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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL CONCEPT
1.1 The definition of moral, ethics, akhlak and norms 1.1.1
Morality What is morality? Most people pay only cursory attention
to the somewhat intimidating philosophical concept called Morality.
They erroneously presume that a precise examination of morality is
the domain of philosophers. Most people acquire a somewhat vague
sense of morality, a sense of how we should or should not behave,
from their parents, their social group, their political environment
or their religious affiliation. They believe that they have a
sufficiently clear understanding of morality to meet their needs
and they do not try to analyze a subject that is seemingly fraught
with contradictions.
Why should we analyze the concept of morality if every human
being knows that it is immoral to kill other people or to steal the
property of other people, except under special circumstances. As
adults, we act intuitively with regard to morality. We absorbed
fundamental aspects of morality during the early days of our youth.
Do we really need to know more about morality? Most persons have
acquired the basic tenets of their morality from others and have
accepted them as true and valid, without further questioning.
However, how will we know if an unexamined idea, imposed on us by
others, is actually true and beneficial to our well-being? Can we
improve our lifestyle, including our interactions with others, if
we enhance our understanding of the nature of morality? Knowledge
is power and the extent of our knowledge of Objective Reality
directly determines our standard of living and our happiness. Our
happiness is determined by our degree of alignment with Objective
Reality, with truth, The more facts we have at our disposition, the
more closely we can align ourselves with reality, the fewer
conflicts we will have in dealing with reality and thus, the more
happiness we will reap. How does morality really work?
The term Morality covers the vast arena of human conduct that
examines our interaction with other human beings. Morality touches
every aspect of our life, every moment of our life. Our morality
governs all of our contacts with members of our family, with our
co-workers, with our church, and with all aspects of our
government. Morality determines our attitude to politics, to war
and peace, to our children, to our parents and to spiritual
questions such as life after death. Morality (from the Latin
moralitas "manner, character, proper behavior") has three principal
meanings. In its first descriptive usage, morality means a code of
conduct held to be authoritative in matters of right and wrong,
morals are created by and define society, philosophy, religion, or
individual conscience. In its second, normative and universal
sense, morality refers to an ideal code of conduct, one which would
be espoused in preference to alternatives
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by all rational people, under specified conditions. To deny
'morality' in this sense is a position known as moral skepticism.
In its third usage, 'morality' is synonymous with ethics, the
systematic philosophical study of the moral domain. 1.1.2 Moral
Code Codified morality (moral code) is generally distinguished from
custom, another way for a community to define appropriate activity,
by the former's derivation from natural or universal principles. In
certain religious communities, the Divine is said to provide these
principles through revelation, sometimes in great detail. Such
codes may be called laws, as in the Law of Moses, or community
morality may be defined through commentary on the texts of
revelation, as in Islamic law. Such codes are distinguished from
legal or judicial right, including civil rights, which are based on
the accumulated traditions, decrees and legislation of a political
authority, though these latter often invoke the authority of the
moral law.
Morality can also be seen as the collection of beliefs as to
what constitutes a good life. Since throughout most of human
history, religions have provided both visions and regulations for
an ideal life, morality is often confused with religious precepts.
In secular communities, lifestyle choices, which represent an
individual's conception of the good life, are often discussed in
terms of "morality". Individuals sometimes feel that making an
appropriate lifestyle choice invokes a true morality, and that
accepted codes of conduct within their chosen community are
fundamentally moral, even when such codes deviate from more general
social principles.
Moral codes are often complex definitions of right and wrong
that are based upon well-defined value systems. Although some
people might think that a moral code is simple, rarely is there
anything simple about one's values, ethics, etc. or, for that
matter, the judgment of those of others. The difficulty lies in the
fact that morals are often part of a religion and more often than
not about culture codes. Sometimes, moral codes give way to legal
codes, which couple penalties or corrective actions with particular
practices. Note that while many legal codes are merely built on a
foundation of religious and/or cultural moral codes, ofttimes they
are one and the same.
Examples of moral codes include the Golden Rule; the Noble
Eightfold Path of Buddhism; the ancient Egyptian code of Ma'at ;the
ten commandments of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the yamas and
niyama of the Hindu scriptures; the ten Indian commandments; and
the principle of the Dessek. Another related concept is the moral
core which is assumed to be innate in each individual, to those who
accept that differences between individuals are more important than
posited Creators or their rules. This, in some religious systems
and beliefs (e.g. Taoism, Moralism and Gnosticism), is assumed to
be the basis of all aesthetics
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and thus moral choice. Moral codes as such are therefore seen as
coercive part of human politics. 1.1.3 Ethics Ethics is a major
branch of philosophy, encompassing right conduct and good life. It
is significantly broader than the common conception of analyzing
right and wrong. A central aspect of ethics is "the good life", the
life worth living or life that is simply not satisfying, which is
held by many philosophers to be more important than moral conduct.
Ethics seeks to address questions such as how a moral outcome can
be achieved in a specific situation (applied ethics), how moral
values should be determined (normative ethics), what morals people
actually abide by (descriptive ethics), what the fundamental nature
of ethics or morality is, including whether it has any objective
justification (meta-ethics), and how moral capacity or moral agency
develops and what its nature is (moral psychology). In applied
ethics, for example, the prohibition against taking human life is
controversial with respect to capital punishment, abortion and wars
of invasion. In normative ethics, a typical question might be
whether a lie told for the sake of protecting someone from harm is
justified. In meta-ethics, a key issue is the meaning of the terms
"right" or "wrong". Moral realism would hold that there are true
moral statements which report objective moral facts, whereas moral
anti-realism would hold that morality is derived from any one of
the norms prevalent in society (cultural relativism); the edicts of
a god (divine command theory); is merely an expression of the
speakers' sentiments (emotivism); an implied imperative
(prescriptive); falsely presupposes that there are objective moral
facts (error theory). Some thinkers hold that there is no correct
definition of right behavior, that morality can only be judged with
respect to particular situations, within the standards of
particular belief systems and socio-historical contexts. This
position, known as moral relativism, often cites empirical evidence
from anthropology as evidence to support its claims. The opposite
view, that there are universal, eternal moral truths is known as
moral absolutism. Moral absolutists might concede that forces of
social conformity significantly shape moral decisions, but deny
that cultural norms and customs define morally right behavior.
1.1.4 Islamic Ethics (Akhlak) Islamic ethics (akhlq), defined as
"good character," historically took shape gradually from the 7th
century and was finally established by the 11th century. It was
eventually shaped as a successful amalgamation of the Qur'anic
teachings, the teachings of the Sunnah of Muhammad, the precedents
of Islamic jurists (Sharia and Fiqh), the pre-Islamic Arabian
tradition, and non-Arabic elements (including Persian and Greek
ideas) embedded in or integrated with a generally Islamic
structure. Although Muhammad's preaching produced a "radical change
in moral values based on the sanctions of the new religion and the
present
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religion, and fear of God and of the Last Judgment", the tribal
practice of Arabs did not completely die out. Later Muslim scholars
expanded the religious ethic of the Qur'an and Hadith in immense
detail. The difference between Islamic akhlak and Greek ethics is
the very source by which they are derived from. Islamic akhlak
comes from divine sources (the Qur'an and the Sunnah) whereas Greek
ethics rely only on the human intellect which is subject to error
and change.
Akhlak in Islam is classified into primarily 5 categories: (1)
Akhlak towards Allah, (2) Akhlak towards self, (3) Akhlak towards
others, (4) Akhlak towards the environment and , (5) Akhlak towards
time. Displaying good akhlak towards Allah can be done through the
following ways:
a. Believing strongly in the existence and the monotheistic
nature of Allah b. Total submission to His orders and shunning away
everything that He dislikes c. Carrying out His orders without
hoping for anything in return, except His grace d. Khusyuk, that
is, putting in full concentration when carrying out our ibadah e.
