CHAPTER- FIVE JURISDICTION OF COURTS AND INITIATION OF TRIAL I. JURISDICTION So far as jurisdiction of the Area is concerned, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of the following acts took place : i) Drawing of the cheque. ii) Presentation of the cheque iii) Returning of the cheque by drawee bank iv) Giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of cheque and failure of the drawer to make payments within 15 days of receipt of notice. 1 If the drawer of cheque is a company, a criminal complaint could be filed against the M.D. of the company, Chairman, Directors and also for against the company for filing complaint on behalf of a Company section 291 of the Companies Act, has vested the general powers of management on the Board, subject to the provisions contained in articles of Association. Thus, if legal proceedings have to be initiated for and on behalf of a Company then the board needs to pass a resolution authorising any Director or Managing Director or any other employee of the Company for initiating such process. The only eligibility criteria prescribed by section 142 is that the complaint under section 138 must be filed by the payee or the holder in due course of the said cheque. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the 1 K.Bhaskarn v. Shanta Karan Vidyan Balan AIR 1999-7 SC-570
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CHAPTER- FIVE
JURISDICTION OF COURTS AND
INITIATION OF TRIAL
I. JURISDICTION
So far as jurisdiction of the Area is concerned, the complainant can choose
any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any of the local areas within the
territorial limits of which any one of the following acts took place :
i) Drawing of the cheque.
ii) Presentation of the cheque
iii) Returning of the cheque by drawee bank
iv) Giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment
of cheque and failure of the drawer to make payments within 15 days of
receipt of notice.1
If the drawer of cheque is a company, a criminal complaint could be filed
against the M.D. of the company, Chairman, Directors and also for against the
company for filing complaint on behalf of a Company section 291 of the Companies
Act, has vested the general powers of management on the Board, subject to the
provisions contained in articles of Association.
Thus, if legal proceedings have to be initiated for and on behalf of a
Company then the board needs to pass a resolution authorising any Director or
Managing Director or any other employee of the Company for initiating such
process.
The only eligibility criteria prescribed by section 142 is that the complaint
under section 138 must be filed by the payee or the holder in due course of the said
cheque. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the
1 K.Bhaskarn v. Shanta Karan Vidyan Balan AIR 1999-7 SC-570
152
company who is the payee of the cheque. It is open to the dejure complainant
company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent to
company in the court. Thus, even presuming that, the initially there was no authority
still the company can, at any stage rectify that defect. At a consequent stage the
company can send a person who is competent to represent.2
Not only this but we are fully alive to the imperatives of a sound “Cheque
system” and in our anxiety to scares away the offenders, we are providing more
stringent deterrents as spelled out in the Negotiable Instruments Act (Amendment)
2002 interalia provides 2 years imprisonment and issue of notice from 15 days to 30
days and day to day hearing in the case and absent only giving the sound reasons. It
provides for discretion of the courts to waive the period of one month for taking
cognizance of the case. Hence, we see that the directors are liable for the
dishonouring cheque severally. We have, therefore, still to go miles in this direction.
A. Jurisdiction u/s 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 –
Where a cheque was issued for business purchased at one place and the
recipient of the cheque also deposited the cheque into his account at that very place,
but, after dishonour, he issued notice of dishonour from his place of business in some
other town, it was held that a complaint filed at that place was competent. The cause
of action partly arose there because to discharge his liability the drawer would have to
make arrangement for payment at the recipient place. Thus the places where the
payment was to be made and where the cheque was delivered are also relevant. Where
a cheque was given at Delhi but was deposited by the payee at some other place, there
was no jurisdiction at that place. It is the duty of the debtor to seek his creditor and,
therefore, the court at the place of the payee had jurisdiction.
Cause of action may arise at the place where the cheque was issued or
delivered or where the money was expressly or impliedly payable. Where there was
2 MMTC Ltd. v. Meehi Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. AIR 2002 Cr.L.J. 266 ( SC)
153
averment in the compliant of an agreement to return the money at the residence of the
complainant, it was held that the cause of action arose there.
