Chapter-2 CONCEPT OF SECURITY: THEORETICAL …shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/20815/7/07_chapter 2.pdf · In addition, R~ond Aron defined the concept of national security

Chapter-2

CONCEPT OF SECURITY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The concept of 'security' in the analysis of the politics and

international relations have long been defined in its continui.D.g

relevance. Perhaps, "security" as a concept is still ''underdeveloped and

contested". 1 However, various attempts have been made to define

security in internatic:mal studies by the scholars of different periods over

since Walter Lippman first defined national security in his celebrated

statement in 1943 as - "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not

in danger of having to sacrifice core values (legitimate interests), if it

wishes to avoid war, and iB able, if challenged, to maintain them by

victory in such a war. "2 Arnold Wolfers while explaining this statement

of Lippman on national security, ''implies that security rises and falls

with the ability of a nation to deter an attack, or to defeat it. This is in

accord with the common uses of the term."3 Thus, "the drive for

2

3

Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Transasia Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, pp.3-9.

Walter Lippman, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, Little Brown, Boston, 1943, p.5l.

Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaborations: Essays on International Politics, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1962, p.l50.

32

security is fundamentally the drive for self-preservation". 4 And with

such definitions developed the idea of security dilemma as measures for

security needs ·of one interpreted as its own defence lead to the threat

perception for others. Ever since then security as a concept has been

characterized as "ambiguous symbol"6 or dismissed as an "inadequate

concept". 6

Before going into further details on divergent opinions on defining

security in international relations and theories, it is important to refer

to the standard literary mea.ning of the word "security". The Oxford

English Dictionary explains its mea.n;ng as - ''Freedom or protection

from danger or worry. The safety or safeguarding of (the interest of) a

state, organisation, person, etc. against danger, especially from attacks,

espionage or theft; the exercise of measures or diplomatic negotiations;

in espionage, the maintenance of cover. Hence (with capital initial) a

department (in government service, etc.) charged with ensuring th1s."7

And it means national security as ''the defence of a country [attributive]

4

6

6

7

John H. Herz as cited in Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p.66; also, John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol.2, 1950, pp.157-180.

Arnold Wolfers cited in Barry Buzan, n.1, p.4.

Hugh Macdonald, "The Place of Strategy and the Idea of Security", Millennium, Vol.lO, No.3, 1981; also cited in Barry Buzan, n.1, p.4.

Oxford English Dictionary, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991.

33

security forces, e.g. police, troops etc., fighting terrorism". 8 Similarly, on

the issue of national security, the International Encyclopedia of the

Social Sciences explains it as "the term 'national security' has long been

used by politicians as a rhetorical phrase and by military leaders to

describe a policy objective .... When modern social scientists talk of the

concept, they generally mean the ability of a nation to protect its

internal values from external threats."9

Thus, the term security of a state in international relations

primarily concerned with external danger or fear that a country might

face in military terms. And, the concept of national security 'is linked

with war and the ability of the nation to deter, defend and attack.

Further, "even scholars who have differed from this starkly realist

perspective and focused on international and national secul1.ty have

been .Primarily concerned with reconciling national security, mea.ning

reducing external threats to a state, with the security of international

system as a whole. They have taken their philosophical cue from

authors such as Martin Wight. "10 Martin Wight had argued that "if there

8

9

10

Ibid.

Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, "National Security", in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan, New York, 1968, p.40.

Mohammad Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, Lynne Rienner, London, 1995, p.5.

34

is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be

maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a

collective interest, and security acquires a broad mea.ning; it be enjoyed

or pursued in common. "11

These definitions of security are viewed negative in its approach in

sense, that has been anaJysed by Simon Dalby as- ''It is crucial to note

the negative use of the term in this definition. Security is a term limited

in usefulness for denoting desirable political situations because it is

formulated as protection from some threat or danger rather than as

promoting a desirable situation. Desp~te the positive value weighting

usually ascribed to the term, anaJysed even this simply, it appears a very

limited term. It is defined in reaction to threats, and usually specifically

to threats to the state. "12 Also some critical literatures on the concept of

security finds similar approach in defining security. State authority,

according to contract theories of the state, provides a state of order in

turn for the abrogation of citizen responsibility for the provision of

security. Security is something done by states. There is no obligation or

moral duty of citizens to provide security. In this sense, security is

11

12 .