Thinking positively of Allah's actions and the fate that has been
ordained for us f. Tawakkal or having faith in Allah such that He
knows best in all that we do g. Syukur or displaying gratitude in
all the bounties that He has given to us h. Tasbih, that is, saying
out the words "Subhanallah" means Glorious is Allah i. Istighfar,
that is, seeking for His forgiveness for our sins and salvation
from hellfire j. Takbir, that is, saying out the words
"Allahuakbar" Allah is Great and glorifying His name and attributes
k. Never failing to raise our hands in doa', because such an act
proves of our weakness and our dependence in Allah s.w.t
Good akhlak towards self can be carried out through displaying
these
various attributes:
a. Amanah, that is, carrying out duties responsibly b. Siddiq,
that is, being true to our words c. Adl, that is, being just in our
daily dealings d. Al-Ifafah, that is, purifying our thoughts and
hearts from mazmumah e. Al-Haya, that is, displaying a sense of
shame and regret for our sins to Allah f. As-Syajaah, that is,
displaying courage in our actions and against any form of injustice
g. Al-Quwwah, that is, displaying physical, mental and emotional
strength against adversities h. As-Sabar, that is, displaying
patience when faced with difficulties i. Ar-Rahman, that is,
displaying love and affection towards all and having a sense of
community spirit j. Al-Iqtisad, that is, being in a state of saving
money, time and energy for more useful purposes
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Good akhlak towards others can be displayed via the
following:
a. Displaying good akhlak towards parents: Submissive to their
orders, displaying ihsan or goodness throughout their lives, being
humble before them, always in a state of gratitude for their love
towards us and pray for them as well as ask for their prayers. b.
Displaying good akhlak towards spouse c. Displaying good akhlak
towards sons and daughters d. Displaying good akhlak towards our
neighbours, relatives and friends
Good akhlak towards the environment is inherent in the teachings
of our
Prophet S.A.W. Having a sense of responsibility towards the
environment is in line with the encouraged state of rahmatan lil
alamin (love towards the environment and its contents) just as the
Qur'an says (meaning): (O people! Worship your Lord, Who hath
created you and those before you, so that you may ward off (evil).
Who hath appointed the earth a resting-place for you, and the sky a
canopy; and causeth water to pour down from the sky, thereby
producing fruits as food for you. And do not set up rivals to Allah
when ye know (better).) (Al-Baqarah 2: 21-22)
Good akhlak towards time, meaning to say, is our attitude
towards time. Are we conscious about the fact that every second
that passes by every now and then, we cannot get back that very
second? And when time passes us by, are we prepared for our final
destination? Which is why time is very important, such that even
Allah s.w.t proclaims its importance in the Qur'an (meaning): By
(the Token of) Time (through the ages), Verily Man is in loss,
Except such as have Faith, and do righteous deeds, and (join
together) in the mutual teaching of Truth, and of Patience and
Constancy. (Al-Asr: 1-3).
1.1.5 Norms Norms are sentences or sentence meanings with
practical, i. e. action-oriented (rather than descriptive,
explanatory, or expressive) import, the most common of which are
commands, permissions, and prohibitions. Another popular account of
norms describes them as reasons to act, believe or feel.
a. Some kinds of norms; Orders and permissions express norms.
Such norm sentences do not describe how the world is, they rather
prescribe how the world should be. Imperative sentences are the
most obvious way to express norms, but declarative sentences also
do it very often, as is the case with many laws. Generally, whether
an expression is a norm does not depend on its form, on the type of
sentence it is expressed with, but only on the meaning of the
expression. Those norms purporting to create obligations (or
duties) and permissions are called deontic norms (see also deontic
logic). The concept of deontic norm is already an extension of a
previous concept of norm, which would only include imperatives,
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that is, norms purporting to create duties. The understanding
that permissions are norms in the same way was an important step in
ethics and philosophy of law.
In addition to deontic norms, many other varieties have been
identified. For instance, some constitutions establish the national
anthem. These norms do not directly create any duty or permission.
They create a "national symbol". Other norms create nations
themselves or political and administrative regions within a nation.
The action orientation of such norms is less obvious than in the
case of a command or permission, but is essential for understanding
the relevance of issuing such norms: When a folk song becomes a
"national anthem" the meaning of singing one and the same song
changes; likewise, when a piece of land becomes an administrative
region, this has legal consequences for many activities taking
place on that territory; and without these consequences concerning
action, the norms would be irrelevant. A more obviously
action-oriented variety of such constitutive norms (as opposed to
deontic or regulatory norms) establishes social institutions which
give rise to new, previously inexistent types of actions or
activities (a standard example is the institution of marriage
without which "getting married" would not be a feasible action;
another is the rules constituting a game: without the norms of
soccer, there would not exist such an action as executing an
indirect free kick).
Any convention can create a norm, although the relation between
both is not settled. There is a significant discussion about
(legal) norms that give someone the power to create other norms.
They are called power-conferring norms or norms of competence. Some
authors argue that they are still deontic norms, while others argue
for a close connection between them and institutional facts (see
Raz 1975, Ruiter 1993). Linguistic conventions, for example, the
convention in English that "cat" means cat or the convention in
Portuguese that "gato" means cat, are among the most important
norms. Games completely depend on norms. The fundamental norm of
many games is the norm establishing who wins and loses. In other
games, it is the norm establishing how to score points.
b. Major characteristics of Norms;
One major characteristic of norms is that, unlike propositions,
they are not descriptively true or false, since norms do not
purport to describe anything, but to prescribe, create or change
something. Some people say they are "prescriptively true" or false.
Whereas the truth of a descriptive statement is purportedly based
on its correspondence to reality, some philosophers, beginning with
Aristotle, assert that the (prescriptive) truth of a prescriptive
statement is based on its correspondence to right desire. Other
philosophers maintain that norms are ultimately neither true or
false, but only successful or unsuccessful (valid or invalid), as
their propositional content obtains or not (see also John Searle
and speech act).
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There is an important difference between norms and normative
propositions, although they are often expressed by identical
sentences. "You may go out." usually expresses a norm if it is
uttered by the teacher to one of the students, but it usually
expresses a normative proposition if it is uttered to one of the
students by one of his or her classmates. Some ethical theories
reject that there can be normative propositions, but these are
accepted by cognitivism. One can also think of propositional norms;
assertions and questions arguably express propositional norms (they
set a proposition as asserted or questioned).
Another purported feature of norms, it is often argued, is that
they never regard only natural properties or entities. Norms always
bring something artificial, conventional, institutional or
"unworldly". This might be related to Hume's assertion that it is
not possible to derive ought from is and to G.E. Moore's claim that
there is a naturalistic fallacy when one tries to analyse "good"
and "bad" in terms of a natural concept. In aesthetics, it has also
been argued that it is impossible to derive an aesthetical
predicate from a non-aesthetical one. The acceptability of
non-natural properties, however, is strongly debated in present day
philosophy. Some authors deny their existence, some others try to
reduce them to natural ones, on which the former supervene.
Other thinkers (Adler, 1986) assert that norms can be natural in
a different sense than that of "corresponding to something
proceeding from the object of the prescription as a strictly
internal source of action". Rather, those who assert the existence
of natural prescriptions say norms can suit a natural need on the
part of the prescribed entity. More to the point, however, is the
putting forward of the notion that just as descriptive statements
being considered true are conditioned upon certain self-evident
descriptive truths suiting the nature of reality (such as: it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time and
in the same manner), a prescriptive truth can suit the nature of
the will through the authority of it being based upon self-evident
prescriptive truths (such as: one ought to desire what is really
good for one and nothing else). Recent works maintain that
normativity has an important role in several different
philosophical subjects, not only in ethics and philosophy of law
(see Dancy, 2000).
1.2 The concept of personal, universal and absolute morality
Personal morality has to do with narrating values that would best
help each of us make sense of our lives, to be good persons,
realise a valuable selfhood and/or live a good life. The values at
stake in personal morality need not be strictly moral. The goodness
of our lives could be measured in terms of our being happy,
worthwhile or successful as well as the traditional, moral, sense
of the word. Defining what it is to be a good person, and to live a
good life, is one of the questions that personal morality must
address. The function of personal morality is to help each of us
realise the meaning of our life in the world through being a person
and living the personal life of a self in the world. All persons
can do and
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must input values just in the process of being persons. Meaning
is an output value 'pointed at' by input values. So persons realise
a meaning from those values. That is why there are values in this
and any other world containing persons. And that is why what
persons do in a world just is the whole and only meaning of that
world. Because we do and must live by values, our lives do and must
have meaning. And, because our personal morality just is the sum of
our input values, the meaning of our lives just is a function of
our personal morality in our personal circumstances.
Moral universalism (also called universal morality) is the
meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal
ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated
individuals", regardless of culture, race, sex, religion,
nationality, sexuality, or other distinguishing feature. Moral
universalism is opposed to moral nihilism and moral relativism.
