CHAPTEI( VII INTEREST ARTICULATION AND INTEREST AGGREGATION
CHAPTEI( VII
INTEREST ARTICULATION AND INTEREST AGGREGATION
224 CHAPTER - VII
INTEREST ARTICULATION Al';ll INTEHEST AGGREGATION
The function or converting demands into general policy
alternatives is called interest aggregation, Every political
system has certain ways o£ aggregating ~Jle 'interests, claims,
and demands which are articulated by _tJle- interest groups or the polity, Otten the functions of' articulation and aggrega
tion overlap, just as do those of' aggregation,recruit9ent,and
rule-making, In some political systems, such as the authori
tarian and the primitive ones, the thrie functions of' articula
tion, aggregation, and rule making may be hajdly dit:ferentiated
from one another.
In other systems, such as the modern western ones,there
are a~parent partitions in the process; and separate structures
or sub-systems with obvious boundaries play a distinctive role.
In the Anglo-American democracies this three-told division in
functioru maintains the :flow from society to pali ty and from
polity to society ( ~rom input to output and again back to
input).
To assimilate and transform these interests into a
relatively small number of' alternatives of' policy and personnel,
a middle range of' processing is necessary, ~ these two
:functions a"'e per:formed in substantial paY't be~ore the authori
tatige governmental structures awe reached, then the output
functions of' rule-making and rule-application are facilitated,
and the political and governmental processes become calculable
and responsible. The outputs may be related to and controlled
by the inputs. Consequently, the circulation becomes relatively
free by virtue of' good boundary maintenance or division ot
labour, But normally this does not happen in the Indian political
process.
Thus, the distinction between interest articulation and
aggregation is fluid one. Modern interest groups, particularly
the •peak• associations, viz, labour, agriculture, business,oarry
aggregation quite far, sometimes to the point of' speaking tor
all tb.e classes o£ the society.
225 In this study we reserve the term "aggregation"
ror the •ore inclusive levels o£ the combinatory process•••
In £act, the aggregative £unction may be per£ormed within
all or the eub-s.stems o£ the political system --legislative
bodies, political executives,bureaucracy, media o£ communica
tion, party system, interest groups or the various types.
Parties, factions, lobbies in legislatures! cliques or
£'actions in political executives; and bureaucracies ,individual
parties 01· party coalitions outside the legislatures! and
individual interest groups or adhoc coalitions of' interest
groups -- all perform an aggregative runction, either by
£ormulating alternative public policies or by supporting or
advocating cbanges in political personnel.
POLITICAL PARTIES
AND AGGREGATION 1
But again it is the party system which is the distinc
tively modern structure of political aggregation, In the
modern, developed democratic political system it regulates
or gives order to the performance o£ the aggregative function
by the other structures. As in France, so in India, tarti es
and interest groups do not constitute differentiated, autono
mous political subsystems. They interpenetrate one another,
There are some parties which more or less,control interest
groups e. g. the ~mmu.,ist Party and the Communist - domina ted
trade unions and to a lesser degree the Socialist Party and
the Socialist trade unions,
Vhen parties control interest groups they may inhibit
the capacity or interest groups to formulate pragmatic speci£ic
demands; they impart a political-ideo-iogical content to
interest group activity.
parties t.,ey inhibit the
When interest groups control ._ the
capacity o£ the party to combine
specific interests into programmes with wider appeal, What
reaches the legislative process from the interest groups and
through tne political parties thus arl the 1 raw 1 unaggregated
demanus or specific interests, or the diffused, uncompromising
or revolutionary and reactionary tendencies o£ the right or the
226 lef't.Since no interest group is lnrge enough to have a
maJority, and the party system cannot aggregate dit"f'erent
interests into a stabLe majority or a coherent opposition, D
the elac~r<U and legislative processes f'ail to provide
alternative and e.ff'ectiva choicos. The result is a legislature
penett·:,tc'" by relatively narrow interests and uncompromising
idec.lo"ical tendencies. A legislature which can be used as an
arena f'oz· propaganda, or :for the protection or special interests,
by veto or otherwise, but not f'or the ef't'ective ru1d timely
f'ormulatian and su,~,>port of' large policy decisions. And without
a strong legislature, special interests and ideological
te"1dencies penetrate the bureaucracies, and undermine its
neutral aHJ instrUIDental character •
.!!!:,!'TERNS OF INTEREST AGGHEGATION IN INDIAN
POLITICAL SYSr&~l
Before independence, interests were usually aggregated
either by the colonial British Government or by the nationalist
movements. As the nationalist movement grew in size in India j
and attracted trade unions, peasantry, business, students, and
the like, its strength t'urther increased. So much so, that
by 1946 it appeared to be winning support t'rom within the
military services as well. By the late 1930's the Congress
Party, in its effort to reconcile diverse movements within it,
articulated an ideology emphasising a broad socialistic outlook
which still guides the party.
