Chapter 17 Moral Knowledge from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD

Copyright © 2011 by William Allan Kritsonis/All Rights Re-served

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MORAL KNOWLEDGE

INSIGHTS

1. The essence of ethical meanings, or of moral knowledge, is right deliberate action, that is, what a person ought voluntarily to do.

2. Language is a social invention that has been de-veloped for purposes of communication.

3. Language meanings are ethically neutral.4. A scientific proposition is true or false or probable.

It is not right or wrong in an ethical sense.5. Saying that something is good means, partly, that

one approves of it and, partly, that one wants one’s hearers to approve of it as well.

6. Ethical language is used to alter feelings and be-havior so as to produce the most harmonious sat-isfaction of desires and interests.

7. In ethics acts are done for purposes of participa-tion.

8. Moral acts are generally thought to exemplify uni-versal principles of obligation.

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9. Everyone is obliged to do right, and if one fails to do so, he incurs guilt.

10. Moral conduct is a universal responsibility.11. Art suffers when moral judgments take the place

of esthetic criteria.12. Moral principles are esthetically irrelevant, and

when they are introduced as factors in artistic pro-duction and criticism, the works of art are in-evitably impoverished and esthetically corrupted.

13. When morals are assimilated to esthetics, right and obligation disappear altogether, and morals become a matter of taste and style.

14. Works of art may quite properly be judged by moral principles to ascertain their effect upon con-duct.

15. It may even prove desirable to prohibit the making and exhibition of certain works of art on moral grounds.

16. Moral judgments have no bearing on the esthetic significance of the works themselves.

17. Moral choice has both personal and impersonal el-ements.

18. Ethical meanings also differ from personal knowl-edge in not having to do with unique person-to-person encounters, but with decisions to which universal claims are attached.

19. Ethics differ from personal understanding in re-spect to the element of obligation.

20. Obligation involves judgment of what is, on the ba-sis of an ideal.

21. Love presupposes unconditional acceptance rather than critical evaluation and action aimed at im-provement.

22. The realm of ethics, then, is right action.23. The central concept in the realm of ethics is obli-

gation or what ought to be done. The “ought” here is not individual but a universal principle of right.

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24. Moral conduct is conduct that is deliberately exe-cuted as an expression of what one is committed to personally.

25. The ethical domain is defined by the fact of its be-ing deliberate and subject to the judgment of right and wrong.

26. Ethics is everybody’s business.27. Ethical considerations enter into every department

of ordinary life.28. There is no discernible class of persons who are

specialists in good conduct.29. There is no road to moral mastery.30. There are acknowledged moral leaders, to whom

many look for moral direction and inspiration.31. The conscience of a society is embodied in the tra-

ditions of civility by which the common life is gov-erned.

32. Certain standards of conduct are taken for granted as the basis of the social system, and a variety of sanctions are used to encourage adherence to these standards.

33. Accepted social standards are intended to provide guidance for conduct.

34. The content of the moral tradition covers every as-pect of the common life.

35. Beliefs about what is right and wrong are the very foundation of culture and civilization.

36. The appropriate organization of society from an ethical standpoint is the one which is just, that is, which gives each person what is due him, or what he ought to have.

37. The unjust social order is one in which the person is deprived of his basic rights arbitrarily and with-out justification.

38. Ordinary people are the guardians and practition-ers of morality, because moral conduct has to do with right action in everyday affairs and with the basic terms for the common life.


39. Moral conduct is the source of the common good, for which everyone is responsible.

40. Right conduct can be taught, and is continually taught by participation in the everyday life of soci-ety according to the recognized standards of that society.

41. The language of morals should be ordinary lan-guage.

42. In the field of ethics common language usage is the basis for the expression of meanings.

43. The special value of ethical theory, like theory in all the other realms of meaning, is in guiding, teaching and learning.

44. Before a person can know where to go, he needs to understand where he is starting from.

45. Conduct is not moral if one acts without due delib-eration, does what first comes to mind, follows precedents automatically, or chooses on the basis of accidental factors.

46. The improvement of conduct depends upon the habit, in making each decision, of bringing into consciousness a range of different possibilities from among which a selection can be made.

47. Perhaps the major problem in moral decision is in the selection of principles to be used as standards.

48. It is said that every person is endowed with a na-tive intuition of the right which, if he attends to it and obeys it, will enable him to know right from wrong.

49. Thee are certain principles, such as the duty to keep promises and to tell the truth, which are uni-versally acknowledged.

50. There appears to be no sure means of demonstrat-ing what the ideal life really is, so that everyone will agree.

51. There continue to be differences in conceptions of the good, just as there are differences in concep-tions of the right.

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52. The distinctive goal of human existence is the real-ization of meaning.

53. The good life consists in the realization of mean-ings, in all realms.

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The essence of symbolic meanings is formal conven-tion, of empirical meanings factual description and ex-planation, of esthetic meanings individual significant perceptual forms, and of synnoetic meanings concrete existential intersubjectivity. The essence of ethical meanings, or moral knowledge, is right deliberate ac-tion, that is, what a person ought voluntarily to do.