However, not all forms of moral universalism are absolutist, nor
are they necessarily value monist; many forms of universalism, such
as utilitarianism, are non-absolutist, and some forms, such as that
of Isaiah Berlin, may be value pluralist. Noam Chomsky states that,
... if we adopt the principle of universality : if an action is
right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us. Those
who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to
themselves the standards they apply to others -- more stringent
ones, in fact -- plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak
of appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and
evil In fact, one of the, maybe the most, elementary of moral
principles is that of universality, that is, If something's right
for me, it's right for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for
me. Any moral code that is even worth looking at has that at its
core somehow.
The source or justification of a universal ethic may be thought
to be, for instance, human nature, shared vulnerability to
suffering, the demands of universal reason, what is common among
existing moral codes, or the common mandates of religion (although
it can be said that the latter is not in fact moral universalism
because it may distinguish between gods and mortals). As such,
models of moral universalism may be atheistic or agnostic, deistic
(in the case of several Enlightenment philosophers), monotheistic
(in the case of the Abrahamic religions), or polytheistic (in the
case of Hinduism). Various systems of moral universalism may differ
in various ways on the meta-ethical question of the nature of the
morality, as well as in their substantial normative content, but
all agree on its universality.
Moral absolutism is the meta-ethical view that certain actions
are absolutely right or wrong, devoid of the context of the act.
Thus lying, for instance, might be considered to be always immoral,
even if done to promote some other good (e.g., saving a life).
Moral absolutism stands in contrast to categories of ethical
theories such as consequentialism and situational ethics, which
holds that the morality of an act depends on the consequences or
the context of the act. Ethical theories which place strong
emphasis on rights, such as
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the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant, are often forms of
moral absolutism, as are many religious moral codes, particularly
those of the Abrahamic religions.
Moral absolutism should not be confused with moral universalism
(also variously called moral objectivism, moderate moral realism,
or minimalist moral realism), which holds that the same things are
right and wrong for all similarly-situated people, regardless of
anyone's opinions, though not necessarily regardless of context.
Moral universalism is in turn opposed to moral relativism (which
holds that moral truths are relative to social, cultural,
historical or personal preferences), and to moral nihilism (which
holds that nothing is right or wrong in any sense at all). L.P.
Pojman gives the following definitions to distinguish the two
positions: (1) "Moral absolutism: There is at least one principle
that ought never to be violated." (2) "Moral objectivism: There is
a fact of the matter as to whether any given action is morally
permissible or impermissible: a fact of the matter that does not
depend solely on social custom or individual acceptance."
Moral absolutism may be understood in a strictly secular
context, as in many forms of deontological moral rationalism.
However, many religions have morally absolutist positions as well,
regarding their system of morality as deriving from the commands of
deity. Therefore, they regard such a moral system as absolute,
(usually) perfect, and unchangeable. Many secular philosophies also
take a morally absolutist stance, arguing that absolute laws of
morality are inherent in the nature of human beings, the nature of
life in general, or the universe itself. For example, someone who
believes absolutely in nonviolence considers it wrong to use
violence even in self-defense. For another example, under some
religious moral absolutist beliefs, homosexual behavior is
considered fundamentally wrong, even in a consensual
relationship.
The historical character of religious belief is seen by some as
grounds for criticism of religious moral absolutism. In Deuteronomy
15:12-15; Ephesians 6:9; Colossians 4:1; & I Timothy 6:1-2 the
Bible recognizes and regulates the practice of keeping slaves.
These passages have been historically interpreted as providing an
endorsement of slavery. For example Jefferson Davis, president of
the Confederate States of America remarked in a speech before the
U.S. Senate that: "[Slavery] was established by decree of Almighty
God...it is sanctioned in the Bible, in both Testaments, from
Genesis to Revelation...it has existed in all ages, has been found
among the people of the highest civilization, and in nations of the
highest proficiency in the arts."
1.3 Factors for developing good morality Whilst much work on
moral reasoning has sought to identify the relatively abstract
conceptual structures which underpin moral judgements, relatively
little has sought to examine the ways in which moral judgements and
decisions are made in real life. There are, however, good reasons
for examining the ways in which these more everyday judgements are
made. Not only is it important to
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learn something more of the social and cultural context in which
moral thought is embedded. It is also crucial to explore moral
decision-making in real life to understand better the links between
more hypothetical moral reasoning and moral action. The discussion
presents research that seeks to identify factors that influence the
decisions that individuals make in response to real life moral
dilemmas. Its empirical focus will form two, inter-related strands.
An initial strand considers how social contextual factors
(internalised notions of gender role and more externalised notions
of gender) relate to moral orientation. A second strand explores
how different types of dilemmas may entail different consequences
for individuals that, in turn, relate to the sorts of
justifications and explanations they give for particular courses of
action.
1.3.1 Moral decision-making in real life A famous example of the
difference between hypothetical reasoning and justification of
experienced behaviour is given by Milgrams (1963) study of
obedience. When participants are faced with a hypothetical
dilemma of either harming an innocent stranger or disobeying an
authority figure they frequently choose the latter. However, the
study showed that whilst more than sixty five percent of those who
were faced with the dilemma in reality chose to harm an innocent
stranger, few felt such behaviour would be morally acceptable when
asked about an imaginary scenario. Moreover when Milgrams adult
participants were asked about their actions they justified their
behaviour with reasons equivalent to stage one on Kohlbergs (1969,
1984) model for example, the status of the experimenter. It would
seem unlikely that all of Milgrams participants were stage one
reasoners. Rather, something about the experimental situation and
their perceived roles within it influenced their moral decisions,
judgements and ultimately their behaviour.
Dominant models of moral development (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) have
focused theoretical attention on age-related shifts in moral
reasoning. Kohlbergs methodology involved presenting individuals
with various hypothetical moral dilemmas which were either
discussed with the participants by means of an interview or
reflected upon using a questionnaire. Responses are then scored
according to a specific manual devised by Kohlberg and his
colleagues. Yet although the value and influence of this work on
moral development is clear, a consistent criticism of, for
instance, Kohlbergs theory has been that he failed
adequately to consider what we might term real life moral
decision-making (Krebs, Denton & Wark, 1997; Leman, 2001).
Research on real life dilemmas (Krebs, Denton, Vermeulen,
Carpendale & Bush, 1991; Carpendale & Krebs 1995; Wark
& Krebs 1996, 1997) found that once participants are asked to
judge moral conflicts that they have experienced in their life,
moral stage tends to be lower, and stage consistency of judgements
diminishes across different types of moral dilemmas. A further
point of criticism highlighted the difference between moral
judgement competency and moral judgement in practice.
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Studies that compare moral behaviour (action) and moral
reasoning have highlighted the problem of how stages of reasoning
(derived from hypothetical problems) are related to real life moral
behaviour. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that despite peoples
acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of impaired
driving they still drove home while having high blood alcohol
level; Carpendale and Krebs (1995) showed that a monetary incentive
also affected moral choices. And Walker (1984) has claimed that
Kohlbergs stage theory has a self-limiting scope in that it does
not deal directly with the issues of moral emotions and behaviour
rather, it deals with the adequacy of justifications for solutions
to moral conflicts. Wark and Krebs (1996) summarise a position
common to many in arguing that whilst there are numerous studies on
moral judgement only a few have investigated the important and
socially pertinent question of how people make moral decisions in
their everyday lives. 1.3.2 Gender and moral orientation Another
critic of Kohlbergs emphasis on abstract aspects of moral thought
was Carol Gilligan. Gilligan (1982) argued that Kohlbergs theory is
insensitive to the
way females view morality and that there are sex related (but
not sex-specific) differences in an individuals orientation to
life. These differences become
particularly visible in terms of moral reasoning. On one hand,
men have a justice orientation which involves an emphasis on
autonomy, separateness and noninterference with abstract rights. On
the other women hold a care orientation involving more emphasis on
a concern for the well being of others and a view of the self as
connected and interdependent with others in concrete situations
(Walker, de Vries & Trevethan, 1987).
Gilligans evaluation of responses to real life dilemmas by men
and
women revealed that although the majority of people used both
care and justice orientations, the majority of women (75%) used a
predominantly care orientation whereas the majority of men (79%)
used a predominantly justice orientation. Also, 36% of women did
not involve any consideration of justice in their report and 36% of
men did not present any consideration of care. These findings led
Gilligan to conclude that individuals use one predominating
orientation related to their gender when discussing real life moral
conflicts. Gilligan claimed that males gain higher moral maturity
scores on Kohlbergs test because they tend to
make justice oriented judgments which are captured at higher
stages (4-5). Females, on the other hand, tend to make care
oriented judgments which are captured at a lower stage (3).