Martin Wight, "Western Values in International Relations" in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, Allen and Unwin, London, 1996, p.103.

Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse", Alternative, 17, 1992, p.97.

35

essentially empty. For aJl the verbiage devoted to the concept, it is not a

positive political initiative. 13

These m.ilitary-do:minated definitions of national security were

inherited by the cold war era. The cold war structures of international

relations overshadowed the conceptual development of national security.

Seemingly, unexpected occurrences and the many unc~rtainties

prevailed among the scholars in defining security of the state in ·this cold

war phase. In other words, the bipolar world adopted the concept of

aJliance security, namely the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation)

and Warsaw Pact, and. its main thrust was external threats. In this

security concept, war, aggression and nuclear deterrence were thought

to be the main instruments of protecting a nation's core values or

interests. In addition, R~ond Aron defined the concept of national

security in the following terms - ''To want the maximum of security

means to want the maximum of power, which in turn means the greatest

number of aJlies, the- fewest possible enemies. '114 Thus the security

became identified With military budget, less and less attention was given

13

14

R.B.J. Walker, The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory, University of California, San Diego, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper No.3, 1988.

Aron R8iYIDond, "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs" in Stanley Hoffman (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Prentice Hall, New Delhi, 1964, p.87.

36

to economic and sociaJ iSsues within states. The resolution was conflict

was viewed as overpowering the opponent in military iSsues.

In internationaJising the security of state, the security of the

indigenous people of any region became secondary to the security needs

of the larger system. .A!3 locaJ domestic conflicts were viewed in the

context of East-West relations, externaJ interventions to control

outcomes co~onaJy turned them into regionaJ conflicts. While the

mil1tary alliance system integrated a number of smaJler states into larger

alliances, middle-sized states found that they could pley a mediator role

betweyn the nuclear powers and the smaJler non-nuclear states,

especiaJly in those regions where regional conflicts were raging. The

various regions were gradually integrated into the global armament race

which caused them to become dependent on this new system for the

purchase of arms and more m1l1tary equipments even at the cost of their

national economies. In these c1rCUID8tances the dominant thoughts on

the security issues argued that seCurity is based on power, legitimiSed by

the capacity either to create peace or to provide security for the allied ·

nations. Thus the concept of national security that evolved during the

cold war viewed security as a function of the successful pursuit of

interstate power competition and required the mobilization Of a high

level of materiaJ and human resources. However, in this atmosphere of·

strong faith in military power, severaJ scholars objected to this simple

definition of security. In the 1980s Robert Keohane caJled for ''better

37

theories of domestic politics, decision making and information

processing, so that the gap between the external and internal

environment can be bridged in a systematic way. "16 However, Kenneth

Waltz hedged that someone ''may one day fashion a unified theory of

internal and external politics... until which time, however, this

theoretical separation need not bother us unduly. "16 Nevertheless, they

have argued that security is linked to the maintenance of peace and

justice and that peace and justice cannot be solely achieved in military

terms, but must include other factors such as economic security, social

security and psychological security.

A si.gntficant change began to come about during the US

experience of the Vietnam war wbich widened the concept of security of

a state. During this period, Robert McNamara categorised a nation's

core values in the form of development activities. To htm, "Security is

not military hardware, though it ID.aiY include it; security is not military

force, though it may involve it; security iS not traditional military

activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development, and

without development there can be no security.1117 And, since then the

16

16

17

Robert Keohane, "Theory of World Politics" in Robert Keohane (ed.), NeoreaJ.ism and its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p.l.

Kenneth Waltz, "A Response to my critics", in ibid, p.340.

Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security, Harper and Rane, New York, 1968, p.149.