After independence, many of these diverse interests
were aggregated by the Congress Party leadership -- or, more
accurately by the Congress Yorking Committee 1the eon;ress
Parliamentary Party and the Council of' Ministers. The Congress
Party bas constantly been in power and those who wanted to
int'luence government policy bad to turn to the Congress.
Autonomous economic interest groups, such as business and
landlords, tried generally to work within the Congress told
especially after the 1952 elections.
227 Tl• dwwaada ot· varl0-.1!:1 1ln<&;uist.Lc grou1•11 tor linguistic
pra,.incea tucLullted an the Congroa:s l'arty
ment wne Caced ·.ci th waki .. ,; a docisiou ""
and when tlle govorn-s \t .,) (
to bow India's states,
be r•,OI'u.cdL~ud, tile decision wae let't to the Coagreaa Workin<.;
Com.nittoe. 1'1u• Cou.,;re11;, i''u1·ty has cluveluped a "lachinory f'ur
dealin,; with 'tile dive•·se intereste all<.l roconcilin~t, theru& t!le
Cougr.o;;~S i'arliamentary l'arty, wllicn managea af'i'aira in the
J.>arliou~><Jntf and the Centr ... l Eloction Coa.mi tt010e 0 which selects
candiclaLea Cor electiOHIII. lt triea to blilanoe the pl~rty ticket
with auffic.i.ent nU1Ubor111, Cor ex..wple 1 of ~lusl.:ims, other
minoritlelll 1 wow.-r1 0 aud untouchables, almost i.n tt<e e.ame way us
the Tam.•a.ny Ih.ll overatea in New York. Congre1111 Party gen!'ral 0
Suc:.·etariet~ and other ,Sbaervers serve as trouble shooters wbu ' rush to lJroviucial. 'fapitals when contlictot threaten to injure
tiH! loc ·1 or~.>nisationa.
Tb<JS, various J.inr;ual, re0ional,ca•te anu c01111nun.ity
interes1: .,;roupa aggre..,,,te in the Congress .i'arty. Tb.e rival
t'aeti ons, .:.li.C:forent :forUIIIs ,bureaucracy -- all acere6a te their
interest in tile ruliu;; party.
A.lllone; tile associatioual .Pre:ss~.&re groupe, it has already
be.,n pointed out tuat th.;, or.,; .. uised busine"o alwaya t'eels
pr~tected and .r~voured by a"gregatina its interest in ti~
Congres111. Ev.,n in t"" trade union"• ~he larcest membership
iJelou~:s to .l!'.!lJC 0 tile labour wintl ot' tae Congreea Party. Tho
workers al"" t'eel that their w.ienos can be carried and tnei~·
demands •ay ue easily t'ul1'illed i.f tbey aggree;ate their interest
in the ruliu.,. t--arty. It i• .;uaaaing that the diverse »res5ure
groups of capitalists ami wor~ers actively ac~rwgatiJ ln the
Con&ress Party, aa both are con1'ident that the op,position
parties would not come in power aud none of' ~;hetU wants to risk
tbeir intares•e.
Interest aggreaation occura at •nny points in the
lndian political ayatam. For exa~~~ple, it 18uy occur thrOU((h
tl•• expli d t tor•u.lation oC genwral policies or tbroUdb t !•e
recruit•ant or politic:..l personnel more or lese ooamtitted to
a particula. pattern of policy. The aaaociational interest
228 (As we have seen in Chapter IV, how the FICCI aggregates the
interest articulation of' the smaller business groups)
In a modern democracy associational interest groups
usually dominate interest articulation but in Indian political
system such groups are quite limited, and those too are
economic in nature. With the help of' the "distribution o£
resources" such groups finally aggregate in the ruling party
either by representation or by proxy. The ruling party may
regulate interest aggregation through policy tormation and
recruitment (as we have seen in Chapter IV, how the FICCI is
represented on the consultative bodies and legislatures £or
f'ormulating the Industrial Policy or the Five Year Plans and
how does it react if' neglected. Similar is the case with the
'peak' organisations of' the trade unions); and the Cabinet
and Parliament may engage in the f'inal rule making choices.