Although some studies supported this assumption (e.g. Bussey &
Maughan, 1982) a large number of studies refuted the claim for
significant sex differences in moral maturity (see Walker, 1984 for
a review of the literature). Moreover, research on moral
orientation revealed that studies that found that women use higher
percentage of care oriented terms in real life dilemmas than men
were methodologically flawed by not controlling for type of
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dilemma (e.g. Ford & Lowery 1986; Walker et al. 1987;
Gilligan & Attanucci 1988; Pratt, Golding, Hunter, &
Sampson 1988; Wark & Krebs 1996).
1.3.3 Moral reasoning: considering the consequences of action
Following many studies that compared Kohlbergs philosophical
dilemmas with
real life dilemmas, Krebs and his colleagues have argued that
the highest stages of moral reasoning rarely exist outside the
Western academic context (within which Kohlbergs philosophical
dilemmas were typically tested). In attempting to explore factors
that may explain the variance between judgments (measured by stages
in Kohlbergs model) of philosophical dilemmas and judgments of real
life dilemmas they found an interaction between moral judgment
competency and various performance factors (detailed in Krebs
et.al., 1997). Individuals ability to retain lower stages of moral
judgment and use them in response to real life dilemmas does not
follow Kohlbergs theoretical assumption regarding stage
replacement, but is more in line with other models of moral
judgment such as Rests layer-cake model and Levines additive
inclusive model. Both these models suggest that new stages are
built on old stages, which are retained and may be used in various
circumstances.
Despite this important outcome of recent research, the remaining
question is why there is such discrepancy between judgment of
philosophical dilemmas and judgment of real life dilemmas. Krebs et
al. (1997) attempted to explain some aspects in real life decision
making, which may serve future research in clarifying how people
make moral decisions in their everyday lives. Two elements are
central to the position. One is the distinction between a third
person perspective (which is implied in philosophical dilemmas) and
a first person perspective (which is implied in personal, real life
dilemmas). When people come across moral conflicts in their life
the question they are faced with is: what should I
do? which is different to what should one do?. Reasoning in real
life situations involves decisions, which are much more practical,
self serving, and less rational than reasoning of hypothetical
characters. The second aspect relates to the first in suggesting
that factors that people consider when they make decisions in real
life are influenced by functional concerns such as advancing
self-interest or social harmony, and by motivational and affective
processes.
One of the most important pragmatic concerns is the consequences
of moral decisions. Krebs et al. (1997) provide a detailed account
of the various types of consequences people consider, which will
not be repeated here. However, their explanation of the distinction
between consequences to others and consequences to the self is a
central focus of this study. Although people believe hypothetical
characters should act in a certain way and although they provide
reasoning to support that belief, they themselves would have not
made that decision in real life due to the consequences of their
decision. For example, despite peoples
belief that Heinz should steal the drug (cf. Kohlberg, 1984,
p.640), they themselves would not steal it as they would not be
willing to suffer the
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consequences (Krebs, Vermeulen, Denton & Carpendale, 1994).
It seems possible that an inconsistency between what one should and
would do in these situations leads to a dissonance that can be
partly resolved by changing ones mind about a particular course of
action (Krebs et al. 1997). Krebs et al. (1997) not only provide a
potential explanation for the inconsistency between reasoning of
hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life moral conflicts.
They also point to a direction for future research into the
underlying mechanisms involved in moral judgment, decision, and
action.
The present study explored two aspects in relation to moral
decision-making. The first part (moral orientation) examined
Gilligans theory of moral orientation and its relationship to
dilemma type, gender and gender role. The second part (moral
reasoning) explored a new aspect in recent research: consideration
of consequences, focusing on whether consequences to the self
differ from consequences to other people in the influence they have
on decision making.
1.3.4 Moral Orientation The results of this study are not
consistent with Gilligans hypothesis about
moral orientation. Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) acknowledged
that individuals can employ both justice and care orientations but
they also claim that only one (either justice or care) prevails
across an individuals thinking. This study however, failed to find
a prevailing orientation across all four dilemmas. Not only do
participants include both care and justice judgements in their
dilemmas, but the majority (all but three) were inconsistent with
the orientation they presented to address each dilemma. This
outcome supports Wark and Krebss (1997) study, in which they claim
to have found poor consistency of moral orientation across four
personel dilemmas.
Gilligan (1982) also proposed that the type of orientation is
related to gender, assuming that males tend to focus on the justice
orientation whereas females tend to focus on the care orientation.
Like previous research (e.g. Walker et al.. 1987) this study fails
to support this claim. On average, females focused on care-based
judgements more than males did but this did not result in a
statistically significant difference between the two gender groups.
However, the overall mean (57%) for orientation suggests that all
participants (regardless of gender) expressed slightly more care
judgements than justice judgements. Furthermore, the consistency
measure did not yield gender differences, which suggests that males
were as inconsistent in their moral orientation as females were. In
a similar vein gender did not produce a significant main effect or
significant interactions, which leaves one to conclude that as far
as this study was able to show moral orientation was not related to
gender.
This study, nevertheless, produced significant results regarding
type of dilemma and gender role. A main effect for dilemma type
qualified by an interaction between dilemma and gender role was
found. A post-hoc analysis
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revealed the exact location of these significant differences:
between the (a) prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas and (b) the
prosocial and impersonal dilemmas at the femininity level and at
the androgyny level. Similar to previous studies which included
gender role as a factor (Sochting, Skoe, & Marcia, 1994) this
study supports the claim that gender role may serve as a better
predictor of moral orientation than gender alone. Moreover Ford and
Lowery (1986) found the significant results to be at the femininity
level, which has been replicated by this study.
Unlike Ford and Lowery (1986), this finding was not related to
gender and extends to generalise gender role as an important factor
by finding significant comparisons at the androgyny level as well.
Both androgyny and femininity gender roles were defined by a high
score on the feminine scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1978). The
fact that dilemma type reached significance at these levels only
(only for the androgynous and feminine people) may provide the
answer for the distinction between the significant results of those
scales and the non-significant results of the masculine and the
undifferentiated scales, which were both low at femininity. In
other words, one may need to have high level of femininity in order
to show significant differences between some types of moral dilemma
(e.g. prosocial-antisocial & prosocial-impersonal).
The overall pattern of results regarding type of dilemma is
similar to earlier findings by Wark and Krebs (1997). Wark and
Krebs (1997) compared three types of dilemma (2 Kohlbergian, 2 real
life-prosocial, & 2 real life- antisocial). They reported that
the Kohlbergian dilemmas pulled for justice orientation, the
prosocial tended towards care orientation, and the antisocial
towards justice orientation. In the present study, results were in
a similar direction. There is, however, a marked difference between
the means of the Kohlbergian dilemmas (Wark & Krebs, 1997) and
the impersonal dilemmas (the present study). The notion that
Kohlbergs (philosophical) dilemmas evoke justice-based judgements
is not new. Indeed, it was one of the main criticisms against
Kohlbergs model (Gilligan 1982). However, the use of impersonal
dilemmas in the past has led to some interesting outcomes. Wark and
Krebs (1996) reported that the philosophical impersonal dilemmas
evoked a similar level of justice to that evoked by Kohlbergs
dilemmas, and that they evoked a significantly lower level of care
than the antisocial impersonal dilemmas. These findings appear
inconsistent with the outcomes of the present study but this
inconsistency may reflect different tendencies in the scoring
procedure. The means of the prosocial impersonal dilemmas and the
antisocial impersonal dilemmas are fairly similar to the means of
the personal prosocial and antisocial dilemmas, and share similar
locations on the moral orientation scale (antisocial towards
justice and prosocial towards care). The overall mean of the
impersonal dilemmas seems to reflect the grouping of the various
types of impersonal dilemmas (prosocial, antisocial, &
philosophical). However, the statistical analyses suggest that
there was no particular influence from any type of
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dilemma on the overall mean of the impersonal dilemmas. There
was no significant difference between the impersonal dilemmas on
moral orientation scores.
