Chapter 11 Pricing with Market Power
Feb 12, 2016
Chapter 11Pricing with
Market Power
Chapter 11 Slide 2
Topics to be Discussed
Capturing Consumer Surplus
Price Discrimination
Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Chapter 11 Slide 3
Topics to be Discussed
The Two-Part Tariff
Bundling
Advertising
Chapter 11 Slide 4
Introduction
Pricing without market power (perfect competition) is determined by market supply and demand.
The individual producer must be able to forecast the market and then concentrate on managing production (cost) to maximize profits.
Chapter 11 Slide 5
Introduction
Pricing with market power (imperfect competition) requires the individual producer to know much more about the characteristics of demand as well as manage production.
Chapter 11 Slide 6
Capturing Consumer Surplus
Quantity
$/Q
D
MR
Pmax
MC If price is raised above P*, the firm will lose
sales and reduce profit.PC
PC is the pricethat would exist in
a perfectly competitivemarket.
A
P*
Q*
P1
Between 0 and Q*, consumerswill pay more than
P*--consumer surplus (A).
B
P2
Beyond Q*, price willhave to fall to create a consumer surplus (B).
Chapter 11 Slide 7
Capturing Consumer Surplus
•P*Q*: single P & Q @ MC=MR•A: consumer surplus with P*•B: P>MC & consumer would buy at a lower price•P1: less sales and profits•P2 : increase sales & and reduce revenue and profits•PC: competitive price
Quantity
$/Q
D
MR
Pmax
MCPC
A
P*
Q*
P1
B
P2
Chapter 11 Slide 8
Capturing Consumer Surplus
Quantity
$/Q
D
MR
Pmax
MCPC
A
P*
Q*
P1
B
P2
QuestionHow can the firm
capture the consumer surplusin A and sell profitably in B?
AnswerPrice discrimination
Two-part tariffsBundling
Chapter 11 Slide 9
Capturing Consumer Surplus
Price discrimination is the charging of different prices to different consumers for similar goods.
Chapter 11 Slide 10
Price Discrimination
First Degree Price DiscriminationCharge a separate price to each customer:
the maximum or reservation price they are willing to pay.
Chapter 11 Slide 11
P*
Q*
Without price discrimination,output is Q* and price is P*.Variable profit is the area
between the MC & MR (yellow).
Additional Profit From Perfect First-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
$/Q Pmax
With perfect discrimination, eachconsumer pays the maximumprice they are willing to pay.
Consumer surplus is the area above P* and between
0 and Q* output.
D = AR
MR
MC
Output expands to Q** and pricefalls to PC where MC = MR = AR = D.
Profits increase by the area above MCbetween old MR and D to output
Q** (purple)
Q**
PC
Chapter 11 Slide 12
P*
Q*
Consumer surplus when a single price P* is charged.
Variable profit when a single price P* is charged.
Additional profit fromperfect price discrimination
Quantity
$/Q Pmax
D = AR
MR
MC
Q**
PC
With perfect discrimination• Each customer pays their reservation price•Profits increase
Additional Profit From Perfect First-Degree Price Discrimination
Chapter 11 Slide 13
QuestionWhy would a producer have difficulty in
achieving first-degree price discrimination?
Answer
1) Too many customers (impractical)
2) Could not estimate the reservation price for each customer
Additional Profit From Perfect First-Degree Price Discrimination
Chapter 11 Slide 14
Price Discrimination
First Degree Price DiscriminationThe model does demonstrate the potential
profit (incentive) of practicing price discrimination to some degree.
Chapter 11 Slide 15
Price Discrimination
First Degree Price DiscriminationExamples of imperfect price discrimination
where the seller has the ability to segregate the market to some extent and charge different prices for the same product:
Lawyers, doctors, accountantsCar salesperson (15% profit margin)Colleges and universities
Chapter 11 Slide 16
First-Degree PriceDiscrimination in Practice
Quantity
D
MR
MC
$/Q
P2
P3
P*4
P5
P6
P1
Six prices exist resultingin higher profits. With a single price
P*4, there are few consumers andthose who pay P5 or P6 may have a surplus.
