CHAPTER IV REGIONAL ISSUES
CHAPTER IV
REGIONAL ISSUES
Bilateral relations and inter-state behaviour can exhibit
three types of group relations, namely, conflict,
competition and cooperation. 1 While the majority of
situations reflect 'competition', it is remarkable that Iran's
relationship with the Indian subcontinent has had a steady
undertone of cooperation and cordiality.
It would be useful to look at the bilateral relations
between Iran and the Indian subcontinent in the context of
certain local and regional issues such as the hostage crisis,
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979, Iraqi invasion of Iran
1.980, Kashmir issue and NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation
Treaty). In the midst of changed regional environment and
demands of politics as well as revival of the Cold War in the
South West Asia, both Iran and the Indian Sub:-contirren·t faced a
challenge and threat perception. Indian ,subcontinent was the
only immediate neighbour with whom Iran's interest did not
clash seriously from the beginning.
The Hostage Crisis _
The hostage crisis in Iran put Pakistan, Banglades_l]._ and, ·
India into an uncomfortable position. This was because the
1. Joseph Frankel, International Rela:tions (University Press, London, 1969), p.71
168
hostage crisis raised two important questions. First the
question of commitment to International Law and Conventions and,
second, the anti-US sentiment. Khorneini considered the USA as
the master mind behind all exploitation, sorrows and tragedies
in Iran and the Shah as a mere pup~et in the hands of the
USA. One writer pointed out that "the United States had
itself been the cause of the hostage crisis. ·It conspired to
destabilise Iran. Apart from successive tactics, the USA
annoyed the Iranian Government and people when it allowed
·Muhammad Raza Shah into the United States. Consequently, the
Iranians had to find a means of preventing it. Taking Americans
in t~e Embassy in Tehran as hostage secured an effective means
to counter US moves." 2 On 4th November 1979 some agitated
Iranian students occupied the US embassy in Tehran and held
fifty two Americans as hostages. "The Islamic reg~m~ .... Q.~manded . ,,_ . ~.· ~ .... :: -, -- . . .
,_.,_tb,e.,return of Muhammad Raza Shah to stand trial ·f<?.r. his crimes I
,as-well as the return of Iranian funds deposited in US banks." 3
Pakif;ltan, Bangladesh and India adopted a correct and
balanced position following the seizure of the United States
Embassy in Tehran in 1979 and holding of American hostages for
444 days and economic sa~ctions against Iran by the west.
2. Asaf Hussain, Islamic Iran. Revolution and Counter Revolution (London, 1985), p.173
3 . Ibid, p. 17 7
169
Pakistan emphasized on a peaceful solution of the crisis and
for quiet diplomacy. 4 It advised the United States to
refrain from issuing threats of using force against Iran. At
the same time, it announced that it would not be a party to
any economic sanctions. Pakistan also called for observation of
international diplomatic conventions. 5
In the crisis, the Bangladesh government expressed its deep
concern for Iran when in December 1979 the Security Council met
for solving the stalement in Iran. Bangladesi;t did face an
unusual and complex situation and approached it with utmost
restraint and patience in the larger interest of peace and
stability. While supporting the unanimous resolution of the
Security Council for the release of the American diplomatic
personnel, Bangladesh also advocated a fair and. j~~-:.
consideration of the Iranian allegations unde.r the International '•!f
Law and Conventions. Meanwhile, Bangladesh did not support the
US proposal to impose economic sanctions age1inst Iran. 6
India expressed its deep concern over the hostage crisis in
4. See for details, Year Book of the United' Nati.on·s 1979 v.oJ. 33 (Department of Public Information, United Nations New York, 1982), P.307
5. Dawn, 21 December 1979.
6. See statement made by Bangladesh at the Security Council Meeting on 31 December 1979, Bangladesh Document, vol. 3, no. 3, October-December, 1979.
170
Iran. It also urged Iran to release diplomatic personnel held in
Iran according to the principles of International Law and
Convention. India'~ view was expressed in the UN Security
Council that "continued occupation of the United States
Embassy in Tehran and detention of its personnel constituted a
serious violation of the fundamental principles of
International Law and diplomatic practice." 7 India also did
not support the West sponsored economic sanctions against Iran.
The Afghanistan Problem
With regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,
Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh cooperated with each other in
strengthening Afghan resistance to the leftist-oriented ~egime
in Afghanistan. But, India did not take a hostile stand
against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The
objective of these countries .. ~ - ..
India policies was to evolve
Pakistan, .. . Bangladesh, Iran and
sound pat tern of relationship a
with their neighbouring countries, taking_ii1to account certain
factors like geographical location and strategic
considerations, past linkage, social, political, economic and
cultural compulsions. The neighbours of Afghanistan,
likewise, evolved t~eir indivi~ual pattern of relationship with
Afghanistan taking into consideration a set of factors to guide
7. Yearbook of the United Nations 1979, no. 4, P.309; Times of India. December 1979
171
their policy formulations. which are unique in themselves and,
thus, differed from eac::. other. However, in general,
geographical proximity anc close historical links acted as the
permanent inputs in artic~lating the policies of its n~ighbours
towards ;._~ ::;hani stan. Thus, the policy of the regional
countries in the wake of the Soviet invasion largely
reflected various struggles and tactics that each sought to
adopt from its own perception of national interest. 8 The Iranian
policy was guided by poli:ico-economic interests with anti-
Soviet and pro-Pakistan biases. Pakistan's policy was dictated
by the Pakhtoonistan issue coupled with anti-1ndia and anti-
Soviet underpinnings. 9 India's pol icy was determined by
historical legacy, geo-strategic and political considerations,
economic interest, and the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-
Marxist government in Afghanistan. Bangladesh's policy was
moulded by politico-economic interests, and pro-Pakistan and
anti-Communist sentiments.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted a watershed
in the political history of this region. Afghanistan, a land-
locked country in Central Asia, covering an area of 250,000
8. Abdul Kalam Azad, "Afghanistan and the Neighbours", Bliss (Dhaka), vol. 10, no 4, 477.
Policy of the October 1989, p.
9. .Syed Abul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: .7::;,.
Geographical Study (Printed and Published by Abdus Salam at Feroz Sons Ltd., 1982), pp. 4-5.
172
square miles and sharing international frontiers with some of
the important countries of the region. 10 It borders with US'SR
and China, the two Communist giants in the North West and North
East respectively, and is flanked by Iran, one of ·the
st~ategically important areas of the world in the West, and
Pakistan in the East. Geographically, the USSR, China, Iran and
Pakistan are the immediate neighbours of Afghanistan. However,
beyond this perimeter are also to be included the potential
countries like India11 in the East and the Islamic countries in
the West as second-door neighbours of Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that all the neighbours
recognized Afghanistan as a viable entity with its own values
and dynamics that exerted its own influence on them through
ages. Afghanistan's peculiar location and its strategic
importance bore special significance for her neighbours.
Throughout its cheque red history, Afghanistan has continued to·
survive as an independent state interacting vigorously with
. her neighbours. The interaction of the neighbours also goes
back to centuries revealing continuity and consistency in each
of the neighbouring country's policy towards Afghanistan.
10. S.V. Nair, Afghanistan Perspectives for Reconciliation and Peace (Panchsheel Publishers, New Delhi, 1988), pp. 1-2.
11. H.S.A. Jafri, Indo-Afqhan Relations, 1947-67 (Sterling Pvt., New Delhi, 1976), p.1.
173
Lying at the confluence of many ethnic and cultural movements,
Afghanistan had often been at the cross-roads of Central
Asia. 12 Numerous races inhabited this land whose contribution
to civilization in and around Afghanistan is unique. Another
factor ¥Jas the Islamic sentiments of its people which acted
as a catalyst in linking Afghanistan with· countries like,
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 worsened the
security predicament ·of the region. Iran and Pakistan became
frontline states. This external threat was compounded by
internal ethnic politics which aggravated Iran's and·Pakistan's
security concerns. In Pakistan, those concerned· about ethnic
tensions "were wary of Soviet and Afghan efforts to promote
Baluchi dissidence. These elements were resentful that
Baluchi identity was not .being given due and
they demanded full-fledged status for this province of
Pakistan. 13 Besides, the influx of refugees in Pakistan and
Iran in the aftermath of the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan was considerably numerous. The presenc:e of. a
large number of Afghan refugees iq Iran became a cause of
---------~-~--------12.· Azad, n~S~ p. 477.
13. For an analysis emphasizing ethnic divisions within Pakistan, see Selig Harrison, The Afghan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation (Carnegi Endowment for Inter-national Peace, New York, 1981).
174
additional concern for the already overoccupied Iranian
Government with matters of 'New Iran' . It is estimated that
there were about 2 million Afghan refugees in Iran and 3 million
refugees in Pakistan.
Iran,· Pakistan and Bangladesh voiced strong protests
through the United Nati~ns and gathered support from virtually
all non-aligned members and major powers. More significantly for
Pakistan, the Islamic conference meeting in Islamabad in January
1980, protested with almost one voice, against Soviet presence
in Afghanistan. Only Syria, Libya and South Yemen dissented. 14
The bogey of Soviet threat was expeditiously used by the
Pakistani leaders to justify Pakistan's direct involvement in
the crisis. At last two conferences of foreign ministers cf
Islamic countries were held
discuss the situation created
in
by
January and May 1980 to
the Soviet action in
Afghanistan in December 1979. The extraordinary
the islamic Foreign Minister's conference held
1980 at the instance of Pakistan decided to suspend
session of
in January
Afghanistan
from the membership of the Organization of Islamic Conferenc~
(OIC) and asked member-states to withhold recognition to the
Babrak Karmal Government and suspend diplomatic relations Hith
14. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. May, 1980, P. 30241.
175
Afghanistan till complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from
that country. It also called upon member- states to extend
economic aid to the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. It
supported the US call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The
second conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in May 1980
in Islamabad decided, at the initiative of Pakistan, to appoint
a panel to explore ways and means of implementing the resolution
passed by the extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign
Ministers Conference in January 1980. 15 It wanted to talk to
Afghanistan without recognizing the Babrak Karmal government ..