B. Where Refusal Takes Place –
Section 177 of The Code of Criminal Procedure states that every offence shall
ordinarily be enquired into and tried by Court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed and Section 179 of the said Code states that when an act is an offence by
reason of anything which has been done, and of a consequence which has ensured, the
offence may be enquired into or tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction
such thing has been done or such a consequence has ensued. So far as the complaint
lodged by the respondent No. 2 against the petitioners for an alleged offence under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is concerned, from the
complaint, it is evident that the cheques that were issued by the petitioner No 1 under
the signature of the petitioner No. 2 in the name of the respondent No. 2, were drawn
on the Vijaya Bank at Shakespeare Sarani in Calcutta, although sent to Bombay, and
the cheques were produced at Vijaya Bank at Shakespeare Sarani in Calcutta for
encashment where those were dishonoured. Accordingly, if any offence was
committed by the petitioners at all, it was committed in Calcutta as per the provisions
of Section 179 read with Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and such an
offence is to be tried by the Court within whose local jurisdiction such offence was
committed namely, by a competent Criminal Court in Calcutta. The ratio of the
decisions in AIR 1954 SC 429: AIR 1960 Cal 513: AIR 1963 Pat. 398 and AIR 1974
P & H 2, therefore, apply with full force so far as the contention of Mr. Mukherjee
regarding the lack jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court in Bombay to
entertain the disputed complaint against the petitioners is concerned, as from the facts
of the present case, it becomes quite clear, that if there be any cause of action for
starting a criminal proceeding against the writ petitioners for their alleged offence at
all, such cause of action has arisen wholly in Calcutta when the alleged offence has
154
been committed and not in Bombay as no part of such cause of action has arisen
there.3
Once the cheque is dishonoured and the payee serves the notice he is entitled
to enforce his rights under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act at the place
of his business.
The Courts at Khanna have the jurisdiction to try the criminal charges against
the petitioner. No case is thus, made out for quashing of the complaint and consequent
proceedings.4
The complaint can be filed in a Court within the jurisdiction of which the
cheque has been drawn or the place where the cheque is presented for collection and
received an endorsement about the dishonour of the cheque or the place where the
cheque is dishonoured. In this case the cheques drawn on State Bank of India,
Kurnool Branch of Hyderabad for collection where a part of the cause of action arose.
There fore, the Court at Hyderabad has got jurisdiction to try the case. Under those
circumstances, the learned Magistrate is perfectly right in dismissing the petition filed
by the accused which does not call for interference.5
C. In Case of Non Payment –
Since Section 142(b) of the Acts speaks of cause of action. What does cause of
action mean? A court gets jurisdiction over the matter if the cause of action arises
within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Cause of action means: “the whole bundle of
material facts which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to
succeed in the suit” to ascertain whether the bundle of facts give rise to the cause of
action and to determine whether one or more of those facts had occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court the entire plaint has to be taken into consideration.
3 Indmark Finance and Investment Co. (Pvt) Ltd. v. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate 28th Court,
1992(1) Crimes 993 at p. 997 4 T.K.Khungar v. Sanjay Ghai, 1994(3) Crimes 802 5 M/s Goutham T.V. Centre v. M/s Apex Agencies, 1993(1) Crimes 723: 1993 Cri. LJ 1004.
155
In the decision in the State of Madras v. C.P. Agencies,6 the Supreme Court quoted
with approval the following observations in Ms. Chand Kaur v. Partap Singh,7
“Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence
which may set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely
to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in
other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to
arrive at a conclusion to his favour.”
The question whether the Court within whose jurisdiction cheque is delivered
can entertain the suit arose for consideration in the decision of Lachhman Dass v.
Chuhra Mal. 8
It was held that in a suit for recovery of loan, the cause of action does
not constitute merely the giving of loan but it consists for of a bundle of facts
including the agreement relating to the loan, the place where the plaintiff delivered to
the defendant the cheque for the amount of loan and the place where the loan was to
be paid back. It was observed that if no cash was advanced by plaintiff to the
defendant but it was the cheque that constituted the loan, then the place where the
defendant got the cheque from the plaintiff gives rise to a part of the cause of action
and the plaintiff has a right to institute the suit in the Civil Courts within whose
territorial jurisdiction the cheque was delivered to the defendant.
The complaint can be laid at the place wherein the cheque was dishonoured
and also at the place where the cheque was issued, which means that the complaints
laid in these cases before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II Kannur has jurisdiction
to try the offence.9
As per Section 179 of Cr. P.C. the place where the cheque was given or
handed over will have jurisdiction and the courts of that place will have jurisdiction to
6 AIR 1960 SC 1309. 7 15 Indian Appeals, 156. 8 AIR 1952 Pepsu 5. 9 Mohmmed Kunhi v. Abdul Kagged, 1996(3) Crimes 406: 1 (1996) BC 271 Ker.