Thus, the functions of' articulation, aggregation, and rule -
making of'ten overlap. If' this conversion process is carri<>d
out by dif'f'erentiated and specialized structures, the function
of' interest aggregation be located and analysed(as it has been
done in Chapter IV). But even otherwise an hypothetieal
analysis can be made. To illustrate this point a case study
of' the land ceiling Act has been made in Chapter x. In the
course of' its enactment the autonomous economic interest
group of' the big landlords pertormed the f'unctions of' interest
articulation, aggregation ( in the legislatures, bureaucracy,
and Party caucus of' the ruling Congress) and finally the rule
making (in the .f'orru of' repeated aJBendments f'rom 1971 to 1 74).
POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND INTEREST AGGREGATION!
Interest aggregation may be performed within all the
sub-systems of' the political system. In £act, some degree ot
aggregation is almost inevitably carried out at all levels
from individual interest articulation to the final decision
•aking. But here we have to see1 what structures play the
major role in aggregating the articulated interests into •ajor
policy alternatives? From these alternatives the authoritative
policies f'or the political system are subsequently produced.
229 The nature of the articulated demand• usually
determines the structure performing the interest aggregation
function as aleo its consequences, In the Indian political
culture, which is still an &nalgam of traditions and moderni
zation, the articulation is quite limited, The majority of'
the population, being politically inert and sluggieh 0does not
formulate autonomous goals or particularietic demands. Secondly,
more o:ften than not, the articulation of' demands is controlll.ed
from the Centre( because the single ruling party aggregates most
o:f the diverse interests). Consequently, the process or aggregating these demands is usually managed successfully by
a small elite,
In the political culture of' India as also of Madhya
Pradesh all the various types of structures performing interest
articulation may also perform interest aggregation, Since
they perform the two functions simultaneously, tbeir mode-cues
are often ambiguous, "In more modern
aesociational interest groupe such ae
societies, large
the Federation of' German
Industries in West Germany, or the British Traders Union
Congress, may represent a great variety o:f associated organi-
zations and aggree;ate diverse
policy alternatives to present
and cont' li cting demands into
before party and Cabinet" ( 1 )
But in India such affective roles are played only by the
institutional and political interest groups. The organised
business and the trade unions also have their significant say,
in the decision making through their aggregation in the Congress
and bureaucracy. But they suffer from the oon£licting attitude
of the competing groupe.
Thus, it is clear that the fuling party and the
governmental bureaucracy are the two aost powerful aggregating
linke whidR operate between the large numbers of interest groupe
and the decision makers.
articulated interest Groups
F<.aure No.6. -.J----
[eongres•) ~
/Bureaucracy[
aggr~gation ~
* ---------[1) G,A,Alwond and G,il,Powell, Jr,
Op, Cit. P,1JO
Decision making
230 BUREAUCUACY AND AGGREGATION&
The role of bureaucracy in interest articulation
has been discussed in Chapter III, Although, it is
subordinate to the formal rule makers, it is formally
organised and linked in elaborate bierachy, They are at
a vantage position oi' performing rune tiona of' aggrega ti ~n
and rule-making by virtue of' their specialization of ta3k,
formal responsibility for set duties, and formal and
standardized rules or procedure. The Indian bureaucracy
generally aggregates the interest articulation outside
its domain, For example, in the event of the taking-over
of the whole-sale trade in wheat, it aggregated the interest
of the traders and the lower officialdom and transmitted it
to the decision makers,
this case, "Colonized"
who were their clients.
Particular agencies became in
by the powerful interest groups
The bureaucracy may become incapable of reconciling
and balancing those dominating groups whose demands may
press directly upon the decision makers, In the political
process of Madhya Pradesh it is characteristic that the
articulated interests particularly business often aggre~ate
in the bureaucracy for the Rule-application function.
