Chapter 8 Slides His

COMMUNIST RULE, MUSLIM RESISTANCE AND US INTERVENTION

COMMUNIST RULE, MUSLIM RESISTANCE AND US INTERVENTIONKHALQIS TAKE POWER ON APRIL 27, 1978NUR MUHAMMAD TARAKI AND HAFIZULLAH AMIN HAVE UNEASY LEADERSHIP FACTIONAL INFIGHTING AMONG KHALQISSOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, DECEMBER 1979RISE OF ISLAMIC RESISTANCE WITH DIFFERENT FACTIONS BY UNITED STATES THROUGH PAKISTANBIRTH OF AL QAEDASOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND ABANDONEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISMViolence became the main factor in state-society relationsSoviet support kept the Afghan Communists in power and able to suppress resistant Afghan populationMassive violence, countless victims, transformative and disruptive force in changing fabric of Afghan societyPDPA/COMMUNISTS TAKE POWERKHALQIS LED BY NUR MUHAMMAD TARAKI ASSUME POWER IN A BLOODY COUP DETATPARCHAM IN GOVERNMENT BUT HAD NO REAL POWERDAUD AND HIS ENTIRE FAMILY NETWORK KILLED BY KHALKISCOMMUNISTS LACKED LEGITIMACY, ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY AND POPULAR SUPPORTNOT EQUIPPED TO RULE OVER MUSLIM AND TRIBAL SOCIETYSOVIET RESPONSE TO PDPA COMING TO POWERSOVIETS SUPPORTED PDPA TAKEOVER OF POWER FOR PRACTICAL, NOT IDELOGICAL REASONS

SOVIETS WANTED FRIENDLY REGIME IN KABUL

INTERNAL FIGHTING KHALQI LEADERS TARAKI AND AMIN GAINING ASCENDANCY IN LEADERSHIP OF COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT PARCHAMIS IN GOVERNMENT BUT DENIED REAL AUTHORITYBY SUMMER 1978 TARAKI CONSOLIDATED POSITION AS PDPA GENERAL SECRETARY AND AMIN BECAME REGIME STRONGMAN, HUNDREDS OF PARCHAMIS WERE PURGED AND ARRESTED OR EXECUTED ON CHARGES OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIESBY END OF 1978 KHALQI DOMINATING POSITION IN ALL GOVERNING BODIES WAS DOMINANT

KHALQI MISCALCULATED POLICIES3 DECREES PROVOKED ARMED RESISTANCE TO KHALQI RULEDECREE NO.6 LIQUIDATION OF USURY IN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND PRODUCTION OF PRODUCTION COOPERATIVESDECREE NO.7 IMPOSED AGE RESTRICTIONS ON MARRIAGE, CURTAILED POLYGAMY, ABOLISHED MAHRDECREE NO.8 CONFISCATION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND WHICH PROVED TO BE DISASTROUS AND NOT BENEFICIAL TO ANYONE

PDPA COULD NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORTWithin 6 months of the coup, 30 agreements worth more than US $14 billion had been concluded between Soviet Union and AfghanistanMany Soviet military advisors came to Afghanistan Number of Soviet military advisors increased fast, 700 by June 1978 and 2,000 by November 1979SOVIET INVOLVEMENTSOVIET ADVISORS WERE PLACED IN EVERY ARMY UNIT FROM BATTALION UPWARDS AND TOOK ACTIVE PART IN PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SECURITY MILITARY OPERATIONSTREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, DECEMBER 5, 1978, ARTICLE 4 PAVED THE WAY FOR SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IF NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE SECURITY, INDPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL UNITY OF AFGHANISTANPRESSURE ON PDPA REGIMETHROUGHOUT 1979 KHALQI REGIME FACED PRESSURE FROM 3 FRONTSUNCOORDINATED LOW-LEVEL ARMED RESISTANCE IN 24 OUT OF 28 PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTANORGANIZED ISLAMIC OPPOSITION LATER BECAME KNOWN AS MUJAHIDEENPDPA INTERNAL FIGHTINGIN MARCH 1979 17TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN HEART REBELLED, DOZENS OF SOVIET CITIZENS, ADVISERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS WERE SLAUGHTEREDALARMING DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WORRIED SOVIETS AND THEY SENT MORE MILITARY HARDWARE, WEHAT AND OTHER STRATEGIC COMMODITIES TO SUPPORT COMMUNIST REGIME IN KABUL BUT PDPA WANTED THE DISPATCH OF SOVIET TROOPS TO AFGHANISTANSOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 1979MARCH 1979 TARAKI ASKED SOVIETS FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN TO SUPPORT PDPA REGIME BUT SOVIETS REFUSED ON THIS OCCASIONBETWEEN APRIL AND DECEMBER 1979 PDPA LEADERS ASKED MOSCOW FOR DIRECT COMBAT SUPPORT ABOUT 20 TIMESSOVIETS INITIALLY WERE NOT KEEN ON INVADING AFGHANISTANHAFIZULLAH AMINS CRUDE LEADERSHIPRELIED ON TERROR TO ADVANCE POLICIESPOWER HUNGRY PASHTUN GHILZAI NATIONALISTBY SEPTEMBER 1979 PUL-I CHARKHI OVERFLOWING WITH 12,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS WHO WERE BEING KILLED OFF BY FIRING SQUADS TO MAKE ROOM FOR MORE VICTIMSPARCHAMIS AND TARAKI PURGED BY AMIN