This amounted to asking the Karmal government and the Soviet
Union to appear before it in sackcloth and ashes, especially
after the Islamic Foreign Ministers conference had. rejected
package of proposals made by the Afghan government on 14 May
1980, on the eve of the conference. This package included
proposals for regional normalization and for bilateral
agreements on border security with Iran and Pakistan to be
jointly underwritten by the Soviet Union and the United States. 16
The broad features of Pakistan's policy towards the Afghan
crisis were: (1) to repel the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;
15. Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Islamabad, 1980), p.20.
16. Link, 13 July 1980.
176
( i i) to keep Pakistan's strong commitment to its Afghan
policy;· (iii) to keep its involvement indirect, discreet and
limited. 17 Later on, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan
proved similar to those of the US and most of the Western
countries. This policy was based on the four points contained
in successive UN General Assembly resolutions as envisaging (i)
immediate and total withdrawal of Soviet forces, ( i i)
independence and non~alignment for Afghanistan and (iii) self-
determination for the Afghan people, and ( i v) creation of
political conditions necessary for the voluntary return
Afghan refugees.18
of the
The Pakistanis want~d the Afghan crisis to serve them well
by generating a massive flow of aid from Washington whose
anxiety over th~ issue coincided with that of Pakistan. General
Zia wanted the United States to take increasing interest in
South-West Asia, Where he pointed out, Pakistan occupies a
strategic position. He stated:
"But if you visualize the map of the region and if you extend the hammer and sickle over Afghanistan and then see from there onwards, which are the areas that are likely to come under influence. Where is Iran, where is the Gulf and where is the ·Strait of Hormuz and where is Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Muslim
.......... - ..... .,_ .... - - _ .... -- .... -17. Uma Singh, Pakistan's Perception about Afghanistan
V.D.Chopra (ed), Afghanistan: Geneva Accord and After Delhi, Patriot Publishers, 1988), p. 120.
in (New
18. Tahir Amin, Afghan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, 1982), pp. 147-151.
177
world ... and if the recent events in Afghanistan, because of the Soviet intervention, have chanf9ed the environment, then Pakistan deserves attention."
The US aid to Pakistan had been severed, restored and
severed again. The $ 3.5 billion aid package from the Reagan
administration boosted the morale of the army.
Pakistan recognized the Iranian role in the settlement of
Afghan crisis. Abdul Sattar on his visit to Tehran in February,
1988, while reporting the latest situation at the Geneva
talks, said that for the future settlement of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Iran are the countries which carry the burden of the
Afghan refugees ~nd migrants.n20 The Pakistani government
started to consult Iran in all seriousness when it was ·rather
late in ~he affairs of fast moving events.
The importance of Iran cannot be underestimated in the
context of Afghan resistance and its aftermath. There could be
little possibility of a "complete success" of· the Muj ahideen
after the Russian withdrawal unless the support of the Iranians
was .achieved. The Afghans based in Pakistan and other parts
of the world began to realize this reality. Professor
19. Pakistan Times, 16 January 1980; World Report, September 5, 1988.
20. See for details, Tahir Amin, n. 18, pp. 145-51.
178
Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Pakistan-based Afghan Leader, visited
Iran from February 26 to March 9,1988, at the invitation of
the Iranian Government. Professor Rabbani was assured in Iran
of its help and assistance. Iran supported the role of
Mujahideen in any future governmental set up. 21 The Iranian
Government emphasized "T:qe unity of all Mujahideen and all the
Afghan Muslim people regardless of their religious
denomination or their ethnic and regional associations." 22
On his part, the Pakistan based Muj ahideen leader had a
series of discussions with the Mujahideen organizations based
in Iran. It was reported that he "spoke to several gatherings
of the Afghan refugees in Tehran, Mashhad and Turbat-e-Jam.
Rabbani's visit to Iran at the crucial juncture of the Afghan
destiny reflected certain tendencies in the political
situation of the region. 23 ~he degree of understanding which he
was able to achieve with the Iranian government as well as the
Mujahideen organizations was a testimony of the fact that a
broad-based consensus did exist between the Afghans living in
21. Afghan News. vol. IV, no. 6,15 March 1988, p.2.
22. See for details, Speech of Syed Ali Khamenei published Iranian Journal of International Affairs (Institute Political and International Studies, Tehran), vol. 1, 2&3, Summer Fall 1989, pp. 261-62.
23. Afghan News, vol. IV, no. 6 , 15 March, 1988, p. 2.
179
by for no.
Iran as well as in Pakistan. Rabbani was impressed by the
response that he received from the Iranian and their Afghan
allies. He praised the Iranian government by saying that
"Iran's foreign policy is based on Islamic principles and that
it does not retreat from its principles on the Afghanistan
issue. n 24
It was alleged by the Western quarters that Iran's
interests in Afghanistan were confined to the Shi' ite Afghans
which comprise roughly 15 percent of the total population. 25 The
Shiite Afghans reside in the Central and Western regions of
Hazarajat. The tribes have been suffering throughout the
modern Afghan history. They were deprived of their belongings
"as a result of Abdur Rahman's policies of the
1890s ... (and) had suffered subsequently at the hands of
successive Pashtun-dominated .... Kabul Governments .. 26 The Hazara
tribes were against the people's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) because of their anti-Kabul Pashtun
sentiments in general and their love for Islam in particular.
As a consequence, they "were easily manipulated by t;.he ag-
24. Tehran Times, March 8, 1988
25. John Fullerton, ·"The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan" Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong) ,1983, p.43.
26. Beverly Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan (Croom Helm, London, 1982) 1 p. 61.
180
gressive Shi'ite sect of Islam, religious oligarchy which came
to power in Iran, (February 1979) and by the resistance groups
present in Peshwar. 27
The assessment of the Western scholars and commentators
while passing judgement on the Iranian support of a particular
ethnic and religious sect is not accurate. Perhaps they did not
realize that practical help can only be provided with ease to
those groups which reside near Iran's borders. Same is true of
Pakistan, where the ·bulk of ·refugees and freedom fighters are
from the geographical region near the Pakistani-border. It was
because of the particular US attitude towards I ran which
hindered the Iranian Government to coordinate assistance
programmes with· the American-supported Afghans.
Nevertheless, the Iranians provided all necessary assistance
to the freedom fighters near the Iran-Afghan border. Peregrine
Hodson, a freelance reporter for the Sunday Times, quoted in
his book, an interesting dialogue with an Afghan Mujahid
inside Afghanistan. After noting the wall posters of
Ayatollah Khomeini, Rabbani and other leaders of Jamiat Islami
when the Muj ahid was asked about Khomeini, his replay was as
follows:
" Ayatollah Khomeini is a new force in the Third World. He is neither capitalist nor communist. He uses the language of religion' to speak to the hearts of men.
27. Ibid, p. 173.
181
That is why he is so important. He is raising the consciousness of the Third World, not by political ideol~~y or machines or money, but by the word of God."
The above sentiments of freedom fighters give an
impression that Iran's ptance on the Russian invasion in
Afghanistan and its help to those opposing the occupation was
regarded with respect and gratitude. 29 The difference of opinion
between the Shi' is and the Sunnis "are linked or separated by
numerous agreements and conflicts." 30 These Rifts are
political in nature and the religious elements have been
overemphasized, especially by those who desired to isolate Iran
from its neighbours.
Both Iran and Pakistan were deeply involved in the supply,
training and support to the counter revolutionary guerrilla
movement against the pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan. In
November 1981, Tehran Radio announced a plan, proposed by
the foreign ministry, which was based on the principles of the
unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan,
28. Peregrine Hodson, Uner a sickle moon: A Journey Through Afghanistan (Hutchinson, London, 1986), p. 64; See Kayhan International. March 12, 1988.
29. Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in (Cambridge UP London, 1986), p. 147.
30. Ibid.
Afghanistan
and the recognition of the people's right to decide their
political destiny. The plan proposed the formation of a
peace-keeping force drawn from Pakistan, Iran and other
Islamic countries which had "demonstrated their clear opposition
in fighting against world arrogance led by America and Zionism. 11
It supported the return of the Afghan Mujahid refugees to
Afghanistan. It also proposed the· formation of an Islamic
Constituent Council, Command Council, a Revolutionary Council and
Constituent Assembly. 3l In late July 1982, Iran and Pakistan
helped to create the United Front headed by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar
for the liberation of Afghanistan. The front committed itself
to getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan and establishing an
Islamic regime there.3 2
Like Pakistan, Iran denounced the Babrak Karmal government
and did not recognize it. The newly established Islamic
Revolutionary regime in Iran openly opposed the pro-communist
·government in Afghanistan. The Iranian policy made no secret of
its sympathy for those elements who had waged a war of resistance
against· the Kabul regime. The Iranian government, on 19th
September 1979, issued a statement in which President Hafez Amin
was warned for his close links with the Soviet Union. The
31. Tehran Radio, 12 November 1981.
32. Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollah (Routledge & Kegan Paul PLC, London, 1985), p. 355
183
statement further said that if the Government of Afghanistan
continued to fight against "Islam and the Islamic Revolution"
they were bound to be overthrown. 33
The Iranian government condemned the 0
Russian invasion
in the strongest possible terms. The Iranian President while
condemning the Soviet prese.nce in Afghanistan said that the
Soviet invasion is a "brutal intervention by looters and
occupiers and a threat to Iran. n 34 In 1980 Iran withdrew from
the Moscow Olympics.35
In its first major political initiative on Afghanistan
Iran proposed a four-point plan in ~ovember 1981. The Iranian
government convened a major international conference on "the
future of Afghanistan" in miq-January in Tehran. Preceding the
conference, the Iranians, on 4 January, sent five plane loads
of humanitarian assistance to Peshawar. The consignment was
the Muj ahideen for then passed on to the 7-party-alliance of
distribution to the Afghan refugees. 3 6 The conference was
33. Keesing' s Contemporary Achieves, January 11, 1980 ,, p. 39032.
34. The Guardian, March 22,1980
35. Shire en T. Hunter, "Soviet- Iranian Relations Revolution Period", in R.K. Ramazani, Revolution: The search for Consensus Washington D.C., 1984), p. 87.