CONGRESS AS THE AGGREGATING FORCE&
Next to bureaucracy is the political party{in Indian
political system it is often the ruling Congress party)
which may be dnnsidered the specialized aggregation structure
of the entire political process. In a two-party competitive
system like Britain and the u.s.A,, the p•rty aggregate•
certain interests into a set of policy proposals and then
attempts to score a victory at the polls to install such
decision makers who would use the previously aggregated
policy structure as a basis for rule-•aking, But in non
competitive systems such as India "the party may aggreg.te
interests in a manner similar to that of a large bureaucracy,
althouch its structure and activities •ay enable it to
perform other functions •ore effectively than a bureaucracy"(l)
( 1 ) .J Almond&: Povell1 Op, Cit, P,102 '
231 CONGRESS PARTY AS AN OMNlBUSa
It is amazingly true that the Congress Party aggre
gates myriad diverse interests more effectively than other
parties oC the world, It is just like an omnibus in wh~ch
various sections ot' people are joyfully riding and getting
down at convenience whenever their ends are not served,
The desire to seek wide spread electoral support compel,. it
to include in its policy package those demands which have
very broad popular support, and to avoid alienating the
most prominent interest groups •. In a political culture where
the parties aggregate in terms ot' certain general considerations,
the policy alternatives are likely to be more clear cut
and consistent. But in India as also in Madhya Pradesh,where
a chie£ objective is the election ot partisan candidates
the ruling party has a strong incentive toward aggregating
atleast the most prevalent patterns ot' demands.
Since the ruling party has the means ot "distribu
tion o£ resources" at its command the articulated interests
teel spontaneously inclined to aggregate their demands in
the party. In tne foregoing Chapters it has been discussed
at length how the party utilises the bureaucracy as its
agent tor aggregating the various interest groups, and as
a consequence the bureaucracy starts dominating over the
party and political executive. We have also seen that when
there is an interaction between party and bureaucracy( as in
the case o£ the state trading in wheat), the latter was
almost sure to wino The Central and State leaderships
found themselves completely helpless to detect the corrupt
officers and to punish them e££ectively.
It is because ot this micro tedency ot interest
aggregation that the healthy structure ot interest articula
tion and aggregation is often defeated in the Indian political
11ystem, It cannot emulate a totalitarian state like USSR
where the bureaucracy is really subordinate to party, and
it cannot become either, the consistent and clear-cut
aggregator like the two party ayste• oC U,K, or the U,S,A,
The pre11ence ot a large number o~ fairly small parti11s makea
232 it more likely that sach party msrely transmits the interests
..,__ of a special sub-culture or client~le with a minimum or
" aggregation. It has already been discussed as to how in
Madhya Pradesh the 1 toutism 1 is responsible ror the interest
articulation and aggreaation.
AGGkEGA'f ION OJ!' AGGREGATOti.S 1
Both the associational groups of organized business
and trade unions aggregate their interests in the Congress
Party. In Chapter IV it has been shown how the FICCI
influences the rule making and rule application pertaining
to industrial policy. At first the articulated interest of' the
lower level units aggregate in the 'peak' organizations and
thence it is transmitted to tbe decision makers. The aggrega
tion takes place by stages; The district and regional
business organisations aggregate their interests in two waysr
( 1) in their peak associations and (2) in the party organi
sation at district and regional level. Similarly, the state
l10vel organisation viz. M.P. Cbamber of Co11111terce and
Industries aggregates tl1e interest of its constituent chambers
and deposits it with tohe State government on tbe one hand,
and aggregates it with the peak organization oa the other.
Tims, the aggr'egation in such cases is o£ a pyramid type as
sho~ in tile diagram;
FlCCI ~///
In the peak Aaso.o£ State t: Ul India lsvel
Decision Makers
~
Aggregation
Local and regional unite.
F.:~unNo.'7.
State Govt.Factional heads higher Bureau & Party caucus
In tbe party org.of' respective area and
1 Bureaucracy,
233 The individual pre>;sure groups and strong lobbies
penetrate in the decision •aking even directly ignoring
the pyramid or rormal aggregation as their channel or access
is much moree stronger than the oruinary ones.