The distinctive logic of ethical meanings may be made clear by comparing and contrasting it with the logic of meanings in each of the four realms hitherto discussed.

COMPARING AND CONTRASTING ETHICS WITH THE LOGIC

OF MEANINGS IN SYMBOLICS, EMPIRICS,ESTHETICS, AND SYNNOETICS

SymbolicsLanguage is a social invention that has been de-

veloped for purposes of communication. That many dif-ferent symbolic conventions are possible is shown by the many different languages actually in existence. It does not make sense to say that one ought to use one language rather than another, except in a hypothetical way. It is proper to assert that if one is to communicate effectively in a society of English-speaking people, he ought to speak English rather than any other language. But his hypothetical sense of “ought” is not what is meant by the moral “ought.” Language meanings are ethically neutral. Symbolic conventions are arbitrary constructions to which the question of moral right and wrong does not properly apply. When we speak of using the “right” word or grammatical construction, we sim-ply mean that the usage in question conforms to cus-tomary practice or is accepted by those who for some reason or other are acknowledged as language authori-ties in the society.

Empirics

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In the empirical realm meanings are factual. Since facts simply are, it does not make sense to ask whether they are right. A scientific proposition is true or false or probable. It is not right or wrong in an ethical sense. An empirical statement may be said to be right in the sense that it is a correct statement of the facts, but this has nothing to do with moral obligation. For example, one may properly ask whether a given state of affairs is morally right whether certain existing social practices are morally right. The factual statements may be right, in the sense that they truthfully represent the actual situation, but the conditions they report may at the same time be morally wrong (or right).

This distinction between empirical meanings and ethical meanings is of great importance. if it were more clearly understood, much confusion about ethical ques-tions would be avoided. David Hume made the distinc-tion clear when he pointed out that one can never cor-rectly make an inference from what is to what ought to be, nor vice versa. Fact and moral obligation are essen-tially different logical orders. From the fact that people actually do behave in a certain way. Similarly, from the assertion that a given kind of action is right, it does not follow at all that the action is in fact done by anybody.

Hume’s insight was further reinforced by the influ-ential work of G. E. Moore, who argued that all attempts to reduce values to facts are instances of the “naturalis-tic fallacy.”1 This fallacy is committed whenever one de-fines value concepts in factual terms when the state-ment “This is good” is said to mean “This gives me pleasure.” The first statement asserts that something is valuable, or praiseworthy, or desirable, all of which meanings are logically different in kind from the factual importance of the second statement. The statement of value is logically independent of and incommensurable with (though not necessarily inconsistent with) the statement of fact. The relative independence of ethical

1 Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1959.


and empirical meanings follows from the fact that it makes sense to ask for any existing state of affairs, whether or not it is a state of affairs that is good or that ought to exist. Thus, “This is good” cannot mean “This gives me pleasure,” because it is entirely in order to ask “Well, is it good that gives you pleasure?”—a ques-tion that would be pointless if the good were properly definable as the pleasant, since a negative answer would then be self-contradictory.

The naturalistic fallacy applies not only to defini-tions of value in terms of natural facts such as pleasure, happiness, and success, but even to definitions using transcendent facts, as in some traditional theological systems. For example, Moore holds that one commits the naturalistic fallacy if he asserts that “right” “what God wills,” for it is not self-contradictory to assert that some command of God is not right, that God ought not to will that action.

The rejection of the naturalistic fallacy preserves the logical integrity of ethical meanings by not allowing them to be absorbed into the empirical realm. One can make ethical valuations of any matter of act because moral judgments do not occupy the same realm of meaning as empirical statements.

There are competent theorists who hold that ethi-cal statements though not reducible to factual state-ments, actually do not have any cognitive meanings at all. A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic2 limits knowledge to empirical, mathematical, and logical meanings and holds that ethical statements are neither true nor false but merely expressions of personal pref-erences. They are merely disguised imperatives or ejac-ulations. Similarly, Charles Stevenson argues that “as a working model, you might regard ‘this is good’ as meaning ‘I approve of this, do so too’—for in saying that something is good one means, partly, that one ap-

2 2n rev. ea., Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1952.

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proves of it and, partly, that one wants one’s hearers to approve of it as well.”3

Stephen Toumin4 takes the position that the differ-ence between empirical and ethical meanings is to be understood in terms of the uses or functions of lan-guage. Empirical language is used to modify expecta-tions, that is, to state predicted consequences. Ethical language, on the other hand, is used to alter feelings and behavior so as to produce the most harmonious satisfaction of desires and interests. Furthermore, Toul-min holds, ethical concepts are not used, as empirical concepts are, to designate properties of things. Instead, they are gerundives, by which is meant that they are based on the idea of worthy of. The value-concept “truth” is a gerundive, because it means “worthy of ad-miration,” and “right,” means “worthy of doing.” Gerun-dive concepts enter into science and art as well as into ethics, since one ought to believe what is factually true and one ought to admire what is esthetically admirable, just as one ought to do what is right. Moral judgments are directly and exclusively of the gerundive type. They are only indirectly pertinent to science and art, in which the central substantive meanings are concerned with descriptions and presentations, respectively, rather than with statements of obligation to believe or admire.

