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International Phenomenological Society
Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of
AristotleAuthor(s): Chung-Hwan ChenSource: Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Sep., 1956), pp.
56-65Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104687 .Accessed: 30/03/2014
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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ARISTOTLE
Every one who is but superficially with the Aristotelelian
corpus knows that there are certain pairs of technical terms which
appear in nearly all of his writings. One of these pairs is
dynamics and energeia (sometimes entelecheia). They not only serve
as suitable topics under which his 'first philosophy' may be
conveniently summarized, but also play an important role in the
other parts of his thought, for example, in his physics, psy-
chology, and ethics. As these concepts are the material with which
he constructs his several influential theories, it follows
naturally that one must first grasp the different meanings of these
terms before one can understand his philosophy.
But it is not a simple task even to acquire this preliminary
knowledge. As to the term dynamics, he devotes a chapter in the so
called 'philosophical lexicon' 2 to the explanation of its various
senses, however insufficient it may be. 3 But with regard to the
term energeia it is much worse. For in the same book of the
Metaphysics there is even no chapter in which its different
meanings are explained, while, as a matter of fact, such an
explanation is more needed because this term is employed in a still
greater variety than the term dynamics. From the Greek
commentators, who busied themselves generally with the exegesis of
single passages, we cannot expect a com- prehensive explanation;
modern scholars do not give us much help in this case, either. The
same is even true of the famous composer of the 'Index
Aristotelicus,' llermann Bonitz, whose contribution to the
Aristotelian study is widely acknowledged.
Nowadays, the intellectual interest of the civilized world is no
longer con- centrated on such historical studies as it was once in
the foregoing century especially in Germany. Although the
subjective situation of the problem has changed, yet the problem
itself remains the same and still waits for solution. Hence a
research is needed now, no less than before, to find out the
different meanings of the term energeia as used by Aristotle, or at
least to point out in how many different senses it was then chiefly
used.
Bonitz writes in his monumental work under the word energeia the
1 The word energy, used now as a technical term in Physics, is a
transcription of the
Greek word 'eyepxsLo -; but its meaning is quite different from
that of the same word used by Aristotle. In order that one may not
mistake the modern sense of the word for that of the Aristotelian
term, we prefer to write this term here in its original form.
2 Met A 12. 3 For what is enumerated there does not cover all
the cases in which the word dyna-
mis is used in different passages of his writings. What
astonishes us greatly is the fact that dynamics in his 'first
philosophy' is not mentioned there.
56
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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLE 57
following: "Quoniam potentiae vel oppositur is motus et actus,
quo res ad perfectionem naturae suae perducitur,vel ipsa illa
perfectio 'evepyeta Xey'-eoa T( Aev Co xtvr~aL npo' 8&VocXVLv,
TMt 3' ( oi'a?'X 7tp6q BlVoc is-v Met. 061048b8. Quod discrimen
quamquam non potest ubique accurate observari, tamen ad
perlustrandam varietatem usus aptum est." 4 His distinction is
generally right, but it suffices in no way. The chief uses which
Aristotle makes of this term are at least nine or ten in number;
therefore it has chiefly so many different meanings. What each of
them is, how they differ from each other, and what- kind of theory
Aristotle uses this term in one or other of its senses to express,
are not all evident to us at the first glance. A thorough
understanding of its uses in his philosophy can be had only through
a careful analysis of the theories in which it is employed. This we
are going to do in the following.
