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CHAPTER 4: SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL APPROACH & MARKET APPROACH
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Page 1: Chapter 4

CHAPTER 4:

SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

THE COMMAND-AND-CONTROL APPROACH

& MARKET APPROACH

Page 2: Chapter 4

Conventional Solution:Command-and-Control (CAC)

•Assessing Cost-Effectiveness

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Standards in Environmental Policy

• Types of Environmental Standards

▫ Ambient standard – a standard that designates the quality of the environment to be achieved, typically expressed as a maximum allowable pollutant concentration

▫ Technology-based standard – a standard that designates the equipment or method to be used to achieve some abatement level

▫ Performance-based standard – a standard that specifies a pollution limit to be achieved but does not stipulate the technology

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Implications of Using Standards

• Two key implications

▫ Are standards set to achieve allocative efficiency? where MSB of abatement equals MSC of abatement

▫ Given some environmental objective, is that objective being achieved in a manner that is cost-effective?

Efficient Standards •MSBAbatement = MSCAbatement

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MSB of Abatement

• Additional social gains as pollution abatement increases

• Measured as reduction in damages or costs caused by pollution (i.e., reduction in MEC)

• Represents society’s D for environmental quality▫ Implies MSB is negatively sloped

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MSC of Abatement• Sum of all polluters marginal abatement costs

plus government’s marginal cost of enforcement

• Two components: MSC = MACMKT + MCE

• MACMKT is the sum of all polluters’ individual marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions (MACi = MACMKT)

• MCE is marginal cost of enforcement Change in government’s cost of monitoring

and enforcing abatement

• MSC is positively sloped

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Firm-Level MAC

• Measures the change in cost from reducing pollution, using least-cost method ▫Equals forgone Mif the least-cost abatement

method is to reduce output

• Typically positively sloped and increasing at increasing rate▫For simplicity, it is usually assumed that MAC is

linear

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Single Polluter’s Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC)

MAC$

Abatement (A)

MAC

MAC 2

MAC 1

A1 A2

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MSC of Abatement

$

Abatement (A)

MACMKT

MSC = MACMKT + MCE

A1

MCE

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Allocatively Efficient Level of A (AE)

AE occurs at the point where:MSB of abatement = MSC of abatement

Graphically where the two curves intersect

10

$

Abatement (A)

MSC

MSB

AE

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Why Standards May Not Be Efficient

• Legislative Constraints▫Many standards are benefit-based, i.e., set to

improve society’s well-being with no consideration for the associated cost

• Imperfect information▫Inability to identify MSB and/or MSC

MSB: due to the problem of nonrevelation of preferences

MSC: difficulty in identifying each firm’s MAC, including implicit costs

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Why Standards May Not Be Efficient(continued)

• Nonuniformity of pollutants▫Changes in emissions do not have uniform

effects on environment e.g., if polluters are at different distances from

populations or ecosystems, MSB would vary

• Regional differences▫Even if AE is identified at the national level, it is

not likely to be efficient at regional level

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Modeling Regional Differences

• Consider two regions, X and Y, with same MSC of abatement

• Suppose their MSB of abatement curves differ, such that MSBX < MSBY

• Result: Allocatively efficient level of abatement for region X (AX) would be lower than for region Y (AY)

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Regional Differences

$MSCX = MSCY

MSBY

MSBX

MSBY = MSCY

AYAX

MSBX = MSCX

A

A single national abatementstandard would not be optimalfor both regions

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Next Step

• If allocatively efficient standards are unlikely, we use cost-effectiveness to evaluate how standards are implemented

• Cost-effectiveness depends on the approach▫Command-and-control: using standards or rules

to control pollution▫Market: using incentives and market forces to

motivate or encourage abatement and conservation

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Command-and-Control (CAC)• Assessing Cost-Effectiveness

Two Standards to Examine•Technology-based standard•Uniform standard

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Technology-Based Standards

• Technology-based standards specify the type of abatement equipment or method to be used

• By definition, these standards potentially prevent firms from selecting and using the least-cost abatement method

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Analysis: Use MAC Curve

• Technology-based standard▫If prevented from using the least-cost abatement

method, firms would operate above their MAC curve

• Performance-based standard▫If allowed to select an abatement method to

achieve some performance level, -maximizing firms will choose the least-cost method and operate on the MAC curve

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Modeling Cost-Ineffectiveness

$

Abatement (A)

MAC

MAC represents least-cost method of abatementTechnology-based standards can force some firms to operate above MAC

AX

Technology-basedstandard

Performance-basedstandard

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•Uniform standards waste economic resources as long as abatement costs differ among polluting sources

•Cost savings can be obtained if low-cost abaters do more cleaning up than high-cost abaters▫Let’s prove this by building a model of 2

hypothetical firms

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Modeling Uniform Standard

• Assumptions▫ 2 polluting sources in some region▫ Each generates 10 units of pollution▫ Government sets emissions limit of 10 units for region

or 5 units per firm▫ Uniform standard: each firm must abate 5 units

• Cost conditionsPolluter 1: TAC1 = 1.25(A1)2

MAC1 = 2.5(A1) where A1 is pollution abated by Polluter 1

Polluter 2: TAC2 = 0.3125(A2)2

MAC2 = 0.625(A2) where A2 pollution abated by Polluter 2

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• Find the total abatement costs using the uniform standard