EstheticsTurning next to the esthetic realm. Ethical mean-

ings differ from esthetic ones in that the ethical arise out of disinterested perception, while the esthetic are concerned with active personal commitment. In the arts things are made for purposes of contemplation. In ethics acts are done for purposes of participation. Fur-

3Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1944, p. 21. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

4 See The Place of Reason in Ethics, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1960.


thermore, esthetic objects are unique individual works with their own intrinsic excellence, while moral acts are generally thought to exemplify universal principles of obligation. In this respect ethical meanings are like the principles and generalizations of science.

The most important difference between esthetic meanings and ethical meanings, as between empirics and ethics, is that in the esthetic the basic ethical idea of right or obligation is absent. Like a fact, an esthetic object simply is. There is no question of “ought” about it. It is presented for contemplation, and its perceptible qualities make themselves felt in the perceiver. One may or may not contemplate the object and one may or may not respond favorably. One need have no sense of responsibility for artistic production or appreciation and no guilt is incurred in connection with one’s esthetic ex-periences. in the case of moral conduct this esthetic neutrality does not apply. Everyone is obliged to do right, and if one fails to do so, he incurs guilt. Moral conduct is a universal responsibility. The requirement to accept moral principles is generally considered far more seriously and urgently than is the requirement to approve of particular works of art. The relative inde-pendence of art and morals rests upon keeping clear the logical distinction between meanings in the two realms. Trouble results when the distinction becomes blurred. Art suffers when moral judgments take the place of esthetic criteria. In that event censorship flour-ishes, the expressive freedom of the artist is violated, and works of art become standardized tools of social control. Moral principles are esthetically irrelevant, and when they are introduced as factors in artistic produc-tion and criticism, the works of art are inevitably impov-erished and esthetically corrupted. On the other hand, when morals are assimilated to esthetics, right and obli-gation disappear altogether, and morals become a mat-ter of taste and style. Then an act is regarded as right if it is fitting, pleasing, or satisfying. The test of the good is then taken to be balance or harmony, and it is held

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that there are no universal principles of obligation, but only individual acts whose worth is judged by the intrin-sic delight they afford. Some traditional hedonistic and utilitarian systems of ethics, in which (committing the naturalistic fallacy) the good is defined in terms of plea-sure, harmonizing of interests, and maximizing happi-ness, illustrate this assimilation of ethics to esthetics.

To maintain the relative independence of the es-thetic and ethical realms is not to deny the propriety of judgments from one realm to the other. Works of art may quite properly be judged by moral principles to as-certain their effect upon conduct. Conceivably it may even prove desirable to prohibit the making and exhibi-tion of certain works of art on moral ground. But such moral judgments have no bearing on the esthetic sig-nificance of the works themselves. Similarly, it is quite in order to evaluate moral principles from an esthetic standpoint, showing what styles of life ensue and to what degree harmony, balance, and satisfaction are re-alized, provided it is understood that these legitimate judgments of taste are not the basis for judging the rightness of the actions prescribed.


While it should bevery obvious to people that

laws are laws and that peoplemust conform to them for the good of

society, many people rationalize an ex-cuse

to break the “little” laws. What obliga-tion

does a teacher have to set an example of

total moral adherence to students? How should people react to a teacher who sits in the back of the room at a

faculty meeting complaining about the students who talk in class while the principal is addressing the faculty?

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Picture

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SynnoeticsWe may now compare meanings in the ethical

realm with meanings in the synnoetic realm. Both are realms of decision, commitment, and active engage-ment. While particular moral decisions are made in con-crete existential situations, the moral principles implicit in making such decisions are abstract and general. Specifically, moral choice has both personal and imper-sonal elements. It is personal in that the whole being of the person is expressed in the decision to act. It is im-personal in that the morality of the act is not a function of the person in his singularity, but of the situation. Eth-ical meanings also differ from personal knowledge in not having to do with unique person-to-person encoun-ters, but with decisions to which universal claims are at-tached.

Above all, ethics differ from personal understand-ing in respect to the element of obligation. Personal re-lations, like facts and perceptual forms, simply are. The relation of one person to another is the awareness of a presence, the I-Thou meeting. Such relationships are not founded on duty, but on love and communion. Obli-gation involves judgment of what is, on the basis of an ideal. Personal relations are consummated in what presently is. Love presupposes unconditional accep-tance rather than critical evaluation and action aimed at improvement. The autonomy of the ethical realm vis-à-vis the synnoetic realm of personal awareness and encounter does not render either domain impervious to the other. While one can properly make moral judg-ments about personal relations, the significance of the personal relations is not determined by moral judg-ments. Likewise, while moral conduct can be criticized from the standpoint of personal relations, the ethical meanings are not determined by synnoetic factors.

THE REALM OF ETHICS

The realm of ethics, then, is right action. The cen-tral concept in this domain is obligation or what ought


to be done. The “ought” here is not individual but a uni-versal principle of right.