Since tl1e Congress Party is an aggregator o£ diverse
interests u~ besides business it also aggregates the
interest of' the trade unions, it acts like its counterpart
in Me~ico 1 by perrorming a mediatin~ role to achieve a
bdlanced aggregatiou. For example, in the Bonus Act the
government had to invite displeasure or the Mill-owners who
in turn had to be recompensed elsewhere in the f'orm of
various concessions {already discussed in ~ Chapter IV)
at the 1'ule-application stage. An empirical analysis o£ the
llonus Act has revealed that the Government had aggregated
the interest o£ all such political parties(mainly the Congress
and the C.l' • .r.) which had aggregated and articulated the
interest o£ the various peak trade unions.
The trade unions again per:formed the .f'tmctions o:f
hoth, articuLttion and aggregation by combining the interest
of' thei.r Con'3ti tuen t Union" and aggregating the same to
thoir parent poli tlc;~l parties. Thus, 1'rom interest articula _
t.; on t > the rtlle-mo)dng and rule-ap.f·licatj_on, viz., ttoo input
"'' .1 tho e>ut,ut !'unctions were c1osely related through a
sharp line o£ political commnnication, a function per:formed
by the trade •mion leaders who at the top participated in
the rule-making (as m9mbers o£ the Consultative Committees
and as legislators ) and trans.f'o:nned it to the bottom
(the Constit;uent affiliated labour unions) where the political
communication in the :form o:f strikes and "bandhJi!s"
precipated the aggregation runction.
Fi9uy" No, 'a witt -('><\~1'a<~ -lh• P' oC.<'S2 ·
FL~~-Je_No. ~· J nt. O.S9Ye. of T. U.
+ 'Pol.· t>a'it(f: Ci-'av<At)
+ 0
234
Soc l.o.L Syst-em.
ootpvt
(!ha_Yl'h€lS
c~ C..~(.c ss-
C!o,.solt. Colnh'lll(t:c
'
~----------------F~~b~~--------------~
DIFFEHENT lATIUN AND FUNCTIONAL
SPECIALIZATION OF ASSOCIATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS!
It is thus cllear that the organized busine•s and
trade unions not only perform the functions of interest
articulation and aggrecation but also participate in rule
making. Some times tnese structures of political process
overlap each other as indicated in the rormulation or
the Industrial policy and the Bonus Act. The development
of specialized structures for the aggregation or a wide
range or interests into a limited number of policy
alternatives ten~s to increase system capability in several
waYS I
(i) It becomes easier for the decision makers
to dlak:e account of' all el em en ts in the Society and to
respond them.
(ii) A wide range or voices can be heard without
ovurwhulwin,_; thu decision making structures by th&' sheer
volUlJie or demands and thus rendering them helpless to
construct ef't'ective and consistent policy.
-
235 The development or specialized interest aggregation
structures thus creates a potential ~or ereater system of
responsiveness and effectiveness. The heavy load or raw,
unstructured and unorganised demands may bring policy making
to a halt or to a confused decision-making. Further, in the
emergence of specialized structures for interest aggregation
there is a two-fold differentiation -- (i) Aggregation
structures(e.g. the peak associations and the party) must be
differentiated from the Central decision-making structures
(such as the Cabinet and the bureaucL'acy) (ii) They must also
be differentiated ~rom the maJor interest articulation
structures (such as trade unions and smaller business organi
sations). But this differentiation is properly maintained
only in the competitive two-party system. In the Indian
political system these differentiations are often mixed up,
because the rulino;~ Congress Party aggregates almost all the
diverse interests. Consequently, the :functions of various
structures often overlap. The problems of the s.v.n. in the
case of multi-party systems,and the difficulty of rem,ining
open to, but differentiated :from, important groups in the
one-party system,a,·e apt to make e~:fective and responsive
aggregation somewhat more difficult.
LACK 0 F' CO !-!E£10N 1
Whlle analysing the political and factional groups
operating witi1in the Congress party we have seen in the last
Chapter t~.1t the internal cohesiveness of' the party is hardly
maintained. The political culture Z. tinged with regional,
caste, community and lingu!stic considerations creates groups
within groups. The ideological differences give birth to
antagonistic factions in the institutional groups. The battle
of left and right constantly disturbs the homogeneity of the
political system. Tilted to the left, the government enacts
a spate of progressive legislation, and succumbing to the
right the rule-application is retarded in the same vein. The
aggre 6 ation becomes inconsistent, hazy, blurt and incongruous.
