Chapter 2 - RUcore - Rutgers University

CONFINEMENTS AND LIBERATIONS

THE MANY FACES OF THE VEIL

by

YUSTINA SALEH

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School-New Brunswick

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Political Science

written under the direction of

Professor Jan Kubik

And approved by

________________________

________________________

________________________

________________________

New Brunswick, New Jersey

January, 2010

©2010 YUSTINA SALEH

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Confinements and Liberations: The Many Faces of the Veil

By YUSTINA SALEH

Dissertation Director:

Professor Jan Kubik

This study explored the veil as norm among modern middle and upper-middle-

class women, a class that historically had rejected the veil until recently. The study

sought to identify the loci of the forces pushing the wearing of the veil. The study is

based on the integration of historical analysis with qualitative methods and content

analysis. Specifically this research is based on triangulated data from (a) detailed

interviews conducted with 65 young Muslim Egyptian women during the summer of

2008, (b) content analysis of 70 sermons delivered by four of the most influential

preachers today, and (c) a survey of the history of the veil in Egypt.

Findings showed that the veil has become a unique instrument of power employed

by several actors at three new and interrelated arenas of struggle. At the social level,

women are using the veil to redefine their roles in society. At the political level, they are

using various forms of the veil to declare full or partial alliance with counter-hegemonic

forces challenging the state’s moral authority and the state’s political liberalization

policies that have targeted women. At the global arena of power, women are engaged in a

ii

solidarity movement against the West and the forces of globalization. All these tension

zones are influenced by new patterns of immigration in the Arab world and by new forms

of intraregional globalization fostered by a newly emerging Arab satellite industry.

This study was the beginning of research that should continue to investigate

through the utilization of novel and more focused integrated methods this particular

phenomenon. The struggle to remove the bonds of the West, in particular, invites future

research to dissect the many aspects of interregional and intraregional globalization and

their impact on religious identities across the world. This research also suggested that the

attitudes towards the veil, women, the state, and the West are in a state of flux, requiring

the use of novel identity barometers to assess the direction, magnitude, and implications

of these changes on the relationships between the West and the Muslim world.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ ii

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1: Three Arenas of Struggle .................................................................................. 1

The State Hybrid ............................................................................................................. 12

The Religiosity Hybrid ................................................................................................... 15

The Veil as a Symbol of the Religiosity Hybrid............................................................ 21

Egypt as a Case Study..................................................................................................... 34

Data Sources ................................................................................................................... 35

My Argument and Research Approach........................................................................... 36

Organization of the Chapters .......................................................................................... 41

Chapter 2: The Socioeconomic Context of the Mass Veiling Phenomenon..................... 45

Economic Overview........................................................................................................ 46

Income Distribution ........................................................................................................ 48

Employment Distribution by Sector and Industry .......................................................... 49

Population and Labor Force............................................................................................ 51

Education ........................................................................................................................ 58

Marriage.......................................................................................................................... 62

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 65

Chapter 3: Methods and Sample Profiles.......................................................................... 68

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 68

My Method...................................................................................................................... 68

The Interviewers ............................................................................................................ 73

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The Interview Instrument................................................................................................ 74

The Sample ..................................................................................................................... 79

Coding and Analysis of Interview Results ..................................................................... 88

Approaches for Analyzing Religious Media................................................................... 90

Study Limitations............................................................................................................ 92

Chapter 4: Antecedents to Change.................................................................................... 96

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 96

The Veil in Islam: Its Status and Role ............................................................................ 98

A Panoramic View of the History of Women’s Dress in Egypt ................................... 106

The Caliphate Period: 641-1258 .................................................................................. 107

The Turkish Dynasties (1258-1805) ............................................................................ 109

The House of Muhammed Ali (1805-1882) ................................................................ 115

British Occupation: 1882-1925.................................................................................... 119

The Veil Debate at the Turn of the Twentieth Century ............................................... 122

Rapid Transformation or Spurious Change?................................................................. 132

Beams of Light in the Midst of Darkness .................................................................... 135

Disappointments and Betrayals.................................................................................... 141

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 144

Chapter 5 :Voices, from the Center and the Periphery: The identities of Veiled and

Unveiled Women Explored............................................................................................. 149

Introduction................................................................................................................... 149

The Scope and Limits of Female Agency..................................................................... 150

Is the Veil a Religious Duty? ........................................................................................ 153

v

The Many Faces of the Veil.......................................................................................... 158

Doubts: The Veil Questioned........................................................................................ 162

Interpretations: The Role of the Veil in Islam .............................................................. 166

The Many Meanings and Functions of the Veil............................................................ 169

Moments of Pride.......................................................................................................... 177

The Responsibility of the Veil ...................................................................................... 180

Styles, Varieties, and Perceptions................................................................................. 184

The Status of Religiosity and Morality in Egyptian Society ........................................ 187

Reinventing the Past: My Mother and Me.................................................................... 190

Bridges and Boundaries: The Veil and the Other ......................................................... 195

Voices from the Periphery: Unveiled Women Speak ................................................... 200

Street Harassments: Its Extent and Its Implication ....................................................... 201

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 203

Chapter 6: The Transforming Religious Consciousness in the Age of Satellite............. 207

Introduction................................................................................................................... 207

Overview of the Arab Satellite Media Industry............................................................ 209

How They Know What They Know? ........................................................................... 210

Assessment of the Effectiveness of Religious Programs in Egypt ............................... 216

Iqraa Channel ............................................................................................................... 221

Iqraa Preachers: Amr Khaled....................................................................................... 225

Amr Khaled and the Veil ............................................................................................. 231

Khaled and Women...................................................................................................... 237

Khaled and Jerusalem .................................................................................................. 242

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Critique on Khaled....................................................................................................... 244

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 246

Chapter 7: The Neo-Traditional Religious Wave and Satellite Television .................... 250

Introduction................................................................................................................... 250

The State-in-Society Approach..................................................................................... 250

The Emergence of Neo-Traditional Religious Channels .............................................. 252

Al-Nas Channel............................................................................................................. 253

Programs Featured on al-Nas....................................................................................... 256

Al-Nas Preachers: The Discourse of Sheikh Mohammed Hassan............................... 260

Hassan and the Veil: .................................................................................................... 264

Hassan’s Views on Women .......................................................................................... 268

Hassan, the Jews, and the West ................................................................................... 270

Competing Visions, Competing Markets...................................................................... 272

Religious Authority and Individual Agency within Satellite Realms........................... 274

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 278

Chapter 8: Conclusion..................................................................................................... 281

The Functions and Meanings of the Veil at the Social Level ....................................... 283

The Political Functions of the Veil ............................................................................... 287

The Functions of the Veil at the Global Arena of Power ............................................. 291

Study Limitations.......................................................................................................... 295

Recommendations Regarding Future Research ............................................................ 297

vii

Appendix A Interview Instrument for Veiled Respondents ........................................... 301

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 309

VITA............................................................................................................................... 327

viii

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Annual Growth in Real Per Capita GDP................................................................ 47

Figure 2. Employment Share by Sector Private vs Public Sectors ........................................ 50

Figure 3. Percentage Share of Agriculture, Industry and Services Sector in GDP................ 51

Figure 4. Labor Force Participation Rate of Women............................................................. 52

Figure 5. Male Labor Force Participation Rates.................................................................... 54

Figure 6. Female Labor Force Participation Rates ................................................................ 54

Figure 7. Unemployment Rates: Male vs. Female................................................................. 55

Figure 8. Ratio of Female to Male Unemployment Rates ..................................................... 56

Figure 9. Growth Rates in Employment: Men vs. Women.................................................... 57

Figure 10. Women’s Share in Nonagricultural Employment ................................................ 58

Figure 11. Distribution of Educational Status in Egypt......................................................... 60

Figure 12. Distribution of Educational Status in Cairo Egypt ............................................... 61

Figure 13. Median Age at First Marriage Women 25-49 Years ............................................ 64

Figure 14. Percentage of Single Women and Men Aged 20-24 ............................................ 65

Figure 15. Age Distribution of Respondents ......................................................................... 81

Figure 16. Spectrum of Veil Styles........................................................................................ 83

Figure 17. Respondents by Socioeconomic Group................................................................ 87

Figure 18. Age at Veiling..................................................................................................... 151

Figure 19. Veiled Women Protest........................................................................................ 154

1

Chapter 1

Three Arenas of Struggle

The Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University, English

Section is one of the most prestigious university faculties in Egypt and home to upper-

middle and upper-class university students. The young women in this faculty are dressed

in the latest fashion trends: Gucci Bags, Diane Von Furstenberg mini-dresses over tight

Levi jeans, complemented with headscarves by world renowned designers such as

Christian Dior, Hermes, Gucci, and Dolce & Gabbana, all of which making the style

combination all the more captivating. A very similar sight would be seen at private

universities, including the American University in Cairo, The German University in

Cairo, and other private institutions whose main clientele are the sons and daughters of

the country’s most elite. Only 10 years ago, a veiled woman on these campuses would be

uncommon. In general, the phenomenon was confined to lower and middle-lower classes

and it was almost nonexistent among the upper-middle and upper classes of the Egyptian

society. While the veiling phenomenon in Egypt has been on the rise since the early

1980s, it has been more of a lower-middle class phenomenon. Today, the veil, or the

hijab, has become the norm even among the most affluent social groups in Egypt. The

veil has traversed, in many different ways, all segments of urban society today and has

done so with fascinating speed and momentum.

The recent and rapid evolution in the forms of dress in the Muslim world and the

adoption of what may be labeled the “Islamic dress” has intrigued many observers and

scholars. One camp of researchers views these new forms of dress as indicative of what

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they call “religious resurgence,” or “religious revival.” Another strand of thought

positions the phenomenon in the context of new and/or continued forms of gender

oppression.1 A third group insists that the spread of hijab today represents a form of

collective action against a secular or secularizing state.2 Common to all these theories are

fundamentally flawed conceptualizations of agency, the state, and the socio-cultural

structure. This project addresses these theoretical problems by reconceptualizing and

examining afresh the process through which the new forms of dress have unfolded (and

are still unfolding). Basically, I seek to answer the following questions: Why has the veil

become the norm among modern middle and upper-middle-class women, a class that has

generally rejected the veil until recently? What are the meaning(s) of the veil that are

shared by this group and what are the different functions it performs for them and in

society at large?

There are two important pieces in this puzzle: the visibility of this new symbolic

form, and its execution through and by women. Its visibility is related to the power of its

symbolism. The fact that the implementation of the symbol is conducted by and through

women who are viewed as important agents for reproducing a (the) state,3 suggests that

1 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, for example, argued that the burqa “is a sign of the

subjugation, of the submission of women.” In the name of freedom and women’s rights, Sarkozy declared, “We cannot accept in our country women imprisoned behind bards, cut off from social life, deprived of identity…” See Doreen Carvajal, “Sarkozy Says Full-Body Muslim Gowns as a ‘Symbol of Enslavement,’” New York Times, June 23, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com (accessed June 23, 2009).

2 Fadwa El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt’s Contemporary Islamic Movement,” Social Problems 28, no. 4 (1981).

3 Many scholars and observers contend that the role of women in preserving and reproducing national identity is crucial. One of the travelers to Egypt in the late nineteenth century, Elizabeth Cooper (1877-1945) argued that Egyptian women were “the chief preservers of the ancient customs of Egypt” (cited in Beth Baron “Unveiling in Earl Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic Considerations,” Middle Eastern Studies, 25, no.3 (1989): 270-386, 373). Leila Ahmed also demonstrated from her own life story how her mother, and mothers in general, were normally stricter in their implementation of cultural regulations than fathers. See Leila Ahmed, A Border Passage: From Cairo to America—A Women’s Journey (New York: Farrar, Straus and Girous, 1999). This research arrives at a similar conclusion: many women were pressured to wear the veil by their mothers. This research also demonstrates that women have

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the veil today is a tool of power, both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. I insist on

emphasizing the multiplicity of the forms of the veil and the multifocal meanings and

symbols that this highly differentiated piece of garment collectively and individually

suggests.

My project is to dissect the many forms, meanings, and functions associated with

today’s veil. Through studying the veil, I investigate the mechanisms of control and

resistance driving the symbolic displays of the veil. In doing so, I seek to unravel the

subtle forms of subversion and submission exercised at various arenas of power. The

global arena of power is shaped by the converging and diverging forces of globalization.

The arena of the state represents the struggle between a multifaceted state that seeks to

monopolize the cultural regulation of society on one hand and various formal and

informal social groups on the other. The social arena encompasses the struggle among the

multiple layers of social groups that are at times challenging and at others accepting of

the version of religiosity propagated by the state. Veiling as a symbolic gesture appears in

one context to signify an alliance with global forces against the state and/or social

barriers, in another an alliance with the state against these ambiguous external forces, and

yet in another the existence of often informal solidarities through which women attempt

to resist and outmaneuver all these forces combined.

The most immediate and most accessible level of power politics at which the

meanings and forms of the hijab are taking shape is the “society”. At this level, veiling is

related to the economic problems that young Egyptian people are facing today. On face

been the main agent and instrument of change in the state. During the Naserite regime, women were targeted most in modernization activities. Religious clerics today are attempting to counter the state hegemony by rejecting the model of the modern woman that the state promoted and presenting an alternative models of womanhood that is being accepted by young Egyptians of both genders. Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

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value, the new veil demonstrates a strong and persistent mode of gender inequality to

which Egyptian women have chosen (or are forced to choose) to submit. Although this

holds significant elements of truth, it is just the partial story. The deteriorating economic

conditions in Egypt and the rising unemployment have resulted in increased discontent

with women crowding out men in the labor market. This is causing many male members

of society to resurrect “traditional” arguments about a woman’s proper role in society.

However, the Egyptian woman responded to or accommodated that pressure through

establishing the appearance of sex segregation without giving up any of the freedoms that

she realized through policy or organized action.

Women today are using the veil to reclaim and assert their presence in public

space without challenging what is now being seen as contemporary interpretations of

Islam.4 The veil empowers women to freely participate in the labor market and various

social activities. Women are also using the veil as a mode of protesting new forms of

gender biases. The veil, traditionally a religious symbol, has become a fashion symbol.

Women have practically subverted the meaning and function of the veil thus turning it

from an article symbolizing tradition to one associated with modernity.

The veil also gives women a very unique strategy for dealing with the economic

situation and the scarcity of jobs. Rampant unemployment has led to a heightened level

of resentment and loss of self-esteem. Today, and as this research demonstrates, young

Egyptian men and women have little or no confidence in their talent. There is a common

perception that “it’s all the same.” Those with the highest degree are equated with those

with no degree, with all ending up in a job as a microbus or cab driver or another job that

4 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 223-225.

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is in no way commensurate with the person’s skills, qualifications, or ambitions. This

phenomenon results in a lack of purpose, which in turn results in an identity crisis.

A similar finding was suggested in Shana Cohen’s (2004) Searching for a

Different Future. Cohen compares the state of the unemployed university graduate with a

stateless individual who cannot prove his/her existence due to “the loss of philosophical

meaning. In a sense, the person’s rights as a citizen are denied by his/her inability to carry

out their social responsibilities, which in turns undermines their citizenship.5 This has

driven recent university graduates to engage in various forms of informal religious

activism, such as veiling and preaching. Responses to these economic situation in Egypt

have been somehow gendered. Many Egyptian males have responded to the economic

crisis by submitting to a state of idleness, spending most of their time with fellow

unemployed or underemployed youth in cafes or joining militant Islamic groups. Women,

on the other hand, are finding a way out of this trap by justifying the lack of opportunities

by their resolution to select jobs that celebrate their veils and stress the importance of

religious values in the workplace. Rather than submitting to the feeling that their talents

are wasted, women are being selective in their career choices to maintain the image of a

respectable Muslim woman.

The second symbolic location of tension codified by the veil is the conflict

between the state and society. Many scholars and observers argue that the veil represents

a general rejection to the secular vision that was promoted by state officials.6 This view, I

5 See Shana Cohen, Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Middle Class in

Morocco (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 6 Gellner, for example, argues that fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon that is based on the

rejection of the tenets of the secular state. See Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992). Ziad Abu-Amr (1997) argues that fundamentalism results from the failure of ideologies of liberalism and secularism, and the pursuit of untried alternatives. See Ziad Abu-Amr, “Issues

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contend, is simplistic as it is based on a false dichotomy between the state and religion.

The Egyptian state, I contend has never been purely secular. Rather, state officials sought

to augment their power power through reconstituting the meaning of religiosity and

synergizing religion and the modernization project that they launched after Egypt became

an independent republic in 1953. The veil, but not religion, was seen by the state as an

antithesis of this project. The fact that today the champions of the dress transformation

are middle and upper-middle-class women, whose role in triggering change,7 promoting

stability,8 and reproducing or transforming the cultural fabric of society,9 clearly speaks

to the acute levels of value contestation that are taking place in the Egyptian society

between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses.

The third level of power struggles where veiling plays a significant role is global.

Huntington’s “clash of civilization” thesis10 has been one of the most contentious

propositions in political science. In essence, he suggests that globalization, instead of

bringing about a “universal civilization” composed of people holding firmly the belief in

individualism, secularism, and Western democratic norms, is pushing forward novel

forms of differentiation and indigenization that are manifested at various levels of

socialization starting with how people vote to how they dress. The forces of

globalization, however, are not unequivocal. As some scholars assert, globalization is “a

in Arab Islamic Fundamentalism,” in Religion, Ethnicity and Self-Identity: Nations in Turmoil, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 35-52 (London: University Press of New England, 1997).

7 Ruth Berins Collier, Paths toward Democracy: The Working Class and elites in Eastern Europe and South America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).

8 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

9 Leela Fernandes, India's New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

7

strange amalgam of both homogenizing forces of sameness and uniformity and

heterogeneity, difference, and hybridity.”11

This study investigates the converging and diverging forces of globalization in

Egypt. I examine how these conflicting forces are mediated and internalized at the

domestic level and illustrate their impacts on religious culture. I also explore the hybrids

that these forces produce at the points of intersection of these conflicting forces. By

hybrid I refer to the fuzziness resulting from the fusion of already complex social

phenomenon at a very high speed. This is not to claim that there were “pure forms” of

concepts like religiosity or statehood in the past that now commixed; a hybrid here

represents a mix of compounds rather than pure elements. The hybridity concept is used

to demonstrate the catalyzation of existing and new forms of fusion and the increasing

complexity and elusiveness of boundaries due to the accelerating processes of

globalization and transnationalization.12

This research project addresses two entwined hybrids: the state hybrid and the

religiosity hybrid. The hybridized state is a new state characterized by novel forms and

realms of state autonomy and the emergence of new, “nontraditional” state functions.13

11 Douglas Kellner, “Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and Its Aftermath,” in

Frontiers of Globalization Research, ed. Ino Rossi, 248 (New York: Springer, 2007). 12 Jan Kubik, “The State and Civil Society: Traditions and New Forms of Governing,” in Civil

Society and the State, eds. Emil Brix, Jürgen Nautz, Werner Wutscher, Rita Trattnigg, 33-52 (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2007).

13 There are many manifestations of the state transformations that we are witnessing today. Timothy Mitchell (1999) talks about the new state role in Egypt’s real estate boom today. The state, particularly the military apparatus is the main thrust of that boom. It has become a de facto partner to the private sector. As such the public-private divide that most literature portrays is misleading. Timothy Mitchell, "Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires," Middle East Report 210 (1999): 28-33. Additionally, Fernandes notes the role of the state in creating a “new middle class” through the promotion of specific Western styles of living while at the same time emphasizing values such as authenticity in the realms of urban and media politics. These are many examples of other transformations taking place within and outside state borders, which mandate “new thinking” and approaches. Leela Fernandes, India's New Middle Class: Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

8

Some of the extant literature challenges the concept of the monolithic state, arguing that

international forces, capital mobility, and transnational movements have weakened the

state significantly and undermined its autonomy to an extent that it has become less

relevant in producing key political outcomes.14 Others argue that the state is still relevant

and treat it as a monolithic form that determines all significant political outcomes related

to regime change and political development. In this study I demonstrate that the state is

still very relevant, but that it has been transformed radically from its original form thus

resulting in the simultaneous transformation of other social phenomena, including

religiosity and secularity. That is why we need new analytical frameworks that are as

adaptive and mutable as the state itself.

The religiosity hybrid refers to the compounds of religio-political symbols that are

rapidly evolving these days. The veil represents a perfect prism for exploring the

interconnection among the state, religiosity, and globalization. The Muslim veil

constitutes a language used to communicate, constitute and reconstitute the “clash.” The

meanings associated with the veil are far from uniform, and its manifestations and forms

are as diverse as humankind. Both the forms and the meanings of the veil are in constant

dialogical relation with the forces of globalization; its meanings and manifestations are

constituted by globalization, and also constitute its direction, magnitude, and effect.

According to Shirazi, “Once the veil is assigned a certain meaning the veil itself acquires

the power to dictate certain outcomes—the garment becomes a force in and of itself.”15

But hijab is not just a tool of power and resistance, as many scholars have convincingly

14 See for example Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies

(New York: The Free Press, 1995) and Walter Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992).

15 Faegheh Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled, 8.

9

demonstrated;16 it also functions in various ways that dilute the binary “clash” logic that

globalization generates and at the same time reifies and reproduces that logic. It is a

perfect cultural object for dissecting and analyzing the collision, reflection, and refraction

of the forces of globalization.

In her Politics of Piety Saba Mahmoud looks at various forms of religious

practices including the veil that evolved in Egypt in the 1990s and how the veil, among

other things, innovatively communicates specific messages even demands.17 Through the

exploration of various mosque-based “piety movements” headed by women, Mahmoud

explains how women express their rejection of the “prevalent form of religiosity that

treats Islam as a system of abstract values that is to be cherished but that, nonetheless,

remains inessential to the practical organization of day-to-day life.”18 The fact that

religion has become a peripheral aspect of social life, and that it has become increasingly

difficult to tell whether a person is a Christian or a Muslim is a cause of concern for many

women. The initiation of these “piety movements” is a reflection of that concern. The veil

therefore represents a desire to assert the Muslim identity that is distinct and unique

through the “cultivation of these bodily aptitudes, virtues, habits, and desires that serve to

ground Islamic principles within the practices of everyday living.”19 The goal is therefore

to establish Islam as the main foundation of all aspects of life, not just religious practices.

Mahmoud’s study revealed that the veil was not just a reaction to the various

socioeconomic and political forces that women were subjected to. The veil in many

16 See Lewis "Veils and Sales: Muslims and the Spaces of Postcolonial Fashion Retail," 423-441;

Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled; Ahmed, "The Veil Debate – Again," 153-17; Haddad, "The Post-9/11 Hijab as Icon," 253-67.

17 Saba Mahmoud, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

18 Mahmoud, Politics of Piety, 45. 19 Mahmoud, Politics of Piety, 45.

10

instances was prompted by a strong desire to reconcile the domain of the profane with

that of the sacred. It should be noted that Mahmoud’s study was conducted between 1995

and 1997. At that time, the mass-veiling phenomenon was not fully in motion, although it

was starting to take roots. Also, the site of her research, mosques, suggests a level of

religious activism and awareness that are common to three urban sites with very different

socio demographic characteristics but are not necessarily universal. In other words, the

forms and meanings of the veil that Mahmoud identified are both time- and group-

specific.

The sample selection criteria in this research also brush the findings in a specific

way. I study the functions and meanings of the veil among middle and upper-middle-

class women only. I therefore can not sufficiently address the connection between the

veiling phenomenon and social class. This study still makes an important contribution to

understanding the dynamics of religiosity and class, which is the elucidation of new

forms of religious practices and meanings that have been almost nonexistent among the

middle and upper-middle classes, a group that spearheaded the antiveil campaign in the

first three decades of the twentieth century and that was adamantly opposed to the veil

until a decade ago. Today they have fully endorsed the hijab and have become among its

most active proponents. Today the majority of middle- and upper-middle class women

are veiled, and yet the veil is still portrayed in the literature as a lower-income group

phenomenon.

The research also demonstrates that the veil, although a religious symbol, has

little correlation with religion. Specifically, I refute the argument that the veil is

representative of what the so-called religious resurgence movement. In fact, the veil

11

seldom translates into any form of formal religious activism. Notwithstanding the deep

spiritual meanings that the veil reflected for some women, for the majority the veil has

little formal connection to religiosity and is more a manifestation of various intricate

power struggles that women engage in on a daily basis.

I am not arguing that religion has become an irrelevant cultural ingredient. On the

contrary, I view the dichotomies between religion and politics as quite artificial. Along

with Talal Asad (1993), I contend that the separation of the domains of politics and is a

cultural artifact that was introduced in modern times by Western Renaissance

philosophers.20 Both religion and religiosity are products of prevailing socioeconomic

and political conditions. Similar to Geertz, I view religion as a stratified phenomenon

made of a doctrinal element at one level and a body of religious practices and rituals at

another. Where Asad departs from that definition, and I agree, is the affirmation of the

strong intercontention between these two strata. Asad argues that the domain of the

doctrine and that of religious practices are mutually constitutive and that both of these

strata are “intrinsically” dependent on discourses, symbols, and practices produced at

other domains, including socio-economic conditions, political institutions, and prevalent

international systems.21 Although the texts constituting the religious doctrine are viewed

to be sacred and unchangeable, the interpretations and meanings of these texts are highly

differentiable and historically specific religious dispositions and practices. In Chapter 4 I

provide a cursory demonstration of the mutability of religious texts and meanings. I

locate the concept of the veil in religious texts and trace the conditions under which it has

20 Talal Asad, Geneologies of Religion: Discourses and Reasons of Power in Christianity and

Islam (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993). 21 Asad, Geneologies of Religion, 30-33.

12

become a requirement after the death of the Prophet of Islam and under very specific

socioeconomic conditions.

The following section analyzes in greater detail the state and religiosity hybrids

and elucidates implications of the hybridization processes on the meanings and functions

of the veil.

The State Hybrid

Many scholars have argued that boundaries between the state and society have

become “elusive, porous and mobile.”22 The most permeable boundaries of the political,

it is argued here, represent the perfect loci for analyzing the various hybrids that were

brought about through globalization. In recent years, the concept of the state has been a

central theme in political science debate. Many scholars discarded the concept of the

state as irrelevant. They argued that revolutionary advances in telecommunications and

information technologies resulted in the internationalization of the production process.

Hardt and Negri23 asserted that the global dispersal of manufacturing created a demand

for a new centralization of specialized producer services, especially financial services.

Centralized financial and trade-related services, which are located in a few “global

cities,” manage and direct the global networks of production. Saskia Sassen concurs,

arguing that the “digitization” of space has penetrated all levels of our daily activities,

including the “societal, cultural, subjective, economic, and imaginary structurations of

lived experience and the systems within which we exist and operate.” This resulted in a

22 Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their

Critics." The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77. 23 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negre, Empire. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

2000).

13

decline in the significance of the concept of the nation-state and the rise of other more

effective political actors, such as the global city, global markets, and regional trade

zones.24

One major manifestation of the digitization of space that this research tackles is

the emergence of satellite television in the Arab world and Egypt in the 1990s. Under

Nasser’s regime, public media, especially radio and television, became the main arm for

educating the public, and even more importantly, for reshaping the Egyptian national

identity.25 It is through television that the state attempted to “modernize” society and to

transform the meanings and practices of religiosity, including unveiling. Television

images reach a much wider audience than any other media channel, owing to the high

illiteracy rates in these countries.26 This is why Arab states maintained tight controls on

the broadcasting realm.

As satellite television penetrated the Arab world, the Egyptian government made

every effort to curtail the demand for cable television. The government increased the

number of terrestrial channels and provided more entertainment programs and drama

shows. These efforts succeeded in keeping the demand for other sources of television

broadcasting low in Egypt. Until the end of the 1990s, Egypt had the lowest access rate to

satellite and cable television in the Arab world. Only 7.5 percent of Egyptian homes with

television had access to cable and satellite in 1999, significantly lower than the 27.2

24 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (New York: Columbia University

Press, 2001); Saskia Sassen, “Between Topographic Representation and Spatialized Power Projects,” Art Journal 60, no. 2 (2001), 12-20.

25 Lila Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood: The Politics of Television in Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

26 Naomi Sakr, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurism, 2001), 5.

14

percent average penetration rate in the region.27 However, the market for satellite

television has increased exponentially during the following decade.28 A 2008 media

survey in Egypt showed that 43.2 percent of urban households had access to digital cable

and satellite.29 Less than 10 percent of the women interviewed in this study indicated that

they had no access to cable television channels.

This digitization of the media space has resulted in major transformation in the

forms and functions of the state as its borders became more fuzzy and elusive. However,

its power and authority have remained resilient. While many of the channels that

Egyptians have access to today are private, and many are owned and operated by non-

Egyptians, all these channels are still transmitted through a state-owned satellite called

Nilesat. It therefore does have the power to ban specific channels and control the content

of other channels. Moreover, the Egyptian state-run satellite channels still secure a very

wide audience today.30 Egyptian soap operas are still unrivalled in the Arab world, and

are important media through which the state is able to influence and remodel national

values.31

This project sheds some light on some of the intricacies between globalization and

the state. Using Migdal’s state-in-society approach,32 I explore religious satellite media

as a site at which the various interactions between the state, the public, and global forces

27 The penetration rate was significantly higher than average in Saudi Arabia (65.4%) and

Lebanon (42.5 percent). See Sakr, Satellite Realms, 114. 28 Sakr, Satellite Realms, 114. 29 The survey was conducted by the Arab Advisors Group. The increase in access is mainly due to

a burgeoning black market of reselling Pay TV signals to neighboring households. I could not access the survey itself, but data was obtained from a press release posted at www.ArabAdvisors,com regarding the results of the 2008 Egypt Media Survey. Press release downloaded at http://www.arabadvisors.com/Pressers/presser-200508.htm (accessed August 22, 2009).

30 Naomi Sakr, Arab Television Today (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 109-136; Sakr, Satellite Realms, 99-130.

31 Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood. 32 Migdal, State in Society.

15

can be illustrated. The examination of these interactions highlights some of the

transformations that the state is experiencing both conceptually and empirically. The

research contributes to the literature on globalization by examining one of its unexplored

layers, namely intraregional globalization. This relates to the fusion of cultures within

regions that are simplistically grouped together in most of the globalization literature,

including Arab cultures, Islamic cultures, Indian cultures, and the like. The last decade

has witnessed an increase in the exposure of the Egyptian culture to Arab, particularly

Arab Gulf cultures. These transformations caused the borders of the state to become

fuzzy and elusive, albeit resilient. It also resulted in significant transformations in the

religious culture and the hybridization of religious symbols, including the veil, along with

the state.

The Religiosity Hybrid

The second locale of hybridity that this study tackles is the religiosity hybrid. The

1980s saw a surge in the literature on ethno-nationalism. This surge is attributable to the

outburst of ethno-national wars around the globe following the collapse of the Soviet

Union. By 1992, more than a quarter of the states in the world were experiencing ethnic

wars. These “cultural” wars greatly puzzled political scientists; modernization theory

predicted that the role of “culture” would subside as states embraced more the ethos of

secularization and became circumscribed by Weber’s “iron-cage” of the secular

bureaucracy, which rejects all that is deemed “subjective” or “unscientific.”

The realities of this time, however, revealed that the “inevitable” emergence of

the secular state is a great myth in social science, and that the practices, meaning creation,

and interpretation have and will always be components of political struggles. Social

16

scientists responded to this new reality in many different ways. Some maintained that

cultural phenomena are ephemeral byproducts of modernization that will soon subside as

the modernization schemes take root.33 Others insisted that what we see as cultural is just

a camouflage of “rational” or “structural” causes of these forms of politics.34 Another

group discarded the rational theory altogether and insisted that the cultural variable,

monolithically and statically defined, are the only causal factor that scientists should look

at.35 Some approaches attempted to reconcile the two poles of the debate and proposed

more nuanced solutions to the agent-structure problem and the relationship between the

rational and the cultural levels. The following section focuses on the literature on

religious revival and evaluates the relevance of the religiosity debate to explaining the

spread of the veil among educated middle-class Muslim women today.

Seeking to explain the rise of Islamic movements in the Arab world, Philip

Khoury36 argues that religious resurgence is the result of “state’s exhaustion,” or the

inability of the state to bring society into modernity through forging the socioeconomic

changes necessary to support the new value system embedded in the secularization and

33 Gellner for example argues that modernization initially results in instability and may result in

ethnic violence. The phenomenon, however, will soon subside as the state progresses in its modernization project. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

34 Rational choice and instrumentalist approaches locate nationalist movements at the individual and/or group level. Some rational models emphasize economic goals, such as Paul Collier’s “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, eds. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000). Others emphasize political goals, such as the desire of the elites to diverge attention from national problems through instigating ethnic conflicts. See Simmel Conflict. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956).

35 Huntington reported that civilization clashes will define all types of conflict during the post- Cold War Era. Culture, specifically religion, is viewed as the main axis of internal and international conflict in the world today. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

36 Philip S Khoury, Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab world: A Historical Appraisal," in Arab Resources, ed. I. Ibrahim, 213-236 (London: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1983).

17

modernization policies that were adopted in the 1950s.37 Khoury maintains that state’s

exhaustion is the result of two structural causes: the state’s position in the international

power structure and the domestic power structure. Here the state apparatus, which is seen

as completely separate and disjoint from society, tries to push society in a direction that it

would have not gone through otherwise. This requires mass mobilization of social

classes. However, economic and social realities awaken the masses whose aspirations and

expectation have gone to a zenith. A significant lag between the mobilization and

assimilation processes develops, as the expectations created through mobilization get

frustrated. The result is greater polarization, the only viable expression of which, given

the exhaustion of other ideologies, is Islamic revivalism.38

Eric Davis39 adds some nuance to Khoury’s model by providing an “ideational”

dimension. His model rests on three concepts: “accumulation, legitimation and

authenticity.” The differential accumulation that accompanies the “imported development

models” of liberalism and state capitalism increases the concentration of wealth in the

hands of few, which causes a drop in legitimacy. This loss of legitimacy stimulates

“introspection” among classes of the Egyptian society that have marginally benefited

from the educational campaign launched during those periods, but are not able to elevate

beyond their social classes. This situation results in an authenticity crisis and ideological

37 This analysis has some common elements with another model presented by Huntington in 1968,

where he argued that forging a certain institutional change to modernize because it did not go at commensurate pace with socioeconomic changes to meet the expectations created by the new institutional set-up is doomed to produce social instability and violence. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

38 See Philip S. Khoury, Islamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the Arab world: A Historical Appraisal," In Arab Resources, ed. I. Ibrahim, 213-2356 (London: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1983).

39 Eric Davis, "Religion Against the State: A Political Economy of Religious Radicalism in Egypt and Israel." In Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, ed. Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, 145-166 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press).

18

vacuum. Among a spectrum of possible ideological alternatives to fill this vacuum,

militant Islam stands as the best competitor given its ability to relate to and explain social

realities.

In this model, the author utilizes a class analysis to understand the dynamics of

the movement. Islamic militants, he argues, come from particular classes. His empirical

research on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt showed that the main base of the Muslim

group is the newly urbanized professional middle classes—a class that modernization

theory predicted would be the first to internalize the secular value system. However, they

are mainly recent urbanizers, whose values are at odds with that of the urban values. That

they chose to move to the city in spite of this perceived clash of values indicates their

upward mobility aspirations, which soon get frustrated by socioeconomic realities.

Without a sufficient ideational appeal for the discourse of radical Islam, Davis contends,

those classes would not have been attracted to this movement as opposed to any other.

The fact that they are professionals dictates a certain way of thinking about truth. Also

the ideology provides a psychological/coping tool, and it explains the complexities of the

social reality these classes are living in.

The strength of this model lies in its ability to capture several factors involved in the

genesis and growth of these movements that other models are only able to capture sides

of these movements. On the one hand, we can see the material forces at play. The gap

between the expectations created by the new institutions and policies adopted by the state

and the socioeconomic realities that the citizenry are facing provokes a desire for change.

We are also able to see the dynamics of the confrontation and “clash” of various value

systems. Third, the model situates militant Islamic movements among a range of other

19

possibilities, and the selection of that model in particular indicates its ideational strength

and its ability to relate well to the structural realities. Nevertheless, the model is not able

to explain why the values shared adopted by the subscribers of these movements are now

shared by a great and expanding segment of society, some of which are not recent

urbanizers, and many of which have actually been subscribers to a more Western style of

life. There is limited applicability, therefore, to the research question at hand.

More recent literature synthesizes the structural models of Islamic activism with a

nuanced institutional analysis that incorporates civil society. One prime example is Sheri

Berman’s Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society.40 Along with Khoury and Davis,

Berman contends that the modernization policies that were initiated during the Nasser’s

era offered Egyptians “a glimpse of what modernity has to offer, but not far enough to

deliver it.”41 She argues that “the necessary precondition for the rise of Islamism has

been the declining efficacy and legitimacy of the Egyptian state.”42 The faltering political

system creates a “revolutionary situation” that invites various forms of revolutionary

movements, the most successful of which is the Islamic civil society. Islamic groups have

exploited the vacuum created through the decline of the public goods system by

effectively providing a wide range of social goods, including health, education, and

emergency services. These initiatives filled gaps in government services and created an

enormous level of popular support for the Brotherhood. The results of various elections

show that, given a fair opportunity, the Muslim Brotherhood may well take over the

parliament and the presidential elections.

40 Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 2

(2003), 257-272. 41 Berman, “Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,” 258. 42 Berman, “Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,” 258.

20

Most, if not all, of the literature, on Islamic activism focuses on organized

movements and imposes the conventional conceptual frameworks of civil society and

social movements. Whether the civil society approach presented by Berman is applicable

or not is a point of contention.43 I argue, however, that the literature on religiosity and

civil society has excluded many other forms of informal activism that are taking place at

various levels of society today and that not only involve lower and lower-middle-class

new urban people, but also spreads to the middle and upper-middle classes. One example

of these movements are championed by a wide variety of religious scholars and

preachers, each of which are targeting a specific segment of society, and all of which are

utilizing the booming satellite television industry as a means of communicating with the

public. These scholars and preachers have recently gained a lot of support, and many of

them today are considered role models.

This study contributes to the literature on religious activism by illustrating the role

of religious discourse in shaping attitudes and identities and the interactions of a wide

variety of agents in the context of globalization. My research suggests that the Islamic

intelligentsia have developed significant power over the process of value contestation and

that many young Egyptians today align themselves more with the nationalist vision

proposed by these groups as opposed to the state-propagated vision. Whereas there are no

publicly announced goals by any of these preachers, there are subtle antiregime

insinuations in their discourses and a declared vision of nationhood that is rooted in a

variety of interpretations of Islam. The multiplicity of the forms of the veil is an

illustration of the diversity of the competing visions of religiosity and nationalism in

43 Kubik argues that some of the defining characteristics of civil society, including transparency

and accountability, are absent in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood.(unpublished manuscript )

21

Egypt today. Many of these visions are propagated at the level of the ulema but are

constantly reconstituted by several other actors, including young Muslim men and

women as well as the state. I will investigate the role of all these actors in redefining

religiosity and the meaning of the veil in Egypt today.

The Veil as a Symbol of the Religiosity Hybrid

The question of the veil has always been a point of debate in Islam. While some

historians and scholars insist that the veil requirement is historically specific, others

contend that it is a general requirement, even as important as all five pillars of Islam. The

latter side of the debate rationalizes the veil requirement in Islam and explains its

necessity as a tool to maintain social stability, to protect the women and to raise her

value. The explanations provided for the veil requirement include a need to curb the soul,

a training tool and illustration of modesty, the necessity of the veil in absence of security

and social equity, an illustration of male dominance, selfishness, jealousy and/or egoism,

and others.44 One of the main goals of the veil according to some of its proponents is the

boosting of the value of the woman who was in the past a subject of exploitation.

According to Mat’hary,45 modesty and seclusion are things that women naturally seek, as

it increases her value in the eyes of men. The veil makes the woman’s beauty even more

desired as it becomes inaccessible. This is especially true given the unstoppable sexual

instinct that human beings have. But only the woman was selected for the veil because

she longs for beautification more than men and enjoys capturing men through her beauty.

Men would refuse to marry women who are unveiled because they are seen as cheap and

44 For a defense of the veil, see for example For a defense of the veil, see for example Murtada al-

Mutahhari, Mas’alat al-h ijāb [The Question of the Veil] (Beirut: al-Dar al-Islamiyyaah, 1987). 45 Murtadá al-Mutahharī, Mas’alat al-hijāb.

22

accessible. 46 This position about the necessity of the veil is the most prevalent right now.

As will be discussed in the following chapters, most women use words like “gem” and

“desired treasure” when explaining why they are veiled.

Towards the end of the 1970s, a body of literature emerged to explain the “return

to the veil”47 as a distinct manifestation of religious resurgence. In general, the literature

focused on the various representations of the veil, including the failure of secularist

policies, women’s oppression, and national/international threat. Today, the discourse of

the veil in Europe, especially France, is laden with Orientalist views regarding the status

of women in Muslim countries. Very few studies, however, attempted to understand the

origins of the phenomenon or women’s motivations for adopting the veil. Although there

was strong evidence to suggest that the veil decision in many cases was voluntarily taken

by women, they insist that this voluntarism conceals patterns of women’s oppression that

are deeply entrenched.48 The following review focuses on four seminal empirical studies

that were conducted over the last three decades. These studies have shaped my

understanding of the veil, my argument, and my research design.

Azza Mohammed Sallam49 investigated the various factors that contributed to the

return of the veil among educated women in Egypt whose grandmothers have went

through great pains to discard in the past. The veil was treated as a manifestation of the

revitalization movement in response to “excessive cultural stress,” which in turn was

46 Murtadá al-Mutahharī, Mas’alat al-hijāb, 57-79. 47 John Alden Williams, "A Return to the Veil in Egypt." Middle East Review 11(1979):49-54. 48 For an interesting discussion on the applications of liberal thought to the study of the veil, see

Saba Mahmood, "Feminist Theory, Agency, and the Liberatory Subject." In On Shifting Ground: Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone, (New York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005). The author critiques herself and other similar progressive liberals who assume that women seek their liberation as a rule, and any appearance of behavior that contradicts that pattern is a form of false consciousness.

49 Azza Mohamed Ahmed Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,” (Ph.D. diss., Purdue University, 1980).

23

produced by an attempt to reconcile “two ways of life.”50 Citing Fareed R. Zakaria, the

author explained that the revival was the result of the failure of the imported Western

culture “to provide abiding solutions to the Moslem world’s social and economic

problem,” which in turn resulted in the return to religion for “spiritual solace.”51

The author, veiled herself, combined qualitative methods (participant

observations) with structured questionnaires that she conducted with a random sample of

80 female university undergraduates: 40 veiled and 40 unveiled. Simple bivariate

analyses were used to test for the relationship between a woman’s veil status (veiled or

unveiled) and physical, health, economic, psychological, religious, family, education

procedures, and future ambitions. The author used a self-designed questionnaire in

addition to a number of standard scales, including the Views of Life Scale and the

Mooney Problem Checklist. The findings suggested that religious reasons were the main

driver for wearing the veil for the veiled group. While veiled women emphasized

religious reasons behind their decision to veil, unveiled women provide nonreligious

excuses for not veiling even though they were convinced it was a religious duty. This,

according to the author suggested that “wearing the veil is consciously expressed as

a…basic tenet of the Islamic religion,”52 and that the return to the veil was part of this

religious revival. Veiled women also expressed a need to emphasize their identity as

Muslim women and to protect themselves from the other sex; they believed that the veil

helped them accomplish both goals.

50 Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,” 26. 51 Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,” 27. 52 Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,”

107.

24

Economic status was another factor correlated with veiling in Egypt during the

1970s and 80s: the higher the status, the less likely the women would be veiled.53 This is

because “religiosity is more obvious among the lower and the middle class than among

the upper-middle-class in Minya city.”54 The study also revealed that veiled women faced

fewer future vocational and education problems. The explanation that the author

proposed (but did not test) was that veiled women “committed to religion, are depending

on God to solve their problems, and are sure that God will reward them as they are

observant of their religion.”55

The study revealed a number of typical problems associated with the research

design the researcher selected. The participant was provided with a number of

predetermined options (i.e., closed questionnaire) regarding the factors that might be

associated with the veil. This approach might have predisposed the participant and

created bias in the answers. Additionally, the author conflated religiosity with the belief

in the veil as an Islamic requirement. The author did not test the religious orientation of

the participants, as measured by how far they observed religious duties, how much they

believed in fate, whether they read Quran regularly, or other indications of religiosity.

The veil was used as an indicator of religiosity (independent variable) and as a subject of

research (dependent variable) at the same time, which is a major methodological pitfall.

Women’s answers to open-ended questions posed by the author revealed a strong need to

express and declare one’s identity as a Muslim. Several participants conveyed that the

53 In Chapter 4 I demonstrate that the association between the veil and economic status was not

linear in Egypt. During the Turkish rule in Egypt, the veil was associated with higher economic status. This association between the veil and higher economic status was broken towards the ends of the Turkish dynasty and then reversed in recent years.

54 Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,” 116.

55 Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Female Undergraduate at Minya University, Egypt,” 116.

25

1967 defeat revealed that the Muslim World was failing due to its negligence of its duties

towards God. There seemed to be strong interaction effect between religious orientations

and prevalent political conditions that the author did not test for. Political orientation

could also explain some of answers of the participants that the researcher attributed to

increased religiosity.

Shortly after Sallam’s study, another one was conducted by the National Center

for Social and Criminal Research regarding spread of the veil among undergraduate

students.56 A quantitative study was designed to identify the correlates of the veil and the

most influential factors prompting the decision to veil. A total of 388 veiled and unveiled

female undergraduates participated in the study and another 350 veiled and unveiled

working college graduates. On aggregate, the socioeconomic profiles of the veiled and

nonveiled women selected for the study were very similar. The study found that the veil

predicted views regarding women’s rights to education and work. Virtually all

participants indicated that education was an absolute necessity, but significantly more

unveiled women (36 percent for unveiled women versus 23 percent for veiled women)

thought education was important in and of itself, not because it makes women better

women and wives. More veiled women thought education was important due its role in

preparing better wives and mothers. Unveiled women were more than twice as likely to

support female work. Veiled women, on the other hand, supported a return to traditional

views on women’s social role. Almost one third of veiled women indicated that the lack

of religious application in Egyptians’ daily lives was the main obstacle facing the

56 Al-Markaz al-Qawmī lil-Buhūth al-Ijtimā‘īyah wa-al-Jinā’iyah, Z āhirat al-h ijāb bayna al-

jāmi‘īyāt. al-Taqrīr al-thānī : al-bu‘d al-dīnī li-zāhirat al-hijāb bayna al-mihanīyāt [The Veil Phenomenon among Female Undergraduates-Second Report: The Religious Dimension of the Veil Phenomenon among Female Professionals] (Cairo: The National Center for Social and Criminal Studies, Religious Studies Unit, 1984).

26

advancement of Egyptian women. Only four percent of unveiled women thought

religiosity was the problem. On the other hand, 52 percent of unveiled women (compared

to 20 percent veiled women) cited tradition as the main impediment to women’s

advancement.

The study revealed significant differences in the type of media content that the

participants were most interested in. Whereas 87 percent of veiled women preferred

religious media sources, the unveiled women were more interested in reading about

political and social affairs than about religion. Both groups, however, provided similar

ratings to the role of religious media in society: 61 percent of both groups thought the

role of religious media was still insignificant. Veiled women were more likely to indicate

that religious media is failing to promote awareness about religion. For them, this

insignificant or negative role was due mainly to the inconsistency of these programs, the

superficiality of the content, and the biased presentation of many topics. Veiled and

unveiled respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the content of drama and movies as

they often conflicted with authentic social and religious values and promoted or at least

sanctioned various forms of corrupt behavior.

Findings about media content are particularly interesting. We see here a call for a

greater role of religious media and a need for the media to become more effective and

more responsive to the needs and issues relating to youth. It is in that context that

religious media mushroomed towards the end of the 1990s and particularly over the last

decade. Today the media is considered the prime source of religious education, and the

spread of the veil is largely attributable to the number of women wearing the veil. The

sheer size of the sample and the level of detail probed by the questionnaire instrument are

27

quite compelling, helping us to understand many facts about the veiling at the time. The

study helped identify many of the correlates of veiling, including socioeconomic status,

parents’ education, media content, and others. It is not clear, however, why these women

veil, and how they internalize the socioeconomic and political conditions in which they

are living. This study needed to be followed up by another qualitative study that would

seek to investigate the identities of these women and what the veil meant to them.

An explanation of the return to the veil based on the modernist approach was

proposed by Fadwa El Guindi. She sought to understand the paradoxical phenomenon of

the rise of veiling among “modern” educated female college students in Cairo. El Guindi

associated the phenomenon with an informal, unorganized social movement called

mitdayyinin, or the religious, that she insisted was different from the other organized

Islamic movements such as militant Islam or ikhwan muslemeen (Muslim Brotherhood).

