Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science

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Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science: The International Research Council, 1919-1926Author(s): A. G. CockSource: Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Mar., 1983), pp.249-288Published by: The Royal SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/531490 .

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249CHAUVINISM AND INTERNATIONALISMIN SCIENCE:THE INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, I9I9-1926

By A. G. COCKDepartmentf Biology,The University, outhampton,09 3TU

T HE InternationalResearchCouncil, founded in I919 by representativesof the leading scientific academies of the major Allied nations, wasintended to promoteinternationalco-operationin science,throughthe forma-tion of a seriesof InternationalUnions, each covering a separatebranchofscience.Itsinternationalbasiswas, however, deliberatelyrestricted: he formerCentral Powers were excludedby statute romboth the I.R.C. andits Unions,while former neutral countrieswere to be admittedonly by a three-quartersmajorityvote. The I.R.C. was thus quite openly partof the general post-warpolicy, whose spearheadwas the Treaty of Versailles,of isolatingthe CentralPowers, of demandingfrom them expressionsof penitence, and of ensuringthat Germany in particularnever regained her old dominance in militaryaffairs, ndustry,tradeor science.Oppositionto the exclusion of Germanyandher former allies was soon expressed,especially in former neutralcountries,andeventually,after two successfulattempts o changethe statutes, he offend-ing clause was repealed in 1926, and all the old Central Powers wereunanimously nvited to join. (I shallhenceforthrefer to groupsof statessimplyas the Allies, the CentralPowers and neutrals,'former'being understood. Ishall also often write 'Germany' when strict accuracy would demand 'theCentral Powers'. This is justifiableto the extent that the exclusionimposed bythe I.R.C., along with governmentalpoliciesandpopularfeeling, wasdirectedprimarily against Germany, with German-speakingAustriastandingnext inthe hierarchyof villains.)It is widely believed that most scientistsareimbued, more or less strongly,with a spirit of scientific internationalism; hat science itself or scientificopinion, constitutesa force working in favour of peaceful internationalco-operation.We may defer, for the moment,any examinationof the natureandcontent of this 'scientific internationalism'; he immediatepoint is that theearly history of the I.R.C. has been commonly regardedas a test case for itsexistence and effectiveness.Not surprisingly(and, up to a point, justifiably)the general verdict has been that scientific internationalism ailed the testabjectly. By 1926, political and generalrelationsbetween the two groupsof

former combatants had become much less strained, even in some respects

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250friendly.Only three months afterthe I.R.C. amended ts statutesGermanywasadmittedto the Leagueof Nations. It could be held, therefore,that the I.R.C.was following in the wake of public opinion, rather han (as might have beenhoped) settingan example.There is then, on the surface,much to supporttheastringentremarkby Schroeder-Gudehushat, in the conflictssurroundingheearlyyearsof the I.R.C., 'the weight of transnationalloyaltieshas been hardlynoticeable'(I). I shallneverthelessbringforwardevidenceindicatingthatsuchanextremeanddismissiveview needssubstantialmodification.This investigation grew out of a project with much more modest andcircumscribedaims.My originalintention wassimplyto provideanaccountofthe activitiesof one outspokenopponentof the I.R.C. policy of exclusion-thegeneticistand biologist William Bateson-and to set this broadly (thatis, notin any comprehensiveway) in the context of similarandcontrastingviews onthe question expressedby other contemporaryBritish scientists. It provedunexpectedly difficult to provide such a context. Although it is clear that asubstantialbody of scientistsbroadlysharedBateson'sviews, it was impossibleto name names and give relevant quotations, except in the case of two ofBateson's friends, who were implicated through their correspondencewithhim: the mathematicianG. H. Hardyand the botanistSirDavid Prain.There is a fairlysubstantialbody of studieson the early historyof the I.R.C.(I-6), but these are concerned almost exclusively with affairsat the centre:with the formal proceedings of the General Assemblies and the views ofmembersof the executive committee. The one exception (in the sensethat itconcentrateson the grassroots atherthan the centre)is Forman'sstudyof therefusal,after 1926, of most Germanscientists, n the faceof pressurerom theirown government,to countenancejoining I.R.C. Due weight is given, in thesepublicationsgenerally, to the widespreadoppositionto exclusionby scientistsin neutral countries, but the existence of any similar opposition amongindividual Allied scientists s barelymentioned.Nor do the affairsof individualUnions, in contrast o the I.R.C. itself,receive more thanpassingattention.These difficultiesled to a broadeningof the scope from my original aims.The evidenceI shallpresentsuffices o show thatthe simplisticpictureof Alliedscientistsunited (apartperhaps rom a small andimpotent fringeof extremists)in supportof Germanexclusionis far from the truth.Yet this paperdoes notpretendto be a comprehensiveanddefinitiveaccount of the controversiesoverthe exclusion of the Central Powers. That would require more time andresources than I can afford (7). It would necessitate,besides the study ofpublished and unpublishedsourceson a wider (and international)range ofindividual scientists han I have attempted,a more thoroughstudyof archives



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25Iat the Royal Society (especially the papers of Sir Arthur Schuster, firstSecretary-Generalof I.R.C.), and a study of the archives of the leadingscientificacademiesof othercountries,of the I.R.C. itselfandof its constituentUnions-in so far as these survive (8). Apart from giving an outline of theformal history of the I.R.C. sufficientto make the rest of the narrativecom-prehensible,I shallconcentrateon fourmainthemes.(i) An accountwill be given of the activitiesof Bateson,Hardy,Prain andotherswhich led to the Royal Society adoptinga resolution hatBritain wouldnot join the InternationalUnion of Biological Sciences(I.U.B.S.) unlessanduntil the I.R.C. statutes were amended to allow Germanyto join. Similareventsin otherEnglish-speaking ountries(particularlyU.S.A.) will be relatedin less detail, and a thwarted rebellion in the InternationalMathematicalUnion (I.M.U.) will be examined.(ii) An attemptwill be made to assess he importanceof dissidentopinionsamong Allied scientists n bringing about the change of Statutes n 1926, incomparisonwith other forces acting in the same direction;opposition fromneutrals,changing public opinion and possible pressures rom Allied govern-ments. The inertialweight that reformershadto overcome, due to the heavilyentrenched .R.C. constitution,will be emphasized.(iii) Publicly expressedoppositionto the I.R.C., particularlywhen it tookthe form of a boycott or other disruptiveaction, appears o have been con-centrated mainly among biologists and mathematicians.This does notnecessarily mply that private opposition was more widespreadamong thesesciences,and I shallsuggestanexplanationof it on tacticalgrounds.(iv) The I.R.C. was also widely criticized for being excessivelybureaucratic ndfor allowing too little autonomyto itsdaughterUnions. Suchcriticisms ed, in 1931, to a majoroverhaulof the I.R.C. statutes.A new title(InternationalCouncil of ScientificUnions) was then adopted,reflectingthenew andmore federalconstitution,which gave, for the firsttime, a representa-tion to the Unions on the General Council, in addition to the nationallyappointeddelegates.Logically, this was a quite separatessuefromthat concer-ning the exclusion of Germany,but in fact these two criticisms were oftenvoiced together by the samepersons.Possiblythis associationhad some psy-chological basis,in that thoseof liberalinternationalist onvictionstendedalsoto be antibureaucratic evolutionists,but I suggestthat a tactical element wasagainmainly responsible.Criticswhose main concern was with Germanexclu-sion would throw in the point about bureaucracy o add weight to their case,and viceversa.On the otherside, thosein control of the I.R.C. resistedpressurefor more autonomousUnions partly, perhapsmainly, becausethey fearedthat



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252if Unions madetheirown membershiprulesGermanywould gainentrancebythe backdoor.