38

issues of economic strength have been integrated to the practices and

policies related to military strength. In this transformation, the

economic dimension gained considerable importance. In other words,

economy has become an important ingredient in the concept of national

security. The collapse of a military strong SOViet Union dramatiSed the

importance of economic prosperity. Further, rise of Germany, Japan

and China showed that economics was vital in any world order and has

its definitive role in shaping the orders too.

Now, the crumbling of Iron-curtain proved that the change is

inexorable and a constant factor in any environment. Especially in its

international dimension with interaction of nearly two hundred

sovereign states, it 1B unreaJ.iBtic to expect statiSm. However, there

comes a time when cataclysmic or revolutionary changes alter the

premises of international order and compel a search for fresh

paradigms. Such a change is at hand with the disintegration of the

Soviet Union and the end of the cold war confrontations. Admitting this

need and in its caJ.l for the 'new world order', the then President of the

U.S. said- "A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path

in peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human

endeavour. Today that new world iS struggling to be born, a world quite

different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law

supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognise the

39

shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong

respect the rights of the weak. "18

However, an opposite notion has taken hold that international

affairs have somehow now become more tumultuous, unstable and

complex. This idea has been repeated so often that Bill Clinton

proclaimed in his 1993 presidential inaugural address that the new

world was more free but less stable. And CIA Director James Woolsey

believed that ''we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle

filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes."19 And Stanley

Hoffman puts it as ''the problem of order has become even more complex

than before, because, during the cold war, the superpowers, driven by

the fear of nuclear war, devised by trial or error, a network of rules and

restraints aimed at avoiding direct military col.l1sion. "20 Besides, in an

anaJysiB of the emerging world order James N. Rosenau suggests- 'It is

an order that expands incrementally at the margins rather than by

wholesale changes at the centre. It 1B an order that sustains both

fragmentation and integration. These are not necessarily conflicting

processes but they unfold simultaneously. And when they clash, they do

18

19

20

George Bush, "Towards a new World Order", US Department of State Dispatch I: 3, 17 September 1990, p.9l.

John Mueller, 1'The Catastrophe Quota: Trouble After the Cold War", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vo1.38, No.3, September 1994, p.356.

Stanley Hoffman, "Delusions of World Order", New York Review of Books, 9 April 1992, p.37.

40

so in different ways at different times in different parts of the world,

with the result that the prevajling global turbulence is proformdly

nonlinear, rmeven in its evolution, rmeven in its intensity, rmeven in its

scope, and rmeven in its direction. "21 And, relatedly, Ted Galen

Carpenter remarks - ''the international system has always been

characterised by instability and there is little evidence that the future

will be markedly different. Indeed, the ebbing of Cold War may produce

an upsurge of regional political turbulence". 22 Even John Lewis Gaddis

remarks on the post-cold war phase as - ''in the post cold war era, the

stability that came to characterise the cold war itself. No one can

guarantee that long peace will survive the end of the cold war. "23

In these circumstances of rmpredictability and apprehensions of

more future regional or local conflicts in the emerging world order

Lawrence Freedman believes that "International security addresses

questions of force: how to spot it, stop it, resist it, and occasionally

threaten and even use it. It considers the conditions that encourage or

discourage organi.Bed violence in international affairs and the conduct of

21

22

23

Ja.m.es N. Rosenau, "Security in a Turbulent World", Current History, Vo1.94, No.592, May 1995, p.200.

Ted GaJ.en Cq.rpenter, "The New World Disorder", Foreign Policy, No.84, FaJ.l 1991, p.32.

John Lewis Gaddis, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future" in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, Ca.m.bridge University Press, 1992, p.38.

41

all types of military activity. "24 He further argues that "Uncertainty

about American intentions now requires many nations to develop

strategies that assume the American passivity. The less activist the

United States, the less activist many of its allies, and the more local

conflicts will be left to regional actors - a development that increases the

odds that small problems will turn into large ones."25 Besides, Patrick

Morgan believes that "it is important to confine the concept of security

to pbysical safety from deliberate pbysical harm inflicted internationally

i.e. across national boundaries."26 And Stephen Walt suggests to restrict

the concept of security as "security studies may be defined as the study

of the threat, use, and control of military force. "27

While one set of scholars emphasiSe more on the iSsues related to

external factors with regard to military threats, another group views the

concept of security in more broader sense. According to one Human

Development Report - ''The concept of security has for too long been

interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression,

or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global

24

26

26

27

Lawrence Freedman, "International Security: Changing Targets", Foreign Policy, No.110, Spring 1998, p.48.