The latter two represented responses to the 1967 defeat in the Arab-Israeli war, but the

mitdayyinin movement emerged after the 1973 victory between Arabs and Israel. The

1973 war had a clear religious framing as it was launched in the name of Islam. Prior to

that war, Islamic movements were all underground and were perceived as a threat to the

regime. The 1973 victory in effect legitimized the Islamic movement and codified its

behavior. “So this Crossing [of the Suez Canal into the Occupied Sinai],” argued El

Guindi, “was the point at which Islam effectively and formally affirmed its legitimacy for

the people.”57 The veil, which is a very visible symbol, represented this legitimization

and an acceptance of the presence of outward expressions of religiosity in public.58

57 El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt’s Contemporary Islamic

Movement,” 481. 58 During Nasser’s regime visible expressions of religiosity were not encouraged. I have heard

many anecdotal stories that police restricted the use of visible religious icons, including crosses and

28

Parallel to the legitimization of informal religious activism, another process was

in motion that also gave the veil a very particular form and meaning: the opening of the

Egyptian market and culture to the international market. The institution of the “Open

Door Policy” or infitah in 1974 brought about unprecedented movement of goods as well

as people (foreign investors, Egyptian out-migrants seeking work opportunities in the

Gulf countries, and tourism). These new exposure produced new patterns of income

inequalities with wealth increasingly concentrated among a new class of entrepreneurs,

many of whom were uneducated, and rising unemployment rates among the growing

number of college students.59 Another associated phenomenon was the increased

perception of westernization and deterioration of morality. “To summarize,” commented

El Guindi, “infitah seems to be going hand in hand with inhilal (societal

disintegration).”60

Societal disintegration, combined with a greater move towards co-education and

sex integration,61 had a direct impact on women. Nasser’s policies resulted in greater

participation of women in public space, and these policies were irreversible. However,

the Open Door policies made women more vulnerable, and experienced more street

harassment more regularly. Al Guindi asserted,

Quranic verses. There were no laws to that effect, but it is a common story among people who lived during the Nasser era.

59 This too is one of Nasser’s legacies. He instituted free education for both males and females from primary school through college. This led to a great increase in demand for college education. The impact was particularly great for women. Whereas enrollment in medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, engineering, and veterinary medicine increased five to nine fold among males, the increase was between 2,000 and 6,000 fold among women. See El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic: Egypt’s Contemporary Islamic Movement,” 480-482.

60 El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic,” 481. 61 This development has been set in motion since the 1950s with Nasser’s emphasis on women’s

education and women’s rights. See Nadje S Al-Ali, “Between Political Epochs and Personal Lives: Formative experiences of Egyptian Women Activists,” in Auto/Biography and the Construction of Identity and Community in the Middle East, ed. Mary Ann Fay, 163-64 (New York: Palgrave, 2001); El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic,” 481.

29

It is common, and has almost became tradition in Egypt, that men harass women in public by the most demeaning and undignified words, gestures and touching. Because men define the public world (not including the workplace) as their space, women are treated as intruders. And while women are being physically harassed, they are also accused of bringing it upon themselves by being there. For El Guindi, the veil constituted the Egyptian woman’s response to all these processes

combined. If a woman responded to globalization62 by acting in a “secular, modern,

feminine” way, she would become much more vulnerable to the secular world. The

increasing religiosity, a societal response symbolized and assisted by the veil, was

associated with the emergence of an image of the woman as “formidable, untouchable

and silently untouchable.”63 Accordingly, the veil represented a tool and a weapon that

enabled women to participate effectively in society while reaping all the accumulated

benefits of modernization. It ushered “the beginning of a synthesis between modernity

and authenticity.”64

This model elegantly synthesized the relationship between structural forces and

the agent. It also helps to understand interesting nuances regarding the interaction of

traditional and modern forces and some of the contradictory outcomes of globalization.

The model, assumed a direct relationship between attitudes and certain events, which is

often a problem of discrete analysis.65 The author assumed that organized Islamic

movements were contingent on a particular point, 1967, while the unorganized version

was hinged on the 1973 war. The reader could not see how these two movements inform

one another, and how they were both arguably products of deeper structural conditions

62 Globalization here refers the increase in the exposure to Western culture and products, 63 El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic,” 482. 64 El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic,” 465. 65 In essence, the author adopted one of the premises of the path dependence approach, which

assumes that the series of events following a particular event are contingent on that event. They cannot be explained, at least entirely, by the course of actions that preceded that event.

30

that predated the two events. In other words, the causal mechanisms for the mitdayyinin

movement were not sufficiently highlighted here. Third, while the arguments are very

interesting, the author provided no empirical evidence to support her assertions, and that

cast serious doubts on the empirical validity of her arguments.66

Arlene Elowe Macleod67 also tried to solve the paradox of modern working

middle-class women “seeming to support their own subordination, and even to reproduce

it…” through adopting the “new veil.” She conducted an ethnographic study between

1983 and 1988 to understand the reasons for educated lower-middle-class women to

choose to wear the veil. Macleod insisted that the new veil was emblematic of the urban

woman’s struggle to meet the dynamics and challenges of globalization that were

especially acute in the urban city.

Macleod also treated the veil as a lens for investigating the contradictory roles of

women in power struggles: while women were constantly engaged in “the reproduction

of the past,” they were also active agents in the production of social change, both of

which were quintessential to the modernization process.68 Modernization resulted in the

widening of income inequalities and the deterioration of the standards of living of lower

middle-class urban women. While provided opportunities for education and government

work to unprecedented numbers of Egyptian citizens across classes, these opportunities

66 I examined El Guindi’s Veil: Modesty, Privacy and Resistance (New York: Berg, 1999)

looking for a development of the argument she proposed in her 1981 article. Although the author insisted that the book was not about the anthropology of dress but more about the identity politics expressed by the veil, there was hardly any analysis of identity in the book. The author here reviews the veil in different civilizations and cultures, how dress was dealt with in anthropological studies, and some applications of the veil among both men and women in various cultures. The article reviewed above was inserted almost verbatim in Chapter 8, although with very interesting photos and figures. None of the problems outlined above were addressed in her book.

67 Arlene Elowe Macleod, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling, and Change in Cairo (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

68 Macleod, Accommodating Protest, 2-5.

31

resulted in new patterns of frustration. “[T]he enormous swelling of the government

bureaucracy…has produced a most inefficient system which gives jobs to many but

satisfying and well-paying jobs only to the highest ranking officials.”69 As such, men

working in the Egyptian bureaucracy were no longer able to provide for their families as

expected culturally, and women were forced to join the labor force.

Most of the Western-centered feminist literature emphasized that women, once

given the opportunity, would seek to become an effective member of the workforce, and

focus on means to facilitate and empower women’s decision to work.70 Macleod told a

different and interesting story: the Egyptian lower-middle class women, many of which

were first or second generations of villagers, preferred to stay home and reproduce their

gender roles as housewives and mothers. The economic conditions that women from this

class experienced impinged on their rights to stay at home. The husbands were even more

resentful of this new reality as it directly diminished their masculinity. Rather than

responding to the redistribution of financial responsibilities through sharing some of the

responsibilities at home, or even relaxing some of their expectations, husbands were more

cynical of their deficiency at home and their inability to cook a good meal and keep the

house neat and tidy all the time. Instead, they constantly complained that their mothers

used to be much better housewives than their wives are.

The social effects of women’s entrance into the labor market were compounded

by another factor: the overemphasis of women’s sexuality in the Arab culture. Macleod

69 Macleod, Accommodating Protest, 83. 70 This critique of Western liberalism prompted the writing of Saba Mahmood’s Politics of Piety.

In that book the author challenged the idea of women as a standard rule seeks their own liberalization. Through an ethnographic study conducted at three mosques representing three different classes, the author found that Egyptian women initiated various “piety movements,” the goal of which was to experience Islam in their everyday lives through a set of rituals and activities that are located in Islamic teachings. The veil and language usage are both manifestations of this movement

32

commented that women in the Arab world were often portrayed as alluring sexual objects

that men easily fall trap to. Some women acknowledged “their own “immoral” urges.71

One of the participants in Macleod’s study explained, “Men see women who have a nice

body and they want her. This is how it is. So, if I want to go to work, I have to expect

this.”72 This is why the norm of veiling and seclusion was imparted from one generation

to another. Both men and women supported this norm and helped reproduce it.

The economic conditions that forced women to go out and work added significant

tensions to the husband-wife relations in Egypt. Men were becoming more restrictive and

controlling of their wives’ behavior; women had to ask permission to go outside home

and, in many cases, they were denied even visits to the family. Additionally, conflict

situations emerged as men became more suspicious of their wives who had to interact

with men in the streets and at work. Women became particularly vulnerable as they were

exposed to verbal and physical street harassment on a daily basis. So although going out

to work was not really a desire or an option, society looked down upon women who

defied the sanctions of gender segregation by going out to work. Working undermined

the natural role of the woman as wife and mother, for which women got the utmost

respect in society.

The veil in this context represented an innovative tool for dealing with all the

contradictions that working, urban class woman faced. Women used the veil to send a

message to people they interacted with that they were respectful, and not accessible to

anyone in the street. Women who left leave their houses on a daily basis. Macleod

asserted, “Veiling is a two-way mode of communication not merely a form of dress

71 Macleod, Accommodating Protest, 84. 72 Macleod, Accommodating Protest, 83-84.

33

imposed on women against their will and depriving them of control.”73 These women

voluntarily adopted the veil as strategy to negotiate power at the domestic, social, and

global levels. Through the veil, they were able to renegotiate ownership of public space.

They were “protesting” the forces that dictated their challenging of their natural roles,

and at the same time they were “accommodating” the counter social forces that were

cynical of her new role as a breadwinner. She was thus using the veil to reaffirm,

synthesize and alter her traditional and new role. Through the veil, women were

demonstrating their rejections of the “Western,” and declaring that while they were active

agents in the modernization process, they were distinct from Western women and were

making every effort to dissociate themselves from them.

The argument presented by Macleod is quite original. There is an elegant

synthesis of various levels at which identities are negotiated as the forces of modernity

are competing with tradition. We are able to examine the historicist arguments about the

endogamous and unchanging role of culture which resulted in deterministic and uncritical

conclusions about the contradictions between Islam and modernity. One major drawback

in her analysis is that her methods are neither clear nor consistent. The reader cannot see

how the author derives her findings from her data. The author also makes many

assertions without providing sufficient empirical evidence, which is not what one would

expect from an almost five-year ethnographic study. Other than a few quotes by women

regarding how different they are from the Western women, there is little evidence of links

between modernity and globalization, a key layer of power struggle in her argument. The

definitions of these two concepts were also left vague.

73 Macleod, Accommodating Protest, 101.

34

The author claims that the “accommodating process” that lower-middle class

working women engage in exemplifies identity negotiations that are taking place in urban

Egypt today; a process which should involve a significant number of social actors.

However, according to the 1996 Census, only 14 percent of Egyptian women worked,

and most of working women were rural women. Many of the urban women stop working

after they get married or after their first child arrives. Accordingly, the scope of the

power struggles that the author identifies is still quite limited. My research builds and

illustrates the arenas of power struggle that Macleod listed but with a clear illustration of

the multi-layered processes of subversion and submission that women initiate through the

veil.

Egypt as a Case Study

For the purpose of this analysis, I will use Cairo, Egypt, as a case study. Egypt is

a perfect case study not just because of its significant political weight in the Arab and

Muslim world, but also because the transformations that took place in the Egyptian

Muslim fashion over the last two decades provide a perfect research material for

understanding religiosity. This is because the Egyptian fashion has undergone

fundamental transformations in a seemingly cyclical way: all women (Muslim and non-

Muslim) were veiled before 1925. By the 1950s, a veiled woman in the Egyptian cities

was a rarity. In the 1970s, the veil started reappearing in the streets, but it was by then a

strictly Islamic product. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, unveiled women became

a one-off. Understanding the underlying causes of these transformations will unravel the

processes through which the forms of religiosity adapt and mutate.

35

A study of Egypt will also allow us to understand the intricacies and complexities

of globalization. Egypt has a strongly entrenched economy. It has strong political and

economic linkages with the West, particularly the United States. These links extend

beyond governmental linkages to include people and groups who do business with the

West as well as nonprofit organizations that have a strong presence in Egypt and the

West. Through a study of religiosity and the veil in Egypt, I will be able to examine the

interaction between globalization and religiosity from different angles and offer an

explanatory framework for understanding radical tendencies and political polarization.

Data Sources

My project uses several data sources and research methods. First, I situate the

current position of the veil in a historical trajectory through examining the genealogy of

the veil in Egypt and the various shifts in its forms and levels of observance. This

analysis relies on secondary data sources, including documents and studies by

contemporary scholars on Egyptian female dress, analysis of art works from various

periods depicting Egyptian women, documentations of travelers and historians who have

visited Egypt at various points in time, and autobiographies and life stories of Egyptian

women who took part in early nationalist activities. This section, therefore, provides the

necessary historical context for the veil debate. It also helps identify trends in the rise and

fall of the importance of the veil in the Egyptian society as well as the various social and

economic correlates of the veil.

A second source of data is responses to a detailed structured interview conducted

with 65 veiled and unveiled middle- and upper-middle Muslim women between the age

36

of 18 and 32 during the summer of 2008. All the interview questions were open-ended.

We started the interview by collecting basic demographic data and then asked questions

regarding the women’s decision to veil, how the veil affects the women’s social role and

view of self and society, the functions that the veil performs, the various sources of

religious education that Egyptian women rely on, the current perceptions about the forms

of the veil that exist in Egypt today and how women perceive the great variety in dress

today. Qualitative and interpretive methods were used in the analysis as detailed in

Chapter 3.

A third source of data is religious sermons given by various popular preachers in

Egypt today, mostly during the past five years.74 My interviews show that religious

sermons featured on cable television were the primary source of religious information for

the vast majority of the respondents. The analysis of these sermons serves to identify

various versions of the religious discourse that coexist in the Egyptian society today and

the effects of these discourses on the dominant forms of religiosity and the meanings and

forms of the veil.

My Argument and Research Approach

The veil is emblematic of three forms of power negotiations and tensions that are

characteristic of Egyptian politics today. The first represents the renegotiation of the

position of women and men in the public space and the social role of gender. The main

74 For preachers who have been influential for a while, I went back to their early sermons to

provide a trajectory of their thought development and identify the changes in their emphases in the religious message.

37

question that will be answered is “How do women view their roles in society today and

what function does the veil play in realizing and affecting these roles?” I demonstrate that

the veil has become a ticket for acceptance in the social space. It determines the level of

social respect a women gets in society and the opportunities she gets access to. However,

social respect of women is not hinged purely on religion, but rather on new attitudes

towards women in public space. Egyptian women today are exposed to enormous forms

of verbal and physical harassment in the street, which prompted many women to the use

of the veil as a signifier of respect and a defense against being branded by the growing

number of people as a person of ill-repute. This strategy is not always successful in that

respect, but it is still viewed as necessary.

While all women insist that they are veiled because it is a religious duty, further

analysis reveals that the veil is not principally the product or signifier of religious

awakening but rather a symbolic tool associated with the emergence of new attitudes

towards women. This is demonstrated through a discussion with women regarding their

perceptions of the current state of religiosity in Egypt and how it compares to the

previous generation. Two thirds of the forms of veil that women adopt today are not

considered strictly Islamic as they do not abide by the modesty rules stipulated in

religious texts. For some respondents, the veil has become distorted from its “pure

form,”75 a very deplorable fact for these women. For many other veiled women, who still

do not abide by the strict religious rules regarding the veil, their veils represent a creative

way to deal with social pressure without giving up their own ways of life. By adopting

“edited” forms of the veil, they are subverting the meaning of the veil and transforming it

75 The “pure form” relates to a modest form that is conservative, not attractive, loose-fitting, and

designed for women to pass unnoticed in the street, as though she is invisible.

38

from a symbol of oppression imposed by a strongly patriarchal and man-centered society

to an article of fashion, protest, and liberation.

The second site of political struggle that the veil indexes is the tension between

the state and society, or more specifically the conflict between the version of Islamic

understanding endorsed by the regime and the many other versions offered by various

preachers and groups. I investigate some forms of religiosity that are competing today

and trace the doctrinal sources of these versions in specific parts of the religious texts.

My interviews reveal that women perceive significant contradictions between religious

opinions issued by the state-sponsored religious institution, al-Azhar, and those provided

by various preachers. The political struggle between the state and the champions of the

various forms of religiosity is still unresolved; many women trust al-Azhar and treat it as

the primarily source of religious information, while others have very negative opinions

about it. Some participants in the research denounced secularism and the diversion of the

regime from the true religious path, while others were not conscious of any role that the

regime plays in the reconstitution of religiosity.

Another solid manifestation of the intense competition over the process of value

construction is traced in the discourses of religious preachers. Regardless of their

opinions about the acceptable form of the veil and the understandings of religious

teachings, the religious discourses contain subtle antiregime underpinnings and a

message that social reform requires regime reform. A clearer message imbued in all the

sermons is the need to reform the woman as a first and most essential step for restoring

society. During the Nasserite era, woman became the primary target of the state’s

modernizing activities. While most political institutions of the state remained

39

underdeveloped despite many state-sponsored modernization initiatives, the status of

woman was steadily improving as measured by women’s access to education and other

types of opportunities.

The educational reforms initiated during Nasser’s regime benefited both sexes,

but women were targeted intensively through media campaigns.76 The modernization of

woman was the only accessible mode of political development that the state was ready to

implement, and the state functionaries made concerted efforts to promote an image of the

female Egyptian citizen as “modern,” equal in rights and responsibilities to the male, and

free to integrate in society. Because of that emphasis on women, the religious

intelligentsia attempted to reverse the state modernization projects that they perceived as

failed, also by targeting women. All liberalization programs adopted by the state were

sharply critiqued as corrupting policies that are behind all social as well as economic

deterioration that the Egyptian society is currently suffering from. Undoing the state’s

policies towards women liberalization is considered the first step to social reform. Each

preacher proposes a vision of reform that is rooted in a definition of women’s social role

and responsibility.

Another manifestation of the unsettled war of religious visions is the tension

between the forms of religiosity advocated by some religious clerics and the application

of that form by an important agent—the Egyptian woman. Through juxtaposing the

teachings of Islam offered by various preachers and the meanings and practices of

religiosity expressed by the women who support these preachers, one sees that the

76 In Women and Gender and Islam, Ahmed discusses some of the results of Nasser’s policies on

women’s education and the status of women. El-Guindi’s “Veiling Infitah with Muslim Ethic” also spells out some of the results of Nasser’s policies as illustrated in trends in enrollment in engineering and science schools, which were least likely for women to enroll in.

40

women are actively engaged in a process of reconstituting the discourse. In other words,

by accepting the rhetorical tenets proposed by a particular preacher, for example his

advocacy of complete sexual segregation expressed through the acceptance of a Saudi-

like dress form (characterized by complete coverage of all face and body), yet not even

attempting to implement any of these teachings in their lives, women are in effect

transforming the message. Ann Swidler’s77 concept of praxis becomes particularly

relevant here. Culture is a “tool kit” of various traditions, symbols, myths, and stories, but

the meanings of the “tool kit” are determined by how people “share” and “use” the

elements of the toolkit.78 Each preacher invokes a very specific version of Islam and

portrays it as the only true image of this religion. In turn, many women “pick” and

“choose” from all these versions and re-ascribe the image they create to one of the

preachers, and in so doing recreate the message and reconstitute its meaning and scope.79

But why are women pretending to accept a particular version of Islam when their

behaviors demonstrate a fundamental rejection of that version? The answer lies in the

third dimension of power struggle they are engaged in. The global “clash” that the veil

represents is investigated through an analysis of how women see themselves vis-à-vis the

West and the functions the veil performs in dealing with the forces of globalization. Even

though I did not ask any direct question regarding the West, a common theme running

through the female respondents’ discourses is the need to resist the American cultural and

political encroachment through invoking and emphasizing their Muslim identity

whenever possible. Both genders are united in this goal. It could be argued that women

77 Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American Sociological

Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273-86. 78 Swidler, "Culture in Action," 273. 79 This selective internalization of religious teachings is confirmed in my research. Chapters 5, 6,

and 7 detail this process and its implications.

41

partially accepted some of the forms of male dominance as a demonstration of their

rejection of the Western ethos. By accepting the regression of their role in society and

status, they are emphatically rejecting what they see as the U.S.’s false world

liberalization and democratization thesis, under which banner it invaded Iraq.

The women’s attitudes towards globalization, however, are not unidirectional. In

their everyday practices they demonstrate a complete, almost uncontested immersion in a

global world. They partake in the Western lifestyle through their dress, their evening

gatherings at “modern” cafes, the movies they watch, or the cars they drive. They also

watch cable television, which features “liberal”80 Arabic and Western movies as well as

religious and entertainment programs offered via religious cable channels. The demand

for both types of channels (entertainment and religious) is astronomical, and most women

watch both equally enthusiastically.81 Through analyzing the content of cable television,

with an emphasis on religious programs, this research offers a new angle of

understanding the contradictory implications of globalization and how the Islamic world

is succeeding in co-opting some of its forces and dynamics to assert its identity.

Organization of the Chapters

This study is composed of eight chapters. In the following chapter, I provide an

overview of trends in socioeconomic conditions over the last three decades. The analysis

provides a macroeconomic review followed by a description of basic labor force

80 These programs are said to promote morals that are counter to authentic traditions. Women are

featured in non-Islamic clothes and their behavior and clothes on television, according to many respondents in this research, are provocative.

81 Many of the multichannel Arab satellite channels, including ART, Orbit, MBC, Dubai TV, signed agreements with Western-owned media, such as Disney, Movie Channel, MTV, and others to feature some of their programs on their channels. These deals have substantially increased revenues for these channels. See Sakr, Arab Television Today, 109-136; Sakr, Satellite Realms, 99-130.

42

characteristics. Trends in educational attainments and marriage statistics are also

reviewed. In Chapter 3, I detail the methods and approaches adopted in this study. All the

data sources are described and methodological limitations are spelt out there.

In Chapter 4, I look at the veil from a genealogical point of view, starting at the

beginning of the twentieth century. The main goal is to demonstrate the nonlinearity of

veiling practices in Egypt and the varying interpretations of religious text that prevailed

during various eras. I also pinpoint some of the key factors that lead up to changes in the

attitudes towards the veil. While I survey women’s dress in Egypt since the beginning of

the Islamic conquest in the seventh century, a major focus of the chapter is the rise of

nationalist movements in Egypt in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. This

analysis provides a context for examining the interaction between religion and politics in

the early makeup of the nationalist visions. It also offers an appreciation of the role and

position of women in the nationalist movements, which is crucial understanding the links

among the veil, religion, and power in Egypt today.

Chapter 5 explores the meanings and symbols associated with dress styles and the

veil in Egypt today. While analyzing my research assistants’ conversations with Egyptian

women aged 18 to 32, I attempt to dig into the minds of Egyptian women to analyze how

she perceives herself in the larger schema of political and social life in Egypt and how

that role is affected, defected, and effected through the veil. It is through this exploration

that I dissect the dimensions of the gender power dynamics. I also delve into some of the

dimensions of the society-state and global power struggles, although a more exhaustive

analyzes of these arenas of power politics is conducted in Chapter 6.

43

Chapters 6 and 7 examine the various sources of religious education that

constitute religious discourse in Egypt. These chapters combine the analysis of the

interview materials with the content analysis of 60 sermons downloaded and transcribed

from the internet. The sermons were delivered by five popular preachers between 1999

and 2008. Both chapters bring to the fore an underexplored level of globalization, namely

intra-regional globalization. Intra-globalization refers to the fusion of cultures within

regions that are simplistically grouped together in most of the globalization literature,

including Arab cultures, Islamic cultures, Indian cultures, and the like. More specifically,

I investigate the impact of the emergence of Arab satellite television and the new patterns

of migrations among Arab countries on the forms and meanings of religiosity and

perceptions regarding women and the veil in Egypt. I also demonstrate how these new

forms of technology affected state legitimacy and power over the domain of value

constitution in Egypt.

In Chapter 6, I explore the development of one of the manifestations of intra-

regional globalization. I examine the first type of religious media that emerged in the late

1990s which emphasized the liberal face of Islam. This type of media is referred to as the

new-age media. Chapter 7 utilizes a state-in-society approach to demonstrate more

clearly the competition taking place between the state and social groupings over value

contestation at another type of religious media that emerged during the last five years.

This type attempts to resurrect traditional interpretations of Islam that are stricter and

more openly anti-Western.

Both the state and social grouping are actively involved in a process redefining

Egyptian identities through repositioning women’s status and role in society. Reframing

44

women’s roles and attitudes has become the key gauge of success of power politics

taking place among competing religious understandings today. The forms and meanings

associated with the veil are indicative of forms of alliance between diverse social groups

and the religious role model they follow. It is also a symbol of protest against the state, a

phenomenon in which the female agency plays a very active, albeit arguably not fully

conscious, role today.

In the last chapter I summarize all results and show how they feed into my general

argument regarding the three arenas of power struggle. I outline some implications of my

study for the further research on gender, power, and Islam in the Middle East. In

particular, I offer several observations regarding the future of Egypt in light of my

analysis of these three issue-areas. A note on research gaps that this study identified but

did not fully address serves as a capstone of the study.

45

Chapter 2

The Socioeconomic Context of the Mass-Veiling Phenomenon

This chapter overviews the socioeconomic context under which the veiling

phenomenon is taking place. The review covers macroeconomic conditions including the

size of the economy and economic growth, as well as some socio-demographic trends in

labor force, educational attainment, income distribution, and marriage. The analysis

emphasizes trends rather than point values as the goal is to track the various

socioeconomic transformations that were taking place at the time when the veil started to

emerge as a social norm.

Data were drawn from a myriad of domestic and international sources, including

the Egyptian Ministry of Economic Development, the Egyptian Agency for Public

Mobilisation and Statistics, The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the

United Stated Agency for International Development. It should be noted that obtaining

data on socioeconomic conditions in Egypt is a major challenge. There are major

contradictions and inconsistencies in the data. Conditions in Egypt do not always allow

for consistent methodologies, which result in data inconsistencies and series breaks.

Some of the shifts in trends that will be discussed below could simply be the result of

methodological changes that may or may not be highlighted by the entity collecting the

data. In addition, the parties collecting the data are not always neutral, and this also affect

the integrity and accuracy of the data. Given these limitations, and also given the

constraints of this research project, explanations of shifts in trends will not be attempted.

46

Economic Overview

In 2007, Egypt’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was estimated at $130 billion,

which was roughly one percent of the size of the United States economy. Egypt is among

top 50 fastest growing countries in the world, averaging at 5.9 percent growth rate in real

GDP over the last five years.82 In 2007, growth in real GDP was estimated at 7.1 percent,

or three times the rate of growth in the United States for the same year (2.1 percent).

Even after the global recession hit the world at the end of 2007, the Egyptian economy

continued to grow at 7.2 percent in 2008 (Figure 1).83 However, the International

Monetary Fund predicted a decline in this growth rate to reach 3.1 percent in 2010, still a

positive growth.84 During the last six years, growth was spurred by recent new

discoveries in natural gas which brought about significant wealth.85

82 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries.rutgers

.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009). 83 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries.

rutgers.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009). Also author’s calculations.

84 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery April 2009 (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publication Services, 2009).

85 Energy Information Administration: Country Analysis Briefs: Egypt. August 2008. www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/pdf.pdf (accessed July 24, 2009).

47

Figure 1. Annual Growth in Real Per Capita GDP

-4.0-2.0

0.02.0

4.06.0

8.010.0

12.014.0

16.0

19

61

19

64

19

67

19

70

19

73

19

76

19

79

19

82

19

85

19

88

19

91

19

94

19

97

20

00

20

03

20

06

Annual Growth in Real Per Capita GDP Annual Growth in Real GDP

According to world organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

and the World Bank, growth during the 1990s was the result of the economic reform and

structural adjustment programs (ERSAP) which was implemented in 1991. The program

resulted in the transition from a public-sector dominated economy to a private-sector, and

market-oriented economy, a transition that is usually is associated with higher efficiency

and greater resource utilization.86 The growth rate in real per capital GDP, although two

percent lower, has been tracking that of the total GDP.

In addition to the recently discovered natural gas reserves, real estate was another

major engine of growth in Egypt. The state launched several mega developmental

projects, such as building new cities around Cairo. The goal was to reduce the population

density around the Nile Valley and to increase the populated areas in the country.

According to Timothy Mitchell (1999), these developmental projects were carried out by

86 There is a vast literature on the contradictory impacts of the ERSAP programs on the social and

economic conditions in Egypt. See for example, Gouda Abdel Khalek, “Structural Reform or Dutch Disease: On the Macroeconomic Effects of ERSAP,” L'Égypte Contemporaine 84, no. 433-434 (993): 101-149; Joseph Licari, “Economic Reform in Egypt in a Changing Global Economy,” OECD Working Paper 129, 1997.

48

the Egyptian Military, which has become the largest real estate contractor today. The

state has also become a de facto partner in many of the large private sector projects. 87

These private-public partnerships make studies such as Barrington Moore’s the role of

the private sector in democratic transitions inapplicable.88

Income Distribution

In 2007, per capital gross national income in Egypt was estimated at US $1,580,

which is three percent of the per capital national income in the United States. There are

great variations in the average income across income group. Egypt ranks 23rd in terms of

income inequality (measured by GINI Index).89 In 2005, the share of the national income

held by the highest income quintile (highest 20 percent) was 41.4 percent (slightly lower

than the United States’ 46 percent). This means that the top 20 percent hold more than

double their fair share of national income. It amounts to an average annual income of US

$3,275.90 On the other hand, the lowest income quintile holld 8.9 percent, or less than

87 Timothy Mitchell, “Dreamland: The Neoliberalism of Your Desires,” Middle East Report 210

(Spring, 1999): 28-33. 88 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship, Democracy and Socialist Revolution in

Central America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 89 The Gini index measures the extent to which income distribution in a give country deviates from

a perfectly equal income distribution. A Gini index of 0 means that every person receives the same percentage of the national income. A of the population hold x percent of the income. Egypt’s Gini index is estimated at 34.4 percent, while that of the United States is estimated at 40.8, which means that Egypt’s income distribution is less unequal than that of the United States. Data downloaded at the NationMaster.com website, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gin_ind-economy-gini-index&date=2000 (accessed August 1, 2009.

90 This translates into 3.5 percent of the average income of the top 20th quintile in the United States (US $105,017). However, the cost of living in Egypt is much lower than in The United States. Many of the major budget items in the typical family income budget are non existent or is much lower in Egypt. For example, housing costs for families that were established before the 1990s were much lower. People in this income group either own their houses (which is fully paid through heir or savings) or rent them at an annual cost of about $40 annually. On average, an American family spends 33 percent of its income on housing. Other items such as childcare, transportation cost less. Accordingly a family making $200 to $500 a month in Egypt may be meeting their self-sufficiency needs while one making $46,000 a year in a place like New Jersey may not.

49

half their fair share of income.91 The average income of the lower income quintile was

US $707, 5.6 percent of the average income of the highest quintile. Income distribution

has not changed significantly between 1990 and 2005.92

Employment Distribution by Sector and Industry

The share of private sector employment has been rising constantly since the

implementation of the ERSAP programs, growing from 61.5 percent in 1991 to 70.9

percent in 2007 (Figure 2). The increase was the result of a privatization program that

that impacted several large retail, wholesale and manufacturing companies. Between

1998 and 2008, the annual growth in public sector employment averaged 0.4 percent

compared to 2.4 percent for the private sector.93 However, the share of public sector

employment in Egypt is still almost twice as large as that of the United States.

91 Their fair income share would be $1,580. The actual share is 44.5 percent (8.7%/20%) of the

fair share of income, which is $703. 92 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries

.rutgers.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009). 93 Ministry of Economic Development, Employment Distributed by Economic Sector.

http://www.mop.gov.eg/English/Employment.htm. Author’s calculations (accessed August 3, 2009).

50

Figure 2. Employment Share by Sector: Private vs Public Sectors

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

Sh

are

of

Pu

bli

c S

ecto

r E

mp

loym

ent

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

58%

60%

62%

64%

66%

68%

70%

72%

Sh

are

of

Pri

vate

Sec

tor

Em

plo

ymen

t

Public Sector Private Secto

The Egyptian economy is one of the more diversified economies in the Arab

world. The share of its primary sector, or the sector concerned with the utilization of raw

materials from agricultural products and mining, has been declining constantly, while

those of the secondary (manufacturing of finished goods) and tertiary (services) sectors

were expanding. Between 1972 and 2007, the share of agricultural sector declined from

31.1 percent to 14.1 percent. The industry (manufacturing and mining) and services

sectors were more volatile and inversely proportional (Figure 3).94

94 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries.rutgers

.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009).

51

Figure 3. Percentage Share of Agriculture, Industry and Services Sector in GDP

12.0

17.0

22.0

27.0

32.0

37.0

42.0

47.0

52.0

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) Industry, value added (% of GDP)

Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)

One of the most important industries in Egypt is, constituting 3.5 percent of total

GDP and 10 percent of the industrial sector. It also constitutes one-quarter of the

manufacturing exports. Egypt is one of the largest garment exporters in the world,

ranking 38th worldwide. The textile and garment industry is also among the fastest

growing industries, with an average annual growth rate of six percent or higher.95 Muslim

women’s fashion is boasting the garment industry growth. Some observers argue that the

diversity and creativity in the veil fashion industry is partly responsible for the current

spread of the veil.96

Population and Labor Force

95 YnFx Yarn ExportWatch, “Egypt’s Textile and Apparel Industry,” YNFX Yarn Monitor” Monthly Textile Market Intelligence 2(5), 2009. Egypt's Textile And Apparel Industry Yarn and Fabrics Exchange. http://www.yarnsandfibers.com/yarn_monitor/feb09/index.php?a=2 (accessed July 24, 2009).

96 For example, a program broadcasted on cable television in 2006 called the “Return of the Veil” argued that that availability of a wide variety of veil styles a fashion-forward garment industry was one factor responsible for the spread of the veil. The program resulted in a lot of debate, and several blogs followed, including one at http://sendrlla.blogspot.com/2006/09/blog-post_14.html and another at http://www.thakafa.net/vb/showthread.php?t=6297 (accessed July 24, 2009).

52

Egypt is the largest Arab state in population size, currently at 77 million.97 It also

ranks 16th in the world in population size.98 In terms of population growth, however,

Egypt ranks 88th in the world, with a population growth rate of 1.7 percent.99 The

government launched a major population control campaign in the 1980s and 90s that

resulted in the reduction of population growth from 2.6 percent between 1980 and 1985

to its current level.100 The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

projected that the growth rate will continue to decline to reach a level of 0.55 percent by

2050.101

The population size, however, does not translate into human capital in Egypt. This

is mainly due to a low labor participation rate and the lack of economic and work

opportunities for utilizing these human resources. Egypt has the second lowest labor

force participation rate in the world, with less than half (49.4 percent) of the population

being employed or actively seeking employment.102 The participation rate has been

declining trend since the end of the 1980s, and has continued its downward until the into

the third millennium, when the rate started reversing slowly (Figure 4).103

Figure 4. Labor Force Participation Rate of Women

97 Egyptian Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics. http://www.msrintranet .capmas.gov.eg

(accessed July 19, 2009). 98 Alyaa Awad and Ayman Zohary, The End of Egypt Population Growth in the 21st Century:

Challenges and Aspirations, The 35th Annual Conference on Population and Development Issues: Current Situation and Aspirations, Cairo Demographic Center, Cairo 20 - 22 December 2005.

99 Source: Index Mundi. http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=eg&v=24 (accessed July 19, 2009).

100 Awad and Zohary, The End of Egypt Population Growth in the 21st Century. 101 Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United

Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects. http://esa.un.org/unpp (accessed July 19, 2009). 102 Source: NationMaster.com. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/

lab_for_par_rat_tot_of_tot_pop_age_1564-total-population-ages-15-64 (accessed July 24, 2009). 103 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries.rutgers

.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009).

53

45.0

46.0

47.0

48.0

49.0

50.0

51.0

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

% o

f Tota

l Popula

tion A

ge

15+

Labor Force

Labor force participation rates among women are particularly low. On average,

four in five women are not participants in the labor force, compared to one in four for

men. Figures 5 and 6 present trends in labor force participation rates for men and women

over the last three decades. During the early 1980s, or the first years in the current

regime, participation rates for both men and women were increasing. The trend, however,

reversed quickly for men (starting 1983). Women’s participation rate continued to

increase until the end of the 1980s. The rates for both men and women continued to

decrease during the 1990s. Towards the end of the 1990s, participation rate started

increasing for women; it increased by 3.7 percent between 1998 and 2007. For men,

however, it continued to decline.

54

Figure 5. Male Labor Force Participation Rates

68.0

70.0

72.0

74.0

76.0

78.0

80.0

82.0

19

80

19

82

19

84

19

86

19

88

19

90

19

92

19

94

19

96

19

98

20

00

20

02

20

04

20

06

% o

f P

op

ula

tio

n

Figure 6. Female Labor Force Participation Rates

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

22.0

24.0

26.0

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

% o

f P

op

ula

tio

n

Unemployment

Significant gender disparities were also found in terms of unemployment. In

Egypt, of the 23 percent of women in the labor force, only four in five were employed.

That is, only one in six (16 percent) women ages 15 and up were employed, compared to

55

66 percent for men. The rates were on the rise during the early years of the

implementation of the ERSAP program, and then they started declining during the second

half of the 1990s to rise again starting the year 2000. There were no notable gender

differences in the trends. However, female’s unemployment rates were two to five times

as large as the male’s rate on average. The unemployment rate differential peaked in

2000, when the female’s unemployment rate was 4.5 times as large as the male’s rate.

This demonstrates that women face complex structural problems in society today, some

imposed by the economy and others triggered by other socioeconomic and cultural

problems.

Figure 7. Unemployment Rates: Male vs. Female

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

22.0

24.0

26.0

Fem

ale

Unem

plo

ymen

t R

ate

(% o

f Lab

or Forc

e)

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

Mal

e U

nem

plo

ymen

t R

ate

(% o

f Lab

or Forc

e)

56

Figure 8. Ratio of Female to Male Unemployment Rates

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Employment

Over the last 15 years, the average growth in employment levels for both men and

women averaged 3.1 percent. Employment growth rate for women was quite volatile

spiking to 19 percent in one year (2007) and dropping to almost negative four percent in

the following year. Men’s growth rate in men’s employment on the other hand has been

relatively more stable, and never recorded a negative value (Figure 9).104

This volatility in female employment and unemployment statistics may be

attributed to several factors. First, the base year employment for women is very small.

Accordingly, small changes in the absolute level of employment translate into big relative

changes. Also, as noted earlier, there are major limitations in data collection in Egypt,

which may result in inexplicable changes. It may also suggest that the gains that women

realized in terms of employment are not deep enough. Changes in family conditions, such

as new births, or in social attitudes towards women’s work may result in significant

104 Egypt’s Information Portal. http://www.eip.gov.eg/nds/nds_view.aspx?id=3693 (accessed July

25, 2009).

57

changes in women’s employment and labor force participation. However, data still

suggest that women’s economic power has increased significantly over the last decade.

Between 2001 and 2006, women’s labor force participation increased by 2.2 percent

(Figure 9) and their share in non-agricultural employment increased by 2.8 percent

(Figure 10).105 As will be noted in the following chapters, these results are particularly

significant with respect to this project. The transformation in attitudes towards the veil

towards the end of the 1990s was associated with greater economic role for women.

Figure 9. Growth Rates in Employment: Men versus Women

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

1993

1994

1995

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Grow th Rate in Women's Employment Grow th Rate in Men's Employment

105 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries

.rutgers.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009).

58

Figure 10. Women’s Share in Nonagricultural Employment

16

17

17

18

18

19

19

20

20

21

21

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1997

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

% o

f T

ota

l No

n-A

gri

gu

ltu

ral E

mp

loym

ent

Education

The public sector is the principal provider of education services in Egypt.

Education is free through university and compulsory from ages six through 15. This is

one of the main legacies of the Nasserite regime. During the 1950s and 1960s, the regime

democratized education; it made it accessible and free to every Egyptian. New schools

were erected in villages and remote areas which previously had no access to public

services.106 The educational campaign was coupled with an employment guarantee for

every university graduate, which promoted exponential increases in enrollment in all

educational levels. Today, according to the 2006 Egyptian Literacy rates have also been

increasing. Between 1986 and 2006, illiteracy rate decreased from 49.6 percent to 30

percent. The rate is higher for women (37.3 percent) than for men (22 percent).

106 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report on Education 1998/99

(Nasr City: Institute of National Planning, 2000).

59

While education is free through college in Egypt, the Nasserite policies also

resulted in an educational system that is overloaded and severely undersupplied. The

system overall has failed to deliver on its core mission. Many Egyptian parents today,

especially in Cairo, send their children to private schools. Countrywide, seven to nine

percent of all primary students were enrolled in private schools between 2002 and

2007.107 This percentage is significantly higher in Alexandria and Cairo, but there is no

data available on school enrollment in bigger cities in Egypt.

One of the main reasons behind the deficiency of the public education system in

Egypt is the low salaries for teachers. According to the 1998-99 Human Development

Report, teachers earned $35 a month. Many of these teachers supplement their income by

providing services through an informal education sector. They offer private lessons to

students that can afford it. Children of parents who cannot afford private lessons end up

with very low quality education and are more at risk to drop out. A 1996/97 survey

conducted by the Egyptian Ministry of Education found that 63 percent of students at the

preparatory level (equivalent to Grades seven to nine in the United States) take private

lessons.108 Students who are able to enroll at a college or a university are generally the

ones who have the means to afford this informal market.

107 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries

.rutgers.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009). 108 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report on Education 1998/99, 26,

82.

60

Figure 11. Distribution of Educational Status in Egypt

Illiterate30%

Below Intermediate

19%

Intermediate26%

Above Intermediate

3%

University or Above

10%

Read and Write or in

Literacy Campaign

13%

There are significant differences in the distribution of educational status in Cairo

compared to the total country population. Literacy rate in Cairo is higher (80 percent

versus 70 percent countrywide) and the ratio of people who are either enrolled at a

university or have attained an university degree or higher is twice as high in Cairo. Data

also reveal smaller gender differentials in educational attainment in Cairo. Twenty-three

percent of Egyptian males have (or are working on) a university degree compared to 19

percent for women (Figure 12).109 The ratio is higher for men and women between 20

and 30 years. At the country level, 15 percent of men and women 20 to 30 years old have

or are working on a bachelor’s degree. Data for Cairo City are not available. But

assuming the same relative distribution of educational attainment in Cairo compared to

the overall Egyptian population, it is estimated that at least 30 percent of Cairenes ages

20 to 30 years have or are in the process of attaining a bachelor’s degree. These

educational statistics are highly comparable to the United States statistics on the

109 Egyptian Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, The Final Results of the Population

and Housing Census 2006, Table 4, Population Distribution by Educational Status and Sex 10 Years and Above http://www.msrintranet.capmas.gov.eg (accessed July 19, 2009).

61

distribution of population by educational attainment, which is estimated at 26 percent.110

This research is based on interviews with women with some college education or who

graduated college. Participants in the study represent about one third of the total Cairene

populatio

Figure 12. Distribution of Educational Status in Cairo Egypt

n.

16%

23%

10% 9%

20%19%

30%

23%

19%

32%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Male Female

Illiterate Read & Write Below Intermediate Intermediate+ University or Above

While women’s participation in the labor force in Egypt is lower than in Western

countries, their enrollment at higher education institutions is relatively high and is on an

upward trend. The size of female enrollment at bachelor level higher education

institutions rose by 71 percent between 1991 and 1996. Moreover, their enrollment as a

percentage of total enrollment rose from 33 percent in 1985 to 35 percent in 1991 to 41

110 U.S. Census Bureau, 2005-2007 American Community Survey. http://factfinder.census.gov/

servlet/DTSubjectServlet?_ts=267233517234 (accessed August 2, 2009).

62

percen

t once graduated, they

ce many cultural and social barriers to employment, resulting in an unemployment rate

that is more than three times as large as than for men.

t in 1996.111 This is comparable to university level enrollment in the United

States., where women constitute 42 percent of tertiary enrollment.112

There is high demand for science, mathematics, and engineering majors in Egypt

In 1990-91, women represented 31 percent of total enrollment in bachelor’s of science

majors (compared to 35 percent in the United States).113 However, this ratio decreased to

24 percent in 1996.114 It appears that the fields of study in Egypt are less gendered in

Egypt than in other parts of the world. Women in Egypt (and many other Arab Countries)

are more likely to excel in science and mathematics fields of study than their counterparts

in other parts of the world. However, as the labor force analysis above demonstrates, their

competitiveness at the level of education does not translate proportionally in the labor

market. Egyptian women are welcomed in all fields of study, bu

fa

for women

Marriage

There have been changes in patterns and trends of marriage that could have

impacted the behavior of both young men and women, especially urban men and women

ages 20 to 30 years. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the worsening

economic conditions have resulted in delayed marriages. The problem is not restricted to

111 See Subhi Qasem, Higher Education System in the Arab States: Development of Science and

112 Data on gender distribution at higher education institutions in the United States was obtained from United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Institute for Statistics,

Technology Indicators (Cairo: UNESCO and ESCWA, 1998).

Custom Tables. http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (accessed August 01, 2009). Data on Egypt was obtained from Subhi Qasem’s Higher Education System in the Arab States study, which was prepared for the UNESCO. There are differences in the definitions and methodologies that render these data incomparable.

113 Linda J. Sax, “Undergraduate Science Majors: Gender Differences in Who Goes to Graduate School.” The Review of Higher Education 24, no, 2 (2001): 153-172.

114 Qasem, Higher Education System in the Arab States.

63

lower-income groups. Upper-middle classes have high economic and social expectations

regarding the potential mates of their daughters. These expectations divert significantly

from th

r women aged 25-49

increased by 1.9 years (Figure 13).117 The average age at first marriage is correlated with

years of education that the woman obtained. The Demographic Health Surveys reveal

that me ian age of marriage for women with a secondary education was more than four

years higher than that for women with only primary education.118

e realities of these times, as the housing crisis and the prices of furniture, jewelry

and other marriage essentials are beyond the reach of even the upper-middle-class

groups.115 This has created what many call today “marriage crisis,” or the transformation

of marriage from a social norm to a luxury. 116

Delayed marriage is evidenced by data on average age of marriage in Egypt.

Between 1988 and 2005, the median age at first marriage fo

d

115 For an analysis on the effect of economic and work conditions on women, see Sajeda Amin and

Nagah H. Al-Bassusi, “Wage, Work, and Marriage: Perspectives of Egyptian Working Women,” Journal of Marriage and Family 66, no.5 (2004): 1287-1299.

116 For a sample of some featured stories on the marriage crisis in Egypt today, see Rahim Sayani, “Marriage in Crisis,” The Yale Globalist, Jan. 22, 2009. http://tyglobalist.org/index.php/20090121181/ Features/Marriage-in-Crisis.html (accessed August 1, 2009) Magdi Abdelhadi, “Spotlight on Egypt's Marriage Crisis,” BBC News, Cairo, Aug 12, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7554892.stm (accessed August 1, 2009).

117 The Demographic and Health Survey is a program funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and is conducted in developing countries.

118 Source: Egypt Demographic Health Survey, Macro International Inc, 2009. MEASURE DHS STATcompiler. http://www.measuredhs.com (accessed August 1, 2009). No data on women with college education are available.

64

Figure 13. Median Age at First Marriage Women 25-49 Years

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

1988 1992 1995 2000 2005

Ag

e

All Women Urban Women

Data also reveal significant increases in the percentage of women aged 20-24

years who were single from 20 percent in 1947 to 56 percent in 1998 (Figure 14).119 This

trend continued into the 2000s. According to the Demographic Health Survey, the

percentage of single women aged 25 to 29 increased from 13.4 percent in 1995 to 16.2

percent in 2000 and then to 18.7 percent in 2005.120

119 Amin and Al-Bassusi, “Wage, Work, and Marriage,”5. 120Fatma El-Zanaty, Enas M. Hussein, Gihan A. Shawky, Ann Way , and Sunita Kishor. Egypt

Demographic and Health Survey 1995 (Calverton , Maryland: National Population Council and Macro International Inc.,1996); Fatma El-Zanaty and Ann A. Way. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2000 (Calverton, Maryland: Ministry of Health and Population, National Population Council, and ORC Macro, 2001); Fatma El-Zanaty and Ann A. Way. Egypt Demographic and Health Survey 2005 (Cairo: Ministry of Health and Population, National Population Council, El-Zanaty & Associates, and ORC Macro, 2006).

65

Figure 14. Percentage of Single Women and Men Aged 20-24

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1947 1966 1976 1988 1998

Female Male

Conclusion

Analyses of the socioeconomic conditions in Egypt reveal a number of facts.

First, macroeconomic conditions are full of contradictions. Simple measures of economic

performance place Egypt in high international rankings with respect to its growth

capacity. They mask, however, deep structural problems. Real estate is a central engine

of growth in the country. The wealth resulting from real estate developmental projects is

shared by a very small minority, thus skewing measures of economic performance and

wellbeing. The majority of Egyptians are suffering from many types of deprivations. In

addition, in spite of high growth rates, human capital utilization rates are quite low. Even

those who are employed are still not making a living wage.

