1 CHANGING PATTERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TWO AFGHAN BADAKHSHANI DISTRICTS: THE IMPACT OF OPIUM AND HEROIN MARC THEUSS ([email protected])
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CHANGING PATTERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCEIN TWO AFGHAN BADAKHSHANI DISTRICTS:
THE IMPACT OF OPIUM AND HEROIN
MARC THEUSS ([email protected])
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RESEARCH LOCALES: BADAKHSHAN
Tajikistan
Pakistan
China
•3.5 years in Afghanistan•3 months research:
•Afghan (Badakhshan)•Tajikistan (GBAO)
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RESEARCH LOCALES: WAKHAN
TAJIKISTAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
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RESEARCH LOCALES: SHUGHNAN
TAJIKISTAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
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RESEARCH LOCALES: GBAO
•Allows for empirical triangulation
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BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH
•Multiple professional trips to Wakhan (1 to Shughnan)
•Wakhan/Shughnan similar: contextual/parametric variables
•Counter-intuitively anecdotal evidence of radical difference:
•Political outcomes
•Political processes
•Power relations
•Conflict processing
•A research enigma. Why?
•Tentative hypothesis: Cross-border heroin trade vs market of addiction
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RESOURCES
CATEGORIES:ACTORS STRATEGIESNETWORKS
POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES
ANALYTICAL MODEL
•Methodologically problematic to study OPE
•Did not want to pre-empt the importance of OPE
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PARAMETRIC SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES
•Geography•Agro-ecology•Religion•Ethnicity
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
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GEOGRAPHY
•Mountainous
•Peripheral
•Remote
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
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AGRO-ECOLOGY
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
•Low land-holding
•High household sizes
•1 cropping season per year
•Previously: moderate land
•Radically reduced now
•1 cropping season
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RELIGION
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
•Shia Ismailis
•Respect 49th Imam (Aga Khan)
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ETHNICITY
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
•Shughnis (Pamiri)•Minority non-indigenous Sunis:
•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats
•Wakhis (Pamiris)•Minority non-indigenous Sunis:
•Politico-military•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats
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SHUGHNAN: HEROIN/POSITIONALITY
•Shughnan transit point between:
•Largest opiate producing nation in world
•Global heroin nexus
UNODC: 50% Afghanistan’s GDP opiate-related
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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•2003
•Ministry of Defence made a drug swoop: Bashur bazaar
•MoD. Pashtun senior Generals and Tajik soldiers
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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•400 KGs heroin seized
•50 KGs opium
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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•Based on 4 week working stock
•Market price 2,000 USD/KG
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SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•Annual heroin trade 9.6 million USD
•2 week working stock: 19.2 million USD
•Probably much higher: stock located off shop-sites: 40 million USD
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OPIUM TRADE: MARKETS OF ADDICTIONESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•20% population addicted
•10,000 population = 2,000 addicts
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OPIUM TRADE: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE
•Annual consumption 1.2 –2.4 million USD opium
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DIFFERENCES –COMMODITY
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
HEROIN OPIUM
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DIFFERENCES –GROSS REVENUE
40 USD MILLION 2.4 USD MILLION
SHUGHNANWAKHAN
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DIFFERENCES –EXCHANGE ‘USE’/PURPOSE
GLOBAL TRADE SERVICE LOCAL ADDICTION
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
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NO. TRANSACTIONS/YEAR
100 KGS PER CROSSING:
•48•96•192
Addict buys once weekly (average)
•Based on 7 grams/day consumption
•2,000 addicts
•100,000 transactions
SHUGHNAN WAKHAN
