Changes After Socialism* March 2016 Leszek Balcerowicz *I’m grateful to Magda Ciżkowicz, Aleksander Łaszek, Sonja Wap, Marek Tatała and Tomasz Dróżdż for their assistance in preparing this presentation. 1
Changes After Socialism* March 2016
Leszek Balcerowicz
*I’m grateful to Magda Ciżkowicz, Aleksander Łaszek, Sonja Wap, Marek Tatała and Tomasz Dróżdż for their assistance in preparing this presentation.
1
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
2
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
3
Dimensions and types of Institutional Systems Dimensions Types
Democracy (D) non-Democracy (non D)
Rule of Law (RL) Civil Rights (CR)
Economic freedom Examples
1. Socialism (communism)
Non-D. V. low RL CR banned
None; Command Economy North Korea, Cuba
2. Quasi-socialism Non-D. V. low RL CR banned
Dominance of SOE’s. A little private sector
Belarus, Central Asia, Venezuela
3. Free Market Capitalism Usually D.
High RL Extensive CR
Wide Hongkong, Switzerland, Ireland
4. Crony capitalism Usually non-D. Low RL Limited CR
Limited due to uneven protection of property rights
Russia, Ukraine
5. Overregulated and/or fiscaly unstable capitalism
D. or non-D. Limited RL- due to arbitrary regulations CR rather high
Limited due to overregulation and/or fiscal instability
Italy, France
Examples of available measures
Polity IV index Freedom of the press (Freedom House), Rule of Law (BTI Index) Civil Liberties (Freedom House)
Private Property (Heritage Foundation), Economic Freedom in the world (Fraser Institute),
4
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcome; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
5
The economic costs of socialism.
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
1950 1990
Spain Poland
Countries under socialism lost a lot of distance to Western European economies. GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars) in 1950 and 1990 (2005 for Koreas, Chile and Cuba).
Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
1950 1990
Austria Hungary
0
10000
20000
1950 2005
South Korea North Korea
0
5 000
10 000
15 000
1950 2005
Chile Cuba
6
The economic costs of socialism. Countries under socialism lost a lot of distance to Western European economies.
GDP per capita in China 1950-2010.
GDP per capita (in 1990 international dollars) - Western Europe=100%
Source: The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
7
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
8
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Political Freedom 2014 (Polity IV).
„Polity Score" is determined which ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracies, -5 to 5 corresponding to anocracies, and 6 to 10 to democracies.
Source: Polity IV Project 9
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
Freedom of the Press 2015 (Freedom House). Degree of pressure placed on the flow of objective information and the ability of media platforms to operate freely and without fear of repercussions.
Source: Freedom House Freedom of the Press 2015 report , https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 10
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Esto
nia
Cze
ch R
epu
blic
Slo
vaki
a
Lith
uan
ia
Slo
ven
ia
Pola
nd
Latv
ia
Hu
nga
ry
Bu
lgar
ia
Cro
atia
Ro
man
ia
Ukr
ain
e
Swed
en
Ge
rman
y
Can
ada
Un
ited
Sta
tes
Fran
ce
Un
ited
Kin
gdo
m
Taiw
an
Ital
y
Sou
th K
ore
a
Ho
ng
Kon
g
Mex
ico
Sin
gap
ore
Zim
bab
we
Ru
ssia
Ch
ina
Cu
ba
Be
laru
s
No
rth
Ko
rea
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Rule of Law (Transformation Index BTI 2014).
Evaluation of the rule of law with an eye to the Separation of powers, Independent judiciary, Prosecution of office abuse, Civil rights
Source: Transformation Index BTI 2014, http://www.bti-project.org/downloads/bti-2014/ 11
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Civil Liberties 2014 (Freedom House).
Each country is assigned a numerical rating—from 1 to 7—for civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.