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FreedomMore action presupposes freedom. Ethical mean-

ing does not attach to coerced, purely habitual or me-chanical, accidental, unconscious, or compulsive action. It is conduct that is deliberately executed as an expres-sion of what one is committed to personally. Such ac-tion is self-determined rather than determined by out-side factors. In this respect, personal knowledge (of the self) is essential to ethical meanings since personal ma-turity is the ground of freedom. Being a free person is prerequisite to moral action, but not all free action is moral. Specifically, personal maturity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for right conduct.

Voluntary ActionsThe concept of ethics sketched here clearly goes

far beyond the restricted idea of the subject matter of morality as concerned only with certain special classes of actions, e.g., sexual relations, property rights, and truth-telling. All voluntary actions whatever are properly subject to moral judgment, regardless of how trivial or important, public or private, they may be and regard-less of any conventions by which morality may be lim-ited in ordinary understanding. The ethical domain is not defined by what conduct is about, but by the fact of its being deliberate and subject to the judgment of right and wrong.

Ethics is Everybody’s BusinessLike personal insights, ethics is everybody’s busi-

ness. Ethical considerations enter into every depart-ment of ordinary life. As in the case of personal knowl-edge, it is difficult to identify the moral expert. There is no discernible class of persons who are specialists in good conduct, as there are specialists in language, sci-ence, and art. Nor is there any clear road to moral mas-tery, as there is in these other fields. The ancient So-cratic question “Can virtue be taught?” continues to be asked.


Acknowledged Moral LeadersOn the other hand, there are acknowledged moral

leaders, to whom many look for moral direction and in-spiration. The great religions of humankind have brought forth their prophets, saints, and seers—Moses, Isaiah, Akhnaton, Gautama Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Muhammad, Francis of Assisi. National life produces he-roes who become exemplars of moral courage—Joan of Arc, Robert Bruce, Abraham Lincoln, Robert E. Lee, Mo-handas Gandhi. Humanitarians like Elizabeth Fry, William Wilberforce, Robert Owen, Jane Addams, and Ja-cob Riis arise to awaken consciousness of social injus-tices. Moral philosophers, too—Socrates, Marcus Aure-lius, St. Augustine, Blaise Pascal, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey—have made contri-butions to moral leadership by the articulation and criti-cal analysis of moral standards.

Laws and Customs of SocietyImportant as these leaders are, they are not the

principal source of moral guidance for the average per-son. By far the most significant sources of such influ-ence are the laws and customs of society. The con-science of a society is embodied in the traditions of ci-vility by which the common life is governed. Certain standards of conduct are taken for granted as the basis of the social system, and a variety of sanctions are used to encourage adherence to these standards. Obe-dience to laws and customs is not, of course, always right. Nevertheless, accepted social standards are in-tended to provide guidance for conduct, and they do embody much well-tested moral wisdom.

FIVE MAIN AREAS OF MORAL CONCERN

Human RightsThe content of the moral tradition covers every as-

pect of the common life. Beliefs about what is right and

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wrong are the very foundation of culture and civiliza-tion. Five main areas of moral concern deserve special notice. First, there are certain basic human rights, which describe conditions of life that it is believed ought to prevail. For example, the Constitution of the United States acknowledges such basic rights as the fol-lowing: trial of jury, in which the accused is given infor-mation on charges and the right to confront witnesses and have counsel; right of habeas corpus; freedom from ex post facto laws; freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition; right to bear arms; protection against arbitrary search and seizure; protection against double jeopardy and self incrimination; due process of law; and freedom from cruel and unusual punishments. An example of a more comprehensive statement of rights is found in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” proposed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. The fundamental human rights, no matter how stated, are those that are intended to secure the freedom, integrity, and dignity of the person as a person against unjust coercion of any kind.

Sex and Family RelationsA second area of primary ethical interest is that of

sex and family relations. Since the family is the elemen-tal social institution in which persons are born and nur-tured, it is essential that the relations between the sexes and among the members of the family be care-fully considered and wisely ordered. It is to this end that moral codes dealing with these matters are elaborated.

Class, Racial, Religious, and Vocational GroupsOther social relationships are the subject of a

third set of moral traditions. Included among these are such matters as relationships among and within class, ethnic, racial, religious, and vocational groups. Every culture has its distinctive expectations and regulations about what is right and wrong in these relationships.


Economic and Political LifeThe fourth and fifth major areas are those of eco-

nomic and political life. The economic aspect has to do with property rights and with the equitable distribution of goods and services, that is, with matters of distribu-tive justice. Political life is a matter of the just deploy-ment of power.

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THE MATTER OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

Each of the last four areas ultimately refers back to the matter of basic human rights, since the appropri-ate organization of society from an ethical standpoint is the one which is just, that is, which gives each person what is due him, or what he ought to have. The unjust social order, whether exemplified in family, vocation, exchange, or civic relations, is one in which the person is deprived of his basic rights arbitrarily and without jus-tification.

ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE THE GUARDIANS AND

PRACTITIONERS OF MORALITY

Since progress beyond the accepted standards of society depends upon criticism and the discovery of new moral possibilities, adherence to law and custom is not a sufficient basis for moral conduct. It is essential to recognize the place of tested tradition in ethics, for in doing so the special relevance of the common life (and of the “ordinary person”) to moral insight and the nor-mal means of ethical education can be understood. Or-dinary people, rather than a corps of specialists, are the guardians and practitioners of morality, because moral conduct has to do with right action in everyday affairs and with the basic terms for the common life. Moral conduct is the source of the common good, for which everyone, and not a particular group of professional moralists, is responsible. Specifically, right conduct can be taught, and is continually taught, not by experts who profess the subject of ethics, but by participation in the everyday life of society according to the recognized standards of that society. Such learning constitutes eth-ical education insofar as the standards engendered by law and custom are deliberately appropriated as the chosen principles of a person’s own conduct.

LANGUAGE OF MORALS SHOULD BE

ORDINARY LANGUAGE


Since morality is everyone’s business, it is natural that the language of morals should be ordinary lan-guage. In this realm no special technical concepts are required to express the intended meanings. Contempo-rary analytic philosophers are making a valuable contri-bution to ethical clarity in their appeal to ordinary lan-guage usage as the clue to ethical meanings. For exam-ple, they point out that when a person says “This action is right” he clearly does not mean the same as “I enjoy doing this” or “You should do this.” If he meant the lat-ter two assertions, he would have made them instead of saying what he said, which means something differ-ent. In the field of ethics, then, common language us-age is the basis for the expression of meanings.

ETHICAL THEORY

Despite this emphasis on common understandings in the ethical realm, there is still a place for ethical the-ory, that is, for reflection on what ethical understanding is and how it may be improved. Since moral judgments are practical rather than theoretical, the person who knows ethical theory is not on that account more moral than he would be without such knowledge. This con-trasts with the case of the scientist who in knowing the theory of his subject ipso facto becomes a better scien-tist. The ethical case parallels that of the artist and of the person in his ability to relate to himself and others in that theory is not of the essence of understanding the subject. The same holds for the person who is fluent in a language without knowing its theory.

The special value of ethical theory, like theory in all the other realms of meaning, is in guiding, teaching, and learning. If one knows precisely what an ethical meaning is and how moral judgments may be criticized and justified, reflection may be directed with maximum effect to developing moral competence.

MORAL DELIBERATION AND METHODS

OF ETHICAL INQUIRY

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How, then, should moral deliberation take place? What are the methods of ethical inquiry, either in soli-tude (where, finally, the moral decision is formed) or in association with others who may have conflicting con-victions about what ought to be done?


Have a Clear Understanding of What the Situa-tion is

To begin with, since moral conduct has to do with decisions to act in particular situations, wise choice pre-supposes clear understanding of what the situation is. The one who is required to act needs to know the con-text of his action—the circumstances and conditions in which his decision is to be made. The moral problem is of the form: What ought I to do in this situation? To solve it one has to be clear as to what is given in the setting where choice occurs. In short, before a person can know where to go, he needs to understand where he is starting from.

Construct in Imagination a Series of Possible De-cisions and Courses of Action

Having defined the situation, the next step in the inquiry is to construct in imagination a series of possi-ble decisions to be made and courses of action to be taken. Conduct is not moral if one acts without due de-liberation, does what first comes to mind, follows prece-dents automatically, or chooses on the basis of acciden-tal factors. The improvement of conduct depends upon the habit, in making each decision, of bringing into con-sciousness a range of different possibilities from among which a selection can be made. The imagined courses of action can be original constructions, like those of a playwright or novelist who invents the plot of his drama, or they make suggestions drawn from the ac-tions performed by other persons (or by oneself) in analogous circumstances.

Up to this point no distinctively moral element has entered in. The situation and the possibilities of action are matters of fact, not of obligation. Now comes the moral question per se: Which of the possible courses of action is the right one for me to take? There are three main types of ethical theory upon which the decision may proceed, namely, the subjectivist, the formalist, and the teleological.

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THREE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY:SUBJECTIVE, FORMALIST, AND TELEOLOGICAL

The SubjectivistAccording to the first type, the idea of right is de-

fined in terms of some subjective feeling-state. The right choice is defined as that which gives one the most pleasure or satisfaction. In effect this position simply dismisses the moral question as meaningless because the idea of right is absorbed into an idea of fact, namely, what pleases or satisfies wants. The chooser is asked to give up the moral search (which, it is as-sumed, will inevitably be fruitless) and unashamedly pursue the natural way of self-interest.

This first method of treating the moral problem is open to the criticism that it contradicts the entire moral experience of humankind and the persistent intuitions of the moral consciousness. As pointed out earlier, about any interest or desire pursued it always seems appropriate to ask, “But ought I pursue it?”—a question that would be pointless if the subjectivist approach were to be accepted.

The other two kinds of approach to the evaluation of the imagined possibilities of action presuppose the autonomy and distinctiveness of the ethical realm. They point to specifically moral resources for guiding choice.

The FormalistThe second type of theory is formalistic, because

the criteria of rightness are certain formal principles of action. According to this theory, there are universal standards of conduct by which decisions should be made. The study of these principles and the methods of applying them to particular cases is the subject of casu-istry. Examples of moral principles are the Golden Rule, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and the Ten Command-ments. The first two are completely formal in that they do not refer to the kind of action but only to the de-mand for reciprocity and universalizability, while the


Decalogue deals with certain specific classes of actions that are held to be intrinsically right or wrong.