36. Tribune, 12 November 1981.
184
in the Post(ed), Iran's (Indiana UP,
unique in that it was probably the most representative
gathering of leaders and numbers of both the .7-party alliance
based in Peshawar and the 8-Party alliance based in Tehran,
plus prominent Afghan intellectuals living in Europe.
Inaugurating the conference, President Khamenei set the pace by
focussing on four essential themes of the ·current Iranian
approach to the Afghan issue. · First, he welcomed the direct
talks between the Mujahideen and the Soviet Union as a "positive
development" and urged the Muj ahideen leaders, who had
subsequently developed some re.servations on the efficacy of
such a dialogue, . that "continuation of the dialogue will be
useful." Second, President Khamenei underlined the need for
sectarian unity, saying that "sowing discord among the Mujahi-
deen and Afghan people under. religious, ·cultural and ethnic
pretexts is one of the objectives of foreign pow'ers". Third, he
urged the Mujahideen "not to allow any foreign power to penetrate
the country so that Afghanistan will start the new era with its
Islamic identity and non-aligned character." Finally,. the
Iranian president stressed that "from now on Iran, with all
its power, will remain on the side of the Afghan Muslims and
will aid them in different fields." 37
37. Mushahid Hussain, "The Afghan Issue, " Middle East International (Washington D.C.), no. 344, 17 February 1989, p. 17.
185
The conference helped to achieve three key Iranian political
.objectives . First, it provided a meeting ground between the 7-
party alliance based in Peshawar and the 8-party alliance based
in Tehran, the latter comprising predominantly Shi'ite groups
of the Afghan Mujahideen. Till then, there was little rapport
oamong the two alliances and infact when the 28-man "provisional
government" of Afghan Mujahideen was announced in Peshawar in
1980, the Tehran-based 8-party alliance were totally ignored.
Second, the Tehran Conference helped to develop a dialogue and a
new political and military relationship between Iran and the
three "moderate" parties of the Peshawar based 7 -party
alliance which had previously been dismissed as being "pro-
imperialist." 38 These included the current head .of the
Peshawar 7-party alliance, Pir Sibghatullah Muj addedi and
Maul vi Nabi Mohammadi, both of whom were present in Tehran.
The leader of Hizb-e-Islami; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was not
present at the Tehran conference. 39
What is equally significant is the ideological linkage
that Iran drew between its own revolution and the Mujahideen
resistance ·in Afghanistan. At the concluding session of the
Afghanistan Conference, Hojjatoleslam Ibrahimi, special
representative of Presid~nt Khamenei, underlined this linkage
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
186
when he said that 11 the nature of the Afghan revolution is 100
percent Islamic. The ground is now laid for an extensive
Islamic movement. Yesterday it was Iran, today it is ....
Afghanistan and tomorrow it will be others.n40
Iran's policy makers visualized the Afghanistan situation
from a different perspective than that of Pakistan. There had
been no generous flow of aid and assistance to the guerrillas
from Iran like that from Pakistan. It is relevant here to
mention that Iran from time to time made many statements
supportive of the resistance and even refused to become
involved in the UN-sponsored negotiations conducted by Diego
Cordovez so long as the Afghan guerrillas were absent. 41 Actual
Iranian material support, that too at extremely low level, was
restricted to those Shi'i factions of the guerrillas who
operated from Iran. The parties based at Peshawar were not
allowed to transport weapons and ammunition into Afghanistan via
Iran. 42
Main reason was that Iran's complicated relations with the
United States made them suspicious of the American involvement
40. Ibid.
41. See, Asia year Book 1983, p. 222.
42. J. Bruce Amstutz, Soviet Occupation 1986) 1 P• 358.
Afghanistan : The First Five Years of (National Defense UP., Washington D.C.,
187
in the affairs of Afghanistan. Although the Iranians
regarded the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a source of
security threat to their country, at the same time, the American
supported resistance movement operating from Pakistan could
not be fully trusted. Furthermore, its war with Iraq
compelled the policy makers of Iran to adjust their policies
i:=1 such a manner which might not ·alienate the Russians
beyond certain limits. As mentioned earlier, inspite of the
delicate foreign policy stance on the matter of Afghanistan,
the Iranian government condemned the Russian invasion in the
strongest possible terms and the policy to do so had been
consistent. 43 As the events unfolded in Afghanistan, the
worsening of Iran's relations with the United States did not
become an obstacle in Iranian support to the Afghan people and
their cause. Iran, being an important factor in the re9.ional
political system, took. a force·ful and principled stand,
advocating the inclusion of the Muj ahideen in the United
Nation's sponsored peace initiative. Such acts were responsible
for the "dampened Soviet hopes of forming a workable rela-
tionship with Tehranw, atleast concerning the Afghan affairs. 44
43. The Guardian. March 22, 1980.
44. See, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati's Address to the 39th Session of UN General Assembly, New York, October 1,.1984, on Global Perspectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran, October 1984, pp 6-7.
188
Iran's policy of curtailing or directing the activities
of ·the Mujahideen in Iran was a reflection of a certain policy
strategy which the compulsions of the circumstance demanded. In
Iran, there was an "eight-fold coalition. -c~nsisting o~ eight
divergent guerrilla groups present in Afghanistan. The main job
of these resistance groups, as the Iraniqn Government expected,
was to fight for their country either inside Afghanistan or
provide material and other support ·from their territory. The
Iranian Government, being revolutionary in nature, would not
allow certain elements in the Afghan refugees camps to exploit
the situation in their favour by indulging in illegal trade or
other illegal activities. In this background, some permit
restrictions by the Iranian Government became relevant.
Nevertheless, the Afghan representatives residing in Iran
had been openly reflecting: their sentiments on a number of
occasions.
The head of the Central council of Afghanistan Islamic
Movement, Hojjatoleslam Syed Mohammad Ali Javid, during an
interview, said that serious measures were being taken for
achieving or strengthening the cooperation for the purpose
of solving the common problems between the "eight-fold"
coalition in Tehran and "seven-fold" coalition groups
Peshawar. Hojjatoleslam Javid said:-
We approve the (future) government (in Afghanistan) which takes into consideration the rights of all walks of Afghan people (including, Shi' ite and Sunni
189
in
Muslims) who have had outstanding activity and role in Islamic struggles in Afghanistan. . . We believe that Zahir. Shah is incapable of even setti~ up a national Government, let alone an Islamic one."
The Iranians regarded the Geneva Accord as a "US-Soviet
Connivance· on Afghanistan". 46 On April 14, 1988 four accords
were signee in Geneva. They were as follows: (1) between the
Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan and Af'ghanistan on
the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan: (2) between
the United States and the Soviet Union, to guarantee the
above; (3) between Pakistan and Afghanistan on non-interference
and non-intervention; and (4) between Pakistan and Afghanistan
on the return of the refugees. Besides, there was a separate
Memorandum of understanding on arrangements for.maintaining the \
Soviet· withdrawal under United Nation' s (UN) auspices. These
accords were the result of the proximity talks between
Pakistan and Afghanistan that had been conducted by the UN
mediator, Diego Cordovez and of bilateral talks between the
United States and the Soviet union. 47
The rejection of the Geneva Accords by Iran was
predictable. The Iranians had taken a consistent policy
45. Tehran Times, March 13,1988.
46. Ibid. (Editorial), April 11, 1988.
47. Asian Security 1988-89 (Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, 1989), p 56.
190
position that without the inclusion of all the Muj ahideen
groups presen~ in Iran and Pakistan the consequence were
going to be far from satisfactory. The statement issued by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 12, 1988 party read as
follows:-
"The Islamic Republic of Iran since the very beginning has considered the Geneva indirect talks unacceptable, because the Afghan Muj ahideen who are · practically involved in this matter have be~n ignored. And secondly, the Afghan regime which is a party to these talks, . has come to power during occupation, therefore, it has no legitimacy for negotiations ... On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that publicity for and recognition of US interference in the Afghan issue contravene the interests of the Afghan Muslim people.n4B
Iran's verbal criticism of· the Naj ibullah regime and the
Soviet invasion were more vituperative and critical than
Pakistani public remarks. The Soviets were described as
"Satanic" and their armed intervention as " a flagrant
violation of International Law carried out in total disregard
for the sovereignty of. Afghanistan." . The resistance was
described as a "sacred holy war" Jihad. 49 Its policy was well
manifested in the statement of the Iranian Minister of
48. Statement· of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Developments in the· Settlement of Afghan issue, April 12, 1988, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, New Delhi.
49. Amstutz, n. 42, p. 359.
191
Foreign Affairs in late December. As it announced frequently,
the Islamic Republic of Iran considered the unconditional.
departure of all the occupying forces, without being
replaced by any other oppressive force, giving the right of self
rule to the people and the honorable return of the Afghan·
refugees to their country as the only essential solution to the·
problem of Afghanistan.50
Despite all the above stated difference over the Afghanistan_
issue between Pakistan and Iran, both sides seemed anxious to
extend cooperation in the establishment of a broad-based interim
government in Afghanistan to stop further blpodshed. 51 The
identity of views between Iran and Pakistan was highlighted in
February 1989 when Velayati met President Gulam Ishaq Khan.
Velayati disclosed that Pakistan and Iran agreed on finding a
comprehensive and political solution of the Afghan problem
acceptable to the Afghan people. In this regard, Ishaq Khan also
said: " Iran and Pakistan should stand together and withstand
all pressures to achieve their common objectives of restoration
of peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and its reconstruction.