BATESON,HARDYAND PRAINBatesonandhis two friendsserveasexamplesof Britishscientificopponentsof the exclusion of Germany.They arenot, of course,a randomsampleof the

opposition, and a largersamplewould no doubt have been desirable.All thesame,the diversityof their socialoriginsandpoliticaloutlookscompensatesosome extent for the meagre numbers.I do not claim that these three werenecessarily the most important and influential of British opponents-theringleadersof the movement, so to speak.The oppositionwas almostwhollyan informalandunorganizedmovement,dependingon privateconviction andprivatepersuasion.Only at one point (9), and that quite late in the day, wasthere any suggestionof an organizedpublic campaign.In sucha context, anyattempt to identify the most influentialfigures would be more than usuallyhazardousandsubjective.William Bateson(I861-1926) (IO)was the 'father'andunchallenged eaderof Britishgenetics,widely respected n otherbranchesof biology, andwith aninternationalreputation.His early embryological work led on to studiesofdiscontinuousvariation,firstdescriptive,then experimental.These put him ina position to give a prompt and vigorous welcome to the rediscovery ofMendelism, and to play a leading part in its development and application.After a careerat Cambridgehe became in I9IOthe first directorof theJohnInnesHorticultural nstitutionn London.G. H. Hardy (1877-1947) was one of the leading mathematiciansof histime (i i). He wasvery much a puremathematician,with a disdain or applica-tions, and his importantniche in the historyof biology arosecasually,througha common interestin cricketwith R. C. Punnett,Bateson'scollaborator(I2).He moved from Cambridgeto a chair at Oxford in 1919and back to a Cam-bridgechair n 93I.Sir David Prain (I857-I944) (I3) took degreesin Natural Science and inMedicine in Scotland,andsoon afterwardsjoined the IndianArmy, servingasa Medical Officer. He joined the staffof the CalcuttaBotanicGarden n 1895and became Director in 1898.In 1905he returned o Britain as Directorof theRoyal Botanic Gardens,Kew. Though his publicationsmay have nothing tomatch the major innovationsof Bateson and Hardy, his work in taxonomicand economic botany was both extensive and highly regarded.From I909 hewas Chairmanof Council of theJohn InnesHorticulturalInstitution; his ledto a close friendshipwith Bateson.(14)



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253In socialoriginsthe three were widely disparate:Bateson was the sonof theMaster of a Cambridge college, Hardy of a house masterat a preparatoryschool, while Prain's atherwas a Perthshire addlercumParishCouncil Clerk.

Hardy's politicalviews set him apart rom the othertwo: he was a pacifistanda political disciple of Bertrand Russell (II, I5). Bateson's political views aredifficult to characterize.He came from a stronglyLiberalfamily but in laterlife, while strongstrandsof liberalismremained, hey were combinedwith ele-ments displayingconservativeand even aristocratic endencies,e.g. he had amarked distrustof democraticprinciples(16). He has recentlybeen describedas 'in many ways an archetypalconservativethinker'but this is seriouslymis-leading. (17)Prain'spolitical attitudes are even more difficult to pin down, and hisobituarist s silent on this point. My partialexaminationof his papersyieldednothing bearing directly on his general political views, or on the I.R.C.However, I was able to discussPrain with three people at Kew who hadknown him well: ProfessorR. E. Holttum, Mr R. D. Meikle and Mr H. M.Burkhill (Burkhill reckoned that he last saw Prain when he (Burkhill) wasaged about 8; his knowledge of him is basedon what his fatherhadtold him.Burkhill seniorhad been a long-standingcolleague of Prain,and had writtenhis obituaryfor the Royal Society. The memoriesof the othertwo aredirect.)All three were in generalagreementon two main points: (i) Prainwas not astrongly political animal, and certainlynot interested n the day-to-day con-flicts of partypoliticsand (ii) his generaloutlook could be broadlycategorizedas liberal (with a small '1'). As it happens,this coincideswith the view I hadtentatively formed (admittedly more from 'readingbetween the lines' thanfrom directevidence) from the writtenmaterial.The generalpoliticalpositionsof Batesonand Prain,in so faras they weredefinite, seem then to have been fairly similar,andcertainlya long way fromthat of Hardy. As a former officer in the IndianArmy, Prain is unlikely tohave had much sympathywith Hardy's pacifistviews. As for Bateson,MrsH.B. Pease (then Miss Helen Wedgwood) worked at theJohn Innes for a shorttime in I917. She was then an adherentof the 'No ConscriptionFellowship',and she recallsthat Bateson was quite scathinglydisparagingof conscientiousobjectors.So far was Bateson from being a pacifistthat in I9I5 he twice (onthe sameday) wrote to the chemist H. E. Armstrong,urging thatArmstrongtake up with the War Office the potential as a weapon of an arsenicalgaswhich had been used to eradicatepricklypearin Australia: its deadliness ..doesnot seemto me a drawback'.(Haldane'sCallinicus asthenunwritten,butBateson's defence of his attitude would no doubt have followed the same



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254generallinesas Haldaneused(18).) Prain and Batesoneach lost a son in actionduring World War I, which was hardly likely to have encouraged anunqualified ympathywith Germany'spost-warplight.Since all mattersconcerning the I.R.C. and its Unions in Britain werechannelledthrough the Royal Society, it is importantthat Hardy and Prainoccupied key positions within the Society. Hardy was Secretary (I9I6-1924)and Prain Treasurer (I9I9-I928). Bateson had, much earlier, been a memberof Council (I90oI-903), but by this time he was at most on the fringes of thecentresof influence n the Royal Society. He was, however, a memberof theirbiological committee at a crucial time (1923). Note that Hardy did not enterinto public controversyuntil he had ceased to be Secretary.Prain may havefelt inhibited by his office from taking part in public, and his role appearsmainlyassympathizerandadviser o Bateson. Unlike Bateson,Prainseemsnotto have been a man who relishedpubliccontroversy.

THEIR OPPOSITION TO I.R.C. AND I.U.B.S.In order to set their activities into context, a brief chronology may behelpful:1918, October. The London Conference called by the Royal Society, with

delegates romBritain,France,Belgium, U.S.A. andItaly.I9I9, August. InauguralGeneralAssemblyof I.R.C., Brussels.The executivecommittee is formed by one representativeeach from the five majorAlliedcountriesnamed above.1922, July. 2nd GeneralAssemblyof I.R.C. Sweden proposedthat the statutesbe altered so that all countriescouldjoin. This received little supportand wasnot putto the vote.I923. I.U.B.S. founded: Officers had been appointedin 1919, but 1923 is theofficially recognized date, and its existence before then seems to have beenpurelynominal.1925, July. 3rd General Assembly of I.R.C. The Netherlands, Denmark, andSwedenjointly proposeda resolutionsimilarto the Swedish one of 1922. Thiswas supportedby Britainand U.S.A., and received a majorityof votes cast.As, however, an amendment o the statutesrequireda two-thirdsmajority,theresolutionwasdeclared ost.1925, December. Executive Committee of I.R.C. decides to call anExtraordinaryGeneralAssemblyspecificallyto considerthe questionof mem-bershiprestriction.1926, June. Extraordinary General Assembly of I.R.C. Resolutions to amend



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255thestatutes, ndto send nvitationso join to theleadingacademies f alltheold CentralPowerswerepassed nanimouslyI9).The LondonConferenceto whichHardywas a delegate)wasof coursecalledat the worstpossibleime,when anAlliedvictorywas withinreachbutnot yet quiteachieved,andwhen,therefore,eelingsof narrownationalismandrevengewerelikelyto be at theirpeak.Theheadline f thereportn TheTimesaptly revealed,withoutintended rony, the predominantmood andpurpose f the LondonConference:BoycottofGerman cientists'(20).One of the reasonsommonlyadvancedor theexclusion f Germanywasthat allied scientistswould find a resumption f personalrelationswithGermansepugnant. hisprobably idrepresenthemajority pinionamongBritish cientistsy 1918-19and or a few yearsafterwards:xpressionsf anti-Germaneeling n scientific ublicationsrenot hard o find.A fewbiologicalexamplesmaybeuseful,f onlyto contrastwith theattitude f Bateson,HardyandPrain.Hampson 2I) prefaced taxonomicpaperwith the remark:Noquotationsfrom German authorspublishedsince August ISt1914 areinserted.Hosteshumanigeneris'.Walsingham(22) applaudedHampson'ssentiments,buthad his own, slightly differentform of boycott to propose:no publications nthe German languagehould be cited. He accusedthe Germans, n effect, ofhaving practised axonomic imperialismover the past fifty years, in that theygave preferenceto names of Germanorigin over earlierforeign names. Hisviews were applauded by Godwin-Austen (23), while Boulenger (24), boastedto Bateson that 'I have bound myself to ignore everything published inGermany after I914' (25). (Koestler comments acidly, and in a potentially mis-leading way, on this last passage (25). That Boulenger was Belgian by birthdoes make his attitude more understandablef not defensible:his homelandhad been invadedby Germanyin I914. Similarlyit is understandablehat, aswe shall see, it was the Frenchand Belgian delegationswhich were to provemost intransigentover the admission of Germany to I.R.C.) Much moremoderate n tone, but still emphaticallyagainstpersonalcontactswith Germanscientists was Sir Ray Lankester(26), while an equally moderate voice wasraisedon the othersideby D'Arcy Thompson(27). Even Bateson(28), writingto a Danish friendin 1920, was unhappyabout a suggestionto hold an Inter-nationalCongressof Genetics in Copenhagenthe following year. He fearedthat a truly internationalcongress(i.e. one including the Germans)held thenmight give widespreadoffence. Opinions were changing, however, and hethought a delay of even as little as six months might encounter a congenialclimate. He expresseda similar view to T. H. Morgan, adding, significantly,that he thought 'no organizedfestivity should be arranged'at such a congress



