CERTAIN ASPECTS OF QUEENSLAND - Parliament of ...

SUBMISSION to INQUIRY: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION RELATED TO COMMONWEALTH

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

Submission by: David ARTHUR

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

"We are in the coal business.” Campbell Newman, Saturday 31 May 2014

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“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal …” §1.1

“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions … are extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century.” §1.2

“Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe,

pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.” §2

“… pathways that are likely to limit warming to below 2°C … would require substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades and near zero emissions [writer’s

emphasis] of CO2 … by the end of the century.” §3.4

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5TH Assessment Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers, 1 November 2014

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“… During a panel discussion at the World Economic Forum this week, India’s Energy Minister, Piyush Goyal, made the surprising announcement that his country will aim to finish

importing thermal coal in the next two to three years. …”

India Wants to End Coal Imports in the Next 3 Years 13 November 2013

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“An Indian company's plan to build one of the largest coal projects in the Galilee Basin in Central Queensland has been given a big boost by the State Government and India's biggest

bank.

“The Queensland Government is promising to fund infrastructure like rail and port facilities while the State Bank of India has agreed to a $1 billion line of credit.

“The project was under a cloud when several large banks including Citigroup decided not to support the venture.”

Eleanor Hall, ABC Radio ‘The World Today”, 17 November 2014

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“The economy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the environment, not the other way around.” – Gaylord Nelson, 1916-2005, lawyer, Governor of Wisconsin, 1958-63, US

Senator, 1963-81, Earth Day founder, 1970.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to an Inquiry into Aspects of Queensland Government Administration.

Summary

The central argument of this submission is that the Queensland Government’s apparent policy of essentially living off the proceeds of exploiting its coal deposits is environmentally and possibly economically unsustainable, and hence imprudent. To the extent that the Queensland government provides financial support to coal-mining developments that might otherwise fail to attract commercial funding, this imprudence could be described as “foolhardy”.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Queensland government reconsider its policy of support for coal-mining, particularly its support for new coal-mining developments, in the light of the known damage due to coal use, the known damage of coal-mining to terrestrial ecosystems and the known damage that the activities involved in coal exporting inflicts upon the Great Barrier Reef.

It is further recommended that the Federal Government advise and assist the Queensland Government in the task of replacing the demonstratedly unsustainable coal-mining industry with environmentally and hence economically sustainable alternatives.

Main Submission

This submission is partially based on three prior submissions.

1. Senate Environment and Communications References Committee Inquiry into the adequacy of the Australian and Queensland Governments’ efforts to stop the rapid decline of the Great Barrier Reef (“Condition of the Great Barrier Reef “) (available as Submission number 26 at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/Great_Barrier_Reef/Submissions);

2. Senate Environment and Communications References Committee Inquiry into the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Bilateral Agreement Implementation) Bill 2014 [Provisions] and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Cost Recovery) Bill 2014 [Provisions] (“EPBC Bilateral Agreement Bill”) available as Submission number 60 at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Environment_and_Communications/EPBC_Bilats_and_cost_recovery_Bills/Submissions); and

3. Queensland Parliament Agriculture, Resources and Environment Committee Inquiry into that Parliament’s Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Bill 2014 (“Common Provisions”) (available as submission number 188 at https://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/work-of-committees/committees/AREC/inquiries/past-inquiries/24-MinEngResBill).

These previous submissions accompany this submission as Attachments 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

In respect of the Condition of the Great Barrier Reef, the writer concluded that

“Perhaps as a consequence of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park management being somewhat ad hoc, and secondary to other priorities, the GBR has suffered ongoing decline described by De’ath et al (2012). This decline demonstrates the need to reform management, and perhaps to prioritise GBR health ahead of other goals.

“If the benefits of setting aside a region of outstanding natural beauty is insufficient to warrant such action, perhaps ensuring that Queensland’s Coral Sea coast continues to benefit from being buffered against the vicissitudes of extreme weather events might serve such function.”

Trends in Reef condition were summarised as

Management of Great Barrier Reef (GBR) has to date been inadequate, to the extent that some 50% of GBR corals have died out over the 27 years to 2012. Major causes of this loss are a) climate change (coral bleaching due to rising water temperatures and structural weakening due to ocean acidification due to rising atmospheric CO2, b) excessive water turbidity due to excessive sediment loads in runoff from rivers discharging to the Coral Sea, sediment runoff from coastal land-clearing and land disturbance and the seabed disturbance of dredging activities, c) elevated nutrient and chemical content of river discharge to the Coral Sea,

Adding that “while addressing the first of these factors requires actions in both Australia and in other nations, the second and third factors are entirely within Australia’s purview.”

Recommendations are made as follows:

1. It is recommended that restoration of riparian vegetation be prioritised throughout the catchments of rivers that discharge to the Coral Sea, for which a ‘Green Army’ might be drawn from the ranks of unemployed people within these river catchments.

2. It is also recommended that the southern boundary of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park be moved southwards to a latitude of approximately 26°S so as to incorporate the waters and corals of Hervey Bay and the ecologically associated inshore waters of the Great Sandy Strait.

3. The need for reform of the GBR Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) is demonstrated by the approval for Abbott Point dredge spoil dumping Point within the boundaries of the GBR Marine Park being given against the Technical Advice of GBRMPA’s own Technical Staff.

4. The needs for streamlining of environmental approvals and improvements in compliance reporting and monitoring are demonstrated by the contamination of Gladstone Harbour, and the fish therein, with heavy metals leaking from a defective bund wall around a dredge spoil dump. a) The project proponent designed the bund wall to meet the specification laid down by the Queensland Government’s approval process, and did not modify that design when the approval conditions were modified by the Commonwealth Department of Environment. The subsequent failure of the bund wall has been attributed to its not

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

being appropriately designed, and is a strong argument in favour of a single level of government having authority to issue environmental approvals. b) Despite the project proponent being aware of the bund wall failure, this was not reported to either Queensland or Commonwealth authorities. As a consequence, reviews of Gladstone Harbour fish contamination by both Queensland Department of Environment and CSIRO mistakenly attributed the fish contamination to exceptional Boyne River flooding, although such contamination had not been previously observed after any Boyne River flood event. This was first highlighted by an independent (non-government) report into the fish contamination.

To the writer’s knowledge, there has been negligible progress on any of these issues in the 5 months since this submission was prepared, and the poor prognosis for the environmental health and ecological integrity of the Great Barrier Reef remains poor, and the concerns expressed by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee remain unaddressed. Importantly, it is noted that while there are multiple contributors to the decline of the Great Barrier Reef, Queensland and Federal Governments continue to fail to comply with their obligations and responsibilities, and are therefore aiding and abetting in that decline.

In respect of the EPBC Bilateral Agreement Bill, the writer concluded that

States should cede any and all environmental responsibilities to the Commonwealth Government; I accordingly ask that the Senate amend the EPBC Amendment Bill (2014) to reflect this goal.

