Changing relationship between science and government post - 9-11-01 AAAS R&D Colloquium Lewis M. Branscomb Harvard University April 12, 2002.

Changing relationship between science and

government post - 9-11-01

AAAS R&D ColloquiumLewis M. BranscombHarvard University

April 12, 2002

25 years of warning The threat of catastrophic terrorism

Type III terrorism was anticipated (Prof. Gerald Holton 1976, to be republished 2002)

Source of vulnerabilities Economic ecology: competition in market

economy maximizes efficiency, stability at cost of resiliency. (NAS Bicentenary presentation to ICSU, 1976)

Assumes a peaceful, obedient society which does not threaten to exploit these vulnerabilities

University-Gov’t relationship changed with every major war WWII: known enemy; duration fixed by

expectation of unconditional surrender. Normal civil life suspended; S&T 100% dedicated.

Cold War: known enemy; indefinite duration; task assigned to military and foreign policy.

Normal civil life continues; military-industrial complex rusn “war”; academic support primarily through basic research agencies (ONR, AFOSR, ARO, DARPA…)

Terrorism: unknown enemy in our midst; duration indefinite; universities will support building on traditional values, but adopting some significant changes.

Asymmetric Warfare Cold War: asymmetry of Soviet ground

forces balanced by NATO technology. Catastrophic terrorism is the ultimate in

asymmetric warfare Each terrorist threat is in some ways a new war. Terrorists techically competent and may be

armed with weapons of mass destruction. To what extent can S&T compensate for the

asymmetry in terrorism threat? What may be the role of and effect on the

US universities?

Offsetting the Terrorists’ Advantage US is not structured to deal with a problem

that cannot be compartmented Into war or civil justice Into domestic or foreign Into short term or long term Into public or private responsibility

US technical community is ready to be called on. Is government organized to benefit from what universities can contribute.

Three approaches to counter-terrorism strategy Reduce the incentives

Foreign and military policies International alliances

Harden the target societies Detect and intercept terrorists Motivate industry to reduce vulnerabilities Damage limitation, enhanced recovery

Detect and arrest terrorists Police and intelligence operations Balance impacts on civil rights

Nature of vulnerabilities S&T created both the efficient economy

and provides the terrorists’ weapons Infrastructure systems are deeply

linked Domino effects Leads to threat of multiple, simultaneous

attacks Deregulation has increased

vulnerability significantly in some areas

Threats Bioterrorism, chemical warfare Nuclear, radiation contamination Critical infrastructures

Energy, communications, transportation Linked attacks

Cities Managing warnings and attacks Supporting first responders

Borders and intelligence

S&T strategies Technical tools needed

Sensor systems Data systems and networks Biomedical vaccines, chem. war treatments Biometrics for efficient ID Human factors – decision systems

Requirements Systems engineering and analysis Strategy driven goals for research Creation of new capabilities through basic

research in pursuit of the strategy

Disciplines drawn into research for counter terrorism

Hazardous materials, sensors: chemisty, physics and engineering.

Nuclear, radiological threats: nuclear science Bioterrorism: biomedical science, medical

services Energy: physical facilities, infrastructure links:

engineering, IT Transportation & distribution: Engineering Water, Food and Agriculture: biology, chemistry Cyber attacks: Information science and

engineering Cities and people: Social and behavioral science Infrastructure linkages: Systems analysis and

systems in engineering

Stovepipes Most counter-terrorism research must be

interdisciplinary and in a systems context Government science agencies tend to be

stove piped; interdisciplinary work is hard to peer review. Many CT problems cut across agency lines.

University structure is also poorly adapted to systems context, multidisciplinary work.

Might result in some institutional innovations both in government and in the universities.

Implementation of S&T strategy

Rely on existing highly decentralized but powerful S&T capabilities Do not try to reorganize federal gov’t.

Create an architecture for defining the strategy and managing its execution Requires linked systems approaches Inter-sectoral collaboration (fed., states,

cities, industry) will be a challenge.

University resources and needs for helping the effort RESOURCES Research capability for

creating new options & capabilities

Links to local government & industry.

Access to students and colleagues from around the world.

Relevant capability in social science, humanities.

NEEDS Research resources Access to foreign

resources Freedom to share

technical information Acceptable levels of

security in university Ability to admit and

collaborate without irrational restrictions

Gov’t – University Relations

in Time of Terrorism Some possible positive effects (Skolnikoff is

addressing risks and threats to universities) New sources and levels of funding Disciplinary rebalance of funding Improved government ability to manage

cross-cutting research programs More constructive linkages with industry

and with state and local government. Important benefits to society from “dual

use.” Renewal of interest in S&E education.

Sources, Balance, Levels of Government R&D Funding Good news

Basic research may be seen as strategic necessity

May help redress imbalance of physical vs health sciences

Substantially funded by traditional civil agencies (NSF, NIH, DOE etc), not DOD

Bad news As agency programs

are “relabeled” they invite constraints

Legislation and agency policy may place information restrictions on grants

Counter-terrorism a preempting budget priority

Gov’t ability to manage cross-cutting research programs Counter-terrorism requires systems

approach. Systems approach demands capability

at top level of gov’t to architect national research programs.

May help with interdisciplinary research If successful can apply to sustainable

development, climate change…

Dual use benefits from the right research strategy

Define problems to address civil as well as security needs: Can we learn to detect an infection prior to

clinical symptoms? Find ways to make needed capabilities

affordable: Can containers be inspected with new probes and

sensors, reducing costs in time and money? Find ways to help deal with natural disasters:

Communications, robotics, clothing, threat characterization for first responders.

Education again a National Security

Priority? Bringing more American students into

science and improving public education will be a necessity. Demand for publicly financed R&D will

stress human resources in S&T Congressional pressure on non-US students

(regrettable but likely) could increase case for US education efforts

“Technology Talent Act” if inacted, seeks to increase US student interest in science.

Knowledge is power. Those who possess it have always sought to deny it to their enemies…. But exactly what knowledge needs to be controlled depends on who those enemies are. Nor is the control of knowledge costless.

A free society should regard it as a last resort. Scientists cannot build on each other’s results if they do not know them. And governments are frequently tempted to hide not only what is dangerous, but also what is embarrassing. That can result in dangers of its own. --From the Economist

Control of Sensitive Information

Chaotic state of government controls on information System of military secret classification is

not adapted to terrorism threat. A very broad range of basic research

information will be needed. HHS has no legal authority to “classify”

information SECRET. “Sensitive but unclassified” likely to be

applied to much university work. There are serious, legitimate dilemmas about

what should in fact be published. PATRIOT Act authorizes intrusion on

Internet, answering machines and other telecoms.

Security and Intelligence on University Campuses

Much more difficult problem than in Cold War Threat is here: public interest in security lapses at

universities will be intense. Enemy is ill defined and diverse Threats are extraordinarily diverse Threat is of indefinite duration; victory is

undefined. Public will expect universities to track

students who may be conceived of as threats Universities with rules against work for the

CIA will find new policies hard to define.

Changes in culture of science? Must the culture of science evolve

to discourage its misuse? If so, in what ways? Is there a consensus on the

expectations scientists place on themselves now?

Congress ready to legislate on universities and terrorism http://www.aau.edu/status/billstatus.h

tml#Terrorism --lists dozens of proposed bills, many of which impose obligations on universities

PATRIOT act – requires colleges to turn over student records, and requires NCES to turn over data in response to warrant, data shared with CIA, FBI etc.