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256(29). (Inthis respectBateson was too sanguine: he next GeneticsCongressdidnot takeplaceuntil I927--but it was held in Berlin!)Batesonwasone of theBritishdelegates o the I919inauguralconferenceofI.R.C., but it is clearthathe attendedonly aftera good dealof hesitation,evenheart-searching.There are four letters from the physicistSir Arthur Schuster(Secretaryof the Royal Society; soon to become Secretary-Generalf I.R.C.)in June andJuly, urging him to attend and there seemsalso to have been aprivate meeting. In his last letter Schuster states'attendancewould, I think,commit you to the exclusionof Germany rom I.R.C.' (30). Batesonobviouslyseized upon the chink of uncertaintyaffordedby 'I think' and decided toattend.It may well be that Schusterdeliberatelyleft the door slightly ajar forBateson. By his office he was bound to strive for a distinguished andrepresentative et of delegatesfrom Britain. His own historyprovides strongreason o suspect hat he would have beenanxiousthatthe rampant hauvinismwhich, even then, he must have expectedto dominatethe Assembly,especiallyamong the French and Belgian delegations, should be temperedby the pre-senceof at leasta few men of moderateviews, such asBateson.Schuster's wnposition on the question of German exclusion is decidedly enigmatic. Hisobituaristsayssimply that he 'strove for the admissionof the CentralPowers'(3I). This must surely relate to a later period. (As we shall see, there isevidencethat he was active in this direction in the few monthsbeforeand afterthe decisiveAssemblyof 1926, in trying to influenceGermanscientificopiniontowardsactuallyjoining the I.R.C.) But if he had been a convinceddissidenton the issue which was the main animusor the foundation of the I.R.C., hecould hardlyhave acceptedthe postof Secretary-General.t is remarkable, ndpossiblyindicative of some ambivalence n hisfeelingsabout the I.R.C., thatinhis Autobiographicalragmentschuster s completely silentabout his nine yearsas Secretary-General (32).

How Schuster'sviews (and his expressionof them) were affectedby hisown Germanorigins is difficult to assess.He was born and brought up in along-established ewish family in Frankfurt-am-Main.n 1869 (when he wasI8) his fatheremigrated o England,becauseof the annexationof FrankfurtbyPrussia.To some extent, therefore,the family were refugees,thoughnot fromGermany,but from Prussiawhich became increasinglydominant in Germanaffairs. Although he had long since become a naturalizedBritish subject,Schusterwas subjected hroughoutWorld War I to persistentharassment,vento somepillorying in the press,on account of hisGermanoriginsand name.AsPresident-designate f the British Associationfor I915, pressureswere exerted



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257(unsuccessfully)o securehisresignation. herewas a series f agitations, y asmallgroupof Fellows edby H. E. ArmstrongI8), to bringabouthisresig-nationor dismissalsSecretaryf theRoyal Society(33).It saysa greatdealfor the good sense,and resistanceo the winds of public opinion,of theCouncilof theRoyalSociety hat,besidesmaintaininghroughouthe waronesecretaryf German irth, rom1916on theirotherSecretary Hardy-wasanoutrightpacifist.Moreover,heRoyalSociety,despitehepressures,idnotfollow theprecedentetby the FrenchAcademy arly n thewar,by strikingfrom ts list of Foreignmembers ll German ationals-eventhough hreeofthemhadbeensignatoriesf the notoriousManifesto f GermanAcademicsfI914.The harassmentchuster adexperiencedwouldsurelyhavemadehim,at the veryleast,mistrustfulf chauvinism.On theotherhand, t is likelytohave made him very consciousof the vulnerability f his own position,especiallyf, as Badashmplies, he attemptso removehimfromhisoffice nthe RoyalSocietyhad at one pointonlynarrowlybeenfrustrated(33).If hedidhope,at theoutset, hat he banon Germanmembershipouldfairly oonbe lifted,he is likely to have kept a low profile, waitingfor a substantialchange n the climateof opinionbeforeventuringo presshis viewsopenly.The evidence hatI have examineds entirelyconsistentwith thissuggestedtactic.At allevents,Schustersunlikely verto havebeenamong he hard-lineopponentsof Germanentry.His defenceof I.R.C. policy, in an unsignedarticlenNature,snotablymoderatentone.(34).Once arrivedat Brussels,Bateson oundhis worstfearsconfirmed.Hewrote ohis wife:

The internationalositions even worsethan I hadsupposed.Everyscrapof common ensesgone.The French redeterminedo turn he worldup-sidedown,andthe restacquiesce.f I hadunderstoodhepurposes f thismeetingI shouldnot have come. It has certainreal and usefulobjects nview, but it is largelybeing made an occasionto exploit science forchauvinisticurposes.keepaquiet ongueandonlyhave ntervenedwhenitcouldbe donewithoutexcitingarow. (35)Hispolicyof a quiettonguedidleadBatesonntooneembarrassingitua-tion.Forhe wasatBrusselslecteda Vice-Presidentf I.U.B.S.Heexplainedsoonafterwards:I regret hatmy nameappears sVice-Presidentf the BiologicalUnionestablished t Brussels.When I acceptedI thoughtthat I was beingappointed Vice-Presidentor theBrussels eeting.refusedo be president



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258of two sections,butwhen I understoodmyfirstmistake, thought hat oprotestand withdraw henwouldbe too 'fussy',as we say,andthatI hadbetter et thingstake theircourse.(36)

His confusion does seem understandable.For although Officers and a com-mittee were electedat Brussels,anddraft statutesdrawnup (butnot ratified)asubstantiveI.U.B.S. did not come into existence until four years later (37).During this period Bateson's position was quixotic: an Officer of a non-existentorganizationwith whose tenetshe disagreed.Two resolutionspassedby the Committee on Biology of the ConjointBoardof Scientific Societiesin 1920 were important n crystallizingoppositionto I.U.B.S. They alsodemonstratedhata substantialhift in Britishbiologicalopinion had taken place since 1918. The first resolution declaredthat 'therestorationof normal conditions of scientific intercoursewith Austria andGermany is an indispensablepreliminaryto the formation of a BiologicalUnion'. The secondresolution,reflectingthe other mainstrandof criticismofthe I.R.C., expressedunwillingness o commit itself to the proppsed chemeforI.U.B.S., andsuggested hat 'the restorationof co-operativeinternational ela-tions in scientific work may for the presentbe better achieved through themedium of InternationalCongressesand by individuals'(38). I know of noevidence that Batesonwas in any way responsible or the formulationof theseresolutions,althoughthey wholly coincidedwith his views andhe doesappearto have been a delegate to the C.B.S.S. from the LinneanSociety (39). It isnoteworthy that no similar resolutions were passedby other sectionalcom-mittees of C.B.S.S.; in fact the committees favouredthe formationof threeother InternationalUnions.In 1919-20 an abortive attempt was made to found a rival internationalbiological organization,of which Germanyshouldbe a member. The leadingspirit in this was the Dutch geneticistJ. P. Lotsy. He visited Batesonin thehope of gaining his support,but Bateson'sresponsewas discouraging.At alaterstagea letterfromLotsy, expoundinghisproposalsandsolicitingsupport,reachedPrain,who passed t to Bateson.Batesonthoughtthe proposalshadnochance of success;moreover,he was scathing n his commentson Lotsy'slackof sensitivity.He knew from the 1919I.R.C. assembly he inflexibleattitudeofmen such as the Frenchbiological representativeFlahault.Besides,he thoughtLotsy'sletter so clumsily composedthat it would put people off. RatherthanLotsy'spolemics,he would have preferreda simpledeclaration hat 'ouraimasmen of scienceis to promotethe growth of knowledge, and that thereforewemust admit to membership hose likely to furtherthataim, without regardto



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259theirmorality,nationalityr anyothercollateralircumstancehatever'.Buthe suspectedthat 'by the time Lotsy had got those innocent remarks nto hishideous French, it would be enough to scarifya rhinocerosanyhow!' (40).(Nevertheless,as a scientistLotsyhad had Bateson'srespect:seehis reviewsofLotsy's books (41).) Beneath this bantering disparagement ies the fact thatBateson was not motivatedby naive pro-Germansentiments.He understoodonly too well the depth of feeling behind the wish to exclude Germany,andhis own dignified responseto the death of his eldest son had been achievedonly through an intense inner conflict (42). He thoroughly deplored theactivitiesof men suchas the plantgeneticistErwin Baur,a close friend of pre-war days (they had collaboratedon one project),who went aboutrepresentingGermanyas an injured nnocent(36).The reservations n Bateson'sattitude towardsGermanywere alsoevidentin his attitudeto the famous,or notorious, 'Oxford letter'.This was signedbyaboutsixty Oxford academics(Hardy among them) and was sentto professorsin the artsand sciences n GermanandAustrianuniversities. toffered themthehandof friendshipandco-operation.Although The Timespublishedthe letterit immediatelycondemnedit in a leading article as 'singularly ll-advised...andreprehensiblen the extreme' (43), andnearlyall the ensuinglettersto theeditor were hostile to the Oxford letter. Bateson'sfeelingsabout the episodewere mixed. While he deploredthe superciliousand self-righteousattitudeofThe Timesand some correspondents,he felt that the tone of the letter was tooeffusive, and that it was thus likely to be counterproductive.He drafted,butprobablydid not send (at all events it was not published)a letterin which heapplauded he final sentenceof The Times'leadingarticle: 'Letthe exchangeatthis time of knowledge pursueits quiet courseand wait for friendshipuntil itcanbe honeston both sides'.But, he pointedout, such a courseof developmentwas impossibleso long as the CentralPowers were excludedfrom I.R.C. (44).Bateson'sattitudeto the Oxford letter recallshis policy of a 'quiet tongue' atthe Brusselsconferenceand his attitudetowardsthe projectedGeneticsCon-gress:he did not like chauvinism,but he preferred o outflank t, rather hanflyprovocativelyin its face.In I92I The Timespublishedan anonymousarticle headlined 'The progressof science revolt againstsuper-organisation',written in fact by (Sir) PeterChalmersMitchell, Secretaryof the Zoological Society of London (45). Thisattacked the whole I.R.C. set-up vigorously, both on the grounds ofbureaucracyand of Germanexclusion, althoughthe formerchargewas givengreaterprominence.Bateson confessedsoon afterwards o Hardy that he hadbeen 'atthe bottom of this',though he was not the authorof the article(46).



