Chapter 3 Implications of World Population Growth

Chapter 3

Implications of WorldPopulation Growth

Contents

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Chapter 3

Implications of WorldPopulation Growth

Abstract

Less developed countries (LDCs) are experiencing severe environmental and resourcepressures to which more developed countries (MDCs) substantially contribute becausetheir fewer numbers consume the greater proportion of the world’s resources. Lower con-sumption levels in MDCs plus agricultural and other developmental aid to LDCs would easemany of these pressures. The continuation of traditional land-use patterns by rapidly risingnumbers of people has significantly weakened the resource base of many LDCs, whose gov-ernments must achieve huge future increases in agricultural production to keep pace withunprecedented population growth. Food resources are expected to be adequate to the year2000, but distribution will remain a serious problem, and the burden of increased produc-tion will fall largely on marginal lands. Most LDCs are in one of four situations: 1) thosewith severely limited resources and heavy population pressures, 2) those with resource po-tential that are slow to exploit it, 3) those with periodic food surpluses, and 4 those withfood shortages but the ability to import. World aquatic yield has declined slightly since1970. Global water supplies, now about 10 times demand, are projected to fall to 3.5 timesdemand by 2000. Water supplies are already critical in some areas and international dis-putes over water rights are likely to intensify. International energy demands indicate a dif-ficult future for LDCs; high oil prices, dwindling fuelwood supplies, and use of needed fer-tilizers (dung, crop residues) as fuels have contributed to decreasing rates of economicgrowth. Continuation of today’s rate of deforestation, with its concomitant large-scale soilerosion and decreased soil productivity, could reduce the world’s forests by 18 to 20 per-cent by 2000. Human intervention has so far altered some 15 to 17 percent of the Earth’sland area; of the world’s land surface, only 30 to 36 percent has significant life-support ca-pability with present technology. The outcome of human impact on the global temperatureis uncertain. less rapid population growth would reduce pressures to provide health care,education, and employment opportunities in LDCs. The impact of population growth on po-litical stability depends on its interaction with the social, economic, and political structureof the society involved. Because rapidly rising numbers of people can limit the ability of gov-ernments to meet the expectations of their people, conflicts can have demographic roots.Growing populations of rural landless, explosive urbanization, and large-scale migrationcan exacerbate socioeconomic burdens in LDCs and influence stability in MDCs. High popu-lation growth rates influence the social, economic, and political factors that threaten thestability of many LDCs in which the United States has vital security interests; many containsuch tangible commodities as oil, chromium, and vanadium. Less tangible but probably farmore important is the significance of some of these countries to regional stability and thebalance of global power. Rapid population growth is intensifying current environmental,food, energy, and resource pressures in LDCs. Its interaction with these problems has gen-erated a new category of national security concerns, the implications of which remainlargely unexplored.

43

LDCS are experiencing selrere entironrnenta]and resource pressures. hlDCs contribute Sub-stantially to these pressures because their farfe~ter numbers consume the greatest propor-tion of’ the ~i’orld’s resources. Effective efforts tocurb consumpt ion lelre]s in NIDCS combined\\’ith agricultural and other det’elopmental aicito LDCS ~vould ease some of the most seriousstresses faced by the det’eloping }vorlci. *

In man~~ LDCS, farmers suilsist ily c l ear ingforestland that has marginal productit~it~~,quickly \%’earing out the soil, and mo~ring on toclear more forest. The traditional use of woodand charcoal for cooking cuts further into thetree co~~er, and forested areas rapidly disap-pear. The Philippines lose an estimated 200,000hectares of forest each ~ear and Thailand’s for-ests are i’anishing at the rate of 2s0,000 hec-tares annually. Droughts hai’e become mor[? fre-quent and sei’ere; floods are unmoderated byforest buffers; erosion is extensile; irrigationand hydroelectric sJ~stems are silting in. India,Brazil, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Burundi, the I\JOI’}rcoast, Burma, Haiti, HOndUI’aS, and Nepal areamong the nations facing similar problems. }’etthese countries must achim’e huge increases inagI’ iCLl h L1l’al ~l’Od LICt iOI~ i II the )’~~a I’s ahead to

keep pace \~’ith their rapid popLllation gro\~th.