The conclusion is arrived at through two arguments:

1) Because

• Australia’s hydrogeophysical zones are not delineated by State boundaries,

• State Environmental Departments are generally under-resourced, and

• (To the author’s knowledge,) States are bound by no obligations beyond political undertakings to their electorates (so-called “core” promises) whereas the Commonwealth is further accountable through the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act and through external treaty obligations,

the Commonwealth is better able to provide adequate responsible environmental oversight than the States.

2) Because State governments are often either

• project proponents, or

• may anticipate royalties from environmentally sensitive projects,

their independence in assessing and approving such projects is widely perceived to, and in certain cases may actually be compromised.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

By making the Commonwealth responsible for all environmental assessment, processes will be streamlined because there will be only one set of requirements applying nationwide, thus ensuring that Australia genuinely has a “one-stop shop” for project assessment and approval, as opposed to the numerous separate and distinct “stop shops” under the alternative proposal that all environmental oversight functions be ceded to State government.

The first of these arguments is a general comment on the Queensland Government’s effective competence in the discharge of its statutory responsibilities, the second argument goes to the structural flaw in the nexus between project advocacy and regulatory oversight.

In respect of the Common Provisions Bill, the writer concluded that the relevant Queensland Parliament Committee approach “… the proposed legislation with a view to empower, rather than disempower, our communities to take responsibility for our State”, adding that:

In Queensland for decades any person or group has been entitled to object to any mining proposal in open court, to have the evidence crutinized about the benefits and detriments of a proposed mine. As the example of NSW shows, the removal of this entitlement has allowed shambolic and counterproductive impacts on health of nearby residents – are these people to be “sacrificial lambs” before the altar of corporate profit?

The writer concluded by requesting of the Committee (and hence the Parliament) that

“you do not accept these changes but instead keep existing provisions that require public notification of all proposed mining projects and that allow any person or incorporated group to object to all mining leases and environmental authorities on all the existing grounds.”

To the writer’s knowledge, the concluding request has been disregarded, consistent with Premier Newman’s statement: “We are in the coal business”.

That this disregard, and Premier Newman’s statement, are inconsistent with

• understanding of the effects of coal use on the world’s climate,

• the impact of coal mining on Queensland’s terrestrial environment,

• the impact of transportation of coal on Queensland’s marine environment, and

• declared intentions regarding the future of coal importation to Queensland coal export destinations,

leads to the conclusion that the Queensland government’s policy of facilitating its coal mining and export industries puts at risk the State’s environmental and economic well-being.

Noting that financing the development of Adani’s Carmichael project has been rejected by major international banks on the basis that the project may prove to be a stranded asset, the Queensland Government’s proposal to financially support the project may be considered an irresponsible allocation of taxpayer funds.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

It should be noted that another Galilee Basin project, the venture between India’s GVK and Gina Rinehart’s Hancock Prospecting has had a negative financial assessment from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) (“Stranded”; attached as Attachment 4), it is recommended that the Queensland Government reconsider its attitude to the coal industry.

Please contact the writer if further comment is required.

David Arthur

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Senate Environment and Communications References

Committee

Submission: Adequacy of Government efforts to stop the rapid decline of the

Great Barrier Reef

Submission author– David ARTHUR

SENATE ENQUIRY: ADEQUACY OF AUSTRALIAN AND QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO STOP RAPID DECLINE OF GREAT

BARRIER REEF DAVID ARTHUR SUBMISSION

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HOW TO SUBMIT COMMENTS Please return the cover sheet and your submission by email (preferred option) or post to the address below.

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For further information, please call 02 6277 3526.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

Adequacy of Gr eat Bar r ier Reef Managem en t :

Dav id Ar thu r Subm ission

Summary

1. Management of Great Barrier Reef (GBR) has to date been inadequate, to the extent that some 50% of GBR corals have died out over the 27 years to 2012. Major causes of this loss are a) climate change (coral bleaching due to rising water temperatures and structural weakening due to ocean acidification due to rising atmospheric CO2, b) excessive water turbidity due to excessive sediment loads in runoff from rivers discharging to the Coral Sea, sediment runoff from coastal land-clearing and land disturbance and the seabed disturbance of dredging activities, c) elevated nutrient and chemical content of river discharge to the Coral Sea. While addressing the first of these factors requires actions in both Australia and in other nations, the second and third factors are entirely within Australia’s purview. Actions to address these second and third factors are proposed.

2. It is recommended that restoration of riparian vegetation be prioritised throughout the catchments of rivers that discharge to the Coral Sea, for which a ‘Green Army’ might be drawn from the ranks of unemployed people within these river catchments.

3. It is also recommended that the southern boundary of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park be moved southwards to a latitude of approximately 26°S so as to incorporate the waters and corals of Hervey Bay and the ecologically associated inshore waters of the Great Sandy Strait.

4. The need for reform of the GBR Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) is demonstrated by the approval for Abbott Point dredge spoil dumping Point within the boundaries of the GBR Marine Park being given against the Technical Advice of GBRMPA’s own Technical Staff.

5. The needs for streamlining of environmental approvals and improvements in compliance reporting and monitoring are demonstrated by the contamination of Gladstone Harbour, and the fish therein, with heavy metals leaking from a defective bund wall around a dredge spoil dump. a) The project proponent designed the bund wall to meet the specification laid down by the Queensland Government’s approval process, and did not modify that design when the approval conditions were modified by the Commonwealth Department of Environment. The subsequent failure of the bund wall has been attributed to its not being appropriately designed, and is a strong argument in favour of a single level of government having authority to issue environmental approvals. b) Despite the project proponent being aware of the bund wall failure, this was not reported to either Queensland or Commonwealth authorities. As a consequence, reviews of Gladstone Harbour fish contamination by both Queensland Department of Environment and CSIRO mistakenly attributed the fish contamination to

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

exceptional Boyne River flooding, although such contamination had not been previously observed after any Boyne River flood event. This was first highlighted by an independent (non-government) report into the fish contamination.

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Management of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is demonstrably inadequate, since it has not prevented the 50% decline in coral cover over the 27 years to 2012 (De’ath et al, (2012) “The 27–year decline of coral cover on the Great Barrier Reef and its causes”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 109, 17995–17999, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1208909109) .

De’ath et al, (2012) i s at tached to th i s subm ission as At tachm en t 1 .

Allowing such decline to continue may prove counter-productive: Ferrario et al (2014) (“The effectiveness of coral reefs for coastal hazard risk reduction and adaptation”, Nature Communications 5, doi:10.1038/ncomms4794), demonstrate the ecosystem service that fringing and barrier reefs provide by buffering coastlines against extreme weather events.