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260In a furtherminorforayin the cause of internationalismn science,Batesonin 1922 tenderedhis resignation(which was not accepted)from the Linnean

Society on the ground that their library was dilatory in obtaining Germanperiodicals.To the Librarian's efencethatGermanperiodicalswere thenverydifficult to obtain, Bateson retorted that he experienced little difficulty inobtainingcopies for his personaluse (47). In fairness o the LinneanSociety itshould be said that they relied on the 'usual channels' of the book trade,whereasBateson,both then and duringthe war, obtainedhiscopies privately,throughhisDanish friendOstenfeld(48).Probablythe most important development during this period was that in1923 the Royal Society sectional committees of Botany, Physiology andZoology, meeting conjointly,passeda recommendation o Council which wasnearly identical in wording to the firstof the two C.B.S.S. resolutions hreeyearsearlier. Bateson'scorrespondencempliesthata similarrecommendationhad been passedin 1920 (though possibly he was referringto the C.B.S.S.resolution,which was in fact forwardedto the Royal Society), and he claimedthat the 1923 recommendationwas passednem.con.(49). Itmaythereforebe ofinterestto name some of the betterknown membersof thesecommittees.Theyincluded, along with Batesonhimself, Sir William Bayliss,V. H. Blackman,Sir Sidney Harmer, A. V. Hill, Sir Arthur Keith, Sir John Russell, A. C.Seward andA. G. Tansley (50). The recommendationwasduly adoptedby theCouncil of the Royal Society in November 1923 (51), thus creatinga some-what paradoxicalsituation. The Royal Society had helped to found I.R.C.; itwas our representativebody upon it, and had mediatedBritainjoining, as afoundermember,each of the six Unions formedto date.At the 1922AssemblySir RichardGlazebrook,on behalf of the Royal Society, hadspokenagainst heSwedish move to admit the Central Powers. How, then, could its Council'adopt' this recommendation?From a narrowly legalisticpoint of view it istrue that the recommendationmerely stipulateda necessarypreconditionforjoining I.U.B.S., saying nothingabout otherUnions, so thatthe RoyalSocietycould claim that it was merely following the admirableprincipleof lettingeach science regulate its own affairs.But in substancethe recommendationattacked he centralprincipleon which the I.R.C. had been founded. One canassumeonly that 'adopt'meant less than it appears o mean,and indicated nomore thantakingnote of, or rubber-stamping;r thatthis was an earlypointertowards the Society'schangeof frontat the I925 Assembly.In 1924came an opportunity or Batesonto squareaccountswith the newlyactivated I.U.B.S. Flahault,the Secretary-General f I.U.B.S., wrote to saythat Bateson had been unanimouslynominatedas Presidentof the Section of



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26IGeneralBiology. In a dignifiedbut vigorous reply Batesonacknowledgedthehonour done him but begged leave to decline the nomination.He expresseddoubt as to whether such a general internationalbiological organizationwasyet necessary,over and above the organizationsof the several branches ofbiology. But he would not, on thatgroundalone, have refusedso flatteringaninvitation:

I have a much graver objection. The Union Internationaledes SciencesBiologiques, as at presentconstituted,seems to me likely ratherto restrictthanto promoteinternational cientificcommunication.This considerationhad, as no doubt you know, weighed so much with us in EnglandthattheRoyal Society hasdeclined to join. I enclosea copy of the resolutionwhichwe latelyadopted, thoughprobably t hadalreadyreachedyou.For my own part, I deplore the introduction of the question ofnationality nto scientificaffairs.The representativesf learningand the artsmight providea dominant nfluence n maintaining he sanityof the world.The force they might exert is prodigious.Thatthey shouldpromotefurtherdivision is to me lamentable. The formation of a Union from whichGermany s in effect excluded, can only increase he mischief.Thereis alsosomethingunrealand grotesquein the thought of a biological union con-taining no German names.After all, the developmentsof cellularbiologyhave always from the beginning been very largely German. We gainnothing by refusingto recognisefacts. One of the great deprivationsof thewar was the suspensionof intercourse with our German colleagues. Icannotbe a partyto any measuretendingstill further o alienateus.Pray do not chargeme with a want of sympathy.I can understandhefeelingsof resentmentwhich have led to suchproposals. f in thejudgementof posterity we are found at this critical time ourselves to have donenothing unworthy, it is much, and with thatambition we may be content.(52)Bateson was not content just to decline on his own behalf. The Danishgeneticist Wilhelm Johannsenhad been nominated as Vice-Presidentof thesame section:Batesonpromptlywrote to tell him what he had done, andhadthe satisfactionof learning,throughone ofJohannsen's tudents, hatJohannsenhaddeclinedthe Vice-Presidency(53).A more successfulattemptthanLotsy'sat forminga 'freelance'Union wasmadein the field of mechanics.Sir HaroldJeffreysrecallsattendingtwo of the

firstthreeconferencesof the InternationalUnion of AppliedMechanics n the



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262

early I920S, held (he thinks)at Delft, Zurich and Cambridge.The Union hadno links with I.R.C. and admittedGermansand Hungarians rom the start(54). A contemporaryreporton the Delft Conferencein 1924saysthat it wasorganizedby a group of Dutch scientists,and, with over 200 attending,washighly successful(including the social festivities!). The only point, in fact,where feelingsranhigh, was in a purelyscientificdisputebetween two groupsof Germans.The Frenchwere conspicuouslyabsent,but otherwise there seemsto have been a reasonablybroadspreadof internationalattendance(55). Ihavebeen unableto discoverfor how long this Union remainedactive,nor whetherit did more thanorganizea series of conferences.(In any case,it seemsthat,atthis period, some of the I.R.C. Unions did little more than this.) The(temporary)successof the Applied MechanicsUnion probablyowed much tothe fact that it served a field not covered by any I.R.C.-affiliated Union, andthus suffered little competition. Hardy and Church mention two more inter-national conferences held outside the I.R.C. umbrella: a Physiological Con-gress in Edinburgh and a Psychological Congress at Oxford (9). Quiteprobably there were yet others: I have not made a systematic search. Mostseries of congresses had standing committees, responsible for organizing thenext congress. Some of these, as with the Genetics Congresses, would simplyhave resumed their activities when the war was over quite independently ofthe I.R.C.Meanwhile, Hardy was achieving several minor victories. By making theissue one of confidence in himself as a much-valued Secretary, he hadpersuaded the influential London Mathematical Society to vote against supportof the International Mathematical Union (46). However, on a national scaleHardy's advocacy was unavailing: Britain did join I.M.U. His other role wasas President of the recently formed National Union of Scientific Workers(later the Association of Scientific Workers) (56). At the May 1924 meeting ofthe Executive Committee he introduced a resolution:

That the organisation of scientific unions or congresses which are describedas international but from which particular nations are excluded on politicalgrounds is unworthy of the spirit of science (9, 57).

This resolution was passed unanimously, together with a recommendation thatit be given the greatest possible publicity. It is no surprise to find twoprominent left-wingers, Lancelot Hogben and Hyman Levy, among thoseattending the meeting. On the other hand, Helen Gwynne Vaughan, D.B.E.,N.U.S.W.'s most noted conservative, was absent (58).