AlthoLlgh its most direct effect is se(?n in the

pressures exertecl on agricultLlral systems, rapid

pOpLlhitiOIl gro~~th eXaCtS a hea\r} toll on OtheI’

important resources. It also points to complexinterrelationships bet~~’een the demands onfood, ~$rater, and fuel resources and their result-ing impacts on the en\rironment, on the socialand economic p regress of delwloping nations,and on the political stabil itf’ of the ~$rorld atkWge.

Food

hlost experts est imate that \troI’ld food re-

s o u r c e s \\’ill be aclecluate to 2000, t)ut m a n y

c o u n t r i e s ~~’ill ha\’e setrere p r o d u c t i o n ancl

+ I’tl(’ I)l[)j(’{li{)lls 011 ItIt’ iIll])ii[’l S ()! IX)[)llldtloll gl’(n$’111 Ill 1,[)(’s

Irl(’lll(k’(1 Ill 11)1s (’llaplcl’ \ \ t)l’t’ })1’t’l)ii 1’(>(1 !01” ( ) [ \ t ) \ ‘1 111> t’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 ’ [ ’ S

(;r(wp (!)}, I\ h(h(I t(lll report is pul)listled as a lt [Jrhing })apt’1’

d i s t r i bu t i on p rob l ems . NIDCS presentl:r ha\re

sLlfficient SLlt-plUS production to be able to exp-ort to 1,DCS, but clistribution s~stenls in thesecountries are inadequate to ensure the receiptof food t]}’ those in greatest need. In the future,

some of the ~~wilthier I.D[;s \\’ill be able to inl-

port food, but nlan~r poor LDCS t~rill hale insuffic-

ient financial resources and are Iikel}’ to expe-

rience continued food c~eficits.

Food prociuction to 2000 is projected to in-

crease bv 2.8 percent per ~’ea r in Africa, 3.0 per-.cent per year in Latin America, and 2.6 percentper year in Asia (6). 11’hether LD(;s can t]~~ thf311

be relatitwl~f self-sufficient ~iill depend to agreat extent on the IIKi#litLldC of their pO]3Ll]a-

t ion gro~$rth. In ,~frica, domestic food produc-

tion can currently meet 86 percent of calorie re-

(~ LliI’enleIlt S. Depending on \\ fhether the high or

loLIr populat ion project ion becomes realit}r b)r~0()(), this proportion f?ith[?r decreases to 80 pCl’-

cent or increases to 92 percent. In I,at in Amer-

ica, domestic product ion, CllI’I’(?llt]J’ Lit 84 per-

cent of food liec~Llir’(?IlleIltsl ~1’ould increase in

either the high or ]mtr Population projections,

bLlt the d i f f e r e n c e \l’OLlld be b[?tll’e(?ll Ill[X?tillg

87 or 101 percent of food I’[;[ltlil’(trllf?rlts. In Asia,the increase L\rOLlld be from 9.5 percent todi~~’ toeither 110 or 120 percent b~’ 2000.

E\ Fen ~%hen total production approaches 100

percent of food I“(?[]llil’etllellts, caloric intake is

often insufficient among large s(?gments of the

~O~LdatiOIl t)eCaLIS(? Of k)sses iIl StoI’:ig(? :111(] t l’all-

sit and the proportion of thos(? Lt’hose intake is

at)o\’e a\’erage. ~]thOLlgh food production Illti)’

rise suffic ientl~’ to meet minimum calori~? rc-

cluirements in sonx? p o o r ” IJD(~s, Smrerc ])rob-

Iems of distribution are likel~~ to continue.

Nlost L[](k are in one of fOur situations:

1. Countr ies \\rith se\’er[?l\~ limited resources

(land and technology) t;) increase food” pro-

dLICt ion, most of Lf’h ich face heavy ])op Llk I-

tiOIl pI’eSSLII’eS :iIld ha\’e Iitt](? UIILIS(X] ;I1’at)l[?

kind (e.g., Bangladesh, Pakistan, ~;gjrpt).

Countries that ha\’e potential l)ut are sIOLI”

to exploit it. ‘rh(;~’ ha\’C ]aIKi a\’aiklbk? [01”

agr icul tural dekwlopment, good” cl i ma t r,

Ch. 3—/mp/ications of World Population Growth . 45

solid infrastructure, and an abundance ofother natural resources (e.g., the majorityof Latin American countries).

3. Countries with periodic food surpluses(e.g., Thailand, Brazil).

4, Countries that have food shortages but areable to import (e.g., South Korea, SaudiArabia).