At the same time, both Iran and Pakistan empnasized the need
for forming a broad-based interim government in Afghanistan to
50. Ibid.
51. Patriot. October 3, 1984.
192
stop bloodshed following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 52
In this context, it was reported that Iran pursued a
policy of uniting force of Afghan Mujahideen groups operating in
Iran and Pakistan. . Ali Akbar Velayati, the Foreign Minister,
.appealed to the Mujahideen to forge unity in their ranks to form
a strong Government in Afghanistan. He said that. the eight
groups of the Mujahideen should have a consensus on the
issue. 5 3 As regards the formation of Government in Kabul,
Velayati said that: 11 no interference from any quarter would be
entertained. 11 But Velayati failed to remove difference
between Afghan Mujahideen alliance in Pakistan and Iran over
the composition of the Shoora. Although he met the Muj ahideen
leaders but appar~ntly he did not succeed in convincing the
Peshawar-based Afghan groups. 54 In early 1989, Iran made it
quite clear that it was not particularly interested in
supporting the establishment of an Afghan regime depending
mainly on Pakistan and then having special links with the
latter. The Shi'ite resistance parties, backed by Tehran, had
been practically excluded from taking part in the Afghan Interim
Government (AIG) supported by Islamabad.
52. Times of India. 30 January 1984.
53. Times of India, 30 January 1984.
54. Frontier Post, February 3, 1989.
193
The Iranian Government continuously emphasized the
necessity of politically solving the intra-Afghan conflict. In
1989, however, another important aspect began to increasingly
influence Iranian foreign policy decision, i.e., the opening of
a new chapter of Iran'.s ·relations with the Soviet Union. 55
There had been a considerable exchange of ideas ·between Tehran
and Moscow on the one hand and Islamabad and Tehran on the
other in order to find a suitable way to end the conflict as
early as possible. Apparently, a real breakthrough could
not be achieved. Iran declared that the "solution of the
conflict should be considered an essentially internal Afghan
affair which third states should not try to influence." He
implied specially the superpowers, "the future Afghan regime
should rest on a broad social base and be Islamic in nature." 56
It has already been mentioned that the Iranian concept of a
broad-based Afghan coalition government might even include
certain elements of the PDPA. According to the perception of a
Pakistani analyst "with Iran progressively drawing closer to
Moscow, the Shia Mujahideen are
settlement with the PDPA regim~
not averse
in Kabul"
55. Kayhan International, December 23, 1989.
56. Ibid.
57. See for details Dawn, 16 September 1989.
194
to a peace
any longer. 57
The view, however, was not supported by Yaqub Khan, Pakistan's
Foreign Minister, who declared_ the same day that his discussions
' with the Iranians had not given the impression that they had
moved away from their traditional position ·on Afghanistan.
The Iranian Foreign Minister claimed that the Iranians "are
still supporting the Mujahideen to whom the power in Kabul should
be transferred".5 8
Iran's new overture was facilitated by the end of the Iran
Iraq war and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan. its fresh policy towards Afghanistan has to be
viewed in this changed context. The interests of Tehran and
Moscow coincided not only in Afghanistan but also in the Caucasus
·and Central Asia. 59 During their meeting in Moscow in June
1989, Rafsanjani who was to become President of Iran the
following months made an informal deal to ensure territorfal
stability in Central Asia. 60 The press release issued by Tass
on 20 and 22 June and Rafsanjani' s interview with Tehran Radio
in July indicated that the visit was most successful. At the
political level, both sides agreed- that foreign powers'
presence in the Indian Ocean in general and the Persian Gulf
59. See for details Sreedhar, "Rafsanjani' s Visit' to Moscow" The Chronicle (Bhopal), 28 July 1989.
60. Oliver Roy, " The Lessons of the Soviet and Afghan War" Adelphi Papers 259 (Brassey's !ISS), Summer 1991, p.38.
195
in particular should be stopped. On Afghanistan, both sides
agreed that 11 the people of that county should forge their
destiny ... The immediate question·that arises is why Rafsanjani
was in such a great hurry to sign a wide range of
agreements. The proposal for large scale economic cooperation
was mooted after ·Iran reached an agreement with the Soviet
Union a major arms supplier. In April 1989 both the
countries entered into a defence cooperation agreement under
which the Soviet Union agreed to supply Iran fairly large
consignment of arms including 300 T-72 and 150T-54 and T-55
tanks I 200, 130 mm artillery pieces and 200 military vehicles.
Recent reports in the · media· indicate that Iran was also
planning to buy T-82 tanks and MIG-29 aircraft. 61
Apparently, Moscow and Tehran agreed to have a coalition
government in Kabul, including the Mujahideen groups and the
PDPA. Iran obtained from Moscow the recognition of Islamic
identity of Afghanistan. Until 1986 Ayatollah Montazeri's
office in Qom was in charge of dealing with the Afghan
resistance in the framework of the world Islamic
revolutionary movements .62 Montazeri chose to support
exclusively the pro-Iranian Shi' i groups (mainly Nasr and Seph) 1
61. Sreedhar, No. 59.
62. Oliver Roy: "The Lessons of the Soviet af!d Afghan war", Adelphi Papers 259 (Brassey's, IISS), Summer, 1991, p.38.
196
to whom some meager arms shipments were sent. The Shi'i parties
supported by Iran were united in the eight-party alliance and
kept under tight contro1. 63
1.. ••• ··~ • ,.. •• ""' • ... .).· .. . ~-..... .f ~~:· . ...
Iran had two options. It could either play the ethnic card,
uniting the Shi'is and the Persian-speaking Afghans against the
Pashtuns who were influenced by the Pakistani's and Saudis or
preside over .a reshuffling of the alliance. It opted for the
latter. At two conferences held in January and October
1989, 64 Tehran tried to merge the Sunnis and the Shi' i
alliances into one entity which could deal directly with the
Soviets and the PDPA. Their efforts were thwarted by the
Saudis and ISI, who convinced the Peshawar-based parties not to
include the Shi'i Afghans in the February 1989 Shoora.
Paradoxically, Iran had better relations with moderate Sunni
parties than with the radi.cal ones {Hekmatyar) who are strongly
anti-Shi' i and in fact strategic {Saudi Arabia verses Iran)
ethnic (Push tun versus Persia speakers) and religious {Sunni
versus Shi'i) factors play a bigger role than the ideological
dimension. 65
Iran's attitude today in Afghanistan is narrow because it
has no means of building a strong base in the country. Even it
63. Ibid.
64. Kayhan International, Octobet 7,1989.
65. Roy, n. 62, p.43.
197
has no interest in a Lebanonizaion of Afghanistan, and is more
of a stabilizing factor than a trouble maker. It made no
breakthrough with the Sunni Persian speakers, and the Shi' is
distanced themselves·from Tehran by creating the Hezb-i-Wahdat
(Unity Party) in July 1990, which is· ethnically based on the
Hazaras, who make up 90 percent of the·Afghan Shi'is. 66
Bangladesh was also deeply concerned about the Soviet
activities in Afghanistan. From the very beginning the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, Bangladesh persistently condemned the
Soviet military interference in Afghanistan. The then
Bangladesi Prime Minister, Shah A Ziaur Rahman, in 1979, had
charged the Soviet Union with flagrant violation of
International laws for this inte~ention in Afghanistan. He said
"the crimson horiz.on of Afghanistan posed a ·threat to world
peace and security and called ·for the withdrawal of all
~oreign troops from that country." 67
Bangladesh cooperated with Pakistan in strengthening Afghan
resistance to the left oriented regime in Afghanistan.
Besides, it made a few initiatives on its own. First, the
convening of the extraordinary session of the OIC shortly after
the Soviet· invasion and suspension of Afghan membership was
sponsored by Bangladesh. Secondly, in the Security council and
66. Ibid.
67. Bangladesh Times. 20 February 1979.
198
the General Assembly, Bangladesh along with other non-aligned
countries, piloted a resolution calling for an immediate with-
drawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. Hussain Mohammad
Ershad, the President of Bangladesh said: "Our brothers in
Afghanistan continue to remain in a tragic plight, being
deprived of their rights of self-determination, national
independence and basic ·human dignity by
force. n 68 .
a foreign occupation
Bangladesh welcomed the Geneva Accord which was signed on 14
April 1988 between the Soviet Union, the United States, Pakistan
and Afghanistan on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan. Ershad Bangladesh had adopted a
principled stand on the Afghan. issue. Speaking at the
banquet hosted in honour of the visiting Chinese Prime Minister,
Li Peng, at President Palace he said: "We welcome a sovereign
independent Islami·c and non-aligned Afghanistan." He also
called for implementation of 1988 Geneva accord$,both in letter
and spirit, so that the Afghan refugees may return home·in honour
and dignity.
Indian policy towards Afghanistan remained re~atively
vague. The Indian foreign policy makers have always desired a
major role for India in international and regional affairs.
68. POT - January 29, 1987; Tehran Times, March 19, 1989.
199
The Afghan crisis put in India a very difficult and perplexing
situation in view of· its special relationship with the USSR and
antagonistic relations with both China and Pakis.tan. The crisis
had great significance for India's strategic environment and
impinged on its relations with the superpowers as well.
In this context an evaluation of India's foreign policy
after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on
December 26, 1979 is an interesting exercise. At the time of
Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Indian Prime
Minster Charan Singh,. s care taker Government was involved in the
campaign for General Election to be held in January 1980. In
a surprising move and confused state, the Indian Foreign
Ministry issued a statement on December 28,1979 saying that
"Consistent with the Gdvernment·of India's commitment to principles of non-alignment, it supports the sovereign right of the Afghan people to determine their own destiny free from foreign interference. The Government of India's attitude to such situation is well known. India has always opposed any outside interference in the internal affairs of one country
·by another. It is also the Government of India's earnest hope that no country or external power would ·take steps which might aggravate the sit~~tion and that normalcy would be restored there early". ·
69. Foreign Affairs Record December 1979, p. 217.
200
(New Delhi), vol. XXV, no. 12
However, on December 30, 1979 an Indian Foreign Ministry
spokesman further explained the Indian stand to reporters thus:
11 We are not supporting or opposing anyone. We are still observing the situation. · We are assessing whether the Soviet assumption that they extended their help and ·assistance on the request of the du?c constituted authorities in Kabul, is right or wrong. 11
What appears is that Indian policy sharply contrasted with
the policies of other neighbours as discussed above. Mrs. Indira
Gandhi was the real architect of Indian Policy towards
Afghanistan after 1979, Immediately, after winning the
elections in January 1980, she brought back Indian diplomatic
activity on the traditional line of maintaining an independent
stand but not condemning the Soviet action. Similar policy
was adopted by Jawaharlal Nehru during the Soviet intervention in
r Hungary in 1956 and by Mrs: Gandhi on the occasion of Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 71 It was under the
instructions that, during the debate in the UN General Assembly
session on January 11,1980 on the Afghan question, India refused
to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Indian
Representative at the UN, Brajesh Mishra, justified the
~-------------------
70. Ibid.
71. Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome : How to Live with Soviets (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982), p 109.