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263TheoutcomewasalongletterpublishedntheManchesteruardianverthenames of Hardyand Church(Secretary f N.U.S.W.). Afterciting their

resolution,heywentontocriticize .R.C.and tsunionsnextenso,ngroundsalreadyamiliar.N.U.S.W. was,theysaid,promoting campaign f protest,and had communicatedheir resolutionto the principalacademiesandscientific ocietiesof Europeand America,and to the press.They invitedsuggestionsrom scientists s to possiblefurthersteps.The letter receivededitorial upport n the form of a short eadingarticleheaded ScienceandSpite'. 9)It is remarkablehat the Hardy-Churchetterprovokedonly one knownresignationromN.U.S.W. (There ouldhavebeenothers:no reasonsgivenfor mostof the 32 recordedresignationsn 1924.)The Oxfordastronomer .H. Turnerresignedbecauseof 'the unioncampaignn favourof Germany'(59).As Turnerhad been one of the most nsistentampaignersor Schuster'sresignation uring he war,his resignationn this issue s hardly urprising.(33)At the endof 1924,Hardy eportedo N.U.S.W. membersn the outcomeof the publicitygiven to the resolution. t had receiveda fair amountofcoveragentheBritishpress, lthoughTheTimes ndNature adeachdeclinedto printit. 'A good many'replieshad been received romacademies ndsocieties, nd while someof thesewere mere ormalacknowledgementsherewere also more positiveresponses.Thus the OpticalSocietyhad passedaresolution ympathetico the attitudeof N.U.S.W. and the MeteorologicalSociety was 'not opposed to the admissionof ex-enemy nations'. TheGeologicalSocietyand he LondonMathematicalocietyhadneverassociatedthemselveswith the I.R.C.policy.On this rather lenderbasis(together,nodoubt, with his personal contacts) Hardy felt justified in reassertingN.U.S.W.'s claim that on this matter hey representedan overwhelmingmajority of British men of science'. The positive responseto the resolutionstrikes one as rather meagre although, given the pace at which scientificsocietiesmove,Juneto November was a rathershortperiodon which to judgeit. Replies had also been received from a number of GermanAcademies,expressingagreementwith andgratitude o N.U.S.W. (60)More significant,perhaps,than responses rom other societies were eventsat the InternationalMathematicalCongressat Toronto that summer.Hardyhimself wasnot at the Toronto congress,but it is entirelypossiblethatcopiesofthe Hardy-Church etterhad reachedsome Americanmathematicians.Hardyclaimed that many American mathematiciansdiscoveredfor the first time atToronto that the Germanswere excluded. This discovery,he said,gave riseto



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264a gooddealof indignation ulminatingn a resolutioncalling ortheremovalof the ban,movedby representativesf the AmericanMathematicalociety,and supported y the delegatesof Denmark,GreatBritain,Holland,Italy,Norway, Swedenand Switzerland.It is especially ignificanthat this listincludeshreeofthe'bigfive'nations f I.R.C., eavingFrance ndBelgiumnrelative solation.) nevitably,t waspointedout from the platformhattheresolutionwascontraryo I.R.C.statutes. he resolutiontselfwasthereuponabandoned,utit wasagreed hatthe attention f the I.R.C.shouldbe drawnto the discussionnd,a moredirect hreat, heplatform'sroposalo holdthenext Congressn Brussels nder he existingstatuteswaswithdrawn.Hardypredicted hatToronto would be the lastmathematicalcongressheld under'boycottrules': f the banwerenot soonremovedby the I.R.C.the I.M.U.would eithercollapseor degeneratento a Franco-Belgianump (60). Theimportance f the eventsat Toronto s thatthey were the firstsignof openrebellionn one of the I.R.C.'sown Unions:thereseems ittle doubt hattheAmericanesolutionwouldhave beenpassed adnotconstitutionalroprietyintervened. o theleadershipf I.R.C. hismusthaveserved sadanger-signalof furtherroublesnstore.

THE CHANGE IN OFFICIALI.R.C. POLICY AND ITS AFTERMATHBatesondid not live quite long enoughto see the doors of the I.R.C.openedto the CentralPowers. Yet the crucialdecisionwas takenshortlybeforehisdeath.Thiswasthedecision f the ExecutiveCommittee,nDecem-ber I925, to call an ExtraordinaryGeneral Assembly. From then on, therevisionistbandwagonrolled inevitably:witnessthe unanimousvotes atBrusselsn 1926.The question herewas not whetherhe statuteswould berevised o admit he CentralPowers,but whichof severaldifferentlywordedresolutions,all having that effect, would be adopted.The 1926decisioninvolveda changeof frontby manywho hadearlieropposedGerman dmis-

sion,includingold I.R.C.hands' ike Schuster,he American stronomer .E. Hale (4, 5) (member f theExecutiveCommittee) ndthe President,hemathematicianmilePicard f France.How did this change of front come about?In large part, no doubt, itreflectshe moreconciliatoryone of publicopinion owardsGermany, ndthegeneral oftening f internationalelationshatdeveloped uringhe I920s,culminatingn the Kellogg pactof 1928.Justthreemonthsafter he BrusselsAssembly f 1926Germanywasadmittedo theLeague f Nations,althoughtmaybesignificanthat he invitation ojoin I.R.C.came irst.But theinternalpoliticsof I.R.C. were also mportant.Once sufficient ank-and-filecientists,



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265in line with the changing climate of public opinion, had come to favourGerman admission, then continuance of the old policy was a source of dissen-sion and a potential danger to the integrity of I.R.C. This point was stressedbySir Richard Glazebrook in explaining Britain's change of stance at Brussels inI925 (I9). The ambiguity of attitudes among men at the centre of I.R.C. is wellseen in a very revealing letter from Hale to Schuster in 1924:

As to the German question, I confess that I am still greatly puzzled regard-ing the best procedure. There is a growing demand in this country for theadmission of Germany to all international affairs, which is naturally mostinsistent in the case of those who have been least in contact with the Frenchand Belgians since the war. (61)Hale regarded the parallel issue of pressure for greater autonomy of theUnions as 'chiefly directed towards the admission of Germany', and he proudlyrelated to Schuster his manoeuvres to prevent this pressure being expressed

through official channels. At a meeting of the Division of Foreign Relations ofthe National Research Council an informal show of hands had shown aunanimous desire for greater autonomy, but Hale had managed to prevent aformal vote being taken. There had been an acrimonious debate on the issue(again without a vote) in the National Academy of Sciences the previous year,and he intended not to allow the question to come up in the Academy in 1924(6i).Yet Hale's personal view (shared by Millikan (62)) was strongly in favourof allowing the Unions to make their own rules, both on procedural mattersand as to membership.

I should be ready to press this point very far, even against strong oppositionby Picard, because I believe the life of the International Research Councilto be at stake. If we insist on the present hard and fast system many of theUnions will break away from us or will dissolve and be reconstitutedindependantly. We cannot afford to let Picard's iron hand wreck the wholeorganisation, which we have set up with so much difficulty. (61)So too on German admission, which Hale believed should be arranged assoon as possible (Millikan was much more strongly in favour). He suspectedthat Schuster and the Royal Society agreed with him on both issues, and

suggested that they should work together, moving 'carefully anddiplomatically'. The first step should be to secure the agreement of the Italianmember of the Executive Committee. The second should be the elimination ofthe intransigent Picard as President. In the interim, his tactic was to suppressovert opposition as far as possible, until a clear victory could be assured in the



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266I.R.C., rather hanacrimoniousanddamagingdisagreement61).Whateverwe may thinkof Hale's machiavellian actics,hischangeof viewdid not amount to inconsistency.His primeconcernthroughouthad been thewell-being and integrity of I.R.C. (4, 5). In the early yearsthe admissionofGermanywould have causeda majorrevolt among the Frenchand Belgians:Hale had thereforebeen against t. Now the dangercamefrom the otherside,so he supportedadmission.He had from the start avoured moreautonomyforthe Unions, but had given in so as to preserveunity: now thatthis issue,too,threatened o becomedisruptivehisadvocacybecame moreforthright.It did not take very long for Hale to bringhis publicstance nto line withhis privateviews. By the time of the 1925 Assembly,at the latest,he was anopen supporterof the admission of the Central Powers. Himself unable toattendthe Assemblyfor reasonsof health,he arranged or VernonKellogg tolead the U.S. delegation (63). Schuster'sconversion to a similarviewpointseems to have roughly paralleledHale's althoughhe was slower than Hale torecognize the need for greaterautonomyof the Unions. This seemshowever,from Kevles's account, to have been due not to things related to the Germanquestion, but to his fear that, with more autonomous Unions, the I.R.C. itselfwould degenerate into a merely ceremonial body (5).Once the decision had been taken to call an Extraordinary Assembly in1926 precautions were taken to prevent a repetition of the fiasco of 1925.Voting on the Dutch-Danish-Swedish resolution in 1925 had fallen only a littleshort of a two-thirds majority of votes cast: 10 for, 6 against. But the rulesrequired a two-thirds majority of all member nations (one vote per nation,irrespective of size). With 29 member nations, even a unanimous vote by the16 nations present in 1925 would not have sufficed to change the statutes.Arrangements were therefore made for a postal ballot among nations notsending a delegation. The unanimous result achieved (both on the postal andpersonal votes) must have been gratifying to old and new opponents of exclu-sion alike, although fairly strong persuasive pressures, especially on people likePicard, had been necessary to bring it about. It was now the French andBelgians and their allies who had been called upon to suppress their privatefeelings in the interests of the unity of the I.R.C.All the same, those at the centre of the I.R.C. must have known that theresolution passed and invitations issued in 1926 were an expression of hope forthe future, not something likely to bear immediate fruit. For there had beenunofficial overtures early in the year, to sound out German governmental andscientific opinion, and the results of these had been distinctly gloomy. InMarch, 1926, C. G. Simpson of the British Meteorological Office had long