TARAKI AND AMIN RIVALRYAMIN EMERGED AS REGIME STRONGMAN AND POWER HUNGRY, RUTHLESS GHILZAI PASHTUN NATIONALISTTARAKI WAS AGING MENTOR OF AMINAMIN PURGED TARAKI AND HIS SUPPORTERSTARAKI IMPRISONED AND STRANGLED IN PRISIONKHALQI REGIME FAILING AND SOVIET ALARMKILLING OF TARAKI BY AMIN ANGERED SOVIETSGOVERNMENT OF PDPA LOST CONTROL OVER COUNTRYSIDE TO MUJAHIDEEN AND SUPPORTERS, HALF OF ARMY DESERTED TO RESISTANCESOVIETS FACED TWO SCENARIOS, EITHER TO INVADE AND PREVENT AFGHAN COMMINIST REGIME FROM FAILING OR TO LET ISLAMIC REGIME TAKE OVERDECEMBER 27, 1979 SOVIET INVASIONSOVIETS INVADED TO REPLACE KHALQI REGIME WITH PARCHAMI REGIMERIGHT BEFORE INVASION SOVIET SECURITY FORCES TOLD AMIN TO CHANGE RESIDENCEDECEMBER 27, 1979 SOVIET SPECIAL FORCES KILLED HAFIZULLAH AMIN SOVIET INVASION FOLLOWED LONG AND COMPLEX PERIOD OF GROWING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTANPREVENT IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF PDPA UNDER AMINSOVIET TACTICS IN WARFARE SOVIET TACTICSINFANTRY ARMOURTACTICAL AIRPOWERSPETSNAZ FORCES AND SABOTAGESCORCHED EARTHMINE WARFAREINTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONSOPERATIONAL RELATIONS WITH AFGHAN ARMY

PROBLEMSDOMESTIC UNPOPULARITY OF THE WARMANAGING THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL COSTS OF THE WAR FOR THE USSRNARROW SUPPORT BASE OF THE KARMAL REGIMEPROPENSITY OF RESISTANCE TO INTENSIFY AS A RESULT OF THE REGIMES DEPENDENCE UPON SOVIET BACKING LIMITED USSRs options in meeting the challenge

MUJAHIDEEN GROUPSThe Mujahideen GroupsSeven Sunni Mujahideen GroupsModerate Parties Mahaz Milli-i Islami Afghanistan led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, a notable Sufi who had been pir of Qaderriya Sufi order since 1947Jabha Milli-i Nijat-e Afghanistan led by Sebghatullah Mojaddidi-member of Naqshbandiya Sufi orderHarakat-i Inqilab-i Islami Afghanistan led by Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi MuhammadiFundamentalist PartiesHizb-i Islami led by Mawlawi Muhammad Younus Khalis Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin HekmatyarIttehad-i Islami of Abdul Rab al Rasul SayyafJamiat Islami led by Burhanuddin RabbaniShia PartiesShura-i Ettefaq of Ayatullah BeheshtiSazman-i Nasr of Abdul Ali MazariHizb-i WahdatMuhammad Akbaris Sepah-i Pasdaran