1. Energia in the meaning of actuality - The well-known meaning
of this term is "actuality." Energeia in this sense corresponds to
dynamics in the sense of potentiality. Energeia and dynamics, or
actuality and potenti- ality, denote a pair of principles which
are, according to Aristotle, valid for the whole realm of being
analogously. 5 They are not constructive principles as form and
matter are, but principles of a quite different nature. In fact, he
holds them to be ways of existence. 6 Hence they are the fore-
runners of the modal principles, 7 with which we are acquainted in
the philosophy of later times. Yet he does not regard them as
purely modal; both in his concept of actuality and in that of
potentiality teleological moments are involved, 8 which are not
contained in any purely modal
4 Aristotelis opera edidit Academia Regia Borussica, Vol. V 251a
21-27. 5 MetA. 5. 107la 3-5. 6 Met. 0. 6. 1048a 30-32. 7 That they
are not purely modal principles is already evident from the fact
that there
is nothing in Aristotle's metaphysics which, forming a triad
together with dynamics and energeia, might denote the mode of
necessity. It is true that in his logic he teaches three different
modes, of which he has no definite term for the mode of reality
(but uses simply the verb iu7okpXeLv to express this); but what
ukrokpxetv and 'ev8exzeaOco u?kPXet expresses in his logical
writings, is different from what 'ev~pyetoc and 86vocu express in
his 'first philosophy.' Therefore energeia and dynamics are only
forerunners of the modal concepts, but not modal concepts
themselves. Cf. next n.
8 In the Aristotelian concepts of dynamics (in the sense of
potentiality) at least the following teleological moments are
involved:
1. Matter is according to Aristotetle the carrier of dynamics in
this sense. If something is potentially something else, its
dynamics is owing to its material constituent. Matter has then a
natural tendency towards form; it aims at being actually so and so
determined as the form is. So in his concept of potentiality
finality is an important moment.
2. This actual determination is the end of the matter. A seed of
a certain tree, for example, aims at becoming such a tree actually.
If the conditions required for this change are fulfilled, it
develops into such a one. Thus the basis of the development is the
dynamis in the sense of potentiality. It forms the second important
moment of his con- cept of potentiality. The same teleological
moments are involved in his concept of actuality. For actuality is
that state in which potentiality is actualized.
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58 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
concepts as such. So let us call these Aristotelian principles
rather quasi- modal principles. When the philosopher employs the
terms energeia and dynamis to denote this teleologically colored
modality of being, it may be said that they are used in the
quasi-modal sense.
2. Energeia in the meaning of being actualized and of being
perfect - closely related with the meaning of actuality there are
two other mean- ings of the same term, "being actualized" and
"being perfect." In the first case it is usually not easy to
distinguis genergeia in the meaning of being actualized from that
in the meaning of actuality when the term is applied to those
things which are subject to the process of coming to be. For among
those things what is actual is that which has become actual, that
is, which is actualized; and, conversely, what is actualized is
actual. Consequently, one is often at a loss to know whether in a
given passage the term energeia has only this, but not also the
other meaning at the same time. In the second case the meaning of
being perfect and that of being actualized are inseparable from
each other. For according to Aristotle matter has a natural
tendency (3vovLcs) to be actually so and so de- termined. This
actual determination is its end. When it has become actu- ally so
and so, its potentiality is actualized, and at the same time it has
reached its end; it is then perfect. 9
3. Energeia in application both to form and to soul - Since when
the term energeia is used to denote things which come to be, its
meaning of being actualized is, on the one hand, closely connected
with its meaning of actuality, and, on the other, inseparable from
that of being perfect, it comes about that in that case (that is,
in the case of yLyv6Vevo) it is usually difficult to locate the
boundary between the meanings, actuality and perfection. But when
it is employed to denote that which is subject to no actualization,
it means unambiguously actuality. It is used just in this sense
when Aristotetle characterizes form (ethoq) by the expression
evlpyELc (actual).
Form will not only be characterized in this way - which is well
known to the students of Aristotle - but also by the nominative
case of the term,10 just as matter is not only described as
potential, but also called potenti- ality. 11 What forms the
background of this nomenclature is a certain theory of Aristotle
concerning the form and the proximate matter. To discuss that
theory here, it would lead us astray; therefore we reserve its
discussion for another occasion.