At the time o£ elections it articulates and aggregates a lot
o£ unort'!alliaed, anomie interests, but when saddled in power,
, )I I
236 it :tails t () auc;regate all o~· them in the wake o£ preeauree and
counter prea~uras. One interest cancelle the other. Since
moat ot' the interes t.B are inart.i culated and unspeciali:&ed •
the Government does not bold any pin-point responsibility
to t bem.
Secondly, the rulin,s party itself shifts the responsi
bility oi' aggre,;atiou to some other channels often the
power£ul !'actions within the party fold. For example, in the
case of' the takia,;; over ot' the wbolesale trade in whl'at, tl1e
government meant to a"._;re;;. te the interest" of' the farmers ·
A speci1d ceil '"""' creat"d in the Consres.e Working Committee
with the prvmised co-ope&·atlon of' the c.P.I. to launch a
countrywide cam.,aign to articulate and aggregate the interests
or tile ftuwers. But nothing substantial could be done in the
face or the stroue:;er articulatiun of interest by the rood
grain traders duly aggregated in t :w bureaucracy and the
party or,;anis tio·• 1 vhi cb reeul ted in the revocation or the
s tap talum by the Government.
lihile considering the etf'ect of dif£1oreut interen
aggregution structures upon tile political syetew, we need
to beer tn rnind two otbex· characteri .. tics of: 118t:re,:ation
per~onnance; (1) Style and, (2) degree o:C' :C'rasmentation.
Dy style we wean to su,;jSest tl•e way in which the etructure
perf'orms the function. According to Almond, ( 1 ) there are
atlcast thr"e dii'ferent etylee of" interest aggc•gation,
correspc•ndi•lg roughly to the secularised politl cnl eubcultures
of' the interest aggregation structures. These 'three etyles
are 1 (1) pragruatic bnrF,ainiag, (2) absolute-value
oriented (J) and traditioualietico Let u .. apply these etyl<·ll
to analyse the intereet aggre._.ation structures in the
political process of' India and Maclhya l'radesh collectively
as more or l""s th" procees ie tile eame.
BAI<G,\L\LNG STH.Ea
It ia a>•plicable in a political system where the
associational intereat grouva at·e fairly large in number,euch
as in tne Un1ted States of ~erica, Grfat IJritain and tt1e
l'hilii>pines. In theae cow1tr1ee a wide variety of interest e
(1) , }, Alraond t. Yowell' 1 o.,. Cit, 1'.108
237 are of'ton combined into a limited number of' alternative
policies. The a~~re~ution is so~etimea guided by more
General ideolo._ical perspectives, but the accommodation
oC diverse interests is its most notable characteristic.
In the .Indiau po.U. tical proceas such style of' ag~J:rega tion
is t'ounu ir. c he ox·gauised bueiness d.n4 the i:ra.de unions.
The vurioua ideolo~ical groups and cliquos f'ormed within
in:.> ti tutiona.J. grou~s also make use of' such a style. In
such C<illias 1 ( "s soan in Cnapter III) compromise between
tae di.f.fez·ent interests dominate tile aggret;l'ltion process,
wnettler the .tunction is pert'ormed by party, legislature
or tile C<lbinot •
.I\IIIOfi6 the non-a,sociational and anomie aroupa this
st,le is also adhered to 7though aparing 1when the cause of'
articulation is quite particularistic. The students; the
traderel dlld otner pro:teuional jJroUpti usually take recourse
to su h a tyle of' ato:~re,.;ation, This style :tacili tates
responeiveness :trom the decision makers.
T '''· .. ~ $
It A'ef'usee to camprooni>~e tlle principles of policy
for the sai<.P ot· accoll!lllodatind dl.veree interests. This style
111ay appeat' as a very rigid rati onal.t'-, Generally, t lle
ag;;regator works out the 'loaJ.cH1 1 solution to a problem
and develop policy to correspond to it. Interests are
eggre,;ated atrictly in accordance with the theoretically
perf'•et solution. For example, in Chepter III we have
di scussod how the 'lo~i cal aolution 1 wae evolved by the
decision m·,ken; to docide;l' tbe auccessors af'ter ftebru and
Shastri. In the drama of eucceesion various diverse
intereeta were a.;greg.-.ted to reacll a aolution.