In making decisions on a formalistic basis the vari-ous possibilities of action are evaluated by means of relevant formal principles. The question of relevance is determined by the kind of action contemplated. The principle used as a standard must refer to the same kind of action as the one being evaluated. In making the application the difficulty arises that moral principles are general, while more decisions are particular. It is necessary to decide whether principles are to be main-tained absolutely and without limitation or whether the particular circumstances alter the demands of the gen-eral rule. Sometimes, too, more than one principle ap-plies to a particular situation, and a decision must be made as to which rule to apply and, if both, how they may be reconciled. Such questions as these fall within the province of casuistry.

Under the formalist approach the moral inquirer needs an array of standards to which he can turn. These are found chiefly in the accepted traditions of the society in which one lives. They are available in the teachings of the great religious leaders, in sacred litera-ture, and in the writings of moral thinkers. They are to some extent embodied in historic charters and constitu-tions, and their particular applications are continually being worked out in the law and the courts.5

Another important source of principles is admired persons who in their own lives exemplify the meaning of good conduct. Probably no other influence to good behavior is as powerful as the example of a man who embodies the principles to which he is committed. For example, when Aristotle set about stating the principles

5 It is not implied here that the laws of a society are identical with moral principles. To a large extent laws are the rules of practice designed to further the ends of society. They are moral only inso-far as the ends to be served are morally conceived. The present point is simply that the laws of society are in fact often used as moral rules in making decisions.

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of right conduct in his Ethics, he simply described how an Athenian gentleman acts. The good life, he said in effect, is attained in acting the way good men act. In the same way, the Christian community has, for the most part, found its ideal of conduct in “the imitation of Christ”—the principle of action is to act the way Jesus did. The followers of the Buddha and of Muhammad the Prophet have adopted analogous procedures.

Useful as the formalist approach to moral decision is, it has its difficulties and limitations. One problem has already been suggested, namely, that of application to the particular situation. Formal principles tend to be empty. The morality of the deed may be more a func-tion of what is done, particularly and substantively, than of the form of doing it. One may assent to the prin-ciple of loving his neighbor, but still not know what lov-ing concretely means nor who his neighbor is in a given instance.

Formalism also tends to degenerate into legalism, that is, mechanical and literal keeping of rules as ends in themselves. The law loses its spirit and becomes let-ter. Obligation becomes the letter of the law. Duty for duty’s sake or the sake of the principle is in fact con-trary to the fundamental meaning of morality as action freely chosen for the sake of the right.

Another problem with formalism is that it may pro-vide no criteria for judging between possible courses of action to which different moral principles are relevant. Each mode of behavior may be judged as right by its own relevant principle, but still no basis may exist for deciding which mode to elect. This difficulty may be avoided only if moral principles are organized in a hier-archy of increasing generality, so that when two proxi-mately independent kinds of action are at issue, a more general principle comprising both kinds of action can be invoked. Such comprehensive principles as the Golden Rule provide standards of this broad type allowing dis-criminations between actions ostensibly different in kind, to which different particular rules apply.


The most perplexing difficulty of all with the for-malist approach to moral judgments is the problem of the choice and justification of the principles them-selves. Perhaps the major problem in moral decision is not in testing imagined possibilities against a set of principles, but in the selection of principles to be used as standards. many offer themselves as leaders, au-thorities, and exemplars. Which among them are the true authorities? Laws and traditions differ from culture to culture. Which are worthy of acceptance as moral guides?

The Teleological MethodPerhaps the best solution to the problems pre-

sented by formalism is to adopt the third of the basic ethical theories, namely, the teleological one. According to this position, the rightness of an act is judged ac-cording to the consequences of doing it. If the conse-quences are good, the act is right; if they are evil, the act is wrong. Thus, the primary category in teleological ethical theory is good instead of right, which is primary in formalism.

Using the teleological method, one makes his choice by considering what the different possible lines of action are likely to lead to and by weighing the rela-tive worth of the several consequences. The right action is then the one that produces the best results. This method is also useful in deciding between moral princi-ples. Those laws or rules are best that, on the whole, yield the best consequences when applied.

The teleological method, of course, does not so much solve the moral problem as shift its basis from judgments about right to judgments about good. To use the method effectively, one has to be able to evaluate the worth of consequences. Much of the appeal of the teleological approach lies in the fact that many people think they can know and agree better on what is good than on what they ought to do, and hence that they can resolve the question of right by determining what

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course of action is the most likely to lead to the agreed good consequences. This analysis of means to ends is the basis for the pragmatist theory of valuation.6

If it is assumed that the good is defined as what gives pleasure, success, or any other state of affairs, then the teleologist commits the naturalistic fallacy of identifying a fact with a value. To avoid this, the mean-ing of desirable consequences must be interpreted as an ideal. This concept of ideals is fundamental to teleo-logical ethical theory. It means a state of affairs that is worth brining into being, “A consummation devoutly to be hoped for.” An ideal is not an actuality, not a fact, but a possibility that ought to be realized, a potentiality it is desirable to actualize.