156
try the offence. Likewise for purpose of Section 178(b) payment of cheque may be
one part of an offence and dishonour of the cheque may be another part and,
therefore, both places, i.e. place where the cheque was handed over and the place
where it was dishonoured will have jurisdiction.10
D. The Court to Try Offence –
The offence falling under Section 138 of the Act will not be the only solitary
act of dishonour by the Bank on which the cheque is drawn. Even giving of the
cheque by the accused when he has not made arrangements for honouring of the
cheque itself will be a part of the facts constituting the offence. Section 178(b), Cr.
P.C. lays down that when an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly
in another area, it may be enquired into and tried by a Court having jurisdiction over
any of such local areas. Under Section 179, Cr. P.C. when an act is an offence by
reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the
offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such
thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. Giving the cheque by the
accused to the complainant and giving the cheque for collection by the complainant to
its Banker at Bangalore will also be the facts constituting the offence. Therefore, in
view of the provisions of Sections 178(b) and 179 Cr. P.C. the complaint can be filed
in a court within the jurisdiction of which the cheque has been issued or the place
where the cheque is presented for collection or the place where the cheque is not
honoured. In view of this position of law, the learned Magistrate was wrong in
coming to the conclusion that he has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. He has
the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of the fact that the cheque was
issued by the accused at Bangalore and the cheque was given for collection by the
complainant to its Banker at Bangalore. These are the facts which took place within
the jurisdiction of the Court.11
10 CanBank Financial Services Ltd. v. Gitajli Motors Pvt. 1996 (1) BC 221: 1995 Cri. LJ 1222: 1995
(1) Crimes 342 : 1995(1) Civil LJ 902. 11 M/s. Pohathi Agencies v. The State of Karnataka, 1991 Cr. LJ 2530 at p. 2531 Kar.
157
It is well settled now that the Court has jurisdiction over the area where the
cheque was issued or delivered or where the drawer of the cheque fails to make
payment of the money or where the cheque was presented for encashment or the area
where the payment was to be made. Therefore, the appellant had cause of action to
file the complaint before the lower Court where the cheque was presented for
encashment and the lower court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.
Therefore, the finding of the lower court that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the offence is absolutely unsustainable.12
The non payment of cheque amount at Madras, despite the written demand
from the Registered Office at Madras, would make the offence complete. This is
made clear even from the observation made by the High Court of Kerala in P.K.
Muraleedharan case,13
that the cause of action arises at the place, where the cheque
was issued or delivered or the place where the money was expressly or impliedly
payable. In the instant case, the complainant, the Registered office at Madras demands
money from Madras, asking the drawer to pay the money to Madras office. Therefore,
the place where the money is payable also will have the jurisdiction.14
E. Where Cheque Dishonoured- Under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 and Sections 177 & 179 Cr. P.C.
A reference may also be made to the decision in Re Jivandas v. Savchand,15
which deals with the question of jurisdiction in a case filed for the offence under
Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held by the Full Bench of the Bombay
High Court as follows :
“What Section 179 provides is that when a person is accused of the
commission of any offence by reason of two things, by reason first,
of anything which has been done, and secondly, of any
12 Varghese v. C.K. Ramani, 1998 Cri. LJ 2755 at p. 2757. 13 1993(1) Crimes 46. 14 Narang Industries Ltd. v. Ashok Leyland Finance Ltd., I (1998) BC 532 at p. 542. 15 AIR 1930 Bom. 490(FB).
158
consequence which has ensued, then the jurisdiction is conferred
on the Court where the act has done or the consequence has
ensued. The offence, therefore, must be charged by reason of the
two things, the act done and the consequence which ensued and the
consequence, therefore, forms the necessary part of the offence.”16
Where cheque was presented for collection that Court had also the jurisdiction
to try the complaint. In the present case, the cheque was presented at Chandigarh and
respondent was also informed through Bank regarding bouncing of the cheque.