Methodologically, the need to control types of moral dilemma
(for both personal & impersonal dilemmas) cannot be over
emphasised. Wark and Krebs (1996) found that females tend to report
more prosocial dilemmas whereas males tend to report more
antisocial dilemmas. These tendencies affect moral orientation
scores the present study demonstrated that prosocial dilemmas evoke
more care judgements whereas antisocial dilemmas evoke more justice
judgements. These gender-related patterns of reporting have not
been demonstrated by this study, yet they may explain the outcome
of Gilligan and Attanuccis (1988) study in which type of dilemma
was not held constant. Moreover, Wark and Krebs (2000) found that
women report more prosocial real life dilemmas, perhaps because
women consider prosocial dilemmas to be more significant as these
dilemmas elicit most guilt (Wark, 1998), whereas men experience
more antisocial (transgression) types of conflict in real life.
Thus, Gilligans notion of moral orientation may be embedded in life
experience rather
than to any particular gender group per se. 1.3.5 Moral
Reasoning consideration of consequences The results concerning the
second part of this study support to some extent some theoretical
assumptions based on research by Krebs and his colleagues (in
particular Krebs et.al., 1997). The statistical analysis revealed a
significant difference between consideration of consequences to the
self and consideration of consequences to others but only as far as
antisocial dilemmas were concerned. When type of dilemma was held
constant for both the personal and the impersonal dilemmas, the
prosocial dilemmas did not yield a significant difference. In fact
both impersonal-prosocial and personal-prosocial dilemmas had
identical means, which suggests that people tend to consider the
outcome of their decisions and actions as important with regard to
themselves and others equally when discussing moral dilemmas
concerning prosocial issues.
The difference in the results between the prosocial dilemmas and
the antisocial dilemmas implies that people tend to regard
consequences to themselves as highly important compared to
consequences to others when discussing antisocial issues. By way of
a contrast, consequences of prosocial dilemmas are regarded as
important whether they relate to the self or to others. Perhaps
this is not such a great surprise bearing in mind that antisocial
issues are closely related to law and punishment whereas prosocial
issues are to a large extent related to ones willingness to help
another. Krebs et al. (1997) provide a constructive distinction
between moral conflicts in terms of their anticipated consequences:
(a) approach approach conflicts (should I spend more time with my
boyfriend or my friends?), (b) approach avoidance conflicts (should
I lend money to my friend or avoid taking responsibility for him?),
and (c)
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avoidance avoidance conflicts (should I lie to my landlord or
face eviction from my flat?). The conflicts discussed in our
antisocial dilemmas involved at least one avoidance aspect (e.g.
underage drinking versus getting caught, facing condemnation versus
feeling guilty, etc). It would be valid to assume that decisions,
which involve consequences to the self that one is trying to avoid,
will have more effect on ones moral decision than decisions
entailing consequences that others may try to avoid. This last
point brings us back to potential dissonance between should and
would that was described by Krebs et al. (1997). In the same way
that this distinction explains the inconsistency between reasoning
of hypothetical dilemmas and reasoning of real life dilemmas, it
may explain the inconsistency between justification of others
reasoning (when one is an observer) and the justification of ones
own reasoning. The outcomes of antisocial conflicts (e.g. law
breaking, being unfair or unjust) often contrast ones own
morality standard. Denton and Krebs (1990) found that people
tend to consider themselves to be more moral than other people, a
phenomenon they named the self-righteous bias. This phenomenon ties
in with the current findings. According to Krebs et al. (1997)
people invest in their moral identities, which in return affect
their moral decisions. In situations where people behave
inconsistently with their moral identities (e.g. antisocial type
situation) they are faced with negative outcome (physical or
mental) and negative reputation, which motivate them to reduce the
inconsistency between their belief about their own moral identity
and how they have been perceived by society (judicial system,
family relatives, friends, etc). This attempt to reduce negative
reputation of ones moral identity is manifested in moral dilemmas
in the form of justification of behaviour, which as research
showed, involves low stage moral structures (Denton & Krebs
1990; Krebs et al, 1991; Wark & Krebs 1997; Krebs et al.
1997).
This is a crucial observation for research on moral
decision-making as it can only be explored by real life personal
dilemmas where participants are asked to justify their own
experiences. It follows then that in the present study participants
may have felt the need to justify their own behaviour and reduce
the inconsistency of their own moral identity, which led them to
consider the consequences of their decisions/actions in a way that
affected their decisions. In other words, participants regretted
acting in a certain way and therefore justified their behaviour by
considering the consequences of their actions in order to avoid
similar outcomes in the future. However, when asked to discuss
others moral decisions in antisocial situations the need to justify
others behaviour in terms of its consequences was less important3.
On the contrary, prosocial behaviour educes a positive moral
reputation that is more consistent with peoples moral identity (the
self righteous bias), and may validate or even improve ones
perception of oneself (Krebs et al. 1997).
These findings do not corroborate Gilligans theory of moral
orientation.
Participants rarely held one orientation across all dilemmas.
Moreover gender was related to neither justice nor care
orientations. Significant comparisons were
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found between the prosocial and the impersonal dilemmas and
between the prosocial and the antisocial dilemmas for both feminine
and androgynous gender role groups. This outcome suggests that
although people, in general, do not hold a particular moral
orientation, feminine and androgynous people score 3 Although it
must be remembered that our definition of personal dilemmas were
those which directly involved an individual and made that
individual take some form of action. Thus it may be true that when
an individual makes a decision not to act prosocially (although not
necessarily antisocially) there may be some justification in terms
of the potential consequences for the self. Significantly higher
percentages of care-based responses when discussing prosocial
dilemmas compared with impersonal or antisocial dilemmas. The
latter focuses the attention on the effect of external sources
(e.g. type of dilemma) on moral decision-making. The
acknowledgement of such interaction between external and internal
(e.g. gender role) sources of variation on moral decision-making is
crucial to the understanding of how people judge real life moral
conflicts. Results also indicate, as might have been anticipated,
that people consider the consequences of their decisions when they
discuss moral conflicts. Furthermore, the consequences of moral
decisions seem to have more influence when people discuss personal
antisocial conflicts rather than impersonal-antisocial conflicts.
This difference was not evident between the
prosocial-personal/impersonal dilemmas. It may be that when people
discuss personal-antisocial (e.g. violations of rules, laws, or
fairness) dilemmas they seek to resist adopting a negative
reputation. The therefore justify their own behaviour with a higher
percentage of consideration of consequences in their attempt to
view themselves more positively (and enhance their moral identity).
This pressure disappears when people discuss impersonal-antisocial
dilemmas because the need to justify other peoples behaviour in a
positive way is less strong and has less influence on judgements
and reasoning. More so, it is not apparent in prosocial dilemmas
because this type of behaviour has a positive reputation and
entails a positive moral identity. Consequently, the outcomes of
peoples prosocial behaviour have less influence on their
reasoning.
It is also possible to see some ways in which the current
findings might inform work in moral education. For instance, we see
in the results of the current study a link between internal (gender
role) and external (dilemma type) factors in making moral
judgements. There is also now strong evidence to suggest that the
underlying motivations for moral judgements differ according to the
type of dilemma under consideration. In view of this, educators
need to consider whether it might be appropriate to employ
different strategies for encouraging mature moral reasoning with
respect to pro- and antisocial behaviour. Moreover, the influence
of internal factors such as gender role points to a need to gear
any educational interventions to the needs of specific
individuals.
As the current study has demonstrated, another important factor
in making moral decisions is a consideration of the consequences of
actions. Such
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consideration appears at its most influential when reasoning
about ones own response to antisocial dilemmas (having done or
doing something wrong). As has already been indicated, the
motivation to maintain a reputation or positive moral identity not
least, one might imagine, amongst ones peers, could explain
findings here. However, it was not the case that participants in
this study were motivated to gain a positive (prosocial)
self-identity but rather that they were motivated to defend
themselves against acquiring a negative (antisocial) one. This is
an issue that is less to do with moral education and more to do
with the values we encourage as a society; behaving morally is less
about prosocial behaviour and more about not committing antisocial
behaviour. But a greater emphasis, in the schoolroom and beyond, on
the social merits of prosocial behaviour might just encourage more
of it.
Finally, when considering antisocial dilemmas from an
abstract,
impersonal perspective people imagine the consequences of an
action as less important than when they consider a similar event
from a first personal perspective. There is, it would seem, a
separation of the actual from the theoretical here (at least in the
reports of our participants). Further studies from an educational
perspective could help to identify whether encouraging a child or
adult to reflect on their own experiences and past, real-life moral
decisions might trigger forms of reasoning that are better suited
to helping individuals make more mature decisions in future,
real-life moral dilemmas.
Altogether this study overcomes methodological problems in
earlier studies and confirms previous findings in terms of the
effect of dilemma type and gender role on moral orientation. It
also points to the importance of individuals consideration of
consequences of their actions in judging real life moral dilemmas.