Si111ila1·l; 1 a£te1· the great SA'lit the Con~reaa( R)
o.~_,re.;o.ted tue int6reeta of tt1e left ving
includint; u.., youn~ tur.l<a and the a.x-c~Ard
o•· ....... Congress
holders or the
C.i',L., l..l,M,;,. gro":k in the Lok Sabha a. also the powerf'ul
rightists aml tho Capitalieta. Theoretically, all poasible
·pc)liciee vere f'ramed 1 aocia.l.i a tic p1·ocrsDnea vera enacted 1
238 even tite Constitution was liberally amend&d, Dut nothing
concrete h:,ppened at the rule- application and rule-
adjudication stage, because ot' tbe 1 pragmati o bargaining'.
The rationale could not prevail due to ideological stakes.
In the S,V,D, Government of Madhya Pradesh a very
rigid rat.i.onal--f:sm- was observed while aggregating the
interests o£ the defectors from the Congress, the Jan Sangh,
the ex-ruling Chiefs and the big land lords of the State,
The absolute value oriented style turned into a value-free
~to;gregation of interests, Consequently, the S.V,D. was
broken. Similarly, the ideologies of Jai Prakash Narain
and his Chambal Valley Peace Mission could not reconcile
wi til the Sta1e Government of' Madhya Pradesll af'ter the
surrender or Jacoii-"s.
Thus, it is clear that in the Indian political
process this style may be used in the initial stages,
mainl.y by the ideal.istic political groupsl but in due course
of time the trend of style is changed to suit their vested
J.n teres ts. r:owev .. z·, many 0 tiler groups manifest sn
J.deol.ogical style und,;r certain circUlllstances, particularly
when tney :f'eel inser.uro and frightened o£ their political
instability,
TP. • ..DITIO!U.L.i.SriC S'l'YLES!
This style of aggregation usually relies upon the
patterns of the past in suggesting policy al.ternatives £or
the future. Such style •manifests both rigidity and diffuse
societal role Orientations~. It is typical of the Indian
political system in which the resources and energies o£
the people are committed by the social and economUc patterns
of the traditional culture to long established and pre -
determined goals. The demands articulated apart £rom these
traditional goals are not easily assimilated by the tradi
tional political elite. But now the traditional system o£
the Indian political process is gradually getting oriented
to the new styles observed in the western countries. Although
the traditional forces are still alive in the process of
239 articulation, they are not heeitating to embrace the
modernizing trends, We are in fact passin* through a
transition of political development,
The traditional groupe of cas tee and communi ties
have started assimilating the business and other economic
groups within tkem, Consequently, the community, caste,
regional, and lineage groups have in:riltrated into the
organised business and the institutional groups. The
amalgam is so much confusing that the political culture
has become hetrogeneous and complex,
Since the political parties are the major structure
perf'orming the :function of' the :Lntereat aggrec;ation,
traditionalistic style is •ainly responsible for the
emergence of" the eecterian, religious and caste-ridden poli
tical parties, The political culture teeds such aggre
gators. For example, the Shiromani Akali Dal is a politico~
religious organisation conf'ined to the State of Punjab -
a :fact that reveals its parochial character. It aggregates
the interests of" the Sikh Community alone. Similarly , the
D,!l.K, is a regional party aggregating many Tamil pressure
groups sustaining the sentiments and wishes of the local
people. It apprehends
in the long run, ruin
in the same vein that ('
the Tamil <'lul ture and I
Hindi shall,
language,
The R.s.s. and the Muslim Majlia are the other
power:f"ul aggregat6~s of interest of Maharaahtrian Brahmins
and Muslims respectively,
The modernizing role of interest aggregation is
being performed by the C,P,I, and its allies which aggregate
the interest of the working class and helpJi them t'ight ~~- _( ''
against the Government, il:t- provide,J f'orums and platforms ' ' .
to the masses or the proletariat~ petty-bourgeo._ cla5s, "t ' • '' (" ' ' ' -'(_
such as Post and Te1egrapq 0 Central Government Employees,
Railway•, L,r.c. Employees, Students and the like,
P'RAGMENTAT ION IN AGGREGATION PATTEUNS!