Food production increases are achieved by in-creasing yields of lands now under cultivationand by opening new lands. Because the mostproductive lands have already been broughtinto production in most areas, pressures to in-crease production will fall on marginal lands,with consequent need for far-higher use of irri-gation, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, andhigher yielding crop strains than for productivelands.

Production from another important source offood, the Worlds oceans, lakes, and rivers, hasdeclined since the peak year of 1970 (3). Thecontribution of the aquatic yield to global foodrequirements is about 25 percent of requiredprotein. Even if the total aquatic yield could beincreased from its present 70 million to 100 mil-lion metric tons by 2000, through the exploita-tion of new species and the emergence of alarge marine-culture industry, the world’s pop-ulation will increase at a slightly higher rate.

Water

An adequate supply of water is the most im-portant factor in raising agricultural productionin large areas of the world, Global water sup-plies are now about 10 times demand. Projectedgrowth of irrigation and domestic water usewould reduce these supplies to about 3.5 times

demand by 2000. Irrigation for food productionis the major use of water, accounting for 70 per-cent of total water use in Africa, 88 percent inAsia, and 60 percent in South America.

The water supply is already critical in variousareas of the world for different reasons. Inareas such as the Middle East, population den-sities are low (the Nile River valley is an excep-tion), but water is very scarce because peopleare crowded close to the few available water

Photo credit Agency for International Development

Hai t ian farmers p lant t ree seedl ings in e f for ts to

restore eroded hi l ls ide

46 . World Population and Fertility Planning Technologies: The Next 20 Years

Table 7.—Projected per Capita Water Avaliability in the Year 2000(thousand cubic meters per capita per year)

Per capita Sub-Saharan North Africawater availability Africa Asia Latin America and Middle East

Medium availability Mali Nepal Argentina(5 to 10) Philippines Guatemala

Low availability Ethiopia Afghanistan Cuba Iran(1 to 5) Ghana China Dominican Iraq

Kenya india RepublicMozambique South Korea El Saivador SudanNiger Sri Lanka Mexico TurkeySenegal ThailandTanzaniaUgandaUpper Volta

Very low Malawi Bangladesh Haiti Algeriaavailability Morocco Pakistan Egypt(o to 1) Saudi Arabia

Tunisia

SOURCE: Futures Group, 1980; contractors report to Office of Technology Assessment.

Energy

The global energy situation signifies a difficultfuture for much of the developing world. Whilemany of the industrialized countries have raisedthe prices of their exported goods, thereby buf-fering the impact of higher costs for oil imports,most LDCs have not been able to effectively doso. They have suffered a double hardship bypaying higher prices for both oil and other im-ports.

Consumption of commercial energy (oil, gas,coal, etc.) is more closely tied to economicgrowth and level of development than to popu-lation growth. But the demand for “noncommer-cial” fuels is directly related to populationgrowth.

Wood is the most widely used noncommercialfuel and supplies the majority of all energy usedin many LDCs. Worldwide, wood burned forfuel provides energy equal to that derived fromall hydroelectric sources. LDCs consumed about90 percent of all fuelwood used in 1974, whichprovided between 30 and 60 percent of theirtotal energy (l).

Wood can be a renewable resource, but en-croachment on forests for farming and fuel hasresulted in widespread shortages. Charcoal isfrequently adopted as a fuel when deforestationextends beyond distances from which fuelwoodcan be economically transported, because char-coal contains about four times the energy perunit weight as wood. But because much of theenergy value of wood is lost in the process ofcharcoal manufacture, intensified charcoal usewill accelerate the problem of deforestation.

Rising commercial fuel costs and diminishingsupplies of fuelwood are forcing many people inLDCs either to greatly reduce fuel consumptionor to find alternative fuel sources. Among theseare dried dung and crop residues. Because offuel shortages, increasing numbers of peoplehave only these materials to burn. Yet they areneeded to maintain soil productivity, as subsist-ence farmers can rarely afford commercial fer-tilizers, and when they are burned, energy isgained at the expense of land productivity.

Burning of dung and crop residues is alreadyextensive in India, Nepal, other parts of Asia,

Ch. 3—lmp/ications of World Population Growth . 47

and in the Andes of South America. Worldwide,between 150 million and 400 million metric tonsof dung are burned for fuel every year. Asabout 50 kilograms of additional food grain canbe produced from land fertilized by a ton ofdung, this burning represents a potential loss ofbetween 8 million and 22 million metric tons offood grain.