From the teleological standpoint, then, moral deci-sion requires a set of ideals to serve as standards of ref-erence in the evaluation of consequences—a realm or kingdom of ends that define what is worthy of effort, sacrifice, and devotion. The sources of these ideals are essentially the same as the sources of moral principles earlier suggested. The moral traditions of humankind contain visions of the good life and have compelling power on the actions of men. For use in moral decision, these goods need to be arranged in hierarchical order so that conflicts among lesser goods may be resolved by reference to goods on a higher level.

A THEORY OF CONSCIENCE AND INTUITION

One solution to the problem of authority is offered in the theory of conscience. It is said that every person is endowed with a native intuition of the right which, if he attends to it and obeys it, will enable him to know right from wrong. Moral principles are simply general-izations of what men had heard with the ear of con-science, and they may be checked for authenticity by any person who sincerely and persistently seeks to know and do what is right.6 For a classic statement of this position see John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939.


A NATURAL LAW VIEW

Other theorists hold to a natural law view of moral principles. According to this view, generalizations about right conduct can be made on rational grounds; there are certain self-evident truths about conduct that can be justified with certainty by rational reflection alone. Specifically, certain rationalists of the Enlightenment held “these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” The natural law of morality is believed to be as real and certain as the natural law of fact discovered in empirical inquiry, although the natural law of morality is a law of obliga-tion which may be disobeyed, while empirical laws de-scribe what necessarily occurs, without any possibility of disobedience. The natural moral law is a normative, prescriptive law in the domain of freedom. The natural law of science is a factual, descriptive law in the do-main of necessity.

THE DOCTRINE OF REVELATION

Another answer to the problem of authority is the doctrine of revelation, according to which certain princi-ples are authenticated on the basis of the supernatural circumstances attending their disclosure. If miracles, signs, and wonders are believed to have accompanied the giving of the law, and if these indications are guar-anteed by a powerful and respected institution with a long and impressive history, the authority of the revela-tion is difficult for many people to call into question.

CONSCIENCE, REASON, AND REVELATION

ARE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED GUIDES

Unfortunately, conscience, reason, and revelation have not proved to be clear, unambiguous, and univer-sally acknowledged guides. The moral intuitions of the most earnest, reasonable, and well-intentioned people

MORAL KNOWLEDGE 397

differ, and what are supernatural proofs to one group of believers are considered superstitions by another group. The fact of persistent disagreement on moral questions is the rock on which all claims to infallible au-thority, whether in intuition, reason, or revelation, come to grief.

CERTAIN PRINCIPLES ARE UNIVERSALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

On the other hand, the problem of disagreement should not be exaggerated to the point where one throws in the sponge with the subjectivists and denies that moral claims have any meaning apart from per-sonal feeling-states. There are certain principles, such as the duty to keep promises and to tell the truth, which are universally acknowledged. Furthermore, ap-parent differences in principle may actually be differ-ences in application under different circumstances. Moral judgments are necessarily relative to situations, and in that sense ethical relativism is justified. It can also be argued that because of human limitations no one can know that is really right and that different prin-ciples are varying approximations to the right, each with some measure of authenticity but each also limited by the particular biases of the persons and groups who accept it.

DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF GOOD AND RIGHT

Unfortunately, there appears to be no sure means of demonstrating what the ideal life really is, so that ev-eryone will agree. There continue to be differences in conceptions of the good, just as there are differences in conceptions of the right. Conflicts may be due to the fact that no common basis for values exists, and that the good is simply another name for what people hap-pen to want. If that is so, the moral problem is dis-missed as a pseudoproblem.7 Again, conflicts may be due to the complexity of the problems of evaluation 7 This is the subjectivist position once more.


and the need for much fuller thought and discussion. The good may be accessible to mutual understanding but difficult to establish.

INGRAINED EGO CENTRICITY IN HUMAN BEINGS

The persistence of disagreements may be a result of an ingrained egocentricity in human beings that bi-ases their judgments in favor of their own interests and makes universal agreement difficult or impossible (in contrast to the field of empirical science, where self-in-terest is not involved in the same extent, making con-sensus possible). This is the position taken by theolo-gians who affirm a doctrine of original sin, or of inveter-ate self-centeredness.8

8 See, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, vol. 1, 1941.

MORAL KNOWLEDGE 399

Guilt is a normal humanemotion. Most people inherently

try to do what they believe is right andare consciously aware of it when they

donot. When people do wrong and are punished for it, society generally be-lieves they deserved it. If an existing

rule is broken and the childis not punished, what does the child

learnabout society’s moral convictions or

about the importance of the rule.