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267conversations,xtendingover two days,with theDutchphysicistLorentznParis;the French scientistPainleve was presentfor partof the time. (Lorentzwas an old campaigneragainstthe exclusion of Germany.He had written toSchuster n that sense, in terms of studiedmoderation,as early as 1919. (64))Simpsonwas a memberof the Council of the Royal Society, but wasemphaticthat he attendedin a private capacity, not as an official representativeof theRoyal Society. As he met Lorentz at the specific suggestionof Sir RichardGlazebrook(Foreign Secretary,R.S.) and sentdetailedreportson the talkstoGlazebrook,Rutherford(President)and Schuster,he is perhapsbest regardedasa semi-officialenvoy.Simpson was told by Lorentz that two members of the Dutch Academy(Went and Kruyt) had had a meeting with the threeSecretariesof the BerlinAcademy (Planck,Rubnerand another).The atmosphereat this meeting hadinitially been bad, but had improved. Lorentz showed him a copy of amemorandumwhich the Germanshadgiven to Went, which setout four con-ditions for Germanycoming into I.R.C., these were:(i) That a positiveinvitationtojoin be issued.(ii) That not only should the regulation banning German entry beannulled,but that it should be declaredthat the reasons or excludingGermany were annihilated ('vernichtet'). (The intention was

apparentlyto avow that there never had been any valid reason forkeepingGermanyout.)(iii) Germanyand Austria should each be given a seat on the ExecutiveCommittee and a proper proportionof offices in the Council andtheUnions.(iv) That the Germanlanguagebe allowed at meetings,and if there weremore than one officiallanguageGermanshouldbe one. (65)Plans were also discussed for a 'preliminary'meeting at Paris, to try toresolve the differencesrevealedby the Dutch-Germanmeeting.This was to be

attendedby representatives f the German,FrenchandBritishAcademies,andof other countries.I have found nothing among Schuster'spapersto indicatethat this 'preliminary' meeting ever took place-perhaps it died in uterothrough intransigenceon one or both sides. Whether it took place or not, itmusthave been clearby the time of the Assemblythat the leadersof Germanscience were determinedto extractthe maximumpossiblenationaladvantagefrom the situation. They were preparedto enter only on conditions whichcould readily be construed as a German victory, rather than as an act ofreconciliation,and which could thereforebe a powerful emollient to injuredGerman pride. Furthermore,some of these conditions were bound to be



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268unacceptable o at least some of the Western countries.To persuadehe Frenchand Belgians to swallow sufficient of their pride to let Germany in wasdifficultenough: to expect them to swallow their pride whole, even to abasethemselvesby apologizing, in effect, for having excludedGermany n the firstplace, wasto asktoo much.In the event, the decisions taken at Brussels in 1926 satisfied only the first ofthe four German conditions. The relevant clause of the statutes was simplyannulled, without comment as to whether it had originally been justifiable,which was a long way from meeting condition (ii).It was therefore inevitable that events after 1926 should be anti-climatic.Neither those who had been blackballed, nor those who had stayed outside inprotest showed any great alacrity to join. The German Academies, inparticular, vigorously rejected the invitation, against the wishes of their owngovernment. The response in the smaller countries of the Central Powers wasmore favourable: Hungary joined I.R.C. in 1927 and Bulgaria in 1934 (thedelay in Bulgaria was ostensibly for financial reasons). But Germany andAustria stayed outside until after World War II: Austria joined I.C.S.U. (thesuccessor of I.R.C.) in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952 and theGerman Democratic Republic in 1961 (66). It is unlikely that German andAustrian scientists really intended to stay outside for so long. The prevalentattitude would rather have been: 'We'll show them we're not to be had justfor the asking-let's wait a few years'. Once Hitler came to power in 1933 theopportunity in Germany had been lost, for the climate of opinion would thenhave been very unfavourable to joining any international organization of thiskind. In Austria, conditions for joining should have been more favourable, forthe country was dominated by political Catholicism up to 1938, and theVatican City was a member of I.C.S.U. from 1934. Not surprisingly,however, feelings of cultural unity with Germany took precedence, especiallyas the Austrian Academies were affiliated to the Verband des deutschenAkademien. Even in 1926, Austria had been prepared to join if only Germanywould (66).Schuster does not appear to have been especially active after 1926 in makingfurther attempts to persuade the Germans to join. There are two probablereasons for this. First, after the initial rebuff, a year or more had to elapsebefore it was worth renewing the attempts, and in 1927-28 Schuster suffered aserious illness, followed by a long convalescence which kept him largely out ofaction for about six months. During this period Glazebrook deputized for him,and kept him informed of such developments as there were. Glazebrook hadmet a retired German scientist (Strecker) who thought he could do something



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269(it is not clearpreciselywhat) to producea betterunderstanding.Much morepromising(in Schuster'sview) was a long letterfrom Went, reportingon thestateof Germanscientificopinion. According to Went's information,at themeeting of the Cartell [=Verband?]deutscherAkademienin 1927 there hadbeen a majority(Berlin, Gottingen, Heidelberg, Vienna) in favour of joiningI.R.C., but the opposition of the minority (Munich, Leipzig) had been sostrongthat the majorityhad not daredto pressthroughtheir proposal.Wentalso believed that the Deutsche PhysikalischeGesellschaftwanted to join theInternationalUnion of Physics, and that the correspondingchemical bodywished to join the I.U. Chemistry. Having learnt that the botanist Goebel(Munich)was one of the leadingopponentsof joining I.R.C., Went had had along talk with GoebelandotherleadingBavarianscientists, rying, he believedwith somesuccess, o weakentheiropposition.Went believedthatonly a veryfew were strongly opposed, while the great majority of German scientistswanted to join I.R.C. (a situation,he suggested, parallelto that in FranceandBelgium up to 1926). Many Germanshad enjoined him to have patience.Other moves were afoot through other Dutch scientists,but Went was notauthorizedto give details. Schusterwas so encouragedby Went's reportthathe suggestedthat the Royal Society ought to proposeor supporta move toabolish the I.R.C. rule whereby countriesadheringto a particularUnion hadalso to belong to the I.R.C., although he did not seemvery optimisticaboutthe chancesof success(66).The picture paintedby Went is much rosierthanthatwhich emergesfromForman'scareful study of Germanopinion (mainly among physicists)at thesameperiod (3). The impression hat one gainsfrom Forman s that,apart roma few outstanding ndividuals(e.g. Einstein,who was widely ostracized as aresult),Germanscientistspresentedan almost monolithicoppositionto joiningthe I.R.C. PerhapsWent, or his informants,had succumbed o wishful think-ing: the contrast,nevertheless,s striking.

The second, more conjectural,reasonwhy Schustershould have stayedinthe background s that the nationalistic eadersof Germanscience would haveacknowledged that most of their counterparts n Allied countrieshad, likethemselves,been actingin accordancewith properand laudablepatrioticsenti-ments. They were men of like minds divided by the accidentof nationality.Schuster, however, would have been seen as a special case. As a man ofGerman birth who had become the chief executive of an anti-Germanorganization, he would probably have been regarded as a traitor, even apariah.