201
Russian intervention in Afghanistan referring .to the attempts
of interference by outside powers in the internal affairs of
Afghanistan by training, arming and encouraging subversive
elements. He brought out the following points: (a) The Soviets
sent troops to Afghanistan on December 26, at the request of the
Afghan government; (b) while India was against the presence of
foreign troops and bases in any country, it had no reason to
disbelieve a friendly country like the Soviet Union when it
said that it would wfthdraw troops from Afghanistan when asked to
do so by the government in Kabul; (c). Ind~a hoped that the Soviet
Union would not violate the independence of Afghanistan and would
not keep troops in that country a day long~r than necessary and;
(d) India was gravely concerned over the response of the
United States, China, Pakistan and others to the Soviet action.
The arming and training of Afghan rebels and encouragement given
to subversive activities in Afghanistan amounted to e-?Ct~rnal
interference in Afghan affairs. Building bases, pumping arms
to small and medium countries_ and expanding naval activities
in the Indian Ocean might lead to intensification of the Cold
War and threaten the peace and security of the region.
activities "pose a threat even to our own nation. 72
These
72. Arundhati Roy, The Soviet Intervention in causes, Consequence and India's Response Publishers House, New Delhi, 1987) .
202
Afghanistan (Associated
This Indian stand in the General Assembly caused shock and
surprise among a large number of a non-aligned countries and
exposed it to the. charge of repaying its debt to Moscow by
abandoning a small nation struggling against a superior force.
It was alleged that India's low-key and compromising position
was suggestive of Moscow's influence over New Delhi's support,
atleast, not to oppose the Soviet action in Afghanistan. 73
India justified its dissociation with member states of
the UN General Assembly to discuss withdrawal of USSR from
Afghanistan. This was done through a statement in the Lok Sabha
during the Question Hour. The then Minister for External
Affairs, P.V. Narasimha Rao, said, " ... Government is not
convinced raising this issue at the UN would be conducive to
defusing the situation in our neighbourhood .. 74
This was the new major Indian response to the Afghan crisis
an international forum. This statement was a virtual
endorsement of the Sovie.t intervention which was not at all in
tune with the reaction of a large majority of nations. One
aspect of the stand taken by India was that it was not
73. Ibid.
74. "India's Dissociation with Members State of UN General Assembly to Discuss withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan 7 August 1980)' Lok Sabha Debate (New Delhi), vol. VIII, no. 45- 48, August 1980, p. 120.
203
prepared to condemn the Soviet Union's action in an
international forum.· The other aspect was that it abstained from
voting in the General Assembly on the issue. The purpose was to
avoid taking sides. On October 3, Narasimha Rao made a
statement at 35th session of the General Assembly. Regarding
Afghanistan he stressed the need for a dialogue among the
parties concerned, ·without pre-conditioning. 75 Besides, on
September 28,1981, speaking in the General Assembly, Narasimha
Rao , in his address, pointed to the emerging threat of Cold War
that would exert pressure on the Non-Aligned Movement. He
expressed India's "disapproval of all kinds of outside
intervention in any country" and mentioned that India always
avoided 11 condemnatory polemics" and preferred a political
solution. 76 On November 17, R.D. Sathe, Secretary in India's
External Affairs Ministry, in his speech in the General
Assembly said that the effort of Kurt Waldheim, U.N. Secretary-
General, to bring about a dialogue between Pakistan and
Afghanistan had been set back by contrived technicalities
presumably because of Pakistan's intransigence to recognize the
regime in Kabul. 77 He advocated a peaceful solution in
75. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, India's Views on the Afghanistan Situation (External Publici·ty · Division, New Delhi, 1980), p. 35.
76. Foreign Affairs Record. (New Delhi), vol. XXVII, no. 9, September 1981, .P. 252.
77. Ibid, vol. XXVII, no . 11, November 1981, pp. 311-12.
204
accordance with the. formulation adopted in the New Delhi
Declaration in February by the Foreign Ministers of non-aligned
countries. It was ~lso at the New Delhi conference, he said,
that the Secretary-General had designated his personal
representative to engage in efforts aimed at facilitating
negotiation among the parties concerned so as to achieve
political solution.
Speaking at the Common wealth Heads of Government meeting
at Melbourne on September 30,1981, Indira Gandhi expressed
India' s grave concern "at the use of Afghanistan as a pretext
for a massive externally funded and encouraged militarization in
our neighbourhood" and remarked that Afghanistan had become
embroiled in a trial of strength between the super powers. 78
She, therefore, advised regional cooperation among the countries
concerned without the intrusion of outside interests. In
fact, as time passed, the Afghan crisis grew intractable.
India's effort towards crisis defusion. did not make headway.
Narasimha Rao's speech at the plenary meeting of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of Non-aligned
countries to the 37th session of
October 4, 1982, reflected this.
the General
There was
Assembly
no mention
the Afghan question but he stated that interference
78. Ibid, vol. XXVII, n. 10, October, p. 276.
205
on
of
and
intervention in the internal affairs of Non-aligned
had increased. The Non-aligned countries had countries
realized that military alliance and interlocking arrangements
did not guarantee peace but served as a potential invitation to
invol vernent in strategic conflict. 79 These utterance were
mainly purported against the US-Pakistan military linkage .. As
the various peace proposals sponsored at various times did not
make a headway, India pinned its faith on UN initiative to
solve the Afghan problem. On October 10, 1982, in his address to
the 37th session of UN General Assembly,
the UN Secretary General' s search for a
Narasimha Rao welcomed
political solution,
which in fact vindicated India's policy of defusing the Afghan
crisis. 80
Indian initiative at NAM Summit held' in Delhi in March
1983, too did not achieve any breakthrough w4atsoever. India
only reiterated its basic policy on Afghanistan. In the keynote
address at the conference, Indira Gandhi said that the non-
aligned movement regarded
intervention -as basic laws
non-interference
of international
and non-
behaviour.
Different types of interference and intervention, overt or
covert, take place. No single power or group of powers has
79. Ibid, vol. XXVII, no. 10, October 1982, pp. 270-71.
80. Ibid, p. 263
206
the justification or moral authority to interfere or
intervene. She said: "you cannot condemn one instance but
condone another. Such situation has its own origins." The
main approach to the conference, initiated by India, as usual
was to arrive at a consensus on all contentious declaration was,
prepared by India as the host country, after consultations with.
at least 40 other member countries. India would have liked
the final formulation to follow the one adopted by non-aligned
Foreign Ministers in February 1982, which called upon the
concerned countries - Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to negotiate
a political solution, while at the same time, demanding
simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country.
India made significant departure from the policy and
response of other nations by recognizing the Babrak Karmal
Government as legal one and
relations with the regime. In May
maintained full diplomatic
1982, the Indo-Afghan Joint
Ecc:momic · Commission, dormant since the 1978 Marxist coup in
Afghanistan, met in Kab';ll. At this meeting India pledged
economic aid to expand hospital facilities in the Afghan capital
and to assist in developing small scale industries. 81 .
India's tacit pro-Soviet policy in the case of Afghanistan
after 1979 has been justified by Bhaban1 Sen Gupta
81 . Amstutz , n . 41, . p . 16 5 .
207
(Journalist) in these words:-
"In no conceivable circumstances could India line-up with Pakistan, China and the United states against Soviet Union, this would have gone ag~~st the grain of India's foreign policy independence."
Rajiv Gandhi also pursued the policy of Mrs. Gandhi
towards the Afghan problem after her death in 1984. India
welcomed Geneva Accord which was signed on 14th April, 1988. In
a statement the official spokesman of the Ministry of External
Affairs said:
r1As a country of the region, India feels that the accords will lead to a lessening of tensions in the region and the removal of the raison d'etr.e for the induction of sophisticated weapons into the area. The settlement should thus create a favourable climate for peace and cooperation. India will make every effort to promote these objectives. The people of Afghanistan and the refugees can now devote their efforts towards the · social and economic reconstruction of their country. We will fully support them in these endeavours. The Governments ·of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USA, and the USSR, as well as the personal Representative of the UN Secretary General, deserve our appreciation for bringing to fruition the Geneva settlement ~83
Indian position did not alter even after the Soviet
withdrawal of its combat troops by 15 February 1989. As Soviets
sought to sustain the PDPA regime through massive non-combat
82. Bhabani Sen Gupta, n. 69, p. 108.
83. "Geneva Accord on Afghanistan;' Foreign Affairs Record (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi), vol XXXIV, no. 4, April 1988.
208
support, India increased its effort to aid the Soviets in
whatever way feasible to boost the position of the regime. The
Soviet Government announced the start of its troops withdrawal
from mid-May 1988 under the terms of the Afghan Geneva Accords
of a month earlier. The Accords, however, qid not provide a . ~·I,
politic~l settlement of the A_fghan· p~em on the basis of right
of the Afghan people to self-determination. Rajiv Gandhi, the
Prime Minister of India denounced the Afghan Muj ahideen as
"Islamic fanatics." 84 He invited Afghan President Naj ibullah
to make an official visit to New Delhi, his first outside
Warsaw Pact countries. The objective was to reassure
Najibullah and to reassert the role that New Delhi could play in
the Non-aligned movement in boosting the international
credibility of hi_s Government . Reportedly, despite India's
public denials there was since the Soviet withdrawal been a . -
substantial increase in India's economic and logistic support
for the Naj ib Government. 85 India also supported Kabuls
candidacy in the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
84. Elaine Sciolino "Gandhi Faults Islamic Rule for Kabul", The New York Times, June 1, 1988,
85. See for details "Indo-Afghanistan Cooperation in Civil··· Aviation "Foreign Affairs Record Ministry of External Affairs,--- ··Government of India, New Delhi). vol. XXXIV, no. 4, April 1968, p. 101. Also see, Yossef Bodansky, "New Pressures on Key Indian Borderlands" Janes Weekly, 30 April 1988, pp. 840-4.