Ibid., p.62.

Patrick Morgan, "Safeguarding Security Studies", Arms Control, Vol.13, No.3, December 1992, p.470.

Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International Studies Quarterly, No.35, 1991, p.212.

42

security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust.... With the dark

shadows of cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are

within nations rather than between nations (Human Development

Report, 1994, p.22)." In a simtlar way, Simon DaJ.by suggestss with

regard to the changing world atmosphere that "security needs to

encompass the interests of the people rater than just states, in gaining

access to food, shelter, basic human rights, health care, and the

environmental conditions that allows these th1ngs to be provided into

the long run." 28 Further, Ken Booth, while criticising the realist

approach to security definitions, mentions - " ... the concept in talking

about security is emancipation. Emancipation means freeing people

from those constraints that stops them carrying out what they would

choose to do, of which war, poverty, oppression and poor education are

a few. "29 Besides, a little more broadened systemic view in defining

security is taken by Helga Hattendorn as - "security is value and or

system maintenance over time and the absence of threats to it. "30

Thus, from the above mentioned varied opinions on the concept of

security, it seems that, like the term 'security' has never precise

28

29

30

Simon Dalby, n.l2, p.ll7.

Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice", International Affairs, 67, No.3, 1991, p.539.

Helga Haft.endorn, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline­Building in International Security", International Studies_ Quarterly, No.35, 1991, p.4.

43

definition during the cold war, in the post-cold war world divergent

concepts of security have been advanced by theorists and statesmen.

Therefore, there are various determinants which constitute the concept

of security of state in the post-cold war era. Barry Buzan has captured

this larger conception in his formulation: "Security is about the pursuit

of freedom from threat... in the context of the international system,

security is the ability of states and societies to maintain their

independent identity and their functional integrity. "31 He advocates a

definition of security which includes freedom from military, political,

societal and economic threats. And in its analysis of diverse threats to

state, Brian L. Job remarks- "For scholars, the traditional concepts and

theories of international relations, articulated in the central premises of

realist thinking - territoriality, sovereignty, nation-statehood, non-

intervention, and separation of domestic and foreign policy - proved

inadequate to the task at hand. Internal-external, domestic-

international distinctions make little sense in situations where

penetration and intervention by :other states and groups is the norm,

rather than exception. "~2

31

32

Barry Buazan, People. State· and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Era, Lynne Reinner, Boulder, 1991, p.18.

Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1992, p.12.

44

Third World Security

As far as the security of the Third World is concerned, many third

world states adopted the western concept of national security which was

based mainly on the alliance system and wherein the purpose was to

protect the alliance partners from external threats. Even, "until the rise

of dependency theory in the 1970s, no western analysis attempted to

configure a theory of international politics that would incorporate the

perspectives and actions of peripheral states, particularly those of what

came to be known as the Third World. "33 Subsequently, Holsti also

concludes that ''until those theories address the issue of the origins of

the state, and relationship between community and state, they Vv"1ll

remain in the peripheries of relevance to the problem of war in the post-

cold war era. "34 But the "anarchy problematic" operates to construct

political discourse by emphasising the differences· between the operation

of political community within the state and the operation of a ''realm of

necessity", contingency, and violence beyond the state. This realm,

which so much of the dominant realist discourse of international

relations and the practice of statecraft suggests, is beyond the

consideration of community and political discussion because it is

33

34

K.J. Holsti, "International Relations Theory and Domestic War in the Third World: The Limits of Relevance" in Stephanie G. Neuman (ed.), International Theory and the Third World, Macmillan, London, 1998, p.l04.

Ibid., p.l25.

45

unregulated. There is no community for political life to occur at this

level.36 This assumption again looks into the primacy to the external

threats. In this regard Holsti argues that it is necessary to rethink

traditional realist frameworks that focus upon states as actors,

sovereignty, balance of power and hegemony, security from external

threats, and war as the fundamentals of national security problematics.