The reasons for much of this decline are well understood, and summarised by James Cook University (JCU)’s Jon Brodie in an article in the 26 May 2014 edition of New Scientist (“Dredge-and-dump will damage the Great Barrier Reef”). Brodie writes that “The causes of decline are well known: pollution from coastal development and agricultural run-off, coral diseases, ocean acidification, coral bleaching and increasingly severe storms”.

Mr Brodie’s article is appended to this submission as Appendix 1.

In a 2012 article for 'The Conversation’, Federation Fellow at JCU’s Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies at JCU Terry Hughes concludes that “To increase coral cover, we need to improve the conditions that help them reproduce, survive and grow. The capacity for coral recovery is impaired on a reef that is muddy, polluted or overfished. The ongoing decline of corals demonstrates that the Great Barrier Reef is very poorly positioned to recover from future bouts of coral bleaching. Governments need to focus on controlling pollution and dredging, reducing carbon emissions, and placing a ban on new coal ports.”

Dr Hughes’s article, “Crown of Thorns is a symptom of reef decline: let’s address the cause”, is appended to this submission as Appendix 2.

The goals of GBR management should therefore be to improve the conditions in which corals must reproduce, survive and grow.

In order to reproduce, survive and grow, corals require unimpeded sunlight to nourish their symbiotic algae (zooxanthallae). That is, corals require the water column above them to be free of suspended material; one management target should therefore be minimising the concentration of suspended particles (turbidity) in the waters of the GBR Marine Reserve.

Although there are programmes to ameliorate the sediment load of riverine discharge to

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

the GBR Marine Reserve, the targets of these programmes are insufficient to address the extent of the problem, as summarised by Mr Brodie (Appendix 1).

Proposal: programme of riparian (riverbank) revegetation to ameliorate riverine sediment loads

A major source of sediment load in riverine discharge is riverbank erosion, itself a consequence of excessive vegetation clearing. It is proposed that a ‘Green Army’ of riverbank (riparian) vegetation restoration workers be established throughout the catchments of rivers that discharge into the Coral Sea, from the Mary River catchment in Queensland’s south-eastern region all the way to Cape York. ‘Recruits’ to this Green Army would be drawn from the ranks of Queensland’s unemployed people, who would then be trained by completion of TAFE qualification Horticulture Certificate II either before or in conjunction with performance of riparian vegetation restoration throughout Coral Sea river catchments.

Possible measures to address increased soluble nutrient load in river discharge.

Another major issue is soluble nutrient load of river discharge to Coral Sea waters. Soluble nutrients are chemical substances dissolved in the water that fertilise growth of free algae. If this growth is too great, and if there are insufficient algae-grazing fish in the vicinity, then the algae may crowd out the corals, preventing light from reaching the zooxanthallae (symbiotic algae) within the coral polyp’s tissue, and the polyps die.

This issue has been partially addressed, by the Howard Government establishment of ‘no-take’ zones over much of the GBRMP, and by subsequent extensions of these zones. This does not, however, completely address the cause of the problem (excess water column nutrient content); further, excessive free algae has the further consequence of supporting elevated recruitment of Crown of Thorns starfish (CoTs) by aiding larval CoTs growth, increasing the density of coral-predating adult CoTs which periodically plague the GBR.

While riparian vegetation restoration will go some way to decreasing nutrient content of river discharge to the Coral Sea, what’s also required is maintenance and augmentation of wetlands. It is suggested that increased nutrient removal from treated urban wastewater treatment effluent from larger towns in Coral Sea catchments may also be beneficial.

This will also enable water recycling should such a measure become necessary in the future.

Southward extension of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park boundary.

Corals have long been present in Hervey Bay; the author was once told an anecdote about how Hervey Bay corals snagged the nets of trawl fishers to such an extent that during the 1970’s, one such fisher engaged two tugboats to drag a scrub-clearing ball between them across the floor of the Bay to clear the coral, after which there were good catches of fish for a couple of years until the lack of coral caused the fish to disappear also.

Corals in Hervey Bay are now recovering, although in recent years they have also endured

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

Mary River flood plumes as reported by Butler et al (2012) “The impacts of flooding on the highlatitude, terrigenoclastic influenced coral reefs of Hervey Bay, Queensland, Australia”, Coral Reefs, DOI 10.1007/s00338-013-1064-7.

Butler et al (2012) is attached to this submission as Attachment 2.

It is proposed that, in the absence of any demonstrable difference between the corals of Hervey Bay and those corals further north, that Hervey Bay corals warrant the same management regime as corals further to the north, and should therefore be included within GBRMP. Since Fraser Island is also World Heritage-listed, and the wetlands of the Great Sandy Strait between Fraser Island and mainland Queensland are listed under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of international significance, that the waters of Hervey Bay are not accorded similar recognition is anomalous, and not conducive to adequate management of adjacent areas.

Greater weighting should be accorded to expert scientific advice in decision-making processes.

The recent decision by the board of GBRMPA to approve the dumping of Abbott Point dredge spoil with the Marine Park is remarkable, and flies in the face of the Abbott Point Capital Dredging Permit Assessment prepared by GBRMPA’s own expert staff, and made public by Greenpeace after obtaining the documents under a Freedom of Information process.

I would like to thank GBRMPA Board Chairman A/Professor Russell Reichelt for his 3 March 2014 contribution to public discussion around this decision “Let’s dump Great Barrier Reef dredging myths: authority chief”, but as my comments to that article suggest, I remain concerned that the decision was not consistent with the integrity of the reef as uppermost consideration.

2011-2012 heavy metal contamination and disease of Gladstone Harbour fish was due to poor management of development activity – as was eventually revealed.

The needs for streamlining of environmental approvals and improvements in compliance reporting and monitoring are demonstrated by the contamination of Gladstone Harbour, and the fish therein, with heavy metals leaking from a defective bund wall around a dredge spoil dump.

The project proponent designed the bund wall to meet the specification laid down by the Queensland Government’s approval process, and did not modify that design when the approval conditions were modified by the Commonwealth Department of Environment. The subsequent failure of the bund wall has been attributed to its not being appropriately designed, and is a strong argument in favour of a single level of government having authority to issue environmental approvals.

In a submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on the Environment’s Inquiry into Streamlining Environmental Regulation, 'Green Tape', and One Stop Shops, attached as Attachment 3, I set out my argument that optimal administrative,

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

commercial and environmental outcomes are simultaneously achieved by States ceding all environmental approval and oversight authority to the Commonwealth.

Despite the project proponent being aware of the bund wall failure, this was not reported to either Queensland or Commonwealth authorities. As a consequence, reviews of Gladstone Harbour fish contamination by both Queensland Department of Environment and CSIRO mistakenly attributed the fish contamination to exceptional Boyne River flooding, although such contamination had not been previously observed after any Boyne River flood event.