Population growth can make a substantial dif-ference in the “affordability” of commercialenergy on the economy. Although supply-priceconstraints are likely to depress economicgrowth and gains in living standards, at a givenlevel of economic growth, gains in living stand-ards can be much higher when populationgrowth rates are lower. A higher populationgrowth rate means that roughly the sameamount of gross national product (GNP) must bedivided among a larger number of people.

Commercial energy requirements have histor-ically been closely linked with growth in GNP. Al-percent increase in GNP is associated with a0.95-percent increase in commercial energy re-quirements. The tremendous oil price increasesthat most oil-importing LDCs have had to payhave meant large balance-of-payment deficitsand increased debts to finance decreasing,rather than increasing, rates of economicgrowth. The World Bank has estimated thatGNP growth rates collectively fell by more than60 percent in LDCs between 1973 and 1975,from an annual growth rate of 7.6 to 3 percent.Higher rates of population growth require morecommercial energy, necessitating more rapidgrowth in GNP-growth that cannot always be

assured and that appears unlikely to occur insome countries.

Environmental effects

Forests now cover about one-fifth of theworld’s land surface but are being depleted at arate of 18 million to 20 million hectares peryear, a reduction rate of about eight-tenths of 1percent per year. If this rate were to persist to2000,” forests would be reduced by 18 to 20 per-cent, or to one-sixth of the world’s land surface.very little forested area remains in such heavilypopulated countries as India and Pakistan.Deforestation has razed about 10 percent ofBrazil’s forests, 30 percent of those in H o n -

Photo credit; Agency for /nternat/ona/ Developrnenf

Makeshift housing characterizes the outlying areasof most cities in LDCs

duras, and over 90 percent of those in Haiti. Theremoval of the forest canopy results in large-scale soil erosion, decreased soil fertility, land-slides, silting-in of reservoirs and irrigationchannels, drought, desertification, and the ex-tinction of forest plant and animal species.

Direct human intervention has caused thetransformation of some 9 million square kilo-meters (kmz) of savanna to desert; 600).00 km2

of forest to fields, grassland, or salvanna; and 1million kmz of fields or forests to paved areasand urban buildings-a total alteration of some15 to 17 percent of the Earth’s land area (8).Much of the best agricultural land lies near ur-ban centers and is being used for urban and in-dustrial development. These alterations are im-portant because only 30 to 36 percent of theEarth’s total land area is fit for agricultural ac-tivities or has significant life support capabilitieswith present technologies.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimatesthat the rapidly rising growth of cities in thedeveloping world is cutting arable land in LDCsby 0.03 hectare per capita per year (1 hectareequals 2.47 acres). If the most likely populationprojection becomes reality, this rate ivoulcd leadto a loss of 49 million hectares of arable land

48 ● Wor/d population and Ferti/ity p/arming Technologies: The Next 20 years

from food production by 2000, an amount pres-ently calculated to feed some 165 million people.If the low projection is achieved, the quantity ofland lost would fall to 41 million hectares, but ifpopulation totals rise to the high projection, thisloss would reach 56 million hectares by 2000) anamount that could have fed 188 million people.

The impact of converting arable land is graph-ically illustrated by the case of Egypt, where thecurrent total of 25)000 hectares of cultivableland lost each year is expected to rise as thepace of urbanization quickens. Despite large in-vestments to expand the country’s irrigated landarea with water from the Aswan Dam, irrigatedland totals remain essentially unchanged be-cause old producing lands are lost at about thesame rate that new hectares are irrigated. Ifits present population growth rate continues,Egypt’s goal of food self-sufficiency will be dif-ficult to achieve.

The increased pollution that accompaniesrapid urbanization has overwhelmed the abilityof many LDC governments to provide sanitationand other public services. In 1976, fewer thanone-third of LDC city dwellers lived in housingconnected to sewer systems and less than 4 per-cent of this housing was connected to someform of sewage treatment facility. Air pollutionproblems have become critical in the urban cen-ters of such cities as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, andBombay.

The leading cause of the transformation ofproductive land into deserts is overgrazing.Overgrazing and overcropping, combined withdrought, are rapidly expanding deserts in theSudan and Sahelian regions of Africa.