Therefore, the Courts at Chandigarh had the jurisdiction to entertain the criminal
complaint. 17
F. Where Even Part Cause of Action Arises –
Coming to the question of jurisdiction, it is to be considered that the issuance
of the cheques and their dishonouring are only a part of cause of action, the offence
was complete only when the petitioners failed to discharge their liability to the
respondent-firm. For discharging a debt, it is the debtor who has to find out his
creditor and since in the present case the respondent, who is the creditor, has its office
at Panchkula, the Court at Ambala had the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence
complained of.18
In the present case the cheques were issued at Moga and these were presented
by the respondent for collection of payment to State of Patiala at Moga. The cheques
were dishonoured by the State Bank of Indian Jalanadhar but intimation of dishonour
was received at Moga. Notices were sent by the respondent to make payment at
Moga. Moga Court had, therefore, jurisdiction to try the case. Similar view was taken
in the case of M/s Probathi Agencies v. State of Karnataka.19
The Court at Moga,
16 M/s. Goutham T.V. Centre v. M/s. Apex Agenceis, 1993 Cr. LJ 1004 at pp. 1005-1007 AP. 17 M/s. Meltro Enterprises v. Ramesh Chander Jain, 1997 (3) Crimes 360 at p. 361. 18 M/s. Ess Bee Food Spectalities v. Kapoor Brothers, 1992 Cri. LJ 739 at pp.741, 742 P & H . 19 1991(2) Recent Criminal Reports 685.
159
thus, had jurisdiction to entertain the complaints. No. case is made out for quashing
the complaints and consequent proceedings. 20
G. When Complainant Died –
Bombay High Court had occasion to hold that the trying Magistrate has
discretion in proper cases to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit
complainant. The court held :
“In a case of non-cognizable offence instituted upon a complaint,
the axiom of actio personalis moritur cum persona, in civil law
confined to torts, does not apply, and the trying Magistrate has
discretion in proper cases to allow the complainant to continue by a
proper and fit complaint, if the latter is willing.”21
The above view has been adopted in Subbamma v. Kannappachari, 22
where
the Mysore High Court held that the death of the complainant in a case of non-
cognizable offence does not abate the prosecution and it is within the discretion of the
trying Magistrate in a proper case to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and
fit complaint if the later is wiling but some other High Courts have taken a contrary
stand.
As to the question whether the complainant’s death ends the proceedings in a
summons case, the Law Commission in its 41st report observed :
“A question has arisen whether the complainant’s death ends the
proceedings in a summons case; and we find that different views
have been expressed on this question. As a matter of policy we
think the answer should depend on the nature of the case and the
stage of the proceedings at which death occurs. It is impracticable
to detail the various situations that may arise and the considerations
20 Tarsem Lal Hans v. Prem Nath Palta, 1995 Cri. LJ 2408. 21 Mahomed Azam v. Emperor, AIR 1926 178. 22 AIR 1969 Mys. 221.
160
that may to be weighted. We think, in the circumstances, that the
decision should be left to the judicial discretion of the Court, and,
the legal provisions need only be that death and absence stand on
the same footing. We trust this will in practice work satisfactorily.”
As sub-section (2) of section 256 of Code of Criminal Procedure is intended to
achieve this objective it cannot be held that the Magistrate has no option but to acquit
the accused when the complainant is dead. In other words, in appropriate cases the
Magistrate can grant permission to the son of the deceased complaint to proceed with
the complaint.23
H. Compoundable Offence –
Though before introducing ‘The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2002 remedies regarding compounding of an offence
committed under Section 138 were available under various sections of Code of
Criminal Procedure viz. in Section 239,319, 320 but now by inserting Section 147 the
offence has been made compoundable. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 reads as :
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973( 2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this
Act shall be compoundable”
II. APPEARANCE OF COMPLAINANT
When a complaint raises all pleas regarding ingredients of the offence under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, then at the time of taking cognizance,
the Magistrate cannot be expected to go into the niceties of the case which would be
set up by the accused and for which complainant’s personal presence should be
needed.24
The complaint was by a Government company through its manager. The
23 T.N. Jayarajan v. Jayarajan, 1992(3) Crimes 866 at. 667. 24 Pearey Lal Rajindra Kumar Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1994 3 Crimes.308.