The absentGermanycontinued to give rise to some dissensionandfriction



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270within the I.R.C., though to a much lesser extent than before 1926. Thus in1928 the British National Committee of the International Astronomical Unionproposed to change the I.A.U. statutes so as to allow individual Germanscientists to attend their meetings, without waiting for a corresponding changein the statutes of I.R.C. itself (68). From Sweden in the same year came a moreominous threat: that Sweden (and perhaps other neutrals) would probably notcontinue her membership beyond 1931 (when the I.R.C. statutes were due tocome up for revision) unless Germany had by then adhered. Behind this threat,Glazebrook saw the possibility that Sweden was considering joining somenew, German-based combination-but the threat never materialized (69).On the other side, British biologists were in no great hurry to reverse theirearlier decision to stay out: Britain did not adhere to I.U.B.S. until 1929 (70).U.S.A., which had stayed out of I.U.B.S. for similar reasons (see below) waseven tardier, not joining until 1935 (71). The reason for this continued absten-tion, now that the German question had, at least formally, been disp6sed of, isto be sought partly in inertia and partly in the old bugbear of bureaucracy: thewidespread feeling that I.U.B.S. was an imposing piece of machinery of littlereal use to biologists. This is well brought out in a letter from Dale to Schusterin 1927, which appears to have accompanied a formal recommendation fromthe various biological committees of the Royal Society not to join I.U.B.S.Dale reported that he had put the case for I.U.B.S. as well as he could (and onesenses that Dale himself did not find it a very convincing case), but there was,he said, a uniform scepticism as to any gain to British biologists or theirsciences to be achieved by joining, apart from a possible influence on thegeneral politics of international science. While the I.R.C. was still postponingthe question of making itself truly international, biologists had taken thingsinto their own hands and organized several international congresses in whichGermans and Austrians had participated (72). The views of leading Britishbiologists seemed, in fact, to be virtually unchanged since just before thestatutes were altered, when Schuster had told the Belgian Secretary-General ofI.U.B.S. that he knew of only a single British biologist (J. H. Ashworth ofEdinburgh) who was favourable towards joining I.U.B.S. (73). (Schuster'sand Dale's informal opinion polls appear to have been restricted to FF.R.S.) Itseems rather remarkable that, only two years after Dale's letter, Britain shouldhave joined: this was surely due less to any changes in conviction about themerits of I.U.B.S., as to a desire not to appear unco-operative in the inter-national scene, and to evade those accusations of 'British perfidy' which Prainhad predicted would result from the ambiguous nature of the original recom-mendation of the biological committees of the Royal Society. (Prain had



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271criticized the wording of the 1923 recommendationas being too 'clever' and'political':he would have preferreda more forthrightdeclaration.As thingsstood, the recommendationdid not commit Britainto joining I.U.B.S. assoonas the Germanswere allowed in, but othercountriesmight well suppose hat itimplied such a commitment,with the consequentdeclarationsagainstBritishperfidyif we did not.) (74).

ATTITUDES OF BIOLOGISTSIN OTHER ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIESSo far, I have treatedthe boycott of I.U.B.S. as a purely British affair.Inow wish to considerbriefly similar strandsof opinion elsewhere, confiningmyselffor simplicityto English-speaking ountries.An examinationof the lists of countries belonging to the eight Unionsformed up to 1926 (Astronomy, Geodesy and Geophysics, Chemistry,Mathematics,Radio Science,Physics,Biological Sciences,Geography)revealsa very sporadicpatternof membership 19). The total membershipof all theUnions togetheris not muchmore than half what it would havebeen had eachcountrybelonged to all eight Unions. The smallercountriesoften belonged toonly one or a few Unions (Monacoin fact belonged to I.R.C. but to no con-stituentUnion). It would clearlybe unrealistic o supposethat all or mostgapsin the membershiphinged on the Germanquestion,and hazardous o assumethisin any individualcase without supportingevidence. Neverthelessthere is astronghint of solidarityamong the biologistsof the English-speakingnations.Only one-South Africa-belonged to the I.U.B.S. at this time. The non-membershipof U.S.A. is particularly triking,since, like Britain,she was oneof the five statesattendingthe 1918LondonConference;shehada representa-tive on the executive committee of I.R.C., and adheredto all the other sevenUnions. Australia belonged to six of them, Canada to five, while NewZealand was in a ratherdifferentposition. New Zealandwascited in I9I9 asa

founding member of I.R.C., but her membershipnever becameeffective (i.e.she did not pay the membershipdues)duringthe 1920s, andconsequentlyshebelongedto no Union.Enquirieshave been madeto the affiliatingacademiesof these countriesasto the reason(s) why they did not then belong to I.U.B.S., and have yielded avarietyof answers.In the caseof Canadano information s now available(74).In U.S.A. the Division of Biology and Agricultureof the National ResearchCouncil voted in May 1923 against oining I.U.B.S. (75). Although Schramm'sbrief letter gives no indicationof the reason,Hale's letter to Schusteralreadycited shows that the exclusion of Germany was (at the least) an importantdeterminant in the vote. 'Here as with you, the biologists and the pure



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272mathematicians seem to be the most insistent regarding the omission ofGermany' (61). Australian withholding from I.U.B.S. was probablyinfluenced by financial stringencies, and there is no definite evidence of aboycott. However, feeling was strong in Australia that Germany ought to beadmitted. Not only was an Australian motion tabled at Brussels in I925alongside the Netherlands motion, making Australia the first former Alliednation to give public and official support to the admission of Germany. Longbefore this, in August 1922, the Australian National Research Council hadpassed a similar resolution, and sent a copy of it to London (presumably toSchuster) (77). Financial stringencies were again important, probably decisive,in preventing the adherence of New Zealand to I.U.B.S.: neither the recordsnor personal memories suggest anything approaching a boycott (78). Thus inU.S.A. and quite probably in Australia biologists took the same line as inBritain, although the role of Australian biologists is less clear.

ATTITUDES IN OTHER SCIENCESClearly, biologists were not alone in including a substantial number of

opponents of German exclusion. We have already met several sourcesimplicating mathematicians: Hardy's account of events at the LondonMathematical Society; the broadly based international revolt at the I.M.C.congress at Toronto, and Hale's remark to Schuster just quoted. (Hale's letterwas not influenced by the Toronto congress; it was written 3 months pre-viously.) There was, besides, a large and growing body of opinion withinI.R.C. itself which worked for a change in the statutes. There was a third alter-native policy for objectors: to form an independent or breakaway Union. Wehave seen that there was at least one unsuccessful attempt (in biology) and atleast one which was temporarily successful (applied mechanics). However,such a course is tactically rather unattractive. Unless a breakaway Union cansecure the support of many countries, including the most important ones, itwill offer few advantages to its adherents (the form rather than the substance)and will besides cut them off from the mainstream of international co-operation in that science. If the science is one where the need for formal inter-national co-operation is fairly slight, this may not matter much, but then theincentive to form a breakaway Union will be weak. A breakaway Union does,however, probably have a greater propaganda value than a boycott: the lattermight be widely interpreted as the result of inertia, parsimony or isolationism.I shall argue that such tactical considerations were the main identifiablefactor in the apparent greater readiness of biologists and mathematicians to



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273indulge n boycottsorbreakawayUnions.An alternativehypothesiswouldbethatpeopleattractednto biologyor mathematicsended o have a differentmentalitywhichsomehowstrengthenedheir nternationaloyaltyor alteredtheir way of expressingt. The 'mentality'hypothesis s not inherentlyimplausible,but it comparespoorly with the 'tactical'hypothesisn threeways.Ithas(i) much essprimafacieupport; ii) lessfeasibility f formulationwith acceptable recision; iii) lessamenabilityo adequate esting.It is forthese reasons,and not becauseI wish to minimize the possiblerole ofmentality,that I shallignore the 'mentality'hypothesishenceforth.For similarreasons, I shall ignore factors which in this context can be regarded as 'chance',e.g. the individual characteristics and geographical location of the person(s) incharge of a particular Union.Biology and pure mathematics may seem to be strange bedfellows. Whatthey had in common was that neither, in the I920s, had any pressing need for aUnion. Mathematics, dealing only in ideas, needs only international means ofcommunication, journals and congresses, neither of which needs the backing ofa Union. This applies with only slightly less force to applied mathematics. It issignificant that the I.M.U., founded in 1922, was dissolved some time betweenI93I and I934 and was not refounded until I952 (I9, 37).

Among the Unions established by 1926, Astronomy, Geodesy and Geo-physics, Radio Science and Geography stand out as sciences with a clear andstrong need for formal international co-operation, even in the very collectionof their data. The case was perhaps less obvious and strong for Physics andChemistry, yet the common coin of these sciences was entities and units whichwere exactly comparable across national boundaries: elements, atomic weights,spectra, electrical units. ... As the I.R.C. had effectively destroyed the rem-nants of the pre-war system, physical scientists had really very little choice butto join I.R.C. (or rather, to support joining by their nations) and, if they felt soinclined, to work from within for reform of the statutes. To have stayedoutside the system, cutting themselves off from vital international sources,would for many of them have been quite crippling.It is instructive to compare the crude classification of sciences above,according to their degree of need for an international organization, with theassessment by Kevles as to the degree of activity of the eight Unions formed bythe mid-1920s. Only two, he says, were flourishing (astronomy; geodesy andgeophysics), while the rest (notably those for mathematics, chemistry andphysics) 'amounted largely to mere paper organisations' (5). Excepting therelative inactivity of the Unions for radio sciences and geography, (whichmight have other causes) the general agreement is good. Where there was an



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274urgentneed for internationalo-operation, he corresponding nion wasactive;where herewasno suchclearneed, t tended o beanempty hell-as,indeed, heleadingBritishbiologistsudged .U.B.S.to be.The commoncoinageof biologywasnot nternationaln the samepreciseway as thatof the physical ciences.Particularpecieswereusually ocalindistributionnd even with stocksof laboratory rganisms,which couldbetransferredcrossnationalboundaries, eneticdriftwouldsoon ensure hatsibling tockswereno longerpreciselydentical. uchbiologicalmeaurementsand unitsasthenexistedweretoo approximateor theestablishmentf inter-national tandardso be a pressing eed.Biologists ouldthusafford o takeastanduponprinciple t verylittlepracticalost.ForBatesonwasquiteright(consideringiologyas t thenwas,not asit isnow) inclaiminghat he func-tionscouldbe servedas well-perhaps better-by informal hannels ndbyexisting pecialist odies uchasthestandingommittees f internationalon-gresses 52). Thesecommittees ften didverymuchmorethan ust organizepreparationsor the next congressand generallymaintain threadof con-tinuity.Themostpressing eed n biologyfor apermanentnternationalodyhad been in taxonomy, o establish nd monitora code of practice or thenomenclaturef species ndhigher axa.Thisneedhadlongbeenserved, ndservedwell,throughhe Internationalongressesf ZoologyandBotany.