209
(SAARC) in 1988.86
The Iran-Iraq War
This was an issue in which Iran itself was a party l.n
conflict. Therefore, the issue had peculiar ramifications. As
members of the Islamic Peace committed to end the Iran-Iraq War
and in their individual capacity, Islamabad and Dhaka continued
to support an end to hostilities. India did so at the· unilateral
level as well as through the forum of the UN and NAM.
The outbreak of war between Iran- Iraq put Pakistan and
Bangladesh into a very uncomfortable and delicate position as
both bell-igerent were members of ore as well as NAM.
Pakistan had been consistent and active in mediation
effort for ending the conflict since the very first days of the
war. The Government of Pakistan agreed with the Libyan
Government's move for special session of the Islamic minister's
conference and it made ~ a number of moves bilaterally as well
as internationally. These included seeking to defuse the
situation and helping the two sides to resolve the dispute
peacefully. Being the Chairman of the Islamic Fo·reign Minister's
Conference, Pakistan started seeking consensus among. the member
countries and special session was convened in Islamabad not only
through their Ambassadors but also through Pakistani envoys in
86. Roy, n. 59, p 37.
210
the two countries. 87 In this regard, Pakistani Ambassador in
Tehran had a meeting with President Ban Sadr. He was learnt
to have been given· a fresh brief instructing him to seek
another interview with the Iranian President. A.t the same time,
Foreign Minister Agha Shahi who was in New ;lork leading the
country's delegation at the General Assembly, .sought to defuse
the situation. He also held detailed discussions with the UN
Secretary General. Besides, he also held discussions with Habib~
Chatti, OIC Secretary General, and Foreign Ministers of Islamic
countries who were at that time at the United Nations.
An editorial in Pakistan's largest circulation English
language daily Dawn, perceptively noted that in the climate
generated by the extremist measures of the tw.o states against
each other "was not surprising that. appeals to end the
confrontation or accept mediation by third party had fallen
on deaf ears." 88
Pakistan expressed grave concern over the escalation of
border clashes between Iran and Iraq as early as April 1980,
well over five months before the outbreak of all-out war. By
September 16,1980 Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries had
volunteered to establish a team of foreign ministers to mediate
with a view to arresting the escalating tension between Iran
87. Dawn, 26 September 1980.
88. Ibid, April 18, 1980.
211
and Iraq. Their aim was to effect an immediate halt to
skirmishes and initiate negotiations between the two belliger
ent.89 On September 23, 1980 one day after full scale war had
broken out between the two countries, Pakistan supported the UN
Security
ceasefire.
Council resolution calling for an immediate
Following ·this, President Zia accepted the
request by Islamic countries to attempt bringing about a
negotiated settlement of the war. Before the war had entered
its second week, President Zia led the Islamic Ummah Committee
to Tehran and Baghdad. However, after meeting Abolhasan Bani
Sadr. The then President of Iran, Zia remarked that Iran was in
a phase "where mediation will lead to nothing". Zia's visit
to Tehran and Baghdad was considered in New York as a welcome
sign· of progress in the peace mission undertaken by him on
behalf of the Islamic Conference. 90
On October 1, 1980, while addres"sing the UN General
· Assembly on behalf of the world's Muslims, President Z ia
expressed grave concern on the continuation of the war and called
for strict. neutrality and non-interference "in the internal
affairs of the belligerent by outside powers." In the
meantime, President Zia-ul-Haq addressed an appeal to Iran and
89. Ibid, September 17, 1980
90. Business Recorder, 1 October 1980.
212
Iraq to order suspension of hostilities during the period of
Haj (between 9th to 13th of Zilhaj), 18 October t6 22 October.9 1
On 30 October, Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi arrived in
Baghdad after a short-stay in Amman in his effort to resolve the
dispute between Iran and Iraq. Shahi told newsmen in Amman
that l).e was carrying a message from Presid.ent General Zia
for the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussain. Iraqi news agency
said that Shahi's visit to Baghdad was in connection with the
Non-aligned countries' initiatives for a goodwill mission to the
two countries.9 2
Pakistan sincerely tried to bring to an end the hostilities
in the Gulf through various peaceful means but it was thwarted
in its effort. Continuous spilling of blood in the prolonged
Gulf war distressed Pakistan. It was pained to find that
inspite of the professed fraternal bonds of faith, the Islamic
world did not present any constructive homogeneity.
Pakistan shared the thought that the Organization of Islamic
Conference should focus its attention towards the problem and
exert in bringing the protract.ed war to an end. Finally,
Pakistan's strict neutrality, was, however, given up in · 1986
91. Dawn, 31 October 1980.
92. Ibid., 31 October 1980.
213
when Zia said:·· "Iraq attacked Iran and occupied its territory.
Iran took back its lands after forcing the invading troops to
withdraw." He further said that " it is not important who
started the war A time will come when according to the
evidence available we will be able to say, he was the aggressor
and, therefore, this is the punishment that should be given to
him. 93
The gee-strategic realities and economic considerations
determined Pakistan's adoption of a partisan stance· in the Iran-
Iraq war. Moreover, given the turbulent situation on
Pakistan's northern border with Afghanistan and the uneasy
state of affairs on. the eastern side with India, it is
conceivable to imagine Pakistan staking the stability on its
western borders with Iran for whatever reason. 94
Pakistan's coastline is.contiguous to the Gulf the strategic
Strait of Hormuz being barely a 350-mile stretch away from the
Makran Coastal range in . Baluchistan. It also shares well over
four hundred miles of common border with Iran along the
Baluchistan landmass as well as a 400-mile railway track. on a
93. Patriot. 15 January 1986.
94. Suroosh Irfani, 'Pakistan and the Iran-Iraq War" Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova), vol IX no. 2 Winter 1985, p. 65
214
road connecting Quetta, capital of Pakistani's Baluchistan
province, to Zahedan, the provincial capital on the
side. n 95
Iranian
With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and its
continuation some political observers \olere convinced that the
war would destroy
would be forced to
other. In July 1987
this "idyllic situation" because Pakistan
overly enter the war on one side or the
Abdul Sattar gave two visits to the Gulf
countries including the two warring countries. He said. that
Pakistan believed that the dangerous momentum of the war should
be arrested as an expansion of the conflict would not only
further disturb and destabilise the region but: also transform
the regional environment.96
Pakistan provided surface transport facilities to Iran
during the Iran- Ira.q War. 97 Meanwhile, Pakistan played a key
role in enabling Iran in getting large scale Chinese arms.
Pakistan also condemned Iraq using chemical weapons which was
appreciated by the Iranian leaders. M. M. Mousavi, the Iranian
Ambassador to Pakistan, said that his c0untry was appreciative of
Pakistan's "definite and positive position on the Iran-Iraq
95. Ibid.
96. The Hindu, August 5, 1987.
97. Hindustan Times. 12 February 1990.
215
War" 98
Bangladesh on its part tried to bring about an immediate
cessation of hostilities and just and honor~ble settlement
through different peace keeping forums (such as Organization of
Islamic Conference, Islamic Peace Committee, United Nations and
Non-Jl.ligned Movement) in accordance with International Law.
From the very beginning of the wa-r, Bangladesh persistently made
all efforts to defuse the conflagration and solve the dispute
through peaceful negotiations. Apparently, the devastating
effect of the Gulf War stirred up all Bangladesh as well as
newspapers and the government so much that they condemned the
meaningless bloodshed in the Gulf in unison. ·criticizing the
sole negative outcome of the Gulf War, one newspaper which
generally reflected the official attitude and thinking commented
thus : "The whole things look like an organized self butchery
without precedent. The devastating effect of it on the economy
of both countries will work out to billions of dollars on either
side." 99
Bangladesh, being a Muslim country, took active initiative
through the Organization of Islamic Conference, and the Islamic
Peace Committee in order to extinguish the burning rage. More
98. Irfani, n. 91, p. 65; Dawn. 25 May 1985.
99. Bangladesh Observer, 19 January 1987.
216
specifically, Bangladesh made desperate efforts to stop the
Gulf war through the Islamic Peace Committee (IPC). At the
third Islamic conference in Taif (Saudi Arabia), 23-28 January
19811 Bangladesh proposed concrete measures to bring about an
immediate cessation of hostilities and honorable settlement of
the dispute in accordance with International Law. The then
Bangladesh President, Ziaur-Rahman, addressed the conference and
earnestly requested the belligerent states to solve the dispute
through peaceful negotiations. It was decided at the conference,
on the insistence of Bangladesh, that priority should be given to
the issue of the Iran-Iraq war. A committee of five nations was
constituted to visit the warring States. The conference also
proposed a simultaneous ceasefire from mid-night of March 12,
1981, to be followed·by Iraqi withdrawal of troops in a week's
time. A committee to assist both states in negotiating a
comprehensive settlement was to be set up. A special Islamic
court was to be set up for working out a reasonable
with regard to the Shatt-al-Arab. The truce
settlement
and Iraqi
withdrawal were to be supervised by observers drawn from the ore
States with the approval of both.the states. Since the outbreak
of the war, President Zia-Ur-Rahman made various attempts to
bring about ceasefire between Iran and Iraq and, on several
occasions, he expressed his deep concern about the war. He
saw this as an obstacle in the path of Islam;i..c unity. He
appealed to the "brotherly Iran-Iraq to stop their senseless war
217
immediately" and said that the war would not only destroy the
t . b 1 d . . t. 100 wo countr1es, ut a so estroy the un1ty of Musl1m na 1ons. .
