8/13/2019 Chappell ThrasymachusVirtues 1993 http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/chappell-thrasymachusvirtues-1993 1/18 The Virtues of Thrasymachus Author(s): T. D. J. Chappell Source: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182424 . Accessed: 27/01/2014 13:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 178.82.6.205 on Mon, 27 Jan 2014 13:37:34 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
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Author(s): T. D. J. ChappellSource: Phronesis, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1-17Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182424 .
Accessed: 27/01/2014 13:37
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
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BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
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describe it, I will say that he has adescriptive thesis about justice. Whereas,
if Thrasymachus' project regarding justice is to make reference to justice inorder to offer us reasons to behave or live in a certain way, I will say that
Thrasymachus has a prescriptive thesis about justice. I shall argue that
Thrasymachus does not have a prescriptive thesis about justice, and does
have a descriptive thesis about justice.
One important complication which will appear in this. Although Thrasy-
machus does not hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, he does hold a
prescriptive thesis about a character trait which is, very often though not
always, coextensive with the character trait of justice. This fact makes it
look at times almost as if Thrasymachus does hold a prescriptive thesisabout justice itself, rather than about the other charactertrait with which it
very often coincides. But I shall argue that this appearance is deceptive. if
Thrasymachus ever prescribes justice or just behaviour, he does so, as
Aristotle would say, only xaxa oaufP3E0Pxo6;,nd not essentially.
II
If Thrasymachus did hold a prescriptive thesis about justice, what form
could it take? Note first that neither Thrasymachusnor Socrates thinks, aswe are often inclined to think, that 'a just person' means pretty much the
same as 'a good person' and that the word 'justice' is, or can be, simply a
(rough) synonym for the phrase 'moral rightness'. Many modern moral
philosophers, for example Professor Hare, have tended to talk as if 'It
would be just to do F' were often or even usually a straightforward equiv-
alent to 'It would be morally right to do F'. But however this may be for us,
it cannot have been so for Socrates and Thrasymachus,for the reason noted
by Mrs. Foot in my epigraph. The modern moral philosophers suppose that
someonewho is told that it would be
'morally right'to do
somethingcannot
go on to question this without making a mistake. It is, they say, merely
incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I have to do what is morally right?'.
If, tacitly or openly,they accept the rough-synonym view of the meaning of
'justice', they must presumably think that 'What reason do I have to do
what is just?' is similarly incoherent. But Thrasymachus and Socrates
apparently do not think it merely incoherent to ask 'But what reason do I
have to do what is just?'. However else Socrates may try to meet Thrasy-
machus' attack on justice, it is not by accusing him of this kind of incoher-
ence. It follows, as Mrs. Foot notes, that Thrasymachusand Socrates must
mean something rather different from these modern theorists when they
talk of 'justice'. Their concept is more specific, less grandiosely all-embrac-
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cited). However, (i) I spell the argumentout differently o Kerferd,whomakesno use of
anydistinction between levels of practicalreasoning;and (ii) my conclusionis different
from his. Unlike him I do not use this technique to argue that Thrasymachus hinksinjusticeis a virtue, but (on the contrary) o arguethatThrasymachushinksthatneither
injusticenor justice is either a virtueor a vice.
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SOCRATES: Thrasymachus, do the unjust seem to you to be intelligent(PQ6vLlVLoL)nd good (aEyaOo0)?THRASYMACHUS: Yes - those who are able to be completely unjust ...
348e 1-4:
SOCRATES: ... But this is what made me wonder: that you put injustice
in the class of virtue and wisdom, but justice in the opposite classes.
THRASYMACHUS: But that is just what I do.
348e7-349a3:
SOCRATES: Now it is clear that you are going to say that [what is unjust] isgood (xakcov)and strong, and that you will render to it all the additions that
we rendered to what is just - since you have dared to put it [sc. what is
unjust] in [the class of] virtue and wisdom (rEL&bi yFexai Ev &'eETi aiT'o
xait oopqt eloPX&oAagOrEvat).THRASYMACHUS: What a good prophet you are.
The first and simplest way to defend IV would be to say this: that if
Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue, then he must for that very
reason hold that justice is a vice and injustice a virtue. But at 348c, where
Thrasymachus certainly asserts that justice is not a virtue, he also deniesthat justice is a vice:
SOCRATES: Then what do you mean?
THRASYMACHUS: The opposite.
SOCRATES: What, that justice is a vice?
THRASYMACHUS: Well,no. . (oi)x...