Further investigations are needed to clarify the role of this new
aspect of moral reasoning that appears to be important in moral
decision making. Such investigations could help in the development
of interactional models of moral reasoning that account for the
interplay between internal (e.g. gender role) and external (e.g.
dilemma type) influences on everyday moral reasoning.
1.4 Religious Morality, Environmental Morality, Individual and
Social Morality.
1.4.1 Religious Morality In the scientific literature, the
degree of religiosity is generally found to be associated with
higher ethical attitudes. Although a recent study by Paul Pierce
published in the Journal of Religion and Society argues for a
positive correlation between the degree of public religiosity in a
society and certain measures of dysfunction, an analysis published
later in the same journal contends that a number of methodological
problems undermine any findings or conclusions to be taken from the
research. In a response to the study by Paul, Pierce. Jensen builds
on and refines Paul's study. His conclusion, after carrying out
elaborate
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multivariate statistical studies, is that there is a correlation
(and perhaps a causal relationship) of higher homicide rates, not
with Christianity, but with dualism in Christianity, that is to say
with the proportion of the population who believe the devil and
hell exist. Excerpt: "A multiple regression analysis reveals a
complex relationship with some dimensions of religiosity
encouraging homicide and other dimensions discouraging it."
Meanwhile, other studies seem to show positive links in the
relationship between religiosity and moral behavior - for example,
surveys suggesting a positive connection between faith and
altruism.
Modern research in criminology also acknowledges an inverse
relationship between religion and crime, with many studies
establishing this beneficial connection (though some claim it is a
modest one). Indeed, a meta-analysis of 60 studies on religion and
crime concluded, religious behaviors and beliefs exert a
moderate deterrent effect on individuals criminal behavior.
Religious belief systems usually include the idea of divine will
and divine judgment and usually correspond to a moral code of
conduct.
Religious persons try to find the answer to moral right or
wrong, evil and goodness, in the bible or other religious texts.
Where do these scriptures come from? In reviewing the origins of
many different religions, it appears that scholars attribute
religious texts to mysterious or mystical writers in the distant
past. The element of time has shrouded all such scriptures in
extreme mystery or factual haziness. There is never any clear,
objective, historical chain that might clarify and establish the
authenticity of the authorship of religious texts. These writings
have been copied innumerable times and have become less and less
focused with each copying process. As a result, religious writings
have become so ambiguous and nebulous that it is often necessary to
substantially re-interpret or re-phrase their meaning. The
translation of these texts from archaic languages provides ample
room for misconstructions or misinterpretations. Such translations
and interpretations will vary with each translator and interpreter,
depending on their personal beliefs, opinions, preconceived notions
and their comprehension of the original language. As the result of
this multi-faceted, compounded obfuscation, there are many
conflicting interpretations dealing with the concept of good and
evil in the Bible, the Koran, the Torah or any of the multitudes of
other scriptures. All of these texts proclaim to be the only
definitive arbiter of morality. Each religious authority implies
that a person acts moral if he follows its prescriptions or its
dogma. Christians have no moral problem eating pork; Muslims and
Jews have strict moral prohibitions against eating pork. It is
moral for Jews and Christians to drink alcoholic beverages, Muslims
can get their heads chopped off if they imbibe alcohol.
How can we determine which of the many contradictory revelations
described in different religious writings are correct so that we
may all act in a moral manner? Since all of these scriptures
contradict each other, how can we know which one is really the true
one and which ones are false? Is the Torah correct or is the New
Testament more truthful? How can we reconcile the Bible
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with the Koran? Do all of the one billion Muslims follow an
erroneous doctrine or does the Koran more truthfully reflect the
nature of true morality than the Bible? Religious person face the
difficult task of selecting a suitable morality because their
search is made more complicated by the large number of religious
sects, cults, churches and denominations from which he can choose.
He faces constant contradictions because each of these belief
systems claims to be the only true and authoritative source of
morality. These contradictory claims appear to be absurd because
they can obviously not all be correct
One of the universal contradictions in the theological approach
to morality involves a dilemma posed by all religions. What is the
relationship of good and evil to a benevolent and omnipotent god?
Regardless of the ambivalent and unreliable nature of religious
texts setting forth the moral teachings of a particular religion,
the ultimate source for the moral code imbedded in a religion
always rests in a god or gods. A god is the central, authoritative
and controlling power that is the backbone of all religions. By
definition, all religions must have an omnipotent god, a supreme
being and creator of the universe. This god must be specific to a
particular religion. Different religions cannot have the same god.
Thus, all religions derive their morality from the authority of the
god they worship, usually through an intermediary in the nature of
a messenger or affiliate, such as Jesus or Mohammed or Joseph
Smith.
A system of morality that relies on the existence of gods or
godlike beings is irrational because no god or godlike beings have
ever manifested themselves in an objective manner to human beings.
There is no evidence whatsoever that a god exists or has ever
existed, anywhere, at any time. In fact, all objective evidence
available to man precludes and contradicts the existence of a god
or gods. Thus, an attempt to seek morality as a derivative of
non-existing gods is difficult to justify. In all religions, faith
and fairytales replace and supersede factual evidence. The
faith-based acceptance of a theological doctrine of morality
reflects merely illusions or delusions: Faith is necessary only for
the acceptance as true of a statement that objective evidence has
already proven false. Faith is only necessary if religious dogma is
in direct conflict with Objective Reality.
No matter which one of the many religious text we might adapt as
the basis for our own morality, we are making such choice based on
our individual preferences and convictions. We are choosing our own
morality from a variety of religious moralities. Again, we choose
our own morality. We are not considering if we should follow an
absolute, universal, objective religious morality, but we are
considering which one of many relative, subjective morality systems
we should select from a smorgasbord of religious morality systems.
Thus, by making a personal choice from many contradictory religious
morality systems, we end up with a personal, relative morality,
rather than an absolute, objective, universal morality.
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1.4.2 Enviromental Ethics and Morality Environmental ethics is
the part of environmental philosophy which considers extending the
traditional boundaries of ethics from solely including humans to
including the non-human world. It exerts influence on a large range
of disciplines including law, sociology, theology, economics,
ecology and geography. There are many ethical decisions that human
beings make with respect to the environment. For example: Should we
continue to clear cut forests for the sake of human consumption?
Should we continue to propagate? Should we continue to make
gasoline powered vehicles? What environmental obligations do we
need to keep for future generations? Is it right for humans to
knowingly cause the extinction of a species for the convenience of
humanity?
The academic field of environmental ethics grew up in response
to the work of scientists such as Rachel Carson and events such as
the first Earth Day in 1970, when environmentalists started urging
philosophers to consider the philosophical aspects of environmental
problems. Two papers published in Science had a crucial impact:
Lynn White's "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" (March
1967) and Garrett Hardin's "The Tragedy of the Commons" (December
1968). Also influential was Garett Hardin's later essay called
"Exploring New Ethics for Survival", as well as an essay by Aldo
Leopold in his A Sand County Almanac, called "The Land Ethic," in
which Leopold explicitly claimed that the roots of the ecological
crisis were philosophical (1949).
The first international academic journals in this field emerged
from North America in the late 1970s and early 1980s the US-based
journal, Environmental Ethics in 1979 and the Canadian based
journal The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy in 1983. The first
British based journal of this kind, Environmental Values, was
launched in 1992.
Suppose that putting out natural fires, culling feral animals or
destroying some individual members of overpopulated indigenous
species is necessary for the protection of the integrity of a
certain ecosystem. Will these actions be morally permissible or
even required? Is it morally acceptable for farmers in
non-industrial countries to practise slash and burn techniques to
clear areas for agriculture? Consider a mining company which has
performed open pit mining in some previously unspoiled area. Does
the company have a moral obligation to restore the landform and
surface ecology? And what is the value of a humanly restored
environment compared with the originally natural environment? It is
often said to be morally wrong for human beings to pollute and
destroy parts of the natural environment and to consume a huge
proportion of the planet's natural resources. If that is wrong, is
it simply because a sustainable environment is essential to
(present and future) human well-being? Or is such behaviour also
wrong because the natural environment and/or its various contents
have certain values in their own right so that these values ought
to be respected and protected in any case? These are among the
questions investigated by environmental ethics. Some of them are
specific questions faced by individuals in particular
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circumstances, while others are more global questions faced by
groups and communities. Yet others are more abstract questions
concerning the value and moral standing of the natural environment
and its nonhuman components.