Bangladesh expressed great hope in the success of the OIC's
peace initiatives on January 26, 1987. Bangladesh again joined
the ore summit which was held in Kuwait. It had an optimistic
attitude towards the Iran-Iraq war and hoped that the summit
"under the auspices of a world Islamic body could provide the
only opportunity to · sort out the problem of the Gulf
War." 101 At the same time, President Mohammad Ershad appealed
to Iran and Iraq to " open a dialogue through the good offices
of the Islamic Peace Committee (IPC) to end the tragic war
between the brotherly countries." He urged both Iran and Iraq
that if they had difficulties in speaking their mind formally,
they were welcome to speak "to any of us, privately and tell us
how this bloodshed can be stopped honourably for both parties .
.. 102
Bangladesh also endorsed the UN' s peace initiative
regarding the Gulf war. Bangladesh's permanent representative
in the UN, Justice B.A. Siddiky, expressed Bangladesh's trust in
100. Bangladesh Times, 3 March , 1981,
101. Bangladesh Observer, January 19, 1987.
102. POT, January 29, 1987.
218
UN' s effort to end the war. He appreciated the UN Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar's and the Security council's efforts to
bring peace in the region. When Iraq started to use poisonous
gas in the battle field, Bangladesh expressed its deep concern
and condemned in UN the "use of chemical weapons in Gulf War
" 103 Talking to BSS on May 6, 1985 on return from Jedda'after
attending the 7th !PC session, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Humayun
Rasheed Choudhury, said that Bangladesh played a "
constructive and moderate· role in the deliberations of the
Jedda meeting. " He also said that the Committee condemned the
violation of international humanitarian law applicable to
armed conflict particularly to Geneva conventions on the laws of
war and the treatment of prisoners of war. The session, he
pointed out, had called for strict observance of the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 and the Chicago Convention
Aviation. 104
on Civil
Bangladesh saw the UN Charter as a fine document that
should be implemented under proper guidance. The UN' s
prescription to the belligerent states was that the warring
parties should ".implement all Security Council resolutions for
a total ceasefire, withdraw forces from each other's
103. Bangladesh Observer, April 27, 1985.
104. Pot. May 8, 1985.
219
territories, exchange prisoners of war and start comprehensive
negotiations." 105 Since the outbreak of the Gulf War the UN
had adopted a number of .resolutions aimed at stopping the war
and bringing peace . These resolutions were as follows 479
(1980); 514 (1982); 540 (1983), 522 (1984); 552 (1984); 582 &
586 (1986) and 598 (1987). When the UN came out with its peace
plans for the mutual and peaceful solutions in the Gulf War,
Bangladesh expressed its confidence over their peace plans.
The handling of the Iran-Iraq War provided another example
of how Bangladesh preferred peaceful resolution of all
conflicts in West Asia and solidarity among the Islamic
countries. As Bangladesh was overwhelmingly dependent on
external aid, it could not afford to annoy or dissatisfy any of
its donors. A peaceful, politically stable and viable West Asia
could promote and guarantee Bangladesh Is interests both in
maintaining peace and security and in accelerating the peace of
socio-economic development.
The rational for the efforts of Bangladesh's commitment
to the causes of· the Islamic Ummah could very well be understood
if one takes a closer look at the resources of Islamic World ... ··.
Since about the mid- 1 70s the Islamic countries of the Middle
East became an important source of aid for Bangladesh. During
105. The Hindu. 18 March 1987.
220
the initial years Bangladesh received $ 200 million Saudi aid,
and one billion dollars in 1978. During the Second Five-Year
Plan period (1980-85) total expected aid from Saudi Arabia was 7
or 8 billion dollars. 106 In November 1974 Kuwait signed an
accord for long-term economic cooperation. The fields of
cooperation included joint ventures in cement, fertilizer,
shipping, gas pipeline expansion, transmission and
distribution of electricity in rural areas. 107 In May 1981
Kuwait provided a loan of $ 29 million for eight rural
electrification projects.108 Saudi A~abia and Kuwait proved to
be the major donors of petro dollars. Besides, ·the Middle East
is also the only source of Bangladesh's crude 9il import 109
In the wake of Iran-Iraq War, India was put ~n an unenviable
and delicate position on issues like naming and condemning the
aggressor. The first official reaction was pronounced by
106. Bangladesh Observer, 21 December 1978.
107. Ibid, 12 December 1979.
108. Bangladesh in International Affairs 5, May 1981.
(Dhaka), vol. 4, no.
109. The aid includes grant and loan elements: of food aid, project aid and non-project aid. For details of ·aid received by Bangladesh from Arab and Western. source:::··see Ministry of Finance, External Resource Division, Flow of External Resources into Bangladesh (as of June 30, 1981), pp. 20-22 and 26-27. Also see Syed Anwar Hussain, 11 Bangladesh And the Organization of Islamic Conference 11
Asian Affairs (Dhaka), vol 9, no. 2, April- June 1987, p. 22.
221
the Government spokesman when he described the conflict as "an
unfortunate development" on two counts - it was between two
countries with whom Ihdia had very friendly relations and both
of them were non-aligned. An Indian scholar pointed out
"India's dilemma at this time was in a sense comparable to the
Soviet predicament way back in 1962 on the India China
border War. 11110 India was the oniy country to which the emis-
saries of the two Government rushed. It was a measure of trust
and faith in India that both Iran and Iraq turned to her to
seek support for their position111 Special envoys of both Iran
and Iraq visited India on 28 September 1980 and 8 October 1980
respectively. 112
Although India· expressed its deep conce~n over the Iran-
Iraq conflict, it avoided spel.ling out its ·judgement. P. V.
Narasimha Rao, the then Minister for External Affairs, said
11 ••••• India made it clear that it has not taken and will not
take sides and has expressed its anguish at the loss of life and
property being, suffered by both sides. 11 He also said that
110. A. H. H. Abidi, 11 Iran-:- Iraq war And India: Some Key · Factors·•i, · · Mainstream ·;(New: n·elhi)"·, vol. 3 7, no. 3 7, May 16, 1981, P. 23- 24.
111. Ibid.
112. 11 Iran- Iraq Conflict, Statement by Minister for External Affairs, P. V. Narsimha Rao 11 , Rajya Salbha Debate, (New Delhi), vol. CXVI, no. 1-7, 18 November JI.98;0, pp. 293-302.
222
prolongation or escalation of the present conflict could have
grave implications on both regional and global peace and
security. 113 Besides, at the UN General Assembly on 3 October
1980, P. V. Narasimha Rao said that the continuing conflict
between the two countries would "only weaken tfie solidarity
of the non-aligned and developing countries. 114
India's policy and attitude were indicated through a
collective forum the joint communique issued by the
conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned states
in February 19 81. India reiterated and· emphasized the
implementation of the principles of non-aligned countries as
outlined in para 26 of the Final Declaration which dealt with
the Iran-Iraq issue. During the Question Hour in Rajya Sabha
the Minister of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Shiv Shankar
said:
"No state should acquire or occupy territories by the use of force, and whatever territories have been acquired in this way should be returned, that no act of aggression should be committed against any state, that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states should be respected, that no state should try to interfere or intervene in the internal affairs of.other states, that all differences or claims which may exist between states should be settled by
113. Ibid, p. 294.
114. Ibid, p. 295.
223
peaceful means with a view that peacelul relations should prevail among members of states~ 11
India also tried its best to end this war through peaceful
means. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, urged King Fahd
of Saudi Arabia to intensify efforts to end the Iran-Iraq War.
In a letter to the Saudi monarch, which was delivered by a three-
member Indian Good-will delegation to the·Kingdom, Mrs. Indira
Gandhi said that the prolonged war between the non-aligned
countries had threatened the security of Asia as some forces were
keen to take advantage of the situation. 116
On March 29, 19?5 India's new Prime Minister, Rajiv -Gandhi,
in one of the biggest diplomatic offensives, sent the Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs, Khurshid Al am khan, and
Foreign Secretary, Romesh Bhandari to Iran. They tried to
persuade the two adversaries not to bombard the civilian areas.
The Indian peac·e team returned on March 31, . 1985 and Khurshid
Alam Khan described his discussions in Tehran as useful and said
that India's approach to bring the Gulf War to an end was very
. 117 much appreciated by Iran.
115. "India's role in lessening Te;:nsion arising out ot .-Iran.:.. :r.raq · war",. Rajya· ·s·a:bha Debate (New Delhi), vol. CXVII, no. 1-7, 20 February 1989, pp. 87-88.
116. Amrita Bazar Patrika. September 27, 1984
117. Tulsi Two 124.
Ram, Persia to Iran One Step Forward Steps Backward (Mahajan Pub., New Delhi 1988~ p.
224
As the chairman of NAM, India made considerable efforts to
stop the tragic war. On 18 February 1986 the official spokesman
of the Government of India issued a statement on behalf of the
Chairman expressing concern and anguish at the renewed
escalation of the conflict. It noted that as Chairman of the
NAM, India had consistently endeavored through manY. initiatives
to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict and to promote
peaceful settlement in the interests of both countries as well
as for stability and peace in the region. The statement
stated that "· .. India was ready to assist them in a sincere and
constructive manner in evolving a phased programme of de-
escalation leading to a just, comprehensive and honorable
solution of the differences that had divided the two
countries." 118
Regarding the devastating Gulf War, India's concern was
genuine. But it could not use the NAM as an exclusive platform
for sorting out the dispute. In fact both Iran-Iraq were f~rm
on their decision not to budge an inch from their rigid
positions. Prof. A.H.H. Abidi rightly pointed out:
"The Gulf War presents an interesting spectacle of
118. Non-Aligned under India's Chairmanship (Published under the auspices of Indian Institute for Non-Aligned Studies, New Delhi, 1986) pp 32-33.
225
international diplomatic demarches as regards issues and mediation. . . This was the first occasion when the international community made diplomatic efforts at three different levels-UN, non-aligned and ore to bring about · peace. However, although the decision in these forums ranged from occupied territories, the aggressor was not named. The. belligerent themselves adopted rigid positions." 119
India's stand on the war was seen by Iranians as partisan
and pro-Arab. The mediation efforts in the Iran-Iraq conflict
had been hampered for various reasons. India had also
cultivated close relations with Iraq since the mid-sixties.