Egypt also ranks high in the world with respect to the educational attainments of

its population. One in five Egyptians has a university degree. However, a university

66

education today does not guarantee a job, and even more importantly, does not guarantee

a job related to one’s education. A physician may graduate to work as a record keeper or

cab driver. In spite of the growth in private sector employment (today accounting for

about 30 percent of all jobs), it still has very limited capacity to absorb surplus workers.

One of Nasser’s legacies was the portrayal of a public sector job as a social right–

every university graduate in Egypt was promised a public sector job. The legacy has

continued until this day. University graduates still wait for an “employment letter” from

the government, which may take years even decades. However, when they get the job,

they find out that they are adding to an already huge labor surplus. There is very little

work to do; public sector employees for the most part sit at their desks solving crosswalk

puzzles, doing crochet, or just going for a walk.121 Accordingly, young Egyptians do not

perceive themselves as playing an active role in the economic boom that Egypt is

experiencing, as will be demonstrated further in the analysis of responses to the detailed

interview. Developments happen irrespective of their engagement and for the most part

have little or no impact or on their prosperity.

The divorce between talent, education, and work opportunities is even more

profound for women. Women in Egypt excel in the science and technology fields. They

face almost no barriers in studying these fields. However, they face significant barriers to

employment. Other research confirms this lack of correlation between educational

attainment and work opportunities for women.122 This study does not analyze the causes

of these barriers. However, it is important to note that these conditions are part of the

social context that affects women’s choices and behaviors related to the veil. The

121 Judith. Cochran, Education in Egypt (London: Croom Helm, 1986). 122 Amin and Al-Bassusi, “Wage, Work, and Marriage.”

67

following chapters will demonstrate that the veil may be considered one of the strategies

that women utilize to cope with these barriers.

Women continue to face barriers to employment today. However, analyses reveal

notable improvements in women’s participation in economic activity. Women’s share in

employment has been increasing almost steadily since 2000 and they have been making

efforts to become more active in the economic and professional realm. Accordingly, any

analysis that takes one data point in time and concludes that the spread of the veil is a

reflection of women’s oppression or economic marginalization is quite misleading and

should be avoided. Although women’s role in the economy is limited, participation rate

data have been trending up during the same period that saw an increase in veiling among.

Again, this does not suggest any causal relationship, poositive or negative, between the

veil and women’s economic power, which may be correlated with delayed marriage or

other factors. Although it is beyond the scope of this research to analyze the relationship

between the macroeconomic and social changes that were taking place in Egypt over the

last two decades and the mass-veiling phenomenon that dates back to the end of the

1990s, it is clear that this phenomenon is deeply entrenched in these conditions that affect

both men and women in Egypt.

68

Chapter 3

Methods and Sample Profiles

Introduction

This research is based in large part on Norwood Russell Hanson’s Logic of

Discovery as opposed to the Logic of Proof. 123 There is little emphasis here on

hypotheses-setting and evidence-searching in support or refutation to these hypotheses.

Given the dearth of research on the process through which the veil emerges or retreats as

a social norm, it is important to follow an investigative design that explores various

processes under which the veil emerged and to identify reasons to suggest (rather than

set) any given hypothesis. This method involves a significant level of inductive reasoning

regarding the triggers and logics of veiling among women.

My Method

This research integrated techniques from three seminal methods in political

science, namely historical analysis,124 case study,125 and interpretive methods.126

Historical analysis was employed to trace the trajectory of veiling practices in Egypt

123 Norwood Russell Hanson, “The Logic of Discovery,” The Journal of Philosophy 55, no. 25

(1958):1073-1089. 124 The James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003) provide a description of comparative

historical analysis in political science. I compared various periods in the Egyptian history and used techniques and assumptions outlined in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer’s article. See James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas,” in Comparative Historical Analysis and Social Sciences, eds. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

125 Assumptions and techniques were based on John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” American Political Science Review 98, no.2, (2004): 341-354; Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, “Part 1,” in Case Studies and Theory Development, eds. Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004): pp. 1-37.

126 See Jan Kubik, “Introducing Rigor to the Teaching of Interpretive Methods,” Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, (Spring 2009): 11-17.

69

since the seventh century. This trajectory highlighted the similarities and differences in

the socioeconomic conditions that prevailed during various phases of the veiling history.

This method provided the necessary context for the various concepts and themes

related to the practices of veiling and seclusion in Egypt. It also helped provide a context-

sensitive understanding of the “origins” of the veil phenomenon and outline the

socioeconomic factors that had brought about changes in veiling practices. The method

by itself, however, could not fully capture the role of culture and praxis in producing

change, especially in political and cultural symbols. This was particularly true given the

near absence of women’s voices in the historical data sources available. This limitation

was overcome through mixing this research strategy with interpretive and small-N

methods.

The second method employed in this research was case study. There are a myriad

of methods and research designs classified under this label. Some scholars portray case-

study as one where the number of cases analyzed is not big enough to qualify for a large-

N quantitative design.127 Following John Gerring, I define a case study as one that

investigates a “single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar)

units.” The unit here refers to a historically-specific phenomenon, which, in my study is

the veil.128 The implementation was carried out through the design of a semistructured

interview that allowed for broad conversations with young Egyptian women regarding

127 See for example Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, The

American Political Science Review 65, no.3 (1971): 682-693.Lijphart argues that large-N studies are always superior. King, Koehane, and Verba (1997) disagree, and argue that through a “good” research design; small-N studies may produce valid causal inferences that may surpass large-N studies in power. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methodology for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

128 Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” 342.

70

what the veil meant to them, how it related to their social roles and identities, and the

various sources of information that constituted those meanings.

The interview was conducted with 65 young women who shared some basic

socioeconomic characteristics. Yes/no questions were avoided as well as any other

questions that might predispose women to a certain response. This was necessary to

ensure that the discovery process sought in this research remained intact. The goal of the

interview was to examine how these women perceive and respond to the complexities of

the social transformations that are rapidly unfolding today. Content analysis was used in

the analysis of the interview results. No inferences regarding causal relationships were

sought as I was more interested in answering the questions what and how than why.

Specifically, my research sought to understand the meanings of the veil today and how

these meanings and forms came about.

The method, while not appropriate for making inferences regarding why a specific

phenomenon took place, is useful in illuminating causal mechanisms. Gerring argues,

“The in-depth analysis of a single unit [through] evidence-gathering—over-time and

within-unit variation—is likely to provide clues into what connects a purported X to a

particular Y.”129 As such, the research identified particular domains at which some of the

processes underlying the veil phenomenon took place, one of which was digital media.

Many interview respondents indicated that digital religious media, which only emerged

towards the end of the 1990s, played an important role in the mass spreading of the veil

towards the end of the 1990s. Some of the respondents celebrated this effect while other

bemoaned. Almost all women, however, confirmed that it played an important role in

changing veiling attitudes and practices. These results suggested the importance of

129 Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” 348.

71

examining the domain of religious media to identify the processes that links them to the

reconstitution of religiosity and religious practices in Egypt.

The interpretive method was used to analyze the relationship between religious

media and the veil. This method is heavily influenced by the anthropological tradition.

One of the main founders of this tradition is Clifford Geertz. In his studies, Geertz seeks

to advance a “thick description” or an interpretation of “the meanings attributed to

politics. Charles Taylor (1987) comments,

Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study. This object must, therefore, be a text, or a text-analogue, which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory – in one way or another unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense.130

Max Weber is one of the earlier proponents of the use of interpretive techniques

to understand or Verstehen the meanings of various concepts and phenomena and how

these meanings are context-specific. The strength of the interpretative approach lies in its

ability to offer deep descriptions and elucidations that other methods fail to do. For

example, much of the literature on collective action that is rooted in rational choice

theory postulates that actors with similar interests organize to affect policy outcomes.

Some literature goes a step further and provides a theory of interest formation. However,

without any knowledge of the cultural values and the value system that actors revolve in,

we are not able to understand the effectiveness of the collective force. Veiling, for

example, is analyzed here as a collective movement seeking to challenge and/or adapt to

particular forces and power struggles.

130 As cited in Jan Kubik’s notes on the philosophy of sciences and the comparative analysis, dated

09/28/2004.

72

Understanding the nature of this collective action requires an analysis of the

various prevailing discourses on the veil. At one level, the words and language of women

interviewed provided one source of data for the interpretive analysis. The method was

used to understand why women veil and to reconstruct their motivations vis-à-vis the

domain of religious discourse, constituted mainly by religious media. This involved what

Kubik (2009) calls semiotic/communicative interpretation.131 Kubik elucidates three

components of this method: the intended meaning of the message, the meaning of the

message, and the reception/interpretation (by an actor) of the meaning.132 The imparter of

the message in this context are the managers, owners, and preachers of religious media

channels. The receivers are the women who follow these media sources. Interpretations

regarding the meanings and functions of the veil were juxtaposed with the meanings of

the veil and religiosity imparted by preachers to understand how the religious message(s)

was (were) filtered by women and what their roles were in reconfiguring the message(s).

I should note here that religious media was not treated as a causal factor. Rather,

it wa viewed as one of several other sites at which the politics of the veil could be

unraveled. My analysis also built on Joel Migdal’s State-in-Society approach133 which is

a processual analysis of conflict and struggle. This media site helps understand how

state, religious groups, and various individuals interact and produce various identity

definitions and cultural meanings.

131 Kubik, “Introducing Rigor to the Teaching of Interpretive Methods,”12. 132 Kubik, “Introducing Rigor to the Teaching of Interpretive Methods,”14-15. 133 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society.

73

The Interviewers

Two interviewers were hired to conduct the detailed interviews. Both were

college students but they came from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Hind,134 a

female in the late twenties, was a student at the Faculty of Pharmacy, Cairo University,

one of the top schools in Egypt that has a higher representation of upper and upper-

middle classes in Cairo. Hind is unveiled and although conservative in her dress style, she

has become disenfranchised due to her lack of conformity. Many times the interviewer

and interviewee shared experiences and thoughts and their voices sometimes

commingled, which provided me with a different vantage point for analysis. The unveiled

women opened up to Hind and shared some of the fears, concerns, and the guilt feeling

that society imposes on the unveiled. Some of the veiled women, on the other hand, were

glad to participate in the study as it was an opportunity to preach and warn Hind, albeit

indirectly, to conform, which again, gave me almost first-hand exposure to peer and

social pressures and the perceived responsibilities Muslim women feel towards the

unveiled that dictate certain behaviors.

Hind had a particular advantage with unveiled women, as she was unveiled

herself. Veiled women, however, in many cased felt obliged to preach to her and not talk

much about their personal experiences that could reflect negatively on the image of the

veil. The vast majority of the interviews, therefore, were conducted by Hatem. Although

he interviewed some friends whose characteristics conform to my target population, most

of the women he interviewed were acquaintances he knew through the variety of

134 These are not the interviewers’ real name. The names of the interviewers are concealed to

protect their privacy and security.

74

networks to which he has access. This allowed for controlling variation in the

socioeconomic characteristics without causing unnecessary bias in the responses.

Hatem, a male in his mid-twenties, was a student in the Open Education Center of

Cairo University. He is a highly sociable person who works three different jobs. In

addition, he is keen to develop himself professionally through signing up for some

postsecondary professional certification in the field of computer technology and again

that gave him a very wide access to respondents from different socioeconomic

backgrounds. His strength lied in his large social capital and network that gave me easy

access to my target group. He also had a personal charm combined with an image of

trustworthiness that allowed him to engage in open conversations with young women

who comfortably shared with him their experiences and concerns. His gender, therefore,

in many cases was helpful as many women opened up with him regarding their views

about Egyptian masculinity. Also the fact that he was neither veiled nor unveiled (as a

man) gave him the appearance of neutrality vis-à-vis both groups.

The Interview Instrument

Given that my research project was exploratory in nature, I decided to design an

interview instrument that would encourage women to open up and share their experiences

and thoughts. My questions were designed to quite broad and neutral, not assuming any

preconceived notions of an answer. They were also indirect, providing just guidance, not

direction, so that respondents talk about what they wanted to share with me rather than

what I expected to hear. In many cases, respondents provided answers that did not seem

relevant. I instructed the interviewers not to correct the respondents or try to get answers

to specific questions. As I looked at all answers globally, I found those “irrelevant”

75

answers most interesting. It was the fragments of respondents’ wanderings and

digressions that were most revealing during the course of my research.

A semistructured interview design was used in this study. My background as an

Egyptian, and my previous conversations with friends and acquaintances in the past

regarding the veil provided a good starting point regarding what I needed to know and

how to extract that information in an Egyptian society. The goals of the interview were as

follows:

1) Explore the experiences of being veiled (or unveiled),

2) Understand what prompts them to either veil or consider to veil,

3) Investigate the scope and constraints of the women’s agency with regards to

veiling and not veiling,

4) Delve into the meanings of religiosity and the veil,

5) Investigate any perceived differences in the meanings and practices of

religiosity between the current and previous generation,

6) Decipher young women’s religious knowledge and examine its homogeneous

and heterogeneous constituents, and

7) Research competing forces in the process of value construction and how they

relate to the state.

The interview instrument was composed of 33 open-ended questions.135 The first

section collected basic demographic information about age, city of residence, college,

work and marital status, as well as parents’ occupation. These questions were intended to

provide socio-demographic baseline data, the effect of which may have impact on

women’s dress styles as well as social and religious outlooks. Although some scholars

would prefer to ask personal questions towards the end of the interview,136 the

135 Full Interview instrument is listed in Appendix A. 136 See Beth Leech, “Asking Questions: Techniques for Semistructured Interviews,” PS: Political

Science and Politics 35, no. 4(2002): 666.

76

similarities in the backgrounds of the interviewer and interviewee meant that this would

not be a problem. In contrast, it is necessary to start with these questions as they provided

the interviewer with some context and leveling information that were helpful throughout

the interview

The second section explored the decision-making process of the veil. It also

attempted to look at the women’s veil from a generational point view. Questions aimed at

comparing the women’s veil to their parents and looked into the role of parents in the

women’s choice of whether to veil or not, and the veil style they wore. The number of

years of experience with the veil and the timing of the veil decision provided useful

indications regarding factors that might have impacted the decision to veil, other than

what they identified as immediate prompts. There were also a couple of questions about

how the veil groups and ungroups people. Are friendships and social associations

determined and/or affected by the veil? Does the veil constitute an axis of conflict or

differentiation between women with otherwise similar social backgrounds? Answering

these questions helped better understand the social dynamics of veiling practices.

The following section was designed to understand the symbols and meanings of

the veil, the messages veiled women seek to send through their dress, and the functions

performed by the veil that they can identify. The section consisted of a number of

questions on the meaning of the veil and whether women perceived any differences in

their roles and responsibilities as Muslim women after they veiled. I also probed deeper

into the experience with the veil by asking question on moments of pride that the veil

brought about, accomplishments they realized through veiling, and the benefits of the veil

they perceived.

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The fourth section of the interview sought to understand why the veil started to

spread so rapidly towards the end of the 1990s. Did participants consider the veil a

religious duty? If yes, why was it not followed so diligently in the past? Did they

perceive the veil and dress style to be directly correlated with the person’s religiosity?

Did they think society was experiencing a religious revival? Did they perceive a moral

revival? Did they think moral revival and religious revival were correlated andor moving

in the same direction in Egypt today? All these questions were designed to see the status

of religiosity and morality in Egypt through the woman’s lens and understand her

experiences with and responses to all the conflicts and paradoxes she is facing on a daily

basis.

The fifth section examined the makeup of women’s religious awareness. I asked

questions on what sources of information women relied on for their religious education,

how they chose those sources, how they assessed the reliability of these sources of

information, and what role they thought those medium sources played in spreading the

veil. These questions were devised to provide leads on how women knew what they knew

about their religion and to understand what efforts they made to know more about Islam.

Once the source was identified, it was decided that content analysis would be conducted

on that media source to investigate the most influential inputs into women’s religious

awareness and the roles of these sources in re-conceptualizing the veil and religiosity in

Egypt.

The religious awareness section was followed with a section on religious

authority. Who did women trust for a religious opinion? Did they perceive conflicts

between various sources of religious information? How did they view the role of the

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state-sponsored Azhar institutions, the only official source of religious decree in Egypt?

This section examined the ingredients of women’s religious information and the religious

authorities they trusted. The answers that women provided were most revealing in

demonstrating the competition over the value construction process and the ongoing

power struggle between the state and the myriad of religious preachers and groups today.

A series of questions were then asked regarding the current forms of the veil. Did

the women perceive a great variety in veiling styles? Did they approve of this variety?

Why did they think there were too many veiling styles today, if they did? What did this

variety reflect with regards the character of the Egyptian woman? These questions were

all intended to expose the relationships among religiosity, identity, and the veil and to

understand more deeply the functions that the veil were currently performing (and not

performing) in the Egyptian society.

Although the questions were, by and large, posed in the indicated order, the order

of the answers was often different. In many instances I had to look for answers to certain

questions or comments regarding particular themes throughout the entire interview. The

interviewers were instructed to be flexible and to make a conscious effort to follow the

interviewees’ line of thought and not to ask them or direct them to follow the particular

order of the interview, a recommendation offered by Jennifer Mason. Mason explains that

“interviewees may be ‘answering’ questions other than those we are asking them, and

making sense of the social world in ways we had not thought of.”137 Instead of correcting

interviewees who might have misunderstood the question or did not answer it, I asked

how the answer they provided related to the question and what they meant. The questions

137 Jennifer Mason, “Qualitative Interviewing: Asking, Listening and Interpreting,” in Qualitative

Research in Action, ed. Tim May, 231 (London: Sage, 2002).

79

were often interjected by follow-ups and probes which were quite revealing. In many

cases, the interview that was designed to last 45 minutes took 90 minutes as women

wanted to share their experiences and thoughts about a subject that touched them daily.

The interview was conducted in Arabic. Some of the women that Hind

interviewed were switching between Arabic and English, a common practice among

upper-middle classes. In general, the transcripts were in Arabic and I translated them. I

often went back to the interviewers to ask them about my translation and interpretation

and whether the interviewee could have meant one thing or another. The interviewers

made themselves indefinitely available throughout the entire summer, and we met weekly

via online chat programs (msn messenger) where we discussed progress, went over each

interview they conducted, discussed plans and scheduled interviews for the following

week and addressed any issues/concerns. We also corresponded daily via e-mail and

sometimes several times a day. Their enthusiasm about the project and their thoughts on

what they heard and learned through the study were quite inspiring.

The Sample

This research focused on young educated middle-class woman who were either

college undergraduates or recent graduates. College students and recent college graduates

were selected as they constitute tomorrow’s technocratic group. Their values today will

therefore shape the future of the Egyptian economy and society. They provide a lot of

insight on the processes of identity formation taking place today and how these processes

would likely impact the prospects of the Egyptian society in the future. This group has

also been understudied in the literature on the veil. Extant literature focused mainly on

the working class. Many of these views found a statistically significant correlation

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between class/income and the propensity to veil.138 The rapid proliferation of the veil

among the middle- and upper-middle class, however, is a new phenomenon that emerged

in the late 1990s. The veil examined here is also quite different from that of the past. It

comes in a much wider variety and provides unique synergies between what is considered

modern and what is traditional. It has been advanced and promoted by middle and upper-

middle classes in Egypt.

The sample was selected using such criteria as age, dress style, social background,

and type of college. The interview instrument asked basic socio-demographic questions,

including age, name of high school, college/university, and marital and employment

statuses. A description of the woman’s dress style at the time of the interview was

provided by the interviewer. The target was women who have at least some college

training,139 and who were between 18 and 30 years old, although a couple of the women

were marginally over my targeted age.

The mean age of the women interviewed in this study was 24 years old. Over a

third of the sample were between 23 and 24 years old, and 60 percent were between 20

and 25 years old (Figure 15). The vast majority (81.5 percent) of the respondents were

single. The sample was roughly equally distributed among students, recent graduates who

joined the ranks of the unemployed and employed women. Three quarters (50

respondents) of the respondents were veiled. Of the 15 that were unveiled, a third

reported that they reversed their decision to veil. The ratio of the veiled to the unveiled

138 See for example Macleod, Accommodating Protest; El Guindi, “Veiling Infitah with Muslim

Ethic”; Williams, "A Return to the Veil in Egypt,"; Sallam, “The Return to the Veil among Undergraduate Females at Minya University, Egypt”; al-Markaz al-Qawmī lil-Buhūth al-Ijtimā‘īyah wa-al-Jinā’iyah, Z āhirat al-hijāb bayna al-jāmi‘īyā [The Veil Phenomenon among Female Undergraduates].

139 Most of the respondents were either college students or graduates. One respondent quitted college in rejection of sexual segregation. She was determined eligible to participate because she went through the college experience and her background and middle-class status, loosely defined as will be demonstrated below, were confirmed.

81

women in my sample is roughly representative of the ratio of veiled women in Egypt.

There are no studies available regarding the incidence of veiling in Egypt, yet many

observers estimate that between 75 and 80 percent of women are veiled today.

Figure 15. Age Distribution of Respondents

0

5

10

15

20

25

18-19 20-22 23-24 25-27 28 or Older

Age

Nu

mb

er o

f R

esp

on

den

ts

The second criterion used for sample selection was veil style. The dress style of

the women was indicative of the level of religiosity that she tried to profess and provided

some clues women’s beliefs regarding the role, meaning, and form of veil according to

Islam. A wide variety of dress styles was represented in my sample. Some women were

extremely strict about the interpretation of the veil requirement in Islam and covered their

entire body and face with dark and loose clothes. Others, while veiled, were dressed very

liberally in very tight clothes and wore a lot of make-up.140 I also interviewed 15

unveiled women, some of which were very conservative in their dress and others very

140 The rules of modesty in Islam require that the clothes not be transparent or revealing, meaning

they should not be too tight that the curves of the body could be detailed.

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liberal. This variety allowed for capturing the great multitude in the meanings and forms

of the veil today.

For the purpose of this analysis, I grouped the styles of the veiled women

interviewed into four groups: the liberal style is characterized with tighter clothes, such as

tight jeans with short and/or tight shirts, flashy colors, and excessive use of makeup. The

less conservative style, representing the most common type of veil, was generally

characterized with a combination of one tight garment (such as pants) and a loose

garment (like a shirt). Many women today wear pants with a half sleeve or sleeveless top

and tight long-sleeve shirt underneath. Sometimes the shirt is in nude color, which makes

the girl look almost like wearing a sleeveless dress with a scarf at a distance. The less

conservative and liberal styles are much criticized by men today. Observations and

conversations with people currently living in Egypt suggest that almost two thirds of the

veiled women today are dressed in either of these styles.

The third group of veil form was the conservative style. This group included

women wearing loose-fitting clothes that do not define the figure and that were not too

bright in color. They also wore long scarves that cover the chest and/or a cloak (called

izdal or ‘abaya) to conceal the body figure. Women in this group wore little or no

makeup to confirm their abidance to Islamic modesty rules, which requires women to not

make any attempts to grab attention to her. The fourth style group was the strictest, with

little variance in the dress styles of women adhering to it. This group of women wore a

khimar, a loose-fitting gown in dark nonpatterned fabric with a long A-shaped scarf

covering the head and trunk area and revealing the face. Some women added a niqab, a

white face cover that extended to the mid-chest area.

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Most of the veiled women interviewed in this study wore styles that, using the

above dress typology, would be classified under the “less-conservative” style group. One-

fourth of the respondents were dressed in “liberal” style (Figure 16). Women belonging

to the “liberal,” “less conservative,” and “conservative” veil forms alternate styles, and

may be dressed in very liberal, tighter clothes one day and more conservative, loose-

fitting styles on another day depending on their mood and/or where they are going. This

made the classification fuzzy and porous. The following chart represents the spectrum of

veil styles in Egypt and the style distribution of the 50 veiled respondents interviewed in

this study.

Figure 16. Spectrum of Veil Styles

14 18 10 8

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

1

Liberal Less Conservative Conservative Khimar/Niqab

very liberal very conservative

Of the 15 unveiled women interviewed, more than half were dressed in clothes

similar to the less-conservative veiled women, minus a head scarf. The rest were dressed

in jeans and below-waist shirts. Unveiled women in Egypt, both Christians and Muslims,

usually indicate that they try to dress even more conservatively than the veiled women in

an attempt to pass unnoticed in the public space. In many cases, they wear more practical,

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plain clothes and little or no make-up to avoid standing out in the streets, which would be

punishable by great verbal (and even physical) harassment in the streets.

The third criterion for selecting women into the sample was socioeconomic class.

My target was middle- and upper-middle class college students or recent graduates. There

are several class stratification systems that are offered in the literature on Egypt’s social

classes, one of which was coined by Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim.141 The stratification is based

on a number of factors, including income, occupation, education, and durable goods

(lifestyle). Ibrahim identifies six social strata in Egypt: the lowest stratum—the destitute

who live way below the poverty line (10.2 percent of total population); the low-stratum

or the poor who live immediately below the poverty line (10.3 percent), the low-middle

stratum or borderline who live just above the poverty line (26.5 percent), the middle

stratum or the upwardly mobile composed of mid-level professionals (36.1 percent), the

upper-middle stratum or the secure (15.3 percent), and finally the upper stratum or the

rich, which constitutes about one percent.142

Using this stratification, the middle and upper-middle class would come from the

upwardly mobile and upper-middle strata. They would be in 80th percentile of income,

making an average annual income of $3,275 according to income distribution data

provided by the World Bank.143 One limitation in my questionnaire instrument, however,

is the absence of a question regarding the respondent’s family income. Income is a very

sensitive issue in Egypt and a question regarding the veil could lead respondents to get

141 Sa‘ad Eddin Ibrahim, "Income Distribution and Social Mobility in Egypt," in The

Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt, eds. Guda Abdel Khalek and RobertTignor, 375-435 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982).

142 See Ibrahim, "Income Distribution and Social Mobility in Egypt.” 143 World Development Indicators Online. http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.proxy.libraries.rutgers

.edu/ext/DDPQQ/showReport.do?method=showReport (accessed July 24, 2009).

85

defensive or uncomfortable, which would impair the answers significantly. In addition, I

may not get the true answer for that question as respondents might refuse to answer or

provide a “false” answer to conceal their class level, a common practice in Egypt. The

socioeconomic profile of the woman was deduced through a number of questions: city of

residence, name of high school, and whether it is a language school or not, a girls-only

school or not,144 and the occupation of the parents.145

Private schools in Egypt are quite expensive, and are normally only affordable by

the upwardly mobile to upper classes. Language private schools (in which sciences are

taught in a foreign language and a rigorous foreign language education is offered starting

preschool) are even more expensive. According to the UNESCO, less than eight percent

of Egyptians sent their children to private schools in 2007.146 The ratio of private school

enrollment would be slightly higher in Cairo but no governorate level data on school

enrollment was available. About one-third of the respondents were women who

graduated from private schools. The other two thirds had other characteristics that still

indicated they belong to the upper 20th income quintile.

Another proxy question for income used in my interview instrument is the type of

college from which respondents were either enrolled or graduated. As was discussed in

Chapter 2, education in Egypt is essentially free through college. However, the

144 Because the public educational system is deficient in quality and resources in Egypt, many parents send their kids to private schools. The range of tuition in private schools is dramatic, from £.E. 12,000 £.E to £.E 65,000 a year or the equivalent of 2,500 to 13,000 USD. The name of the school parents sends their kids to is an important status symbol. Whether a school is girls-only or mixed school also tells something about the level of conservatism of the parents and whether they believe in gender segregation. In lower-class cities, parents tend to send their kids to segregated schools, while in middle and upper classes, especially in Cairo, more parents accept the fact that mixing gender is important.

145 The occupation of the parent is an important variable as it gives an indication regarding the level of education of the respondents’ parents, their income levels, and their social strata (small business, versus technocrat, versus state employee).

146 United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Institute for Statistics, Custom Tables. http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx (accessed August 1, 2009).

86

ineffectiveness of the public system entailed that only students with more economically

comfortable pares would be able to get the grades required to enroll at a higher education

institution. Accordingly, while the main determinant of the major (faculty)147 is the

student’s high school grades, the ability to score high enough to go to top-tier faculties is

largely determined by the student’s economic resources. The faculties of medicine,

pharmacy, computer science, engineering, and economics and political science, for

example, are top tier schools requiring an average high school grade of over 95 percent

and are more accessible to upper-class students. The second tier faculties consist of all

other faculties, including faculties of arts, commerce, tourism and hotels, and require an

average grade of 85 percent, and are more accessible to middle-income groups. The third

tier colleges contain institutes and two-year colleges are more accessible to lower-

middle-class income group. A number of respondents were selected from this group as a

way to measure the role of income on constituting the meanings of the veil.

Although the target group of this study is middle and upper-middle classes, it was

still important to include some respondents from the lower-middle stratum to understand

the role of class in constructing the meanings of the veil. Respondents were grouped

roughly into three socioeconomic groups. Lower-middle class consisted of respondents

living in highly dense, urban areas, who went to public schools, and whose parents have

either clerical jobs or other jobs that required a high school degree or less. The middle-

income group was composed of women who lived in middle-income districts, who went

147 High school scores determine not only the type of college/university that the student goes to,

but more importantly the major. In the United States, a student will say I go to Rutgers University, for example, and (s)he may or may not indicate the major in a casual conversation. In Egypt, the majors (or the faculties) are highly stratified and students generally provide the name of the faculty before the university/college as it speaks more to both their abilities and their socioeconomic backgrounds. On the flip-side, the student’s decision regarding the higher education degree to pursue is determined less by aptitude at certain fields and more by the pressure to enroll in more prestigious faculties.

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to public schools but scored high enough in their high school diploma to enroll in first-

tier colleges. Upper-middle income groups were the one that went to the more expensive

high schools and/or enrolled at a private university, which is typically only accessible to

the wealthier parents who work in multinational corporations or have own their own

businesses. Figure 17 depicts the distribution of respondents across the three class strata

that I defined above.

Figure 17. Respondents by Socioeconomic Class

Lower-Middle Class

11

Middle Class27

Upper-Middle Class

27

As was suggested earlier, a correlation was found between class and the veil type.

For the upper-middle classes, 82.4 percent of the female respondents were dressed in

liberal or less conservative veil styles, compared to 60.9 percent for middle class and 50.0

percent for middle-lower classes. This suggests that although the pressure to veil was

experienced at all levels, the upper-middle classes were better equipped and/or more

determined to maneuver around the requirement and construct new meanings and forms

of the veil.

The topic of the study interested many of the women interviewed. Fifty-three

respondents were described as willing or very willing to participate and share their

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thoughts about the veil. A few women looked worried and were a bit anxious about

participating, but participated out of curiosity. The rest were in a hurry but still

participated to kill some time. Only one woman completely refused to participate in the

study. She was an unveiled woman in the mid-twenties and indicated that she had

previously gotten into trouble for participating in another study. She was sitting nearby

while we were conducting one of the interviews, and seemed quite opinionated, even

made a few remarks about the veil and the pressure that the unveiled women faced to

wear the veil. That was why, she explained, inappropriate veil styles emerged.

Coding and Analysis of the Interview Results

Each interview transcript was read several times right after it was received. I

decided not to do any analysis until I received a substantial number of responses. This

was because I did not want to predispose myself in a way that I could potentially frame

the answers into specific stereotypes or predetermined categories. I also wanted to ensure

that I explored women’s lives and answers before I started leaving any permanent marks

through coding and analysis. While the interviews were being conducted, and while

reading each interview as it was received, I was working on the historical analysis, during

which time I was reading a tremendous number of autobiographies, commentaries, and

essays written in the late twentieth and early nineteenth century. It was very interesting to

compare what women said during the interview and what they said throughout the history

about society, the role of women, and the veil. This too helped reveak trends at the

macrolevel and provided unique context for the responses that women provided during

the interview.

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Having learned all that I did about the women, and having established a one-on-

one relationship with each respondent through reading her words holistically, I started

analyzing responses. All interview transcripts were entered into qualitative analysis

software, Atlas.ti 5.2. Simple codes/variable names were created for the responses to each

question. The software made it easy to aggregate responses to the same question in one

location where I could identify patterns and common themes in the answers. Responses

were then entered into a huge excel sheet with variables corresponding to each question.

I used a mixture of discourse and content analyses techniques.148 My research

goals and assumptions were more compatible with the ontology of discourse analysis. I

believed that the mass-veiling phenomenon was historically specific, and was produced

in a relational process that could only be understood through a constructionist framework.

However, absent a detailed ethnographic study that followed the lives of these women for

a period of time, a pure discourse analysis was not possible. Consistent and objective

coding was therefore the key analysis strategy. Answers were coded into a number of

categories that were outlined after a holistic reading of most of the interview transcripts.

Codes were not based solely on word or phrase usage but on the context in which those

words and/or phrases were used. In other words, the analysis was context-sensitive even

though the context available for analysis was rather limited.

Atlas software was especially helpful in making the analysis consistent. Words

and phrases were searched, and the context in which these words were said were

148 Discourse analysis is premised on the assumption that social phenomena and meanings are

constructionist. The main goal of the analysis is to discover how reality is produced, which in turn assumes that this reality is in flux. Analysis is context-sensitive. Content analysis on the other hand assumes that there is a reality that is stable and accessible through the utilization of consistent coding and analyses techniques. Results obtained through content analyses are expected to be replicable and context-neutral. See Yoshiko M. Herrera and Bear F. Braumoeller, “Symposium: Discourse and Content Analysis,” Qualitative Methods (Spring 2004): 15-39.

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analyzed and coded. For example, words denoting the state, such as the government (al-

hekooma), state, leaders, and Egypt were searched throughout the text and the paragraphs

where they occurred were marked and coded. Also a search was done for the names of all

religious preachers and religious programs. The output was then analyzed cross-

sectionally to identify patterns. Variables such as views on the West and “the other” were

created to analyze the links between identity constructions and the veil.

Simple cross-tabulations were conducted to examine differences (or their lack)

across groups. After grouping answers to the various questions, such as the meaning of

the veil, simple statistical tests were performed to identify if these meanings differed

across socioeconomic characteristics, sources of religious information, types of preachers

the respondent listened to, and other factors. In some instances, I provided quantitative

codes and used SAS (Statistical Analysis Software) to identify trends and patterns

through the use of bivariate analysis. Where relevant I used visual representations of data

to show how responses clustered or diverged across particular themes.

Analysis of Religious Media

The interview results provided leads regarding the importance of digital media in

promoting the veil. Respondents also directed the research to examine the types of media

and preachers that women rely on for religious education. The question then was, How to

analyze this site of cultural production? There is currently a massive body of literature on

the role of television in the making and shaping of national identity.149 As Abu-Lughod

149 See for example Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood; Arvind Rajagopal, Politics after

Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James Lull, Media Communications, Culture: A Global Approach (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); David Morley and Charolotte Brundson, The Nationwide Television

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contends, studying television is equivalent to “examining a ‘national space’ rife with

tensions, inequalities, and regionally configured power systems.”150 The significance of

this institution makes the method of inquiry into it even more significant and problematic.

Media ethnographers insist that the most effective approach for studying

television is through examining the immediate viewing context which is the best way to

understand how “people encounter, use, interpret, enjoy, think and talk about

television.”151 Abu-Lughod points out several problems that make this ethnographic

approach less than optimal, mainly the great variety in viewing settings and viewing

habits even among the same viewers. For example, a married person will interact

differently with a television program if he is watching it with his friends than if he

watches it in the midst of his family. Abu-Lughod, on the other hand, follows what Marie

Gillepsie calls “TV talk.” She identifies general themes in people’s conversations that

may be traced back to particular television programs.152 The author therefore

recommends viewing specific programs in an ethnographic setting and substantiating

notes from these experiences with associations drawn between specific every day

conversations and ideas with messages imparted in that program.

Given that media and television politics is not the main subject of this research, it

was not possible to follow this rigorous method. I used results from the semistructured

interview to identity the programs and channels to review. I used content analysis

techniques and the qualitative analysis software to identify key nodes in women’s

conversations regarding sources of religious information, attitudes towards these sources,

Studies (London: Routledge, 1999); Roger Silverstone, Television and Everyday Life (London: Routledge, 1994); Marie Gillepsie, Television, Ethnicity, and Cultural Change (London: Routledge, 1995).

150 Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood, 9. 151 Ien Ang (1991) cited in Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood, 22. 152 Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood, 23.

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and the meanings related to religiosity and the veil that they spoke of. I then examined

these sources of information closely and used the same qualitative analyses techniques to

identify similar and different messages in these programs. Specifically, I followed the

messages imparted by preachers that were found to be most influential in promoting the

veil and shaping current religiosity. This was done through downloading and transcribing

70 religious sermons delivered by these religious preachers and made available on the

Internet. Most of these preachers had their own Web sites, but the channel Web sites

were also used to identify relevant sermons. I focused on sermons that discussed women,

morality, and the veil. Each of the preachers had exclusive sermons on these themes.

The sermons were read holistically to identify common themes and concepts.153

Content analysis techniques were used. Parallels and contrasts were drawn between the

messages imparted by preachers and the ideas communicated by respondents. This

compare and contrast approach provided a lens to understand the interactions between the

religious intelligentsia and the female agents. It gave insight into the scope and domain of

the female agency with respect to the veil and allowed the researcher to capture the effect

of two players in the veiling phenomenon that would not be captured otherwise, namely

the West and the Jews. These two subjects were central themes in all sermons, especially

the ones that discussed the veil.

Study Limitations

There was one major limitation set by the identity of the researcher in this study. I

am both Egyptian and non-Muslim. My name quickly reveals my identity to any

Egyptian. The fact that I am doing my research in the United States of America, which, in

153 Herrera Braumoeller, et al. “Symposium: Discourse and Content Analysis.”

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the minds of many Egyptians is the new imperialist that has invaded Iraq and will invade

other parts of the Islamic world, and that I am writing about Islam and politics, would set

automatic and immovable barriers between the researcher and the participants.

Speculations about the “real” goal of the research would be enough to tarnish the results I

obtain during my research. There would also be major security issues involved had I

decided to personally conduct the interviews. Any discussion about religion between an

Egyptian Muslim and non-Muslim in Egypt could be interpreted in many different ways,

posing many security threats to the researcher and subjects. Where direct contact with a

researcher was involved, I resorted to using middlepersons in my research.

The distance from my subjects was in some cases advantageous. It offered a

telescopic view of society and a unique to map a multilayered power struggle that

strongly engaged the agent but also transcended her; it implied a limitation in what I

could analyze, including gestures, facial expressions, or changes in voice tones and

emphases. Notwithstanding my emphasis to the interviewers to record all moves and

reactions to questions made by the interviewee, and the abundance of information they

reported in their transcriptions of the interview responses regarding body language, I

submit that I still missed considerably on this very important source of knowledge. In

many instances, it was also hard to distinguish the identity of the interviewer from that of

the subject. But the momentary fusion of the identities of the researcher and researched is

an inevitable limitation in all research, especially qualitative research. I contend that this

would still be a problem if I were to do the interviews, with the further limitation that the

researcher would be less aware of this fusion and less able to objectify it.

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The exploratory nature of this research project had several limitations. The

interview instrument was designed to ask broad and nonspecific questions and to take

clues from respondents regarding what they viewed as important or not. Some women

provided specifics regarding the televisions programs they viewed, the preachers they

preferred, and their views on the West. Others spoke more generally without providing

any details. It was important to keep the interview neutral to avoid predisposing

respondents and to cast a wide net regarding the factors influencing the veil. The tradeoff

is that some women could have had some opinions regarding these factors but were not

prompted. Also because I collected no identifiable data regarding the respondents—no

addresses or phone numbers information was collected—follow-ups with respondents

were not possible.

These tradeoffs were partially compensated through a number of research

strategies. I avoided making conclusions about the absence of an opinion. In other words,

commonalities in opinions about these factors, especially given the absence of any direct

prompts, were taken as strong indications regarding the salience of a specific variable.

The absence of an opinion, on the other hand, was not considered a significant finding.

Another way I overcame this tradeoff was through substantiating the data from the

interview results with data from religious sermons and programs. The consistency in the

method by which I selected the preachers to be analyzed, the sermons to transcribe and

the coding and analysis method were effective way to cover these gaps.

Another significant limitation in this study was the absence of an ethnographic

dimension. This is particularly significant in reference to the results obtained from the

satellite media analysis that was conducted here. This research would have benefited

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significantly from an ethnographic study of the television programs. The setting through

which I viewed and analyzed the satellite domain would be vastly different and much

richer had I been more immersed into the lives of the Egyptian women viewing these

programs on a daily basis. Fewer inductions would have been needed regarding the

associations between specific ideas that echoed during the interview and the themes of

religious sermons. Following a rigorous and consistent method of the content analysis

made the inductions made during this research more reasonable and less spurious. I also

followed up almost immediately when women pointed out to specific programs or shows

by downloading the show and viewing it myself.

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Chapter 4

Antecedents to Change

Introduction

The history of women’s dress and fashion in Egypt is full of intriguing turning

points. At the dawn of the twentieth century, urban Egyptian women, regardless of their

religion or class, wore a veil consisting of a black cloak covering the entire body and a

white face cover. By the end of the first quarter of that century, the veil was cast off.

Pictures of outdoor women in my family’s possessions and in magazines reveal a striking

similarity between women’s fashion in Egypt and Europe. After almost completely

disappearing, the veil reappeared again in the Egyptian streets, and today is the norm of

dress in Egypt, particularly urban Egypt.

This chapter provides a historical context of the veil in Islam and the Egyptian

history. In the beginning, I discuss the mutability of religious discourse through

illustrating the wide variety of meanings and practices produced by the same religious

text. I then trace the history of the veil in Egypt going back to the seventh century, when

Egypt was incorporated into the Islamic Empire, up until the twentieth century. The main

goal is to demonstrate the nonlinearlity in the course of the veiling practices in Egypt and

that the wide variety in the symbols, meanings, associated with this article. These

meanings and forms are functions of various socioeconomic, political, and cultural

factors, some of which are identified in this chapter. While I will survey women’s dress

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in Egypt since the beginning of the Islamic conquest, a major focus of the chapter will be

the rise of nationalist movements in Egypt in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The chapter is divided into four sections. First, I review some of the doctrinal

texts pertaining to the veil in Islamic texts. Second, I survey women’s dress in Egypt

starting with the Islamic conquest in the seventh century up until the Ottoman dynasty.

Associations and correlations between veiling practices and socioeconomic conditions

are drawn. Third, I analyze the socioeconomic and political conditions leading to the

British occupation as well as the impact of that occupation on the Egyptian nationalist

movement(s) and dress styles in Egypt. Finally, I examine the development of the female

agency in the context of nationalism, particularly how women from various social classes

internalized and utilized these conditions to claim a share in public space. The chapter

relies on two sources of data: historical documents and studies on Egyptian female dress

and autobiographies and life stories of women who took part in early nationalist

activities.

The analysis suggests that changes in dress style have economic, political, and

cultural roots. The economic structure dictates certain division of tasks across gender and

classes that favor certain dress styles over others. Also the level of integration in the

international and political relations is an important factor. Increased level of integration

in the global economy is always a trigger for changes in identities and cultural

expressions. Both the economic and political factors are mediated through a cultural

sphere, a process that determines the direction of change, be it stricter or more relaxed

veiling practices.154

154 Chatty, “The Burqa Face Cover: An Aspect of Dress in Southeastern Arabia,” in

Languages of Dress in the Middle East, ed. Curzon Surrey, Nancy Lindisfarne, and Bruce Ingham

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The Veil in Islam: Its Status and Role

A brief analysis of Islamic texts reveals that the hijab has been a highly debatable

issue since the rise of Islam, even among religious clerics and scholars. Some religious

scholars insist that the veil was a fundamental requirement in Islam, while others

maintain that it is a voluntary or preferred practice. One major source of contention

regarding the veil lies in the ambiguities of language. Language in general is a very

dynamic medium of exchange. When taken out of context, any sentence or statement can

mean one thing in a given community, and another when transported to another era or

group.

The problem of language is particularly potent in the Arabic language, which is

known for its malleability and context-sensitivity. While an English word, for example,

may take different meanings depending on the context, most of the time it will read and

sound the same. In Arabic, however, the vowels are not spelled out in writing, and the

same word may be pronounced in many different ways, and mean very different things

depending on the context. This is why Leila Ahmed155 insists that words in Arabic can

take an infinite number of meanings “until life is literally breathed into them.” She

observes that “Arabic and Hebrew words…are not words but only potential words, a

(Surray: Curzon Press, 1997);; Lewis "Veils and Sales: Muslims and the Spaces of Postcolonial Fashion Retail"; Shirazi, The Veil Unveiled; Stillman, Arab Dress; Charolette Jirousek, “The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,” in Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922, ed. Donald Quataert, 206-208 (Albany: State University of New York, 2000).

155 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 127-128.

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chaotic babbly and possibility of meanings…And so by their very scripts these two

languages seem to announce that meaning can only be here and now.”156

This feature of the Arabic language makes the appropriation of meanings to

Quranic verses and Islamic religious texts very difficult. While one expects the dynamic

nature of the language to dictate a need for constant reinterpretation and contextualization

of religious text, as a result of political decisions made during the tenth century, the

practice of religious jurisprudence was halted. Ijtihad, or the process of making legal

decisions based on the reinterpretation of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet of

Islam, hadith. In an attempt to maximize and sustain its power, the Abbassid regime

locked the body of legal jurisprudence that was produced until then. The rulers “closed

the gates of ijtihad.”157 Religious scholars were required to apply the body of legal

opinion that that were created primarily between the eighth and tenth centuries.158

The end of Islamic legal jurisprudence, however, did not end the process of

meaning constitution or legal jurisprudence. Using the same body of the Shari’a law,

religious clerics were always able to influence and constitute religious requirements.

Religious scholars continued to contextualize texts and provided varying interpretations

of the same texts from time to time, although they insisted that these interpretations were

unchanging. The process of interpreting the text, however, required very specialized

skills, including mastering Arabic language, and the ability to read and synthesize a huge

156 Ahmed discussed the personal difficulties she had with the Arabic language in her personal

autobiography. She did not have to study Arabic until the 1952 revolution and she struggled significantly with the language. See Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 127-128.

157 Ironically, this took place at the peak of the Islamic civilization. Most of the legal texts in Islam were produced in this period.

158 Ahmed (1992) describes some of the social and political circumstances that led to the decision to prohibit ijtihad. She emphasizes that the decision was politically driven; it was a strategy used by the Abbasid regime to consolidate and perpetuate his power through assuming full monopoly over religious interpretation. (See Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 89-91).

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body of religious text. It should be noted that fluency in classical Arabic is a very rare

skill. Colloquial Arabic is very different from classical Arabic. Even Arabic teachers

today, who have specialized education in Arabic language, grammar, and literature, do

not properly speak and write the language. Due to the difficulty of the language, the

interpretation of religious texts was always monopolized by an elite group of religious

scholars, or ulema, who received very specialized education. As Mernissi159 stresses,

getting an answer about whether any action is halal (allowable), haram (illicit), fard

(religious requirement), preferred, or a choice requires the navigation of great volumes of

texts written in inaccessible language. Most of this text was written between the ninth and

twelfth centuries, a period of political flux due to the fusion of Islamic and non-Islamic

cultures. The result of these cultural and political turmoils was a general decline in the

status of women and religious minorities.

Three verses in Quran are often cited by religious scholars and the proponents of

the veil as one that legislated the veil requirement. The first verse is from the 33rd Surat

in Quran and reads in the following way:

[33:53] O Ye who believe! Enter not the dwellings of the Prophet for a meal without waiting for the proper time, unless permission be granted you. But if ye are invited, enter, and, when your meal is ended, then disperse. Linger not for conversation. Lo! that would cause annoyance to the Prophet, and he would be shy of (asking) you (to go); but Allah is not shy of the truth. And when ye ask of them (the wives of the Prophet) anything, ask it of them from behind a curtain. That is purer for your hearts and for their hearts. And it is not for you to cause annoyance to the messenger of Allah, nor that ye should ever marry his wives after him. Lo! that in Allah's sight would be an enormity.160

159 Fatima Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987). 160 The Holy Quran, Yusuf Ali Translation. Downloaded at

http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/qmtintro.html (accessed September 06, 2009).

101

The circumstances of the occurrence of verse are important to note.

Commentators and religious scholars indicated that the verse descended during the

wedding feast of the prophet of Islam, to Zeinab bint Jahsh. The tradition note that one of

the guests lingered behind too long in the wedding room, which annoyed the prophet of

Islam significantly. Shortly after, the verse was revealed. It instituted the seclusion rights

of Muhammed’s wives. In his interpretation of the verse, al-Tabari161 narrated that the

witness of the verse revelation (Aban Ibn Malek who lingered behind) says that

Muhammed murmured the verse while physically drawing a curtain between the

unwanted guest and Muhammed.162

The word hijab is one of the complicated words in Arabic, and its usage in Quran

renders it more confusing. I stems from the Arabic verb hajaba which means “to hide”

and the word itself literally means curtain or a screen used to obstruct from viewing.

Hijab, therefore, may refer to any or all of the following: the object used to hide

something from sight; the act of separating or marking the border in space; and an ethical

dimension, referring to seclusion, or just covering up.163 There was distinction made

between veiling and seclusion in Quran. The two meanings of the veil (seclusion by

descending a curtain and adopting a specific form of dress) were used interchangeably.