This was first highlighted by Dr Matt Landos’s independent report into the fish disease outbreak, commissioned by the Gladstone Fishing Research Fund. At the time Dr Landos conducted his investigation, knowledge of the bund wall failure that caused the disease was not generally available, yet Dr Landos was able to exclude Boyne River flooding as the cause of the fish disease.

A presentation of Dr Landos’s findings is attached to this submission as Attachment 4.

It seems plausible to this submission author that Gladstone Ports’ own report into this incident was only made public in order to support GBRMPA’s decision to permit dumping of what is uncontaminated Abbott Point dredge spoil within the GBR Marine Park.

Conclusion

Perhaps as a consequence of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park management being somewhat ad hoc, and secondary to other priorities, the GBR has suffered ongoing decline described by De’ath et al (2012). This decline demonstrates the need to reform management, and perhaps to prioritise GBR health ahead of other goals.

If the benefits of setting aside a region of outstanding natural beauty is insufficient to warrant such action, perhaps ensuring that Queensland’s Coral Sea coast continues to benefit from being buffered against the vicissitudes of extreme weather events might serve such function.

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

Appendix 1: 26 M ay 2014 article by Jon Brodie “Dredge-and-dump will damage the Great Barrier Reef” – New Scientist issue 2970

LATE last year, the Australian government approved a plan to expand a coal terminal at Abbot Point in Queensland, one of five major ports along the Great Barrier Reef coastline.

The Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. involves dredging approximately 5 million tonnes of sediment from the seabed to deepen the port. The resulting material will be dumped 25 kilometres out to sea, inside the boundaries of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. The park authority claims that the approval is subject to 47 strict environmental conditions that will protect the reef from damage.

Environmentalists, not surprisingly, are up in arms. Some claim that the dredge material is toxic and that it will be dumped directly on to the reef. Neither claim is true – the material is just sand, silt and clay and will be dumped on to bare seabed. But that doesn't mean that the project won't damage the reef. Far from it.

The Great Barrier Reef is a World Heritage Site but has been in severe decline for decades. For many species and ecosystems – corals, seagrass, dugongs, turtles and fish including sharks – the situation is dire.

The causes of decline are well known: pollution from coastal development and agricultural run-off, coral diseases, ocean acidification, coral bleaching and increasingly severe storms.

Water pollution is a particularly serious threat. Suspended sediment makes the water murkier, which can deprive sunlight-dependent organisms such as coral and seagrass of food. Farm run-off also increases the population of crown-of-thorns starfish, which prey on coral.

At present, the only measure in place to reduce pollution is an agricultural run-off scheme, which is quite successful but also quite limited. There is nothing to specifically manage sediment from port development.

Nonetheless, the Australian government claims that the Abbot Point project will not affect water quality. In fact, when environment minister Greg Hunt announced the plan, he said it would improve water quality. The government expects to achieve this with an "offset" programme that will stop farm run-off entering the Coral Sea.

If that sounds too good to be true, that's because it is. Such improvements to water quality are likely to be impossible.

To offset Abbot Point's 5 million tonnes of dredge spoil will require an equivalent

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

reduction in agricultural sediment over the approximately five years that the project will run. Given that the total sediment reaching the Great Barrier Reef from human activities on land is only 6 million tonnes a year, that is a tall order.

In addition, the rules require that the offset must come from the watersheds of just two rivers, the Burdekin and Don, which together contribute less than 3 million tonnes of sediment a year. Reducing their discharge by 5 million tonnes over five years implies restoring them to almost pristine conditions, requiring the removal of most agriculture – obviously an impossible and undesirable situation.

A further complication is that the offset sediment must consist only of particles smaller than 15 micrometres across. Given our limited knowledge of particle size distribution in agricultural run-off, this creates immense technical hurdles.

Finally, based on the cost of the existing farm run-off scheme, the overall cost may be as much as A$1 billion. The minister's statement only mentioned funding of A$89 million.

If that wasn't bad enough, three other large Queensland ports – Cairns, Townsville and Hay Point – are also planning major expansions over the next decade. Another, Gladstone, has been undergoing expansion since 2010.

From the public documents available, I estimate that these projects will generate a total of up to 150 million tonnes of dredge spoil at a rate of 15 million tonnes a year. To offset the impacts of all these port developments is even less achievable.

Even more port expansion is likely in the future. The recent approval of a large coal mine near Alpha, Queensland, will require further dredging at Abbot Point which is not accounted for in the current project.

If dredging is not managed well, I expect severe degradation of the reef as a result. Seagrass beds, the dugongs and turtles that rely on them, and inshore coral reefs will be severely damaged.

There are a few encouraging signs of improvement, however. Hunt has ordered that in future, Gladstone's spoil will have to be dumped behind bund walls rather than offshore. Spoil from the expansion of the port of Cairns may be dumped on land.

Nonetheless, it is clear that under the current regime, management of port development is not compatible with the Great Barrier Reef's World Heritage values.

On top of that, neither the Australian nor Queensland governments have effective climate policies that would help protect the reef; the Queensland government

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

rejects the scientific evidence of climate change and the position of the Australian government is ambivalent.

So of the three big threats to the Great Barrier Reef – climate change, coastal development and agricultural pollution – only the latter is being managed on the basis of good science, and then only to some extent.

There is another way. At Abbot Point, dredging could be avoided altogether by building a long jetty into deeper water. If dredging must happen, the spoil could be dumped behind container walls. It is inexcusable that these options have been rejected: the decision has clearly been made to expedite the project at least cost to the developer but maximum cost to the environment.

This article appeared in print under the headline "Reef madness" Jon Brodie is the chief research scientist at the Centre for Tropical Water & Aquatic Ecosystem Research at James Cook University in Townsville, Australia. A more detailed and fully referenced version of this article is published in the journal Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science (vol 142, p 1)

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

Appendix 2: 3 October 2012 article by Dr Terry Hughes - Crown of Thorns is a symptom of reef decline: let’s address the cause A recent report on coral loss from the Great Barrier Reef has pointed the finger at cyclones and Crown of Thorns starfish. The real culprit is human activity, and until we reduce port activity and pollution, coral will be unable to bounce back.

Three recent studies, published in 2004, 2007 and this week, have shown that at least 50% of the corals on the Great Barrier Reef have disappeared in recent decades.

Last year, another report claimed the declines were more modest and the result of a natural cycle. But the latest report, from the Australian Institute of Marine Science, confirms earlier studies – the Great Barrier Reef is in trouble.

Corals are the backbone of the reef, providing habitat for many other species. Measuring coral cover on a reef is the simplest way to monitor its condition. But other metrics - like counts of sharks, dugongs and turtles - also show alarming downward trajectories. The decline in coral cover highlights UNESCO’s concerns about the dwindling Universal Heritage Values of the Barrier Reef.

The key question now is, what are we going to do about these losses?