Irrigation often causes long-term problems ofloss of soil productivity through waterlogging,salinization, and alkalinization. These problemsoccur when irrigation systems provide poordrainage or where there is improper use of fer-tilizer. Evaporation of water from soil surfacesleaves residues of salt that form a mineral cruston the surface that can kill plants or inhibittheir growth.

Anthropogenic land-use changes are said tohave played a role in depressing the global tem-perature by about 0.20 C over the past 25 years,and this temperature could fall by another fulldegree by the end of the century (8). Otherstudies suggest that the release of chemicals,particulate) and carbon dioxide into theair—the most serious human-induced threat toclimatic stability—could instead result in agradual warming trend (7). Still others projectlittle or no effect on global temperatures. Thereis no doubt that humans have caused significantchanges in the environment, but whether thesechanges extend beyond the microclimates ofspecific regions is still being debated.

Economic and social impacts

The numerous pregnancies, closely spacedpregnancies, and additional pregnancies at com-paratively late ages that are associated withrapid population growth are also associatedwith higher rates of illness and death for bothmothers and infants.

An important health side effect of high fertil-ity is nutritional deficiency. Each additionalchild in a poor family may be believed by thefamily to provide greater social security for theparents’ old age, but available food must also bedivided among a larger number of people. Mal-nourished children are more vulnerable to dis-ease and their physical and mental growth maybe retarded.

When women are malnourished during preg-nancy, they are likely to develop maternal de-pletion syndrome, * and while infants derive im-portant benefits from breastfeeding, the prac-tice further compromises the nutritional statusof malnourished mothers. There is a high in-cidence of infant mortality and low birthweights in almost every part of the world where

* Klaternal depletion syndrome is characterize~i b}r smwral dis-ease states including anemia, osteonudacia, and iodine-deficiencygoiter. It is caused hy multiple repregnancies occurring while thewoman is suffering protein/calorie ciepri~~ation, Its effects arecumulatit’e and contribute to lo\4’ birth \i’eight infants, failure togain sufficient l~x?ight during pregtMncy, and a drrreaw in sub-cutaneous fat and muscle tissue. The process undouhtedl!’ plays apart in the premature aging and early death often seen amongwomen in LDCS.

Ch. 3—/mp/ications of World Population Growth ● 49

the population is under age 15. This group of 1.4billion people will enter their economically ac-tive years during the next 15 years. But the In-ternational Labor Organization estimates thatthe underemployed already account for almost30 percent of the labor force in Latin Americaand 36 to 38 percent in Asia and Africa. Reduc-tions in fertility and mortality for the Africancountries will be particularly significant be-cause of the difference between the high andlow projections of population growth (table 8).In Kenya, for example, annual new job require-ments in 1975 were about 170,000. By 2010, thenumber of new jobs needed annually, prinmrilyfor young people just entering the job market,would rise more than fivefold under the highprojection—to 900,000—as compared with530,000 under the low projection of populationgrowth.

Per capita income increases only to the extentthat gross domestic product (GDP) growth ex-ceeds the rate of population growth. But rapidpopulation growth requires high rates of invest-ment at the same time that it makes domesticsavings more difficult.

Table 8.—Average Annual Growth of Labor Force forSelected Countries

2000-2025

Low Medium High1970-77 variant variant variant

Sub-Saharan Africa:Ethiopia. . . . . . . . . . .Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . .Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . .Tanzania . . . . . . . . . .Zaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Asia:Bangladesh. . . . . . . .India. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Indonesia . . . . . . . . .Malaysia . . . . . . . . . .Pakistan . . . . . . . . . .Philippines . . . . . . . .Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . .

Latin America:Argentina . . . . . . . . .Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . .Colombia. . . . . . . . . .Mexico, . . . . . . . . . . .Venezuela . . . . . . . . .

North Africa andMiddle East:

Egypt ., . . . . . . . . . . .Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Morocco . . . . . . . . . .

1.82.82.02.31.9

2.31.72.03.62.42.12.1

1.22.83.53.33.3

2.22.52.7

1.92.72.82.52.1

2.21.31.31.12.21.60.7

0.51.61.22.51.7

1.62.02.3

2.73.43.43.22.4

2.61.61.71.32.61.90.8

0.72.31.92.92.1

1.82.32.6

3.13.93.73.52.9

3.01.92.01.62.92.31.1

0.92.92.43.22.6

2.22.63.0

SOURCE: The Futures Group, “The Impacts of Population Growth on LessDeveloped Countries, ” report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, 1980.