9 Energeia in the sense of being perfect is used, for example,
in Met. 0. 6. 1049b25, De gen. anim. II. 1.734b21, where man or
other living beings are concerned. For a man is begotten by another
man who is in his vital aspect fully developed, that is, vitally
perfect.
'0 For example, Met. H.2.1043a6, 12. I Cf. Met. Z. 16.
1040b6.
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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLE 59
What we are going to emphasize in this connection is the
application of the same term to soul. Soul is related to body as
form is to matter. If the latter two are called energeia and
dynamics respectively, and soul is regarded as form, 12 it is very
natural to transfer the name energeia to the soul. 13 In
consequence of this conception of soul the strict unity of the
living being is established. 14 The empsychon is then a unity (or
rather a concrete whole aiuvoXov) of matter (body), which is
dynamis, and form (soul), which is entelecheia, 15 or energeia. 16
The relation between soul and body will be no more like that
between two things taken at random as it was practically supposed
to be by certain predecessors of Aristotle, but soul and body are
now, according to his own opinion, one and the same thing which
exists in two opposite modes. The transition from that theory of
form to this important psychological theory is well prepared in his
"Discourses on Substance." 17
4. Energeia in the meaning of actualization - So much for the
quasi- modal sense of the term energeia, the chief uses of which we
have just discussed. In the following let us turn to the non-modal
sense of the same term, of which there are also different shades of
meaning. First of all, we consider this word as it is used in
defining movement. In this case it does not mean actuality, but
actualization. Aristotle's famous definition of movement runs thus:
The actualization of what is potential, in so far as it is
potential, is movement. 18 The expression "in so far as" (g) is of
great importance. He illustrates it by a concrete example. Though
bronze, as he shows, is potentially a statute, but the entelecheia
19 of bronze, in so far as it is bronze, is not movement. For to be
bronze and to be potentially movable are not essentially the same;
otherwise the entelecheia of bronze would have been certain
movement. But they are not the same, as has been said. 20 What
Aristotle means by this is the following: actualization is related
only to what is potentially, but not to what is actually, existent.
The proximate matter, for example, bronze, is potentially a certain
thing, but apart from being this it has still another side; it is
namely actually
12 Met. Z. 10. 1035bl4-16. 13 Ibid., H. 3. 1043a35-36, cf. De
an. II. 1.412a27-28. 14 Ibid., 412b6-9. -15 Ibid., 11.2.414al4-19.
16 Cf. Met.H.3.1043a35. 17 In Met.Z.10.1035bl4-16 soul is regarded
as el8u; in Z.13. and in H. energeia or
entelecheia is frequently used to denote ethos (for example,
H.2. 1043a6,12; Z. 13.- 1038b6). Therefore soul is called
'evepyetoc a6c-Ot0coq rtLV6q in H.3. 1043a35-36, from whence the
conception of soul in the De anima follows.
18 Met K91065bl6, cf. Phys.III.I.201alO-II. The comparison of
these passages with each other shows that energeia and entelecheia
when used to define movement are in the same sense.
19 See note 18. 20 Phys. III.I.201a 29-34; Met.
K.9.1065b23-28.
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60 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
bronze. The actualization does not concern its actual, but only
its potenti- al being. 21 Therefore movement is not the
actualization of a thing, in so far as it is actually this (for in
this respect it is already actualized), but the actualization of
it, in so far as it is potentially something else, 22 (for only in
this respect the actualization is possible).
The difference between energeia in the sense of actualization
and the same term in the sense of actuality consists in the
following: Actuality excludes potentiality completely while
actualization includes the latter always, though in a continuously
diminishing degree.