161
manager was exempted from attendance. The counsel of the company did not appear
on the listed date. The dismissal of the complaint for such non–appearance was held
to be not justified. There was nothing to show lack of diligence to prosecute the
complaint.25
III. PROPER EVIDENCE
When the accused challenged the prosecution for the offence under Section
138 of the Act on the ground that goods supplied by the complainant were defective
and having been rejected there could be no liability to pay, it was held that without
proper evidence at the stage of the accused being summoned, it could not be said that
the accused company did not have the liability for which cheque was issued.26
Where a complaint was filed on the basis of the three cheques in a year, the
court demanded the complainant to make up his mind as to the cheque on which the
prosecution was to continue.27
IV. DATE OF CHEQUE
The Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption that cheque is drawn
on the date it bears and it is to be presented within six months of the date of the
cheque though beyond six months of the date of delivery. Offence is committed
within six months from the date it bears irrespective of when the cheque was written
or delivered.28
V. DEFENCES TO PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 138 –
A. Which May be Available -
The set of defences available under the section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 have been listed as follows:29
(i) Absence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
25 Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Vishwakarma Agro and Allied Industries, (1996) 86 Comp. Cas. 929
P & H. 26 Dilip Kumar Jaiswal v. D. Banerjee, (1992) 1 Crimes 1233. 27 Printo Stick v. H.C. Oswal , (1996) 86 Comp. Vas. 942 Mad. 28 Manoj K. Seth v. Fernandez, (1994) 1 BC 1 SC. 29 K.T. Kuriyan v. K.K. Sreedharan, (1992) 74 Com Cas. 853: 1993 Bank LJ 346.
162
(ii) Cheque was not returned for the reasons constituting an offence.
(iii) Complaint is not as per time periods provided in Sections 138 and 142 i.e. the
plea of limitation.
(iv) Absence of legal notice of 15 days (now 30 days as per new provisions).
(v) Lack of jurisdiction.
(vi) No return of the cheque to the payee.
(vii) The holder did not receive the cheque in terms of Section 139; it was given
with certain conditions.
(viii) Payment after receipt of Notice.
The court added that so far a Section 138 is concerned mens rea is irrelevant.
That is why it is specified in Section 140 that it shall not be a defence in prosecution
for an offence under Section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he
issued the cheque that it may be dishonoured for the reason stated in Section 138.30
It was held to be no defence that the cheque was give for refund of capitation
fee paid for seeking an admission which did not materialise.31
Payment after receipt of
notice is also a good defence. The complaint was not quashed just because the receipt
of payment was produced. The payee’s allegation that the receipt was forged required
enquiry.32
Allahabad High Court held that the cases in which the payment of a cheque
can be justifiably refused for example, the mutilation of the cheque, the offence under
the section is not made out.33
Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the defence that the
cheque was stolen was held to be something that could be considered at the trial and
not for quashing the prosecution.34
30 Ibid. 31 R.Sivaraj v. Llognathan, (1996) 86 Comp. Cas. 771 Mad. 32 Suraj Sharma v. Ajay Dahiya , (1996) 85 Comp. Cas. 764 P & H. 33 Deepak Agarwal v. Shanti Swarup Jain, (1996) 85 Comp. Cas. 771 All. 34 P.T.V. Ramanujachari v. Giridharilal Rathi, (1992) 73 Comp. Cas. 492 AP.
163
B. Defences Which may Not be Available –
(i) That the drawer had believed that the cheque may not be dishonoured
on presentation.35
(ii) A banker cannot take advantage of his own fault.36
(iii) Insufficiency of funds.
(iv) Exceeding arrangement with Bank.
VI. STAY PROCEEDINGS ( SECTION 138)
Where after the issue of notice to the drawer of the dishonour of his cheque he
filed a civil suit denying his liability to pay and, therefore, contending that Section
138 was not attracted and obtained an interlocutory injunction retraining the payee of
the cheque from proceeding under Section 138. The grant of the injunction was held
to be illegal.37
Whereas The Supreme Court held that where a civil suit was pending at
the time when criminal proceedings were launched for the dishonour of a cheque and
the High Court stayed the civil proceedings under the apprehension that the
defendant’s defences in the criminal case would become disclosed in advance, the
approach of the High Court was not correct. The court noted that the defence in the
criminal case had already been filed and therefore, nothing remained which deserved
protection from disclosure.38
Civil and criminal proceedings are simultaneously possible. Hence, a
complaint is not liable to be stayed pending the disposal of a civil suit.39
The court
said that a civil suit cannot debar a criminal prosecution. The successful end of a civil
suit cannot by itself amount to abuse of the process of the court.