50 • World Population and Fertility Planning Technologies: The Next 20 Years

The extraordinary period of the 1960’s and1970’s illustrates this point. World populationgrowth, at an average annual rate of 1.9 per-cent, was greater during these two decadesthan at any other period of human history, andthe economic growth rate of more than 5 per-cent per year was also unparalleled in humanhistory. World income per capita grew rapidly,averaging about 3.2 percent per year.

Although economic performance in terms ofaggregate growth of output was about the samefor LDCs and MDCs, a substantial difference indemographic growth gave MDCs a marked ad-vantage in per capita income. The LDC popula-tion grew by 1.2 billion people during thisperiod, at an annual rate of more than 2 per-cent, while MDC numbers rose by fewer than200 million, at a rate of less than 1 percent. MDCper capita income growth exceeded 4 percentannually, but LDC growth remained below anannual rate of 3 percent. The absolute incomegap between LDCs and MDCs widenedsignificantly between 1960 and 1978, but therelative gap—as measured by per capita in-come—widened to a far greater degree (4).

Thus, population growth, even when rapid byhistorical standards, does not necessarily pre-

vent significant and even very high rates of percapita income gain. But to overcome the eco-nomic burden of rapid population growth re-quires rates of economic advance that exceedthe rate of natural population increase by a sub-stantial margin. Given the demands for services,employment, etc., by constantly rising numbersof people in the next two decades, declines inrates of economic growth are likely. Thus, pop-ulation growth aggravates the economic prob-lem of many countries that have had to borrowfrom outside sources, and their increasing debtsare now becoming a hindrance to development.

The combined benefits of slowing populationgrowth–on health, education, and the eco-nomy—are all interrelated. A smaller child pop-ulation makes it easier to provide quality educa-tion and health care to young children. It alsoreduces dependency ratios, which can lead toincreased savings. A healthier, better educatedwork force is more productive. Increased sav-ings can lead to more investment, more capitalper worker, and, again, higher worker produc-tivity. The resulting higher output and incomecan, in turn, make it possible to provide still bet-ter health care and education to the young pop-ulation.

Political consequences

The impact of population growth on politicalstability depends on its interaction with thesocial, economic, and political structure of thesociety involved. The ability of any governmentto meet the needs and demands of its people isclearly a critical element in that government’smedium- and long-term survival. There is gen-eral agreement that political stability is jeopard-ized when the expectations of individuals andgroups are not fulfilled. Resultant frustrationscan then lead to political and social unrest as in-creasing numbers of people place ever greaterdemands on the limited capacity of national gov-ernments and economies to provide desiredgoods and serv ices .

Although demographic factors such as rapidpopulation growth do not act alone or directlycause conflicts, conflicts that have been viewedas primarily due to political causes can have

demographic roots (2). Religious, social, andracial differences are important contributors toviolence and conflict, and differential rates ofpopulation growth among separate ethnic, lin-guistic, or religious groups can generate seriouspolitical strains.

Rapid population growth in rural areas canjeopardize political stability in several ways. Asrural population densities rise, existing agricul-tural acreage must either be divided into eversmaller parcels or an increasing proportion ofthe rural populace must be left landless. Eitherresult can lead to political unrest as living stand-ards decline and frustrations grow. Rural pop-ulation growth also stimulates migration fromrural to urban areas, as people search for thebetter economic and educational opportunitiesthat urban centers are more likely to provide.Explosive urbanization in turn strains service

Ch. 3—/replications of World Population Growth ● 5 1

----

52 . World Population and Fertility Planning Technologies: The Next 20 Years

Table 9.—Population Trends in Selected Countries Involving U.S. Security Interests

Total Annual UrbanTotal Annual population Population urban

populationpopulation

population doubling under population doublingmid-1981 increase a time age 15 increase time

Country (millions) (percent) (years) (percent) (percent) (years)

All MDCs 1,138 0.60/0 113 24 ”/o 1.40/0 50LDCs 3,357 2.1 34 39 4.0 17

Selactad countrios: Stratagic ImportanceBangladesh

BoliviaBrazil

Central America

Egypt

India

Indonesia

Kenya

South Korea

Mexico

Morocco

Nigeria

Pakistan

Philippines

Somalia

Thailand

Turkey

VenezuelaZimbabwe

Collapse or political realignmentwould have destabilizing effecton Indian subcontinent . . . . . . . . .