So Thrasymachus does not think that justice is a vice, and injustice is a
virtue, simply because justice is not a virtue. But might he not hold that
justice is a vice and injustice a virtue on other grounds? A second, and moresubtle, line of argument for IV might point to what comes next at 348c:
THRASYMACHUS: Well, no - but it is naive simplicity (3navic Evvatcav
vIOEMav).
SOCRATES. You mean then that injustice is duplicity (xaXoiOELav)?
THRASYMACHUS. No: injustice is practical intelligence (EvBouXkLav).
Here, it can be argued, Thrasymachus identifies justice and naive simplic-
ity, and injustice and practical intelligence. Now he clearly holds that naive
simplicity is a vice, and that practicalintelligence, as opposed to duplicity, isa virtue. In which case Thrasymachusmust, surely, hold that justice is a vice
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beinga strict dentitybetweeninjusticeandpracticalntelligence.For it isargued hat (a) injustice s (thesameas)practicalntelligence; b) practicalintelligence s a Thrasymachean irtue;and therefore(c) injustice s (thesameas) aThrasymacheanirtue.ButThrasymachusejects hisargumentbecausehe rejects(a). For(a) tobe true sforthistobe true:anybehaviouris practicallyntelligentbehaviourf andonlyif it is unjustbehaviour: Vx)(Px <-> Ux). But thisbiconditionals doublyfalsified,forThrasymachusclearlyholdsthattherecan bebothunjustbehaviourwhich snotpracticallyintelligentbehaviour, and practically ntelligentbehaviourwhich is not
unjust behaviour. This is a consequence of Thrasymachus'emarks, orexampleat344c, aboutthe need forfullorperfect njustice o be accompa-nied by power:
'Thus, Socrates, injustice is stronger,andmoreliberated,and more masterlythanjustice when it comes to thefull (Nxavds yLyvot )..
Thrasymachusdoes not hold that any unjust act I do exemplifiesmypractical ntelligence:only the unjustact which is calculated o matchmypower.Actingin accordwithThrasymacheanracticalntelligence, here-fore, cannot simplymean actingunjustly;rather t must meanactingasunjustlyas you can get away with. It follows from this that practicalintelligenceandinjusticeare, on Thrasymachus'iew, notonlynot identi-cal; in manysituationsthey are actually nverselyproportionate o eachother. Glaucon'sstoryof Gygesin Bk.II brings hispointout well. Com-paretwo men, equallyempowered,whobothwant to do whatGygesdid,butneitherof whomhasGyges'ring.The one whotriesto do whatGygesdidwithoutthe ring s the moreunjust,butthe one who restrainshimself,knowinghe will neverget awaywithit, is the morepracticallyntelligent.
cannotbe identified:henceinjustice s not shown to be a Thrasymacheanvirtuejust becausepractical ntelligence s. Thiscompletesmy argumentagainstprescriptive hesis IV, whichwas the last prescriptive hesis stillavailable.So, if it is coherentat all,Thrasymachus'hesiscannot,inanyofthese senses, be a prescriptivehesis.
III
Considernow the profferedalternative: hat Thrasymachus'hesis is a
decriptive hesis.
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In this case, Thrasymachus is not primarilyconcerned to tell us why, as a
matter of policy, we should choose justice (or for that matter injustice). Hismain concern is to tell us what, as a matter of fact, justice is like; to observe
and describe the social practice called bxa1orC'v1, justice.
What is the nature of that social practice, according to Thrasymachus?
For him justice is neither a virtue nor a vice; it is a device. Consider in its
context what I labelled (4):
'You do not realise, Socrates,thatjusticeand the just is in realityanotherperson'sgood (thatis, it is the strongerand the rulingperson's nterest)andone's own injury- if one obeys and complies. But injustice is the opposite, and gives control overthose who are in truthsimpleandjust (Tiv d;ga'kTJ06g EiMi0OX6VTe xai btxaiwv).