35 Holland v. Manchester & Liverpool District Banking Co.(1909) 25 TLR 386. 36 Brahma v. Chartered Bank, AIR 1956 Cal.399. 37 Aristo Printers P. Ltd. v. Purbanchal Erade Centre, AIR 1992 Guau 81. 38 State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 87 : (1996) 86
Comp.Cas. 433. 39 Sanjiv Kumar v. Surendra Steel Rolling Mills, (1996) Comp. Cas. 418 P & H.
164
VII. PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF HOLDER -
The special rules of evidence contain certain presumptions concerning
negotiable instruments and the estoppels arising from them. The presumptions are
stated in Section 1. They are presumptions of law. The court is bound to raise such
presumptions. The presumptions being rebuttable, the party against whom a
presumption is drawn can lead evidence to the contrary to overthrow the presumption.
There is, for exampled the presumption that all instruments have been issued or
transferred for consideration. It relieves the plaintiff of the initial burden of proving
that he became a holder for consideration. The opposite party may show that there
was no consideration, in which case the plaintiff will have to prove consideration, the
presumption in his favour having been rebutted. Section 118 is as follows–
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable- Until the contrary is proved
the following presumptions shall be made :
(A) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was
made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
instrument which it has been accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed,
negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(B) as to date: that every negotiable instrument bearing a
date was made or drawn on such date ;
(C) as to time of acceptance: that every accepted bill of
exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after
its date and before its maturity;
(D) as to time of transfer: that every transfer of negotiable
instrument was made before its maturity ;
(E) as to order of endorsement: that the endorsements
appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in
the order in which they appear thereon;
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(F) as to stamp: that a lost promissory note, bill of
exchange or cheque was duly stamped;
(G) that holder is a holder in due course: that the holder of
a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course:
Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner,
or from any person in lawful custody, thereof, by means of an offer or fraud, or has
been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud or
for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due
course lies upon him.”
Section 139 of the Act says
“ it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder
of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section
138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability.”
In this way Sections 118 and 139 collectively provide:
(i) Special rules of Evidence ;
(ii) Presumption and their applicability;
(iii) Holder;
(iv) Essential ingredients
(v) Liability;
(vi) Debt;
(vii) ‘Shall presume’
(i) Special Rules of Evidence –
Section 139 is what may be termed as Special Rules of Evidence and to
confirm the presumption already provided by sections 118(a) and 118(g) of Chapter
XII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It means that the cheque is for discharge of an
existing debt and not for creation of a new debt. The phrase “shall presume” is
explained under Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
166
It says that whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a
fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disapproved. Thus in this
case onus will be on the drawer to prove:
a) that cheque was not received by the holder for discharge of a debt
or other liabilities;
b) that the person in possession of cheque is not the holder;
c) that cheque represented for payment of any gratuitous act like
donation, gift, etc.
(ii) Presumptions and their applicability –
According to the section the presumption can be rebutted also and thus if A
give a loan to B by means of a cheque, if the cheque is dishonoured and B wants to
prove under Section 138 of the amended Act then A can prove that it was a
transaction creating a new debt. Moreover, the presumption under Section 139 is
applicable only for the cheques referred to under Section 138 and not in any other
case i.e. cheques issued for the discharge of a lawful debt or liability. In suits on
negotiable instruments, though the plaintiff is not in general required to prove that he
gave value for the instrument and the want of consideration is to be proved by the
defendant, yet the burden may shift in case of fraud and undue influence etc. and the
plaintiff may be required to prove his case.40
It should be kept in mind that the rules stated in Section 118(a) of the
Negotiable Instruments Act as to shifting of onus of proof when fraud of legality is
proved must be taken with the provisions of Section 53 of the Act. In certain cases the
plaintiff is to prove that consideration was free from taint.
(iii) Holder –
Every instrument initially belongs to the payee and he is entitled to its
possession. The payee can transfer it to any person in payment of his own debt. This
transfer is known as ‘negotiation’. Negotiation takes place in two ways. A bearer
40 Shanmugha Rajeswara v. Chidambaram, ILR (1938) Mad 646( PC) : AIR 1938 PC 123.
167
instrument passes by simple delivery and the person to whom it is delivered becomes
the holder. An order instruments, on the other hand, can be negotiated only by
endorsement and delivery and the endorsee becomes the holder. Hence the holder
means either the bearer of endorsee of an instrument. Accordingly Section 2 of the
English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, provides that “holder means the payee or
endorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof”. The
definition contained in Section 8 of the Indian Act is to the same effect, although
expressed in different words. It says that holder “means any person entitled in his
own name to the possession” of an instrument “and to receive and recover the
amount”. Now, no one can be entitled to the possession of a bill or note unless he
becomes either the bearer or endorsee thereof.41
Section 8 says :
“The ‘holder’ of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque
means any person entitled in his own name to the possession
thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the
parties thereto.