The other verses that referenced female clothing and/or hijab occurred in two

different surats both revealed in the Year 5 or 6 of the Islamic Calendar.

[33:59] O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad): that is most

161 Al-Tabari (823-923) is one of the earliest and most reputable religious scholars in Islam. He has produced a 30-volume commentary and explication of Quran, called Tafsir al-Tabari, in addition to a 13-volume tradition book called Tarikh al-Tabari [History according to al-Tabari].

162 Tafsir al-Tabari cited in Mernissi, Beyond the Veil, 85-87. 163 For a detailed description of the meanings of the veil in Arabic and its uses in Quran, see

Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society and Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam.

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convenient, that they should be known (as such) and not molested. And Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. 164 [24:30-31]. Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them: And Allah is well acquainted with all that they do. And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husband's fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! turn ye all together towards Allah, that ye may attain Bliss.165

These two verses were not directed to Muhammed’s wives only, as was the case

in the former verse, but to all women believers. However, there were, and still are, a lot

of disagreements regarding the meaning of the verses. These two textual pieces indicate

that women are required to be modest and wear clothes that are not revealing. But what

constituted modest clothes was never clearly spelled out in the Quran. There is a lot of

debate over what is considered “that which is apparent” or “ma zahara minha.”

Disagreements existed even among the companions of Muhammed. Some insisted that

the verse meant that women cannot expose any part of their bodies other than their outer

garments. Everything else, including the face, should be covered. Others suggested that

women can expose their cheeks only. Others yet said that they can reveal their face and

hands.166 There were many other interpretations reported by other commentators.

164 The Holy Quran, Yusuf Ali Translation. Downloaded at

http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/qmtintro.html (accessed September 06, 2009).

165 The Holy Quran, Yusuf Ali Translation. Downloaded at http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/qmtintro.html (accessed September 06, 2009).

166 Asgharali Engineer, The Qur’an, Women, and Modern Society (Berkshire, U.K.: New Dawn Press, 2005), 62-65.

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Looking at the rest of the verse, some commentators, however, insisted that the

verse referred to a very specific form of dress that were common at that time, and that

Islam sought to overturn. The verse says, “that they should draw their veils over their

bosoms.” The word used in Quran for veils in this verse is khimar, and there is no unified

description of what a khimar is. In Egypt today, the khimar is a long headscarf extending

loosely on the chest and back, normally covering the entire trunk area. Many religious

scholars take this verse literally and insist not only that hijab is a religious requirement

(fard), but also that there is only one acceptable form for it, which is the khimar. An

important historical fact, however, needs to be highlighted here. In pre-Islamic times and

until this verse descended, women dressed in what was called a khimar, which was a long

veil covering the entire back and head, but not the front or the bosom area. Accordingly,

some commentators and religious scholars insisted that the veil verse came to require

women to cover the bosom area, which women at that time left bare.167

The verse, it has been argued, isintended to protect women from sexual

harassment. During that time, women, including Muhammed’s wives, were harassed or

teased a lot by hypocrites and rapists in Medina City. Sexual harassment was a common

practice in the urban setting of Medina, much more than Mecca. It was legal at that time

to harass slaves. But Medina men often harassed free women as well claiming that they

could not tell from their dress whether they were free women or slaves. The verse

attempted to address this problem by setting an identifier for free women for their own

167 See Engineer, The Qur’an, Women, and Modern Society, 65; Iqbāl Baraka, H ijāb: ru’yah

‘as rīyah (al-Qāhirah: Mu’assasat Rūz al-Yūsuf, 2002), 62-65.

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protection.168 Hence, the veil was a tool for racial and class discrimination rather than a

religious requirement.

Before these verses were revealed, Muhammed’s wives were allowed to move

freely without a veil. Once uttered, only Muhammed’s wives abided by the seclusion

requirements. Some commentators said that Muhammed’s wives, especially ‘Aisha

strongly regretted this new requirement and blamed it all on one of Muhammed’s

companions and the third Caliph of Islam, Umar Ibn el-Khattab who had been constantly

nagging the prophet of Islam to veil and seclude his wives as they were getting

harassed.169 The veil requirement was not generalized to the rest of Muslim women until

much later.170

That said, an important historical context for these verses should be noted. The

three verses were revealed in Years 5 and 6 of the Muslim Calendar—Hijra. Until the

Year 5 of Hijra, women, including Muslim’s Prophet’s wives, played a very active role in

all aspects of social and political life, including war. Tradition related stories of

Muhammed’s wives tucking their garments in during the war, serving warriors and

removing the dead and wounded. This changed dramatically following the defeat of

Muslims in the Battle of Uhud171 and an attempt by the Meccans to ally with other tribes

forming coalitions or Ahzab, to attack Medina. In the midst of all this, and while

168 Engineer, The Qur’an, Women, and Modern Society, 62; Baraka, Hijāb: ru’yah ‘asrīyah, 56. 169 See Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam; Engineer The Qur’an, Women, and Modern

Society. 170 Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, 92-96. 171 The Battle of Uhud was fought in Year 3 After Hijra, which corresponds to the year when the

Muslim community emigrated from Mecca to Madina at Mount Uhud. The war took place between a force from the Muslim community of Medina led by Muhammad, and a force led by Abu Sufyan from Mecca, the town from which many of the Muslims had previously emigrated (hijra). The Battle of Uhud was the second military encounter between the Meccans and the Muslims, preceded by the Battle of Badr in 624, where a small Muslim army had defeated the larger Meccan army. The Muslims were defeated in this war, and the defeat lead to a great loss of morale as well as significant social and political instability

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Muhammed and Muslim leaders were heavily occupied in war planning, rebels and

hypocrites in Medina started instigating strife in Medina, especially between Muhammed

and his wives.172

There remains one important feature about the Quran that explains why the veil

was a contentious point of debate in Islam. As Leila Ahmed explains, Quran has two

distinct layers, one which is concerned with the ethical and one that is mainly geared

towards pragmatic issues. So while some verses in Quran emphasize equality across

gender, religion, and class, others draw some boundaries in order to establish a political

community. These two “competing voices” coexist in Quran and Islamic teachings, and

each has some power over the process of value construction and reproduction. The

literature on the pragmatic side is overwhelming and often overshadows the former; it is

elaborated in the huge body of legal and political thought, most of which was produced

during the Abbassid Empire, and just reproduced over time. The ethical dimension, on

the other hand, has no literary evidence. Its domain is restricted to the understandings and

applications of the ordinary Muslim laymen regarding Islamic teachings.173

The distinction can also be drawn along historical lines. In Islam, the spirit of the

Quranic verses that were revealed in Mecca diverge significantly from those revealed in

Madina. The earlier Meccan verses emphasized the core Islamic teachings and

commonalities in divine religions. The Madinan verses, on the other hand, were more

concerned with the establishment of a political community and emphasized procedures,

laws, and regulations that were essential to maintain the political community. What

contributes to the overshadowing of the Meccan teachings is a verse in Quran that allows

172 Baraka, Hijāb, 55-56; Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim

Society, 94. 173 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 65-66.

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abrogation of previous text with new text. So in theory, some ulema may argue that the

verses that emphasized the ethical dimension were overwritten with new Medinan verses

when there is perceived conflict in meanings and implications of the verses.

A Panoramic View of the History of Women’s Dress in Egypt

The unveiling of Egyptian women during at the end of the first quarter of the

twentieth century is often portrayed in the literature as an abrupt event that followed the

dramatic act of early Egyptian feminist called Huda Sha‘arawy (1879-1947. Sha‘arawy

publicly drew back her face veil in front of a big crowd of Egyptian men and women who

came to greet the Egyptian delegation leading the nationalist movement in 1923, some of

which just returned from exile. It is said that all Egyptian women unveiled following that

act. The unveiling of the Egyptian women, however, was quite gradual. It took place

almost over 100 years or more. Women were gradually downveiling and/or defying the

veil requirement over time. One quote from a lecture given by an Egyptian feminist in

1909 illustrates this gradualism. Lamenting the virtual abandonment of the veil, Malak

Hifni Nassef, known by the pseudonym, Bahithat al-Badiya,174 noted:

Nowadays the lower half of our attire is a skirt that does not conform to our standards of modesty (hijab) while the upper half like age, the more it advances the more it is shortened. Our former garment was one piece. When the woman wrapped herself in it her figure was totally hidden. The wrap shrunk little by little but it was still wide enough to conceal the whole body. Then we artfully began to shrink the waist and lower the neck and finally two sleeves were added and the garment clung to the back and was worn only with a corset. We tied back our headgear so that more than half the head, including the

174 Malak Hifny Nassif (1886-1918) is an Egyptian Muslim and writer who used a pseudonym as

was common for many women writers at that time. The daughter of a renowned professor of Arabic literature, she was among the few women who received formal education in a one of two public schools for women. She became a teacher but had to give up her teaching career at marriage. Yet, she continued to advocate women’s advancement through education throughout her short life. Nassif strove to present an oriental version of feminism that honors and capitalize Islamic culture. She tried to highlight the discords between the oppressive traditions towards women and Islam while de-emphasizing Western values and traditions. Her strain of feminism did not gain much support as more secular versions dominated the scene.

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ears, were visible and the flowers and ribbons ornamenting the hair could be seen. Finally, the face veil became more transparent than an infant’s heart. The purpose of the izar is to cover the body as well as our dress and jewelry underneath… Does our present izar, which has virtually come ‘a dress’ showing the bosom, waist and derriere, conform with this percept. Moreover, some women have started wearing it in colors… In my opinion we should call it a dress with a clown’s cap which in fact it is. I think going out without it is more modest because at least eyes are not attracted to it.175

While literature on the history of women’s dress in Egypt is scarce, few scholars

trace dress styles and patterns over time through the analysis of the documentation

produced by travelers, historians and legal scholars as well as an analysis of art works

from various periods. The goal of this section is to summarize the changes that took place

in women’s dress through an examination of secondary data, mostly existing studies on

dress and fashion.

It should be noted that the task of identifying fashion and dress style trends over

time in Egypt is complicated, particularly for women. Women always remained in the

shadows in history books and documentaries. Another problem with interpreting the scare

and sparse documents that exist is that the distinction between the dress styles across

groups, communities, and classes is rarely made. Often scholars interpreting the data

over-generalize dress styles. Even a cursory review of the some of the available literature

suggests a wide disparity in the dress codes and styles among the Egyptian women from

various classes and even across geographic regions. This explains why the literature is

full of seeming contradictions regarding veiling and seclusion in different periods.

The Caliphate Period: 641-1258

175 Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke, Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing

(London, Virago, 1990), 232.

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Whether Egyptian women were veiled or not before the Arab conquest in 641 is

not clear. Literature suggests that women under the Byzantine Empire were veiled and

secluded as a sign of wealth and class.176 Many historical documents suggest that the

Byzantine society was very strict about maintaining the veil and secluding women.

Veiling and seclusion were considered signs of honor. One eleventh century Byzantine

author proudly narrated that his mother never raised the veil from her face in the presence

of men except at her daughter’s funeral.177 However, there is strong evidence suggesting

that the Egyptians and Jews under the rule of the Byzantine Empire did not veil. Coptic

art is abundant with images of unveiled female saints and martyrs. There is also a lot of

evidence about the social role that Egyptian women played in society and how her status

was quite advanced compared to other populations under the Byzantine rule.178 Although

the status of women in Egypt deteriorated through greater exposure to the Byzantine

habits and culture, evidence suggests that the veil was not observed in Egypt until the

Arabs conquered of Egypt.179

The veil requirement was never generalized during the days of the Prophet of

Islam. Until the reign of the third Caliph in Islam, ’Umar Ibn el-Khattab, the veil was

restricted to the Prophet’s wives and a few other honorary women. The veil was

promoted by el-Khattab as a way to distinguish between people with various ethnic and

religious backgrounds. It was part of what came to be known as the ’Umar Pact.180 These

176 Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society ; Ahmed Women

and Gender and Islam. 177 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 27. 178 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 26-31. 179 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 26-33. 180 The Pact of ’Umar is an agreement established between the Muslim Arab Conquerors and the

dhimmis or the Christians and Jews of the conquered lands. It stated inter alia, “We shall not attempt to resemble the Muslims in any way with regard to their dress…We shall not engrave our signets in Arabic… We shall always adorn ourselves in our traditional fashion.” As cited in Yedida Kalfon Stillman, Arab

109

set of religious markers were expanded during the ’Abbasid period (750-1258 AD), a

period that also coincided with the evolution of most of Islamic legal texts that are used

today to inform moral religious codes and behavior.

The mass conversion to Islam that took place during that period created a period

of cultural flux that necessitated the institution of physical markers to distinguish the

believer from the nonbeliever.181 This differentiation was necessary for maintaining order

and preserving and/or constituting an “imagined” Islamic community (umma). By

prohibiting non-Muslim women from being veiled, differentiation between classes of

citizen was made possible. There were few brief periods in the tenth and eleventh century

that the laws of differentiation (called ghiyar) were not enforced. For examples, the

differentiation laws were not strictly observed during the Fatimid Dynasty (909-1171

AD), as it was considered a class marker rather than a religious marker.182 In spite of all

these laws of differentiation, veiling and seclusion in Egypt were never observed by the

lower and lower-middle classes, which constituted the vast majority of the Egyptian

population. It therefore was a symbol of wealth that was restricted to upper classes.183

The Turkish Dynasties (1258-1805)

Dress: A Short History: From the Dawn of Islam to Modern (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2000), 102. The Pact was put in place to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims through dress. See Mernissi, Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, 92-96; Stillman, Arab Dress: A Short History: From the Dawn of Islam to Modern, 104-112.

181 Stillman, Arab Dress, 104-112. 182 Stillman, Arab Dress, 56. 183 Chatty, “The Burqa Face Cover: An Aspect of Dress in Southeastern Arabia,” in Languages of

Dress in the Middle East, ed. Curzon Surrey, Nancy Lindisfarne, and Bruce Ingham (Surray: Curzon Press, 1997); Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 106-120; Huda Lutfi, “Manners and Customs of fourteenth-Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy versus Male Shar’I Order in Muslim Perspective Tretises,” in Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender, ed. Nikki Kiddie and Beth Baron, 101 (Ninghamton: Vail-Ballou Press, 1991); Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious Politics: Where, When, and Why do "Fundamentalisms" Appear?" Comparative Studies in Society and History 40, no. 4 (1998): 696-723.

110

Literature on women’s dress during the Mamluk period show significant

contradictions. Some travelers described women at the time as being completely veiled,

looking almost like black tents. Some paintings from that period, however, portray

women with their hair and faces uncovered. Others depict women with transparent face

veils showing parts of the body and revealing long braided hair.184 The problem with

interpreting these documents is that the background is never clear. Women’s indoor and

outdoor dress was quite different at that time. Also, the paintings do not reveal whether

the portrayed woman was a slave or free women. Slave women were forbidden from

wearing the veil as they were not to be confused with free women.185

Generally speaking, upper- and upper-middle-class women were wrapped in a

large sheet-like cloth called izar and their faces were veiled with a face cover, the

thickness of which varied over time.186 Women’s dress consisted of a number of layers

including a knee-length underdrawer, a long undefined chemise, a loose gown and a face

cover, called burqu. The burqu that could be as long as the gown or as short as chest-

length depending on the women’s wealth and social status. The wealthier the women

was, the greater the number of layers she put on.187

Lower classes in the Mamluk period, which constituted the vast majority of the

Egyptian population, included peasants, traders, working class, and laborers. Because of

their limited means, the outdoor and indoor dress of women belonging to this class was

similar, consisting of a single layer of gown and a head scarf that they also used to cover

184 Amal Misri, Azya’ al-mar’ah fi al-‘Asr al-‘Uthmani [Women’s Fashion During the Ottoman

Era] (Madinat Nasr: Dar al-Af aq, 1999). 185 Jennifer Scarce, Women’s Costume of the Near and Middle East (Sydney: Unwin Hyman),

120-124. 186 Stillman, Arab Dress, 82 187 Stillman, Arab Dress, 75-82; Al-Masry 1999, 70-73.

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their faces. The middle class was a very narrow sliver of petty bourgeoisie and lower-

level state employees. This upwardly mobile class always aspired to copy the dress styles

of the upper classes. When they could afford it, they opted to veil and mimic the number

layering dress styles of the upper classes.188

Several religious treatises written during the Mamluk period reveal the lack

uniformity in the dress and indicate that women constantly challenged social customs

through their dress and outdoor habits. Some Muslim scholars during that period

deplored the immodest dress and behavior of many women. For example, a thirteenth

century author, Muhammed Ibn al-Hajj, lamented: “Look how these norms have been

neglected in our days… The [woman] goes out in the streets as if she were a shining

bride, walking in the middle of the road and jostling men. They have a manner of walking

that causes the pious men to withdraw closer to the walls, in order to make way for

them.”189 This suggests that women enjoyed a considerable level of freedom during that

time. They played active roles in the trade and crafts industries. Some received formal

education, earned educational certificates, and became teachers of fiqh.190 Afaf Marsot

(1996) and Nikki Keddie (1991) suggested that this freedom in movement and dress was

the result of the relative economic stability and the heavy involvement of women in trade,

which was an important constituent of GDP at the time.191

The defeat of the Mamluks in 1517 paved the way for the establishment of the

Ottoman Empire. Although part of the Ottoman Sultanate, Egypt continued to be

188 Misri, Azya’ al-mar’ah fi al-‘As r al-‘Uthmani , 71-73; Lutfi, “Manners and Customs of

Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women,” 100-104. 189 Lutfi, “Manners and Customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women,” 103. 190 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 113-8. 191 Misri, Azya’ al-mar’ah fi al-‘As r al-‘Uthmani , 27-33.

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controlled by the Mamluks, and the period was characterized by greater social and

political instability as the Mamluks constantly attempted to increase their power and

independence from the Ottoman Empire. These events were accompanied by major shifts

in dress and attitudes towards women. The years of war and its aftermath were

accompanied with an increase in crime rate. A rising number of women were raped and

sexually harassed by the Ottoman soldiers who were prohibited from marrying, a

common strategy used by the Ottoman rulers to ensure that the soldiers’ prime loyalties

were to the state not to their families. These conditions brought about greater pressures

on women to abide by a stricter dress code and to stay at home. Several decrees were

issued in 1517 that prohibited women from going out altogether. These law were slightly

relaxed in 1521 when the ruler permitted woman to go out if they were accompanied by

their husbands, brothers, or fathers.192

Some scholars noted a positive correlation between the status of women and

economic conditions, particularly the unemployment rate: at times when unemployment

is high, competition between men and women over job opportunities increases, and

attempts are made to limit the role of women to housework and childbearing.193 The

second half of the fifteenth century witnessed a severe recessionary period compounded

with rising corruption and political instability. The main cause of the recession was the

loss of an important source of revenue from trade and transportation because of the

192 Misri, Azya’ al-mar’ah fi al-‘As r al-‘Uthmani , 51. 193 Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, “Entrepreneurial Women in Egypt,” in Feminism and Islam:

Legal and Literary Perspectives. ed. Mai Yamani, 33-49 (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

113

discovery of the path of Vasco da Gama's course, which rerouted imports and exports

between Europe and India away from Egypt to an all-sea round Africa route.194

In her study on Arab dress, Yedida Stillman (2000) noted that the most dramatic

change in dress and fashion started in the eighteenth century, when contact with Europe

increased dramatically through trade and other forms of economic and cultural exchange.

This change in dress was a result of the industrial revolution in Europe, which also

implied the industrialization of fashion and the emergence of a mass fashion system.195

Prior to the eighteenth century, it was difficult to identify major shifts in dress and

fashion in Egypt and the Arab world as the elements of the dress remained unchanged

and even if their shapes changed overtime, their names and basic descriptions remained

the same. The exposure to European dress up until the end of the seventeenth century was

very limited; even travelers to the Ottoman Empire had to dress in Ottoman styles.

However, as trade between the Ottoman Empire and Europe expanded, exposure to

Western styles increased and started affecting domestic tastes.196 Ironically, just as

veiling in the Islamic world began with the contact with the Hellenistic West, unveiling

too started with increased exposure to Western culture.

The increase in trade with industrialized Europe adversely affected local crafts in

Egypt, prime of which was the textile industry. The European products outperformed the

local industry in terms of cost and quality, and Egyptians, especially upper classes,

readily adopted European fashion products. The decline in domestic industries caused a

194 Vasco da Gama is one of the most renowned Portuguese explorers. He discovered an all sea

path to India round the African Continent between 1497 and 1498. The story of his first epic voyage forms the single greatest part of this account, and makes him the greatest Portuguese of all time.

195 Jirousek, “The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire.” 196 Jirousek, “The Transition to Mass Fashion System Dress in the Later Ottoman Empire,” 206-

208.

114

decrease in the standard of living, high unemployment, widening income gaps and other

structural problems. These problems were magnified for women, since the textile

industry was one of few that were open for women.197 The continuous warfare among the

Mamluk rulers and the loss of many Egyptian lives to plagues in the eighteenth century

all augmented the economic and structural problems facing Egypt at that time.198

The deterioration of the economic, political, and social conditions during the

Ottoman period made its fall inevitable. In 1798, the French military forces, led by

Napoleon Bonaparte, launched a campaign against Egypt and occupied the country for

three years. This brief period arguably had a greater cultural impact than a political one.

Egyptians were introduced directly to the French culture and European fashion. The

association of the veil and wealth started to break as Egyptian women saw the French

elite women wearing liberal dress styles. While some Egyptian men and women adopted

European fashion, others rejected it, and the debate on women’s rights and the veil

moved to the center of public discourse.199

In summary, veiling practices varied significantly in Egypt. During the early

Mamluk era, the status of women improved. Women were more integrated in the

economy and there was a degree of tolerance to her dress style choices. This was mainly

due to the significant role she played in the large trade economy. Later on, as economic

conditions worsened, and the political climate became unstable, more restrictions were

placed on women’s freedom, and the veil was observed more strictly by upper-middle-

and upper-class women.

197 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 131. 198 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 130-132. 199 Misri, Azya’ al-mar’ah fi al-‘As r al-‘Uthmani , 40-43; Chatty, “The Burqa Face Cover,” 130.

115

During the Ottoman era, the Egyptian society faced even more acute

contradictions. The worsening economic conditions and the antimarriage restrictions on

members of the military corpse resulted in increased harassment and greater restrictions

on women’s liberties. At the same time, greater exposure to the European and fashion

culture during the second half of the eighteenth century resulted in polarizing views

regarding women’s rights and appropriate dress. All these economic and social conditions

caused a shift in the meanings, forms, and applications of the veil. The veil was

associated with honor and the image of women as sexual objects dominated the discourse

on women. Women were blamed for many social malfunctions and the culprits of men

against women blamed on the victims who had an alluring (or fitna) power over men.200

The House of Muhammed Ali (1805-1882)

Muhammed Ali Pasha was able to usurp power from the Anglo-Ottoman power

that defeated the French armies in 1801. The period preceding Ali Pasha’s rule was

characterized by political vacuum, which he viewed as an opportunity. Within a few

years, he crushed all Mamluks and restored order and stability in the country. Shortly

after, ‘Ali set on a plan to industrialize and modernize Egypt through importing the

“know-how” from Europe and through sending several missions of Egyptians to Europe

for education. He also launched a series of land reforms aiming at centralizing land

ownership, a main cause of feuds among ruling elites during that time. The irrigation

schemes that ‘Ali introduced significantly increased the area of cultivable land and

200 Chatty, “The Burqa Face Cover,” 130-1; Nawal Sa’dawi, 1986. Dirasa t ‘an al-mar’ah wa-al-

rajul fi al-mujtama’ al-’Arabī [Studies on Women and Men in the Arab Society] (Beirut: al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabīyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 1986), 831-33; Stillman, Arab Dress, 150-152.

116

increased the number of crops grown in Egypt. Extra long staple cotton was established

as a cash crop, which he monopolized and commercialized besides other crops. Europe,

particularly Britain, became a major importer of the Egyptian cotton.201

As these reforms were introduced, the standard of living of the Egyptians

improved and the size of the middle class expanded, pushing down that of the lower

class. However, these reforms caused a regression in the status of women who

significantly lost their economic power and freedom. Afaf Marsot argued that

centralization policies were often accompanied with deterioration in the status of women,

even w the economic conditions in general improved.202 Seclusion and veiling were

generalized in urban Egypt. As the lower-middle class decreased in size, the veil became

more predominant. The trend was still challenged by contradictory forces triggered by

globalization. At that time, the infiltration of European ethos and dress styles continued

to challenge traditional norms, leading to the rise of the debate on the meaning of honor,

morality, and tradition. As Leila Ahmed noted, “By mid-nineteenth century, Egypt was

swinging between a full admiration of European ethos and adoption of modern ways.”203

Many of the elements of the current discourse on women and the veil can be traced back

to that period.

One important factor associated with changes in dress styles in Egypt were

transformations in the concubine system. A key component of the aristocratic households

was slaves purchased at a young age from various parts in the Balkan region and brought

up in the households of the ruling elites. The aristocratic class in the Mamluk and

Ottoman Empires were almost exclusively Balkan and Turkish in ethnicity. These slaves

201 Marsot, “Entrepreneurial Women in Egypt,” 43-45. 202 Marsot, “Entrepreneurial Women in Egypt,” 43-45. 203 Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 36.

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filled high ranking positions that Egyptians were banned from filling by law.204 Egyptian

upper classes sought to emulate the Turkish elites’ lifestyle through purchasing female

slaves of Turkish origins and establishing a harem, a quarter in the house that was

exclusively dedicated to women and children and from which men were excluded.

Muhammed ‘Ali brought about significant changes in the composition of the

ruling class. In an attempt to sever links of dependency between Egypt and the Ottoman

Empire, ‘Ali drew elements of the endogenous population into the army and state

bureaucracy. As more ambitious Egyptians joined the state apparatus, and as more were

able to increase their power through landholdings and education, they replaced the Turks

in the aristocracy, and the structure of the ruling elite began to transform, causing

significant changes in dominant value systems. Egyptians, however, were still prevented

from filling senior positions in the army and bureaucracy, which later caused frictions

between the ruling class and the bureaucracy.

Another factor that contributed to the shifts in the elite structure is the decline in

slave trade. Several international treaties were established in the second half of the

eighteenth century restricting slave trade. Most of these treaties were not enforced and

had little impact on the slavery market. The greater shift came about through a decline in

the supply for slaves. Slaves came from Balkan and Circassian populations under the

Ottoman Empire, who led nomadic lifestyles, and sent their children as slave to secure

better opportunities for them. These populations started settling down during the

204 These slaves were referred to as Turks, but were ethnically diverse. They came from various

sources, including Albania, Circassia, Bosnia, and other areas of the Balkan region. But they were all referred to as Turks, especially that all of them learnt to speak Turkish as they were brought up in Turkish households.

118

nineteenth century and as they did, they were less inclined to send young send their

children to the Ottoman elite structure.205

The demise of the slavery system and the incorporation of endogenous

populations into the Egyptian bureaucracy were key factors in the structural

transformation of the elite structure. Egyptians in the bureaucracy sought to rise higher in

the ranks as their Turkish counterparts, but were blocked in an attempt to maintain

superiority. This resulted in tensions and conflicts between the Egyptians and the Turks at

the end of the nineteenth century. The laws that prevented Egyptians from filling senior

positions, which were never revoked, were invoked. One conflict escalated quickly and

had serious implications. Egyptian army officers, under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed

‘Urabi, launched a campaign, the theme of which was “Egypt for the Egyptians.” ‘Urabi

appealed to the British Empire under the banner of slave abolition to take their sides. The

conflict escalated into a major revolt in1882, called the ‘Urabi Revolt. In an attempt to

curb the movement and restore order, Khedive Tawfiq requested the intervention of the

British forces. The British took the Ottomans side and sent a large army to restore order.

Their goal, however, was to expand their Empire and they eventually occupied during

Egypt in summer of 1882. The British occupation gave ushered in the age of Egyptian

nationalism which was entangled with the question of belonging and the role of

women.206

205 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, 37, 94-102; Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman:

Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005): 18-22. 206 Baron, Egypt as a Woman, 18-26

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British Occupation: 1882-1925

By the second half of the nineteenth century, Egyptian fashion and views on the

veil were becoming polarized. Foreign intervention in domestic affairs were on the rise

and central power was challenged by a weak government plagued by internal strife and

sharp power competition between three different political entities namely Egyptians,

Turks, and British. Effectively, Egypt was ruled by the British Empire, but had a nominal

Muslim but foreign (Turkish) government in place and aspiring Egyptian upper-class that

was seeking to share power. The modern educational system that Ali Pasha introduced to

Egypt produced a body of educated middle class Egyptians who filled important, but not

senior, positions in the bureaucracy and army and started challenging the Ottoman regime

to achieve greater measures of power sharing.

The multiplicity of governments also resulted in a multiplicity of value systems,

with some members of the upper-class elite looking to Istanbul, the capital of the Islamic

Caliphate, for moral values and reform ideas while others looking to Europe for symbols

of development and reform. As will be shown below, some nineteenth century reformers

like Tal‘aat Harb, for example, insisted that the root of many of the social ills in Egypt is

that Egyptians forsook the authentic traditions that they inherited and strayed behind

foreign and corrupt mores.207 Others like Muhammed ‘Abdou sought ways to reconcile

the moral values of Islam with European inspired reform schemes.

But even Turkey, the symbol of tradition in the Islamic world, was becoming

more integrated in the European mores. Turkish women preceded Egyptians on the path

to unveiling. The trend started first among the religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire

207 Muhammad Tal‘at Harb, Tarbīyat al-mar‘ah wa-al-hijāb [Woman’s Education and the Veil]

(Cairo: Unknown Publisher, 1899).

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and slowly tricked down to Egypt in rather subtle forms.208 Bahithat al-Badiyya’s noted,

Egyptian women adopted tighter, more revealing dress styles with wider necklines and a

chiffon white veil that travelers like Elizabeth Cooper209 suggested made women look

sexier.

The adoption of European ways was restricted to upper-class women. Middle-

class women, who by then constituted a considerable segment of urban society, resisted

the transformation, and critiqued the upper classes for abandoning their authentic values

and traditional ways. A British European traveler and scholar, Elizabeth Cooper, noted

that middle class women in Egypt were “the chief preservers of the ancient customs of

Egypt.”210 The veil, therefore, symbolized tradition and a means to distinguish the

endogenous from the foreign. Both male and female members of the middle class used

various traditional symbols, including the veil, as means to affirm the authenticity of the

Egyptian identity and to resist Western imperialism. The power-aspiring middle class

also used these symbols to challenge and undermine the legitimacy of the westernized

Turkish ruling. The use of the veil as a tool of power negotiation is thus not new in

Egyptian politics, although the meanings, forms, and manifestations of those power

struggles varied widely over time.

The British occupation and the nationalist movements produced a great diversity

in the forms of dress and attitudes towards the veil. While upper-class women became

more relaxed with their veils, ameliorating their Turkish counterparts and the European

women, middle-class Egyptians became more rigid in their interpretation and application

of the veil requirement. The upper classes, which frequently traveled to Europe for

208 Stillman, Arab Dress, 152. 209 Elizabeth Cooper, The Women of Egypt (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1980). 210 Cooper, The Women of Egypt, 133.

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vacation and business did not veil during their travels. In her memoir, Huda Sha‘arawy

described how, with no objection from her husband, she was accustomed to removing the

veil and dressing in European clothes once arrived in Europe.211 The unveiling trend was

launched by religious minorities, starting with the Armenians, followed by the Jews. The

Copts of Egypt were the last group to unveil and were still veiled by the beginning of the

twentieth century.212 Stillman noted that non-Coptic Christian and Jewish Egyptians

abandoned the face veil almost a generation before the Muslims. These populations never

observed the segregation and seclusion practices as strictly as other Muslim groups.213

Unveiling followed a gradual path until Sha‘rawy’s dramatic act of lifting the face

veil in public. Baron emphasized, Sha‘rawy’s action ushered the end of an era rather than

the beginning of a new one. Before that time, younger women either postponed veiling or

never veiled. On the eve of the First World War, some travelers to Cairo noted that

Egyptian women seemed more liberal than their counterparts in Lebanon and other

“progressive” Arab states.214

There are some accounts of early feminists who appeared with their faces

unveiled in the wake of the First World War. However, unveiling was still considered an

act of defiance. These women were verbally harassed in the streets and stores, and

women continued to challenge these forces by subverting the veil. In 1918, one woman

correspondent to the feminist magazine, al-Jins al-Latif [The Delicate Gender], recounted

how she was approached by a stranger who scolded her saying, “Muslim and unveiled!!

211 Huda Sha‘rawi and Margot Badran. 1986. Harem Years: The Memoirs of an Egyptian Feminist

(1879-1924 ( London: Virago, 1986), 13. 212 Baron, The Women's Awakening in Egypt, 46-47. 213 Stillman, Arab Dress, 162. 214 Beth Baron, “Unveiling in Earl Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic

Considerations,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 3 (1989): 380-82.

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Aren’t you ashamed?”215 In 1919, another correspondent expressed embarrassment that

Egyptians were still debating the issue of the veil in the twentieth century and noted that

only 16 percent of Egyptian women wore the veil by that time, and that the Egyptian

woman “has naturally rejected [the veil].”216

By 1925, a significant convergence between outdoor and indoor dress was

noticed, with women appearing in European dress styles. The all-time famous singer,

Umm Kalthoum, who came from a very traditional family and performed while veiled in

the beginning of her career, took off the head scarf in 1932 and encouraged many other

women to follow suit.217 Pictures from the 1930s and 1940s showed women with

uncovered hair wearing short sleeves or sleeveless dresses.218 This was not only true for

upper-class women, but also middle-class women. Unveiling was publicly sanctioned

when the Azhar, the premier institution of Islamic scholarship and edicts, announced that

it is not opposed to unveiling in 1937. The Azhar also indicated that one of four main

schools in Islamic Shari‘a law did not consider the veil a religious requirement.219 This

move, however, came almost ten years after women have actually given up the veil. It

was just a formality. By the 1950s, the veil almost disappeared in Egypt, and unveiling

was sanctioned and even promoted by the Arab socialist regime.

The Veil Debate at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

215 Baron, “Unveiling in Earl Twentieth Century Egypt,” 381. 216 Baron, “Unveiling in Earl Twentieth Century Egypt,” 381-82. 217 Stillman, Arab Dress,156. 218 I have a personal collection of pictures from my greater family portraying this trend and had

the opportunity to discuss this trend with close family members who lived during that period. In addition, there are many television drama serials that depict this period. One political soup opera was Layali el-Hilmiyya (Hilmiyya Nights), featured over many years in the 1980s and 1990s. This series depicts stories of Egyptian families from different classes and how they participated in nationalist movements and social action. The series

219 Stillman, Arab Dress, 156.

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To understand the conditions associated with the lifting of the veil in the early

twentieth century, I will analyze the discourses on women’s rights as well as the veil

debate in the writings of various twentieth century thinkers and scholars. I begin with

covering the veil debate in the writings of three writers and scholars: Muhammed Tal‘at

Harb, an Egyptian nationalist, Malak Hifni Nassif, a female activist and Qassim Amin,

another nationalist and writer.

The debate on the veil evolved gradually, and the emphasis changed over a

narrow period of time. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the emphasis of the

debate was not on whether women were equal to men or not, but rather what they needed,

in terms of education and outdoor exposure, to perform their duties as mothers and

housewives effectively. Another focus of the debate was whether Egyptians should

emulate the West in their behavior and dress, as they proved superior in their command

of economic resources and abilities to advance their states, or to revive the values and

traditions that Egyptians inherited from the glorious Islamic civilization. The positions on

these two debate issues varied widely, and the diversions and positions reflected steep

divides in nationalist visions.

In his book Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab [Women’s Education and the Veil],

Tal‘at Harb,220 discussed the proper role of women in society. He insisted that women

were less than men in physical and mental abilities, as manifested by the long years of

male dominance in the family structure, as evidenced by the long years that men

subordinated women.221 He also insisted that the veil was a necessary requirement that

protected the family from the natural shortcomings of the various members of society.

220 Harb, Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab. 15. 221 Harb, Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab, 15.

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While Harb underscored the role of Islam in defining gender roles and upholding the veil

requirement, and even cited and interpreted Quranic verses that required the veil, his

message did not exclude members of other religious groups. According to Harb,

Christians and Jews were also required to veil according to their sacred texts. He quoted

verses from the Torah and Bible that required women to be modest and to veil and to

demonstrate that men had dominion over women.

Women, according to Harb, were created for men’s pleasure and to serve them.

Any divergence from this natural order would threaten the family structure and society

overall, which was what the experience of the West demonstrated. Women who pursued

equality with men gave up their natural purpose and ended up never marrying and having

children. The few women who tried to become scientists or professionals either failed

altogether or presented a mediocre product that was not worth the sacrifices they made.

That was not to say that women did not need education, but their education, according to

Harb, needed to focused on making women more effective wives and mothers. Women

needed to be educated in basic literacy, history, geography, and arithmetic so they could

more effectively communicate with their husbands and children. Any attempt to emulate

the West in their female education was misleading and would bring about severe social

calamities.222

Harb also warned Egyptians that it was in the best interest of the imperial West

for Egyptians to adopt their customs with regards to women. Europeans, he argued, knew

well that the most effective way for the West to control the Muslim world was by

changing its social structure through lifting the guard off women. Once women were

liberated, the Islamic World would all be captured and destroyed by Europe. The push for

222 Harb, Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab, 55-57.

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the liberation of women was, therefore, driven by imperial forces that Egyptians needed

to protect themselves against.223

The author explained that the veil and seclusion of women performed a very

important function, which was to protect the family from the natural instincts of jealousy

and suspicion. If women were allowed to go out and integrate in society, the family

would be destroyed as it would be impossible to prove fraternity. This was especially true

since women, even with the best upbringing and moral education, were inclined to fall to

sin. Seclusion, therefore, protected honor and the family structure.224

Harb’s position represented a popular middle-class position regarding the veil and

the role of women. His book was a response to another book written by a member of an

upper-class Egyptian who was a product of European educational systems, called Qassim

Amin. Amin’s 1898 book The Liberation of Women advocated unveiling (of the face

only) and the end of seclusion. He argued that the Islamic Shar‘ia law preceded all legal

codes in the declaration of gender equality and insisted that women were capable of

performing all functions performed by men and were equal to men in both physical and

mental capabilities.225 The only reason that men appeared to be superior to women was

that the capabilities of women were never exercised or nourished through proper

education and training. Shari‘a Law granted women perfect equality in rights and

responsibilities, argued Amin.226

Harb appropriated a high level of importance to seclusion and veiling as they

were essential for maintaining family unity and honor. Amin, on the other hand, argued

223 Harb, Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab, 5. 224 Harb, Tarbiyyat al-Mar’ah wal Hijab, 62-65. 225 Muhammad ‘Imarah, ed., A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn [The Complete Works: Qasim Amin]

(Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989, 322. 226 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 324

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that the insistence on the veil denied the power of men to control their instincts. Amin

argued that restricting the veil requirement to men implicitly presumed that woman were

stronger than men in controlling their sexual desires.227 He also argued that seclusion did

not guarantee female purity and that full control over anyone was impossible. The only

effective guarantee of honor and purity was the woman’s upbringing and morality.228

Seclusion, on the other hand, resulted in counter results as it made both men and women

more vulnerable in situations when encounters between the opposite sexes took place.

Whereas Harb called for a return to the core traditions and for expelling the

foreign buds that were planted in the Egyptian society by imperialism, Amin lavishly

praised the West in both their moral and economic schemes and called for adopting a

Western model of reform. The reason behind the success of the West, he claimed, was

that the Western woman was fully integrated in social functions. This meant that the

human capital assets were fully utilized. While women could be very effective in the

workplace, the purpose of their education did not have to turn her into an employee.

Rather, this education would enable her to be a more informed and effective parent and

housewife and would also give her the tools to survive financially if she lost her husband

or family’s support.229

In response to critiques similar to Harb’s that education might cause a

deformation in social morals, Amin insisted that what caused morality to fail was

ignorance rather than gender integration. A person who became a slave of ignorance

often had to resort to dishonesty and cunningness.230 Ironically, women that were least

227 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 355-356. 228 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 356 229 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 329-334. 230 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 345-347.

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ignorant, according to Amin, were female peasants. These women were integrated in

society and were able to contribute to their family and social well-being at maximum

capacity. Upper-class women, on the other hand, surpassed all women in their level of

awareness as they were idle and concerned themselves with gossip and external looks.231

Education, the liberation of women, and morality, he insisted, were all positively

correlated. The American woman experienced the greatest level of social integration, she

was also the most faithful woman to her husband. He insisted that these women never

looked at men in any sexual or abusive way, contrary to the Eastern women who looked

and scrutinized men in the streets.232

Amin advocated a fundamental transformation in the social and cultural fabric of

society. Women, who constituted 50 percent of social assts, should be utilized fully to

become either more effective housewives and mothers or more productive members of

the labor force. The key engine of this social transformation was the reform of women’s

conditions through the abolition of seclusion and excessive forms of veiling. He denied

that what he was proposing was a blind emulation of the West but a realignment of social

customs with the true essence of Islam. However, his excessive praising of the West,

including Western morals and the Western family structure, was a clear indication of his

full rejection of anything traditional. He also argued that Egyptians had already set on a

path of progress but the West is more advanced. He projected that the Oriental woman

231 ‘Imarah, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 329-334. 232 It is interesting how Amin portrayed this image of woman. Most literature talks about men

harassing women verbally and by the way they looked at them. It is not known how popular this account of women was among upper class women, but I have not come across any similar account in the past. Amīn, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 346-347.

128

would eventually cast off the veil, just as the woman in Europe did in the fourteenth

century. 233

The positions of Amin and Harb on the veil represented two polar views on the

veil; either the veil was essential because women were weak, or it was not necessary

because the male was not weak. It was either desired because it bridged the gap with a

glorious past that was contaminated by Western imperialism, or it was a sign of

backwardness and a curtain preventing the lights of science and knowledge emanating

from the West. The positions of the women, however, were less polarized. In fact,

women found the question of the veil peripheral and even demeaning to the feminist

agenda. Margot Badran noted, “Unveiling was never part of the Egyptian feminist

movement’s formal agenda.” In fact, early feminists saw the debate part of a “male

discourse” that aimed at perpetuating patterns of gender dominance in new forms.234 In

some way, early Egyptian feminists used the veil to negotiate power positions, rights, and

responsibilities rather than as an obstacle. The writings of Bahithat al-Badiyah were a

clear exemplification of that position regarding the veil.

Bahithat al-badiya regarded the veil debate as part of a masculine discourse

aiming at the reproduction of female inferiority and a way to divorce the question of

233 The writings of Qasim Amin inspired many female scholars and journalists to follow the same

path. Feminist journals al Fatat (the Young Woman), established in 1908, contained many articles by “progressive” writers and commentators about the necessity of casting off the veil as a prerequisite for reform. In 1908 and 1915, another two women’s magazines emerged, al-Jins al-Latif [the Tender Sex] and al-Sufur [Unveiling] which also promoted unveiling. Both magazines advocated women’s rights and female emancipation. In his first editorial article, the Chief Editor of al-Sufur, Abd al-Hamid Hamdi argued that al-Sufur (unveiling) had a much broader meaning than just the physical cover, it referred to the unveiling of the minds, thought, and capabilities. “We are a veiled nation” he contended in his opening editorial article, and this was what he sought to address. Other than few women talking about the difficulties they faced with the veil, with disrespectful men who harass women and obscenity, the contributors to these magazines were mostly men, and the discourse was similar to that of Orientalism, which produced and reproduced Eastern inferiority. See Abd al-Hamid Hamdi, “We are a veiled nation,” al-Sufur (1:1), 1915, 1. Amīn, A’māl al-kāmilah: Qāsim Amīn, 356-366.

234 Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 149-150.

129

women from the question of nationalism through the westernization of the issues. In one

of her poems, she remarked, “You ask the women to remove the veil, but where amongst

you is the virtuous? The woman is afraid, not of uncovering her face, but of the

corruption of men’s morality.”235 “We are not afraid of air and sunlight, but we fear his

[man’s] eyes and tongue.”236 Dismayed with the fact that it was man who always decided

for the woman everything, even whether to veil or not, Nasif said, “if [man] promises to

lower the gaze as instructed by his religion, and to hold his tongue as his moral standards

require” women would consider lifting the veil. She thus advised men to “mind their own

businesses”237 and stop instructing women on what they needed to do, as only woman

understood the pains of unveiling.238

The veil that became popular in the beginning of the twentieth century, argued

Nassif, was a mediocre cover that revealed more than concealed any of the beauties of the

women. She lamented that women went out in tight clothes, albeit all covered, and that

they filled their faces with makeup and wore too much jewelry. This, she insisted, was a

disgrace to the veil and to women. She advocated that women cover their hair and dress

in loose nondefining clothes. The face cover, she argued, was not necessary and not even

Islamic and had negative effects on woman’s health as it prevented proper breathing and

sunlight.239 For Nasif, the veil was a protector or a shield from sexual harassment and

male jealousy, both of which resulted in the confiscation of women’s freedom. Nasif

235 Malak Hifni Nāsif, Muslimah al-‘asrīyah ’inda Bāhithat al-Bādiyah, Malak Hifnī Nāsif [The

Modern Muslim to Bahithat al-Badiyah: Malak Hifni Nanif] (Cairo: Dar al-Ansar, 1976), 21-22. 236 Malak Hifnii Nas if, al-Nisā’īyāt: majmū’at maqālāt nushirat fī al-jarīdah fī mawdū ‘ al-mar’ah

al-Misrīyah [Gender Studies: A Collection of Articles Published on the Egyptian Woman, 2nd Edition] (Cairo: Multaqa al-Mar’ah wa-al Dhakirah, Agouza: Max Group,1998), 202.

237 Nasif, al-Nisā’īyāt, 202. 238 Nasif, Muslimah, Al-‘asrīyah ’inda Bāhithat al-Bādiyah , 21-22. 239 Malak Nasif, al-Nisā’īyāt: majmū’at maqālāt nushirat fī al-jarīdah fī mawdū ‘ al-mar’ah al-

Mis rīyah [Gender Studies: A Collection of Articles Published on the Egyptian Woman] (Cairo: Bab al-Khalq, 1910), 59.

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maintained that the veil was necessary, at least for the time being because “Our men are

not ready for complete unveiling, otherwise I would have been for it.”240 Women needed

to focus on unveiling their minds and capabilities. In a sense, the underlying message was

that removing the physical cover would stifle the core issues of the feminist question and

distract women from seeking resolutions for the underlying causes behind their

disenfranchisement.

Nasif was also critical of the other pole of the debate exemplified in the writings

of Harb. She firmly upheld the equality of men and women in both physical and mental

abilities. The current state of inferiority that women suffered from and the restriction of

women’s social role to domestic care giving were not ordained by any divine or earthly

law. In fact, the early communities rejected this artificial law as both men and women

worked side by side. This was also the case for rural societies where women enjoyed a

high degree of equality of rights and responsibilities.241. Nasif maintained that women’s

first responsibility were towards their husbands and families. However, a woman would

be a better wife and mother if she was at par with men in terms of education and

knowledge and she would have a more positive social impact in society if she had the

tools to be an active citizen, even if she did not hold a job out of home.

Nassif countered Harb and other antifeminists’ arguments by asserting that

women’s weakness was constituted by the male discourse on women and the state of

seclusion that men imposed on her, which prevented her from realizing her capabilities. It

was true that no significant inventions were advanced by women, but only because

240 Malak Nasif, Al-Nisā’īyāt, 50 241 Nasif, Al-Nisā’īyāt, 43.

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women were barred from entering these fields. They excelled, however, in the areas

where they had an opportunity, such as the field of arts.242

Nasif addressed two other concerns regarding seclusion and female education.

The first was with regard to the effect of education on women’s morality. She argued that

the morals of both men and women were deteriorating, not due to education, but because

of upbringing at the level of the family. She criticized Amin (implicitly) for arguing that

the West was higher in their moral standards, insisting that proper upbringing was not

about kissing the hands of female guests. Proper upbringing, according to Nasif, entailed

the realization of both men and women of their own strengths.243

In response to the critique that women’s education and entrance into the labor

force would crowd out male job seekers, she presented an innovative argument: men

were the ones that started crowding out women in their jobs by inventing the many tools

and machines that reduced her duties, including the sewing machine, weaving, and the

vacuum. The tools were useful, but their use resulted in a significant reduction in the time

she needed to perform her duties at home. Instead of lying idle and growing sluggish,

women should be allowed to participate in the workforce. After all, whether she worked

or not should be her own choice, not an imposed decision.244 She also noted that it was

quite premature for men to feel threatened in their jobs, as women had just started to

receive education, and it would be decades before she was ready to compete with him in

the labor market.

242 Nasif, Al-Nisā’īyāt, 38, 44-46. 243 Nasif, Al-Nisā’īyāt, 51-54. 244 Nasif, Al-Nisā’īyāt, 39-42.

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Rapid Transformation or Spurious Change?

