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Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles, 6/E William Stallings
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Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Dec 19, 2015

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Page 1: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Chapter 14Computer Security Threats

Patricia RoyManatee Community College, Venice,

FL©2008, Prentice Hall

Operating Systems:Internals and Design Principles, 6/E

William Stallings

Page 2: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Computer Security

• Confidentiality– Data confidentiality– Privacy

• Integrity– Data integrity– System integrity

• Availabilty

Page 3: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

The Security Requirements Triad

Page 4: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Additional Concepts

• Authenticity• Accountability

Page 5: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Threats

Page 6: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Threats

Page 7: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Threats

Page 8: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Threats

Page 9: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Scope of System Security

Page 10: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Assets

Page 11: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intruders

• Masquerader• Misfeasor• Clandestine user

Page 12: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intruders

Page 13: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intruders

Page 14: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Intruders

Page 15: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Backdoor

• Trapdoor• Secret entry point• Useful for programmers debuggin

Page 16: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Logic Bomb

• Explodes when certain conditions are met– Presence or absence of certain files– Particular day of the week– Particular user running application

Page 17: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Trojan Horse

• Useful program that contains hidden code that when invoked performs some unwanted or harmful function

• Can be used to accomplish functions indirectly that an unauthorized user could not accomplish directly– User may set file permission so everyone has

access

Page 18: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Mobile Code

• Transmitted from remote system to local system

• Executed on local system without the user’s explicit instruction

Page 19: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Multiple-Threat Malware

• Multipartite virus infects in multiple ways• Blended attack uses multiple methods• Ex: Nimda has worm, virus, and mobile

code characteristics

Page 20: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Parts of Virus

• Infection mechanism• Trigger• Payload

Page 21: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Stages

• Dormant phase– Virus is idle

• Propagation phase– Virus places an identical copy of itself into

other programs or into certain system areas on the disk

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Page 22: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Stages

• Triggering phase– Virus is activated to perform the function for

which it was intended– Caused by a variety of system events

• Execution phase– Function is performed

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Page 23: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Simple Virus

Page 24: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Compression Virus

Page 25: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Target

• Boot sector infector• File infector• Macro virus

Page 26: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Concealment Strategy

• Encrypted virus– Random encryption key encrypts remainder of

virus

• Stealth virus– Hides itself from detection of antivirus

software

Page 27: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Virus Classification by Concealment Strategy

• Polymorphic virus– Mutates with every infection

• Metamorphic virus– Mutates with every infection– Rewrites itself completely after every iteration

Page 28: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Macro Viruses

• Platform independent– Most infect Microsoft Word documents

• Infect documents, not executable portions of code

• Easily spread• File system access controls are of limited

use in preventing spread

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Page 29: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

E-Mail Viruses

• Attachment• Open e-mail • Uses e-mail software to replicate

Page 30: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Worms

• Use network connections to spread form system to system

• Electronic mail facility– A worm mails a copy of itself to other systems

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Page 31: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Worms

• Remote execution capability– A worm executes a copy of itself on another

system

• Remote log-in capability– A worm logs on to a remote system as a user

and then uses commands to copy itself from one system to the other

Page 32: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Worm Propagation Model

Page 33: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Bots

• Zombie or drone• Program secretly takes of another

Internet-attached computer• Launch attacks that are difficult to trace to

bot’s creator• Collection of bots is a botnet

Page 34: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

Rootkit

• Set of programs installed on a system to maintain administrator (or root) access to that system

• Hides its existece

Page 35: Chapter 14 Computer Security Threats Patricia Roy Manatee Community College, Venice, FL ©2008, Prentice Hall Operating Systems: Internals and Design Principles,

System Call Table Modification by Rootkit