First, we need to consider why coral cover changes. The amount of coral goes down when they reproduce less, grow more slowly or die more frequently. Even under ideal conditions, about one-quarter to one-third of a coral population dies each year from background mortality. They can die from old age, disease, predation, competition with a neighbour, erosion of their skeleton, smothering by sediment, severe coral bleaching, and from storms.

On a healthy reef, loss of cover is balanced by new recruitment of young corals and by new growth. It’s just like a human population – we measure births, deaths and net migration to track demographic changes. Measuring mortality alone won’t help us to plan for schools or new roads.

Next consider where the loss of coral cover is greatest. The 50% decline in coral cover is averaged over the whole Great Barrier Reef (GBR). However, there has been no net loss of coral cover in the remote north beyond Cooktown or on reefs far from shore. Consequently, most reefs that are close to the coast (and to people) have lost far more than 50% of their cover.

Coastal reefs have been obliterated by runoff of sediment, dredging and pollution. Once-thriving corals have been replaced by mud and seaweed (see Figure 1).

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

Figure 1. Dramatic loss of coral cover on Queensland’s coastal reefs. Both photographs are from the same site, indicated by the hilly backdrop. Modern photo taken by David Wachenfeld

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

House Standing Committee on the Environment

Inquiry into streamlining environmental regulation, 'green tape', and one stop shops

Submission

Submission author– David ARTHUR

The latest study attributed 100% of the loss of coral cover solely to higher mortality, due to just three causes – cyclones (48%), crown-of-thorns starfish (42%) and coral bleaching due to climate change (10%). However, reefs have coped with cyclones for millions of years, and - despite some claims to the contrary - the number of cyclones per decade has actually dropped slightly in the past 100 years. Too many starfish is a symptom of the decline of the Great Barrier Reef, not the direct cause.

In reality, we are responsible for the loss of corals, not storms and starfish. Before people, corals recovered from routine shocks like recurrent cyclones, and now they don’t (except in the most remote places).

The rush by many reef scientists to focus solely on climate change research has distracted attention from other ongoing threats to the reef that, so far at least, have been much more destructive. Four outbreaks of crown-of-thorns starfish have occurred on the Great Barrier Reef since the 1960s, and widespread damage from the first two of them led to the initiation of formal monitoring of corals in the 1980s.

There are two plausible but unproven theories about the causes of outbreaks of crown-of-thorns starfish. One suggests that dredging and runoff of nutrient pollution from land promotes blooms of phytoplankton which speeds up the development of starfish larvae, contributing to outbreaks. The other surmises that the changes we have made to the structure of foodwebs have resulted in fewer juvenile starfish being eaten.

The best way to restore foodwebs and rebuild fish stocks is to create a network of no-take fishing reserves. The success of the GBR green zones in rebuilding depleted fish stocks bolsters the Commonwealth’s plan for a national system of marine reserves.

There is no shortage of crackpot solutions being proposed to fix the problems of the Great Barrier Reef – like covering corals with shade cloth to prevent bleaching, moving corals out of harm’s way, or killing millions of starfish one at a time with a syringe. There is a new outbreak of crown-of-thorns underway, the fourth in 50 years, and it is far too late to stop it. Direct intervention to kill starfish is expensive and time consuming. At best, it just might help to control numbers adjacent to a tourist pontoon, but it won’t change the trajectory of the current outbreak.

To increase coral cover, we need to improve the conditions that help them reproduce, survive and grow. The capacity for coral recovery is impaired on a reef that is muddy, polluted or overfished. The ongoing decline of corals demonstrates that the Great Barrier Reef is very poorly positioned to recover from future bouts of coral bleaching. Governments need to focus on controlling pollution and dredging, reducing carbon emissions, and placing a ban on new coal ports.

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

8 July 2014

The Research Director Agriculture, Resources and Environment Committee Parliament House George Street BRISBANE QLD 4000 By email to: [email protected]

Dear Sir/Madam,

Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Bill 2014

I am a resident of and registered voter in Maryborough, having moved here from Townsville in 2002.

This submission is made by and on behalf of myself only, in my capacity as a Queensland voter and Australian citizen.

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to the Committee.

Over my half-century or so of life, I have become increasingly aware of the relationship between our environment and our health and wellbeing, and increasingly aware of and concerned about industrial encroachment upon, and to any other disruption of, that same environment.

Because my immediate environment is an indistinguishable part of the broader environment further afield, my health and wellbeing can be affected by changes and disturbances to atmosphere, water, land and even oceans well beyond my immediate purview. This is also true for all my fellow citizens, and for all people everywhere.

In particular, I have come to realise that processes and events beyond the limits of my own property have the potential to affect my health and wellbeing; the same holds for any and all other people in whose best interests each and every member of this elected government is obliged to act. As such, I have a strenuous general objection to any attempt to deny each citizen the opportunity to make submissions and presentations on any land-use change, such as proceeding with mining projects.

The environmental impacts of mining projects may persist for decades after they have been abandoned, as the impact of the Mount Morgan mine pit on the Dee River demonstrates1. Mining

1 The impact of acid mine drainage from the abandoned mine workings at Mount Morgan on the downstream Dee River are described under ‘Mining legacies – Mount Morgan’ at http://www.mininglegacies.org/mines/queensland-

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

projects may have serious impacts on our finances, ecology, environment and society long after the mine has ceased operating, and over a much broader area than the mine’s own footprint.

Earlier this year (2014), the Hunter Community Environment Centre (HCEC) gained access under the NSW Freedom of Information laws to correspondence between several government departments relating to the pollution licence conditions held by the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC). The documents demonstrate a systematic public relations effort by the [NSW Environmental Protection Agency] EPA to conceal the extent and nature of pollution caused by coal trains in residential areas.2

This example illustrates one way in which mining projects can have deleterious impacts well outside the mine footprint, proving that residents well outside the land on which a mine is proposed may be affected. The right of any and all such potentially affected people to raise their concerns should therefore be preserved at every stage of the approval process.

While dust from coal transport is one issue, another issue is dust from mining operations themselves. This was the subject of Paul Cleary’s 2012 report in ‘The Australian’ “Living in the dusty shadow of coal mining” (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/living-in-the-dusty-shadow-of-coal-mining/story-e6frg6z6-1226255705308?nk=694f5afff1e4c68977f13a1bafb89aa1); this article is appended to this submission as demonstration of the impact of dust and noise on residents well outside the mine “footprint”.

Public objection rights are powerful rights to go to court, unlike mere consultation. Public objection rights to proposed mines are essential to enable the costs and benefits to be debated openly in Court and to deter the type of corruption exposed in New South Wales. Public objection rights should therefore be retained in Queensland.

In accordance with the above statements of general principles, I particularly oppose legislative changes that would function to diminish property rights as follows.