In the literature on environmental ethics the distinction
between instrumental value and intrinsic value (meaning
non-instrumental value) has been of considerable importance. The
former is the value of things as means to further some other ends,
whereas the latter is the value of things as ends in themselves
regardless of whether they are also useful as means to other ends.
For instance, certain fruits have instrumental value for bats who
feed on them, since feeding on the fruits is a means to survival
for the bats. However, it is not widely agreed that fruits have
value as ends in themselves. We can likewise think of a person who
teaches others as having instrumental value for those who want to
acquire knowledge. Yet, in addition to any such value, it is
normally said that a person, as a person, has intrinsic value,
i.e., value in his or her own right independently of his or her
prospects for serving the ends of others. For another example, a
certain wild plant may have instrumental value because it provides
the ingredients for some medicine or as an aesthetic object for
human observers. But if the plant also has some value in itself
independently of its prospects for furthering some other ends such
as human health, or the pleasure from aesthetic experience, then
the plant also has intrinsic value. Because the intrinsically
valuable is that which is good as an end in itself, it is commonly
agreed that something's possession of intrinsic value generates a
prima facie direct moral duty on the part of moral agents to
protect it or at least refrain from damaging it (see O'Neil 1992
and Jameson 2002 for detailed accounts of intrinsic value).
Many traditional western ethical perspectives, however, are
anthropocentric or human-centered in that either they assign
intrinsic value to human beings alone (i.e., what we might call
anthropocentric in a strong sense) or they assign a significantly
greater amount of intrinsic value to human beings than to any
nonhuman things such that the protection or promotion of human
interests or well-being at the expense of nonhuman things turns out
to be nearly always justified (i.e., what we might call
anthropocentric in a weak sense). For example, Aristotle (Politics,
Bk. 1, Ch. 8) maintains that nature has made all things
specifically for the sake of man and that the value of nonhuman
things in
nature is merely instrumental. Generally, anthropocentric
positions find it problematic to articulate what is wrong with the
cruel treatment of nonhuman animals, except to the extent that such
treatment may lead to bad consequences for human beings. Immanuel
Kant (Duties to Animals and Spirits, in Lectures on Ethics), for
instance, suggests that cruelty towards a dog might encourage a
person to develop a character which would be desensitized to
cruelty towards humans. From this standpoint, cruelty towards
nonhuman animals would be instrumentally, rather than
intrinsically, wrong. Likewise, anthropocentrism often recognizes
some non-intrinsic wrongness of anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused)
environmental devastation. Such destruction might damage the
well-
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being of human beings now and in the future, since our
well-being is essentially dependent on a sustainable environment
(see Passmore 1974, Bookchin 1990, Norton, Hutchins, Stevens, and
Maple (eds.) 1995).
When environmental ethics emerged as a new sub-discipline of
philosophy in the early 1970s, it did so by posing a challenge to
traditional anthropocentrism. In the first place, it questioned the
assumed moral superiority of human beings to members of other
species on earth. In the second place, it investigated the
possibility of rational arguments for assigning intrinsic value to
the natural environment and its nonhuman contents.
It should be noted, however, that some theorists working in the
field see no need to develop new, non-anthropocentric theories.
Instead, they advocate what may be called enlightened
anthropocentrism (or, perhaps more appropriately called, prudential
anthropocentrism). Briefly, this is the view that all the moral
duties we have towards the environment are derived from our direct
duties to its human inhabitants. The practical purpose of
environmental ethics, they maintain, is to provide moral grounds
for social policies aimed at protecting the earth's environment and
remedying environmental degradation. Enlightened anthropocentrism,
they argue, is sufficient for that practical purpose, and perhaps
even more effective in delivering pragmatic outcomes, in terms of
policy-making, than non-anthropocentric theories given the
theoretical burden on the latter to provide sound arguments for its
more radical view that the nonhuman environment has intrinsic value
(cf. Norton 1991, de Shalit 1994, Light and Katz 1996).
Furthermore, some prudential anthropocentrists may hold what might
be called cynical anthropocentrism, which says that we have a
higher-level anthropocentric reason to be non-anthropocentric in
our day-to-day thinking. Suppose that a day-to-day
non-anthropocentrist tends to act more benignly towards the
nonhuman environment on which human well-being depends. This would
provide reason for encouraging non-anthropocentric thinking, even
to those who find the idea of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value
hard to swallow. In order for such a strategy to be effective one
may need to hide one's cynical anthropocentrism from others and
even from oneself. 1.4.3 Individual Morality (Individualism)
Individualism is the moral stance, political philosophy, or social
outlook that stresses independence and self-reliance.
Individualists promote the exercise of one's goals and desires,
while opposing most external interference upon one's choices,
whether by society, or any other group or institution.
Individualism is opposed to collectivism, which stress that
communal, community, group, societal, or national goals should take
priority over individual goals. Individualism is also opposed to
any tradition or other form of external moral standard being used
to limit an individual's choice of actions.
The concept of "individualism" was first used by the French
Saint-Simonian socialists (the opposite of individualism), to
describe what they
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believed was the cause of the disintegration of French society
after the 1789 Revolution. The term was however already used
(pejoratively) by reactionary thinkers of the French Theocratic
School, such as Joseph de Maistre, in their opposition to political
liberalism. The Saint-Simonians did not see political liberalism as
the problem though, but saw in "individualism" a form of "egoism"
or "anarchy," the "ruthless exploitation of man by man in modern
industry." While the conservative anti-individualists attacked the
political egalitarianism brought about by the Revolution, the
Saint-Simonians criticized laissez-faire (economic liberalism), for
its perceived failure to cope with the increasing inequality
between rich and poor. Socialism, a word introduced by the
Saint-Simonians, was to bring about "social harmony."
In the English language, the word "individualism" was first
introduced, as a pejorative, by the Owenites in the 1830s, although
it is unclear if they were influenced by Saint-Simonianism or came
up with it independently. A more positive use of the term in
Britain came to be used with the writings of James Elishama Smith,
who was a millenarian and a Christian Israelite. Although an early
Owenite socialist, he eventually rejected its collective idea of
property, and found in individualism a "universalism" that allowed
for the development of the "original genius." Without
individualism, Smith argued, individuals cannot amass property to
increase one's happiness. William Maccall, another Unitarian
preacher, and probably an acquaintance of Smith, came somewhat
later, although influenced by John Stuart Mill, Thomas Carlyle, and
German Romanticism, to the same positive conclusions, in his 1847
work "Elements of Individualism".
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "social contract" maintains that each
individual is under implicit contract to submit his or her own will
to the "general will." This advocacy of subordinating the
individual will to a collective will is in fundamental opposition
to the individualist philosophy. An individualist enters into
society to further his or her own interests, or at least demands
the right to serve his or her own interests, without taking the
interests of society into consideration (an individualist need not
be an egoist). The individualist does not lend credence to any
philosophy that requires the sacrifice of the self-interest of the
individual for any higher social causes. Rousseau would argue,
however, that his concept of "general will" is not the simple
collection of individual wills and precisely furthers the interests
of the individual (the constraint of law itself would be beneficial
for the individual, as the lack of respect for the law necessarily
entails, in Rousseau's eyes, a form of ignorance and submission to
one's passions instead of the preferred autonomy of reason).
Societies and groups can differ, in the extent to which they are
based upon predominantly "self-regarding" (individualistic, and
arguably self-interested) rather than "other-regarding"
(group-oriented, and group, or society-minded) behaviour. Ruth
Benedict argued that there is also a distinction, relevant in this
context, between "guilt" societies (e.g., medieval Europe) with an
"internal
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reference standard", and "shame" societies (e.g., Japan,
"bringing shame upon one's ancestors") with an "external reference
standard", where people look to their peers for feedback on whether
an action is "acceptable" or not (also known as "group-think").
The extent to which society, or groups are "individualistic" can
vary from time to time, and from country to country. For example,
Japanese society is more group-oriented (e.g., decisions tend to be
taken by consensus among groups, rather than by individuals), and
it has been argued that "personalities are less developed" (than is
usual in the West). The USA is usually thought of as being at the
individualistic (its detractors would say "atomistic") end of the
spectrum (the term "Rugged Individualism" is a cultural imprint of
being the essence of Americanism), whereas European societies are
more inclined to believe in "public-spiritedness", state
"socialistic" spending, and in "public" initiatives.