• Solution:• The TACs for each firm are

▫TAC1 = 1.25(A1)2 = 1.25(5)2 = $31.25TAC2 =0.3125(A2)2 = 0.3125(5)2 = $7.81

▫Sum of TACs = $39.06, which represents the value of resources given up by society to clean up the pollution

Modeling Uniform Standard

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• Use MACs to prove that the uniform standard is not cost-effective

• Solution▫ With uniform standards, the MACs are not equal

MAC1 = 2.5(5) = $12.50 MAC2 = 0.625(5) = $3.125

Shows that Polluter 2 has a cost advantage The 5th unit of A (i.e., the marginal unit) costs Polluter 2

$9.37 less than it costs Polluter 1

▫ It would be cheaper if Polluter 2 did more of the abating, but it lacks an incentive to do so

Modeling Uniform Standard

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• Find the cost-effective abatement, A1 and A2

• Solution: uses 3 simple steps

• (i) Set MAC1 = MAC2

2.5A1 = 0.625A2An application of the equimarginal principle of

optimality• (ii) Set A1 + A2 = Abatement Standard

A1 + A2 = 10• (iii) Solve equations (i) and (ii) simultaneously

2.5 (10 - A2) = 0.625A2

25 - 2.5A2 = 0.625A2, so A1 =2 A2 =8• Prove that this is cost-effective

MAC1 = 2.5A1 = 2.5(2) = $5.00MAC2 = 0.625A2 = 0.625(8) = $5.00

Modeling Uniform Standard

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• Show that total abatement costs are lower at this abatement allocation than the costs when a uniform standard is used

• Solution▫ TAC1 = 1.25(2)2 = $5.00

▫ TAC2 = 0.3125(8)2 = $20.00▫ TACs (cost-effective) = $25.00▫ TACs (uniform standard)= $39.06

• Cost Savings= ($39.06 - $25.00) = $14.06

Modeling Uniform Standard

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Further Observations

• Problem: Public officials will not know where to set firm-specific standards without knowing MAC for every polluter

• Implies that a cost-effective solution is virtually impossible under CAC framework

• Result is possible using market approach

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ECONOMIC SOLUTION:

MARKET APPROACH

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Overview• Market approach refers to incentive-based policy

that encourages conservative practices or pollution reduction strategies▫ Difference between market approach and

command-and-control approach is how each approach attempts to achieve its objectives

• Types of Market Instruments▫ Pollution charge▫ Subsidies▫ Deposit/refund systems▫ Pollution permit trading systems

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Pollution Charge

• Fee that varies with amount of pollutants released▫Based on “Polluter-Pays Principle”

• Types of pollution charges ▫Effluent/emission fees▫Product charge▫User charge▫Administrative charge

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Product Charge

• Fee added to price of pollution-generating product, which generates negative externality

•Impose product charge as per unit tax on product, e.g., gas tax▫ How does the tax on gasoline in the US compare

with that of other nations?▫ If the tax equals the marginal external cost (MEC)

at QE, it is called a Pigouvian tax

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Modeling a Pigouvian Tax

$

Q of gasoline

MPB = MSB

MPC

MSC = MPC + MEC

0 QE QC

MPCt

b

a

Amount of tax

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Assessing the Model – Product Charge

•In theory, achieves an efficient outcome

•In practice, difficult to identify the value of MEC at QE

•Allows only for an output reduction to reduce pollution

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Emission (Effluent) Charge

•A fee imposed directly on the discharge of pollution▫Assigns a price to pollution

•Typically implemented through a tax

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Model: Single Polluter Case

• Government sets an abatement standard at AST

• Policy options to polluter are:▫ Abate up to AST and incur those costs OR▫ Pay a constant per unit tax, t, on any abatement

less than AST

Total Tax = t(AST - AO) where AO is actual abatement level

Marginal Tax (MT) = t Because t is constant, t = MT

• Firm will choose the least-cost option: the marginal tax (MT) or the marginal abatement cost (MAC)

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Modeling Emission ChargeSingle Polluter

$

Abatement (A)0

MAC

MTt

AO AST

a b

c

Firm abates up to Ao sinceMAC < MT; firm pays tax between AO and AST, sinceMAC > MT in that range

0aAO = cost to abate AO

AOabAST = tax on pollutionnot abated up to AST

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Assessing the Model (cons)

• Tax authority will not know where MACs are equal▫Will have to adjust rate until objective achieved

• Monitoring costs potentially higher

• Firms might evade tax by illegally disposing pollutants

• Distributional implications▫Consumers may pay higher prices due to tax▫Job losses may result from polluter paying new

taxes and/or changing technology to abate

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Pollution Charges in Practice

• Internationally, the pollution charge is the most commonly used market-based instrument▫ Some countries use effluent charges to control

the noise pollution generated by aircraft▫ Others levy charges on products such as motor

vehicles, pesticides, fertilizers, batteries and gasoline

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Environmental Subsidies

• Two major types of subsidies:

▫ Abatement equipment subsidies

▫ Pollution reduction subsidies

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Abatement Equipment Subsidy

• Defined as a payment aimed at lowering the cost of abatement technology

Goal is to internalize the positive externality associated with the consumption of abatement activities

• If the subsidy (s) equals the marginal external benefit (MEB) at QE, it achieves an efficient equilibrium and is called a Pigouvian subsidy

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Subsidies in Practice• Environmental subsidies typically are implemented

as grants, low-interest loans, tax credits or exemptions, and rebates.