Harakat-i Islami of Asif Mohseni

US COUNTERINTERVENTIONIST STRATEGYWASHINGTON BEGAN A PROGRAM OF MASSIVE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AS A FRONTLINE STATE AND CONDUIT FOR SIMILAR ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN ISLAMIC RESISTANCE FORCES, MUJAHIDEENWORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET INVASIONCIA DELIVERED INTERNATIONAL ARMS TO MUJAHIDEEN VIA PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPED STRONG RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTANI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (ISI)USA WAS ONLY INTERESTED IN DEFEATING THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM/REVENGE FOR VIETNAMNOT INTERESTED IN AFGHANISTANBIRTH OF AL QAEDAAS PART OF ITS COUNTER-INTERVENTIONIST POLICY, THE USA ENCOURAGED ARAB FIGHTERS TO COME TO AFGHANISTAN AND FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIETSTHESE ARAB FIGHTERS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN FIGHT THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR, THEY WERE USING AFGHANISTAN AS A LAUNCHING PAD TO CONDUCT THEIR GLOBAL WAR AGAINST THE WESTAL QAEDA WAS BORNABDUL RASUL SAYAF GAVE ACCESS TO THE FIRST TRAINING CAMP TO AL-QAEDAARAB FIGHTERS PERFORMED VERY POORLY IN SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR AND DID NOT DO MUCH FIGHTING IN THE FIRST PLACEFACTORS LEADING TO SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTANCHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET UNION AND STINGERL MISSLESCHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET UNION IN 1985YOUNGER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV COMES TO POWER AND CALLS AFGHANISTAN BLEEDING WOUND, WANTED TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN BUT IN A WAY TO MAKE IT SEEM LIKE IT WAS A VICTORY FOR SOVIETSSOVIETS WANTED AN HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTANACHIEVE POLITICALLY WHAT IT COULD NOT ACHIEVE MILITARILYMUJAHIDEEN RECEIVE STINGER MISSLESIN 1986 THE MUJAHIDEEN RECEIVED STINGER MISSLES WHICH ALLOWED THEM TO COUNTER SOVIET AIRPOWER

THIS RAISED THE MATERIAL AND HUMAN COST OF THE WAR FOR THE SOVIETSGENEVA ACCORDS AND HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL APRIL 14, 1988 PDPA AND PAKISTAN SIGNED AFGHAN GENEVA ACCORDS WITH USA AND USSR AS CO-GUARANTORSFOUR ELEMENTSNON-INTERFERENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTANSOVIET COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS WITHIN 10 MONTHS BY FEBRUARY 15, 1989VOLUNTARY AND SAFE REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN REFUGEES FROM PAKISTANGUARANTEES OF THE ACCORDS BY THE USA AND USSR

CONTINUED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PDPA AFTER WITHDRAWALGENEVA ACCORDS ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN AS MUCH NON COMBAT SUPPORT TO PDPA REGIME IN KABUL AS WAS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN COMMUNISTS IN POWER AFTER WITHDRAWAL FROM COUNTRY IN FEBRUARY 1989GENEVA ACCORDS WAS NOT A PEACE ACCORD AND DID NOT BRING ABOUT PEACE, IT MERELY ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THE WAR IN AN INDIRECT WAYWAR CONTINUED AS USA CONTINUED ARMS SUPPLY TO MUJAHIDEEN AFTER 1989PDPA IN POWER UNTIL 1992BABRAK KARMAL WAS REPLACED BY DR. NAJBULLAH IN 1986GOVERNMENT OF DR. NAJIBULLAH CONTINUED TO RECEIVE ARMS AND MONEY FROM SOVIET UNION AFTER 1989 BUT NAJIBULLAH BEGAN CHANGING HIS IMAGE AND DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM COMMUNISM AND EMBRACED ISLAMIC UNDERTONESDECEMBER 1991COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION AND NO MORE AID FROM SOVIET UNION FOR NAJIBULLAH GOVERNMENTFALL OF NAJIBULLAH REGIMEWITH THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION, SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN COMMUNIST REGIME ALSO DIEDAMERICANS ALSO STOP AID TO MUJAHIDEENAND ABANDON AFGHANISTANAFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS FAIL TO REACH ELITE SETTLEMENT AND CIVIL WAR STARTS