Q
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
$/Q
D
MR
MCAC
P0
Q0
Without discrimination: P = P0 and Q = Q0. With second-degree
discrimination there are threeprices P1, P2, and P3.(e.g. electric utilities)
P1
Q1
1st Block
P2
Q2
P3
Q3
2nd Block 3rd Block
Second-degree pricediscrimination is pricing
according to quantityconsumed--or in blocks.
Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
$/Q
D
MR
MCAC
P0
Q0
P1
Q1
1st Block
P2
Q2
P3
Q3
2nd Block 3rd Block
Economies of scale permit:•Increase consumer welfare•Higher profits
Chapter 11 Slide 19
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price Discrimination
1) Divides the market into two-groups.
2) Each group has its own demand function.
Chapter 11 Slide 20
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price Discrimination
3) Most common type of pricediscrimination.
Examples: airlines, liquor, vegetables, discounts to students and senior citizens.
Chapter 11 Slide 21
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price Discrimination
4) Third-degree price discrimination is feasible when the seller can separate his/her market into groups who have different price elasticities of demand (e.g. business air travelers versus vacation air travelers)
Chapter 11 Slide 22
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationObjectives
MR1 = MR2
MC1 = MR1 and MC2 = MR2
MR1 = MR2 = MC
Chapter 11 Slide 23
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationP1: price first group
P2: price second group
C(Qr) = total cost of QT = Q1 + Q2
Profit ( ) = P1Q1 + P2Q2 - C(Qr)
Chapter 11 Slide 24
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationSet incremental for sales to group 1 = 0
0(
11
)11
1
QC
QQP
Q
MCQCMR
QQP
11
1
11 )(
Chapter 11 Slide 25
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationSecond group of customers: MR2 = MC
MR1 = MR2 = MC
Chapter 11 Slide 26
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationDetermining relative prices
)11()11(11
222111 EPMREPMREPMR d
:Then :Recall
Chapter 11 Slide 27
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationDetermining relative prices
Pricing: Charge higher price to group with a low demand elasticity
)11()11(
1
2
2
1
EE
PP
:And
Chapter 11 Slide 28
Price Discrimination
Third Degree Price DiscriminationExample: E1 = -2 & E2 = -4
P1 should be 1.5 times as high as P2
5.12143)211()411(
2
1
PP
Chapter 11 Slide 29
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
D2 = AR2
MR2
$/Q
D1 = AR1MR1
Consumers are divided intotwo groups, with separate
demand curves for each group.
MRT
MRT = MR1 + MR2
Chapter 11 Slide 30
Third-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity
D2 = AR2
MR2
$/Q
D1 = AR1MR1
MRT
MC
Q2
P2
QT
•QT: MC = MRT
•Group 1: P1Q1 ; more elastic•Group 2: P2Q2; more inelastic•MR1 = MR2 = MC•QT control MC
Q1
P1
MC = MR1 at Q1 and P1
Chapter 11 Slide 31
No Sales to Smaller Market
Even if third-degree pricediscrimination is feasible, it doesn’t
always pay to sell to both groupsof consumers if marginal cost is rising.
Chapter 11 Slide 32
No Sales to Smaller Market
Quantity
D2
MR2
$/Q
MC
D1
MR1 Q*
P*
Group one, with demand D1, are not
willing to pay enoughfor the good to
make pricediscrimination profitable.
Chapter 11 Slide 33
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Those consumers who are more price elastic will tend to use the coupon/rebate more often when they purchase the product than those consumers with a less elastic demand.
Coupons and rebate programs allow firms to price discriminate.