• Clauses 418 and 420 These clauses remove existing community notification rights and rights to object to mining lease applications. Changing land tenure to allow for mining rather than another land use could impact on a broad section of the public. Therefore the narrow definition of an ‘affected person’ proposed, which would exclude neighbours or community groups or people in the water catchment, is absurd. Land use decision making processes for other industries provide for community submission and appeal rights, so there is no good reason why mining tenure should be exempt from this basic standard.

• Clause 245 Limiting community notification and formal objection rights to the Land Court to “site specific” environmental authorities will, in conjunction with the above clauses, remove all existing public rights to lodge formal objections to the Land Court in up to 90% of mining projects3 in Queensland. This is unacceptable and fails to recognise the positive

2/mount-morgan/, part of a broader survey of mining’s detrimental legacies in Queensland at http://www.mininglegacies.org/mines/queensland-2/ 2 “EPA conspires against community over Hunter Coal Dust”, http://miningleaks.com.au/hunter-coal-dust-cover-up 3 Discussion paper, p 7.

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

impact of community objection rights. The same mining companies who want to limit public objections are often foreign owned. Suggestions by State government Ministers that objectors lodge frivolous or vexatious cases is entirely untrue, rather the opposite is true: there are no examples of such cases and objectors are very responsible. In the Alpha coal case (2014) the land holders and conservation group exposed that the mining company had a lack of hard data on groundwater impacts. Public spirited objectors went to Court and saved Ellison Reef (1967) from limestone mining and helped show the importance of protecting Fraser Island, now World Heritage Listed (1971).

• Clause 423 and 424 It is inappropriate to restrict matters that the Land Court can consider and give these powers, such as to consider the ‘public interest’, to the Minister. Decreasing judicial oversight, increasing ministerial powers and shutting out community participation has worrying implications for corruption.

• Clause 429 Removal of restricted land status when the miner is granted exclusive surface rights to access land removes one of the few rights of vulnerable landholders. No-one should have the land surrounding their house destroyed by an open-cut mine yet this would be possible under this clause.

I call on the Committee to approach the proposed legislation with a view to empower, rather than disempower, our communities to take responsibility for our State. In Queensland for decades any person or group has been entitled to object to any mining proposal in open court, to have the evidence scrutinised about the benefits and detriments of a proposed mine. As the example of NSW shows, the removal of this entitlement has allowed shambolic and counterproductive impacts on health of nearby residents – are these people to be “sacrificial lambs” before the altar of corporate profit?

I request that you do not accept these changes but instead keep existing provisions that require public notification of all proposed mining projects and that allow any person or incorporated group to object to all mining leases and environmental authorities on all the existing grounds.

Consultation Process prior to the Bill reaching Parliament

Please ask Minister Cripps to provide exact figures on how many of the 176 submitters to the discussion paper opposed changes to existing objection rights and detailed examples of alleged cases of vexatious objections. According to EDO Qld, at least 106 submissions of a total of 176 submissions on the discussion paper, from both rural and urban submitters, opposed the changes. Yet Minister Cripps does not report this key fact in p47-48 of the explanatory notes.

Yours sincerely,

David Arthur

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Appendix: article from ‘The Australian’ of 28 January 2012, describing the impact of dust and noise from coal-mining well outside the immediate footprint of the mine itself. Living in the dusty shadow of coal mining • THE AUSTRALIAN • JANUARY 28, 2012 12:00AM Paul Cleary Reporter, Sydney

Farmer Tanya Plant and her daughters, one of whom suffers coughing fits that her doctor says may have "environmental" causes. Picture: Jack Tran Source: The Australian AUSTRALIA'S resources boom is already generating a lot of dust, noise and fumes, and the amount stirred up is only going to increase, given plans by miners to double coal and iron ore extraction this decade.

Yet state and federal governments are doing surprisingly little to monitor and regulate these impacts on the people living in the shadow of mining and energy projects. While state governments require companies to submit voluminous environmental impact statements, designed to protect flora and fauna, less is being done to protect people.

From the time minerals are dug from the ground and shipped to port in open wagons to the time they leave our shores as exports, governments generally leave it to the companies concerned to monitor the harmful effects of toxic substances on people, and the reporting seems patchy.

Tanya Plant, a Queensland farmer and mother of two, worries about the effect the emissions from New Hope Corporation's coal mine, located about 2km from her home, may be having on her family. Her two-year-old daughter has been having coughing fits and after successive trips to the doctor she has been told the causes may be "environmental".

"It has been worrying to have one of our children coughing a lot for months. We are concerned about those really small particles, as well as things like heavy metals," says Plant, who grew up on her Acland farm, west of Toowoomba, and obtained a PhD from Oxford University as a Rhodes scholar.

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

In fact, Plant, her husband, children and parents seem adversely affected by constant exposure to dust, noise and plumes of gases released by regular blasting.

"I'm uncomfortable telling too many people the details of all our health issues, but there are some worrying symptoms which seem to have been going on for quite a while and none of us seem as healthy as we should.

"I'm only 36 and had hoped and expected to continue to live an active life for some time yet, and to be able to raise our kids in a good environment to give them the best start and chance in life. This farm has been in my family for many generations and is very much a part of us. I can't really picture a happy future without it, but I'm not sure whether we should live here any more."

The permanent dust monitor recently installed on her property is a crude device: a plastic funnel that sits on top of a glass jar. In response to Plant's requests, NHC measured fine particles known as PM10 on one occasion last year, but it is yet to forward the findings. In response to Plant's complaints about noise levels, the company has taken readings but has refused to divulge some results.

When the company did the PM10 study last year, it appeared the officer from the Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station, a government agency, was contacted by an executive from New Hope while conducting the test and agreed to meet him immediately afterwards, Plant says.

But it is the smaller particles, known as PM2.5 and PM1, that health studies indicate are even more dangerous to human health, and these are not being measured at Acland, or in most other mining regions in Australia. A human hair is seven times the width of a PM10 particle, and 30 times that of a PM2.5. These ultra-fine particles are dangerous because they can become embedded in lungs or enter the bloodstream.

In response to questions from Inquirer, a New Hope spokesman declined to comment on why the company would not provide the results of dust and noise tests to Plant's family. The company would not comment on the frequency of its testing for dust levels near the mine and its expansive coal dump near the town of Jondaryan, nor would it cite its evidence for using the crude jar and funnel for measuring dust.

But New Hope says it operates "above compliance" and provided the results of monthly noise tests carried out "at random times". But these tests are different from those done when complaints are made, which the company won't release.

The company says its dust monitoring is "above and beyond compliance". It says the testing done by Simtars has " consistently met government air quality requirements". But the company tests only for PM10 particles, and the spokesman would not say how frequently they are carried out.

New Hope says it is investing "thousands of dollars" installing quieter reverse beepers on its vehicles, and it is trialling a muffler suppression system on its trucks, even though it is meeting all compliance levels.