John Kenneth Galbraith made a classic distinction between
"private affluence and public squalor" in the USA, and private
squalor and public affluence in, for example, Europe, and there is
a correlation between individualism and degrees of public sector
intervention and taxation.
Individualism is often contrasted with either totalitarianism or
collectivism, but in fact there is a spectrum of behaviors ranging
at the societal level from highly individualistic societies (e.g.,
the USA) through mixed societies (a term the UK has used in the
post-World War II period) to collectivist. Also, many collectivists
(particularly supporters of collectivist anarchism or libertarian
socialism) point to the enormous differences between liberty-minded
collectivism and totalitarian practices.
Individualism, sometimes closely associated with certain
variants of individualist anarchism, libertarianism or classical
liberalism, typically takes it for granted that individuals know
best and that public authority or society has the right to
interfere in the person's decision-making process only when a very
compelling need to do so arises (and maybe not even in those
circumstances). This type of argument is often observed in relation
to policy debates regarding regulation of industries, as well as in
relation to personal choice of lifestyle. 1.4.4 Social Morality
Social morality is more concerned with how we would collectively do
well to live as citizens of a society. It has to do with narrating
sets of shared/mutual rules and values that would best enable folk
to rub along with each other, to be reasonably safe in each other's
company, to have enough freedom and power to live as we want to
live, and generally enjoy the kind of society that we variously
find congenial and valuable. A derivative function of social
morality is to narrate valuable relations between persons and other
species and/or impersonal integrities such as eco-systems, works of
art and so on.
Morality does not apply to individual human beings when they are
alone. A shipwrecked survivor on an island need not concern himself
with morality
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because it does not apply to him in his isolation. This
illustration emphasizes the fact that gods or extraterrestrials did
not imbed the concept of morality in individual human beings but
that morality is applicable to an individual only when he interacts
with other persons. Morality is a societal phenomenon and, since
man creates societies, all morality is a concept created by man. It
follows, that morality is relative to our environment and does not
apply to all persons at all times. Morality can only be relative
and subjective; instead of objective, universal and absolute.
A general problem, facing any moral or political narrative, is
that all persons do and must live by values but that no human
person actually knows what, if any, values really are valuable.
This matters especially for social morality because; (1) persons
can neither enjoy nor endure any kind of social integrity,
co-operation or connectedness (any society, fellowship,
communication or relationship) without some kind of shared
morality. (2) Any shared morality, like any language or other
ethic, simply will and must impose values on those who might not
otherwise freely adopt them. We mightn't like the rules of
language, for example, but we cannot profit from language without
allowing it to impose its rules on us (after all, if we don't
follow the rules then we won't be understood when we speak) - the
same goes for mathematics, politics, self-realisation, or any other
ethic. (3) None of us have a morally justified authority to impose
our values on others if we cannot justify that our values are those
that others ought to follow. And none of us have a right to impose
our values on others if we cannot justify imposing on others the
costs involved in either accepting or dissenting from those
values.
These conditions seem impossible to meet so, just in order to
have any kind of interpersonal relationship or society at all, we
have to do what we have no right to do. This problem is aggravated
by the fact that (a) human persons are chronically irresponsible
about our imposition of values, to the extent that some of us even
deny that we do impose our values on others, (b) imposing values
violates the evaluating integrity of those on whom the values are
imposed, and the imposition of values is god-playing
[parentocentric], but (c) the only forms of social morality we know
are parento-like defences against disvalue that assume a god-like
superiority on our part.
Contrary to parentocentric mythology, our social, moral,
political and aesthetic 'parents' are not better informed about
values than are those they treat as moral children. And that so
many of us think that we know what is right is evidence only that
we haven't thought about it carefully enough to be aware that we
don't know what is not knowable. Moral uncertainty logically
justifies no more than a degree of humility (especially on the part
of government). But, to the extent that we are morally insecure, we
are generally fearful enough of our own uncertainty only to violate
others in an effort to secure our own need for significance. The
cost of this kind of logic is evident in the history of Communism,
Islamic fundamentalism or 20th Century Germany. In each case,
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assumptions of moral superiority have given rise to an appalling
history of vast and costly violence.
The dilemma, of having to do right by doing what we cannot know
is right, cannot be escaped because, the attractions of
pseudo-innocence notwithstanding, we simply cannot avoid imposing
some values on others, and/or avoid responsibility for imposing our
values on society, just because we have no moral authority to do
so. To live is to impose one value on society, to not live is to
impose another. To join in imposes our presence, to opt out imposes
our absence. To vote or not vote, to speak or not speak, to mind
our own business or interfere, are all values-imposing. Our choice
is not to impose no values but only, and always, to choose which
values we will impose, how and why.
Being responsible about the values we input into the world is,
however, a behaviour which humans are generally scrupulous to
avoid. We normally translate any responsibility that we have for
others as according us the privilege of parent-like power over
them. We protest that no one has a right to impose her or his
values on us while, of necessity and in fact, vigorously imposing
our values on others with a viciousness made worse [more violent]
by: (1) our refusal to recognise and take responsibility for what
we are doing - we deceive ourselves that it is not us who impose
moral violence on others, we are just the agents of deities or
forces of one kind or another, society/women/the workers,
convention/tradition, fate, karma or 'historical necessity',
justice and so on and on and on. And (2) our confusion of moral
values with political [preference] values - we impose our
preferences on others under (a) a compulsive need to confirm that
we matter and (b) the assumption that our tastes and preferences
are morally good because, if they are not, then there are doubts
about our value as persons.
We cannot make these problems go away, but neither can we elect
to have no social morality; even the denial of morality inputs a
morality, and those who follow what others call 'evil' do so only
because they believe it to be valuable [good]. We each and all have
the power of persons, whether we want it or not, and we all use our
personhood power whether we want to or not. Any use or non-use of
personhood power necessarily inputs values to the world and,
thereby, onto others in the world. So the only possibility, for
using our power in any way that is valuable, is to follow the rules
(the 'oughts') of a genuinely valuable morality.
We cannot know that any moral values are genuinely valuable but,
as with all beliefs, we can know which moral beliefs are more or
less justified. So what we can do (and the best that we can do) is
'shorten the odds' - we can strive for those values which are best
justified by the evidence and reasoning that is available to
us.
Integrity-respecting values are necessary for any relationship
or society. To not impose such values on each other is to impose
the values of social dis-integration. We do and must, in fact,
impose integrity-respecting moral values on
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each other. And, if any kind of relationship is valuable then we
are justified in imposing such values just as the price of our
connectedness with others and theirs with us. This does not prove
that an integrity-respecting morality is 'right', but it gives us
better reasons for acting as if it was right than we have for
acting as if integrity-violating values were justified. And, this
being the case, we are better justified in imposing these values on
each other, than we are in imposing other values, just as we are
better justified in personally living by a respect for integrity
(including an integrity of personal and social morality).
We are not similarly justified in imposing preference values on
each other because preferences are pegged to subjects, and that any
person or persons prefers something tells us nothing at all about
whether or not it should or can be valued by any other person or
persons. I can, for instance, compel others to hear the sounds I
like, or to say what I want them to say, but I cannot make them
like the sounds or believe the saying.
Some social rules are a necessity of relationship, just as
linguistic rules [grammar] are a necessity of communication. And,
given that some rules are inevitable, moral rules (which
impartially empower everyone, and without which a society could not
function) are much easier to justify than are political rules
(which empower some at the expense of others and/or compel us all
to realise only the values that some parentocentric elite
prefers).
1.5 The importance of practicing good values in daily life Live
by your personal code of values to get the most out of life. Life
is fulfilling and free of stress when we live in accordance to our
own personal values
Your personal code of values are what's important to you; not
something
you want or would like to have, but something you literally need
in your life to be happy. A value is a principle or quality
intrinsically valuable or desirable to you. Values are personal.
They are your convictions, your beliefs, and your ethics rolled
into one. Your personal code of values may be identical to your
family's values. Or they may be dramatically different. Living in
agreement with one's values is fulfilling. Living in conflict with
one's values is stressful and dissatisfying. That's why it is so
important to clearly understand your own personal code of values;
your happiness depends upon not only knowing your values, but
living in accordance with them. Stress does not result from hard
work, long hours, or multiple roles in life. Stress results from
values conflicts. When put in a situation where you are unable to
honor a value, you will feel stressed out. No amount of relaxation,
meditation, or exercise will eliminate the stress until the values
conflict is resolved.
It's important that we separate what society, culture, and
family values from our individual set of values. Values are not
about right and wrong as a
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