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Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.
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Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Dec 25, 2015

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Page 1: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and

Outsourcing

Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and

Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Page 2: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Vertical integration & outsourcingLearning objectives

• Identify the benefits of acquiring inputs or services through competitive markets

• Describe conditions favorable to acquiring services through nonmarket (internal) transactions

• Analyze tradeoffs involved with acquiring inputs through long-term contracts versus vertical integration

• Identify how asset specificity and environment uncertainty affect the vertical integration versus long-term contract decision

Page 3: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

The vertical chain of productionpersonal computers

Page 4: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Vertical chain of production

• Vertical integration– Forward integration– Backward integration

• Outsourcing– Spot markets– Contracting

Page 5: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Outsourcingchoosing along a continuum

Purchased at market price with no long-term commitment

Part or service produced internally

Page 6: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Benefits of competitive market transactions

• Economies of scale

• Incentives for efficient production

Page 7: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Reasons for nonmarket (internal) transactions

Lower nonmarket costs• Firm-specific assets

– Site specificity– Physical asset specificity– Human asset specificity– Dedicated assets

• Measuring quality• Reducing externalities• Extensive coordination

Page 8: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

More reasons for nonmarket (internal) transactions

• Taxes and regulation– Reduce government intervention

• Market power– Ability to price discriminate

• Insure input availability and quality

Page 9: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Using vertical integration to price discriminate

Page 10: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Vertical integration versus long-term contracts

• Circumstances favoring vertical integration– Incomplete contracting– Ownership and investment incentives– Specific assets and hold-up auctions

• Circumstances favoring long-term contracts– Nonspecific assets– Stable environments– Incentive distortions

Page 11: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Asset specificity, uncertainty, and the procurement decision

Page 12: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Contracting with distributors

• Free-rider problems– Advertising– Exclusive territories

• Double markups– Two-part pricing– Quotas

• Regulatory issues– per se illegal versus rule of reason

Page 13: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Optimal output in an example of the double markup problem

Page 14: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Example of double markups

Page 15: Chapter 19: Vertical Integration and Outsourcing Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, Managerial Economics and Organizational Architecture, 4th ed.

Recent trends in outsourcing

• Global competition

• New production technologies

• New information communications technology