In the economic terms 52 percent of all the construction
projects being executed by India in foreign countries were
located in Iraq and this significantly influenced the Indian
attitude. Besides favourable economic relations with Iraq,
other factors also determined .India's response to the Iraq-Iran
conflict. These were: the presence of a large number of Indian
workers and professionals· in Arab Gulf States; Indian
participation in civil construction in that region and the fact
that the majority of the. Arab world supported Iraq. These
constraints led to the belief that India's stand on the Iran-
Iraq War had been partisan and pro-Arab. 120
119. A.H.H. Abidi, "The Iran-Iraq War : A Balance Sheet," in R.C. Sharma, ed., Perspective on !rag- Iran Conflict (Raj esh Pub, New Delhi, 1984), p. 86
120. Year Book on India's Foreign Policy 1985-86 1985-86 (New Delhi. 1987), p 114.
226
Iran always suspected that India had a military training
team in Iraq that predated the Gulf War. On occasions Iranian
officials voiced their apprehension that some of the Indian
teams were specifically positioned in Iraq to help maintain
combat aircraft of Soviet manufacture. 121
India's policy has always been to condemn all aggressions
and to deny the fruit of aggression in any part of the world.
But India did not condemn Iraqi invasion on Iran. Secondly,
India· also did not condemn the Iraqi use of chemical weapons.
In January 1981, Iran alleged that chemical weapons had been
used by Iraq during the fighting around Ahwaz in Khuzistan.
More detailed allegations came late in 1982. India could have
examined all these developments and issued a statement
condemning the use of chemical weapons. Since India was one of
the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the ...
use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gas and of all
analogous liquid materials and devices. 122
India lost an opportunity to win Iran's confidence when the
latter was looking for support in its criticism of Iraq's use
of chemical weapons. In April 1988, Iranian ambassador,
121. The Hindu, August 17, 1989.
122. Year Book on India's Foreign Policy no. 138, p 115.
227
Ebrahim Behnam Dehkordy, said that Iran would like India to
lead the members of the non-aligned movement in condemning Iraq
for using chemical weapons in the Gulf War. This was a
humanitarian issue. He further said that as leader of the NAM
and its Chairman, India was expected to 11 take an appropriate
position" on chemical weapons and other issues of humanitarian
nature. It is, t·nerefore, not surprising that the Indiari peace
initiative did not achieve any break-through -during the non
aligned Summit held at New Delhi in March 1983. 123
Iran also accused the UN of having failed to take the
necessary steps to prohibit Iraq's 'aggressive act, Iran had
exhausted all appeals to reason and logic.n 124
The Kashmir issue
This issue has remained a bone of contention between India
and Pakistan in the sub-continent since the partition in 1947.
Both have fought three wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971. The first
two wars were fought over Kashmir. The issue has largely
influenced the international outlook of the two countries, and
has caused embarrassing situations for the friends and 'allies'
of the two countries. Support for Pakistan's position on the .J • - •·
123. Statesman, Apri~ 23, 1988.
124. See Velayati, n. 43, p. 9.
228
Kashmir issue was the yardstick used by
the friendship of other nations.
Pakistan
Iran extended diplomatic support to Pakistan.
to measure
The Iranian
Television carried a special programme on Jammu and Kashmir in
J_uly 1982. The programme clearly upheld Pakistan's point of
view on the Kashmir issue and referred to the Indian state
of the Kashmir as "Indian-held Kashmir". The programme traced
the history of Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir and the
Indian failure to grant them the right of self-determination.
This reflected Iran's position on Jammu and Kashmir-the first
time since the Islamic revolution in Iran that publicly
supported Pakistan's position on the Kashmir issue. 125
In 1983 Ayatollah Khomeini's regime invited a Britain-based
Kashmir independence group, working for Kashmir's 'independence'
to participate in a celebration marking Iran's revolution day
in February.
According to
Independence
The group has its headquarters in Glasgow.
the Hindus tan Times, dated 6 April _1983, Kashmir
Group had been greatly encouraged by the
recognition given to it by Ayatollah Khomeini's regime.~ 26
The Iranian Parliament (Majlis) also discussed the Kashmir
125. The Muslim , August 1,1982.,
126. See for details The Hindustan Times, 6, April 1983.
229
issue. In the opening session of the Majlis on March 4,1990,
Speaker Karrubi focussed his remarks on the events in Jammu and
Kashmir and condemned the Indian Government for violent
against the Muslims of Jammu confrontation
province. 127 He termeq the Indian Government' s
and Kashmir
treatment of
the Kashmir Muslims as i~rational and injudicious· and expressed
his regr.et and sorrow._Karrubi also warned the Indian Government
to deal with the case of the Jammu and Kashmir in a rational and
judicious manner, saying that the problem could not be resolved
through killings and violence. While expressing his condolence
to the bereaved Kashmir families, the Majlis Speaker called on
the Iranian Foreign Ministry to do its utmost in order to end
the massacre of the Kashmir Muslims. 128
On· 8 March 1990, the Kashmiri Muslims residing in Iran
gathered in front of the UN mission in Tehran and ~ondemned the
massacre of Muslims by Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. In
that gathering the Muslims of Kashmir passed a resolution in
which they lent support to the liberation movement of the
people of Jammu and Kashmir, while seeking the implementation
of all resolutions ratified by the UN aimed at staging a free
and impartial referendum in Kashmir. Another part of the
127. FBIS/NES, 24 May 1980.
128. Ibid.
230
resolution stated:
"We Muslims of Kashmir residing in Iran demand the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Indian forces from the territory of our beloved land. Further, we urge the UN, the Islamic countries Conference, the Non-aligned movement, all liberation movements, and all freedom-seeking leaders of the world, as well as the Islamic world in particular the dear revolutionary brothers. and sisters and the martyr-nurt1.:1ring ummah of Iran to lend support to the Jihad of Muslims of Kashmir against the Indian Government. 11129
The Iranian media also took note of prevailing developments
in Jammu and Kashmir. A morning daily Jomhuri -e-Eslami stressd
that the aggressive attitude of the Indian government towards
Muslims in Kashmir would have no outcome but increase scope of
furious protest of Muslims. In a weekly commentary on recent
bloody clashes in Kashmir, the Persian language Jomhuri -e-
Eslami noted that the attitude of the Indian government would ...
also make .. the Muslims in Kashmir more determined to settle
their dispute with the Government once and for all. "Demands of
Muslims in Kashmir are clear to the government'_, the commentary
said, adqipg that 'they were determined to regain their
rights". It also noted that "irrational reactions by the Indian
government further indicate that authorities and local forces
have not realized {the ) gravity of the situation." 130
129. Ibid, March 15, 1990
130. Quoted in FBIS/NES, March 8, 1990.
231
The Iranian concern on the Kashmir issue should be seen
in the light
solidarity with
of· Iran's
the oppressed
consistent
Muslims
policy of expressing
everywhere be they in
Palestine, Eritrea, southern Philippines or Western Sahara.
President Hashemi Rafsanjani said" ... We will continue our
eiforts to eliminate this oppression, and we believe that time
when Muslims were crushed and pressured and their request
ignored throughout the world, has ended and that the policy
of iron fists regarding Islamic beliefs will not be
effective". A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry
spokesman in Tehran · on April 15, 1990 said that the Indian
Government not only hurts religious and humanitarian sentiments
of the World Muslims but also wipes out the possibility of
resolving the issue through wise and rational means.
Meanwhile, the Central Secretariat of Friday Prayer Leaders
throughout Iran also issued a statement condemning the
massacre, while urging resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir
issue through peaceful means. The statement further expressed
condolence on the martyrdom of the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir.
to world leaders and ·the people of India. 131 .
At the same time, the Iranian government offered to mediate
between India. and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. The Iranian
131. FBIS/NES, May 6, 1990,
232
ambassador in Islamabad, Javed Mansuri, on April 14, disclosed
that the Islamic Republic and other countries had offered to
mediate on the issue, had yet to receive the Indian
Government's reply. He expressed hope that the Indian
government would forgo its use of force in Jammu and Kashmir, and
work towards a peaceful solution of the issue. 132
The Kashmir issue became an irritant in the Indo-Iranian
relations particularly after 1990. The Foreign Minister T. K.
Gujral's visit to Iran scheduled from January 19,1990, was
called off by Tehran. The Iranian decision was seen in New
Delhi as a demonstration of its critical stand on the then
current developments in Kashmir. Iran reaffirmed its
solidarity with Pakistan on· the question of Jammu and
Kashmir. Accepting the credentials of Pakistan's ambassador
designate in May 6, 1990, President Hashemi
Rafsanj ani said that the peaceful settlement of the Kashnd.r
problem and Afghan issue would contribute to the cause of
peace and stability in the area. In the meantime, the
ambassador said that Pakistan highly appreciated Iran's right and
principled support on the Kashmir.issue. 133
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid, April 16, 1990.
233
The NPT Issue
Iran was concerned about. "nuclear race" in the Indian
subcontinent. It supported the stand of Pakistan and Bangladesh
on a draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a Nuclear-
Free Zone in South Asia" in UN. Apparently the intentions of
Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh were not secret. On the
nuclear race, Pakistan and Bangladesh always expressed their
reservation and in a subtle manner, inspite of India's
objection, they pledged to make the. subcontinent a "nuclear free
zone". 134
India voted against the draft resolution, maintaining
that the nuclear disarmament was a global, not a regional issue
and that lasting World peace could be built only on the basis
of general ·and complete ·disarmament under effective
international control. It believed that the security provided by
a nuclear- weapon-f~ee-zone was illusory, given the global search
of nuclear weapons and the fact the such zones did nothing to
reduce the level of existing nuclear stock-pile~. Nevertheless,
India did not object to certain proposals· for the establishment
of such zones because, in the first place, the proposal enjoyed
consensus among the states of the region concerned. 135
134. "General Assembly ·and D-isarmament", (Department of Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament, New York 1990), pp. 91-92.
135. Ibid.
234
United Nations Department of