Butthey, since they arebeingcontrolled,do what is in the interest of the one who isstronger.' (343c-d)
Thrasymachus believes that justice is a device in this sense: that it is a trick
played on the naive by the cunning, to make the naive give up any ad-
vantages they may have over the cunning. He gives us what are clearly
meant as descriptions of how this works in social practice:
'The just person always come out the worse in his encounters with the unjustperson. For one thing, suppose they co-operate together in some partnership.When the partnershipis dissolved, you will invariablyfind that the just personcomes away, not with more, but with less than the unjustperson. Again, taketheirrelationswith the city. Whenever there are taxes of some sort to be paid, the justpersoncontributes more thanthe averageamount, and the unjustpersonless; butwhenever there are benefits to be claimed, the just persongainsnothing, and theunjust person gainsa lot.' (343d)
For another example of what Thrasymachus means when he describes the
just person as E"Thr'I;,aive or simple, take the deed of the Anglo-Saxon
general Beorhtnoth, fighting the Vikings at the Battle of Maldon in 991
A.D.:
'The Northmen andthe English were . . . separatedbyan arm of the river; illedbythe incomingtide, it could only be crossedby a . . . causeway,difficult to force inthe face of a determineddefence . . . But the Vikingsknew, or so it would seem,what mannerof a manthey had to deal with:they askedfor leave to cross the ford,so that a fairfightcould be joined. Beorhtnothacceptedthe challenge andallowedthem to cross. This act of pride and misplacedchivalry proved fatal. Beorhtnothwas slain and the English routed . . .'
(J.R.R. Tolkien's account: TheHomecoming of Beorhtnoth(London: Unwin,1975, p. 149-150)
Beorhtnoth's failure, in Thrasymachus'eyes, would not be to do with a fatalflaw in his character of pride and misplaced chivalry', as Tolkien suggests
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(in line with the Maldonpoet's 'ofermode':v. TheBattleof Maldon, ines
85-954).For Thrasymachus,Beorhtnoth's atal flawwould be his lack of?Fi4oukXa,practical ntelligence: his inability, or refusal, to see through
the socialpracticeof justice. He fails to see that the institutionof justice is
simplynot somethingwhich humanshave any need of if they are to liveflourishing ives;on the contrary, o act according o justice is, in normal
cases, to choose to contributeto the flourishingof others' lives at theexpense of one's own flourishing. Justice as a social institution is, then, the
embodiment of a trick; a trickwhich the stronger play on the weaker, which
rulers play on their faithful subjects, and which the Vikings play on Beohrt-
noth - with the very natural result, as Thrasymachus would see it, thatBeorhtnoth not only ceases to have a flourishing life, but ceases to live at
all.
If this is Thrasymachus' escriptive hesisaboutjustice, then thereare
four interesting consequences. First, it becomes apparent that Thrasy-
machus is not an 'immoralist' - if by this it is meant that, in Shorey's words,
'Thrasymachus' "Umwertung aller Werte" reverses the normal applica-
tion' of all moral terms. For (i) Thrasymachusdoes not reverse, simply hold
the mirror image of, any standard moral views at all. He may believe that
justice is not a virtue, but he does not, ipso facto, believe that justice is avice; nor that injustice is a virtue. And (ii) he does not express disagreement
with all standard moral views; he expresses disagreement with standard
moral views about justice. What his views are of the other virtues in Plato's
list-temperance, courage and wisdom - we do not hear. We certainly have
no reason to think that he would deny thatcourage and wisdom have at least
some importance for human flourishing.
Secondly: we have seen that Thrasymachus' thesis about justice is a
descriptive one, and not a prescriptive one. But we can now see that, quite
apart from his descriptions of the nature of justice, Thrasymachus does
have a general prescriptive thesis, a view about what human flourishing is,
and a more specific prescriptive thesis, a view about what character traits
enable one to flourish, both of which have a bearing on our attitude to
justice. Thrasymachus believes that human flourishing consists roughly in
this: in getting for oneself as much as possible of what are uncontroversially
agreed, in our society as much as in his, to be clear and obvious examples of
good things to have: money (343e), property and valuables like treasure
(344b), and power over others to bend them to my will (344b). Now one
'Text and translationof TheBattleof Maldoncan be found in R. Hamer, ed., A Choice
of Anglo-Saxon Verse (London: Faber, 1970).
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character trait which we need to obtain this sort of good life is practical
intelligence. For practical intelligence involves knowning how to use the
device justice; and so what is prescribed for us about justice is that we
should use it, as the device it truly is, to help us achieve just these sorts of
good things. But this recommendation, that by putting practical intelli-
gence to work we use justice as a device, is not a prescriptive thesis about
justice, but about practical intelligence.