The debate on the veil and women’s rights evolved in the midst of wide-reaching

sociopolitical, economic, and cultural transformations. The first transformation was

related to the modernization scheme launched by Muhammed Ali in an effort to sever

dependence on the Ottoman Empire for security. Muhammed Ali established a formal

state education system to the local religious schools, or kuttab. The intent was to provide

the new modern army and bureaucracy with the necessary expertise and it broadened

access to education to wide segments of society. It also resulted in the formation of a

middle class of endogenous technocrats who had technical skills became exposed to the

nationalist movements taking place in other parts of the world. This new class initiated an

Egyptian nationalist movement and pursued various political and social rights, including

freedom of speech, self determination rights, and the right to organize.245

Kedive Isma‘il (ruler of Egypt between 1863 and 1879) followed the steps of his

grandparent, especially in modernization policies. He launched a series of vast state-

sponsored projects, such as the construction of an Egyptian railroad in 1853 that was

extended in various phases to connect Cairo with Alexandria and Upper Egypt, the

building of the trams in Egypt and Alexandria, and the opening of the Suez Canal as well

as several bridges and dams. Khedive Isma‘il also emphasized education, and built

several new public schools for both boys and girls. Among the first schools for women

were the Siyufiyah and the Qirabiya, both of which were established in 1873. While

upper-class elites refused to send their daughters to receive formal education, preferring

245 Leila Ahmed, A Border Passage, 35-38; Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 149-150.

133

to provide them with private home-based education, middle-class families seized the

opportunity and sent their children, males and females, to these schools. 246

The implementation of modernization policies catalyzed the process of nation-

building and instilled a strong sense of national identity among Egyptian middle and

upper classes. However, the inability of the state to raise sufficient revenues to finance

these projects resulted in a profound fiscal crisis. The fiscal crisis was exacerbated with

the inability of the state to implement a balanced developmental plan. The economic

development projects was not backed up by the necessary political institutions that

supports these developments and ensures stability and sustainability.

Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies clarifies the antecedents of

the identity and political crises that characterized the sociopolitical scene in Egypt in the

twentieth century.247 Absent a compatible degree of institutionalization modernization

may cause violence and instability.248 Institutionalization ensures the legitimization of the

modernization schemes and the establishment of institutions that are capable of extracting

revenues to sustain these developments.249 The latter is closely connected with the

resulting fiscal crisis which caused the state to declare bankruptcy in 1876. The ‘Urabi

Revolt and the British occupation in 1882 were directly linked to the imbalanced

modernization scheme launched during the nineteenth century. Egyptian society

experienced rapid social mobilization, but failed to develop the political institutions

246 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 9-11. 247 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 4. 248 Huntington, Poliical Order in Changing Societies. 4. 249 Margarete Levi’s Of Rule and Revenue is primarily devoted to understanding how the state

goes about maximizing its revenue through the provision of public goods. While the use of force is an option, it is very expensive and difficult to maintain. The most successful states are ones rely on producing quasi-voluntary compliance from its constituents through various bargaining arrangements. The Egyptian state has clearly failed to produce any form of quasi-voluntary compliance. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

134

capable of absorbing or mediating conflicts that occur among various groups.

Accordingly, improvements in economic conditions, if not sustainable, produce

expectations that if not met lead to violence not met.

The British administration in Egypt compounded the challenges that were already

in existence by the time they invaded the country. The occupation took place during a

period of relative economic prosperity in Egypt that was driven primarily by a booming

export-oriented economy. By that time, the size of the lower class was diminished as

more of this group joined the lower-middle and middle classes. Except for the lower class

peasants, most classes and groups in Egypt benefited economically from this prosperous

period. The British regime adopted a laissez faire approach that ensured that also resulted

in the increase in women’s participation in the economy. The administration also granted

freedom of speech and women took advantage of these new rights. A number of women’s

magazines and journals were created during the first two decades in the twentieth

century.250 Freedom of speech, however, was neutralized by the reduction in investment

in education. The British invested minimally in education, especially women’s education,

and never provided secondary education for women.

The following section examines some of the contradictions that characterized the

British occupation and their repercussions on feminist and nationalist movements in

Egypt. The life stories of two early Egyptian feminists, Huda Sha‘rawy and Nabawiyya

Musa, provide insight on the implications of the British occupation on the feminist

movement. Sha‘rawy’s life represent an upper class feminist perspective while that of

Musa’s is representative of a middle class one. These two feminists provide two different

250 Baron, “Unveiling in Earl Twentieth Century Egypt: Practical and Symbolic Considerations,”

372-374.

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perspectives that shaped the feminist discourse in Egypt and defined the relationship

between the feminist and nationalist activism.

Beams of Light in the Midst of Darkness

Huda Sha‘rawy is the daughter of an Egyptian elite father who benefited from a

modern education system that helped him get a high ranking job in the Ottoman

bureaucracy. Following the traditions of the Ottomans, the father possessed a harem and

married to a Circassian woman. Sha‘rawy was brought up in a typical upper-class

society, which observed the seclusion of women to the furthest extent. She received her

education through home schooling which focused on foreign languages, home

economics, and humanities. She tried to receive instruction in the Arabic language but

was denied as Arabic proficiency was necessary only for working in the bureaucracy and

women are not expected to work. For Sha‘rawy, not being allowed to master Arabic

represented a denial of membership, which made “[her] depressed, hating being a girl

because it kept me from the education I sought.”251 Her hope to become an active part of

society was further disappointed through an arranged marriage to her cousin at the age of

twelve. Sha‘rawy did not consent to the marriage but was forced to accept it.

Had this marriage continued its normal course, Sha‘rawy would have lost any

hope to become actively engaged in political and social domains. Her only salvation

came from a clause in her marriage contract that her mother insisted on adding, which

stipulated the nullification of the marriage contract should her husband take another wife.

Within a year her husband violated the contract by remarrying, and Sha‘rawy separated

from her husband for seven years. During that time, she was able to further her education

251 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 40.

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in various fields, except Arabic. She also enriched her cultural knowledge through

attending a number of home-based seminars, called salons, opera evens and many other

cultural events. When she returned to her husband at the age of 21, she had already

achieved a level of autonomy and independence that were difficult to revoke and she

continued her cultural activities with no objection from her husband.

The differences and conflicts between Sha‘rawy and her husband continued,

however. What brought them together and maintained their marriage until her husband’s

death in 1922 was their involvement in the nationalist movement through the Wafd

Party.252 Badran noted, “The nationalist movement brought husbands and wives who

normally led more separate existences in the divided harem world into closer contact.”253

The peak of that collaboration was towards the end of the First World War. Sha‘rawy’s

husband, Ali Sha‘rawy, was one of three delegates (the other two being Sa‘ad Zaghlul

and ‘Abd Al-‘Aziz Fahmi) who represented Egyptians before the British high

commissioner. This delegation requested the independence of Egypt from the British

occupation but their request was denied. The delegation was also prevented from

representing Egyptians at the Versailles peace meeting. This disappointment resulted in

the transformation of the request for independence to a full-fledged nationalist and the

formation of the first political party in Egypt. The Wafd Party (Arabic for delegation)

was a secular political movement which successfully mobilized one of the biggest

national revolutions in the Egyptian history which brought together Egyptians of all class

and gender groups. Huda Sha‘rawy spoke fondly of this period and her active role in

leading a militant female movement during the 1919 national revolution. Her husband, as

252 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 111. 253 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 116.

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well as Sa‘ad Zaghlul, the leader of the Wafd Party, were both deported in an

unsuccessful attempt by the British to quell nationalist fervors.

Huda Sha‘rawy and other women were the liaisons between the exiled leaders of

the nationalist movement and the masses. She recalled, “My husband kept me informed

of events so that I could fill the vacuum if he were imprisoned or exiled.”254 She

organized the movement and ensured that all women participating in the demonstrations

stayed informed and that the demonstrations took place in spite of the British maneuvers

to discourage the demonstration by using machine guns to block the streets. “I was

determined that the demonstration should resume,” recalled Sha‘rawy. When a British

soldier pointed a gun towards her, she still proceeded bravely, saying, “Let me die so

Egypt shall have an Edith Cavell.” She also narrated how the women stood for hours on a

hot sunny day, saying “I did not care if I suffered sunstroke—the blame would fall upon

the tyrannical British authority.”255 She spoke fearlessly of the British atrocities towards

the Egyptians, sending numerous letters to women and men in Europe and the United

States, thus embarrassing the British Kingdom among those who were beginning to

advocate the principles of self-determination and sociopolitical rights.

Women’s economic engagement was needed as well. They urged men to quit

their government jobs as they were funded by the colonizer and they “took off their

jewelry and offered it to government workers” as a compensation for their lost wages.

She narrated talking to Egyptian men saying. “If you want money, take this [jewelry] but

do not hinder our cause by going back to work under British threat.”256 In response to the

second deportation of Zaghlul in 1921, the women organized one of the most effective

254 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 116. 255 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 112-114. 256 Sha‘rawy and Badran, Harem Years, 120.

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and far-reaching boycotts of all British services and product. They also took on selling

shares of the first national bank in an effort to finance the nationalist activities and were

the first to buy these shares.

As upper-class women continued their struggle to engage other women in the

nationalist activities using their economic power, middle-class women benefited from

another development, namely the expansion of education for both men and women.

Nabawiyya Musa, the daughter of a middle-class army officer, was among the

beneficiaries of the schools that were established during Khedive Isma‘il. Middle-class

families were eager to send their daughters to schools because they perceived education

as a means to raise their status. Musa received a formal education that, at least in theory,

was gender-neutral. She studied Arabic and was proud to outscored male peers who later

became renowned writers and political leaders. Again, mastering the Arabic language

was portrayed as an official ticket to legitimize participation in social and economic

activity.

In spite of the absence of any secondary education for women, Musa studied at

home and became the first to receive the baccalaureate degree in 1908. She recalled how

the British officials, both men and women, tried many times to prevent her from taking

the exam, but she resisted these maneuvers successfully. Alarmed by her success, the

British colonizers instituted stricter rules to prevent other woman from following Musa’s

path. Musa recalled, “Of course, I didn’t have any fellow women students. It was not

until 1928 that the next Egyptian woman would sit for the baccalaureate examination.”257

This personal experience shaped one of the most profound arguments in the women’s

nationalist struggle. At the peak of the nationalist struggle in 1920, Musa published her

257 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 42-44.

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book The Women and Work where she argued for the need for women to enter the labor

force to release Egypt from its technical and economic dependency on the colonizer. In

that book she argued,

A nation cannot prosper unless its people are vital and productive. A people cannot be vital as long as half are paralyzed and isolated from the affairs of everyday life. If women do not work, half the nation is unproductive. Egypt has a great need for labor. There is no way we can keep Egypt’s wealth in our own hands except through the education and training of women…First we neglect the education of women; then remain ill-equipped to work. Then we look down on them, slam the door of work in their face, and welcome foreign women into our homes, entrusting them with our basic needs. Egyptian capital is lost to foreign women, found perfect, rather than going to our own women, found wanting. Had we spent money on educating Egyptian women, they would have been able to perform these jobs, and we Egyptians would be keeping Egyptian money in Egyptian hands. At a time when we make great efforts to win our political independence, why do we lag behind in fighting for our economic independence while we have the means in our hands?” 258

Musa also used a cultural argument. She insisted that it was not appropriate for

Egyptians to trust British women to impart values and moral codes into the youngsters as

they practically controlled the educational system. Egyptian women should be the ones to

be trusted for that task. These arguments were well-received by Egyptian nationalists,

especially the more secular ones.

Nabawiyya Musa viewed education as the only viable and sustainable route for

women’s emancipation. She was critical of women involvement in militant activities,

indicating that “taking part in street demonstrations was not fitting to our dignity as

Oriental women.”259 She also insisted that “schools going on strike did not help the

country…The country is in great need of education. Teachers should be far removed from

258 Musa 1920 cited in Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 79. 259 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 79.

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militancy in the national movement because they are performing great national work that

they should not put aside for anything else, however important it might be.”260

Throughout her life Musa strove to portray herself as a friend and promoter of

Eastern tradition and customs insofar as these traditions were true to the spirit of Islam.

She advocated limited sex integration, conservative dress codes, and all the manners

expected of women. She maintained a very modest appearance, dressing in a black cloak

and a veil even after Egyptians cast off the veil completely. Her meticulous adherence to

traditional codes of dress and sex segregation were her way to gain the confidence of

parents who were resistant to the idea of formal female education, and her strategy

proved successful. She became the first headmistress of a girls’ school in an Egyptian

village, a position traditionally held by British women. She related,

At that time there were only eighty girls in the school. Most were no older than ten because people, especially villagers, were not eager to educate their daughters since they believed education would lead to corruption….However, when people saw that my attire was nearly the same as that of the village women, they stopped believing that teachers dressed immodestly and began to approve of the school. Not more than three months from the day I started working in the school the number of students exceeded two hundred. 261

Was Nabawiyya Musa suggesting that the women’s involvement in militant

nationalism was premature? Were the strategies adopted by women at the time to realize

freedom and equality in opposition to the social construct and therefore unsustainable?

Musa’s voice echoed another faint voice also trying to re-steer women’s efforts, and that

was the voice of Malak Hifni Nassif. Towards the end of Nassif’s life, she resorted to

total silence and disappeared from the literary scene almost completely. At receiving a

plea to guide women who were divided and confused with no common goals, she said, “I

260 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 78. 261 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 58.

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retreated from writing, not because I lack material to write about, or due to satisfaction

with the little I wrote, but because I got tired of the calls for the reform of the Egyptian

woman, and the fact that the new educated class, both men and women, forsook the goal

of establishing the needed Egyptian nationalism.”262

Building national identity is a gradual process that cannot be externally induced

but has to come from within through education and common sharing of experiences. The

process of nation-building can be catalyzed through social mobilization, but it cannot be

forged, and in the absence of institutions that will capitalize on these movements and

sentiments, their effects would dissipate quickly. The insights provided by both Musa and

Nassif, therefore, provide an important context to understanding the series of

disappointments and failures that followed the 1919 revolution.

Disappointments and Betrayals

As more Egyptians rallied behind the goal of independence, the ability of the

British administration to maintain internal stability diminished. In response to these

mounting national pressures, the British proposed what was called the Curzon Plan in

1920, which was a proposal for Egyptian independence that, while giving the Egyptians

some sovereignty, would still maintain the presence and role of the British colonizers in

Egypt. Sa‘ad Zaghlul, who negotiated the plan in London, consulted with various male

members of the Wafd Party. The women section of the Wafd Party, called the Wafdist

Women’s Central Committee (WWCC), were not consulted. The president of the

WWCC, Huda Sha‘rawy, expressed dismay, and wrote an open letter to Zaghlul

deploring his action. Not only did the male members of Wafd fail to engage the women

262 (Nasif 1998, 201. Author’s translation)

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who supported and promoted the nationalist activities, but the proposed plan did not

include the full range of Egyptian demands. Consequently most Egyptians agreed that the

independence was nominal and that the plan would have a negative impact on the

Egyptian nationalist movement.

Notwithstanding protests by various segments of the population, the plan went

into effect in 1922. Egypt became nominally independent with Egyptians controlling only

internal affairs while the the British continued controlled foreign affairs and security.263

Sha‘rawy was extremely critical of the “independence,” stating that the independence

granted by the British under the Curzon Plan was “deformed and dismembered,” as

Sha‘rawy insisted. She insisted that this independence was nothing but a maneuver by the

British to “paralyze our national movement and to calm our frazzled nerves.”264 Yet, the

granting of this partial independence cooled down the fervor of nationalist movements

and brought about several divisions within the Wafd Party as well as within other parties.

Shortly after the nominal independence of Egypt was declared, a constitution was

promulgated, which established all Egyptians, regardless of religion, gender, or class as

equal. Less than a month later, however, a new electoral law was issued that restricted

women from voting. This new law was a shock to female Egyptian activists who were

ready to sacrifice their lives for the nationalist cause. Divisions continued between the

leadership of the Wafd Party and other segments of society regarding the Sudan.265 In

addition, and in response to the assassination of the British General of the Egyptian army,

the British issued an ultimatum to Egyptians. Again, Zaghlul accepted the first four

263 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 81-86. 264 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 85. 265 Prior to 1922, most Egyptians insisted on the unity of Egypt and the Sudan. However, Zaghlul

and other politicians expressed willingness to accept the sovereignty of the Sudan, which the WWCC strongly opposed to and that caused significant divisions.

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conditions of the ultimatum, while most Egyptians as well as the WWCC found it

dishonoring. Zaghlul, therefore, ceased to represent the voice of the nation, and his

leadership was no longer viewed as legitimate. In an open letter to Zaghlul, who was then

the prime minister and party leader of the first democratically elected government,

Sha‘rawy declared, “Since you have not succeeded while in office to fulfill your promise

by positive action, I ask you not to be an obstacle in the path of your country’s struggle

for salvation….I ask you to step down from governing.”266

In the same month that Sha‘rawy’s letter was published in al-Akhbar newspaper,

Zaghlul resigned, taking with him any hope for leadership. Leadership is one of the most

essential ingredients of state and nation-building. The nationalist movement broke down

to several smaller movements, including a feminist movement (eventually aligned with

an international feminist agenda), an Islamic movement, a secular movement, and

others.267 Within each of these movements, personal differences emerged that made them

susceptible to further breakups. The result of this was an endemically weak central

government that was unable to forge and promulgate a unified vision of who belongs to

the nation.

The weakness of a central government and the absence of effective institutions of

conflict resolution typically generate opportunities for the emergence of radicalism. In

my research on the Sudan, I found that the endemic weakness of the central government,

and its failure to forge a unified vision of who belongs to the nation w primary reason

behind the radicalization of the regime and the plague of civil wars the plagued the

country. Busy playing sectarian politics, the constituents of the central government in the

266 Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation, 86. 267 Notable among these new movements is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by a teacher called

Hassan al-Banna in 1928.

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Sudan failed to engage opposition groups in a dialogue, thus leaving them to accuse one

another of being the enemy and to mutually radicalize one another.268 While the Egyptian

regime is not radical, it has bred strong radical religious movements, the first of which

emerged in 1928. The failure of the nationalist experiment in Egypt may be one of the

causes of the rise of radical movements in Egypt, and may explain some of the pressure

on women to adopt an Islamic dress code.

Conclusion

This chapter presented snapshots of Egyptians’ dress history that spanned almost

thirteen centuries. My goals was to demonstrate the continuities and discontinuities in the

discourses and practices regarding the veil and to identify some of the factors that are

associated with the change in the dress styles and to draw parallels between the recent

change in dress that started in the 1970s but crystallized toward the ends of the 1990s and

all these historic episodes.

This chapter demonstrated the role of women in reproducing the past and/or

changing it. Egyptian women were treated as the face of the nation and the main agent of

its cultural preservation. This is why she was always a major target in policies attempting

to change the cultural fabric of Egypt. Even the colonizer attempted to establish its

legitimacy and maintain Egypt’s dependence by portraying the veil of women as a sign of

Egypt’s backwardness. The British portrayed the image of the emancipator of women.

The debate on the veil during that period contained components of resistance to imperial

268 Unpublished Manuscript, “Identity Crisis and Radical Movements: The Case of the Sudan,”

2007.

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powers and parts of the discourse sought to highlight the hypocrisy that imbued that

British “civilizing mission.”

The use of women as a tool of transformation and preservation has been

attempted almost in every period throughout the Egyptian history. However, women have

also resisted attempts to control and shape her. At times, women defied seclusion and

veiling regulations and subverted the veil at many times. At others, they used the veil to

challenge the imperial power, insisting that they rejected the models of female

emancipation that the colonizer offered. These emancipatory models would substitute one

form of constraint into another more dangerous and resilient and form. Middle-class

women were especially active in shaping that form of resistance.

The analysis suggested that the direction of the change in the cultural outlook of

the nation through women had economic and political as well as cultural roots. The

structure of the economy and economic conditions, in particular the mode of production

and the distribution of economic power among groups and classes is strongly correlated

with the status of women. In times when Egypt’s economic engines were the agricultural

industry or trade, Egyptian women were more likely to be integrated in social activities

and observe less the laws of seclusion. Literature suggests that one of the main reason for

the high gender equality in Egypt that lasted until the Byzantine Empire is associated

with its agricultural economic structure, which necessitates that both men and women

share economic responsibilities.

Through greater integration in the global economy, other nonagricultural

industries were introduced, including trade and basic manufacturing. The introduction of

these industries, which were highly sensitive to global conditions and domestic affairs,

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resulted in high variance in the status of women. At times when the economy was

prosperous and employment opportunities abound for both men and women, women’s

status improved. The first and second centuries of the Mamluk were exemplary periods of

gains realized by women that were associated with improvements in the standard of

living and the abundance of economic opportunities. The last century in the Mamluk

period witnessed significant political turmoil due to civil wars and a sharp deterioration

in economic conditions. These politico-economic conditions resulted in major restrictions

on the dress and movements of women.

The Ottoman period witnessed an intensification of these factors compounded by

greater integration in the global economy and a greater exposure to the European culture.

During that period, European products caused the decline in local industries, including

the textile and trade industry, both of which employed a great number of women. As

opportunities declined, arguments for higher measures of seclusion and veiling mounted.

At the same time, as Egyptians were exposed to European travelers, segments of the

upper classes started adopting European dress. During that period, the middle class

adhered more to traditional dress codes as they felt threatened by European power. The

size of this class increased significantly during the reign of Muhammed Ali and thus

increased the power of this class.

The discourse and path of the nationalist movements in the first few decades of

the twentieth century demonstrated another important cause of the volatility of cultural

expressions in Egypt and the process of identity formation. While Egypt was able to

produce the charismatic leadership capable of mobilizing Egyptians, the colonizer

ensured that this leadership did not take root through preventing the institutionalization of

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politics. This implied the absence of dialogue among the various visions and discourses

on nationalism and the lack of mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Any

disagreement regarding the path Egypt should take resulted in separations and

dissolutions. The political scene in Egypt in the second half of the 1920s up until the

1950s, therefore, was characterized by fragmentation and instability, and the national

identity that was at its embryonic stage never saw the light of day as petty political

conflicts killed it at its birth.

The casting off of the veil in the 1920s took place in the midst of a national crisis.

It was catalyzed by a desire to emulate the West and to follow the path of Turkey and

Iran, both of which cast off the veil in the 1920s and 1930.269 It was then that the

discourses of nationalism and women’s rights had divorced, rendering both movements

superficial. The women achieved significant gains in the following years; however, the

cultural fabric of society and views on women hardly changed. In addition, the feminist

discourse became increasingly westernized, resulting in a limited acceptance in the

beginning and finally a rejection by a large portion of male and female Egyptians. Thus,

identity continued to experience a crisis. This explains why many of the gains realized

through feminist activism were ephemeral or shallow.

Leila Ahmed insisted that while “the veil might go, but not necessarily the

attitudes that accompanied it—the habits of seclusion and the cultural conditioning about

the meaning of seeing and not seeing, of being visible and invisible.”270 This is, to a large

extent, what happened in Egypt. The revolutionary transformation in dress code that

Egyptians saw in the 1930s had no roots in the social and cultural fabrics. Until this day,

269 In both countries, a secular regime forced this change on women. This was not the case in

Egypt where women chose to take off the veil themselves with no direct intervention from the state. 270 Ahmed, A Border Passage, 95

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Egypt had not been able to develop a unified nationalist vision. This caused the

discourses on religion and politics to be taken lightly in Egypt. The sudden return to the

veil in its current form, therefore, is an exemplification of such trivialization. Both

pursuits were like a Faberge egg, beautiful on the outside, but empty on the inside. This

internal vacuum makes the form vulnerable and easily crushable. Just as the veil almost

vanished in a blink of the eye, it returned back in another blink, as identity continued to

be in crisis.

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Chapter 5

Voices, from the Center and the Periphery

The Identities of Veiled and Unveiled Women ExploredError! Bookmark not defined.

Introduction

The previous chapter demonstrated the historical specificity of dress and attitudes

towards the veil in Egypt. I argued there that the discourse of the veil is closely linked

with the discourse of identity and nationalism. I also highlighted some of the roots of the

current attitudes towards the veil, particularly the divorce between the discourses of

nationalism and feminism and the failure to compose a nationalist vision that provides the

necessary “glue” to achieve national unity. This chapter explores the meanings and

symbols associated with dress styles and the veil among young middle-class Egyptian

women today. It examines how respondents view the self and the other through the prism

of their dress. I argue that the rapid evolution of the veil today is catalyzed by various

forces of globalization, which increased exposure not only to Western cultures, but also

to Arab Gulf cultures that are characterized by high levels of gender inequalities and by a

limited presence of women in public space.

The analysis in the chapter is based on the results of a detailed semistructured

interview that was conducted in Cairo, Egypt, during the summer of 2008. Through an

interpretive analysis of the words of the women participants regarding the meaning of

religiosity, their social roles and responsibility, and the status of morality today compared

to the past, the chapter examines the process through which the meanings and forms of

the veil are reconstructed. My main argument is that the veil today is used as an

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instrument of subversion and subservience in a political struggle where women appear to

be the both the targets and the agents. The veil is also a weapon of resistance in face of

globalization and the perceived “War on Islam.”

The Scope and Limits of Female Agency

One of the first questions posed is this research was What is the domain of the

Egyptian female in the decision to veil? Are they effectively “free” to choose to veil or

not? To answer this question, I asked veiled respondents regarding the main prompt of

the decision to veil. I also looked at the distribution of the age when the respondent took

that decision. As Figure 18 shows, there are two peak points for veiling: one at puberty

and the other during college. In Islam, puberty means that the person is liable to every

action he/she commits. The Muslim is accountable for carrying out all obligatory acts of

Shari‘a from that time onward. The veil is now considered one of the principle

requirements of Islam. According to Sunnah, or the sayings of the Prophet of Islam,

“Allah does not accept the prayer of a woman who has reached puberty unless she wears

a veil.”271 In the past, this Hadith was interpreted to mean that women should be veiled

while performing the prayer ritual or her prayer would be rejected. Today, preachers

insist that the acceptance of any of forms of worship from a woman by God is pegged to

the veil. The other peak point at which the probability of veiling increases is enrollment

at college, normally at the age of 18. This suggests that women may experience

significant peer pressure to conform to the social norms of veiling in college.

271 Sunnah is second most important sources of Islamic teachings after the Quran. It is comprised

of the sayings and traditions of the prophet of Islam that were report by his companions. This hadith is cited in two of four main collections of Hadiths. Source: University of Southern California, Compendium of Muslim Texts. http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/ abudawud/002.sat .html#002.0641 (accessed May 27, 2009).

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Figure 18. Age at Veiling

0

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4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

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10

11 to 1

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esponden

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Respondents were asked to identify what personal experiences prompted them to

wear the veil. Some women thought the question was strange and said, “What do you

mean prompt? The Hijab is fard (a religious duty), and I have to oblige whether I am

convinced or not.” Ten respondents indicated that they got veiled because it is fard, and it

is “haram (illicit) for a girl to reveal her hair to anyone.” These answers respondents

suggested an underlying belief among young Egyptian Muslims that women should not

practice agency in matters related to religion. The veil today has acquired a law status in

Islam and as such women were not allowed to rationalize it.

For two thirds of the veiled respondents, parents were the main force behind

veiling. This force took the form of advice or a discussion regarding the veil. “My mom

and dad convinced me;” “My mom convinced me after a very long discussion;” “I

wanted to please God in the beginning, and secondly home (parents).” Others indicated

that their mothers or fathers insisted that they wear the veil: “My dad insisted that I wear

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it;” “My mom decided that I must wear it because now I am older and am about to get

married.” Some women indicated that they experienced a lot of pressure at home to wear

it, and just wanted to stop the hassle: “I don’t need the headache, and my hair is useless

anyway.” While the first group expressed an inner conscience force for veiling, this

group alluded to some forms of social pressure for veiling that is applied by the parents.

The veil was driven by a strong spiritual drive for some women. Seven

respondents indicated that they experienced a spiritual moment after a trauma, or had a

need to get closer to God and just took the decision to veil.

I was not thinking about it at all at that time when I got veiled…But at a certain moment, I just felt from inside that I want to get veiled… I felt that it’s the right thing to do and that I am already late. A lot of girls were getting veiled around me and I am still not veiled…. I was afraid I was going to die before I veiled. At that time a boy at school died in a car accident and then shortly my grandfather died…Because of all these incidents I suddenly started thinking a lot about death and the fact that we were…flying a lot [i.e. traveling by plane] made me even more aware that I might die any moment. Then I’d have to face God and answer about why I didn’t wear the veil. I was at a time of my life when I felt God gave me so many good things and I needed to thank Him for all His blessings. I was trying to get closer to Him and was looking for a way. That was when I decided to veil. For some women, therefore, the veil was a very personal matter that was driven

by a strong a desire to become closer to God and a conviction that the veil is a

prerequisite to building a relationship with God. However, even in those instances, the

lurking impact of the religious sermons in media today that emphasized the after-life

consequences of not veiling was apparent. The fear of death without receiving

“salvation” through the veil obsessed many women, and it became a constant thought for

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the unveiled. The following chapter analyzes the content of some of these sermons and

discusses their impact on the position of the veil in Egypt today.

There were significant limitations to the women’s freedom to choose whether to

veil or not. All women experienced direct and/or indirect pressure to veil. The pressure in

many cases was exercised by the immediate family, who in some cases advised and in

others ordered the young woman to veil. Many women also internalized a lot of the

teachings of contemporary preachers. While very few indicated that they veiled

immediately after the sermon, the greatest impact seemed to be the resonation of these

teachings during a life-crisis.

Is the Veil a Religious Duty?

The religious intelligentsia today has accumulated a lot of power over the domain

of value constitution. Egyptian women, however, still retained a considerable realm of

freedom in their interpretations of these sermons. They are actively engaged in the

reconstitution of Islamic teachings and religion through their everyday practices. Chapter

4 reviewed some of the Islamic texts that involved the veil, and it was found that it was

not clear whether the veil was a religious requirement or not. In recent years, few

renowned public figures, including the Minister of Cultural Affairs, Faruq Hosny, and the

Editor-In-Chief of a weekly women’s magazine, Iqbal Baraka, expressed doubts about

the veil requirement. Great protests broke out in Egypt against the Minister, requesting

his resignation and lawsuits were also filed against him and the writer for simply denying

the centrality of the veil in Islam.

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Figure 19. Veiled Women Protest Veiled women and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood chant slogans and carry signs that read in Arabic "The veil is a religious duty like prayer and fasting,” and “Not my veil!” during a demonstration in the northern Egyptian city of Alexandria, 23 November 2006. The protest came against Culture Minister Faruq Hosni's comments in an interview in which he suggested that wearing the veil was regressive. Many students since, mostly veiled women demanded the minister's immediate resignation.

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To understand the views of Egyptians regarding the position of the veil in Islam,

respondents were asked a number of questions. The goal was to investigate how deep

their knowledge about their religion was and how they acted upon its perceived religious

duties through various behaviors, including style selection. Their reactions towards some

of the statements made by Iqbal Baraka regarding the veil and the bias against women in

the media and religious teachings were also tested to analyze the depth of their

understanding of their religion and their tolerance towards nonmainstream ideas.

When asked if the veil was a religious duty, all 65 respondents, veiled and

unveiled, answered in the affirmative. Some even argued that not only was the veil a

religious duty, but that requirement if fulfilled only by specific form of veil required by

Islam, which is the khimar and/or niqab.

That is a question that does not need an answer. The khimar is a religious duty; if it is not, then why did the house of our honorable Prophet peace be upon him wear the niqab. The khimar is the correct veil but we distorted it….

272 Image downloaded at Daylife Publishers. Source: http://www.daylife.com/photo/

03Jpc1k4363m0 (accessed May 27, 2009).

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Of course it is fard but the problem is girls do not understand what the veil is. The veil is the khimar… the khimar is the first step then comes the niqab…. God says “draw their veils [khimars] over their bosoms.” You see, it says khimar. So khimar is the correct veil….

That the veil or an article of appearance has become a fundamental requirement in

religion equal in status to worshipping, giving alms, and caring for the poor, is puzzling.

It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that the veil in the past was more related to modesty

and tradition, which was important concepts in Islam. It was not, however, considered the

core of Islam as many respondents and preachers argued today. As the chant slogans that

the above image reflects, and as suggested by many respondents in the study, the veil

today has become a principal constituent of Islam, even as important as the second pillar,

prayer.273 It is portrayed as a prerequisite for earning religious credits (thawab) for any

good deed that the woman performs.274

Interestingly, when respondents were asked if they knew the specific reference

from the Quran and/or Sunna that confirmed this duty, most respondents could not

remember the verse. This is puzzling since these two verses are cited all the time by

sheikhs whose sermons resonate in street corridors and the cassettes of taxi and microbus

drivers. We also see posters everywhere (in elevators, store walls, bridges) saying things

273 There are five pillars or foundations to Muslim life. These are 1) declaration of faith or the

belief that “There is none worthy of worship except God and Muhammed is the messenger of God,” 2) observing daily prayers five times a day, 3) observing almsgiving; 4) fasting; 5) the pilgrimage to Makkah for those who are physically and financially able. The reason why the veil is portrayed sometimes as being as important as prayer is that in Islam a woman has to veil during prayers or her prayer will not be accepted. In the past, that was restricted to the act of prayer only. But today, many preachers say that all the worship of the unveiled woman will be rejected if she is not wearing a veil.

274 Thawab refers to the positive credits that a Muslim gets in return for a good action or a form of worship. Whether a person goes to heaven or hell depends on the number of good points in comparison to negative points. If the person scores a net number of positive points that person goes to heaven. This is according to verse 99:7-8 of Quran says, “Then shall anyone who has done an atom's weight of good, see it! And anyone who has done an atom's weight of evil, shall see it,” The Hadith cited on page 12, “Allah does not accept the prayer of a woman who has reached puberty unless she wears a veil” focuses on prayers. But, as responses to the interview instrument indicated, the requirement has been generalized to all good deeds.

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like “The veil to protect, or the eyes will molest,” and “al hijab before judgment,”275

which are often followed by a verse from Quran on the veil. I should note here that one of

the few women that was able to cite the verse was unveiled and answered laughingly,

saying, “I know the verse by heart because they keep saying it to me all day long.” Only

three women cited one of the verses correctly, and they all only cited the part of verse

24:31, requesting believing women to “draw their veils over their bosoms.” The word

draw here in Arabic is yadrebn, from the verb darb which literally means hit. The

colloquial use of the word is very different from its use in this verse. One of the women

who failed to cite the verse said, “Yes it is fard, there is that verse that has darb in it.”

Two respondents said, “I am sure there are some religious texts requiring it.” “I know

there are several texts but I do not remember them.”

The reason why the inability of the respondents to cite religious text is

paradoxical is the fact that the appearance of Egyptian people would suggest a much

deeper internalization of religious texts. Today, youth insist on using religious phrases in

every relevant and irrelevant situation. Informal conversations with some male and

female Egyptian friends revealed that the use of religion and religious terminologies has

increased dramatically and has become quite excessive. Non-Muslims express concern

regarding this excessive use of religious language in everyday conversations, indicating

that the phenomenon alienates them.

It should be noted that Islam is different from Christianity in its emphasis on the

unique and unchanging Arabic text of the Quran. While the Bible or Torah can be read

275 One poster had the picture of an unveiled woman, with hair flying wildly next to an uncovered

candy that was also covered in flies. The poster says, “You can't stop them, but you can protect yourself." See Ellen Knickmeyer, “In Egypt, Some Women Say That Veils Increase Harassment, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR2008081602063.html (accessed May 27, 2009).

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and memorized in any language, the Quran has to be memorized and recited in Arabic,

and it has to be memorized literally and to the slightest declination and letter movement.

It is actually a sin in Islam to quote wrongly a verse because the miracle of Quran lies not

only in its meaning but its rhythmic prose that is enchanting and relaxing. Muslims may

read translated versions of Quran, but they are strongly encouraged to learn Arabic and in

all cases, when they pray, they must recite the Quran in Arabic. That said, the infinite

recitations of the hijab verse become all the more puzzling as these women are aware that

a miscitation of Quran is a sin.

While all women insisted that hijab is fard, as we probed further with them,

several women recorded some doubts about the relevance of the veil today. Two unveiled

respondents said, “Yes it is fard, but the girl has to be convinced of it,” or else she will be

just following the rest. Another veiled woman related that she was not convinced that a

girl in a non-Muslim community should wear it because wearing it would be counter-

productive as it would make the woman stand out. An unveiled girl said,

Yes it is fard…but frankly I do not know why Islam instituted it. The veil today does not protect the woman in any way. I thought before that the veil is a protection and raises the value of woman. Even the khimar doesn’t do that. A girl in khimar walking in a dark street will still be exposed to problems just as those walking with their hair uncovered and in miniskirts.

The answers of two other unveiled women were particularly interesting:

Many scholars argue that [the veil] is fard. As for me, I think if the veil would obstruct the woman’s path and prevent her from realizing her ambitions then she does not have to wear it. Today the veil is not as important as in the past. I mean both veiled and unveiled women are exposed to the same daily problems [referring to street harassment]….

Look, I really don’t like this question, not because it is a bad or difficult question… Yes, it is a religious duty, but if it would obstruct other greater duties, then I do not need to do it…We cannot take religion without thinking. If I abide by the veil, I will not get from it what it was originally intended fror, like giving the woman greater respect in society.

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That veil would also obstruct me from doing something greater that God wants me to do. So I am not convinced that I should veil. Plus, today women do not really respect their veils and are just wearing it in response to social and family pressure…

These two respondents had a clear idea of social responsibility and the importance

of looking at oneself as part of a bigger system that they should help build and reform.

The role of any person, male or female, is to maximize their social contribution and

public good through their actions. If that would be through veiling, so be it. But if not,

then the veil requirement should be relegated behind other requirements. Also implicit is

an inner resistance the conviction that religion is an agency-free domain, where people

should apply all laws blindly. They both insisted that the goal of religion is to promote

the good of society and while certain religious requirements could be important tools to

promote goodness at one point, they might not be at other times. As indicated, only two

out of 65 were willing to rationalize religious requirements and both women faced

significant discrimination and harassment in their everyday lives, as their interviews

highlighted.

The Many Faces of the Veil

The previous sections demonstrated the pressure that the Egyptian woman

experiences to wear the veil and the unanimity regarding the veil being a religious duty.

Analyses revealed the limits to the female agency in choosing whether to veil or not. The

agency of the Egyptian woman, however, was manifested in her application of the veil

duty and the way she interpreted religious text. To better gauge what women considered a

benchmark of appropriate veiling, and also to understand how they interacted with the

religious message they received, respondents were asked what, in their point of view, was

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the correct form of the veil. Respondents were not specifically asked to assess the

correctness of their dress styles compared to what they view as correct but many

voluntarily commented on their own styles.

Two thirds of the veiled respondents gave descriptions of the correct veil that

were very similar to the styles they were wearing at the time of the interview. Their styles

ranged from very tight clothes to very strict styles and anything in between. This

suggested that the domain of freedom a woman enjoyed with respect to veil style was still

very wide. The self-satisfaction with one’s own style, even though that style in many

cases diverged from most religious descriptions of the accepted form of the veil,

demonstrated the role of women in constituting religious teachings. In fact, many women

during the interview reported that they were encouraged to wear the veil because of the

variety of styles that were available today that would allow them to stay fashionable and

chic while conforming to religious requirements.

One third of the respondents insisted that the Quran literally prescribed the khimar

at a minimum or even a niqab. Half of these respondents (8 respondents) conformed to

that narrowly defined form of veil. Another three indicated that they were planning to

conform to that “correct” form soon. “To wear the khimar is to wear the veil,” insisted

one respondent. “Thank God, there are not many forms of the khimar” added another. For

three women, the correct veil is the niqab, because “it is preferred, and if it is preferred

then it is better for the woman.”

Fifteen women were less strict in their definitions of the correct veil (i.e., did not

argue for one particular form), but still gave specific descriptions of what a veil should

look like. Some recited what is now considered the basic rule of the veil, which stated

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that clothes should be loose-fitting and not transparent or revealing.276 For them, this

meant that the clothes should not be tight, preferably no pants, no make-up, and some

identified certain parts of the body that have to be covered like the cheeks and the

neck.277 According to some women, new styles of the veil that did not cover the neck and

cheeks were “religious innovations [bid’ah] and are unlawful.”278

While the majority of the women expressed satisfaction with their one style vis-à-

vis religious expectations, several expressed dissatisfaction with their dress. One

respondent suggested, “No offense, but the dress should be respectful in general, not

transparent and not revealing. So frankly, my veil is not correct because my neck is not

covered.” Another insisted that the correct veil is the niqab, but she was described as

wearing less conservative clothes. This respondent used to wear the niqab in the past and

then took it off. Her entire family wore the niqab, and she seemed to be under a lot of

pressure to go back to wearing it. She resisted that pressure in pursuit of a compromise

between her religious duties and her social and professional ambitions. The niqab is

generally not accepted in the workplace today. This highlights the levels of contradictions

that Egyptian women suffer from and the state of inner conflict they constantly undergo

and how they attempt to reconcile disparate needs and expectations from the family,

society, and the professional world.

276 This rule is cited in every sermon about hijab. The rule neither came from a Hadith nor a

Quranic verse, but from interpretations of some religious scholars. 277 Until recently, about 90 percent of veiled women wore a scarf that covered the neck and parts

of the cheeks. A new fashion came up recently, called the Spanish style, which are turban-style scarves wrapped around the head and revealing the neck and the entire face. Many women spoke disapprovingly about this style.

278 In Islam, a bid’ah or innovation in religions is considered an alteration of the true religion and therefore unlawful. One hadith says, “Every new thing is an innovation, and every innovation is an error, and every error leads to hell.” (Cited in Jonathan P. Berkey, “Tradition, Innovation and the Social Construction of Knowledge in the Medieval Islamic Near,” Past and Present, 146 (1995): 42. This verse is often cited by traditionalists, also called salafists (from salaf, or going back to origins) who reject any attempt to contextualize Shari‘a and rationalize religion.

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Some respondents did not provide a physical description of the correct form of the

veil but rather provided a more functional than literal meaning. The correct veil was to

“give up the parts of one’s social life that she can’t continue to have after the veil,”

suggested one woman. Her style was described as liberal, and she was wearing full

makeup, but to her, she would be accepted by God because she “veiled” herself from

inappropriate associations and places. Another affirmed that the correct veil meant to be

“veiled from the inside and let your clothes reveal what is inside you.” The veil here was

described a liberator that allowed women to transcend the boundaries of the physical to

the more spiritual realm through revealing the inner beauties. But to do that, the dress

style had to be conservative and modest, which was consistent with the clothes she was

wearing.

The definition of the correct veil was even looser for some respondents: “The

correct veil was to cover the head. That’s what I know,” insisted one. “What else?!”

another defiantly asked. “The correct veil is what I am wearing…. I believe it is enough

to cover the head.” According to this last woman, “If one girl wants to cover herself

completely, let her do that. But that cannot be fard because it is difficult for many

women.” This group of respondents managed to reconcile the social pressure to veil and

internal needs to appear fashionable and unrestricted. They devised unique “hybrids” of

styles to find a middle way between the various forces around them. However, many of

these women still faced pressure to conform to the more acceptable conservative dress as

was apparent in their defensive responses to some of the interview questions.

The variations in the answers of the respondents regarding the correct form of the

veil revealed some of the features and dynamics of the social arenas of the power

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struggle, of which the veil was emblematic. While society made the veil an uncontested

requirement for being Muslim, the female agency successfully reconstituted that veil to

take an infinite number of “correct” forms. But the process of reconstituting the

meanings and forms of the veil was still underway. Many respondents were struggling to

find acceptable resolutions for the contradictory forces they were exposed to on a daily

basis. They agreed with many of the preachers that there were specific requirements for

the veil that they failed to conform to and they internalized a sense of guilt regarding their

veiling practices. On the other hand, they were faced with the pressure to emulate other

nonconforming women and to look modern and fashionable. This revealed the

complexity and elusiveness of this new phenomenon.

Doubts: The Veil Questioned

There was a consensus among respondents that veil was a religious duty. Some

questioned its importance, though, given the large divergence between its ultimate goal,

modesty and women’s respect, and its current forms and outcomes. To further understand

the internalization of the veil duty, a quote by the Editor-in-Chief of a women’s

magazine, Iqbal Baraka, was recited and women’s reactions to the quote were note. The

quoted author rejected the connection between the veil and Islam and insisted that the veil

became important because men in Egypt looked at women disgracefully. Religious

clerics did not reproach men for harassing women nor asked them to “lower the gaze” in

accordance to verse 24:30 of the Quran.279 Instead they asked women to veil.

279 Lowering the gaze is a common concept in Islam which means that men are not supposed to

look at a woman and desire her. So once he sees a woman, he should turn his eyes quickly before lust and temptation enters his heart. The verse says,

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Although several respondents refused to comment on what an “infidel” or “bad”

woman such as Iqbal Baraka said (8 respondents),280 the majority of the respondents (52

percent) agreed with Baraka regarding the gender bias of religious clerics. Those who

agreed said, yes, there was a responsibility on both men and woman, not just women. Yet

the preachers “do tend to put the entire blame on the girl.” One woman commented, “In

Egypt, people would go through the roof if a girl is walking with her arms revealed, and

if a guy harasses her verbally in the street, he would be considered a hero.” Another

veiled woman insisted that preachers would always find excuses for a harasser:

Even if a girl was veiled and respectful yet was harassed in the street, the preachers would still say, she was walking late, or she looked at him, or she breathed. Anything whatsoever, but at the end we [women] would always be to blame. Respondents also indicated that preachers were sometimes “annoying” in the pressure

they put on the woman. Some blamed preachers for their emphasis on appearance in

general. “They never explain the depth of our religion. They are only concerned with

dress…”

While essentially agreeing with Baraka, some women still found excuses for why

preachers emphasized the role of the female. “Maybe because the male is weak and

cannot hold himself from sinning,” pondered one respondent. So while the bias of

preachers was notable, “there is some merit because women do bear the biggest portion

of responsibility… if a girl is respectful enough, no guy would come near her.” Another

“Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them: And Allah is well acquainted with all that they do. And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty.” It is the verse that directly precedes the one requiring hijab and that is most popularly quoted.

Several traditions by the Prophet of Islam suggest that a man will not be punished for the first glance at a woman because it is accidental. A common saying in Egypt is “the first glance is for you, the second is against you.” This was misinterpreted and a common joke in Egypt today among men, “lengthen the first glance as much as you want, it is no sin.”

280 As mentioned earlier, anyone who doubts the veil requirement today is considered infidel.

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said, “Maybe they do not see any hope in the male so they put all the responsibility on the

female!”

Several women commented harshly on Baraka, saying, this was “infidel talk” and

“answering to this kind of people is haram.” “This woman wants to destroy our religion

and spread strife.” “She is just trying to defile to ease her conscience” for not wearing the

veil. Others denied any bias from the side of the preachers in their emphasis.

Surprisingly, many women gave excuses to the man and even insisted that the preachers

were correct and that women were rightfully to blame for men’s inability to control their

instincts. “Guys are weak” and “it is the woman that draws men to harass her.”

Let’s imagine what society would be like if there were no veil. Then women’s only concern would be to attract men. Look at the rape crimes taking place, look at bad manners…And why doesn’t she take the physiological point of view then since she is so well read? A male’s physiological structure is different from the female’s. A male can get attracted to any woman even if she’s a stranger whereas the woman can only get attracted to a man she already knows. It is not healthy for a man to always be subjected to bare flesh. Look at the West and how cheap the body is there!

Other women asked, “Is she Muslim…she must have read in the Quran the verse

that says how a woman who does not veil will be hung by her hair in the afterlife.”281 The

“eternal condemnation” that the unveiled girl would receive is a common theme in many

sermons. Although the verses from the Quran refer to the disbelievers, a woman who

chooses to stay unveiled is considered a disbeliever. While the veiled women conveyed a

lot of zeal regarding the centrality of the veil in the Islamic creed, the unveiled women’s

voices faintly expressed how society looks at them and how the pyramid of morality and

moral judgment got inverted. Several unveiled women annoyingly said, the veil “is all

281 The verse this respondent referred to is often cited by preachers today. The verse describes the

destiny of nonbelievers and those who did not abide by the religious laws. Preachers today, however, present this verse as evidence of punishment for the unveiled. This reinterpretation of the religious texts will be examined in further detail in the following two chapters.

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what [the preachers] talk about.” “We are now applying religion literally, and in return,

we are not concerned with morals. Morality is on a steep decline.”

The analysis on the status of the veil in Islam revealed significant contradictions

and revealing dynamics. The forces directing women towards veiling were undeniably

formidable. While some women veiled for personal and spiritual reasons, many

experience pressure from various types of preachers who insisted that God would not

accept or consider any good deed from an unveiled woman and that the unveiled woman

would receive the greatest torment during the Day of Judgment. This new religious

discourse had a strong impact on the status and views on women. These pressures played

an important role in producing the mass-veiling phenomenon. The responses of women

were very diverse and in many cases ran contrary to many of the stereotypical images of

women’s resistance that the Western feminist discourse suggested, such as women

naturally seeking their own liberation.282

While everybody interviewed insisted that the veil was a religious requirement,

few women rejected the status ascribed to it today. Some even refused to abide by a

requirement that may compromise other more important requirements. Some reluctantly

and doubtfully accepted the veil but refused to accept its implications regarding the

restriction of behavior and the veil style. Other women chose to “accommodate”283 the

pressure, through veiling, but used that veil as a weapon against the veil symbol through

subverting it.