Source: Freedom House 2015 report, https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world 12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Cze
ch R
epu
blic
Es
ton
ia
Po
lan
d
Slo
vaki
a Sl
ove
nia
B
ulg
aria
C
roat
ia
Hu
nga
ry
Latv
ia
Ro
man
ia
Alb
ania
G
eorg
ia
Mac
edo
nia
M
old
ova
U
krai
ne
Arm
enia
K
azak
hst
an
Kyrg
yzst
an
Aze
rbai
jan
B
elar
us
Ru
ssia
Ta
jikis
tan
Tu
rkm
enis
tan
U
zbek
ista
n
Au
stra
lia
Au
stri
a C
hile
G
erm
any
Irel
and
N
ew Z
eala
nd
U
nit
ed S
tate
s B
razi
l So
uth
Ko
rea
Taiw
an
Ind
ia
Mex
ico
Si
nga
po
re
Turk
ey
Egyp
t N
iger
ia
Thai
lan
d
Ven
ezu
ela
Vie
tnam
C
hin
a C
ub
a Zi
mb
abw
e
No
rth
Ko
rea
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Protection of property rights 2014 (Heritage Foundation).
Measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the extent to which those laws are respected. Each country’s property rights are scored from 0 to 100.
Source: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 2015 report 13
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Esto
nia
Cze
ch R
epu
blic
Lith
uan
ia
Pola
nd
Slo
ven
ia
Hu
nga
ry
Latv
ia
Slo
vaki
a
Cro
atia
Ro
man
ia
Bu
lgar
ia
Be
laru
s
Ru
ssia
Ukr
ain
e
Can
ada
Ge
rman
y
Ho
ng
Kon
g
Sin
gap
ore
Swed
en
Un
ited
Kin
gdo
m
Fran
ce
Un
ited
Sta
tes
Sou
th K
ore
a
Taiw
an
Ital
y
Mex
ico
Ch
ina
Cu
ba
Zim
bab
we
No
rth
Ko
rea
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Economic Freedom of the World 2013 (Fraser Institute).
Measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom.
Source: Economic Freedom of the World, Fraser Institute 2015, http://www.freetheworld.com/release.html 14
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ukr
ain
e
Ru
ssia
Slo
ven
ia
Lith
uan
ia
Latv
ia
Cro
atia
Alb
ania
Bu
lgar
ia
Pola
nd
Slo
vak
Rep
Ro
man
ia
Cze
ch R
ep.
Esto
nia
Ven
ezu
ela
Arg
enti
na
Zim
bab
we
Ch
ina
Bra
zil
Ind
ia
Mex
ico
Ital
y
Fran
ce
Ko
rea,
…
Spai
n
Swed
en
Jap
an
Ger
man
y
Un
ited
…
Taiw
an
Ch
ile
Au
stra
lia
Swit
zerl
and
New
…
Sin
gap
ore
Ho
ng
Ko
ng
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Private sector share in % of GDP (1991 and 2010).
Source:*The “private sector shares” of GDP in 1991 represent rough EBRD estimates, based on available statistics from both official (government) sources and unofficial sources;
Transition Report 2000; www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/sci.xls
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1991 2010
15
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The institutional trajectories after socialism. Trade openness (merchandise trade as % of GDP) Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
0% 50%
100% 150% 200% 250% 300% 350% 400% 450%
Aze
rbai
jan
Arm
enia
Kaz
akh
stan
Turk
men
ista
n
Tajik
ista
n
Geo
rgia
Ro
man
ia
Pola
nd
Kyrg
yz R
epu
blic
Mo
ldo
va
Latv
ia
Bel
aru
s
Bu
lgar
ia
Esto
nia
Slo
ven
ia
Hu
nga
ry
Cze
ch R
epu
blic
Slo
vak
Rep
ub
lic
Bra
zil
Gre
ece
Ital
y
Spai
n
Turk
ey
Ch
ile
Port
uga
l
Mex
ico
Irel
and
Ko
rea,
Rep
.
Sin
gap
ore
Ho
ng
Ko
ng
SAR
, …
1995 2014
16
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Observations:
Democracy was introduced and maintained in the countries which introduced
capitalism (CEE)
Non-democratic political systems co-exist with:
quasi-capitalist economies (e.g. Russia)
quasi-socialist economies (e.g. Belarus, Central Asia)
Important questions regarding the variation of the economic systems after
socialism include especially the differences between the capitalist systems in
CEE and quasi-capitalist systems elsewhere
17
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
18
‹#›
‹#›
‹#›
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
22
‹#›
60
65
70
75
80
85
1989 2013
The non-economic outcomes after socialism. Life expectancy at birth, total (years). .