The word energeia is used to signify not only the process by
which the potentially existent is actualized, but also that process
which sets it in motion. Hence both action and passion are denoted
with the same term by Aristotle. He arrived at this point from the
following processes, but what occurs is only a single
actualization, an actualization which is at the same time the
actualization of the agent in the patient and the actuali- zation
of the patient through the agent. By -this unity he does not mean
that the two processes were identical, but that they coincide in
movement. It is just the same as the fact that though the steep
ascent and the steep descent differ from each other, but there is
only one way. 23
5. Energeia in application to both sensation and intellectual
knowledge In his psychology Aristotle makes use of the term
energeia to signify
both sensation and thinking or, more properly, intellectual
knowledge. 24 Let us turn first to sensation. The Aristotelian
psychology is the faculty psychology. That whose function consists
in sensation is called by Aris- totle aisthetikon, i.e., that
faculty 25 with which the subject acquires sensi- ble perception.
According to the exposition in the De anima this dynamics is to be
regarded, in a certain sense, as faculty to suffer or be acted upon
i.e., a passive faculty. 26 For it is aroused to function by what
exists ex- ternally to the mind, by the sensible object; 27 only
the expression "to suffer" or "be acted upon" is here not to be
understood in the sense of being destroyed by its opposite, but in
the sense of preserving what is potentially existent by what is
actually existent and like it. 28
21 Phys.III.1.201a28-29; Met.K.9.1065b22-23. In both passages
the reading o'yx ii 'oct o:u' iv xwr6v of Aspasius (cf.Ross's
Aristotle's Physics, p. 537) is to be adopted. oaut"o, then, refers
to 'evreXeyj6tc '6v. Bronze, for example, is actually bronze, but
it energizes not in so far as it is bronze, but in so far as it is
movable.
22 Phys. III.1.201b4-5; Met.K9.1065b33. 23 Phys. III.
1.202al8-20, b19-22; Met. K. 9. 1066a31-34. The same unity in the
case
of sensation is discussed in De An. III. 2.245b25 sg. 24 De An.
II. 4.425al6-20; Met. 0.6. 1048b33-35. 25 Aisthetikon is called
dynamics, for example, in De An. II. 3. 414a32. 26 The term Nvocpu
c-qnxd is found, for example, in Met. A15.1021 a15-16. 27 De an.
III. 7.431a4-5, II. 5.417b20-21. 28 Ibid., II. 5.417b2-4.
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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLE 61
This faculty is not only a dynamis in the non-modal sense of the
term (i.e., "capacity)," but also 8uvkcet in its quasi-modal sense
(i.e., "po- tentailly)." For what is capable of sensation, namely,
aisthetikon, is potentially such as the sensible objects are in
actuality. 29
Sensation is then the exercise of the faculty of suffering or
being acted upon and, moreover, in this sense that by this exercise
what was potential- ly existent before is now preserved in
actuality, or to express more exactly, its characteristics, being
actualized, are preserved. Hence sensation consists of two moments:
the capacity to suffer or be acted upon and the actualization of
potentiality. Aristotle calls it energeia.
Next we come to intellect and, moreover, to such intellect with
which the soul thinks and conceives, 30 that is, not the so-called
intellects agens which, as Aristotle holds, is independent and
exists eternally by itself after its separation from the body. 31
Although in other respects sensation and intellectual knowledge
differ from each other. As the sensitive faculty is a capacity for
sensuous knowledge, the intellect is a contemplative faculty. 32
Just as sensation, the intellectual knowledge is in a certain
sense, affection.33 Hence, even this contemplative faculty may be
regarded as a faculty of suffering or being acted upon, too. Amd
just as the sensitive faculty is potentially such as the sensible
objects are actual, the intellect is in a manner potentially all
the intellible objects, but is actually none of them until it
exercises its function. 34 So the intellectual knowledge is made
possible through the identity of characteristics which are common
to the subject and the object, just as in the case of sensation.
Hence the expression "to suffer" or "to be acted upon" is here not
to be understood in the sense of being destroyed by the contrary,
but in this sense that what is potential- ly existent is actualized
by what is actually existent, and in this actuali- zation its
characteristics are preserved. For who has the wisdom and exercises
it, is subject to no alteration; by this exercise there is only the
development into actuality. 35 So, as sensation, the intellectual
knowledge consists of two moments: the capacity to suffer in the
given sense and the actualization of what is potentially existent.