282 Saba Mahmood, The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2005). 283 See Arlene Elowe Macleod, Accommodating Protest: Working Women, the New Veiling, and

Change in Cairo. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

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A fourth group completely internalized the new teachings regarding the veil, and

even considered themselves as agents of its promotion and institution in society. These

women participated in what Saba Mahmood called “piety movements,” or movements

aimed at integrating the religious experience into everyday practices. These piety

movements were intended to assert women’s position in society and to create a

community of belonging and activism in a domain that was restricted to men. The zeal

about the veil and the excessive use of religious language were important ways to achieve

these goals. However, my research found limited impact for these in terms of the

internalization of religious teachings. There was strong evidence to suggest that although

people’s religious practices have increased, their effective knowledge of religion and the

text was limited.

Interpretations: The Role of the Veil in Islam

How did women reflect on religious requirements, particularly the veil? Did they

perceive contradictions between the goal of the veil according to religious text and what

it currently did? More was learned about the role of the veil in society through inquiring

about the reason why respondents thought Islam instituted the veil requirement. The

women’s understanding of this requirement presumably shapes their behavior and offers

insight regarding how they internalize religion.

The most frequently cited Islamic goal of the veil was the protection of women.

Respondents suggested that the veil became a religious requirement to “protect the

woman from anyone who wants to harm her or touch her….” One respondent explained,

“The woman is the more beautiful sex so the veil protects her and raises her value.” The

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veil also gave women “dignity and respect.” It was regarded as a purity guarantee and/or

preserver by eight women (one of which also emphasized protection over purity). So long

as the woman was veiled, no man would look at her and desire her; to catch a male’s

attention was to have a woman’s purity tarnished, even if she did not intend it or realized

she did.284 One woman in niqab proudly said, “When I wore the niqab, it put a barrier

between boys and me, and they no longer had anything to do with me.” The true goal and

meaning of the veil according to another woman was to “set a hijab (curtain) between a

man and a woman, which means I don’t just joke around with anyone anywhere.”

Implicit in the language of the women who emphasized the concepts of purity,

was a rejection of the male projection of an image of all women as sex objects, and

therefore covering up was a strategy of liberation from the confines of the visible

appearance. At the same time, many respondents were quite sympathetic to the opposite

gender, who, as one respondent remarked, were “only human and have feelings… there is

no such thing as a man who does not look.” Setting a firm boundary between men and

wom3n is highly emphasized in the language of many of today’s preachers’ who blame

the deterioration of morality in society on women who dress inappropriately. The vices of

sex integration represent another primary focus of many sermons.

284 In Islam, the male who fails to lower his gaze sins and accumulates negative points in his life

book, but the female is condemned even more because she caused the male to sin. Verse 24:2 of the Quran says "(As for) the fornicatress and the fornicator, flog each of them, (giving) a hundred stripes, and let not pity for them detain you in the matter of obedience to Allah, if you believe in Allah and the last day, and let a party of believers witness their chastisement. " It should be noted that the adulteress is mentioned before the adulterer in the verse. Several interpreters agree that the precedence is significant because it points out that the adulteress is more at fault than the adulterer. Qortoby’s interpretation of the verse was the following: “The adulteress preceded the, adulterer in this verse since at that time, adultery was prevalent among women and also because she could get pregnant, it is more harmful. It was also said that the sexual desire for women is more prevalent and dominates her more than for men…” Interpretation of the verse was obtained from a downloadable computer software program at http://quran.al-islam.com/Tafseer/DispTafsser.asp?l=arb&taf=KORTOBY&nType=1&nSora=24&nAya=2

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While citing women’s protection as the primary goal of the veil, some women

doubted that the veil in its current form performed that function. One reason for that was

the distortion of the veil from its original form. “A large number of veiled women today

were wearing clothes that were very inappropriate,” argued one woman. Another

suggested that women were the real culprits behind sexual harassment in the street. One

veiled respondent argued, “You know the problem is with the women not boys because

boys are forced to harass women when they are not properly dressed. They can’t help

it….” The veil was a duty to “protect women from men and to protect men from women.

Other respondents refused to take blame for the sexual harassment problem insisting that

men harass women regardless of what they were wearing. “It is all the same,” insisted

one respondent. “Everybody gets harassed in the street.” One veiled respondent went far

enough to suggest, “If the veil today is not providing the protection that it promised, then

it is not needed.”

Realizing that the veil offered little protection, some women emphasized other

goals. For 20 percent of the respondents, the veil was not about protection or preventing

sexual provocation, but about the value of woman. A woman should be shielded because

she was “not a commodity for anyone to approach because she looks good.” “When

something is completely revealed,” argued another respondent, “you no longer wonder

what's behind it” and one loses interest in it. Some even gave some tangible goals, such

as preserving “the women’s beauty because it protects her hair and skin.”

Five respondents, two veiled and three unveiled, could not answer this question.

Another two indicated that it was a duty because it was a tradition that did not need to be

explained or questioned. I found no pattern of a relationship between how women

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understood the role of the veil in Islam and their dress code. Some of the women that

indicated that the veil was a protection were dressed quite liberally and in tight clothes.

The same was true for those who indicated that the veil covered women’s beauties; some

of them wore a lot of makeup and tight jeans, but were still convinced that they were

fulfilling this religious duty.

The above section highlighted more of the contradictions embedded in the veil.

Some women appeared to be caught in a cycle of reproducing a practice without much

reflection on its purpose. Others were employing this practice as a means of emancipation

from their own sexuality and tool of empowerment so that they stand on par with the

males in society. Some women realized these contradictions and attributed the “failure of

the veil” to social bias against women. Others insisted what failed was mediocre forms of

the veil rather than the veil itself. This group also aligned itself with the values of some

preachers and with the Egyptian male against female distorters of religion towards. They

seemed to be uniting with the preachers and the males to achieve a “greater” goal, which

will be discussed in the following section.

The variations in the answers regarding the religious rationale of the veil revealed

some of the features and dynamics of the social arenas of power struggle, of which the

veil was emblematic. Who was the veil protecting is a debatable issue. There was a

“chicken-egg” type of argument where some women represented a contemporary position

that the profanity of some woman’s veil was the trigger behind the enormous street

harassment problem. Another position insisted that the problem was the result of male’s

disrespectfulness for women in general, regardless of how women dress.

The Many Meanings and Functions of the Veil

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The analysis above suggested strong disagreements regarding why the veil was a

religious duty. Some women were skeptical about this duty. Although all participants

believed that the veil was a religious duty, the applications and meanings attributed to

that duty were quite divergent. The interview instrument explored the various meanings

of the veil and the many different functions it performed in the lives of various

respondents. Respondents were asked what the veil meant to them. For some

respondents, the veil had a very symbolic meaning, but for the majority, it was a

functional instrument that did not say much about the character but rather performed a

specific function, which was to fulfill a religious duty.

For half of the respondents, the veil was a religious and/or social duty. Twenty-

two respondents indicated that it was a religious obligation that they were responsible for

before God. Four respondents underscored that it had no other meaning beyond that. “It

means nothing more to me,” one respondent emphasized. “It is an obligatory from God!

That’s all,” declared another. For four women, the frontier of the religious and

traditional/cultural in the veil requirement was quite fuzzy. “It is a religious duty on one

hand, and a tradition on the other.” “Society requires that woman be veiled,” commented

one respondent. In a follow-up question, one respondent was asked if she thought it was

more a religious or a social requirement. She answered,

I believe it is fard. But frankly, in my opinion, girls today consider it more of a social requirement to avoid criticism from society more rather than a religious requirement… For many girls, what comes to mind first is how to relieve oneself from the hassle around.

For other women, the veil was a fundamental requirement in Islam, without which

a Muslim woman would be deficient. “It is like prayer to me,” said one respondent. “If I

hadn’t been veiled, I would have felt incredibly short in my duties.” The veil took a more

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symbolic/spiritual meaning for 15 women. For these, the veil signified the respectfulness

of the woman wearing it and implied that she was available for everyone. The veil was

also a representation of the woman’s conscience, thus holding her back from sinning or

straying. “It reminds me that I must be a good role model,” or else the woman would set a

bad example of the veil. This article of garment gave the woman a sense of responsibility

that was similar to that of married woman. “It felt like I was free [before veiling] and now

I have something to watch over.” For another eight respondents the veil meant

“everything,” “it is my identity;” “my life;” “my title;” “it is who I am.” The veil to these

women was an identifier that distinguished them from the non-Muslims and from the

nonrespectful.

There were a myriad of practical functions that the veil performed on a daily

basis. To understand these functions, we asked women if the veil helped them (or, for

unveiled women, would help them) accomplish something that they would not otherwise

achieve. They were also asked to identify some of the personal benefits they realized

through the veil. Answers to these questions provided a greater opportunity for women to

express their views about the veil and to share more about their experiences with the veil,

which helped better understand the veiling dynamics.

All unveiled woman insisted that the veil would not help them realize any

practical gain. Many also argued that that the decision to veil should not be made in

pursuit of worldly benefits and should only be prompted by one’s personal convictions

and beliefs. “It will neither help me nor harm me,” defied one respondent. “This is a

personal matter, and it is no one’s right to judge me about it.” Two of these unveiled

respondents indicated that the veil might actually limit their opportunities in the

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professional world, as many jobs were still not open for unveiled women, such as jobs in

hotels, jobs in some multinational companies, and diplomatic jobs. One respondent

commented,

Whether the veil would help me accomplish something, I am not sure. But in reality, it could prevent me from achieving certain goals. For example, the big hotels and the higher state rank positions in many places are not open for veiled women.

Some women also feared that the veil might put the person in a particular

“untouchable” frame that restricted her social integration. According to one unveiled

respondent, if she were veiled,

Lots of people would be afraid to talk to me like they do now… I feel that plenty of doors would be closed, like if I go out and have fun people would criticize me for being veiled and not acting properly. I will be expected to act “old”. There are many taboos put on the veiled girl. She shouldn’t talk loud, she shouldn’t joke too much, I may not be asked any more to run some of the errands I do for work because I will be viewed as a “respectful” girl. I don’t want to feel so limited. This comment better explained what one veiled woman meant when she made an analogy

between the veil and marriage. The veil made the woman feel less free and more self-

conscious. That mold of how a “respectful” veiled woman should behave discouraged

some woman from veiling.

More than one third of the veiled respondents (38 percent) agreed with their

unveiled counterparts regarding the practical functions of the veil. Several of them

indicated that the veil would not obstruct them from participating in the social and

professional real. “My social role is to get a good job and earn good money. I don’t think

the veil would prevent or promote that goal. It won’t have an effect.” One respondent

insisted, “The veil is a form of worship not tradition, so if I am wearing it because it

might help me, then it is not really a way to worship.” For most women, the veil was not

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an absolute requirement for achieving something in specific in the professional world.

Although it did help some get certain jobs, several indicated that there were places in

Egypt that did not hire veiled women.

For about 14 percent of the women interviewed, the veil performed an essential

spiritual function in their lives. It helped them get closer to God and in some cases acted

like the voices of their consciences constantly reminding them of how they should

behave:

To me the veil is something that holds me back from doing something wrong. It reminds me that I must be a good role model and that I have come a long way and the rest of the way will be easy. When I was unveiled, I never felt truly disciplined. I used to talk to guys for a reason and for no reason…The veil made me more disciplined…

The veil offered several women a “large sense of relief” that emanated from the

feeling of acceptance by God:

I became peaceful from inside…I felt that I have done everything that God wants me to do and therefore I felt closer to God…Overall I feel that my life will be full of blessing because God is satisfied with me.

Even when the veil almost disappeared in Egypt during the 1940s and 1950s,

many women veiled as a result of a deep religious conviction and a desire to realize a

certain level of closeness to God. For many other the veil performed various practical

functions. Several respondents expressed that the veil relieved them from the burden of

an unfulfilled social duty that distinguished the honorable woman from a disrespectful

one in these daus. After a long pause, one respondent declared:

In the beginning I was not very comfortable in the veil. But home was on fire because of me [being unveiled]. Now I feel I gave myself a peace of mind from the constant arguments. At the same time, I fulfilled a religious duty.

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Another indicated: I got relieved from nagging at home. I also fulfilled a duty that I should have completed a long time ago.

The veil provided many other practical benefits. Several respondents indicated

that the veil signaled entrance into a new stage where the woman was treated as mature

and responsible, a status that only married women realized in the past:

“I felt as if I grew up ten years and am now responsible for myself.” I felt I got kind of older and wiser. My girlfriends started to consider me responsible for them spiritually. I felt like a sheikha285 among them, maybe because at the time when I wore the veil, none of them was veiled. It is as if the veil helped women transition from the status of a minor, who could be easily

swayed and therefore needed to be restricted and controlled, to the status of an adult.

Women also indicated that the veil improved their social status and gave them respect.

One woman suggested,

The veil improved the way people look at me. Most people are judgmental about others and accordingly I am sure that I would be completely misunderstood for a disrespectful unreligious girl if I weren’t veiled.

This added respect also allowed several women to participate more freely in

social activities. One respondent proudly said:

The fact that I am veiled is the first impression people take about me… This makes the patients feel that they are in capable hands. They trust that I will be God-fearing and just to them… Because I work in Kasr el Einy286 my patients are all poor people. They don’t trust but the veiled woman… Second, if I am in a discussion, regardless of the topic being a religious matter or not, the veil will make me more heard because they will trust me and feel that they can take an opinion from me. They can mentally trust me…. Because I am veiled, nobody will be thinking they can’t take a good opinion from me …I would not manage to be taken seriously enough if I had not been veiled.

285 Sheikha is female for sheikh. It literally means the elder of a community or tribe and in

everyday language it refers to an Islamic scholar 286 Kasr el-Einy is the state hospital of Cairo University’s School of Medicine. It is a free hospital;

patients without insurance receive free treatment there.

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In other words, the veil legitimized women’s participation in the male-dominated

professional world. The veil, therefore, had a very empowering effect in some cases.

The veil acted like a protector for a number of women. One girl remarked that the

veil protected her because “our society looks at the veiled girl in one way and at the

unveiled girl in a totally different way.” Another respondent noted, “I stand out less now

that I am veiled. I do not get as harassed in the street as before when I used to get my hair

done.” One respondent proudly said, “When I wore the niqab, it put an obstacle in front

of boys, and they no longer had anything to do with me.”

The multivocal meanings associated with the veil became apparent by this

analysis. At one pole, the veil represented a tool to satisfy a religious and social

requirement with little or no implications regarding the women’s character. At another

pole, the veil was an important symbolic marker of the woman’s identity as a Muslim.

There was little variation in the distribution of the meanings ascribed to the veil across

social class. The only difference found was with respect to the probability of restricting

the meaning of the veil to the duty it performed. More respondents classified as lower-

middle class suggested that the meaning of the veil was limited to the duty it performed

(70.0 percent compared to 47.6 percent for middle class, and 50.0 percent for upper-

middle class). The difference was, however, not statistically significant.

A number of interesting facts were revealed from the responses regarding the

benefits and accomplishments from the veil. For some women the veil was a very

personal and spiritual matter. For the majority, however, the veil represented a social

duty, the absence of which exposed them to much pressure that might lead to their

marginalization. The fulfillment of the veil requirement, on the other hand, gave women

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social status and helped them realize the social rights that she gained during the Nasserite

regime, which were not accompanied with the structural changes needed to sustain them.

As was discussed in Chapter 2, women’s participation in the labor force has been

increasing since the late 1990s, following a period of decline between 1989 and 1998

(Figure 4). While it is beyond the scope of this study to understand the correlates of these

changes, data suggest that Egypt experienced significant changes in attitudes towards

women during the 1990s. Interestingly, a minor reversal in this trend started towards the

end of the 1990s, which also marks the period when veiling rates increased. This suggests

an association between veiling and the assertion of women in public space and the labor

force.

Analyses also suggested that for many middle- and upper-middle-class women the

veil was a tool that helped them get by in a society that did not fully accept their right to

participate in various social activities and was generally biased against the working

woman.287 As Macleod suggested, the veil helped women deal with these social biases

against women. The veil also helped women deal with the decline in economic

opportunities available for both genders. It provided a religious rationale for their

unemployed status. They were unemployed because they wanted to abide by proper

religious standards on the mixing of sexes rather than for lack of talent.

The veil today has become an essential power tool. It simultaneously liberates and

imprisons, confines and releases, sanctions and disempowers. It helps women carry out

many functions that they were only able to carry out on a limited basis in the past. At the

same time, it limits their ability to perform other functions and sets some limits on their

287 Macleod suggests that the veil provides an instrument for dealing with gender biases against

working women. Lower-middle-class women are forced by economic conditions to go out to work, yet society still view working women as less honorable. See Macleod, Accommodating Protest.

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behavior s well as social expectations. In short, the veil represents the convergence point

of highly paradoxical forces in society and provides a strategy for dealing with all these

contradictions.

Moments of Pride

In addition to discussing the meanings and functions of the veil with participants,

I explored with them if they explored any special moments since they got veiled.

Specifically, respondents were asked if they could recall a specific incident that made

them proudest about veiling. Twenty-eight respondents said nothing specific happened or

nothing happened that they could recall at the time of the interview. Many of these

respondents, however, insisted, “I am always proud of my veil.”

Three main types of incidents made veiled respondents proud about their veil:

when they were part of a group and felt they were better-mannered and more respectful

than others, when they felt the veil protected them from harassment/excessive

harassment, and when they felt distinguished as Muslims. One respondent narrated that

she applied for a job as a secretary to a business person. She was the only veiled

applicant, but she was the one selected for the job. “[T]he employer trusted me because I

looked trustworthy and committed to my religion and so will also be committed to my

work.” Her selection for the job made her “extremely happy” that she was veiled.

Respondents also felt proud when they were in a place where everyone else is acting

inappropriately (for example drinking alcohol or wearing swimsuits). At that time,

women reported feeling “very proud that my veil shows that I am not like those

disrespectful people.” Another woman recounted, “When any girl looks at me, I feel she

says I wish I were like her. If she does not, then she doesn’t know anything.”

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The image a person projects in society and how others think about the person was

quite important to respondents. Many looked for approval or confirmation from society

that they were better. Sometimes the confirmation came from complete strangers, which

was extremely significant for some of the respondents. One woman spoke about an

incident at a water park, when all women were in swim suits and having fun while she

was the only veiled girl. She narrated, “A stranger passed by and said, ‘You are better

than all of these girls.’” It is quite common today that complete strangers approach

women commenting about their dress, either praising or condemning. As several

respondents pointed out, men, even those who do not approach the unveiled or harass

them, speak disrespectfully about unveiled women, and that made some women proud as

they looked “respectful.”

There was also a lot of interest in preaching and “witnessing” for the veil as a

form of jihad.288 Muslims are required to attempt to correct the behaviors of the

nonconformists at least through providing advice. Two respondents spoke proudly about

their preaching and witnessing activities and how what they said was more believable

because they looked like somebody who “walks the talk.” Today, many women consider

themselves ambassadors for the veil and seek every opportunity for advising others to

correct their ways, as will be discussed further below.

Sexual harassment in the street has become a very common problem. Many

women expressed the limitation this problem set on their movements and self-respect.

Some research suggests that 83 percent of Egyptian women today are subjected to street

288 The concept of jihad is very fluid. It takes many forms and meanings depending on the

socioeconomic and historic context. One important dimension is spreading Islam. During the early years of Islam, this meant waging war against the nonbelievers. But another important dimension is witnessing for God through one’s good deeds and through preaching. Striving to become more virtuous and to resist sin are also considered forms of jihad.

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harassment on a daily basis.289 In some cases, the harassment is limited to verbal obscene

flirtations but in other cases, it is physical. Verbal and physical sexual harassment in the

street is another thing that makes the veiled feel proud, either because they are subjected

to lower degrees of harassment or are exposed to harassment less often. “The unveiled

girl is subjected to much more humiliating harassment than the veiled girl,” maintained

one respondent, and that made her proud. These functions that women associated with the

veil, however, may not be necessarily accurate. A recent study conducted by the Egyptian

Center for Women’s Rights on the phenomenon of sexual harassment suggested that the

veil did not protect women from harassment. On the contrary, veiled women were found

to be more likely to get exposed to street harassment.290

The third reason for women’s pride in their veil is the mark it gave them as

Muslim women. As one woman stated, “When a stranger sees me, he knows right away

that I am Muslim. I am recognized as a Muslim anywhere I go.” There is some kind of

stigma today associated with the concealment of a woman’s religious identity. “I really

don’t like to be asked if I am Muslim or Christian,” recalled one respondent. She told a

story about a male acquaintance who was interested in an unveiled friend of hers, but he

never approached her because he assumed she was Christian (since she was not veiled).

Another respondent recalled, “I worked in an all-Christian company, and I was the only

Muslim, and I was veiled. I felt I was really proud to be a veiled Muslim.” This is less of

a factor in pride today, according to some women, because everyone is veiled. One

respondent indicated that the veil no longer distinguished between women in Egypt today

because “all girls are veiled, so I really do not feel that great difference.” The difference

289 Shahla al Menufi, Al-Tahharush: Al Saratan Al Ijtima‘i (Cairo: Egyptian Center for Women’s

Rights, 2008). 290 Al Menufi, Al-Tahharush: Al Saratan Al Ijtima‘i

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would be abroad, where Muslims are minorities and where the veil becomes more of an

identifier.

Most respondents could not recall a specific event that gave them pride in their

veil, although many of these insisted that the veil gives them specific dignity and pride.

The feeling of pride was strongly correlated with the feeling of respect that unveiled

women lack. There are mounting pressures on women to limit their appearance in the

public space. The veil legitimizes the woman’s existence in public space and empowers

her to participate more fully in a society that has redefined the concept of respect to mean

covering up. It protects the woman not just from harassment, but from being a subject of

male conversations where she is viewed as disrespectful. The veil also gives woman

access to the domain of what Leila Ahmed (1999) calls official Islam, in which a few

“elite” clergy have the right to deliberate in matters related to Islamic teachings. By

virtue of veiling, many women are seen as knowledgeable enough to start deliberating on

religion and even preaching Islam. In a sense, the veil provides a weapon for resisting

forces aimed at pushing women aside from arenas of existence to which she has gained

access in the past. It is also provides a link to other arenas where she was historically not

accepted.

The Responsibility of the Veil

The previous discussion illustrated some of the expectations set on the woman she

veils. In addition to the expectation regarding dress and behavior, the veil adds a a sense

of responsibility towards other unveiled woman. Once veiled, many woman attempt to

spread the veil. In many cases, that means taking a more active role in preaching the hijab

to the unveiled to correct their ways. Witnessing for the veil involves a range of

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strategies, such as striving to become a role model in appearance and outward behavior

and finding opportunities to preach to other women to correct their ways. Through

projecting a proper image of piety, some women felt that they effectively preached the

veil, even if silently: “Any girl that sees me will consider wearing the veil now. So you

can say I have become like a symbol in Islam.” Another woman recounted, “When any

girl looks at me, I feel she says, I wish I were like her. If she does not, then she doesn’t

know anything.”

The active role that women played in spreading the veil greatly enhanced their

confidence and expanded their agency. To demonstrate this, respondents were asked if

they felt responsible for their unveiled friends. They were also asked how they acted

upon that sense of responsibility, if they did. Almost three quarters of the respondents (73

percent) indicated that they did feel a sense of responsibility towards others. The

remaining 27 percent insisted that every person was responsible for his or her own

actions, and/or that they did not feel comfortable in probing into other people’s personal

matters.

The way the responsibility towards the unveiled translated into action varied

significantly from one woman to another. While feeling responsible for other women,

some reported that they never tried to preach either because they did not think they had

the right to do so or were too shy. Another group of respondents indicated that they might

give advice to their friends but would not nag and would not impose the conversation on

somebody. One woman indicated that her inability to preach enough about the veil gave

her a sense of guilt: “Naturally, any good veiled person would like to advise others…

But I don’t do that.” Other women’s sense of responsibility dictated them to preach and

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advise others whenever opportunities arose. Some expressed a commitment to do

everything it took to convince their friends to veil. Some felt a distinct sense of pride at

succeeding at convincing an unveiled woman to adopt the veil. Some would even talk to

strangers if the opportunity availed itself.

Whenever I find an unveiled girl, I do not leave her until I advise her and provide proofs from everywhere. It is haram that I see something wrong and not correct it.291 Islam required jihad from me and I have to go to any unconvinced girl…and try to convince her. I have not succeeded yet in convincing anyone. But I probably changed the ways of thinking of some. Unfortunately I had to let go as they were stubborn and did not want to be convinced. I have a responsibility towards all the girls that I see and to whom I could talk to about the proper female Muslim attire and the proper way to behave. I have not succeeded before but may God reward me according to my good intentions.

It should be noted that Islam is a very communal religion. According to one

hadith, “A believer to another believer is like a building whose different parts enforce

each other.”292 That is why many Muslims feel responsible towards other fellow

Muslims; all body parts have to be healthy for the body to be healthy. It is every

Muslim’s duty to try to get others to follow the correct path. The application of this

requirement and the definition of what is correct and what is evil and/or objectionable

varies from one time to another. At this present time, there appears to be a lot of

emphasis on dress and rituals.

While the sample size did not allow for detecting statistically significant

correlations between that sense of responsibility and other characteristics, the

291One of the traditions of the Prophet of Islam requires all Muslims to correct the evil and

objectionable either by hands, tongue, or at least in one’s heart. 292 The tradition says that the prophet of Islam clasped his hands with the fingers interlaced while

reciting this hadith. The hadith was narrated in al-Bukhari Authentic Hadith Collection (Hadith 3:626). Translation was downloaded at http://muslimonline.org/cgi-bin/hadith.cgi (accessed February 1, 2009).

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distributions of responses suggested a relationship between social class and the level of

responsibility that women felt and how women acted upon it. Middle- and lower-middle-

class women were more likely to express responsibility towards their unveiled peers.

Three quarters of middle- and lower-middle class respondents felt responsible for others,

compared to 64 percent for upper-middle-class women. Middle-class respondents were

more likely to act on that sense of responsibility than both lower-middle- and upper-

middle-class women. Seventy percent of middle-class women indicated that they acted

upon that sense of responsibility that the veil dictates, compared to 50 and 44 percent for

lower- and middle -class respondents, respectively. This demonstrates the active role the

middle-class plays today in reconstituting social and religious values in Egypt.

The analysis suggested an important role for the veil in the Egyptian society. It

provided women with a sense of meaning and value in their existence which other social

circumstances undermined. While the economic and social conditions were reducing the

tremendous human capital in Egypt into “surplus labor,” or “social burden,” women were

using religion and the symbol of the veil to assert their worth and derive the perception of

being active participants in social life. They were also using it to demonstrate their

religious agency and their autonomy. They countered the idea that they were forced to

veil, for which this research found significant supporting evidence, by actively engaging

in the production of these forces.

The research also detected a lot of concern about maximizing religious credit

points through adopting various behaviors, including preaching. Many of the religious

sermons that women listened to emphasized religious credit and the various activities that

might help the Muslim earn them. These credit points also appeared to compensate for

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the lack of social and monetary reward for one’s efforts through the labor market. The

promise of an after-life reward help many men and women cope with the social and

economic difficulties that they face on a daily basis.

Styles, Varieties, and Perceptions

The variations in the answers of the respondents regarding the correct form of veil

highlighted some of the features and dynamics of the social arenas of power struggle of

which the veil is emblematic. While society made the veil an uncontested requirement for

the Muslim woman, the female agency has successfully reconstituted that veil to take

infinite number of “correct” forms, and the process of reconstituting the meanings and

forms of the veil is still ongoing. Many respondents were struggling to find acceptable

resolutions for the contradictory forces they were exposed to on a daily basis. They

agreed with many of the preachers that there were specific requirements of the veil that

they failed to conform to, an acknowledgement that made them feel guilty. On the other

hand, they were faced with the pressure to emulate other nonconforming women and to

look modern and fashionable. This revealed the complexity and elusiveness of this new

phenomenon. The variety also suggested that the variety had some implications on the

perceptions regarding nationhood and the concept of Egyptianness, which was further

demonstrated through a question on what the variety in the forms of the veil said about

the Egyptian woman. The question allowed the researcher to take a journey into the

women’ minds as they sat back to reflect on what was happening around them and, more

importantly, why it was happening.

Most of the women took the question to refer to the less conservative types of the

veil today. The majority of the respondents (65 percent or 42 respondents) thought the

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variety said something negative either about the veiled women or about society in

general. Respondents indicated that the inappropriate styles that have mushroomed

recently gave a bad image to the veil and Islam. “Some people misunderstand the hijab

thinking it just means covering the hair,” indicated one respondent. “This reflects very

negatively on Islam.” This, for another respondent, “gives a chance to the unveiled

woman to criticize the veil by saying, look at how she’s dressed. I’m dressed better than

she is, and I’m not veiled…” All these new forms “are totally non-Islamic” and were

induced by “cable and television” that Egyptian women “just imitate blindly.” Some

women also blamed the parents for not enforcing the correct veil on their daughters.

While 20 respondents focused on why the variety was negative, the remaining 22

focused more on the implications of this variety. Some women commented that the great

variety of styles was indicative of the high level of confusion in Egypt today. “There is a

lot of confusion today about what is right and what is wrong,” said one respondent.

“Today girls wear the veil because of pressure not because they are convinced.” One

respondent argued,

A girl that is not convinced finds all girls around her veiled, and they face discrimination and pressure until they veil. The father and mother force their daughter to veil no matter what. The most important thing is that the girl covers her head, and then she can wear a ton of makeup and even have hair bangs.

The media was cited as a dual force in the veiling phenomenon. On the one hand,

women “face pressure from the media to veil.” This referred to religious media, which is

analyzed in the following chapter. On the other hand, nonreligious television channels

“distort the veil by offering many forms of it that are non-Islamic.” Pressure from the

males around the woman was also cited as an important factor in inducing the state of

confusion, and the submission of the women to the pressure to veil. Another important

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implication of this variety was the superficiality of religion in Egypt today. One unveiled

woman commented,

Everybody has narrowed down the veil to mere appearance. A girl would veil and wear whatever she likes so long as her head is covered…The veil has lost its meaning because of how much people talk about it. It bothers me when I am dressed more respectfully than a veiled girl and yet she’s categorized as “respectful” and am not.

The variety, for some women, was a sign that the Egyptian woman was

“hesitant,” “confused,” “unreligious,” “uncultured,” “has no personality,” and even

“Westernized.” For one unveiled respondent, these forms also suggested that the

Egyptian woman “has no confidence in herself due to the chaos that we are experiencing

with regards to religion and the proliferation of strict preachers.” Another veiled

respondent commented,

[The variety] speaks of the many contradictions that [the Egyptian woman] faces in her life and how torn and mixed up she is between all of them. I’ll tell you a story. One day a colleague of mine at work took “misconduct” because she wasn’t wearing makeup. You get that at work and then on the street you are treated like an unmannered girl if you do wear makeup!

What troubled many of the respondents about the variety of the veil was that “we

look awful among other Islamic countries.” “We are an Islamic country, and what is

happening here is haram.” “If we continue this way, we will be like any other non-

Islamic country.” The variety “makes us look like belly dancers. [Arabs] think we are

neither religious nor well-mannered” One response was particularly interesting:

For me, there is no such thing as an Egyptian woman. The Islamic society is one nation. There are many issues and problem in our society and the only solution is religion [Islam]. The Egyptian identity experienced significant transformation after the First Gulf War.

This transformation is partially the result of the increase in the rates of inter-Arab

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migration that followed the war and the proliferation of satellite television. Both of these

phenomena brought closer citizens across the different parts of the Arab world. The

variety in veils, therefore, is illustrative of an identity crisis that Egyptians face today.

This crisis has triggered a polarization of dress and a trivialization of religious discourse

as the meanings of existence has dissipated amidst the social and political disarray that

Egyptians are facing.

The multiplicity of the veil forms was not disconcerting to all respondents; some

saw something positive about this variety. For some, it meant that the Egyptian woman

was “creative,” “fashionable,” and knew how to reconcile the various contradictory

forces that she faced on a daily basis. For others it suggested that “people are able to

tolerate differences.” One respondent commented that the innovation in dress styles

implied that the Egyptian woman was not like other Arab woman “who are forced to

wear the niqab and are oppressed.” Rather she is “free to choose her own styles.” In other

words, the variety, while illustrative of many contradictions and pressures, was also a

manifestation of the Egyptian’s women resilience, power, and agency.

The Status of Religiosity and Morality in Egyptian Society

Many scholars insist that the Islamic world is experiencing a religious revival.

The interview instrument was used to test this hypothesis and to find out if the veil was

emblematic of this phenomenon. Respondents were asked whether they thought Islam

was experiencing a revival and if this revival could be detected in people’s manners and

the status of morality. The core of any religion, in essence, is morality, and the role of

religion is to provide guidance on relationships and how to behave towards the other to

maintain peace and order in society. Was the apparent increase in religiosity also

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associated with moral reform? If not, how did the divergence between the two come

about and how do respondents deal with that paradox?

Initially, the majority of the respondents (60 percent or 38 respondents) thought

that Islam was experiencing a revival as evidenced by the increase in the number of men

growing beards and women wearing the veil and the vast increase in the number of

religious programs and channels on cable television. All except six of these respondents,

however, saw that morality was on the decline. These six respondents indicated that

“since Islam is on the rise, also morality is on the rise.” But in general, the vast majority

of the respondents did not see an empirical reflection of the increase in religiosity on

morality. Eight of the women that acknowledged the divorce between morality and

religiosity found it “really strange”. “I hope you’d ask a sociologist and come let me

know please,” requested one puzzled respondent. One of them, however, insinuated that

the religiosity of some was not real: “I don’t know, go ask the men who got religious and

but are still harassing women in the street.” Another thought there was a possibility that

morality would eventually follow religiosity. “Maybe we just need more time for this

religiosity to be demonstrated in behavior…”

While religiosity increased, according to some respondents, temptations also

increased even at a higher rate, and that explained the paradox. Sources of temptation

included obscene media scenes as well as Westernized women. For some respondents,

this meant that society got polarized between a group that was religious and susceptible

to the positive influence of increased religious awareness, and another group that fell prey

to temptations and negative social influences such as deteriorating economic conditions

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and exposure to the West. “It is as if society got split into two major groups; one very

religiously conscious and one very corrupt,” meditated one respondent.

A significant proportion of respondents (40 percent) suggested that the religiosity

of people was superficial. “I told you, this religiosity is all superficial.” “Not everyone

growing a beard and wearing the veil is religious.” “Lots of people are very strict with

their appearances, but they don't heed the more important things.” “You don’t find real

fear and love of God.” The answers of these women were very similar to those of another

13 women, who while indicating that religiosity had increased, still insisted that that

religiosity was artificial. “Yes, you see many religious programs on cable” and “many

people growing beards and getting veiled, which is a good thing,” but it is only because

people “like to appear religious but are not applying religion correctly.”

One respondent noted that this form of religiosity was a reaction to secularism.

“When religion becomes the ruling system, morality improves,” claimed one respondent.

According to this respondent, the government was not able to control crime because its

laws were still not founded on religion. This respondent took Iran as a model case for an

Islamic state where Shari‘a Law was applied accurately and that resulted in significant

reductions in crime rates. Her answer was indicative of the second level of power

struggle that the veil represented, or the struggle between state and society. Some

respondents did not consider the current political regime legitimate because its laws were

secular. They declared their rejection of the state through adopting forms of dress and

religious practices that were discouraged by that state, particularly the niqab.293 Their

293 There is a great ongoing debate regarding the niqab today. On October 8, 2009, Al-Azhar

banned the niqab in all its affiliate girls-only schools, educational institutes and dormitories. The ban has resulted in severe attacks on the Azhar and stirred up a big debate which demonstrated the legitimacy problems that the state official religious authority, al-Azhar, is having,

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resistance, however, is obstructed by the state that rejected this version of religiosity and

refused to submit to popular demand for the effective application of Shari‘a law, which is

thought to be the root behind the collapse of the moral scheme in Egypt.

Reinventing the Past: My Mother and Me

One of the prime questions of this research is why the veil has been elevated to

the highest levels of importance among religious duties today when very few people

talked about it or observed it in the past. Respondents were asked, if the veil requirement

was so clear-cut in Islam, why then the previous generation did not observe that

requirement when they were their age. Many of the respondents shared with me their

bewilderment about the phenomenon. Eleven respondents could not answer the question

but insisted that the lack of veiling among the previous generation did not reflect

negatively on its morality. “They were much better than us,” asserted one respondent. “If

you hear any stories about the past you would feel a great difference in their morals.”

The answers of the 54 respondents that took the challenge could be broadly

grouped into two classes: one that emphasized something positive about the past that

made the veil unnecessary (26 respondents), and another class of answers that highlighted

something good about the present that brought about this positive change (20

respondents). For the first group, the emphasis was on the moral standards of the previous

generation and how they treated one another with respect and without judgment.

They did not need the veil because they were more respectful. Respect was defined from many different angles not just appearance like today. The world was very different then. My mom and dad would rarely hear about a rape or harassment incident. Today, we hear about it every day. People feel that the only way to protect women is to veil them. But you know, this is just wishful thinking; everyone is

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subject to harassment today, I even heard one time that a woman dressed in niqab got raped. Could you believe that? The generation of my mother and grandmother was more religious. They protected their honor [didn’t commit adultery] much better…The difference is today women just get veiled but in response to social pressure rather than religious calls. That caused so many social problems. They did not have as many materialistic problems that preclude marriage, which made the incidence of harassment much less….

They think the spread of the veil will force girls to be better. But today, the girls that are wearing the true veil are quite rare.

People in the past, according to some respondents, were “less nosy,” “less strict,”

“less judgmental,” and “did not do anything against their will.” One respondent insisted,

“Today girls find everyone around them veiled and still doing whatever they want, and

that is not the correct veil. I really think today the unveiled woman is much better than

the veiled.” “We are not more religious… We are still discussing basics.” The previous

generation was also less exposed to media pressure, and there were not as many

preachers as there are today who “talk about the veil all the time.”

Respondents also cited social and media pressure as two possible reasons why this

generation is veiling while the previous one did not. The previous generation did have

preachers, argued some respondents, but “the preachers did not talk about the veil then.”

Also “[the] media emphasized things other than religion, and there were more moral

religiosity then.” “Our parents had a better understanding of religion. Today we apply

religion literally and in return, our morals are in steep decline.”

Many respondents also remarked that the rise in immorality today was behind the

increased emphasis on appearance. They believed that many women were using the veil

to cover their immorality and appear “pious.” The veil and increased religiosity were seen

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as reactions to the outburst of moral corruption in society and the increased need for

religion as a savior or coping mechanism. Several respondents saw a direct connection

between the veil and Western imperialism. “The infidels outside are trying to corrupt our

youth. That’s why people got awakened and launched jihad.” One respondent asserted,

“Jihad takes many forms…The veil and the khimar especially is one.” But this

reactionary behavior, according to one woman, resulted in many forms of extremism.

“You rarely find moderate people in our society today. It is either very corrupt people or

very religious people.” Many women were very perplexed with both questions regarding

the spread of the veil today and its absence in the past.

Forty-three percent of the respondents thought the proliferation of the veil was the

result of the increase in religious awareness, which was lacking in the past.

They had nobody to advise them. Many preachers were lazy, and there was no cable TV like today. God sent some good people who made us more aware of our religion. Nowadays, the number of preachers increased dramatically, in the past they were very few, They did not know the punishment awaiting the unveiled like today and what will happen to the woman that leaves her hair uncovered. During their time, there was no religion. Everything was appropriate, not appropriate, not halal and haram.

Two respondents also argued that the unpopularity of the veil in the past was due

to the control of the government over the media and the anti-religious sentiments at that

time. “You know the government has no religion,” and religious people experienced

significant oppression from the state at that time. It should be noted here that were no

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significant differences in answers to this question across dress styles: many veiled women

thought that the fact that their mothers did not veil reflected something negative about

society today. Some unveiled women also thought it said something positive about this

current generation.

The widespread perceptions of women regarding the cultural change shed light on

other dimensions of the contradictions that women are facing. These contradictions are

further exacerbated by women who were constantly reinventing the past and

reconstituting the present. While some rejected the transformations, others endorsed and

celebrated them. This is what gave the veil its special hybridity and complexity. But what

was the main trigger behind this cultural shift and the mass adoption of the veil by

modern, educated women? The question was posed to the female respondents.

Women were asked what, in their opinion, caused the widespread use of the veil

towards the ends of the 1990s. The majority of the women interviewed (26 respondents)

thought that the shift in trend was due to an increase in religious awareness. “Religious

awareness increased and women started realizing that the veil is a religious duty.” This,

for many respondents, was mainly due to the proliferation in religious media and the

widespread religious campaigns. “Anybody who needs to know something about religion

does not need to go to the regional preacher.” All one needs is to watch one of the

religious channels for just an hour a day, “and you will understand everything about

religion.” Respondents also indicated that there was a lot of discussion on religious

programs about the veil, “which made many parents put pressure on their daughters to

veil.”

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Another factor that contributed to the spread of the veil was social pressure.

Almost one third of respondents cited social pressure coupled with a superficial

understanding of religion, which resulted in this clear transformation in attitudes towards

veiling. Many women suggested that today’s religiosity in Egyptian society was

“superficial” and people today “are only concerned with outward appearance.” Another

veiled respondents said the veil spread widely today “so that girls relieve themselves

from the negative remarks by men…” An unveiled respondent argued this pressure was

“why many veiled women are quite immoral today.” Another respondent insisted, “I

really think the spread of the veil in that manner is not a good indication. On the contrary,

it distorts the image of Islam and turns it into a religion of appearances.”

In addition to social pressure from family and society at large, women were

exposed to intensive media pressure. Some women saw the proliferation of religious

media as a positive trend, while others maintained that the media exerted excessive

pressure on women to veil. This impact was exaggerated among the poorer and less

educated segments of society as it “increased violence against women either by their

husbands or other family members.” This respondent urged preachers to watch for the

unintended consequences of what they said. “Many people today are taking advantage of

religion to release their psychological complexities.” Another unveiled woman remarked,

All what the preachers care about is outward appearance. We all have spiritual needs and we reach out to preachers so that they teach us how to fulfill those needs. But all they tell the woman is go get veiled, so she does. What makes it even worse is that they don’t tell us where to go from there.

One respondent claimed that some media channels received foreign funding to

“spread religious intolerance.” The perception regarding the introduction of a “Gulf”

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version of Islam is not uncommon today. Several prominent intellects and scholars

subscribed to this view. For example, a renowned screenwriter and journalist, Osama

Anwar Okasha, argued during an interview on an Egyptian satellite channel program that

the current proliferation of the veil, especially among famous female artists and actresses,

was the result of religious campaigns orchestrated by Wahhabi movements that are

strongly linked to the Gulf countries.294 The following chapter provides evidence

regarding the links between some of the versions of Islam that have gained popularity in

recent years and the Gulf countries.

The contradictions and conflicting forces that the Egyptian woman is facing today

are quite enormous and are leaving them all confused and indecisive about whether the

veil is a good thing or a bad thing. The answers of respondents also elucidate the current

forms of struggle that women are engaged in. At one level, they are using the veil as a

weapon of “self-defense” against moral corruption. At another, they are using it to resist

the forces of their marginalization. At a third level, the veil has become a strategy for

confronting globalization and Westernization. All these new functions are performed

simultaneously, resulting in the manifested contradictions in perceptions regarding the

veil today.

Bridges and Boundaries: The Veil and the Other

Dress and appearance play a constitutive role in the cultural makeup of the

Egyptian society today. To explore the scope and limits of this role, women were asked if

294 The interview was aired on Dream TV on April 07, 2007. It was downloaded at

http://www.free-christian-voice.net/kwares-stalite.html (accessed April 1, 2008).

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a woman’s dress gave an accurate indication of her religiosity.295 Forty-four percent (29)

of respondents answered that it did. For many women, dress was an important yardstick

for religiosity: the more conservative a woman was in her dress, the more religious she

was assumed to be. Answers of the respondents ranged from a categorical, “Of course it

does” to a less positive yes. “If she is dressed in really tight clothes then definitely she is

not religious.” “Only if she is wearing a niqab, then she is really religious.” Some

insisted that there was some correlation between dress and religiosity but the correlation

was not perfect. Others insisted it was a very reliable indicator. A number of respondents

were asked a follow-up question on how accurate their judgment was. They responded

“My judgment is usually spot on 85-90 percent of the time” or “[my judgment] is very

accurate.” According to several respondents, “a girl that does not care about her dress

style is not religious.” “The more respectable the girl is,” argued one woman, “the more

she would try to conform in her dress to what God requested.” Other responses were

noted:

Definitely a girl that does not want to veil either knows she is wrong and does not care or is not concerned, and in all cases, it is haram. Of course, you would notice that the veiled girl is relatively more disciplined and is more scrupulous than an unveiled girl. If she is not veiled, how would you know if she is Muslim or Christian?!296 How would you know if a girl is Muslim? …I can tell if a girl I see is good or not through the way she dresses first and second through her behavior… The first step for a girl to be respectable in my opinion is through her appearance…

295 This question was reserved for the veiled respondents, although some unveiled women

responded to the question without being asked. 296 The importance of being distinguished from a Christian girl was a common theme in the

responses. This is emblematic of the deteriorating interreligious group relations in Egypt; many riots and violent conflicts have erupted recently between the Muslims and Christians of Egypt. This could have played a role in enforcing the role of visual symbols in expressing religiosity today.

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More than half the respondents, however, insisted that there was no correlation

between dress and religiosity. Some were even annoyed by the question and remarked,

“Only judgmental people do that.” “If you do that, then you would not find any religious

person in Egypt.” Unveiled women were not asked this question as it could be

misperceived. However, a couple made statements that lead the interviewer to ask about

dress and religiosity in a follow-up question. These women said:

“[Dress] has nothing to do with religiosity. I consider myself a religious person [although am not veiled!” “No, a woman could be veiled and not religious. And just because she is veiled doesn’t mean she is well-mannered.” After a long pause, one respondent answered: “No. Sometimes I see a girl who is very properly dressed but it doesn't necessarily tell me that she has better morals. I used to dress very inappropriately before I got veiled, yet I was more religiously strict than I am now.

For many women, the importance of dress lied in the fact that it provided an

important marker distinguishing the “good” from the “bad”, the “real” Muslim from the

disingenuous one. In recent years, it has become increasingly important for Muslims in

Egypt, especially Egyptian women, to strive to remove any doubts regarding their

religious identity. This is partly why the veil has occupied such an important status today.

However, in spite of all the propaganda regarding the veil, the majority of the women

insisted that the veil and religiosity were uncorrelated and still refused to accept the veil

as a yardstick for manners or religiosity. These doubts were not specific to any one class.

Analysis revealed that the distribution of responses to this question was very similar

across the three groups represented in this sample.

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The following two questions in the interview further probed the link between the

impressions generated regarding a woman’s morals and her dress. Respondents were

asked how many female friends they had were veiled and how many were unveiled. We

did not openly ask if they would take a friend that did not look like them, but many of the

respondents took the question to mean that way and were not offended. Most unveiled

women indicated that it did not matter to them whether a girl was veiled or not. They

reported that half their friends or a bit more were veiled. One of the unveiled respondents,

however, indicated that all of her friends were unveiled: “But not because I prefer

unveiled friends, it just happened...” For another girl, she did not have veiled friends

because veiled women are prejudiced. Another unveiled respondent said:

Look, frankly, my unveiled friends are more, maybe because the veiled girls do not like to befriend unveiled girls. But I really think this is utter stupidity. As for me it does not matter. What matters is how the girl treats me. Oftentimes in our society I feel the veiled girls do not like to associate with girls like me not to be embarrassed. One time at college, I had two girls that I knew well, they were veiled. When I wanted to go get something from my car off campus, they told me, no you go alone and we will wait for you here. I knew that they were ashamed of the way I dress. I know that the way I dress is not quite appropriate in this society but it is no one’s business, or elsewhere is that personal freedom they talk about?

Thirty eight veiled women reported that the majority of their friends were veiled.

Twenty-three of all veiled respondents affirmed that they preferred their friends to be

veiled. “Every girl likes the girl that thinks like her,” commented one respondent.

“Frankly, when I see a girl unveiled I feel she is not one of us, she is not natural.”

Another woman noted that it was important for many veiled women to befriend the veiled

to be sure that they think alike. One woman wearing the niqab revealed, “The veiled,

especially if she wears the niqab would not like to walk in the street next to one with an

uncovered head.” She added, “It does not matter for unveiled girls; they befriend anyone;

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they have no objections whatsoever” as they did not care. Another respondent described

as wearing less conservative clothes enthusiastically answered saying, “You know what?