The International ommission f ZoologicalNomenclature atesfrom1894,when t wassetup byanInternationalongressf ZoologyatLeyden. tis truethaton the botanical ide a similarpermanent ody wasnot formeduntil 1930(International otanicalCongress,Cambridge).This delay wasmainlydue to the fact that the Americans dopteda code of their own inBotany,slightlydifferentromthe one in generaluse.Theinternationalodesof botanicalnomenclaturen factgo back even further han the zoologicalones: to I867 (Paris). The International ommission nd the InternationalBureaudo now receivefinancialsupportromI.U.B.S., but theyremainasindependentodies,answerable ot to I.U.B.S.,butto theCongresses hichset them up.) It is of interest hat when, in 1934,U.S.A. did at lastjoinI.U.B.S., it was largelyon the initiativeof a taxonomist,E. D. Merrill(Directorof New York BotanicalGardens):Merrillwas promptlyelectedPresident f I.U.B.S.(80).But the growingbody of experimental iologistsneededto have littleconcernwiththe niceties f propernomenclature,eyondensuringhemselvesthatthe organismhey workedwith was(approximately,t least) he 'same'speciesas thatusedelsewhere, ndconversely,hatthe samespecieswasnotbeing experimentedupon under two differentnames. And the average



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275biologist of the time could support a boycott without putting his professionalinterests appreciably at risk.

CONCLUSIONSThe events surrounding the early years of the I.R.C. have sometimes been

regarded as a test-case for the existence and effectiveness of a spirit of inter-nationalism among scientists. Clearly, judged by the highest standards, thescientists (or rather, the scientific establishments) of the Allied countries, andno less those of Germany, failed the test. If the scientists of neutral countriescame out of the affair with much greater credit, that, it may be said, wasbecause they faced a much lesser challenge: there was for them no conflictbetween scientific and national loyalties. The view expressed by Schroeder-Gtidehus, that 'the weight of transnational loyalties' among scientists was'hardly noticeable' is therefore superficially attractive. Nevertheless, I believe,for three main reasons, that it is seriously exaggerated and one-sided.First, a major war presents a particularly severe challenge-perhaps themost severe-to any system of international loyalties which transects the con-ventional duties of patriotism. Failure in this test by no means implies thatscientific loyalties would have failed a less demanding test. Witness theactivities (undoubtedly effective, though not immediately so) of scientists ofneutral countries in the I.R.C. affair. The main motive of these can hardly havebeen anything else than a sense of scientific internationalism. Indeed, from anarrowly nationalistic point of view, an indefinite continuation of theimmediate post-war situation would have given the neutral countries at least amarginal advantage in competitive terms, since they alone would have been incommunication with their fellows in both the opposed camps.Second, the question of adherence to the I.R.C. or any of its Unions waseffectively outside the control of rank-and-file scientists in any country. Thesystem of representation through the leading scientific academy of eachcountry meant that the power or decision lay in the hands of a rather smallbody of distinguished and comparatively elderly scientists. (The I.R.C. didhave an alternative, for use in countries where no suitable academy existed,whereby membership was effected through the government itself. This waslittle used, and was hardly calculated to give a more representative result.)Academies like the Royal Society were self-selecting and self-perpetuatingelites. Even had there been some more representative system of election ofmembers of the academies, with scientists as a whole forming the electorate, itis unlikely that the collective views of those elected would have been verydifferent. For election to the academy would still have been seen as an honour,



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276a rewardandrecognition f eminentachievementn science.Thisconsidera-tion would have dominated he voting, whichwouldhave beeninfluencedhardlyat all by questions f sciencepolicyandpolitics, uchasadherenceothe I.R.C.Indeed,giventhehighlydispersedlectorate,t isunlikely hattheviews of potentialcandidatesupon suchquestionswould have been at allwidelyknown.Only a referendumspecifically n I.R.C.mattersould havegivena truereflection f the viewsof thescientificcommunitysawhole,andeven this wouldhavefaceddifficultiesn the delineation f theelectorate. hepoint s well illustratedyGolub'sprotest oncerninglections o the(councilof the?)Americannstitute f Physics.Accompanyinghe ballot formwerethumbnailbiographiesf thecandidates. hese,however,relatedsolely o theacademic ndresearch chievementsf the candidates,nd not at all to theirviews on, say,the relationof the physicsprofessiono society.Accordingly,Golubconsideredhe elections farcical opularityontest 81).In thepresentase, hereareseveral ointersuggestinghatopinionamongrank-and-filecientistswould have been on average ess chauvinistic hanamong hescientific stablishments.here s, of course hevery generalpointthatchauvinismn time of war,at least n its extremerorms,s characteristicmoreof theolderpopulationt home(civilians ndperhapsrass-hats)hanofthe actualcombatantorces,who tend moreto see 'theenemy',equallywiththemselves, s helplessvictimsof fate.An example s providedby the causecelebref the removal of BertrandRussellfrom his fellowshipat TrinityCollegeCambridgen I917.(Russell'sllegedoffencewasnothispacifismerse,buthispersistent ublicadvocacy f pacifism,which andedhim n prison.Otherlessvocalpacifists mongthe Fellows Eddington,or example,andHardy himself-escaped unscathed.)From Hardy'saccount,it was pre-dominantly he older Fellows-too old for war serviceand thus still inresidence-who voted for Russell'sxpulsion.The youngermen,whilenotagreeingwithRussell'siews,weremuchmore nclined o toleratehem,butbeingmostlyawayonwarservice,wereunable o vote(15).Morespecifically,Kevles,discussinghedifficultiesfacingSchustern 1926,says hattheyoungerFrench cientistswere'reasonable,uthadno influence'(5). As we haveseen,Wentexpressed similar iew (thoughnotspecificallybringingn thequestion f age)overtheconverse ituationn Germany66).There s also the instructiveexampleof the N.U.S.W., stronglyopposed oGerman xclusion.Withoutdoubt heaveragemember f N.U.S.W. was, nageandrank,considerablyunior o thosewho formed he centreof power nthe RoyalSociety.The N.U.S.W., however,cannotbe considered typicalsample f scientistsf the time: t haddistincteft-wing endencies,whichwere



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277probably atherstrongeramongits leadershipdespite he 'mandatory're-sence of a conservativein Gwynne-Vaughanon the Executive Committee)than among the general membership. This, indeed could hardly have beenotherwise: the very idea of joining a trade union, especially one including in itsranks technician grades as well as the more middle-class type of scientist,would in the I92os have been repugnant to most scientists of more con-ventional views. There was, then, a self-selecting bias among the membershipof N.U.S.W., and one which might be expected to produce a concentration ofviews favouring internationalism. Nevertheless, N.U.S.W. membership in1924 reached over 900: on MacLeod's estimated total (necessarily imprecise) of20,000 scientists in Britain, this amounted to 4.5% of all British scientists-asmall but not inconsiderable minority (82).The exclusion of Germany from the I.R.C. was, then, the responsibility ofscientific elites, although it is problematical how much difference to events itwould have made had the generality of scientists had a say in the matter. If itseems highly unlikely that this would have sufficed to prevent the initial exclu-sion of Germany in 1919, it seems on the other hand, very likely that it wouldhave done something to hasten her subsequent admission. As German scientificopinion against accepting an offer to join hardened with each delay, even anadvancement by a single year (as it was, only the stringent voting requirementsthwarted the majority view in the I.R.C. in 1925) could have had veryimportant and enduring consequences for international scientific relations.The view of a scientist as one wholly devoted to a dispassionate search forobjective truth, coming down from his ivory tower only to give the lessexalted members of the populace a demonstration of how the application ofscientific principles could set the world to rights, has long since lost whateverplausibility it may once have had. If we are to look for effects of a 'spirit ofscientific internationalism' in public affairs, we must therefore not expect tofind scientists wholly immune from the wave of chauvinism occurrin

Chauvinism and Internationalism in Science

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