of popular politics, both at local and at national level.

Where traditional politics are inserted into the state by providing legitimacy and serving as a charter to power, they become a productive part of the political system itself. The overall effect of this process in Nigeria, however, appears complex. While the assimilation of traditional and modern politics points towards the integration of localities into the state through the traditional, the same process helps to retain and reformulate local and regional differences within Nigeria. However, despite the suggestion that such a process leads towards cultural ethnicisation, depriving the state of ground (von Trotha, 1996), it would seem that, while ethnic politics in Nigeria can be expressed through the traditional, they remain rooted in the distributional logic of the state itself. Finally, the integration of the traditional into state politics impacts on local discourses on legitimacy and on the mythical histories on which royal legitimacy is based. As history remains a charter to power, local systems of political discourse remain politically and culturally productive.

When the Abacha regime suppressed many other avenues of economic or political access to the state, it indirectly contributed to the volatility of the Abeokuta chieftaincy conflict. However, the association of traditional status and state politics is a structural feature of the Nigerian state, and even under the present democratically elected government, traditional status has been closely associated with political power and competition. In this sense, local discourses on legitimacy and history, too, continue to have political implications and remain culturally and politically productive.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am very grateful to the anonymous referees for reading through an earlier version of this article and for making several valuable suggestions.

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ABSTRACT

This article investigates the relationship between chieftaincy and the state in modem Nigeria. It focuses on politics and the mythical history of kings in the city of Abeokuta and argues that, particularly during the 1990s, the royal politics of the town drew heavily on different versions of mythical history. The reasons are twofold. They concern, first, the traditional political discourse of Yoruba kingship, in which a king's legitimacy can be discussed in terms of the attributes of the royal persona he embodies. In this context, legitimacy and status are often discussed as the first king's mythical origin. However, the continued political relevance and even volatility of this discourse in the 1990s related to the nature of the Nigerian state, in which traditional status is closely associated with political power.

RESUME

Cet article examine la relation entre la chefferie et l'Etat dans le Nigeria moderne. Il s'interesse particulierement a la politique et i l'histoire mystique des rois de la ville d'Abeokuta, en affirmant que la politique royale de la ville, surtout dans les annbes 1990, s'inspirait de diverses versions de l'histoire mystique. Les raisons ia cela sont de deux ordres. Elles concement d'abord le discours politique traditionnel du royaume yoruba, dans lequel la lgitimite du roi peut &tre abord&e en termes d'attributs de la personne royale qu'il incarne. Dans ce contexte, la legitimite et le statut sont souvent decrits comme la premiere origine mystique du roi. Cependant, la validite politique continue, voire la volatilite de ce discours dans les ann&es 1990, se rapportait a la nature de l'Etat nigerian, dans lequel le statut traditionnel est &troitement associe au pouvoir politique.

Chieftaincy and the State in Abacha's Nigeria: Kingship, Political Rivalry and Competing Histories in Abeokuta during the 1990s

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