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REVENUE PER TRANSACTION
SHUGHNAN:
200,000 USD
WAKHAN:
24 USD
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THE ARGUMENT
•The nature of the resource bases in respective districts influences:
•Kinds of actors involved in the economic system
•Way actors articulate themselves in networks vis-à-vis systems
•Sorts of strategies that are appropriate, to achieve objectives
•Proviso: find that this relationship is not deterministic
•Strategies can change, despite the same resource base
•Very different outcomes emerge rapidly
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WAKHAN
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ACTORS
•Tajik Suni Badakhshanis
•Incentivised by state-building –privileging Sunis (Zahir Shah)
•More recent mujaheds
Ex-security commander/opium trader Non-indigenous opium trader
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NETWORKS: ASSOCIATIONAL GLUE
•Ethnicity: Tajik
•Geography: Badakhshani
•Politico-military: Jamiat-e-Islami
•Religion: Suni
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100 household survey in 3 villages:
•Land taken against will: 28%
•Threats of force: 21%
•Force: 11%
•Slapping•Beating•Torture•Mock executions•Electrocutions
STRATEGIES: FORCE
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•2002
•Director of Education (Wakhan)
•Paid teachers in-kind in opium
•Made a profit on the side
STRATEGIES:INSTRUMENTALISATION OF ADDICTION
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STRATEGIES: DEBT MECHANISMS
•Wheat for opium
•Debt term: 1 to 6 months
•Interest rate = 90%
•Cash for opium
•Interest rate = 60%
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PUNITIVE DEBT FOR ‘ESSENTIALS’
1% 2% 4%
20%
35%
38%
Food
Opium
•Food and opium a necessity
•Food insecurity politicised
•Addiction promoted
•Addiction instrumentalised
•Power asymmetry
•Opium: a necessity
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OUTCOMES
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% Population with debt
75 85 95
46
68
91
83
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
05
%
Peak during Jehadi-era
+37%
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LAND OWNERSHIP CROP TRENDS
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
1975 1985 1995 2005
LandWheatPatakPoppyOrchardsBarleyBaqulySugar Beat
-38%
-35%
Jeribs:1/5
hectare
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LAND TRANSFER: INSIDE OUTSIDE
60%
40%
Sold within communitySold to outsider
•40% sales: outsiders
•30% land owned Suni Badakhshanis
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VERTICALISATION OF LAND
•Minimum 15% land owned by 3:•Commanders•Drug dealers•Government bureaucrats•Hybrid mixture
•Latifundism
•Remote-control extraction: agents
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POWER RELATIONS
•Power-locked
•Radical asymmetry
•Rare example of enduring asymmetry
•Opium encourages avoidance
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SHUGHNAN
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ACTORS: PASHTUN DRUG-DEALER
•Most powerful drug dealer: Pashtun
•From Kabul/Pashtun belt east of Kabul
•Was Khalqi
•Fought in Afghan Airforce (Soviet-era)
•Personal friend of President Najibullah
•Sophisticated trader:•Gems•Commodities•Antiques
•Intelligent/knowledgeable
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PASHTUN/TAJIK STATE ACTORS
•Drugs swoop (2003)
•Pashtun Generals in Kunduz
•Presently high up in Government
•‘Stole’drugs
•From state and non-state actors
•Drugs not declared - stolen
•Suni
•State actors
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CRIMINAL STRONGMEN: INTERNATIONAL
•Senior drug dealers in Khorog
•Former UTO commanders
•Links to criminals: Tashkent/Moscow
•Ismaili
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DISTRICT INDIGENOUS ELITE
•Shughni
•Ismaili
•Cosmopolitan
•Educated
•Soviet-era apparatchiks
•Product of Soviet minority politics
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NETWORKS
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CROSS-BORDER HEROIN TRADE
•15 Afghans moved over to Khorog
•Pashtuns/Tajik Badakhshanis
•Network: Khorog/Bashur/Baharak
•Associational glue:
•politico-military
•Localist
•Family/kin
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‘BUSINESS-TRADING’: NETWORKS
•3 elite political-entrepreneurs:
•Chief of Police (Baharak)
•Drug dealer(s) in Khorog
•Pashtun commodity-dealer (Bashur)
•No associational glue:•Religious•Socio-professional•Ethnicity•Politico-military
•In works of Khorogi drug dealer:‘It is about heroin and money’
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TAJIK BADAKHSHANI/SHUGHNI ELITE
•Local Shughni elite coopted
•Into Tajik Badakhshani state apparatus
•Shughnis junior ‘partners’
•Second-tier positions are Shughnis
•Chief of Border Security, KhAD, Dep Woliswol