Price Discrimination
Chapter 11 Slide 34
Price Elasticities of Demand for Users Versus Nonusers of Coupons
Toilet tissue -0.60 -0.66
Stuffing/dressing -0.71 -0.96
Shampoo -0.84 -1.04
Cooking/salad oil -1.22 -1.32
Dry mix dinner -0.88 -1.09
Cake mix -0.21 -0.43
Price ElasticityProduct Nonusers Users
Chapter 11 Slide 35
Cat food -0.49 -1.13
Frozen entrée -0.60 -0.95
Gelatin -0.97 -1.25
Spaghetti sauce -1.65 -1.81
Crème rinse/conditioner -0.82 -1.12
Soup -1.05 -1.22
Hot dogs -0.59 -0.77
Price ElasticityProduct Nonusers Users
Price Elasticities of Demand for Users Versus Nonusers of Coupons
Chapter 11 Slide 36
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Cake Mix
Nonusers of coupons: PE = -0.21
Users: PE = -0.43
Chapter 11 Slide 37
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Cake Mix Brand (Pillsbury)
PE: 8 to 10 times cake mix PE
Example
PE Users: -4
PE Nonusers: -2
Chapter 11 Slide 38
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates
Using:
Price of nonusers should be 1.5 times users
Or, if cake mix sells for $1.50, coupons should be 50 cents
)11()11(
1
2
2
1
EE
PP
Chapter 11 Slide 39
Airline Fares
Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a higher fare than others.
Business travelers have few choices and their demand is less elastic.
Casual travelers have choices and are more price sensitive.
Chapter 11 Slide 40
Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel
Price -0.3 -0.4 -0.9
Income 1.2 1.2 1.8
Fare CategoryElasticity First-Class Unrestricted Coach Discount
Chapter 11 Slide 41
Airline Fares
The airlines separate the market by setting various restrictions on the tickets.Less expensive: notice, stay over the
weekend, no refundMost expensive: no restrictions
Chapter 11 Slide 42
Intertemporal PriceDiscrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Separating the Market With TimeInitial release of a product, the demand is
inelasticBookMovieComputer
Chapter 11 Slide 43
Separating the Market With TimeOnce this market has yielded a maximum
profit, firms lower the price to appeal to a general market with a more elastic demand
Paper back booksDollar MoviesDiscount computers
Intertemporal PriceDiscrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Chapter 11 Slide 44
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Quantity
AC = MC
$/Q
Over time, demand becomesmore elastic and price
is reduced to appeal to the mass market.
Q2
MR2
D2 = AR2
P2
D1 = AR1MR1
P1
Q1
Consumers are dividedinto groups over time.
Initially, demand is lesselastic resulting in a
price of P1 .
Chapter 11 Slide 45
Demand for some products may peak at particular times.Rush hour trafficElectricity - late summer afternoonsSki resorts on weekends
Intertemporal PriceDiscrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Peak-Load Pricing
Chapter 11 Slide 46
Capacity restraints will also increase MC.
Increased MR and MC would indicate a higher price.
Peak-Load Pricing
Intertemporal PriceDiscrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Chapter 11 Slide 47
MR is not equal for each market because one market does not impact the other market.
Peak-Load Pricing
Intertemporal PriceDiscrimination and Peak-Load Pricing
Chapter 11 Slide 48
MR1
D1 = AR1
MC
P1
Q1
Peak-load price = P1 .
Peak-Load Pricing
Quantity
$/Q
MR2
D2 = AR2
Off- load price = P2 .
Q2
P2
Chapter 11 Slide 49
How to Price a Best Selling Novel
What Do You Think?
1) How would you arrive at the price for the initial release of the hardbound
edition of a book?
Chapter 11 Slide 50
How to Price a Best Selling Novel
What Do You Think?
2) How long do you wait to release the paperback edition? Could the
popularity of the book impact your decision?
Chapter 11 Slide 51
What Do You Think?
3) How do you determine the price for the paperback edition?
How to Price a Best Selling Novel
Chapter 11 Slide 52
The Two-Part Tariff
The purchase of some products and services can be separated into two decisions, and therefore, two prices.
Chapter 11 Slide 53
The Two-Part Tariff
Examples
1) Amusement ParkPay to enterPay for rides and food within the park
2) Tennis ClubPay to joinPay to play
Chapter 11 Slide 54
The Two-Part Tariff
Examples
3) Rental of Mainframe ComputersFlat FeeProcessing Time
4) Safety RazorPay for razorPay for blades
Chapter 11 Slide 55
The Two-Part Tariff
Examples
5) Polaroid FilmPay for the cameraPay for the film
Chapter 11 Slide 56
The Two-Part Tariff
Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P).
Choosing the trade-off between free-entry and high use prices or high-entry and zero use prices.