But all these political parties in turn aggregate
their interests in the Congress Party and its Government-.1
240 institutional groups. This tendency is caused by the fragmen
ted pattern of interest aggregation which is generally
associated with a feagmented political culturef a fundamental
fragmentation in the values and aspirations of different
groups in the society. However, the aggregation pattern is
not determined by t be cultural pattern. The Congress Party
and the Central decision-makers generally aggregate tba demands
mediating through these parties -- tbe fragmented aggregators
of interests. It combines the traditional and modernizing
interest aggragators by adopting a synthesized poliey
mitigating the significance of the opposition parties and
reducing them to ~ne mara pressure groups. Hartmann's
following estimate about the prospects of the socialist
parties of India appears to bold truth for all the opposition
parties with differing patternst
"The re-creation of the Congress monolith has created
a political atmosphere in which a policy of building up a self•
reliant and independent party of democratic socialism can
hardly bring dividends, but only lead to acute discomfort
among the party members"{ 1 )
But when the parfor.ance of the aggregation function
fails to bridge such differences, and particularly when
fragmented aggregation appears together with other sources
of strain, the political system begins to face very severe
problems, The Congress is the victim ot these tendencies of
different and diverse aspects of aggregation. The fragmented
multi-party system transmits conflicting and ideologically
rigid d .. ands into a fragmented legislature and a diversified
cabinet. Illportant and povertul institutional interest
groups also articulate interests directly to t be decision
•akers. Such aggregation, as we have discussed here and in
the last Chapters, is undertaken by the relatively weak and
multi-centrad decision-making structure. It ie hampered by
( 1 ) ' f ~ •i' ,·,Hartmann I •Tbe Socialist parties of India•
(Journal of' Const. aDd Parl. Studies) Oct. to Dec. 1971 - P.6,1
241 ideo~ogical differences provoked by the different rorume
based on left and right leanings. Imrnobi~ism and ineffective
ness in policy have tended to be the result.
INTEREST AGGREGATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTt
Man~ or the considerations suggested while discussing
the environment and interest articulation, app~y to patterns
o£ aggregation as well. Factors or political communication,
resource distribution, and political culture which intensify
or ease the number of articulated interests, also affect the
prob~em of aggregating those interests. In the Indian
politic~! development, the tendency of social and economic
modernization to expand communication levels to increase
inclinations towards participation, to wider.. the gap between
rich and poor, and generally to increase the number of
autonomous demands arising from the complex society, places
growing stress upon tbe aggregation structures.
This burden has further intensified as the politica~
system has been involved in a vast number o£ social institu
tions and activities. All the d .. ande ranging from students
to organised business may become po~itical d .. ands. Protests
over social problems also become political protests -- partly
because in the name of welfare state,the Government has
involved itself directly in so many :facets o:f social li•e.
Myron Weiner has rightly suggested that decentralization may
insulate India's regime £ram sa.e o:f its aggregative burdens{l)
However, the need to agggrgate 1 or control, a large
and diverse number of articulated demands presents itself
to a •odernizing system. Er:forts o:f modernizing systems to
create a controlled form of participation and a hierarchical
and unified aggregation represent tne authoritarian st~ce
towards the process of political develop.ent. In the Indian
political system the Congress party and bureaucracy ha:t-been
( 1 ) Myron Weiner 1 •Poli tics of Scarcity • P.P. 220 ff
242 uti1ized to accommodate and assregate the increasing number
of' demands. This tendency "enerally overloads the centralize,
system and the unprocossed demands either block the politica1
process or cause conflict in the policy aaking. The party
caucus and the institutions such as the National Development
Counci1 serve to sonte degree to ba1anoe con:t'1i.cting interests
and shape coherent policy in response to nationa1 needso The
decision makers are always anxious to suppress new demands
unless they become so well articulated that their aggregation
becomes rather imperative.
ASPIRATIONS OUTSTRIP CAPABILITIESt
It is, thus, clear that there is no simple solution
to the problem of' aggregation in meeting the challenges of
participation and distribution. Ev~n in cases of' "authori
tarian" solutions, the divisions and conflict o:t'ten reappear
in new :t'orm within the ruling party or the elite 1 tsel:t',
as we saw in the creation of' the two forums within the
Congress fold, or the many :t'actional antagonistic political
groups of Madhya Pradesh(disoussed in Chapters III to VI),
The Congress party has the aspiration of aggregating all the
articu1ated interests, single handed! but aspirations often
outstf~p capabilities in the initiation of' •oderniaation,
and an almost intolerable burden is coanonly placed upon the
aggregative :t'unction.
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