Picture

MORAL KNOWLEDGE 401

APPEAL TO ESSENTIAL HUMAN NATURE AS THE

ULTIMATE CRITERION OF THE GOOD

The goal of universal consensus is itself an ideal deeply rooted in the moral consciousness. It is this ideal that persistently stands in the way of surrendering to an easy subjectivism—a toleration of all values as per-sonal preferences, not subject to moral judgment. One way of establishing an ideal of the good that can be uni-versally acknowledged and used to counteract the ego-centric bias is to appeal to essential human nature as the ultimate criterion of the good. This approach is in effect a species of natural law ethical theory, applied to ends rather than to kinds of action. The highest good for man is taken as the maximum fulfillment of human potentialities, or as realizing what is deepest and most essential in human existence.9

It might seem, and it is frequently so argued, that refer-ring the good to the nature of man opens the possibility of an empirical ethical theory, since human nature is a matter of fact. This conclusion is erroneous because the standard here is not actual empirical human nature, but “ideal” or “essential” human nature. These terms, and ones like “maximum fulfillment” and “deepest,” do not refer to facts, but to values. They are gerundives rather than descriptions. “Essential human nature” is not a natural fact but an ideal that is appropriate to human beings.

THE GOOD LIFE CONSISTS IN THE REALIZATION

OF MEANING IN ALL THE REALMS

The present study suggests a basis for articulating an ideal of human nature. It has been indicated throughout that the distinctive goal of human existence is the realization of meaning. The good life consists in the realization of meanings, in all realms: in the ability to communicate intelligibly and forcefully, to organize the experience of sense into significant generalizations 9 This is the approach used by certain ethically oriented psycholo-gist like Erich Fromm and Abraham H. Maslow.


and theories with predictive power, to express the inner life in moving esthetic constructions, to relate with oth-ers and with oneself in acceptance and love, to act with deliberate responsibility, and to coordinate these mean-ings into an integrated vision and commitment.

PERFECTING HUMAN LIFE THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING

Such an ideal of what human life can be and ought to be is consistent with the facts of human experience and with the persistent visions of universality, truth, beauty, love, duty, and integrity that have come down in the moral traditions of humankind. It states a goal, based on the study of human potentialities, by which the consequences of actions may be assessed, and con-sequently provides a solid ground for moral decisions. On this foundation a defensible and productive theory of morals can be established—a theory according to which the entire educative endeavor is seen as a moral enterprise aimed at the consummation of human life through the increase in meaning in all its realms.

WAYS OF KNOWING

1. Why are language meanings ethically neutral?2. How are face and moral obligation essentially dif-

ferent logical orders?3. What is meant when a person says, “This is

good?”4. What does the term “naturalistic fallacy: mean?5. How does rejecting the naturalistic fallacy pre-

serve the logical integrity of ethical meanings?6. How are ethical statements merely expressions of

personal preference?7. What are gerundives?8. What is truth?9. What does “excellent” mean?10. What does “beautiful” mean?11. What does “worthy of admiration” mean?

MORAL KNOWLEDGE 403

12. What does “right” mean?13. How do ethical meanings differ from esthetic

meanings?14. What is the most important difference between

ethical meanings and esthetic meanings?15. Why is it important to keep clear the logical dis-

tinctions between meanings in the two realms of esthetics and ethics?

16. How does moral choice have both personal and impersonal elements?

17. How do ethical meanings differ from personal knowledge?

18. How does ethics differ from personal understand-ing in respect to the element of obligation?

19. What is the central concept in the realm of ethics?20. Why is ethics everybody’s business?21. Can you add several names to the list of moral

leaders identified in the book?22. How are the laws and customs of society signifi-

cant sources for moral guidance?23. What are human rights?24. Why is it essential the relations between the sexes

and among members of the family be carefully considered and wisely ordered?

25. Why does every culture have its distinctive expec-tations and regulations about what is right and wrong?

26. Why are economic life and political life important to the matter of basic human rights?

27. What is important to remember about basic hu-man rights?

28. How are ordinary people the guardians and practi-tioners of morality?

29. Why should the language of morals be ordinary language?

30. Why is there still a place for ethical theory in the ethical realm?

31. How should moral deliberation take place?


32. What are the methods of inquiry in moral delibera-tion?

33. Why is conduct not moral if one acts without due deliberation?

34. How do you put into practice or action the three main types of ethical theory upon which decisions may proceed, namely, the subjectivist, the formal-ist, and the teleological?

35. What is the subjectivist approach?36. What is the formalist approach?37. What is the teleological approach?38. What are some inherent problems in using the for-

malistic approach?39. What is the theory of conscience?40. What is native intuition?41. What are natural law principles?42. What is the doctrine of revelation?43. Why aren’t conscience, reason, and revelation ac-

knowledged guides for ethical behavior?44. What useful principles are universally acknowl-

edged for guiding ethical behavior?45. Why are there conflicts between differences in

conceptions of good and right?46. Why are disagreements perhaps the result of in-

grained egocentricity in human beings?47. How can appealing to essential human nature as

the ultimate criterion of the good help to counter-act the egocentric bias of human beings?

48. According to the book, what does the good life consist of?

49. How can a defensible and productive theory of morals be established in the educative endeavor?

50. How does one perfect life through the realms of meaning?

Chapter 17 Moral Knowledge from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD

Education

ethical considerations

basic rights

cambridge

moral tradition

basic human

obligation

unjust social

acknowledged