Such frameworks do not address the contemporary nature of the Third

World.36

But the fact remained that the alliance system of cold war was

superimposed 'On the Third World states directly or indirectly by the

superpowers. This imposition reinforced the conflict within the third

world which strengthened external security threat perceptions. In this

way also, the Third World neglected internal threats and became

preoccupied with the external factors which led to the neglect of the

essentials of "state-making" in spite of military equipments and forces at

its disposal. The Third World iS aptly described by Azar and Moon as the

shortage of security "software" and the abundance of ''hardware"

36

36

Richard Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Post-structuralism and War" in James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), InternationaJ/IntertextuaJ Relations: Postmodern Readings of Colonial Politics, Lexington Books, Toronto, 1989, p.259.

Brian L. Job (ed.), n.32, p.3.

46

accumulated by such states.37 They argue that Third World states were

unable to solve both external and internal threats with the help of

hardware (military force) and that they should concentrate on state

legitimacy and state integration to deal with internal threats. They also

emphasise on state legitimacy (identification of people with the state)

and state integration (identification of the people with each other within

the state).

Caroline Thomas has explained the concept of security of Third

World States as- " ... does not simply refer to the military dimension, as

is often assumed in western discussions of the concept, but to the whole

range of dimensions of a state~s existence which are already taken care

of in the more developed states ... for example, the search for internal

security of the state through nation -building, the search for secure

systems of food, health, money and trade, as well as the search for

security through nuclear weapons. "38 In such explanation she

associates state's strength or weakness With the institutional capacities

of the state to cope up with the challenges it may face. In her analysiS

she finds two forms of state power - despotic power and infrastructural

power. The first signifies the power of the state to use force and

37

38

Adward E. A:z.ar and C. Moon (eds.), National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, Edward Elgar, London, 1988, p.8.

Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987, p.l.

47

imposing rules upon the civilians. The second form of power of the state

implies the level of sophistication, effectiveness, and reach within the

state's territorial domain of the institutions. Sjmilarly, Mutbi.ah

Alagappa believes that ''internal challenges to. the state have been quite

pervasive". 39 And so, she stresses on the regime legitimacy in the Third

World states.

With regard to the regime legitimacy and the insecurity dilemmas

a regime faces within the weak state T. David Mason and Dale Krane

concludes - "This leads us to the question of why a regime, itself

composed of supposedly rational. individuals, would pursue a policy of

escalating repression if such measures are ultimately counterproductive.

We argue that the conditions of structural dependence character1z1.ng

these regimes leave them without the institutional. machinery, economic

resources, or politicaJ. will to address opposition challenges through

more accommodative program.s of reform. Thus escalating repression is

perpetuated not because it has a high. probability of success but because

the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent

alternatives. "40

39

40

Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security ·of Developing States, Auburn Publishing House, 1987.

T. David Mason and T. Karne Dale, "The Political Economy of Death Squds: Toward a Theory of impact of State-sanctioned Terror", International Studies Quarterly, Vol.33, No.2, 1989, p.l98.

48

Barry Buzan while e:xp]a.ining the concept of security of states

mentions - ''the external perspective distorts the view in relation to

national security by covering over the domestic security dimension.

National security cannot be considered apart from the internal structure

of the state, and the view from Within not infrequently explodes the

superficial image of the state as a coherent object of security. A strong

state define itself from Within and fills the gap between its neighbours

With a solid political presence. A weak state may be defined more as the

gap between its neighbours, With little political substance underlying the

fagade of internationally recognised statehood.... Unlfi!SS the internal

dimension iB relatively stable as a prior condition, the image of the state

as a referrent object for security fades into a meaningless blur. "41 In its

explanation, Barry Buzan, describes and conceptuaJizes the security

perceptions at three inter-connected levels i.e. the individual, state and

the international system. Its analysis of these three units and their

interplay in the light of domestic environment explains the nature of the

weak states, lacking the social cohesion and institutional structures that

many western states have evolved.