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.
24
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
0 20 40 60 80
100 120 140 160
1989 2015
The non-economic outcomes after socialism. Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births).
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates.
25
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
The non-economic outcomes after socialism. Improvement in social indicators in Poland have reached even higher level than that of economic growth. .
■ 39th place in terms of the UNDP Human Development Index
■ 47th place in terms of income per capita
■ Index takes into account the results of education and life expectancy
■ Polish students achieved very good results in international OECD PISA competency tests:
13th place in mathematics
9 in life sciences
10 in reading comprehension
■ In terms of the OECD Better Life Index Poland ranks 24th among 34 OECD countries
■ In terms of income per capita occupies 29th place among OECD countries
Human Development Indicator
Education Improving overall
satisfaction
■ Since 1996 the Gini coefficient remained stable at around 33%
■ And remains below the average for OECD countries and the EU
Moderate Inequalities
26
Content:
The institutional systems, policies, and outcomes; socialism as an institutional system.
The economic costs of socialism.
The institutional trajectories after socialism.
The economic outcomes after socialism.
The non-economic outcomes after socialism.
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
27
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
Two main determinants of long-term economic growth:
1. The propelling institutions
2. The negative shocks, which mostly depend on domestic policies which in turn are the product of personality factors of the policy-makers and the constraining institutions.
The economic growth after socialism was the stronger:
1. The more progress has been achieved in strengthening the propelling institutions (the extent of market reforms).
2. The less frequent were the strong negative shocks.
28
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
Polanec, Saŝo (2004) ”(…) we find that in later stages of transition, measures of economic reforms matter for productivity growth, although with a lag, which is in our exercise equal to four years. This result confirms importance of reform efforts in enhancing the potential for growth.”
Krueger, Anne O. (2004)
”(…) it is worth noting that those transition countries that experienced the most rapid structural reforms have, by and large, experienced more rapid growth. This is true, for example, of the Baltic States. In recent years, Russia has also seen higher rates of growth – a result, in large measure, of reforms that were implemented in the 1990s.”
Fischer, Stanley; Sahay, Ratna (2004)
”The general conclusion was that the effect of initial conditions, while strong at the start of transition, wears off over time (…). Moreover, the importance of the fiscal policy variable (the budget balance) increases with the longer period data set. The coefficients on the reform indices (…) are significant throughout the period, irrespective of the time period considered.”
Falcetti, Elisabetta; Lysenko, Tatiana; Sanfey, Peter (2006)
”During transition, a positive correlation between progress in market-oriented reforms and cumulative growth is observed for most countries. This is reassuring to those who have promoted the virtues of reforms; is also serves as a warning of the dangers that arise when ‘reform fatigue’ set in, as it appears to have done in parts of some region (…) We find that the importance of initial conditions as a determinant of growth has declined over time, but that fiscal surpluses remain positively associated with higher growth.”
Aslund (2012) The Baltic States and Central Europe have accomplished the best results. They pursued all major reforms together in a comprehensive, early, and radical package. There reforms were deregulation, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, institutional reform and democratization. Nothing suggests that it would be advantageous to intentionally hold back on any reform, whereas many reforms were technically complex and could not possibly be done very fast. (…) The slower reforms were, the grater was the danger that rent-seeking interests would become entrenched and block democratization and the combat of corruption, of which they were the main beneficiaries.”
Christopher Hartwell (2014) Institutional Barriers in the Transition to Market. Examining Performance and Divergence in Transition Economics - Palgrave 2014
Finding no 1 is strongly supported by substantial empirical literature reviewing the experience of countries in transition.
29
Explaining the differences in economic growth.
Some crucial factors conducive to long-term economic growth are also conducive to environmental improvement and to favourable health-related developments, e.g.
economic reforms
less waste
less environmental deterioration and less damage to health
healthier foodstuffs become more available and relatively cheaper
privatisation (separation of companies from the state)
ecological regulations are more strictly observed
stronger enforcement of laws
less frequent accidents on the job
Why better economic results go hand in hand with better non-economic indicators (health, environment, etc.)? .
30