The Queensland government has installed only two dust monitors near mining towns. One of its 29 permanent monitors is at Mt Isa, but the others are all based near major urban centres. Coal mining regions in the Bowen Basin and on the Darling Downs do not yet have permanent monitors in place, and the closest monitor to the Acland mine is at Toowoomba, more than 50km away.

The government has installed a monitor in the centre of the Bowen Basin coal mines at Moranbah, 5

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

even though there are several other towns closer to the coal mines. The results from this temporary monitor are not published on the government's air quality website. Instead they are reported "through a reference group".

This contrasts with the NSW government, which has responded to community pressure and installed a network of 13 dust monitors in the Hunter Valley, although only three of them measure PM2.5 particles.

Queensland Environment Minister Vicky Darling says that in addition to the government's monitoring, companies are required to report any hazardous impacts swiftly, as well as in an annual report. Executives who provide false and misleading information face penalties of up to $832,500 or two years' imprisonment.

Darling defends the use of the funnel and glass jar as a device to measure "dust nuisance impacts", essentially a crude measure of the sheer volume of material in the air.

The Plants live near the New Acland coal mine, which opened in 2002 as a small mine and has grown into a four million tonne a year operation. While still a modest mine by Australian standards, NHC has a plan before the state government to more than double production to 10 million tonnes a year, while also developing a pilot plant for coal-to-liquids technology.

The listed company's ownership is tied to chemist chain Soul Pattinson. Washington H. Soul Pattinson owns 60 per cent of New Hope, and in turn owns 24 per cent of Australian Pharmaceutical Industries, which includes Soul Pattinson and Priceline.

While the existing mine is scheduled to be exhausted in 2018, the plan for a third-stage expansion would extend its life by a further 35 years and also mean double the amount of dust for nearby communities. It would come within 5km of the town of Oakey, population 3600.

Plant says the state government has made assurances about the proposed expansion being assessed through a rigorous EIS process, but the current stage of operations went through the same EIS processes. She says these don't require monitoring of dust, noise or the rainwater consumed by people living just a few hundred metres from the mine's main operations. Plant points out that people living in the settlement of Muldu, just 700m from the key mine operators, were not included in the EIS among the "sensitive receptors", meaning people affected by the mine.

"It doesn't give me confidence that the health of people near the mine is treated all that seriously," Plant says. "There doesn't seem to be much data available but even so, it doesn't seem like noise and dust has always complied with the state standards. I have seen how black some of the rainwater collected from people's roofs has been."

A group of concerned doctors has written to federal and state ministers about the risks for the population near this mine. Doctors for the Environment, which includes Gustav Nossal on its scientific committee, says in a letter to federal Environment Minister Tony Burke that the expansion to a four million tonne annual operation had already subjected the surrounding population to "serious pollution which is likely to have affected their health and this situation has existed since 2006 when stage 2 commenced".

Emeritus professor David Shearman told Burke it "beggars belief" that the company has not produced adequate data on PM2.5 levels and that of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, which are commonly found in high levels around coal mines.

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

"However the data that is presented, though inadequate, suggests that air quality has been unacceptable for some years," he wrote.

While there has been limited research in Australia on the health effects of coal mining, Shearman pointed out that extensive studies in the US by the Physicians for Social Responsibility found people living in high coal-producing counties had higher rates of cardiopulmonary disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension and kidney disease compared with people in non-coal-producing counties.

Noise is also going largely unmeasured, despite its impact on human wellbeing.

Plant describes the noise as an almost constant irritant that her daughter sometimes describes as "that loud growly noise" as she puts her hands over her ears. "We often have to shut windows due to noise and even then some nights I haven't been able to sleep for even a whole hour at any point. It is hard for the kids as they get woken too," Plant says.

The risks to the surrounding population extend to the coal dump just 1km from the town of Jondaryan, and then all the way along the railway line to the port of Brisbane, where the coal is loaded on to ships.

From Jondaryan the coal is often trucked through Toowoomba by road to local power stations, but most of it is shipped via rail to export terminals in Brisbane. The coal moved in trucks is meant to be covered with tarpaulins (although locals have taken photographs of uncovered trucks), while the coal moved on trains is not required to be covered.

People who live along the railway lines, and in the towns, say the black soot on their roofs gets into their drinking water.

Peter Faulkner, who lives just 300m from the railway line, has black streaks on the plastic water tank he uses to collect drinking water. Another resident, 600m from the line, says her drinking water is being contaminated by soot from the train. When Inquirer visits her property, she shows a jar of black water produced from washing the soot from her roof.

Asked if he has considered obtaining an assessment from the government, Faulkner says he no longer trusts the institution.

"There's no impartiality when it comes to assessing these mining projects," he says. "The fact they seem to be covering everything up concerns me greatly. They have a duty of care towards us. They are not looking after us at all."

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Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

13 June 2014 David Arthur

Regulatory Reform Taskforce Department of the Environment GPO Box 787 CANBERRA ACT 2601 Email: [email protected] Cc: [email protected], [email protected] Dear Taskforce members, Submission on Draft QLD – Commonwealth Bilateral Approval Agreement Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act) Thank you for this opportunity to provide comment on the proposed delegation of Commonwealth environmental approval powers to Queensland.

Summary

It i s t h i s subm ission ’s conclusion t hat States shou ld cede any and al l env i r onm en tal r espon sib i l i t i es t o the Com m onweal th Gover nm en t ; I accor d ingly p r opose that t he EPBC Am endm en t Bi l l (2014) be am en d ed to r ef lect t h is goal .

The conclusion i s ar r i ved at t h r ough two ar gum en ts:

1) Because

• Aust r al ia’s hyd r ogeophy sical zones ar e not del i neated by

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

State boundar ies,

• State Envi r onm en tal Depar tm en ts ar e gener al l y under -r esou r ced , and

• (To t he au thor ’s knowledge,) States ar e bound by no ob l igat ion s beyon d pol i t i cal under t ak ings to thei r elector ates (so-cal led “ cor e” p r om ises) wher eas t he Com m onweal t h i s fu r ther accoun table th r ough t he En vi r on m en tal Pr otect ion and Biod iver si t y Conser vat ion (EPBC) Act and th r ough exter nal t r eaty ob l igat ions,

t he Com m onweal t h i s bet ter ab le to p r ov ide adequate r esponsib le env i r onm en tal over sigh t t han the States.

2) Because State gover n m en ts ar e of ten ei ther

• p r oject p r oponen ts, or

• m ay an t icipate r oyal t ies f r om en v i r onm en tal l y sen si t i ve p r oject s,

t hei r i ndependen ce in assessing an d app r ov ing such p r oject s i s widely per ceived to, and in cer tain cases m ay actual l y be com pr om ised 1.