Chapter 11 Slide 57
Usage price P*is set whereMC = D. Entry price T* is equal to the entire consumer surplus.
T*
Two-Part Tariff with a Single Consumer
Quantity
$/Q
MCP*
D
Chapter 11 Slide 58
D2 = consumer 2
D1 = consumer 1
Q1Q2
The price, P*, will be greater than MC. Set T* at the surplus value of D2.T*
Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Quantity
$/Q
MC
A
BC
ABC e than twicmore )()(2 21
**
QQxMCPT
Chapter 11 Slide 59
The Two-Part Tariff
The Two-Part Tariff With Many Different ConsumersNo exact way to determine P* and T*.Must consider the trade-off between the
entry fee T* and the use fee P*.Low entry fee: High sales and falling
profit with lower price and more entrants.
Chapter 11 Slide 60
The Two-Part Tariff
The Two-Part Tariff With Many Different ConsumersTo find optimum combination, choose
several combinations of P,T.Choose the combination that maximizes
profit.
Chapter 11 Slide 61
Two-Part Tariff withMany Different Consumers
T
Profit
a :entry fee
s :sales
Total
T*
Total profit is the sum of the profit from the entry fee andthe profit from sales. Both
depend on T.
entrantsnnQMCPTTnsa
)()()(
Chapter 11 Slide 62
The Two-Part Tariff
Rule of ThumbSimilar demand: Choose P close to MC
and high TDissimilar demand: Choose high P and low
T.
Chapter 11 Slide 63
The Two-Part Tariff
Two-Part Tariff With A TwistEntry price (T) entitles the buyer to a
certain number of free unitsGillette razors with several bladesAmusement parks with some tokensOn-line with free time
Chapter 11 Slide 64
Polaroid Cameras
1971 Polaroid introduced the SX-70 camera
What Do You Think?How would you price the camera and film?
Chapter 11 Slide 65
Polaroid Cameras
Hint
cameras producing of costfilm producing of cost
sold cameras of numbersold film ofquantity
camera of pricefilm of price
)()(
)()(
2
1
21
nCQC
nQTP
nCQCnTPQ
Chapter 11 Slide 66
Pricing Cellular Phone Service
QuestionWhy do cellular phone providers offer
several different plans instead of a single two-part tariff with an access fee and per-unit charge?
Chapter 11 Slide 67
Bundling
Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantage.
Conditions necessary for bundlingHeterogeneous customersPrice discrimination is not possibleDemands must be negatively correlated
Chapter 11 Slide 68
Bundling
An example: Leasing “Gone with the Wind” & “Getting Gerties Garter.”The reservation prices for each theater and
movie are:
Gone with the Wind Getting Gertie’s Garter
Theater A $12,000 $3,000Theater B $10,000 $4,000
Chapter 11 Slide 69
Bundling
Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie:Maximum price Wind = $10,000Maximum price Gertie = $3,000
Total Revenue = $26,000
Chapter 11 Slide 70
Bundling
If the movies are bundled:Theater A will pay $15,000 for bothTheater B will pay $14,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000.
Chapter 11 Slide 71
Bundling
Negative Correlated: Profitable to Bundle
A pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000).
B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000).
Relative Valuations
Chapter 11 Slide 72
Bundling
If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in revenue.
Gone with the Wind Getting Gertie’s Garter
Theater A $12,000 $4,000Theater B $10,000 $3,000
Relative Valuations
Chapter 11 Slide 73
Bundling
If the movies are bundled:Theater A will pay $16,000 for bothTheater B will pay $13,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by selling the films separately.
Chapter 11 Slide 74
Bundling
Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumersMany consumers with different reservation
price combinations for two goods
Chapter 11 Slide 75
Reservation Pricesr2
(reservationprice Good 2)
r1 (reservation priceGood 1)
$5
$10
$5 $10
$6
$3.25 $8.25
$3.25
ConsumerA
ConsumerC
ConsumerB
Consumer A is willing to pay up to $3.25 for good 1 andup to $6 for good 2.