• Many countries around the world use these instruments, including Austria, Finland, Japan, and Turkey.

• In the U.S., common uses include federal funding to build publicly-owned treatment works and subsidies to encourage the development of cleaner fuels and low-emission vehicles

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Pigouvian SubsidyMarket for Scrubbers

($ millions)

MSC

MPB

MSB

0 QC = 200 QE = 210

PC = 170

PE = 175 Subsidy = $14 million

MPBS

Q of scrubbers

PE – s = 161

K

L

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Assessing the Model

• It is difficult to measure the MEB

• May bias polluters’ decisions about how best to abate

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Pollution Reduction Subsidy

• To implement, government pays the polluter a subsidy (s) for every unit of pollution abated below some pre-established level ZST

• Per unit subsidy = s(ZST - ZO), where ZO is the actual level of pollution▫ Analogous to an emission charge

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Subsidies in Practice

• Environmental subsidies typically are implemented as grants, low-interest loans, tax credits or exemptions, and rebates

• Many countries around the world use these instruments, including Austria, Finland, Japan, and Turkey

• In the U.S., common uses include federal funding to build publicly-owned treatment works and subsidies to encourage the development of cleaner fuels and low-emission vehicles

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Deposit/Refund Systems

• A deposit/refund system is a market instrument that imposes an up-front charge to pay for potential damages and refunds it for returning a product for proper disposal or recycling

• Targets the potential vs. actual polluter

• The deposit is intended to capture the MEC of improper waste disposal (IW) in advance▫ Preventive vs. ameliorative

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Modeling Deposit/Refund SystemIW disposal market

• MECIW: health damages + aesthetic impairment from litter, trash accumulation, etc.

• MPCIW: costs to disposer (e.g., trash receptacles, collection fees, plus forgone revenue from not recycling)

• MSCIW = MPCIW + MECIW

• MPBIW: demand for improper disposal Assume MEBIW = 0, so MPBIW = MSBIW

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Deposit-Refund Model$

Improper Waste Disposal (%)

MPBIW = MSBIW

MPCIW

MSCIW

0

QE QIW

MPCIW + Deposit

b

a

Deposit=MEC at Qe

100Proper Waste Disposal (%) 0100

Deposit converts % of overall waste disposal, measured by (QIW - QE), from improper methods to proper

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Assessing the Model

•Promotes responsible behavior

•Requires minimal supervision by government

•Can help slow the use of virgin raw materials by improving availability of recycled materials

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Deposit/Refund Systems in Practice

• Deposit/refund systems are used worldwide▫ Many nations use these systems to

encourage proper disposal of beverage containers In the US, 11 states have bottle bills

• Other applications include systems used to promote responsible disposal of used tires, car hulks, and lead-acid batteries

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Pollution Permit Trading Systems

• A pollution permit trading system establishes a market for rights to pollute by issuing tradeable pollution credits or allowances▫ Credits are issued for emitting below a

standard▫ Allowances indicate how much can be released

• Two components of the system are1. Fixed number of permits is issued based on an

“acceptable” level of pollution set by government

2. The permits are marketable• Bargaining gives rise to a market for pollution

rights

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How Permit Trading Works• There is an incentive to trade as long as

polluters face different MAC levels.

• Suppose a firm has 50 permits but normally emits 75 units of SO2. What must it do?▫ Answer

Abate 25 units of emissions OR Buy 25 permits from another producer

• Which option will the firm choose?▫ Answer

Whichever option is cheaper

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Result• Low-cost abaters will clean up pollution and

sell excess permits to other firms▫ They will sell at any P higher than their MAC

• High-cost abaters will buy permits rather than abate▫ They will buy at any P lower than their MAC

• Trading will continue until the incentive to do so no longer exists, at which point, the cost-effective solution is obtained, i.e., the MACs across firms are equal

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Assessing the Model

• Trading establishes the price of a right to pollute without government trying to “search” for a price

• No tax revenues are generated

• Trading system is flexible ▫Note that an emissions standard can be

adjusted by changing the number of permits issued

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Pollution Trading Systems in Practice

• International examples▫ Trading of greenhouse gas allowances are part

of the Kyoto Protocol, an international accord aimed at global warming

▫ Canada has a trading program for ozone-depleters

▫ Denmark has one for carbon dioxide emissions

• Most of the evolution of trading is occurring in the U.S.▫ An important example is the establishment of

an allowance-based trading program to control sulfur dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990