Thirdly, and consequent to this, Thrasymachus'stated or implicitview of
human flourishing may even suggest that he has a list of four cardinalvirtues
to rival Plato's. At 344c he mentions three of these virtues: 'Thus, Socrates,
when it comes to the full, injustice is stronger and more unrestrained and
more imperious than injustice . . '. Why is injustice to be preferred to
justice? As we have seen, not because it is itself a virtue; rather because it is,
in general and as a rule, more in accordance with the Thrasymachean
virtues of Strength ('ioxtU3),f Unrestraint(XEvuOEQcta;or the justifi-cation of my translation cp. Gorgias 492c), and of Imperiousness (bEolo-
tEa). What is the fourth Thrasymachean virtue? It is not Injustice, for
reasons we have already seen. It is rather that quality of mind which,
Thrasymachus says, discerns the realities of the social institution of justice,
and of which he sees unjust behaviour as being, normally, a manifestation:
namely Practical Intelligence, cv3ouVXca.
IV
The fourth consequetice of this descriptive understanding of Thrasyma-
chus' thesis about justice is that we can now reconcile his remarks about
justice, A-D, with which we began, and also sort out the sheep from the
goats among the commentators' opinions about Thrasymachus, 1-7.
First, then, his observation that justice is 'another's good' (D) means that
going in for justice entails doing like Beorhtnoth, entails being persuadedor duped by the other person into giving up all your advantages over her. So
when Thrasymachus says that justice is 'the interest of the government in
power' (C), he will mean that whatever government is in power, it will,
wittingly or not, be playing exactly this confidence trick of justice on its
subjects. In persuading them or legislating for them to act justly, it will be
causing them to do what is in fact in its own interest. If the Thrasymachean
account of virtue is right, perhaps the citizens would do much better for
themselves, and for their own interests, if they did not generally act justly by
(to take one prominent example) 'obeying the laws' (B). But they are beingdeluded by their rulers into thinking that they have some good reason to act
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xaLov [01 OVTa, 'the height of injustice is to seem just without being just'
(361a). The person in this situation, in fact, gets the best of both worlds: forshe gets all the good repute and honour of justice, without having to suffer
any of its disadvantages. Thrasymachus would no doubt agree with
Nietzsche that, if one is foolish enough to thinkjustice a virtue, then one can
damage one's soul. But provided justice is recognised to be a device and not
a virtue, and used accordingly, it can be a very useful thing to the superior
person on Thrasymachus'view. In short: Nietzsche thinks that the so-called
virtue of Justice, and indeed all 'slave morality', is a device of the weak for
preventing the strong from getting too great an advantage over them;
whereas Thrasymachus, on the contrary, thinks that Justice is a device ofthe strong for keeping the weak in their place.
(6) Houranian conventionalism is disposed of by my remarks about the
compatibility of A-D in Section I. And lastly (7) the Kerferd/Foot view,
that Thrasymachus argued from the premise 'that injustice was more profit-
able than justice' to the conclusion 'that a man who had the strength to get
away with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', is also,
if I am right, to be rejected. For my view has the consequence that injustice,
as such, will not be Thrasymachus' 'best way of life'; for considerations of
justice and injustice will not feature at all in Thrasymachean practical
reasoning, or not at least (to borrow a phrase from Aristotle) as supplying
'premisses of the good'. Hence, though it might on my interpretation of
Thrasymachus' view be true 'that a man who had the strength to get away
with injustice had reason to follow this as the best way of life', such a
Thrasymachean agent's reason to live some form of the unjust life could not
be: 'Because this life is unjust'. The injustice of his preferred life is not
central, but incidental, to the practical reasoning on account of which he
chooses to live that way. For it is true that the person of Thrasymachean
virtue does, typically but not always, do what is unjust; but he does not do
what is unjust under the description 'act of injustice', but under the descrip-
tion 'act of ci4ouXv(a'.His reasons for living like that would be given, not
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by reference to a supposed virtue of injustice; but by reference, firstly, to
the Thrasymachean conception of the flourishing human life which I have
tried to develop, and, secondly, to the human character traits (especially
'ri4ouia) by which the good life so conceived is to be rendered attain-
able: which is to say, by reference to the virtues of Thrasymachus5.
Wolfson College, Oxford
' I am grateful to MalcolmSchofield and Roger Crispfor written comments on earlierdrafts. In conversation, Steven Everson and David Charles gave useful criticisms.ElizabethTelfer, RichardStalleyandMary Haightmadevaluablepointswhen I presen-ted one form of the paper at Glasgow University, as did Roger Trigg at WarwickUniversity. I am also indebted to my pupils David Kensingerand James MacLain of
WilliamsCollege, Massachussetts,U.S.A., for obliging me, in Trinity Term 1992, tothink harderabout Thrasymachus.