Consequently, Aristotle calls it energeia, too.
6. The term energeia employed in the definition of the chief
good - The word energeia is further used as a technical term in
Aristotle's ethics;
29 Ibid. , 418a3-4. 30 Ibid., III. 4.429a23. 31 Ibid., III.
5.430a17,22-23. 32 The expression av c6VoLLq is used in De An. II.
2. 413b25, where it is
identified with intellect. 33 Ibid., III. 4.429al3-15. 34 Ibid.,
III. 4. 429b29-430a2, cf. supra 429al5-24, 27-29, where intellect
is said to be
aU&V&ml 62-N, i.e. vobqrak. 35 Ibid., II. 5.417b2-7.
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62 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
then it signifies a definite activity of soul. 36 In his inquiry
into the nature of the chief good he arrives at the conclusion that
the human good - which is identified with happiness (s 8CLtLov0oc)
37 is the activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there
is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most
complete. 38
What the most complete virtue and what perfect happiness is
Aristotle explains elsewhere in the Nichomachean Ethics. The
perfect happiness is the activity of intellect and in accordance
with wisdom. It is namely the contemplative activity of man. 39
What the word energeia in this ethical theory signifies is,
therefore, the knowing activity of intellect. Thus the meaning in
which this term is used here is rather one of its usual senses as
discussed in section 5, in a special application than an entirely
new meaning.
7. Energeia in the meaning of pure activity - We showed above
that Aristotle uses the term energeia to denote the passive
intellect and two characteristical moments of which are the
capacity to suffer and the actualization of potentiality. The same
term is further used to denote an activity which is neither the
exercise of capacity nor the actualization of potentiality, an
activity which has no dynamics either in the non-modal or in the
quasi-modal sense for its foundation, i.e., the pure activity. In
this sense we find energeia to be used in Aristotle's theory of God
and that of the so-called intellects agens. 40 In his Theology, as
stated in Book y of the Metaphysics, he starts from discussing the
cosmical problem of eternal movement, and arrives at the conclusion
that its principle must be an activity. 41 This activity is namely
the pure activity. It is further identi- fied with the unmoved
mover, 42 intellect, 43 God 44 noesis or thinking,and finally with
thinking of thinking. 45
It is meaningless to take the term energeia here in the sense of
actuality. For now can the principle, upon which both heaven and
nature depend, 46 be-in his mind only a mode of existence? 47 It is
true that God is regarded by him as formal substance, 48 and the
form is also called energeia in the
36 Eth. Nic. I. 6.1098a7 et abliot. 37 Ibid., I. 2.1095al7-20,
6.1097b22-23. 38 Ibid., I. 6.1098a8-17. 30 X. 7. II 77al2-18. In
line 6 r -o6oX ZoxvpyrLoc is z zV~pyrLoc rov vov (1177bl9)
and xocmto r-'Jv &pzTrv is xc-to& L9v mayoc (1177a24).
40 Met. a. 6.1071b20,22; De An. III. 5.430a18. 41 Ibid.,
1071b12-22. 42 Ibid., 7.1072a23 sq. 43 Ibid., 1072bl8 sq. 44 Ibid.,
1072b26-30. 45 Ibid., 9.1074b33-35. 46 Ibid., 7.1072bl3-14. 47 See
supra. 48 God is called -o o' iv LtvC l 7rp Otpcrov in Met. A
18.1074a35-36.
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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLIE 63
quasi-modal sense, but this nomenclature should not be
transferred to the divine. For the theory in consequence of which
the form is called energeia concerns the proximate matter;
therefore it cannot be applied here. 49 On the other hand, God is a
substance with definite attributes and in no way only a mode of
existence.