Further, Brian L. Job in its diagnosis of "insecurity dilemma" for

the third world states explainS- "there is no singular notion of national

security and no dominant externally oriented security dilemma for the

41 Barry Buzan, n.l, p.69.

49

typical Third World countries. Instead there exiSt competing notions of

security advanced by the contending forces within society. The state I

itself is at issue in most coil.flicts. National security has to be seen as

distinct from state security and regime security, with each component of

society competing to preserve and protest its own well-being. What

results in such a contentious environment is better characterised as an

insecurity dilemma, i.e., the consequences of the competition of the

various forces in society being (I) less effective security for all or certain

sectors of the population, (ii) less effective capacity of centralised state

institutions to provide services and order, and (iii) increased

vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and

control by outside actors, be they other states, communal groups, or

multinational corporations. "42

In an comprehensive anaJysis of the state-making and Third World

security, Mohammad Ayoob summarises - ''The political capacities of the

Third World states are overloaded by the conjunctions of many of the

factors and forces. These factors include the lack of adequate time

required for state building; the near impossibility until recently of

alienating juridical sovereignty once it iB achieved; the bigbly disruptive

colonial inheritance; the accentuation of ethnic fissures in the early

stages of modernization, leading to frequent attempts at secession; the

42 Brian L. Job, n.32, p.l8.

50

demands for political participation, economic redistribution, and social

justice at a very early stage in the state-making process; and the

unrepresentative and authoritarian character of many regimes, which

spawns a vicious circle of violence and counterviolence as regimes are

challenged and react with brutal force. The political overload that comes

about from the combination of all or many of these factors lies at the

root. of the high degree of insecurity witnessed in most Third World

countries. This overload also provides the basic logic for the argument

that the internal dimension of security is of paramount importance in

the totality of Third World state's security calculus., In other words,

internal insecurities fundamentally determine the security predicament

of the Third World states."43

Thus from the above discussions, it can be concluded that the

distinguishing characteristics of the cold war era, Le. the traditional

concepts of security, mainly reflected in the theories and policies related

to the threat of use of force or the external threat perceptions among

competitive power-equations in the international security arena.

However, in due course, there came a turn in theory-building

implications toward domestic aspects of international politics by those

who judged that systems level analysis (usually termed neo-realism or

43 Mohammad Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System, Lyrme :Rienner, Boulder, 1995, pp.4l-42.

51

structural realism) was inherently flawed due to several visible changes

in the national and international environments. Then there comes the

end of cold war and emergence of new world order. It compelled the

scholars and statesmen to redefine and rethink the issues concerned

with the security of the state in the emerging post-cold war world.

Though thBre came up several advocates for the changed notions of

security, two main groups of theorists do define "security" in two

different ways. The first argues that internal factors require attention

only when it is sought to explain policy responses to international

stimuli. The second group 1p-0re a~daciously asserts the primacy of

domestic politics and is incompatible with system level theory. This

perspective denies that the international dim.ension generates effects in

the national realm that are utterly independent of domestic mediating

1nfl.uences. However, after the end of the cold war and subsequent

diminishing chances of war or nuclear war, a new impetus has been felt

by the scholars. And a more fundamental challenge before them today is

to include the domestic challenges to the state for broadening the agenda

of security.

In a Third World perspective, it is even more difficult to

distinguish the internal-external dimensions of security in the Third

World countries. Most of the aspects of national security in these states

have threats within the states. Scholars have broadly agreed the

security of the state in third world primarily concerns directly or

52

indirectly with the domestic instabilities and lack of social cohesion

Within the state. It has led to failure in the developments of "state­

making" with persistent ''weak software" in most third world states.

Besides, Third World problems of state legitimacy, political stability and

capital accumulation, and demands for resource distribution and

political participation have led to major overloads on the state. The

abilities and pursuits towards individual freedom from threat have to be

assured in an atmosphere where the state itself has been facing a

number of vulnerabilities at different social and institutional levels.

Thus, in most o~ the third world countries, the ability and desire of

states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their

functional integrity have been facing multid.iniensional domestic threats.

53