Source of tin, antimony, tungsten . .Source of manganese ore,

columbium and iron ore; size;leadership role in LatinAmerica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Panama Canal; excessiveemigration to U. S.; proximity . . . .

Key to U.S. strategies for peacein Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

World’s second largest country;key to stability Indian Oceanregion and U.S.-Soviet balance . .

Major source of U.S. oil imports;fifth largest country in world;strategic location as U.S. allyin Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Leader of pro-Western Africanstates; U.S. military accessagreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. military ally; potentialstaging area; possible NorthKorean threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Size; proximity; major source ofstrontium, cadmium, and majorpotential source of oil and gas;large labor migration to the-

U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Major source of potassium; U.S.

friend in North Africanconflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Second largest source of U.S. oilimports; one-fourth of totalAfrican population. . . . . . . . . .

Principal bulwark againstRussian move into Gulf ofOman and Indian Ocean . . . . .

Source of chromite and copra;military ally with key U.S.bases; strategically important

Strategic location; U.S. friend inconflicts over Horn of Africa .

Source of tin, tungsten andtantalum; military ally; strate-gic importance in SoutheastAsia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Eastern anchor of NATO; strate-gic window on the U.S.S.R. , . .

Source of oil and vanadium . . . .Major source of chrome; key to

political stability in SouthernAfrica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

. . .

91.45.7

130.0

95.9

43.1

709.8

155.4

17.0

38.6

72.4

21.0

79.7

85.1

52.5

3.8

49.0

46.515.4

7.7

2.60/.2.5

2.4

2.7

3.0

2.1

2.0

3.9

1.7

2.5

3.0

3.2

2.8

2.4

2.8

2.0

2.23.0

3.4

2728

29

26

23

33

35

18

41

28

23

22

25

29

25

35

3223

21

440/0

42

41

46

40

41

42

50

38

46

46

47

46

43

44

43

4043

47

6.70/, 10

4.3

4.0

4.1

3.4

3.8

4.2

7.1

4.1

4.4

4.8

5.6

4.7

4.1

5.4

4.2

4.33.9

6.3

16

17

17

20

18

17

10

17

16

14

12

15

17

13

17

1618

11

aNatural increase, exclusive of emigration and immigration.

SOURCES: Draper Fund, 1981; U. N., 1979-World Population Trends and Prospects by Country, 1950-2000: Summary of the 1978 Assessment.

Ch. 3—ImpIications of World Population Growth . 53

Chapter 3 references

1. Brookha\’en National I,aboratory, “Energy Needs,[Jses and Resources in Dmreloping Countries,” pre-pared for the (1.S. Agency for International De-irelopment under PASA NO. F. RDA/TAB-995-18-76m’ith the LI. S. Department of Energy, Nlarch 1978.

2. Choucri, N,, Population D-vnamics and Inlerna?iona/i’iolence; Proposition, !nsights and Evidence (Lex-ington Itlass.: Lexington Books, 1974).

~. Council on Em’ironmental Quality and the Depart-ment of State, The (Johal 2000 Report to the Presi-dent: Entering the ~vent}r-First Century, The Tech-nical Report, \rol. 2 (i$’ashington, D. C.: U.S. Go\rern-ment Printing Office, 1980).

4. Demeny, P., “The North-South Income Gap: ADemographic Perspecti\re, ” Population and Dew/-oprnent Revietfrl \rol. 7, No. 2, J u n e 1 9 8 1 , p p .297-310.

5. Draper Fund, “World Population Growth and U.S.

6

7

8

9

Security Interests” (Washington, D. C.: DraperFund, 1981).Food and Agricultural Organization, Agriculture:Toward 2000 (Rome: FAO, 1979).National Academy of Sciences, Understandin g C/i-matic Change: A Program for Action, U.S. Commit-tee for the Global Atmospheric Research Program,National Research Council (M’ashington, D. C.:NAS, 1975).Sagan, C., Toon, O. B., and Pollack, J. B., “Anthro-pogenic Albedo Changes and the Earth’s Climate,”Science 206(4425): 1363-1367, 1979.The Futures Group, The Impacts qf PopulationGrowth on Less Developed Countries, report pre-pared for the Office of Technology Assessment,Washington, D. C., 1980.