I never befriend a Christian, and if a Muslim is unveiled, I don’t trust her.”

Twenty-seven veiled respondents indicated that it did not matter whether a girl

was veiled or not. One argued, “On the contrary, I sometimes like to befriend unveiled

girls because I pity them. Maybe if I become her friend I can help her become veiled.”

Even if the woman chose to befriend an unveiled woman, the veiled woman would make

it her mission to get the unveiled to change her ways and veil: “I heard a veiled friend of

mine said once that we must not leave our unveiled friends without trying to talk to them

about the veil, especially if the girl was good from the inside.”

Analysis revealed a strong correlation between class and patterns of association

among veiled and unveiled women. Eighty two percent of the middle-lower class

affirmed that they’d preferred to befriend women who looked like them, compared to

only 11 percent for upper-middle class and 52 percent for respondents classified as

middle-class women. This might suggest that the level of tolerance with regards to dress

was greater among higher socioeconomic groups.

The analysis revealed the importance of dress in determining social associations

and barriers today. It divides society between preachers and preached to, moral and

immoral, and honorable and disrespectful. These neat categories help women deal with

the contradictions they face every day, thus bringing some order to a world that has

become quite chaotic. But in so doing, dress draws boundaries between people and

results in the exclusion of certain groups, namely the unveiled women, as “unreligious,”

even non-Muslim. The stigma and peripherization that the unveiled respondent

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experience today are quite significant. The following section further manifests these

difficulties.

Voices from the Periphery: Unveiled Women Speak

The previous section demonstrated some of the challenges of staying unveiled

today. Throughout the interview, unveiled respondents talked about the difficulties, even

oppression, they faced in a society that rejected them as an ill-mannered and peculiar to

society. This became even clearer as we asked a random sample of 30 male respondents

whether they would consider marrying an unveiled girl. Twenty-seven men were asked.

Of these, 18 indicated that they would either prefer a veiled woman, or would never

marry an unveiled woman. For those who preferred the veiled, they remarked that they

would do everything to veil their wives after marriage. The comments regarding the

unveiled made by young men in Egypt were quite significant:

I would never marry an unveiled woman.

Of course my wife has to be veiled. She must be veiled at the very least; I could never love an unveiled woman. I would never marry an unveiled girl. I could sleep with one but will never marry one. I do not respect unveiled girls. I would never marry one to start with. That's impossible. There is no rational woman who would reject the veil. And I wouldn’t go marry a devil…

A couple more stories related informally by some of the unveiled girls I know are

even more revealing. One woman narrated,

One day I was sitting in my car and a woman wearing a niqab passed by me with her young daughter. Suddenly the woman started pointing to me so her little girl would see and then she asked her daughter "You know where this woman will go in the afterlife?"

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The girl answered her mother "to hell." And her mother said "Good answer. Do you know why she will go to hell?" The girl said "Because she is not veiled."

Another incident revealed the boundaries that the veil sets between the girl

viewed as respectful, and the disrespectful. The female interviewer narrated this story

Last year at school we had some time to kill between two lectures. Some of our Christian friends (boys and girls) began to play a certain game. They looked hilarious so I joined with another two Muslim veiled women. We were laughing out loud and having a ball, but then later when we were going up for the lecture, a male friend stopped two veiled girls (and not me) and rebuked them about their inappropriate behavior. He even went as far as to say that, “Where do you think you are? You are on campus.” He provoked Marwa so much that she stayed mad about it for a week and even cried, saying, "What does he want us to do? Sit on a bench for two hours so we could look mannered?"

While the veiled woman was mad that a male friend tried to impose a certain code

of behavior on her, the unveiled felt excluded. She recalled,

I am not even considered in the league of mannered girls that are worthy to be part of a discussion on manners. So it is not a surprise for an unveiled i.e. ill-mannered girl like me to act inappropriately. I am not even susceptible for reform since the very first rule of being mannered, that is the veil, does not apply.

Street Harassments: Its Extent and Its Implication

Street harassment is a strong and inexplicable force shaping the behavior of

Egyptian women and parents today. Several respondents and observers (like Iqbal

Baraka) suggested that the shift in dress and the spread of the veil were direct outcomes

of increased harassment in the street. A recent study published by the Egyptian Center for

Egyptian Women found that at least four in five women are subjected to street

harassments on a daily basis. The report also suggested that veiled respondents could be

more provocative to men as the veil could raise men’s curiosity.297

297 al Menufi, Al-Tahharush: Al Saratan Al Ijtima‘i.

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Several interviews were conducted with a variety of women that were exposed to

sexual harassment. In one interview, a woman, Noha Roshdy, narrated an incident that

took place in June 2008. A truck driver stretched his hand out of the car and grabbed the

woman’s breast until she almost fell. The man was about to flee, but another car cut off

the truck and forced the driver of the truck to halt. Noha was able to grab the harasser,

and she insisted on reporting the man to the police. Strikingly, as she expressed her

determination to take the man to the policy station, everyone started rebuking her, saying,

“Don’t you see what you are wearing.” When she went to the police station, the police

officer tried to dissuade her and her father from filing the report saying, “You are a

respectable family, the name of your father would be tarnished with this.” The police

officer also refused to send the man to the other station to complete the procedures. Her

father had to take the man in his own car to the other station.298

Women in Egypt are always blamed for being harassed or sexually abused. One

rapist was interviewed on April 22, 2005. The interviewer, a veiled woman, first asked

him what his crime was. The second question was What was the woman wearing? The

rapist explained that the woman was wearing provocative clothes. The interviewer

showed sympathy to the rapist and cast all blame on the victim. The way the woman was

dressed was seen as making her deserving of the crime. The interviewer went on to ask

him, would you do that with a girl who dressed modestly and the rapist answered, “Even

if it kills me. I would free her.”299

298 The interview was conducted on the Mehwar Channel on October 15, 2008. On October 26,

2008, the man was sentenced to three years in prison. This is quite an anomaly as most sexual harassment cases go unreported and police officers oftentimes discourage victims from filing harassment complaints.

299 The interview was downloaded at http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/ 671.htm (accessed November 28, 2008).

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Conclusion

Looks and appearances play an important in role in categorizing and even tiering

the members of society in Egypt today. There is a strong need to be recognized as

Muslim and religious. People are being ranked according to a discrete yardstick of what

is acceptable and what is not. In the absence of a similar study conducted in the past, it is

hard to tell if the emphasis on appearance and physical expressions is new to this society.

However, it is clear that appearance and dress brings certain types of people within the

same community together and others apart, regardless of compatibility of backgrounds

and ways of thinking.

Research also revealed some interesting intergroup dynamics. There is a

heightened sense of responsibility to preach. This new activity that many women are

engaged in today gives them pride and adds meaning to their existence. In the lack of

opportunities for asserting the person’s worth, this has become one of the main survival

strategies. The promise of reward in the afterlife for witnessing further encourages this

trend and compensates for the absence of return on human capital investment in Egypt.

However, these activities give some a sense of superiority and others a sense of

inferiority. Many groups in society, particularly the unveiled, feel alienated and

marginalized by these activities. Some lament the fact that deep inside they could be

much more religious than the veiled woman preaching to them, and that religiosity in

Egypt is now reduced to mere appearances.

While much of the research on the veil today associate it with what is now termed

religious revival, this research decoupled the relationship between religiosity and the veil.

Many respondents saw today’s religiosity as superficial, and saw that society today is

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actually experiencing a steep set back in its moral and religious standards. Also, more

Egyptian woman found this generation to be less religious and more morally corrupt than

the previous generation. The veil today therefore functions as an instrument of resistance

and accommodation functioning at least at three interrelated arenas of power conflict.

At the first level, women are using the veil in response to new forms of male

dominance that has emerged over the last two decades. One Egyptian scholar suggests

that this phenomenon is caused by “three decades of incitement against women.”300

Sexual harassment of women in the streets is one manifestation of this phenomenon. Also

the portrayal of unveiled women as disrespectful, even deserving of violent crimes

against them is another illustration of these gender politics. These forms of oppression

today are sanctioned by religion and are playing a prominent role in spreading the veil

across all income and class groups.

Many women today are forced to veil as they want to avoid nagging, disgraceful

harassment in the street, and the stigma of being unveiled. However, the research

illustrated very unique and interesting forms of agency that women still enjoy. The

Egyptian woman is actively engaged in a dialogue regarding what religious laws mean, a

domain traditionally monopolized by men. The diversity in the forms of the veil and the

interpretation of what the veil means and looks like in Islam are some of the expressions

of her agency today. The assertion of her agency has been confirmed through an

examination of labor force statistics. The spread of the veil has coincided with an

increase in the female participation rate in the labor force. Egyptian women are

300 The scholar is Muhammad El Sayyed Said, Director of the Center for Political and Strategic

Studies at al-Ahram Institution. See Magdi Abdelhadi, “Egypt’s Sexual Harassment ‘Cancer.’” BBC News, July 18, 2008, sec. Middle East. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7514567.stm (accessed November 28, 2008).

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successfully responding to the many conflicting forces acting on them to conform,

modernize, Westernize, traditionalize, and to exit the public space through employing a

mix of submission and resistance strategies.

These two underlying forces are constitutive of the social arena of conflict. One is

related to a state-society struggle aiming at redefining the role of religion in society and

the version of Islam that the state should adopt. Women’s responses provide some clues

regarding this level of power struggle. Some women have suggested that the veil is a

response to the perceived secularization of the state and social laws, which resulted in a

social disintegration. The following chapter provides more evidence on this arena of

power contestation.

A third arena of power that is shaping the meanings and forms of the veil is

related to globalization and technological advancements. The recent revolution in digital

media coupled with a freer movement of goods and people across the borders of the Arab

world brought closer very diverse Islamic cultures and produced new forms of Islamic

activism. One particular event that catalyzed this process was the First Gulf War, a war

that resulted in the dislocation of massive number of Arab people who resided in the Gulf

Countries prior to the war. The fusion of distinct cultures in the Arab world was

accompanied with the importation of “foreign” attitudes towards women and the

emergence of antifeminist sentiments targeting the confinement of women’s presence in

public space.

The veil is also used as an instrument of identity assertion and a weapon against

the forces of globalization that are threatening to impinge on traditional culture that is

defined more along religious rather than local/Egyptian culture. My research revealed a

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cultural and identity shift whereby Egyptians see themselves as belonging more to an

Islamic nation rather than an Egyptian culture. Again, inter-Arab migration trends that

emerged over the last three decades played an important role in this cultural shift. In

addition, the proliferation of Arab satellite media channels, many of which promoted

specific versions of Islam, is another factor behind this identity shift. In short, the veil is

symbolic of two simultaneous battlefields. An internal battle whereby social problems are

projected on women. Women respond by veiling as a to adjust to and resist these social

issues. The veil is shown to be a manifestation of these power dynamics and a weapon for

resisting them. The external battlefield is one whereby women are active warriors in a

struggle against a state that is losing its legitimacy and a foreign imperial force that is

threatening the traditional culture. This external power struggle will be demonstrated

further in the following chapter.

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Chapter 6

The Transformation of Religious Discourse in the Age of Satellite

Introduction

The discourse on globalization took shape during the post Cold War era. Much of

the discourse focused on the political economy of global forces, and how globalization

resulted in the reconfiguration of economic structures.301 Other elements of the debate

discussed the effect of globalization on state sovereignty and power.302 The literature

expressed anxieties regarding the “globalization of culture” and the decay of local

cultures as globalization tools such as the Internet, satellites, and cable television dissolve

away cultural boundaries and transform local identities.303 This globalization literature

emphasized the effect of the intersection of two opposite cultures; the Western culture on

one hand, and the local culture an the other. Little or no literature discussed the effects of

globalization on interactions among non-Western cultures.

The following two chapters shed some light on how globalization has also

catalyzed intraregional interactions and resulted in significant identity transformations. I

argue that globalization results in the fusion of cultures that are stereotypically grouped

under the same brand (e.g., Islamic, Asian, Arabic). These dynamics are still constantly

traversed by interregional and “intercivilizational” forces, thus further compounding the

complexity and elusiveness of globalization. They also produce novel state-society

301 See for example, Hardt and Negre, Empire; Haggard and Kaufman, The Politics of Economic

Adjustment. 302 Ohmae, The End of the Nation; Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty. 303 Fernandes, India's New Middle; Kellner, “Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy."

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relations and new forms of social movements. The multifaceted nature of the veil is a

strong demonstration of these rich, unexplored arenas of globalization. Specifically, I will

examine the impact of the emergence of the Arab satellite television on the forms and

meanings of religiosity as well as perceptions regarding women and the veil in Egypt. I

also demonstrate how these new forms of technology affected state legitimacy and its

power over the domain of value constitution in Egypt.

The chapter starts with an overview of the digital media industry in the Arab

world. This is followed by an examination of some of the primary components of

religious awareness in Egypt, as suggested by responses to a detailed questionnaire with

veiled and unveiled Muslim Egyptian women conducted during the summer of 2008.

These interview results provided evidence regarding the centrality of the digital media to

the mass-veiling phenomenon. As such, the analysis proceeds to assess these new forms

of media through conducting a content analysis of the various messages and programs

featured on these media channels. Two genres of religious media are analyzed. This

chapter focuses on the first type, which emerged towards the end of the 1990s and took a

quasi-liberal, more lenient form. In this analysis, this type of media is referred to as the

new-age media. The second type, the neo-traditional media, is stricter in its

interpretations of Islam and emerged half-a-decade into the history of exclusively

religious media. It is analyzed in detail in Chapter 7. The constitutive effect of these

media channels is explored through discourse analysis of religious sermons delivered by

some of the most influential preachers in Egypt today, as highlighted by the responses to

the interview instrument.

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Overview of the Arab Satellite Media Industry

One of the most troubling political crises in the Arab world during the last few

decades was the invasion of an Arab country, Kuwait, by a neighboring Arab country,

Iraq. The invasion shocked the entire Arab world, as citizens could not fathom the fact

that two “sister” Muslim countries could go to war against one another. The Gulf War

was covered in the media almost exclusively by the American cable news networks, most

prominently the Cable News Network (CNN). The coverage was perceived in the Arab

world to be biased and ethnocentric. While the demand for CNN increased significantly

in the region during that time, there was a growing rejection of American imperialism

that was able to dominate the entire world not just through its military power, but also its

cultural hegemony and its monopoly of media technology. The citizens of the Arab world

were dismayed by the absence of any Arab channel that have the technological

capabilities to present the news effectively but from a regional, “less biased” perspective.

This was an opportune moment for some wealthy Saudi businessmen who were

closely related to the regime to enter the market of satellite media. The first businessman

to venture into this market was Walid al-Ibrahim, a brother-in-law of King Fahd. Al-

Ibrahim established the Middle Eastern Broadcasting Center, or MBC. MBC started in

1991 as a news and entertainment channel. Shortly after, the satellite television media

industry mushroomed in the Arab world and attracted many investors. Toward the end of

the 1990s, new exclusively religious channels emerged and captivated the attention of

young Muslims thirsty for information about their religion. These young youth were also

eager to dispel the images of shame that the Western media created about Islam and

Muslims in the late 1990s. The demand for exclusively religious media was confirmed

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through surveys in different parts of the Arab world. The channels filled a clear demand

gap and soon became the primary source of religious knowledge and education.

The emergence of religious satellite television was closely correlated to another

phenomenon, namely the rise of what is now called the “new-age” Islamic preachers.

These were nontraditional preachers who were not part of the “institutionalized Islam,” or

the Islam of official Islamic institutions like al-Azhar University,304 and whose main

platform for preaching was the mosques. New-age preachers, on the other hand, did not

receive any religious education or training; they were, for the most part, secular people305

who had the gift of public-speaking and had self-educated themselves in religion. They

were also relatively younger and many of them even had other full-time jobs that were

not related to religion or preaching. Satellite television gave an extraordinary forum for

these new preachers to become like stars in the Arab world. These new preachers also

contributed to the success of these new religious media.

How They Know What They Know?

In the qualitative study conducted in Egypt in the summer of 2008 regarding the

veil, many respondents cited the media as the principal factor in the increased incidence

of veiling among Egyptian women today. Almost three quarters of the respondents

indicated that the media was their main source of religious information. Of these, 80

304 In Islam, a preacher is expected to receive specific religious education that starts at a very early

stage. Many of the preachers in the past were brought up in local mosque-affiliated educational system, called kottab, where they memorize the Quran. They then receive scholarly education in Shari’a and Islamic jurisprudence at an Islamic institution, such as al-Azhar. This was the expected background of religious preachers in the past, but the new-age preachers significantly altered that.

305 By secular, I mean they are not part of any formal religious institution. In the past, preachers dressed in traditional Saudi-like male clothes (loose-fitting gown and a hair cover), but now, many preachers who belong to the formal religious institution have started wearing ordinary clothes, including Western suits, and some do not grow a beard in order to appear more contemporary.

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percent reported that media was their only source of religious information. When asked

whether they read any religious books to learn more about Islam, the vast majority (77

percent) indicated that either they did not, or they read very little. Twenty-one

respondents said they did not like reading or had no patience for reading. The responses

of some of the women illuminated the domain of control that the digital media have today

on religious awareness today. Respondents said,

Religious programs on television are almost the only source….

I do not have the patience for reading. I prefer visual and audio media.

I got used to the computer screen. Getting quick information through the net is better than reading the entire book. Honestly, I do not read at all. I do wish I could sit and read for more than five minutes before getting bored. Since the Internet entered my house, books became a store for spiders.

I like the media most of all. I’m too tired after work to read and just want to lie down in bed and watch television [Laughingly]...I read about two pages per week. I should read more, but I do not manage to understand from books like from television

Respondents considered digital as a good substitute for books that were not

accessible to readers either due to their content or language style. To some women, it was

an alternative to no religious education at all. Traditional preachers and religious scholars

normally targeted older people and spoke formal Arabic, which, as explained before, is

very difficult to understand and sounds almost like a foreign language to many Egyptians.

They also only focus on reading and interpreting the Quran, but do not incorporate

religion in everyday life. Many of the preachers on religious programs today are more

successful in relating to youth through a new content focus and through the utilization of

innovative presentation techniques. The programs presented on religious channels are

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“easy to understand and close to the youth,” and the preachers “speak our language and

know how to address the youth,” which is quite a change from the near past. Respondents

appreciated the fact that many of the preachers are young and dynamic and make sure to

address the interests and concerns of the young and discuss the issues that they deal with

on a daily basis.

To assess the level of power that digital media had on people’s religious ideas,

respondents were asked if they trusted the information they received through this

medium, if they found any contradictions in the material presented to them, and if they

developed special mechanisms to deal with any contradictions. Forty percent of

respondents indicated that, for the most part, they trusted all the material presented on

their favorite shows. These respondents insisted that it was important to trust the

preachers presenting on television. “If we do not trust our preachers, then where else

would we learn our religion from?!” The questioning of the trustworthiness of these

preachers, as this question might have suggested, caused distress among some

respondents. “Of course I trust the [preachers on cable television] very much, and it never

occurred to me before that what they are saying might be wrong,” asserted one

respondent. Another remarked, “Why are you asking that question? Just sit and watch

them yourself and you will find that all preachers presenting are respectful and

knowledgeable.” One annoyed respondent added, “It has become fashionable these days

to question our preachers. Of course the ones that are questioning them are all wrong.”

These respondents were of the opinion that “the principles and foundations of Islam are

well-known, and no one could alter or distort them.” They asserted that all preachers

constantly referred to passages from Quran and Sunna, which are unchangeable. There

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was no reason to doubt that the information imparted was accurate because the source of

information, religious texts, was eternal.

Responses of some women suggested that they trusted the preachers because they

needed to. “I really do not know how to answer this question. But what would make us

distrust even our preachers…Maybe some lack the ability to impart the information, but

why would we doubt that they are making the information up?!” The chaos and confusion

that respondents were experiencing in their lives created a need to have a stable pillar on

which to lean and for many women, that pillar was the source of religious information

through which they make sense of the world. These preachers were filling a specific void

represented by a lack of vision and direction, a function that the state traditionally

provided.

Some women trusted the preachers, but were not sure why. “I do not think any of

the preachers would be saying anything wrong. Don’t ask me why!” For some women,

there was some sort of a “hidden hand” that filtered out bad preachers and information.

The nature and the authority of that hidden hand was not clear, but to some it could be

fear of embarrassment that other preachers might come out and refute what a given

preacher said. Others alluded to some authority that scrutinized the information presented

and the credibility of the presenter. That might be the authority of the management of the

channel or the state, but that was also not clear. What was evident here was that the level

of trust for the material presented on the digital screen was high, but there was still some

doubt about the material presented.

The level of trust was conditional on certain factors for many (39) respondents.

Some women only trusted those preachers who were “similar to me in thinking and

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belief.” Others trusted the ones that everyone else trusted and those who were least

controversial. “If a preacher is not good, you will find a million bad rumors about the

person.” The market field provided some guarantee that good preachers remained

trustworthy through maintaining a good name. A number of respondents admitted that

they did hear some information that they found strange. But they attributed the

strangeness of the information to “one’s ignorance” rather than the preacher’s

incompetence.

It should be noted that over the years, and in an attempt to maintain their

authority, many preachers propounded the idea that questioning what they say was

equivalent to questioning religion and to being unfaithful. The human mind, they argued,

could not comprehend everything God commanded. Another complicating factor here is

that while Muslims are encouraged to read the Quran, they are taught that they do not

have the power or ability to interpret it. They therefore have to rely on accepted

interpretations of Quran and Sunna provided by certified Islamic scholars. Only people

with specific credentials are authorized to interpret the Quran and provide “fatwas”. As

discussed in Chapter 4, during the Abbasid period, it was decided that the body of Islamic

jurisprudence was complete and eternal. This gave a body of laws created during a

specific period the status of immutability and permanence.

There is a very fine and fuzzy line in Islam between seeking more knowledge

about religion and questioning it. Many Muslims are afraid to ask or understand why a

certain teaching in Islam has become a law, even if that law sounds unreasonable or

contradictory to the essence of Islam. Many Muslim youth in Egypt are trapped between

the desire to know more and the risk of letting the reign of the mind go too loose to lead

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to disbelief. The solution that many preachers present is to “have faith,” and not question

the material they presented, a solution that gives the ulema considerable power.

Not all respondents perceived a “hidden hand” that ensured that “truth will always

triumph.” Some expressed concerns about the contradictions and narrated various

mechanisms for dealing with them. Some listened only to the preachers they knew and

trusted. Others said that they could always sort out bad information from good

information through an honest conversation with the heart and soul as one’s conscience

always had the right answer. “Ask your heart,” one respondent recommended. “I pray for

guidance,” another remarked. A third suggested, “I go with what I feel is right.” Finding

answers to religious questions inside one’s heart is a very basic principle in Islam. In one

of the traditions of the prophet of Islam, it is recommended, “Consult your heart even if

you receive an official fatwa.” This principle stands in stark contrast to the rigidity

portrayed in the process of fatwa-making, and Shari‘a interpretation regarding who has

the power and authority to do either and how the religious teachings are eternal.

The filtration of information appeared to be more complicated and disconcerting

for another group of respondents. These insisted that there were many contradictions in

what they saw on television, and some “don’t know how to tell who is right.” Several

respondents suggested that the platform of digital religious programs was full of

preachers “seeking fame and money” and many misrepresented or bent religion. Some of

these preachers presented a very rigid and radical version of Islam because there was a

market for it. Others “sculpt religion” to make it more lenient and attractive for young

people. Respondents also indicated that for these religious channels to attract the greatest

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number of young audience, they needed to “present religion in a fast and superficial

way,” which did not allow for a comprehensive understanding of religious ideas.

Several respondents regretted the recent confinement of the domain of religious

education to cable television and thought that the source was either insufficient or

unreliable. “I hate it when I hear something on one of the programs and then later

discover that it was wrong,” remarked one woman. “I hate these contradictions!” These

respondents, therefore, still preferred books because they were not “people’s opinions.”

But these were a minority (only five respondents) among middle- and upper-class groups

that were well-educated and are expected to be tomorrow’s technocrats, entrepreneurs,

and policy makers.

The shift to a screen culture is a global youth phenomenon not restricted to Egypt.

The problem is that in Egypt this television culture is coupled with an educational system

that emphasizes memorization over understanding. The result is the loss of critical

thinking and a tendency to reduce the world into binary categories of bad and good, halal

and haram. This seems to play an important role in the phenomenon of the trivialization

of religion that Egypt as well as many other parts of the world are experiencing today.

Assessment of the Effectiveness of Religious Programs in Egypt

To assess the impact of the new media forms on shaping the meaning of the veil

and religion, we asked the participants in the qualitative study two questions: 1) “Do you

think the media is giving sufficient coverage to topics related to the veil?” and 2) How

about the essential morals of Islam, do you think they are adequately covered by the

media? Forty percent of respondents indicated that the coverage of topics related to the

veil was enough while 44 percent insisted that it was still insufficient. The remaining 16

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percent were not sure. All unveiled respondent insisted that the coverage was enough or

more than enough. The variation in the responses to this question came from the veiled

respondents. Those who thought it was enough referenced the fact that “many girls are

getting veiled today,” while others insisted that there were a lot of programs related to the

veil, but the effect was sometimes offset by bad media and programs that featured

improperly dressed women.

Several respondents argued that the coverage on television was extreme: “Many

women veil and then shortly unveil” due to media pressure, suggested one participant.

“This pressure makes women veil even if she was not convinced and then she takes it off

when she feels bridled with it.” One woman critiqued the way the veil was preached.

“They need to eliminate those programs that present the veil in a terrifying way,”

demanded one unveiled respondent. “They probably talk about the veil more than

anything else,” noted another unveiled woman. She continued, “I don’t want the veil to

be the only concern of Egypt tomorrow!” A veiled woman shared this same concern and

noted that the coverage was “excessive to a depressing point.”

Some respondents did not think the coverage of the veil topic was sufficient. They

agreed that the issue was receiving lot of attention but “we need more” or that not all

segments of society are reached through the current media because “not everyone has

dish.” Some suggested that while the coverage was “way too much,” it was not effective

because the coverage is superficial. Some emphasized that more programs should target

men “to realize the value of the veiled women.” This recommendation is in reference to

the problem of street harassment, which both veiled and unveiled women alike suffered

from.

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Those who deemed the coverage insufficient compared the air time of religious

shows to that of entertainment shows. According to several respondents, entertainment

constituted a major temptation to Egyptian youth today and created a greater need for

more shows discussing how to face these temptations. “Of course they are not enough,”

asserted one respondent. “We need a lot more.” “All these video-clips and movie

channels and you tell me the coverage is adequate?” “So long as we have bad shows on

television, we will need more coverage on the veil.” Others were resentful that there were

still many female program presenters and broadcasters who were still not veiled, ”Many

young women today take these women as role models,” which neutralized the effect of

the good programs.

There was less variation among respondents regarding the coverage of topics

related to morals. The vast majority (81 percent) thought the coverage was not enough.

Some of those who were not sure about the level of coverage of issues related to the veil

were more positive that the coverage of morality in religious media was not enough.

“We need much more coverage in this area in particular.” Twelve women thought the

coverage of morality was enough. They said, “Yes, it is all they talk about….” If that

does not translate into improvement in morality, it is because the media “is full of

contradictions. There are channels that broadcast very good religious shows, but then you

find the same channel broadcasting entertainment shows with inappropriate video-clips.”

One respondent went far enough to request that “all non-Muslim channels be eliminated”

for a satisfactory coverage of morality to be realized. Respondents also noted that even if

the amount of air time was sufficient, the timing of the programs gave it limited

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viewership. One woman thought that the increase in religious shows was very recent and

had not taken root yet. “We need more time to gauge its impact,” she suggested.

For several respondents adequacy and effectiveness were entwined; respondents

deduced that the coverage was not enough because “people are not behaving on a moral

level.” So “without watching” one respondent concluded that the programs were not

adequate as evidenced by the state of social morality. One respondent noted that the

coverage was very random and reactive. “They don’t talk about morals unless there had

been a certain accident or crisis” that was too striking and therefore warranted media

coverage. A frustrated unveiled woman said, “I really hope they focus more on morality

and the moral values like honesty, fairness, etc.” One puzzled respondent thought,

“maybe it is not enough, but what would the media do? Issues related to morality are

quite intuitive?” Implicitly, this respondent was suggesting that the domain of morality

was still a private family issue that did not need to be discussed on the media. The veil,

therefore, was an exceptional topic of morality that needed to be covered because of a

noted deficiency in this less intuitive requirement. Morality, on the other hand, did not

need preaching because what is right or wrong is obvious.

Perceptions about media coverage of religious topics were quite divergent. While

all respondents were exposed to the same types of media, their experiences underwent

significant mental and cultural processing and translated very differently for each

respondent. This divergence suggests a number of facts. First, it is not clear whether

supply created its own demand or the opposite. We do not know whether the preachers

have created a demand for religious programming or whether the market gap in religious

media has been in existence and these programs have just fulfilled these gaps. Previous

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survey research suggested great demand for religious programming.306 This could be on

explanation for the proliferation and success of religious channels on television.

However, the lack of religious media does not explain the success of particular versions

of Islamic media programming. It may be argued that the version of Islam adopted and

promoted by many preachers today thrives on a perceived cultural war between evil and

good, authentic and foreign, traditional and Western. The contradictions and complexities

that society faces contrast starkly with such simplified binary framings, such as, “Islam is

the solution” and “The veil before judgment.”

The discussion also demonstrates that private religious programming, in many

women’s minds, has become a substitute for the state in providing a very important

function: setting values of right and wrong. Within a short span of time, private preachers

have built up the requisite legitimacy to be a value provider. Responses suggest that the

state, through the state-sponsored Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU),

continues to provide entertainment and drama shows that are perceived to be morally

corruptive. Private media, on the other hand, are offsetting this corruptive influence

through airing religious programs. At the same time, the “corrupting” effect of the secular

media is clear and perceived to be long-lasting: the majority of the respondents insisted

that social morality has deteriorated, and attributed that deterioration to bad media. The

positive impact of the religious revival movement orchestrated by the media is not yet

realized, according to the participants in this study. This is partly because the cultural war

between “good” media and “bad” media is very intense.307

306 See for example al-Markaz al-Qawmī lil-Buhūth al-Ijtimā‘īyah wa-al-Jinā’iyah, Zāhirat al-

hijāb bayna al-jāmi‘īyāt. 307 Lila Abu-Lughod, Dramas of Nationhood.

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Participants’ responses also highlight the importance of private media today in

constituting values and shaping attitudes towards the veil. To understand the process of

value constitution through the media and to assess the ingredients of religious discourse

in Egypt today, I reviewed the channels and programs that respondents cited most often. I

also conducted a content analysis of the sermons of preachers that were most frequently

cited and who are featured on these channels. The following section reviews one strand

of religious media, while the following chapter reviews another more recent strand.

Iqraa Channel

Iqraa Channel was selected to represent moderate, new-age religious streaming

today. As one of several other moderate channels,308 it is by far the most frequently cited

by the participants in this study. It was also the first exclusively Islamic satellite channel

in the Arab world. The channel, created in 1998, is owned by a Saudi businessman,

Sheikh Salah Kamal, who is also the owner of another well-known media conglomerate,

The Arab Radio and Television (ART) Network. In the beginning, the channel did not

charge viewers any fees. If they owned a dish, viewers were able to tune in for free.

However, as the financial situation of the channel became tougher, additional sources of

revenue were sought, including membership fees, sponsorships, donations, and gifts.

Iqraa is headquartered in Saudi Arabia, but it has a main office in Egypt.

Iqraa started broadcasting after very detailed field studies to identify the needs

and current market gaps in religious programming. The channel management also

surveyed viewers regarding the program designs and formats that they preferred most.

One survey was conducted in 1998 with 500 male and female respondents from Egypt,

308 Iqraa literally means “recite” Iqra, which means read in Arabic, was the first word that the

archangel Gabriel spoke to the Prophet of Islam, “Iqraa in the name of Allah who created!”

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Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. It revealed the need for a specialized

Islamic channel as no satellite channel at that time tackled Islamic issues with sufficient

depth. Respondents demanded that the new channel be balanced, tolerant, credible, and

modern. They also recommended that it provide a wide variety of programs, including

cultural, recreational, political, and even sports programs. Based on the survey, Iqraa

revolutionized the format of religious and cultural broadcasting through adopting modern

techniques and tackling contemporary and controversial issues freely and courageously.

Many controversial issues are discussed that public broadcasting in general avoid, such as

the concept of deviant women (nashez or pariah) in Islam,309 women’s political rights,

male dominance, and others.310 The mission declared by the management of the channel

is:

To help Muslims apply the teachings of Islam that call for tolerance [and to create] a Muslim society whose members will be able to positively interact both on the local and international levels. Iqraa Channel also aims at presenting the true moderate face of Islam to people in the West where media does not present an objective view on the Islamic Law.311

One of the main goals of the channel is to provide an alternate type of

entertainment medium tp that promoted by the West. It also seeks to dispel the

misconceptions and accusations against Islam that prevailed in the 1990s and 2000and to

“develop the feelings of attachment to the unified cultural identity of the ummah [Islamic

309 Shari‘a Law has a clause on women who rebel against their husbands. Rebelling against

husbands is a punishable civil crime. Husbands are allowed to put the women under house arrest if she was declared nashez.

310 Abdul Qader Tash, “Islamic Satellite Channels and Their Impact on Arab Societies: Iqra Channel- a Case Study,” Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal 13 (2004). http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall04/tash.html (accessed May 28, 2009).

311 Source: Iqraa Web site at http://www.iqraa-tv.net/En/Channel.aspx (accessed January 22, 2009).

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nation]…[through creating a] spirit of dialogue among individuals of the nation.”312 This

last objective is fulfilled through a number of programs that stress the commonalities

among Arabic-speaking Islamic countries. It broadcasts in many Arab countries and is

especially popular in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries.

Journalists interview persons from all over the Arab world, region. Iqraa is the first

channel to do so and has succeeded remarkably in that regard. Its success in Egypt in

particular is notable since Egyptians are in general biased to their dialect and are not very

good at understanding non-Egyptian dialects. So there is a significant shift in culture and

that was clearly reflected in some of the comments of the young women interviewed

regarding the Egyptian identity. There is also a strong emphasis on women issues in

Iqraa. The channel seeks to “take care of the Muslim woman and affirm her role in

building a sound society.”313 This last focus was further emphasized after the year 2000

when programming directed to women and family increased significantly. The increase in

family/women programming time is associated with shifts in dress and perceptions about

women as will be demonstrated in the following sections.

Until 2004, the channel practically monopolized the market for specialized

religious programming in the Arab world. In 2004, it was the most viewed satellite

channel in Egypt. According to a survey conducted by the Egyptian Cabinet, this channel

was viewed more than any of the entertainment channels broadcast on the Egyptian

satellite.314 Today (2009), Iqraa continues to market itself to the audience as the only

312 Abdul Qader Tash, “Islamic Satellite Channels and Their Impact on Arab Societies.” 313 Abdul Qader Tash, “Islamic Satellite Channels and Their Impact on Arab Societies.” 314 Ethar El-Katatne, “The Business of Islam.” Business Today Egypt, July 2008.

http://www.businesstodayegypt.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=8058 (accessed February 1, 2009).

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truly moderate Islamic channel. In an interview with one Internet Islamic Web site called

IslamOnline, the executive manager noted:

Iqraa is the only channel that has a moderate religious outreach mission. This contrasts with other satellite channels, be it entertainment channels, which destroys the family and social structure, or even the Islamic channels. I believe society is made up of male and female, and it cannot function without the interaction of both, given appropriate Shari’a regulations. This contrasts with other Islamic channels that present “Wahabi” ideas.

The executive manager is implicitly referring to channels, such as al-Nas, and al-Hekma,

which advocate total segregation between men and women and a very confined role of

women in social life.

Iqraa was cited by 13 respondents as a prime source of religious information. It

was the most preferred medium of information for upper-middle-class women as they

were able to connect with the preachers featured on the channel. Most of the preachers

come from very similar backgrounds and some, for example, a rising star, Mo‘ez

Mas‘ood, even speaks in English, which makes him able to connect with this strata of the

society whose Arabic language skills are limited.315 Iqraa programs are “easy to

understand and close to the youth.” Moreover the religious instructions and duties

imparted through the channel programs are simple and easy to follow. In general, it is

less strict than other religious channels in its interpretation of religious texts.

Although they strongly emphasize tolerance and moderation, many Iqraa

programs could be labeled anti-Semitic. In May 2002, for example, a veiled female

presenter interviewed a three-and-a-half-year-old girl and asked her if she liked the Jews.

The girl answered, “No.” When asked why, the girl responded that Jews were "apes and

315 Again, classical Arabic is very different from colloquial Arabic. Understanding the Quran and

relating to traditional preachers are difficult for many respondents. Preachers on Iqraa were able to break that language boundary and simplify the message.

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pigs." When asked how she knew that, the girl answered that the Quran said that. The

interview ended with a hail of praise to the girl as she demonstrated herself as a true

Muslim and to her parents for their great upbringing. The final note was, “We must

educate our kids now while they are children, so that they turn into true Muslims.” Other

similar comments made by various preachers cast serious doubt on the moderation of

Iqraa. But the use of such rhetoric can be explained by the fact that it ignites a lot of

Muslims in the Arab world today, which in turn results in greater viewership for the

channel.

Iqraa Preachers: Amr Khaled

This section analyzes the sermons and programs presented by one of the pioneers

of new-age preaching, Amr Khaled. Because of his emphasis on women’s issues, and his

liberal, “pro-women” discourse, many people today refer to Khaled as the “preacher of

women.” This preacher was born in Alexandria, Egypt in 1967 and has an upper-middle

class social background. He graduated from the Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University

in 1988. In 2001, he received a diploma in Islamic Studies from an unknown Islamic

Institute316 and is currently studying for his doctorate degree at Wales University. He

started preaching in the late 1990s on a small scale, giving lessons at the Shooting Club

in Cairo. This club is visited by mid- to upper-class youth who are looked at as

Westernized youth with little or no interest in religion.

Khaled accrued a great number of fans at the Shooting Club and then moved to

preach at mosques located in affluent districts in Cairo. One of these was a very large

mosque called al-Hosary. The mosque has a maximum capacity of 40,000 people and is

316 I tried to find the institute that granted Khaled his diploma but found no reference to it.

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located in the outskirts of Cairo. Most of the people who go to the al-Hosary Mosque live

at a great distance from the mosque. In spite of the long commute, thousands of youth

flocked to Khaled’s sermons from various parts of Cairo. By some estimates, about

40,000 people attended his sermons.317 It was at al-Hosary that his star rose and his name

became a household brand among youth and even parents. Soon after the management of

Iqraa offered him a program of his own. Many other channels invited him to host his own

shows, including al-Resala TV, al-Mehwar, Dream TV, and Abu Dhabi TV.

Khaled’s style is simple, yet sensible and captivating. He has practically

revolutionized Islamic preaching in the Arab world. Contrary to the long beard and

Arabian-style loose-fitting white robes that traditional preachers wear, Khaled is usually

dressed in trendy casual clothes, is well groomed, closely shaved, and speaks in

colloquial Arabic like a typical middle-class person in Egypt. He is also relatively open-

minded, welcoming arts and culture in general. This again is in sharp contrast with the

styles of many “religious” people today who insist that the arts are “haram.” He

welcomes, even encourages, female participation in society, so long as it does not

interfere with their prime responsibilities towards her family and children. He portrays

himself as an ordinary person who is able to break the barrier between youth and religion

that was characteristic of the past. One of his greatest achievements is propagating hijab

among middle and upper-middle-class women. One participant in the qualitative study

suggests:

Only Amr Khaled had the influence [on the veil]. We've always had Sheikh al-Sha‘rawy and other Azhar preachers on television. What did they accomplish? It was only with Amr Khaled [that the change in attitudes towards the veil has come about].

317 Ethar El-Katatne, “Amr Khaled: A Religious Rock Star,” Egypt Today (October 2007),

http://www.egypttoday.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=7718 (accessed February 1, 2009).

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Khaled was cited by 23 respondents as a source of religious information that they

relied mostly on and/or trusted. In his teachings, he focuses on moral and social reform.

The logo of his Web site is “Development through Faith,” and that, to a large extent

summarizes his discourse. He argues that the Islamic nation is lagging behind the world

in prosperity and development due to the current state of divorce between religion and

society and the failure to abide by the true principles of Islam. In one of his sermons he

asserted “God made you more special than any other creature so that you take on the role

as His successor.” As God’s successor, the person should focus on the development of

the earth, the implementation of justice, and the spread of righteousness.318 He also

initiated a large charity campaign, called the Makers of Life, which turned into a popular

show on Iqraa, the aim of which was to recruit youth to volunteer in community service

projects in the name of Islam.

One of the techniques that Khaled uses is the accentuation of the Islamic identity

as a source of pride and empowerment. He declares, “This generation is the hope of Islam

that will be able to change the bitter state of Islam in the world today.” There is a lot of

emphasis on the image of Islam in the West and the need for youth to “show the world”

that Islam is the best religion and the engine behind any sustainable development, only if

people abide by it. “Oh Mohammed's umma,” he laments on one of his episodes:

When shall we stand tall? We cannot be degraded. We have to be an umma that raises its head high among other nations. God is allowing our degradation now so we can come back to our senses.319

318 From a program he delivered on Iqraa TV in 2004 called Kenouz or Treasures. The sermon was

entitled “Adam’s Succession on Earth” and was downloaded at http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia537.html (accessed January 1, 2009).

319 Amr Khaled, “Don’t Degrade Yourself,” Al-Kenooz Program [Treasures]. Delivered in 2003. Downloaded at Amr Khaled’s Web site: http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia276.html (accessed January 15, 2009).

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Lacking any confidence in their culture and identity, Egyptian youth were very

susceptible to this new and different message.

Many critics of Khaled claim that his preaching style and a lot of his ideas

originate in Protestantism, especially his focus on social reform through self-

realization.320 In his sermons, Khaled proposes a utility function for adopting a certain

virtue, behavior, or outlook. The language he uses is similar to this: “Each time you do so

and so, you will add to your balance of merit such and such.” To encourage youth to read

the Quran, for example, he says,

Each letter in Quran is worth 10 merit point. If you read one of the thirty parts of the Quran, you are reading about 1,000 letters. If you do that in Ramadan, you get 70*10 fold the merit. Imagine, 1,000*10*70. This is around four million points of the merit points collected in half an hour!

Just as great as the merit for adopting the veil, the cost of not adopting it is also great and

should deter the people from not adopting it. A woman who chooses not to veil, for

example, keeps accumulating sins every time a male stranger sees her.

There is a significant obsession with accumulating merit points in Egypt today,

and Khaled played an important role in promoting that obsession. The following incident

took place during one of the interviews and illustrates this obsession better. The

interviewer was about to throw some paper in the garbage (Egypt does not recycle paper

and plastic). At that point the interviewee noted that she knew a specific charity

320 Some people claim they saw Khaled in a Protestant church in midtown Cairo attending

sermons for a very charismatic Evangelical preacher, and they draw a lot of parallels between the ideas and style of that pastor, called Dr. Sameh Mouris and those of Khaled. Khaled’s emphasis on building a personal relationship with God, for example is very untraditional in Islam. See Shifaa, “Amr Khaled’s Evangelical Roots,” Shifaa: Personal, Political, Proactive. October 30, 3006. http://shifaa.blogspot.com/2006/10/amr-khaleds-evangelical-roots_817.html (accessed January 29, 2009).

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organization that recycles paper into something useful. She suggested that the interviewer

should give that paper to that organization. The interviewer, a pharmacy student,

responded that she would not want to do that as she knew these types of organizations

turn this recycled paper into tissue paper used on the face, which spreads germs.321 The

interviewee looked puzzled, and responded, “It doesn’t matter what they do with the

paper. What matters is that I will add to my merit balance (thawab).” On further

investigation, we did find that the charity organization the woman referred to recycled

paper into tissue paper. I do not have any evidence that Khaled promoted this particular

behavior. However, the conversation confirms that there is a lot of obsession with utility

maximization through collecting merit points without reflection on the implication of the

person’s action, and this has been promoted by Khaled in his sermons.

In recent years, Khaled has given more attention in his programs and activities to

the family. He produced several programs on the family, including “Paradise in our

Homes,” which was featured during the month of Ramadan for two consecutive years.

Khaled’s prime commitment is still social reform, but in recent years he has moved away

from the emphasis on the individual to a family approach. According to him, the family is

the main nucleus of society and the most effective gateway for social reform. The switch

in focus may be a strategy by Khaled to distance himself from the Protestant

individualism of which many people have accused him. However, given that many other

current programs also emphasize the family unit, it is apparent that there is a greater

demand for family programs in the Muslim World today.

321 There are very poor health and safety regulations in Egypt.

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In his lectures and sermons, Khaled provides many parables and examples of

early Muslims and Prophet Contemporaries. He goes back to the compilations of

traditions and contextualizes the text, drawing a lot of parallels with the current situations

to provide answers to questions such as “What would the prophet do?” What would

‘Aisha (his favorite wife) do? Have other favored Contemporaries been faced with the

same situation, and what did they do? He reconfigures the past to show that it is still very

relevant. He always draws attention to the moderation and tolerance of the early fathers

to show that going back to the core of Islam does not involve going backward in time and

rejecting modernity with all its positive implications. However, many commentators and

critics note that Khaled often misconstrues, even bends, historical facts to arrive at certain

conclusions. His version of Islam is referred to as an “air-conditioned” version because it

seems too easy and not necessarily accurate. 322

A 2007 Islamonline.net survey found one of Khaled’s programs on Iqraa, called

“Paradise in our House,” as the best show on television. The show was successful mainly

because of its practical approach, which made it more accessible and relevant to viewers.

Another survey conducted by the same portal also found Amr Khaled to be the best

Islamic preacher in the Arab world today.323 Three hundred-fifty Arab youth participated

in the survey, the greatest number being Egyptians and Moroccans. Participants attributed

Khaled’s success to a number of factors, including his emphasis on youth issues and

concerns, his simple presentation style, his practical and realistic outlook, his concern fpr

322 Patrick Haenni and Husam Tammam, “Egypt’s Air-Conditioned Islam,” Le Monde

Diplomatique. September 2003. http://mondediplo.com/2003/09/03egyptislam (accessed February 01, 2009).

323 Rooda Abdel-Hameed, “Behasab Gumhuur Islam On Line: “Al Ganna,” “Khawaater,” “Al-Qudsiyya” …al-afdal in 1428” [According to the Audience of Islam on Line: “Al Ganna,” “Khawaater,” “Al-Qudsiyya” … The Most Preferred Programs in 1428 Hijra (2007)] Islam On Line, January 16, 2008.

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issues related to capital development as well as the overall development of the umma, and

his appeal to passion and feelings as resources for enforcing religious passion. In spite of

his great popularity, he also received the highest number of identified weaknesses and

demands for improvement. Participants demanded that Khaled work to improve his

knowledge in Islamic Shari‘a, and to move beyond pulling on people’s emotional strings

to more substantial topics.324

Amr Khaled and the Veil

Between 1999 and 20002, Khaled spent most of his time preaching at the al-Hosary

Mosque. His Web site contained an audio library of these lectures, and it is classified into

six categories: morals, worships, guidance, heart reform, the stories of prophets, and

Jerusalem. The veil was classified under the morals series, along with virtues like

honesty, faithfulness, and patience. Appearance and virtue, therefore, are strongly

associated in Khaled’s discourse. Most of the women who participated in the qualitative

interview insisted that appearances are good indicators of virtues, and Khaled might have

had some influence on this too. He was not the first to portray that association, but he

definitely strengthened the perceived correlation between the two. “[Harassers] can’t see

your heart,” he argued. “But they can see the veil which says the person is respectful and

doesn’t deserve to be harassed.”

324 Yasser Mahmoud, “Khaled, Abdel Kafy, and Hassan, The Better in 1428.” IslamOnLine,

January 8, 2007. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1199279368818&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout (accessed February 01, 2009).

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Khaled rationalizes the association between the veil and morality. For him,

modesty325 is the greatest and most important virtue a woman possesses. Men too should

have this virtue, but if it is an obligatory onefold for men, it is expected a hundredfold

more of women. Women, according to Khaled, have much greater power over men. He

argues, “A 100 men will not be able to get a women attached to any of them, but only one

woman can have a very significant impact on a man…If a woman straightened her way,

all society would be reformed too. If a woman loses her modesty, the entire society

would as well. The greatest sign of modesty is the veil.

Amr Khaled had a profound impact on the spread of the veil between 1998 and

2001. This was a clear finding from the qualitative interview. While media was cited as

having an indirect impact on the spread of the veil, Khaled’s sermon on the veil was cited

by many respondents as an immediate and direct prompt for veiling. “I don’t think

anyone ever watched a show about the veil and then decided to veil,” suggested one

respondent. “Only Amr Khaled’s tapes I suppose had that much influence.” “Amr

Khaled's cassette tape about the veil had a real influence,” insisted another respondent.