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STRATEGIES: CROSS-BORDER TRADE
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SHIFTING ELITE STRATEGIES.FROM: FACTIONALISM AND FLUID ALLIANCES
• 1990 -1999
• Factionalism
• Local elite fragmented
• PDPA factions
• Deployed patrons
• Badakhshanis fragmented
• Faizabad vs Baharak
• Alliances: fluid/capricious
• Extreme violence
• Rationale: control-border
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TO: STABLE POWER ASYMMETRY - AT ELITE-LEVELS
• 2001 - 2005
• Woliswoli
• Junior partners: Shughni
• Senior: Suni Tajik Badakhshanis
• Predictable asymmetry
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HOW/WHY?: COOPERATION BENEFICIAL
• Cooperative behavior: profitable
• Uncooperative behavior: not profitable
• Factionalism: 200 deaths
• Loss of drugs/money
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HOW/WHY?:REDUCTION IN INTER-JEHADI TENSIONS
• Inter-jehadi tensions: diminished
• Baharak disarmed
• Faizabad more powerful
• Therefore less rivalry
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EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE
• Spring food insecurity
• Drug dealer supplies flour
• 40% reduction in price
• Flour war
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STRUCTURES OF FLOUR MARKET: SPRING/EARLY SUMMER
• WFP included
• 42% drug dealer
• 31% flour consortium
• Flour market politicised
• WFP not included
• 58% drug dealer
• Flour market dominated
• By 1 political entrepreneur
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EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE
• Did not make loss on deal
• However, only made smallprofit
• Could have made: 50,000USD
• Actual profit: 4,000 USD
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WHY?
• Reduce de facto power of state• Reduce power indigenous elite actors• Physical security/protection
• First act of ‘charity’• Legitimacy• Long term power-asymmetries
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OVERWHELMING FORCE/LEVERAGING OF PATRONAGE
• Drug seizure
• Bashur
• 100 armed MoD forces
• Overwhelming force
• MoD forces threatened by Rabbani
• Deployed threats of patronage
• Americans as super-patron
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OUTCOMES
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CROSS-BORDER TRADE: PROFESIONALISED
• Centralised
• Professionalised
• Concentrated
• Verticalised
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SUMMARY: ECONOMICS OF RESOURCE BASE
DispersedConcentratedGeographical focusModerately profitableHighly profitableProfitHighLowTransactionsHighLowLogisitical difficultyLowHighRevenuePetty tradeGlobal nexusNature of tradeWakhanShughnanIndicator
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SUMMARY: ACTORS
InexperiencedExperienced
Experience (business;modern bureaucraticadministration)
ParochialCosmopolitanWorld-viewLowHighEducationProvinciallyInternationally, KabulPolitically connected?CrudeSophisticatedCharacter
•Provincial•District
•International•National•Regional•Provincial•DistrictPositionality
HomogeneousHeterogeneousDiversityWakhanShughnanVariable
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SUMMARY: NETWORKS
SimpleComplexAssociational glueProvincialCross-border/internationalGeographical scopeHomogeneousHeterogeneousCompositionFossilised
Fluid/capricious butstabilisingNature
One nexusMultipleNo. networksWakhanShughnanIndicator
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SUMMARY: STRATEGIES
UnimportantImportantPatronage for positionalityCoercion and brutalityOverwhelming forceForceUnimportantImportantCultivating legitimacyImportantUnimportantExploitative institutionsUnimportantImportantPower sharingImportantModerately importantInstrumentalise: addictionWakhanShughnanIndicator
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SUMMARY: OUTCOMES
Dispersed but verticalising
ProfessionalisingCentralisingVerticalConcentrated
Arrangement ofdrug economy
ExtremeModeratePower asymmetry
Power-lockedStabalisingPower-relationsUnequal gains
•Mutuallybeneficial•Mutuallyprofitable
Power-relations(Suni vs Ismailielites)
Latifundism/verticalisationUnchangedLand-concentrationMassive land lossMinor land-lossLandRadically increased (opium)Increased (heroin)AddictionViolentPeacefulConflict processingDisembeddedEmbeddedConflict processingWakhanShughnanIndicator
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AFGHAN CENTRAL STATE: FRAGMENTED STATE
• Shughnan: high revenues
• High levels of state interest
• Wakhan: petty trade
• Insignificant state penetration
• Conclusion. Wakhan:
• Left to district/provincial potentates
• Autonomous extraction
• Shughnan:
• Multiple interest groups (state/non-state)
• Violent competition
• Fragmented state (not failed state)
• Economic extraction primary driver of state centre-periphery relations
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