Chapter 11 Slide 76
Consumption Decisions WhenProducts are Sold Separately
r2
r1
P2
IIConsumers buy
only good 2
22
11
PRPR
P1
Consumers fall intofour categories basedon their reservation
price.IConsumers buy
both goods
22
11
PRPR
IIIConsumers buy
neither good
22
11
PRPR
IVConsumers buy
only Good 1
22
11
PRPR
Chapter 11 Slide 77
Consumption DecisionsWhen Products are Bundled
r2
r1
Consumers buy the bundlewhen r1 + r2 > PB
(PB = bundle price).PB = r1 + r2 or r2 = PB - r1
Region 1: r > PB
Region 2: r < PB
r2 = PB - r1
I
II
Consumersbuy bundle
(r > PB)
Consumers donot buy bundle
(r < PB)
Chapter 11 Slide 78
The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demands.
Consumption DecisionsWhen Products are Bundled
Chapter 11 Slide 79
Reservation Prices
r2
r1
P2
P1
If the demands are perfectly positivelycorrelated, the firm
will not gain by bundling.It would earn the same
profit by selling the goods separately.
Chapter 11 Slide 80
Reservation Prices
r2
r1
If the demands are perfectly negatively
correlated bundling is the ideal strategy--all the
consumer surplus canbe extracted and a higher
profit results.
Chapter 11 Slide 81
Movie Example
r2
r1
Bundling pays due to negative correlation
(Wind)
(Gertie)
5,000 14,00010,000
5,000
10,000
12,000
4,0003,000
B
A
Chapter 11 Slide 82
Bundling
Mixed BundlingSelling both as a bundle and separately
Pure BundlingSelling only a package
Chapter 11 Slide 83
Mixed Versus Pure Bundlingr2
r110 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
C2 = MC2
C2 = 30
Consumer A, for example, has a reservation price for good 1 that is below marginal cost c1.
With mixed bundling, consumer A is induced to buy only good 2, while
consumer D is induced to buy only good 1,reducing the firm’s cost.
A
B
D
C
C1 = MC1
C1 = 20 With positive marginalcosts, mixed bundling may be more profitable
than pure bundling.
Chapter 11 Slide 84
Bundling
ScenarioPerfect negative correlationSignificant marginal cost
Mixed vs. Pure Bundling
Chapter 11 Slide 85
Bundling
ObservationsReservation price is below MC for some
consumersMixed bundling induces the consumers to buy only
goods for which their reservation price is greater than MC
Mixed vs. Pure Bundling
Chapter 11 Slide 86
Bundling Example
Sell SeparatelyConsumers B,C, and D buy 1 and A buys 2
Pure BundlingConsumers A, B, C, and D buy the bundle
Mixed BundlingConsumer D buys 1, A buys 2, and B & C buys
the bundle
Chapter 11 Slide 87
Bundling Example
Sell separately $50 $90 ---- $150
Pure bundling ---- ---- $100 $200
Mixed bundling $89.95 $89.95 $100 $229.90
C1 = $20
C2 = $30
P1 P2 PB Profit
Chapter 11 Slide 88
Bundling
Sell Separately3($50 - $20) + 1($90 - $30) = $150
Pure Bundling4($100 - $20 - $30) = $200
Mixed Bundling ($89.95 - $20) + ($89.95 - $30) - 2($100 - $20 - $30) =
$229.90
C1 = $20 C2 = $30
Chapter 11 Slide 89
Bundling
Question
If MC = 0, would mixed bundling still be the most profitable strategy with perfect negative correlation?
Chapter 11 Slide 90
Mixed Bundlingwith Zero Marginal Costs
r2
r120 40 60 80 100
20
40
60
80
100
120
120
In this example, consumers B and C are willing to pay $20 more for the bundle
than are consumers A and D. With mixed bundling, the price of the bundle
can be increased to $120.A & D can be charged $90 for a single good.
C
10 90
10
90 AB
D
Chapter 11 Slide 91
Sell separately $80 $80 ---- $320
Pure bundling ---- ---- $100 $400
Mixed bundling $90 $90 $120 $420
P1 P2 PB Profit
Mixed Bundlingwith Zero Marginal Costs
Chapter 11 Slide 92
Bundling
Question
Why is mixed bundling more profitable with MC = 0?