In the same sense the word energeia is used to signify the
intellectus agens. 50
8. Energeia and movement - The two meanings of the term energeia
which Bonitz distinguishes are indeed nothing else than the
quasi-modal and the non-modal meaning, of which the former was
discussed in sections 1-3, and the latter in sections 4-7. When the
term energeia is employed in the non-modal meaning, it is used then
in a broad or in a narrow sense. In the first case, it signifies
movement as well as sensation, thinking or intel- lectual
knowledge, the contemplative activity of human intellect, in which
happines consists, the so-called intellects agens, the unmoved
mover or God, who is, according to Aristotle, the thinking of
thinking. 51 In the second case, it denotes all of them except
movement. This is the reason why sometimes he holds movement to be
energeia, 52 sometimes sets it in opposition to energeia. Energeia
in the latter case is repeatedly illustrated by the example of
seeing. 53 It is our next task to investigate how he distinguishes
movement and energeia from each other. The distinction made by him
is based upon three different points: (1) Movement is incomplete,
energeia is complete; 54 (2) What is set in motion is imperfect,
what energizes has reached its perfection; 55 (3) Movement is
either quick or slow, energeia is neither. 56
1) In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues thus. Every
movement (e.g., that of building) takes time and is in no moment
complete, except in the last one when the building is finished or
in the whole period of time which the movement lasts. On the other
hand, seeing is in every moment complete; for it does not lack
anything which coming into being later will make its form complete.
57
In the Metaphysics movement is again said to be incomplete. This
time Aristotle emphasizes the fact that the end of movement is
external to the
49 Cf. supra. 50 De An. III. 5.430a18. 51 Besides these there
are still other things, for example, living, living well (Met.
0.6.
1048b25,27) which are signified by it. 52 Cf. definition of
xvasLc' in Met. K. 9.1065bl6. 53 For instance, Met. q, 6,
1048b23-30. 54 Eth. Nic. X. 3. 1174al9sq.; Phys. III. 2.201b31-32,
VIII. 5.257b 8-9; Met. K.
9.1066a20-21, q.6. 1048b21-23, 28-30; De An. II. 5. 417al6-17.
55 De An. III. 7. 431a6-7. 56 Eth. Nic. X. 2. 1173a31-b4. 57 Ibid.,
3. 1174al9-29, 14-16.
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64 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
movement. Of such actions which have a limit, as he points out,
none is itself an end, but a means to the end, e.g., removal of
fat. A person who is under the treatment of fat-removal, aims at
being thin, as long, as this curing process continues, he has not
yet achieved what is intended by him; but at that moment when he
has become thin, the process is ended. Thus the end of fat.-removal
lies beyond that movement. There it is no praxis or, at least, not
a complete one. All movements are like fat-removal, and are,
therefore, incomplete. On the other hand, the action which has the
end in itself, is a praxis. 68 For example, seeing aims at nothing
else than itself for the use of sight is the end. 59 Consequently,
when a sensitive subject sees, the end of seeing is simultaneously
reached; hence "at the same time it is seeing and has seen. 60 The
same is true of thinking, being happy etc., ion contrast to which
are fat-removal, walking, etc. The former are all energeiai or
activities, the latter movements, which are all incomplete. 61
In the De Anima movement is distinguished from sensation on the
ground that the subject of the one is differently determined from
that of the other. For what is set in motion is imperfect; what
energizes has reached per- fection. Movement is the transitional
process from the potentiality to actuality. 62 So long as anything
is in motion, it has not yet been entirely actualized, it has not
yet reached its end; it is still imperfect. On the contrary, one
who sees, just during the moment when one is seeing, has seen, he
has reached his end; it is then perfect.