Where the note, bill or cheque is lost or destroyed, its
holder is the person so entitled at the time of such loss or
destruction.”
In Section 139 the words used are the ‘holder of a cheque received the
cheque.’ The word ‘Holder’ has been defined in Section 8 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act as well as in Section 2 of English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 as
mentioned above. Reading these definitions with section 78 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act it means that a person to whom the payment should be made in order
to discharge the maker or acceptor from all liabilities under the instrument is the
holder of the instrument or he is accredited agent such as Banker, acting as an agent
for collection. A person cannot claim and does not have right to recover the amount
41 Avtar Singh’s Negotiable Instruments at p. 39.
168
due on the instrument, is not the holder. Thus, a person who can sue in his name is a
holder. He may be the payee or one who becomes entitled to it as endorsee or
becomes the bearer of an instrument payable to the bearer. The most significant words
in the section are ‘entitled in his own name’. Thus, the term ‘holder does not include a
person who, though in possession of the instrument, has no right to recover the
amount due thereon from the parties thereto. However, the assignee of such person is
entitled to sue in his own name.42
.
(iv) Essential ingredients –
The following may be stated to be the essential ingredients for bringing the
offence under Section 138 of the Act :-
a) the cheque should have been issued for the discharge in whole or part
of any debt or liability.
b) debt or liability means legally enforceable debt or other liability.
So far as the word ‘debt’ is concerned in accordance with section 2(b) of the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 it includes a judgement debt. According to a
Dictionary of Banking by F.E. Perry, ‘debt’ means something owned to another, a
liability, an obligation. A chose –in –action which is capable of being assigned by the
creditor to some other person. The assignment must be in writing and must apply to
the whole of the debt. According to the same Dictionary ‘debtor’ means one who
owes money, or is under some obligation to another, the debit side of an account. For
the purposes of the Consumer Credit Act, 1974 ‘debtor’ means the individual
receiving credit under a Consumer Credit Agreement or the person to whom his rights
and duties under the agreement have passed by assignment or operation of law, and in
relation to a prospective consumer credit agreement includes the prospective debtor.
According to the section the cheque must have been issued in discharge of whole or
part of debt or liability. Thus, a cheque given as gift will be out of the frame work of
42 S.N.Gupta’s Dishonur of Cheques, 3rd Ed.1995.
169
this chapter. According to New Webster Dictionary ‘debt’ means which one person is
bound to pay to or perform for another. It means an obligation and the state of owing
something to another, as to be in debt. It must be an existing debt and not a contingent
debt. It must a debt accrued and not a debt in future43
. The Supreme Court made the
following observation:44
“The question whether a contingent debt is a debt as understood in
law has often come up for consideration before English Courts in
connection with garnishee proceedings taken by the judgement
creditors to attach it as a debt. The decision has invariably been
that they are not debts ‘accruing’ and could not be attached. The
point for decision45
was whether an amount payable by a trustee to
the beneficiary in futuro could be attached by a judgement-creditor
as a debt ‘owing or accruing’, and it was answered in negative.
Discussing the distinction between an existing debt, and a
contingent debt, Lord Lindley observed: “I should say apart from
any authority, that a debt legal or equitable can be attached whether
it be a debt owing or accruing; but it must be debt, and a debt is a
sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the
future by reason of a present obligation, debitum in praesenti,
solvendum in futuro. An accruing debt, therefore is a debt, not yet
actually payable but a debt which is represented by an existing
obligation… The result seems to me to be this: you may attach all
debts, whether equitable or legal; but only debts can be attached ;
and money which may or may not become payable from a trustee
to his cestuigue trust are not debts.”
43 S.N.Gupta’s Dishonour of Cheque 3rd ed. at p.164- 165. 44 Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement Foreign Regulation Act, BLC Vol. 2 p. 347 : AIR