Chapter 12

Chapter Twelve: Chapter Twelve: The Fact-Value ProblemThe Fact-Value Problem

MetaethicsMetaethics

►Philosophizing about the very terms of ethicsPhilosophizing about the very terms of ethics

►Considering the structure of ethics as an object Considering the structure of ethics as an object of inquiryof inquiry

Fact-Value ProblemFact-Value Problem

►The problem of determining whether values are The problem of determining whether values are essentially different from facts, whether moral essentially different from facts, whether moral assessments are derived from facts, and whether assessments are derived from facts, and whether moral statements can be true or false like factual moral statements can be true or false like factual statementsstatements

►Metaethics is used as a type of inquiry to address Metaethics is used as a type of inquiry to address the fact-value problem.the fact-value problem.

Hume and Moore: The Problem Hume and Moore: The Problem Classically StatedClassically Stated

►Hume: The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from IsHume: The Fallacy of Deriving Ought from Is

►Moore: The Naturalistic FallacyMoore: The Naturalistic Fallacy

The Fallacy of DerivingThe Fallacy of DerivingOught from IsOught from Is

Hume:Hume:In every system of morality which I have hitherto met In every system of morality which I have hitherto met

with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.

The Fallacy of DerivingThe Fallacy of DerivingOught from IsOught from Is

►Moral theories begin by observing some specific Moral theories begin by observing some specific facts about the world, and then they conclude from facts about the world, and then they conclude from these some statements about moral obligation. these some statements about moral obligation. ►In other words, they move from statements about In other words, they move from statements about what what isis the case to statement about what the case to statement about what oughtought to to be the casebe the case

Moore: The Naturalistic FallacyMoore: The Naturalistic Fallacy

►It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any specific natural property such as “pleasure” or specific natural property such as “pleasure” or “being more evolved”“being more evolved”►G. E. Moore claims that a concept like the G. E. Moore claims that a concept like the “Good” is indefinable because it is a “Good” is indefinable because it is a simple simple propertyproperty, a property that has no parts and thus , a property that has no parts and thus cannot be defined by constituent elementscannot be defined by constituent elements

Open-Question ArgumentOpen-Question Argument

►A test to help determine whether a moral theory A test to help determine whether a moral theory commits the naturalistic fallacycommits the naturalistic fallacy

►For any property that we identify with For any property that we identify with “goodness” we can ask, “Is that property itself “goodness” we can ask, “Is that property itself good?”good?”

Ayer and EmotivismAyer and Emotivism

Ayer's Two Pronged Approach:Ayer's Two Pronged Approach:►Argues that the fact-value problem arises Argues that the fact-value problem arises

because moral statements cannot pass a critical because moral statements cannot pass a critical test of meaning called the test of meaning called the verification principleverification principle

►Ayer's solution is that moral utterances are only Ayer's solution is that moral utterances are only expressions of feelings, a position called expressions of feelings, a position called emotivismemotivism

Verification PrincipleVerification Principle

A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either tautological or empirically verifiabletautological or empirically verifiable

Ayer's TheoryAyer's Theory

►Emotivism holds that moral judgments do not Emotivism holds that moral judgments do not have truth values.have truth values.►Moral judgments are expressions of our Moral judgments are expressions of our attitudes.attitudes.►These judgments express our feelings and help These judgments express our feelings and help us to persuade others to act as we desire.us to persuade others to act as we desire.

Criticisms of EmotivismCriticisms of Emotivism

►The verification theory of meaning doesn't pass The verification theory of meaning doesn't pass it's own testit's own test►There is a problem with their view that ethical There is a problem with their view that ethical disagreements are disagreements in attitudedisagreements are disagreements in attitude►Morality seems deeper than mere emotions or Morality seems deeper than mere emotions or acting on feelings or attitudesacting on feelings or attitudes

Hare and PrescriptivismHare and Prescriptivism

►Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact) Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact) and prescriptive (value) element.and prescriptive (value) element.►The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and recommends that others adopt our value attituderecommends that others adopt our value attitude►Moral judgments add a prescriptive element to Moral judgments add a prescriptive element to the descriptive element, the prescriptive being the the descriptive element, the prescriptive being the more important elementmore important element

The Logic of Moral ReasoningThe Logic of Moral Reasoning

►There is a logic to prescriptive judgmentsThere is a logic to prescriptive judgments►Moral judgments do not have truth value but Moral judgments do not have truth value but they do have a logical formthey do have a logical form

UniversalizabilityUniversalizability

►In making moral judgments one has to say that In making moral judgments one has to say that one would make the same judgment in all similar one would make the same judgment in all similar cases. A judgment is not moral unless the agent is cases. A judgment is not moral unless the agent is prepared to universalize his or her principleprepared to universalize his or her principle►Universalizability is both a necessary and a Universalizability is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for moral principlessufficient condition for moral principles

PrinciplesPrinciples►Principles are central to moral reasoning.Principles are central to moral reasoning.►Principles serve as major premises in our moral Principles serve as major premises in our moral arguments.arguments.►We acquire or learn a basic set of principles.We acquire or learn a basic set of principles.►Then we learn when to use or when to Then we learn when to use or when to subordinate those principles.subordinate those principles.►We choose when, where, and why to apply our We choose when, where, and why to apply our specific principles but we are committed to them specific principles but we are committed to them and to universalizing themand to universalizing them

Criticisms of PrescriptivismCriticisms of Prescriptivism1. It is too broad and allows for conduct that we 1. It is too broad and allows for conduct that we

typically deem immoraltypically deem immoral

2. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral 2. It permits trivial judgments to count as moral onesones

3. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away 3. It allows the moral substance in life to slip away from ethical theoryfrom ethical theory

4. There are no constraints on altering one's 4. There are no constraints on altering one's principlesprinciples

NaturalismNaturalism

Links moral terms with some kind of natural Links moral terms with some kind of natural property. property. NaturalNatural in that they are found in the in that they are found in the natural world, specifically the natural realms of natural world, specifically the natural realms of human psychology and human societyhuman psychology and human society

Naturalism and the Naturalism and the Open-Ended ArgumentOpen-Ended Argument

Moore's theory regards the idea of goodness as Moore's theory regards the idea of goodness as though it were a thing, the fallacy of though it were a thing, the fallacy of hypostatizationhypostatization

It's a category mistake to treat a functional term as It's a category mistake to treat a functional term as though it were a thingthough it were a thing