That Movement is incomplete, as we have just learned from
Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics, receives an explanation from
this very passage of the De Anima. Movement, as defined in the
Physics, is the actualization of the potentially existent, in so
far as it is potentially existent. Anything which is potentially
existent is not actualized, it has not reached its end and it is
imperfect. Movement is the process by means of which it attains its
end. Hence just as this end has not yet been reached by the thing
in movement, so it lies also beyong the movement itself; it
transcends both of them. In this transcendence both the
imperfectness of the potentially existent and the incompleteness of
the movement express themselves. Strictly examined, they are
related to each other in the following way. When the potentially
existent begins to actualize itself, its transcendent end is
assigned to its movement, too. So from the imperfectness of what in
movement the incompleteness of the movement itself follows. Our
58 Met. 0. 6. 1048bl8-23. The word ntp&o is in line 18 used
to denote all actions which have either the end in themselves or
that external to them, but in line 21 it is employed only to
signify the former. In order to avoid this ambiguity we use
"action" for np&EL in a general sense and "praxis" for the
original word in the strict sense.
59 Met. 0.8. 1050a23-35. 60 Ibid., 1048b23 (with Bonitz's
reading). 61 Ibid., 1048b23-25. 62 See supra, definition of
movement.
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-
DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLE 65
interpretation finds a precise verification in a passage in
Aristotle's Phy- sics. 63
3) We find the third difference between energeia and movement
illustrated by the example of pleasure. It is evident that every
movement, if it is not by itself, at least relative to other
things, is quick or slow; pleasure, on the other hand, is neither.
Although one gets the feeling of pleasure quickly or slowly, but
one does not have it quickly or slowly. 64 This third
characteristic of energeia is closely connected with the first one
Pleasure, for example, just like seeing, is complete in every
moment. For it is a whole, and at no time one can find a pleasure
whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. 65 The
quickness or slowness of a movement consists just in the fact that
the movement takes a longer or shorter time to pass over a given
distance. 66 So in either case it covers a number of time units;
and it is, therefore, not complete in every moment.
To sum up: there are at least nine, respectively ten, different
meanings, in which the term energeia is chiefly used in the
philosophy of Aristotle. They are to be classified thus:
I. Quasi-modal meaning: - 1. actuality 2. being actualized or 3.
being perfect 4. in application to form 5. in application to
soul
II. Non-modal meaning: - A. in the broad sense: 1. actualization
2. in application to
sensation 3. in application to
intellectual knowled- ge
4. contemplative ac- tivity of human intel- lect
5. pure activity B. in the narrow sense: all of the five
senses,
except the first one, in A are included here.
CHUNG-HWAN CHEN. UNIVERSITY OF TAIWAN, TAT PET, FORMOSA.
63 Namely III. 2. 201b31-33, of. K. 9. 1066a20-22. 64 Cf. n. 56.
65 Eth. Nhc. X. 3.1174al5-19. 66 Cf. Phy8. VI. 2. 232b 1420.
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Article Contentsp.56p.57p.58p.59p.60p.61p.62p.63p.64p.65
Issue Table of ContentsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol. 17, No. 1 (Sep., 1956), pp. 1-142Front Matter"Cognitive" and
"Normative" [pp.1-21]A Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals
[pp.22-35]Human Nature, Homeostasis, and Value [pp.36-55]Different
Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle
[pp.56-65]Created Truths and Causa Sui in Descartes
[pp.66-78]Pragmatism and the Theory of Signs in Peirce
[pp.79-88]DiscussionSome Issues in Current Psychological Literature
[pp.89-104]Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature [pp.105-113]The
Fundamental Types of Present Philosophic Anthropology
[pp.114-121]Contradictories and Strict Implication [pp.122-124]
Reviewsuntitled [pp.125-127]untitled [pp.127-128]untitled
[pp.128-129]untitled [pp.129-130]untitled [pp.130-131]untitled
[pp.131-132]untitled [pp.132-133]untitled [p.133]untitled
[pp.133-134]untitled [pp.134-135]untitled [pp.135-136]untitled
[pp.136-137]untitled [pp.137-138]untitled [pp.138-139]
Recent Publications [pp.139-142]Back Matter