Chapter 11 Slide 93
Bundling
Bundling in PracticeAutomobile option packagesVacation travelCable television
Chapter 11 Slide 94
Bundling
Mixed Bundling in PracticeUse of market surveys to determine
reservation pricesDesign a pricing strategy from the survey
results
Chapter 11 Slide 95
Mixed Bundling in Practice
r2
r1
The firm can first choose a pricefor the bundle and then try individual
prices P1 and P2 until total profitis roughly maximized.
P2
PB
PBP1
The dots are estimates of reservation prices for a
representative sample of consumers.
Chapter 11 Slide 96
The Complete Dinner Versus a la Carte:A Restaurant’s Pricing Problem
Pricing to match consumer preferences for various selections
Mixed bundling allows the customer to get maximum utility from a given expenditure by allowing a greater number of choices.
Chapter 11 Slide 97
Bundling
TyingPractice of requiring a customer to
purchase one good in order to purchase another.
ExamplesXerox machines and the paper IBM mainframe and computer cards
Chapter 11 Slide 98
Bundling
TyingAllows the seller to meter the customer and
use a two-part tariff to discriminate against the heavy user
McDonald’sAllows them to protect their brand name.
Chapter 11 Slide 99
Advertising
AssumptionsFirm sets only one priceFirm knows Q(P,A)
How quantity demanded depends on price and advertising
Chapter 11 Slide 100
Q0
0
P0
Q1
1
P1
AR
MR
AR and MR are averageand marginal revenue whenthe firm doesn’t advertise.
MC
If the firm advertises, its average and marginalrevenue curves shift to
the right -- average costsrise, but marginal cost
does not.
AR’
MR’
AC’
Effects of Advertising
Quantity
$/Q
AC
Chapter 11 Slide 101
Advertising
Choosing Price and Advertising Expenditure
adv. of MC full1
)(),(
AQMC
AQPMR
AQCAPPQ
Ads
Chapter 11 Slide 102
Advertising
A Rule of Thumb for Advertising
ratio sales toAdv.
1)(
pricingfor /1/)(
PQA
AQ
QA
PMCP
AQP-MC
EPMCP P
Chapter 11 Slide 103
Advertising
A Rule of Thumb for Advertising
Thumb of Rule
demand of elasticity Adv.
P
)(1)(
))((
PA
A
EEPQAEPMCPEAQQA
Chapter 11 Slide 104
Advertising
A Rule of Thumb for AdvertisingTo maximize profit, the firm’s
advertising-to-sales ratio should be equal to minus the ratio of the advertising and price elasticities of demand.
Chapter 11 Slide 105
Advertising
An ExampleR(Q) = $1 million/yr$10,000 budget for A (advertising--1% of
revenues)EA = .2 (increase budget $20,000, sales
increase by 20%EP = -4 (markup price over MC is substantial)
Chapter 11 Slide 106
Advertising
Question
Should the firm increase advertising?
Chapter 11 Slide 107
Advertising
YESA/PQ = -(2/-.4) = 5%Increase budget to $50,000
Chapter 11 Slide 108
Advertising
QuestionsWhen EA is large, do you advertise more or
less?When EP is large, do you advertise more or
less?
Chapter 11 Slide 109
Advertising
Advertising: In PracticeEstimate the level of advertising for each of
the firmsSupermarketsConvenience storesDesigner jeansLaundry detergents
)3.01.0;10( to AP EE
);5( smallvery AP EE
)13.;43( to to AP EE
);43(
largevery to
A
P
EE
Chapter 11 Slide 110
Summary
Firms with market power are in an enviable position because they have the potential to earn large profits, but realizing that potential may depend critically on the firm’s pricing strategy.
A pricing strategy aims to enlarge the customer base that the firm can sell to, and capture as much consumer surplus as possible.
Chapter 11 Slide 111
Summary
Ideally, the firm would like to perfectly price discriminate.
The two-part tariff is another means of capturing consumer surplus.
When demands are heterogeneous and negatively correlated, bundling can increase profits.
Chapter 11 Slide 112
Summary
Bundling is a special case of tying, a requirement that products be bought or sold in some combination.
Advertising can further increase profits.
End of Chapter 11Pricing with
Market Power