Apparently, Khaled’s prints on dress style were easily traceable. He advocated the veil,

but also elegance and gracefulness. Some women even suggested that certain veil styles

in Egypt during the early 2000s could be traced directly to him. One respondent noted:

There came a time when the veil started to spread fast. I was at school 326 and even though my school followed the British system,327 the hijab started to spread in it too. You could even tell if the girl got veiled because of Amr Khaled's sermons. The girl’s veil

325 The Arabic word for modesty does not have an exact match in English. It is a mixture of

shyness, meekness, and abashment. Muslim women are expected to be shy, with low voice and try not stand out.

326 The respondent was 22 years old, so that must be four to six years ago. 327 That is to say the school is an upper-class school that is well-aligned with the British system

and is sympathetic to the West.

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would have a particular look; chic clothes…I used to walk up to the newly veiled girl and ask "Amr Khaled?" and she would say "yes."

The fact that one preacher could have such a marking effect is quite significant.

This is not purely because of the styles of the newly veiled, which were very elegant, but

also because he truly broke into the upper-middle and upper classes, which associated

more with the Western culture. The quality and style of a woman’s clothes says

something about her class. When the clothes look “expensive” and Islamic, then it is easy

to trace them to the preacher of the upper classes, Amr Khaled. As indicated before,

Khaled was found to be most popular among upper-middle and upper classes. He was

less popular, however, among middle and middle-lower classes who preferred more

conservative, more traditional preachers like Mohammed Hassan.

Khaled’s discourse heavily emphasizes the Muslim identity. His speech is full of

“show the West” message, aiming at demonstrating to the West that the Muslim culture is

superior and that the Islamic moral codes, when applied honestly and wholeheartedly,

will lead to the social, economic, and political development necessary for Muslims to

regain their pride and political power in the region. He proposes a number of visual as

well as spiritual moral markers for that demonstration of the uniqueness and superiority

of the Islamic culture. The veil, at least in essence, combines both. According to Khaled,

the hijab is an effective way for gaining moral advantage over the West; it is a symbol of

Islamic morality and identity. In his famous veil sermon, he says,

Isn't the real reason behind a woman not wanting to veil is to imitate the West? I tell you the West has defiled the image of the woman. They can't even sell a matchbox without

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putting a picture of a naked woman on it. Islam elevates the woman and the West degrades her.328 The veil is then an easy way to gain independence from the Western culture that has

invaded the Muslim world and corrupted it. It is also an effective means for reforming the

entire society. Khaled argues,

The most important thing for a woman is her modesty and the best form of modesty is the hijab. I swear that if the women had modesty, all of society would be straightened. That's why when Anti-Islamists try to gain ground over our society they attack women first. 329

The idea that the veil elevates the value of women has always existed in the Muslim

culture. However, Khaled reinforced that idea and transformed that value meaning by

linking it to the Islamic identity. Islam, according to Khaled, freed the woman from the

sexuality of her body and gave value to her moral beauties. “Before Islam, the symbol of

beauty was the body. Islam elevated the value of woman’s beauty to her morals and

emotions.” Many respondents mentioned that the veil makes them feel like precious gems

that need protection, and that idea was promoted by Khaled. “A gem should be kept safe.

Not anyone is allowed to see it,” argues Khaled, and along with him many other women

interviewed during the summer of 2008 said the same thing.

Khaled also enforced the idea that the veil “protects the women from the harms of

strangers in the street who would keep away when they see she is veiled.” But while prior

preachers focused on the function of the veil as a tool to cover the woman’s beauty,

Khaled proposed the idea that the veil is a tool to unravel her morality. He insists that

strangers and harassers, “can’t see your heart; they can’t tell that you are good from

inside to keep away from harming you. But your veil will tell them so.” This exact idea

328 Amr Khaled, “Al-Hijab,” Amrkhaled.net, Mosque Sermons: Section on Morals. Sermons

delivered between 1999 and 2001. http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia91.html (accessed February 1, 2009).

329 Khaled. “Al-Hijab.”

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resonated in some of the respondents’ words. Khaled successfully portrayed the veil as a

lens to the inside of the woman, even a beautifier of the soul, which gave the veil

significant momentum and attraction

In the veil sermon, Khaled presented another compelling case for why Muslim

women must veil. The veil is a form of submission to the will of God; the literal meaning

of the word Islam is precisely that, submission to the will of God. The veil is an integral

element of Islam, and people cannot pick and choose in religion. Even if a woman prays

and does all her duties, she could never be sure at the end that her “good deeds would

outweigh her bad deeds.” If women are concerned about getting hot when they veil, they

should think of hell and how much hotter it would be, for that would be the undisputed

result of unveiling. He recited a hadith 330 about the Judgment Day:

On that day, people awaiting the final judgment will be standing hot and thirsty. They would flock to the Prophet seeking to quench their thirst. He proceeds: The unveiled woman would do that, but the angels would stop her. The Prophet of Islam would say, leave her, she is a member of my umma, but the angels would say, you do not know what she has done after you. As the Prophet learns that she was unveiled he lament,s stay away, stay away, stay far, stay far!

This hadith referred to anyone who did not follow the commands of the prophet.

The part about the unveiled woman is Khaled’s interpretation. Assuming that the veil is

one of those commandments, then that interpretation is applicable. This hadith in

particular had a chilling effect on many women and was mentioned by some respondents

during the interview. Khaled also warned the unveiled woman saying that every time any

male sees her, even if he did not lust after her, she added to her sins. Jokingly he said,

330 Khaled. “Al-Hijab.”

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“Imagine now if she takes a public bus one day, or attends a lecture in a large auditorium.

That would be a disaster [in terms of the number of men who sees her]” So even if a

women fulfilled all duties and was very good but is unveiled, the “mountain of sins” that

she accumulated while unveiled would prevent her from going to heaven as her good

deeds would most probably not be sufficient to cover all these sins. 331 According to

Khaled, husbands would be bearing the sin of their wives if they were not veiled and had

the responsibility to advise their wives and provide for them the spiritual environment

that was conducive for taking the veil step. He did not advocate that men force their

wives into veiling, but he still put much of the onus on them.

It should be highlighted that Khaled never called an unveiled women non-Muslim

or a disbeliever as many of the new sheikhs today do. Once a new Sheikh fiercely

critiqued Khaled on television because Khaled received a call from a woman who said

she was unveiled and had a certain question and Khaled just said, “God does not care for

your veil,” which for this sheikh was a grave mistake that Khaled committed, a mistake

that spoke to Khaled’s ignorance and the misguidance he caused.332

To be sure, Khaled always insisted that the veil is a fard (religious obligation).

However, that duty would not absolutely bar a woman from entering Heaven, although it

more than likely would. For Khaled, the veil was a fard and was also a clear

demonstration that the woman “loves the prophet to the extent that she can’t walk the

streets without a veil.” Apparently, some of the women who attended his sermons were

unveiled. He did not reject them but rather implored them to veil at least during the

331 In Islam, so long as the good deeds are greater than the bad deeds at the end of life, then the

person will go to heaven. This is why there is a lot of emphasis on collecting positive points, called hasanat, to increase the probability of entering Paradise.

332 The sermon by the preacher was found on YouTube. http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=aq5ddzEKXvse (accessed February 1, 2009).

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session. In one of his early sermons he noted, “It pains me a great deal that some girls

come to the sermon wearing inappropriate clothes. For the safety and protection of

everyone in attendance, all women should wear a scarf at least till the end of the lesson,

which is also necessary to “keep the angels in our presence.”333

At the time that Khaled delivered the veil lecture in 1998-99, the majority of

upper-middle class young women (between 18 and 35) were unveiled. That is why in

many of his sermons he talked to women who were afraid to stand out in their family or

among other friends who were not veiled and were therefore “ashamed” to get veiled. He

urged women to fear the shame they would feel on Judgment Day for not veiling. In less

than five years the majority of this class adopted the veil. The spread of the veil was one

of the biggest influences that Khaled had on the youth. Even Islamic preachers who were

critical of Khaled still agreed that he was the greatest motivator behind the spread of the

veil among Egyptian women.

Khaled and Women The emphasis on women, their issues, and their rights in Khaled’s discourse is a

total break from the past. His sermons narrates many stories of early Muslim women who

participated in war, occupied senior positions in government, and played heroic roles in

the battlefield. “We want Muslim women to be successful in their professional lives,”

advocates Khaled. The Prophet and the first Khalifas hired a lot of women in important

positions, many of whom were married. He goes further by addressing women saying,

“Being successful in your work is part of your religiosity. We need women's input in

333 Amr Khaled, “The Biography of Prophet Mohammed Sermon.” AmrKkhaled.net, Mosque

Sermons: The Biographies of Prophets Series. Delivered between 1999 and 2001. Downloaded at http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia168.html (accessed January 21, 2009).

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society. But of course if it stands in the way of your home, then your home is the

priority.” Balancing responsibilities is, according to Khaled, expected more of women.

However, “both men and women alike” need to “try to balance between work and home.”

The difference is that the first priority for men is to support the family financially, then to

provide emotional and moral support. For women, working is a third priority, and it is not

framed in terms of financial support.

According to some interpretations of Islamic texts, women have fewer ritualistic

and worshipping expectations than men. Men pray and fast more because a menstruating

woman cannot pray, fast, or hold the Quran. Men are required to pray in the mosque on

Friday at a minimum and are strongly encouraged to perform other prayers at the

mosque. Women, on the other hand, are expected to stay home as much as possible and

are generally discouraged from going to the mosque.334 The Prophet of Islam joked one

time to one of his wives saying women are “deficient in intelligence and religion,” and

that joke has been taken out of context and used to limit the role of women in society and

portray her as inferior. The fact that women were discouraged from going to the mosque

and were excluded from the arena of public religious practice and interpretation,

according to Leila Ahmed, created duplicity in the understandings of Islam between the

“official Islam” and “women’s Islam.” The official version is based on religious texts,

most of which were created during the Abbasid period, a period characterized by cultural

influx and anti-women sentiments.335 Khaled attacked this schizophrenic understanding

334 The second caliph of Islam, ’Umar Ibn al-Khattab (634-44) instituted several laws that sought

to confine women to their homes and to prevent them from attending prayers at the mosques. He was not successful, however, in doing that. Instead, women continued to go to mosques but prayers were segregated and led by separate imams.The following Caliph, Uthman Ibn ’Affan, revoked those laws. Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 60-61.

335 Ahmed, A Border Passage, 120-121.

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and advocated some level of gender equality and integration that were quite a break from

the past. “Women, don't get caught up in cooking and forget to worship,” he urges. “We

want the mosques to be full of women in Ramadan.”336

Whenever he goes into one of his charismatic moments of encouraging people to

rise up to change themselves for the betterment of society, he addresses men and women

separately to ensure that he does not exclude either sex. “Strive yourself, resist, so that

you be a true man….Strive yourself to be a true woman, do not give yourself any excuses

for not performing midnight prayers.…” Women even have a role in freeing Palestine, a

very prominent topic in Khaled’s sermons. The most successful armies, including the

army that scored victory over the Crusades, had active female participation. He also talks

a lot about how the Prophet of Islam treated women with reverence and appreciation and

describes in detail the intimacy of the Prophet of Islam had with one of his most favorite

wives, ’Aisha. Mohammed, according to tradition, chose to die on ’Aisha’s chest and

always admitted that she was his greatest love. She was also the one chosen to announce

the death of Muhammed. “She! A woman!” he emphasized. “What a great place Islam

gives to the woman.”337

Khaled’s discourse reveals the great diversions in the interpretations and practices

that prevailed in Islam over time. There were times, including the times of the Prophet of

Islam, when the interpretation of religious texts were very liberal with regards to women

and minorities. Other times were more restrictive and less favorable to both groups.

While many of the traditional preachers use text generated during the Abbassid period to

336 Amr Khaled, “Al-Omran Sermon.” http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia168.html

(accessed January 1, 2009). 337 Amr Khaled, “‘Aisha Sermon.” Amrkhaled.net, Satellite Programs: And Beloved Meet.”

Sermon Delivered between 2001 and 2002. http://www.amrkhaled.net/multimedia/multimedia369.html (accessed January 10, 2009).

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issue religious decrees, Khaled uses text that predates that period, with a great focus on

the first few decades in the history of Islam. As such, he is able to highlight the moderate,

pro-feminist, face of Islam, which is one of his primary concerns. Some of the examples

he uses do not sound quite liberating to the Western reader; however, relative to the

prevalent interpretations, they are quite liberal, especially with regards to women’s rights.

That is how he gained his popularity among upper-middle class women.

In spite of his “feminist” discourse, it is doubtful that Khaled’s ultimate purpose is

to promote gender equality. While the greatest proportion of his sermons are addressed to

women, and while in many cases he insists that women “hold the keys” to social reform,

his discourse indirectly reproduces the gender power gaps that are currently in existence

and further reinforces them among upper-middle classes who have distanced themselves

from these patterns. He ultimately blames women for the spread of sexual immorality in

society and ascribes a very high value to the virtue of modesty/shyness, which is only

expected of women.

For example, in recent years, many youth, embroiled with economic barriers to

starting a family, have resorted to some sort of relationship between a man and a woman,

which is less than marriage but is somehow condoned by religion. Rather than going

through official marriage, the couple sign a piece of paper that says they are married and

get it signed by two witnesses. In such cases, the sexual relationship between the two is

not defined as adultery in Islam.338 This is considered by some a way around taking a

boyfriend or a girlfriend in the West, which is not acceptable in the Muslim tradition but

is becoming more popular. Khaled is very critical of these practices and insists that these

338 Premarital sex is a form of adultery and is considered an honor crime. This form of contract is a

way around that. There are a lot of conflicting religious opinions about this relationship and whether it is elicit or sanctioned by Islam.

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inter-sex relationship models are imposed by the West. He holds women responsible for

promoting them. The woman gets the lion share of the warnings and direct talk in these

and similar sermons about morals. According to Khaled, women need to be loved and

cared for more than men. This makes them more vulnerable to entering into such types of

relationships. Secondly, they have the power to stop these relationships from the start. “I

address the girls more because the key is in their hands.339 Do not sell yourselves cheap!”

he entreats women.

This explains why many “modern,” upper-middle class women who participated

in the qualitative study blamed themselves and/or other fellow women for many of the

social degenerations that society is experiencing today. In the absence of similar data

from a prior decade, I cannot confirm that upper-middle class women today are more

likely to accept and accommodate these patterns of male-dominance and to hold

themselves responsible for men’s lack of respect for women. However, as a person who

lived in Egypt prior to 2000, who is a member of the upper-middle class, and who

interacted very closely with women with similar demographic characteristics ten years

ago, I contend that Egypt, and especially the upper-middle class has experienced a

cultural shift. Khaled successfully repackaged existing forms of gender power gaps and

presented them in very modern wraps that made his message particularly appealing to

many women from that class. This explains the seeming paradox in the speeches of most

of the respondents that illustrated a great level of internalization of male dominance and

the idea of male being “victims” of corrupt media, Westernized women, and economic

hardships, while still declaring the empowering even liberating benefits of the veil.

339 Taking a boyfriend/girlfriend in Egypt is socially unacceptable. It is considered a form of moral

perversion.

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Khaled and Jerusalem

The religious discourse in Egypt is abundant with calls for Muslims to rise up in

jihad to liberate Palestine from the Jews. Although Khaled preferred not to openly

discuss politics, the call to liberate Palestine has been common in many of his speeches.

Liberating The Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem is one of the goals that greatly galvanize

Muslim youth. The most significant illustration of that fervor is the unprecedented

numbers of Arab Muslims that rose up to protest their governments for letting Israel

invade Gazza and kill the Hamas Mujahedeen in December 2008. Khaled uses the heated

passion of youth, both male and female, towards the Palestinian cause to call for a total

reform. In one of his lectures he outlines the characteristics of the person who would

liberate Jerusalem.340 That person would be like the awaited Messiah for the Jews,

humble, yet powerful and very successful.

Khaled often draws analogies with earlier Muslim leaders and warriors who were

victorious in wars against the nonbelievers. He often cites the example of Salah al-Din al-

Ayyubi, the Kurdish Muslim Leader who led the Muslim armies against the Crusaders

and victoriously entered Jerusalem. He cites other examples of ordinary Muslims who

were able to turn their lives to become heroes, including al-Ayyubi.341 He urges every

Muslim to follow that model and start leading purposeful lives. “I am offering you a goal

for your lives,” calls Khaled. “Liberate Palestine!” If youth uphold that goal, they will be

able to turn their lives around because it requires a lot of work. The person who liberates

Palestine has to be religious and has to have the personal skills to attract others to the

340 I found many similarities between the description of the Muslim leader who would liberate

Jerusalem and the awaited Messiah in the Jewish tradition. 341 This may not be historically accurate. Al-Ayyubi comes from a Muslim family that always

served in Muslim armies, and al-Ayyubi was trained since his childhood in military tactics.

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religious path. “Make your friends religious; teach ten of your friends to read Quran.”

The person also has to be successful in his/her professional life and academics. That

person should also be physically fit and strong. In other words, according to Khaled, the

Palestinian cause is in perfect sync with the social reform cause. Whereas it is hard to

mobilize Muslims around the social reform agenda, the Palestinian cause has an

electrifying effect and may be a more effective route to reform.

Khaled relies on anti-Semitic language to give Muslims all the greater reason to

fight the Jews. He provides examples from the Old Testament and from the Quran

regarding the Jews lack of faith to fuel hate for the Jews. In spite of all the miracles that

were performed before them, they still did not believe. He exclaims,

Are those people human? Are the people who kill unarmed women and children human? What type of people are those Jews? They were the only people who were sent so many prophets and seen so many miracles and …yet they kept killing the prophets. … We have not seen even one-quarter of the miracles they saw and yet we believe. Truly Muslims are a great nation.

Khaled provides examples of the inclination of the Jews to betray and break their

promises, as they did with the Muslims during the Battle of the Trench.342 The Jews

betrayed the trust of Muslims and broke a treaty with them. After the victory of the

Muslims over the infidels, the Jews came asking for forgiveness, he narrates. But the

Prophet did not forgive them and decided to “kill all their men, take their women as

slaves and take all their belongings” as this was the “verdict of God.” Khaled adds, “See

Islam is very forgiving but not with the heads of evil, not with treason. Those people

342 The Battle of the Trench took place on 627 and was the war after which Muslims conquered

Madina City.

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must be gravely punished.” This is why Muslims should never trust the Jews and should

seek to take revenge for the Prophet for all the crimes they perpetrated over the centuries.

The topic of Israel and the Jews is one that most Egyptians are very passionate

about. Khaled’s discourse on the Jews bonded him with young Egyptians. He retooled

their passion towards the topic and gave youth hope and purpose in life. The economic

situation coupled with political apathy, and socio-political marginalization have all led to

a loss of identity and purpose. Khaled was able to draw a different picture of what could

be, which found great reception among youth, especially the ones with more resources

and better prospect in society due to their social capital.

Critique on Khaled

Khaled is one of the most controversial figures in Egypt today. While a lot of

people acknowledge his impact on religious discourse, many others are skeptical of his

motives. Others question his legitimacy as a religious preacher as he did not receive

proper religious training. The Azhar clergy and many other Egyptian sheikhs accuse him

of being ignorant and even disrespectful of Islamic verses. It was also quite disappointing

for many young Muslims to see Khaled topping the Forbes magazine list of the richest

Muslim preachers, with over $2.5 million net income in 2007.343 Many respondents

expressed their disillusionment with Khaled and one said:

This guy wants to be famous at the expense of religion. He is talking like a sheikh or someone who understands the foundations of religion when he is actually distorting religion…. What can I say, Hasbuna Allahu wa ni’ma al-wakeel (“God is sufficient for us and the best Disposer of Affairs”)344

343 Sonia Farid, “Amr Khaled Richest Islamic Preacher: Forbes.” Al Arabiya News Channel. February 28, 2008. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/02/28/46255.html (accessed February 3, 2009).

344 Hasbuna Allahu wa ni’ma al-wakeel is a verse from Quran that Muslims recite when they are disappointed especially at another person that they trusted or when they experience unfairness and/or great loss. In Islam, the verse is said to move the throne of the Lord to defend the rights of the victim against the perpetrator. So it is like a curse in some instances, a legitimate curse.

245

Some of the conservative religious sheikhs bitterly criticize Khaled for his “lenient”

position regarding sex integration and scorn him for allowing unveiled women to attend

his lectures. One of the neo-traditional sheikhs, who is frequently on a competing

religious channel, al-Nas, describe his lecture halls as a “harbor for lovers” and a place

for men and women to meet and socialize, which, according to these sheikhs, is strictly

forbidden in Islam.345

Despite all the oppositions that he faces both on the moral and scholastic level,

Khaled still enjoys great popularity and influence on the Egyptian people. He became a

pioneer in a new style, and he was followed by several other preachers, including Mo‘ez

Mas‘oud346 and Moustafa Hosny,347 who also attracted a lot of fans today. Most

importantly, it is Khaled who created the demand for religious programming and

religious teachings among the richer, more modern segments of the Egyptian society. He

has been cited as one of the most immediate triggers for the cultural shift in dress and

345 Ali Abdel Aal, “Al-Salafiyyun wa-Qanat Al-Nas: Al-Da‘wa fi Shasha Hassab al-Talab”

[Salafists and al-Nas Channel: Preaching on a Demand-Driven Screen] IslamOnine: Islamic Movements Section, May 7, 2008. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1209357345783&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout#***1#***1 (accessed January 17, 2008).

346 Moez Masoud is a 31-year-old preacher who comes from a very liberal background. He graduated from the American University in Cairo and is known to mix theology with other disciplines including philosophy and psychology in a way to rationalize religion. He speaks English fluently and usually preaches in English thus targeting upper class Egyptians as well as Muslims living in Europe and the United States of America. Mo’ez describes his youth teenage and early twenties years as being reckless, all revolving around parties and drugs. He got a “wake up” call when his friends were killed in an accident and he was diagnosed with a tumor. This series of traumatic experiences changed his life 180 degrees. His strong memory helped him memorize the Quran and his social science background gave him a different perspective on its interpretation. Moez owns an advertising agency and hosts programs on Iqraa as well as other Egyptian Channels, including Dream TV and al-Mehwar.

347 Mustafa Honsy’s background is very similar to Khaled’s and is also one of the “new-age” preachers. He is a young preacher, 31 years, who received a secular education and then received a diploma from the Islamic Studies Institute in Egypt. He started his career as a salesman but changed his direction into fulltime preaching after he had reached the position of sales manager. He preaches in several mosques, including Al Hosary Mosque, which also witnessed the rising star of Khaled. His programs on Iqraa Channel are very popular and he also hosts several programs on Egyptian satellite channels, including Dream TV and Mehwar TV.

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religious orientation among this social group. Prior to Khaled, youth did not habitually

watch or follow religious programs, mostly because of the styles of the preachers, and the

irrelevance of the topics they discussed to youth. Khaled changed that pattern and created

a new market for religious teachings, which has brought about success not just for this

new-age style, but also for the newly emerging religious channels that thrived on

characters like Khaled.

Conclusion

This chapter explored some of the untested dynamics of globalization. It revealed

the effect of the interaction among intraregional cultures. Through investigating the

content and some of the processes involved in the less than two-decade-old Arab satellite

industry, and through focusing on exclusively religious channels, I brought to the fore

some of the dynamics of resistance and acquiescence to inter- as well as intra-regional

globalization. The intrusion of many of the Saudi and Gulf customs and values into the

Egyptian society through media have resulted in significant cultural shifts and produced

new attitudes towards women among middle and upper-middle classes in Egypt.

This chapter focused on the first wave of religious streaming via satellite

television in the Arab World. This was more liberal and targeted mainly the middle and

upper-middle classes. Iqraa, like many other Arab satellite channels, is Saudi in origin,

but has one of its primary offices in Egypt. It relies heavily on popular new-age Egyptian

preachers to relate with young Egyptians. The discourse of the new-age channel and

preacher demonstrate the impact of the perceived Western attacks on Islam and Muslims

on religious culture today. These cultural wars are compounded by myriad of

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contradictions and complexities experienced at the domestic level in the Muslim World

that give rise to binary identities and meanings, whereby self is defined as that which is

non-Western. The programs featured on the channel and the new attitudes towards

women and the veil reflect these complexities.

The support for Iqraa channel stems from the fact that it is the first exclusively

religious channel and is the face of moderate Islam. Iqraa provides a different strategy for

countering and dealing with globalization, which is the utilization of the tools of

globalization for advancement, while emphasizing the uniqueness of the Islamic identity.

The use of satellite television is one example and the innovations in veiling styles is

another. Both of these tools are used to reconcile the homogenizing forces of

globalization with the need to assert and celebrate one’s identity. Arab entrepreneurs took

advantage of the satellite technology to develop a new hybrid feature, namely exclusively

Islamic channels. Women too are using global fashion icons like Gucci and Levi’s and

mixing Western garment articles with newly invented clothing articles that were

appropriated to Islam such as headscarves and body tights. In this way, the woman

appears fashion-forward and yet in adherence to traditional values. Iqraa channel

sanctioned and even promoted these fashion hybrids.

Through analyzing Khaled’s sermons, one can better understand some of the

dynamics of three arenas of power examined in this study, namely the gender struggle,

the state-society struggle, and the global struggle. At one level, Khaled was able to re-

introduce patterns of gender dominance that were previously repressed among upper-

middle classes in Egypt. Khaled affirmed acceptable forms of male dominance but

concealed them in new wraps that were appealing to upper-middle class groups. Instead

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of arguing that women were inherently seductive and deficient in religion in intelligence,

for example, he argued that they were the more emotional and sensitive and thus wanting

for protection through the veil. Men, on the other hand, were portrayed as the weaker sex,

with less control over their desires, and therefore in need of women’s help through

adopting the veil. This “new wrap” of gender dynamics, however, resulted in similar

patterns of gender politics, with women expected to abide by specific confinement

regulations. These patterns of confinement were uncommon among upper-middle classes

a decade ago.

Khaled also gave women some tools for resisting these new confinements and

provided ways to turn one level of confinement into a new form of liberation. The

preacher introduced wide varieties in the veil styles that allowed women to resist the

gender struggles they faced. These new “chic” styles were condoned, even encouraged by

Khaled not just as a means of creating acceptance for the veil among upper-middle

classes, but also as a conduit to demonstrate to the West the superiority and sophistication

of the Muslim women. Creating acceptance for the veil among a segment of society that

previously aligned its values and life styles with the West also declared a forceful

message of rejection of Western values. The veil simultaneously put a barrier between the

value system promoted by the state and the social values that young people adopt. The

upper-middle class, which was largely reconstituted by the state during the last fifty

years, had rejected some of the primary modernization values that the state promoted,

unveiling being one of which. The analysis of new-age religious media thus helped

comprehend the triangulated power struggles that women take part in which were

codified by the veil.

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Chapter 7

The Neo-Traditional Religious Wave and Satellite Television

Introduction

The previous chapter provided insight into the development of the first type of

exclusively religious television broadcasting that came about during the last decade. This

chapter investigates another wave of religious programming that emerged in response and

competition to the first kind of streaming. This new genre of religious programming is

stricter, more conservative, and “puritan” in outlook, calling for a return to the

fundamental set of behaviors and practices in Islam, which was essentially promulgated

during the Abbasid era. I argue here that neo-traditional religious media is a perfect site

for analyzing particular forms of interaction between social groups and the state that have

shaped the current forms of religiosity and the veil. I use Migdal’s state-in-society

approach, which examines the process of identity formation as a product of that

interaction.348 The current forms and meanings of the veil is analyzed through exploring

the interaction among three specific social groups: religious intelligentsia, individual

female agents, and the state.

The State-in-Society Approach

Migdal’s primary concern in his State in Society: Studying How States and

Societies Transform and Constitute One Another is to problematize the boundaries

between state and society and to demonstrate the fuzziness of these boundaries. He

emphasizes the role of social groupings not only in constituting identities, but also in

348 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society.

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setting and enforcing binding rules. The state-society framework that Migdal offers

illustrates the recursive nature of the relationship between state and society, which results

in mutual engagement, constitution and transformation. Through studying the politics

of the veil at the site of exclusively religious, neo-traditional satellite channels, the

analysis demonstrates the intricate conflicts between various social groups and the state

and the struggle of these groups to expand their power through controlling the domain

of value constitution.

One of the primary goals of the Egyptian Republic at its inception was to

reconstitute the Egyptian identity through instituting a number of policies, including

rewriting educational curricula, redefining gender roles women in society, and

providing a new conception of religiosity. The Egyptian woman was a primary target in

these identity reformation efforts. Modernizing women was viewed as the key to

projecting an image of a modern state. The modern woman was educated, socially

integrated, at least nominally, and unveiled. The previous chapter demonstrated how

Iqraa and Amr Khaled challenged this framework among a social group that aligned

itself with the “modern” outlook that the state until a decade ago but then rejected it.

This transformation involved a struggle among new-age religious preachers and

channels, individual agents, particularly women, and the state. For the most part, the

struggle was subtle and submersed. As the neo-traditional media emerged, that conflict

became more acute and overt. Neo-traditional preachers started to attack the state more

openly. It capitalized on the anti-West sentiments that had intensified after September

11.

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In this research, neo-traditional Islam is defined as a form of religious

interpretation that calls for return to traditional Islamic laws and texts portrayed as

ahistorical and immutable. The texts used as a foundation for this new version of Islam,

however, were selectively picked based on a hidden socio-political agenda. The

promoters of this religious vision are critical of the state of corruption, economic

deprivation, and inequality and are selecting texts and text interpretations that support

their agenda. T

The Emergence of Neo-Traditional Religious Channels

The first wave of exclusively religious channels was quite successful and invited

significant competition. In a few years, several other channels emerged, including “al-

Risala” (the message), “al-Nas” (the people), “al-Majd” (glory), “al-Fajr” (dawn- and is

the title of the first of the five prayers in Islam), and “al-Hikma” (wisdom). In the

beginning, many of these channels were living in the shadow of Iqraa, presenting very

similar types of programs. However, within a few years, the demand for more

conservative, anti-Western religious streaming emerged and gave rise to several strict

channels, one of which was al-Nas Channel. These channels relied on religious preachers

that received proper religious education and were closer in looks to traditional religious

preachers, speaking in formal Arabic dialect and dressed in Saudi-like male clothes.

Shortly after these channels came into existence and took form, a campaign

against Iqraa and new-age preachers was launched. One of the preachers featured on

these channels released a fatwa (religious edict) that people should not listen to channels

that “mix poison with honey, presenting a fragile version of true Islam and resorting to

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unvirtuous paths.”349 Many viewers also rejected the first wave of religious media and

accused it of bending religion to make it appealing to youth. In an anonymous letter

posted on a Web site called Arab Forum (al-saaha al-arabiyya), a writer sent a letter to

the owner of the channel saying,

Fear God…I am writing this letter as a testimony to you on Judgment Day. What are these programs you present on the channel and what are these travesties and mockeries you created on this channel …. Why are you presenting such an image of Islam when you know that Muslims want to know the true Islam.350

Al-Nas Channel Established in January 2006, al-Nas was primarily an entertainment channel. Its

initial goal was to attract a wide audience through providing various services to the public

with a focus on lower-income groups. Among the programs it featured in its primary

stages were wedding announcements, dream interpretation, financial counseling, and p

candidates running for parliamentary elections. Some legal and medical counseling

services were also provided. The channel relied on connecting directly with the audience

through providing toll-free numbers for service and consultation access. The logo of the

channel then was appropriately, “People’s channel for all people”, [Qanat al-Nas le-kul

al-Nas]. Al-Nas is also owned by a Saudi businessman called Mansour Bin Kadsah.351

The channel portrayed itself as a gateway for young talent. It invited many young

media professionals and amateurs to volunteer and demonstrate their talent to the public.

349 Mohammed Abd Al-Rahman, “Why Mickey Mouse Must Die, and Other TV Fatwas,”

Menassat, October 17, 2008. See http://www.menassat.com/?q=en/news-articles/4895-fatwas-war-erupts-again-between-satellite-tv-sheikhs (accessed February 1, 2009).

350 This quote was posted on 06/29/2001 by an anonymous author. The quote was downloaded at http://www.alsaha.com/sahat/3/topics/52481 (accessed February 1, 2009).

351 Abdel Aal, “Al-Salafiyyun wa-Qanat Al-Nas: Al-Da‘wa fi Shasha Hassab al-Talab.” For a discussion in the Arab satellite television and the role Gulf country entrepreneurs, see Sakr, Arab Television Today; Sakr, Satellite Realms.

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Management of the channel declared that due to its modest financial means, it would not

be able to pay these volunteers. Despite the lack of financial compensation, many recent

graduates and talented people flocked to the channel in pursuit of an outlet for their talent

and abilities, which has become very rare in Egypt. At that time, the channel was not

considered religious and most of the programs it featured were nonreligious.

The transformation in the identity of the channel came about with a solid

realization that with its limited means, it could not compete with the myriad of channels

that were offering the same services using much more advanced technologies and higher

capital. Unless it changed its strategy and identity and unless it provided a product that

was unique and in demand, the channel was not able to survive. The clear market gap that

manifested itself to the management was a stricter, more fundamental version of Islam

than the “air-conditioned version” represented by Iqraa. There was a clear demand for a

“purer”, more tradition version of Islam that was more as portrayed by specific

interpretations of religious texts produced during the Abbasid period. However, that form

of Islamic teaching was provided in a modern capsule that was still attractive to young

people.

In August 2006, the management changed the logo of the channel to “The

Channel That Will Take You to Paradise,” and took a number of aggressive moves to

quickly project this new image. First, all female broadcasters were laid off under the

banner that in Islam, “the female’s voice is a form of awra (nudity).” When asked about

the decision to fire all female presenters, the managing directors of the channel, Atef

abdel-Raseed indicated that he took that decision at the request of the viewers who

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demanded the channel take an ideal outlook and realign itself closely with the days of the

prophet of Islam.352

Three religious scholars were recruited, each having impressive credentials from

renowned Islamic institutions. The three preachers laid the foundation of what may be

called neo-traditional Islam in Egypt. All three preachers were already popular as mosque

preachers. Many youth attended their sermons, and the channel management capitalized

on their popularity. The three preachers were Mohammed Hussein Ya‘qoub, Mohammed

Hassan, and Ishaq al-Huwainy. All programs presented on the channel became strictly

religious, and nothing in contradiction with Islamic Shari‘a, as narrowly defined by the

triangle of neo-traditionalism, was tolerated. At the request of the three preachers, all

music programs on the channel were banned. Its policy was to “present all what

promoted religious, moral, and patriotic values with no music”353 because music and the

arts in general are considered illicit (haram). Accordingly, religious hymns replaced all

songs and music featured on the channel. The three preachers became highly influential,

having the power to approve or disapprove any program. They also had the lion share of

air-time on the channel.354

This complete transformation proved very successful; the channel became the

number one religious channel in Egypt. IslamOnLine.com estimated that about 70

percent of Egyptian satellite viewers today prefer al-Nas Channel.355 It was also the

channel most frequently cited by female respondents during the interview, even more

popular than Iqraa Channel. The phenomenal success of this new line of satellite

352 As discussed in Chapter 4, the complete sex segregation was never observed during the time of

Prophet Muhammed Ahmed, Women and Gender and Islam, 41-63. 353 www.alnas.tv/ 354 Abdel Aal, “Al-Salafiyyun wa-Qanat Al-Nas.” 355 Abdel Aal, “Al-Salafiyyun wa-Qanat Al-Nas.”

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streaming provided strong evidence of the high demand for a strict religious media

discourse, which in turn invited two other similar channels to follow its footprints,

namely al-Hikma, established in 2006, and al-Rahma, established in 2007. Thirty-two of

the 54 respondents (60 percent) that cited a satellite channel as their main source of

religious information cited one of these three nonmoderate channels.

Programs Featured on al-Nas

After the radical shift in the identity of the channel, it continued to provide

various social services for free to the public, but all these services were dressed in a new

religious cover. The channel featured programs aiming at the promotion of religious,

health, and social education in layman language. It targeted a variety of age groups,

including kids under 12 years old, teenagers, and parents. A number of respondents

indicated that their parents watched the channel regularly, a clear demonstration of the

breadth of the viewership base of the channel. The channel declared that its content was

apolitical, and that it was respectful of all religious factions. However, there was a heavy

anti-Semitic discourse in the channel and subtle anti-regime remarks. The Palestinian

question today is viewed more as a religious rather than political question in Arab public

discourse. That is why most apolitical channels were not shying away from taking on the

Palestinian issue.

There is a lot of emphasis on social issues in the channel. One program called The

Court discusses various social issues and problems through interviewing specialized

experts on the topic as well as people with relevant personal experiences. The goal is to

identify possible causes and solutions for the problem. Another social program called The

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356World and Religion, or Donya wa Din explains how any simple person can fully

integrate religion into their everyday lives and worldly decisions, such as choosing an

academic major, a friend, a partner, or a job through consulting religious. The theme is

that the person can make all these decisions while making religion the center of their

lives.357 Many of the programs are aired directly, and a call-free number is always

provided so that the audience gets a chance to participate in the discussion, relate

personal experiences, and ask questions. This feature that has given the channel a lot of

popularity.

The main source of revenue to the channel is commercial advertisement. The

advertisements sometimes feature unveiled women and music. This source of revenue

has been criticized by many of the women interviewed in this study, and has also been a

main source of contention between the channel management and the three conservative

sheikhs. One of the participants in the qualitative interview commented on al-Nas

Channel saying, “right after the religious show, they would feature an advertisement to

promote a commercial product. I find this really irritating.”

Because of its latent political agenda, the channel received many indirect threats

of closure from the state. In a maneuver by the state, the Egyptian Minister of

Information signed what is called The Document on Satellite Broadcasting. Several other

Arab Information Ministers took part in the drafting and endorsement of this Document.

The goal was to regulate the content of programs aired on satellite television and

356 The word world and religion share the same stem in Arabic because the literal meaning of

religion is a guiding principle for life. 357 As Saba Mahmoud demonstrated, many Egyptians rejected the perceived divorce between

religion and life and took concerted efforts to marry these two domains. See Mahmoud, Politics of Piety.

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implicitly to assert the state power.358 The government also shut down another less

popular religious channel, called al-Baraka, to send a message to all channels deemed

radical that the government is still omnipotent. Shortly after these state maneuvers, the

managing director of the channel interviewed Amr Khaled on one of al-Nas shows

fighting drug addiction. The perceived goal was to project an image of tolerance and

moderation The three religious preachers protested the move vigilantly, and all three

withdrew from the channel for accommodating what they regarded as mediocre religious

scholarship.359

Whether this is a signal of another shift in the channel identity or just a strategic

business move to counter threatening messages from the state is still not clear. What is

clear is that there is significant competition in satellite realms, and this competition has

had significant implications on religious culture during the past decade. The competition

involves states, peoples, and private actors, a fact that complicates an analysis of its full

implications and scopes. It feeds on globalization and yet counters its forces using its

own devices. Through the use of global technology, these three sets of actors new hybrids

of religiosity and the state, and transformed the meanings and forms of many cultural

symbols.

358 This document was issued in 2008. The government claims that the goal is to protect the

consumer from obscenity and violence. See Masrawy, “Wazeer al I‘laam: Watheeqat al-bath al-fada’ey tahmy al mogtama’ men al-‘ury wal ‘onf.” [Minister of Information: The Document on Satellite Broadcasting Protects Society from Nudity and Violence.] Al-Masrawy.Com, March 1, 2008. http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2008/march/1/minster.aspx (accessed May 31, 2009). The Syndicate of Journalists, however, finds this Document an assault on freedom of expression. Al-Moheet, “Watheeqat al-bath al-fada’ey kaarethah I‘laameyya waqa’at belfe‘l” [The Document on Satellite Broadcasting: A Communications Catastrophe Already in Place.” Moheet.com April 6, 2008. http://www.moheet.com/show_news.aspx?nid=109354&pg=62 (accessed May 31, 2009)..

359 Mustafa Sulliman, “Qanat al-nas: Men al-salafiyya lel-tadayyun al gadeed” [Al-Nas Channel: From Salafism to New Religiosity] IslamOnline.com: Islamic Movements Section, May 7, 2008. http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1209357320618&pagename=Zone-Arabic-Daawa%2FDWALayout (accessed February 9, 2009).

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Al-Nas channel cited by 25 female respondents in the interview. Eighteen of these

women were classified as middle- or lower-middle-class respondents. Respondents from

the middle and middle-lower classes were found more likely to cite al-Nas as the main

source of religious information: almost half (47.4 percent) of the lower and middle-lower

respondents cited al-Nas as their most preferred channel, compared to 26 percent for

upper-middle classes. The channel was also the most criticized and/or rejected by

respondents.360 Four respondents indicated that they hated this channel. This comment

was not made regarding any other channel. Some of the negative remarks about the

included:

I do not like to watch the new religious channels because I feel they are channels that “will take you to hell” not Paradise…like al-Nas Channel…and the like. They feature preachers that come and cry and scream and they take advantage of simple-minded people. My mom once told me that some of the programs on al-Nas are strict to a repulsive extent… She also told me that they teach kids wrong things and things that are not their age…361 I just want to say that if there is something unique about Islam that we would like to communicate to the normal citizen, then the communication method currently used is the worst because of the horrifying levels of intolerance that are blended with the religious message. I have been watching al-Nas channel lately, and I found that they are trying to impart religious information to the viewer through hatred and intolerance, and so I stopped watching these programs altogether…

There is still a lot of acceptance among respondents and viewers of the version of

Islam endorsed by al-Nas. Much of that acceptance however, is driven by a desire to

support what might have been the “unheard voice.” The state has repressed any voice in

360 The interview did not directly ask about the media channel that they preferred most. Respondents were only asked to list the most preferred medium of religious information, which could include religious channels, books, sermons, etc. When the respondent listed a channel, I coded it, otherwise the preferred channel variable was coded none.

361 I am not sure what this participant was referring to but some of the programs aired on television interview kids and ask them about their attitudes towards the Jews and promote hatred, which might be what she was referring to.

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Islam that it deemed extreme, and that level of marginalization resulted in the

radicalization and trivialization of Islamic discourse simultaneously. However, the forces

acting to trivialize and radicalize the discourse are neither linear nor mono-directional.

There are countering forces exercised by women, as well as other agents, to circumvent

these forces through a myriad of strategies, one of which is today’s veil as will be

discussed further in the following sections.

Al-Nas Preachers: The Discourse of Sheikh Mohammed Hassan

Mohammed Hassan was born in 1962 in a small Egyptian village in the Delta

area. He received his early education at a mosque-affiliated school (Kottab) where he

memorized the Quran at the age of eight. He also memorized several collections of hadith

at a young age. He started preaching in his local mosque at the age of 13. After

graduating high school in the village, he studied mass communication at Cairo

University. At graduation and after fulfilling the military service requirement, he went to

Saudi Arabia to receive his doctorate degree in Islamic studies at al-Imam Muhammed

Ibn Saud Islamic University. When he returned to Egypt, he started teaching at various

Islamic Studies institutes in the Delta area. He was recruited by al-Nas Channel in 2006.

Since then, other similar religious satellite also recruited him.

Hassan presents himself as a traditional preacher. He only wears Arabian-style

robes with a white head scarf and a long beard. This dress code is modeled after the

Prophet of Islam. His sermons are in classical Arabic, and this further enhances his image

as a very knowledgeable preacher.362 In his early sermons, Hassan’s language was rigid.

362 The Arabic language is considered the second most difficult language after Chinese. Its

grammar rules, in particular, are very complicated; a slight movement in one of the letters would make a great difference in meaning. To figure out the movement that one should give the last letter of the word,

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Over time, his preaching style became more relaxed, and he developed a sense of humor

that the audience found quite amusing. His more recent sermons contained a mix of

colloquial and formal Arabic, with a distinct sense of humor, concealing a very strict

religious message.363

Because of his social background and style, Hassan relates well to middle and

lower-middle classes. In contrast to Khaled, Hassan focuses on answering the “what,”

rather than the “why” question. He is interested in relating what the “official” religious

texts say rather than rationalizing them. When he conveys religious regulations, he is

always fully armed with a vast body of religious texts to support his religious opinions

narrated in a matter of fact style. He appeals to the natural sense of faithfulness that

Egyptians have and their God-fearing nature. He ends every sermon with a fervent prayer

calling for repentance and reminding people of the horrors of Hell that await the

disbelievers and the unfaithful.

Hassan is known to be honest and blunt; he relates what he knows from Quran

and Sunna plainly and with no attempt to “package” the message in a way that would

make it either more appealing or more practical to the audience. He presents religious

texts and their interpretations as an eternal and unchanging body of literature that should

be followed to the letter. In his opinion, if daily life is not in synch with pure religious

teachings (mostly the body of text that was produced during the Abbassid period), then

one has to make a lot of calculations in his or her mind regarding where the word is falling in the sentence, its meaning, and its context. Arabic language gurus, such as my mother, compare Arabic language to sophisticated mathematical functions that need to be solved in one’s mind. Because of its difficulty, and the deteriorating education, it has become very rare to find a person, even an Arabic language teacher, who speaks proper classical Arabic. Because of the strong connection between Arabic and the Quran, speaking classical Arabic eloquently is also considered a sign of knowledge in religion.

363 As explained in Chapter 3, I analyzed the content of the preachers’ sermons over time. Sermons delivered at various times were downloaded, transcribed, and analyzed to trace developments in speech, style, and religious message.

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this mode of life should be rejected and changed altogether until it fits the religious

requirement, narrowly and literally interpreted. An attempt to modernize or contextualize

any part of religion is for him blasphemous. That is a common accusation that Hassan has

had against Amr Khaled and other “new-age” preachers.

Hassan employs various tactics to covertly delegitimize the state. One tactic is

attacking the co-education system at the higher education level. While Khaled and other

moderate preachers accept the practice of sex integration but advise men and women to

“mix wisely,” Hassan totally rejects sex integration and insists that there is no such thing

as “wise mixing”. He accuses public higher educational institutions in Egypt, except the

segregated al-Azhar University, of promoting sexual immorality. These universities,

according to Hassan, allow “boys to be sitting next to girls” in the lecture halls thus

causing “the poor boy's body to rage with desire because of the girl sitting next to him.

How will he ever understand or concentrate!?”364

No form of sex mingling is tolerated by Hassan, not even to learn the Quran. Even

mixing among relatives is considered unacceptable. He is not completely against female

participation in the labor market; in fact the only way that complete sex segregation could

be realized is through incorporating women into the labor force. That way it would be

possible for females to receive the types of product and services they need in a male-free

environment. Similarly, males would receive all the services and products they need in a

female-free environment under such setup. Although he avoids overt talk about politics,

by criticizing acceptable and long-standing cultural practices, he declares rejection of the

state that is un-Islamic and is promoting pro-Western, un-Islamic practices.

364 Mohammed Hassan, “al-Hijab,” Mohamedhassan.org: Women’s Section.

http://www.mohamedhassan.org/Womans%20Part/SaveFiles.aspx?hAudVidID=810&hRateID=1. Delivered 2004/05 (accessed February 9, 2009).

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Many women interviewed showed some acceptance of idea of setting limits in the

relationships between men and women. When asked if they felt there were moral

standards that were unique to Islam, some respondents proudly confirmed, “The limits in

the relationships between a male and a female is unique. In Islam there are manners

among people not like other religions.” The respondent made the comment while looking

disrespectfully at a Christian woman sitting nearby. In spite of nominal acceptance of

Hassan’s ideas on sex segregation, very few fully internalized and implemented his

views. The majority accepted the educational setting provided by the state, and the levels

of sexual integration in the professional world.

Hassan talks about issues related to jurisprudence quite comfortably. His task is to

relate the rules and regulations prescribed by Shari‘a. He believes that the human species

will not, and should not seek, to understand God’s reason. Questioning or even seeking to

understand the rationale behind religious requirements, in Hassan’s point of view, in the

path of blasphemy and disbelief. This is a common position among traditionalists and

neo-traditionalists. In one of his sermons entitled “Knowing God,” he recites a verse in

Quran, "the merciful sat upon his throne" (Quran 20:5) and interprets the verse saying,

God sits above place and whereas the act of sitting in itself is understandable, the method is unknown to us; it is an obligation that we believe and not ask how because asking would be a religious innovation (bid’ah—i.e. a sin),365 … One must cut the inner greed to know God with a knife of faith because knowing God completely is not possible.366

365 In Islam, a bid’ah is an innovation in religions and is considered an alteration of religion. One

hadith says, “Every new thing is an innovation, and every innovation is an error, and every error leads to hell” (cited in Berkey “Tradition, Innovation and the Social Construction of Knowledge in the Medieval Islamic Near,” 42). This verse is often cited by traditionalists, also called salafists (from salaf, or going back to origins) who fight any attempt to contextualize Shari‘a and rationalize religion.

366 Mohammed Hassan, “Kayfa nata’‘arraf ‘ala allah” [Knowing God],” Islamway.com. Lessons and Sermons Section. Delivered 2006. Downloaded at http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=28 (accessed February 9, 2009).

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There is a strong and declared affiliation between Hassan and the Wahhabi

discourse. Other than receiving his religious education in Saudi Arabia, Hassan also

promotes and preaches Wahhabism. In one of his lectures, he discusses the three

foundations of Iman Muhammad bin Abdel-Wahhab, who is the father of Wahhabism.