By m ak ing t he Com m on weal th r esponsib le for al l env i r onm en tal assessm en t , p r ocesses wi l l be st r eam l ined because t her e wi l l be on ly one set of r equ i r em en ts app ly ing nat ionwide, t hus en su r ing that Aust r al ia gen u inely has a “ one-stop shop ” for p r oject assessm en t and app r oval , as opposed to the num er ous separ ate and d ist inct “ stop shops” under the al ter nat i ve p r oposal t hat al l env i r onm en tal over sigh t f unct ions be ceded to State gover n m en t .

I have p r ev iously p r esen ted sim i lar ar gum en ts to the Senate Inqu i r y - Env i r on m en t Pr otect ion and Biod iver si t y Conser vat ion Am endm en t (Retain ing Feder al App r oval Power s) Bi l l 2012; t hat subm ission is i n cluded in th i s subm ission as Appen d ix.

Th is subm ission begins wi t h a shor t In t r oduct ion in wh ich I

1 NSW public sector – allegations concerning mining exploration licences (Operations Jasper and Acacia) and the provision of a motor vehicle to a former NSW government minister (Operation Indus)

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

sum m ar i se m y un der stand in g of how p r uden t , in t r in sical l y conser vat ive, m anagem en t of nat i onal estate for t h e benef i t of al l ci t i zens has been abandoned for t h e sake of ideologi cal war far e against “ p r ogr essive” p r ovocateu r s, who have belated ly com e to under stand t he value of con ser vat i on .

I t hen p r esen t m y ar gum en ts in suppor t of each of t h e poin t s of t he sum m ar y .

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Introduction. A Brief Personal Interpretation of How Prudent Environmental Stewardship became Contested Cultural Farce

Over t he last hal f cen tu r y since the publ i cat ion of Rachel Car son ’s “ Si len t Sp r ing” i n Sep tem ber 1962, ther e has been an incr ease of env i r onm en tal awar eness an d com m ensur ate appr eciat ion 2 of how our p r osper i t y depend s on r espon sib le stewar dsh ip of ou r nat ion ’s land s an d oceans, and of t he r esour ces ther ein .

A p let hor a of env i r onm en tal l y -m ot i vated or gan isat ions, such as Gr eenpeace an d Wor ld Wide Fund for Natu r e – WWF - have em er ged in the f r ee l iber al nat ion s of t he West 3, and m uch legislat ion and r egu lat ion has been developed in r espon se to gr owin g publ i c an d scien t i f i c awar eness and concer n .

Too of ten , however , t he above or gan isat ions have been per ceived as, or actual l y have been , u t i l i sed as ‘cover ’ for ideological opponen t s of Wester n cap i tal i st i c l iber al i sm , wh ich h as had the adver se ef fect of d r awin g what shou ld be sim p ly p r uden t stewar dsh ip of natu r al assets i n to t he com ed ies and far ces of dem ocr at ic pol i t i cs.

Th is pol i t i cal far ce has been of ten deleter ious, and occasional l y t r agic, for Aust r al ia’s natu r al endowm en t 4.

__________________________________

1. State Government as project proponent may compromise integrity of assessments conducted under purview of State authority.

An exam p le of wh er e a State gover n m en t was insu f f i cien t ly d isin ter ested in a developm en t app l i cat ion to give fai r assessm en t

2 A similar change has occurred in the USA, as described in Eliza Griswold’s 21 September 2012 New York Times magazine article “How ‘Silent Spring’ Ignited the Environmental Movement” 3 See for example, “A Brief History of the Modern Green Movement in America”, “A Brief History of Environmentalism” by Andy Reynolds, or “Environmentalism: A Global History (review)”. 4 Stephen Dovers (Ed). 2000. Environmental History and Policy: Still Settling Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. 306 pp. ISBN 0-19-550749-5

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

was t he Queen sland Gover nm en t ’s p r oposal t o con st r uct a dam on the M ar y River at Tr aveston Cr ossin g.

As a r esiden t of t he ar ea, I [Dav id Ar th u r ] consider ed the hyd r ology of t he p r oposal and deter m ined that i t wou ld never have wor ked as a water stor age; too leaky , t oo shal low, too war m , i t wou ld have been l i t t le m or e t han a st ink ing m ud f lat for t h r ee m on ths of t he year , t hen a dustpan for t he next f i ve m on ths un t i l i t r ained again .

M y f ind ings wer e consisten t wi t h t h ose of t he Hyd r ological M odel l ing Review of t he Tr aveston Cr ossin g Dam Dr af t EIS5, com m issioned by the Com m onweal t h M in ister as par t of t he assessm en t ; wh i le i t was found that t he hyd r ological m odel l ing of t he Dr af t EIS p r ov ided for QWI – t h e State gover nm en t in st r um en t estab l i shed as p r oject p r oponen t – was able to m eet t he En vi r on m en tal Flow Obl igat ions for t he M ar y River Water Resour ces Plan – the r elevan t natu r al r esour ce m an agem en t p lan – t h e Envi r onm en tal Flow Obl igat ion i t sel f i s substan t ial l y lower than even the lower quar t i le dai l y f low down st r eam of the p r oposed Dam si t e.

The dam i s not r equ i r ed for water supp ly in Sou th -East Queen sland ; Br isbane al r eady has under -u t i l i sed water r ecycl ing p lan t s and in f r ast r uctu r e6 t hat cou ld supp ly far m or e water than Tr aveston ever cou ld .

As i t happen s, t he debacle that was the pol i t i cal p r ocess ar ound the Tr aveston Cr ossing Dam Pr oposal was on ly ended by the in ter ven t ion of t h e Com m onweal t h M in ister of t he En vi r on m en t , who exer cised au thor i t y under the En vi r on m en tal Pr otect ion and Biod iver si t y Conser vat ion Act (EPBC) to r eject t he Pr oposal because i t also th r eatened the su r v ival of t h r ee endanger ed species.

5 “Hydrological Modelling Review of the Traveston Crossing Dam Draft EIS”, Bewsher Consulting ,10 June 2008. 6 South East Queensland Water Strategy, (Queensland Water Commission) 2010

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

If t h is nat ion had un i for m nat ional env i r onm en tal assessm en t and app r oval p r ocesses, wh ich m eans t he Com m on weal t h takes over al l env i r onm en tal over sigh t , t hen t her e wou ld be less, not m or e, env i r onm en tal legislat ion and r egu lat ion . It wou ld also p r ov ide for nat ion -wide consistency in env i r onm en tal r egu lat ion .

The al ter nat i ve, t he devolu t ion of r esponsib i l i t y t o st ate and local gover n m en t au th or i t ies m ay , i n t h e absence of nat ional standar d s and gu idel ines, r esu l t in less r ather than m or e ef f i ciency , and m ay also see an er osion of en v i r on m en tal standar d s i f t hese ar e not benchm ar ked at a nat ional level . It is u n d erstoo

businesses - par t i cu lar ly sm al l f i r m s - ar e of ten keen to see com m on standar ds to al low for gr eater sim p l ici t y i n hav ing to deal wi th gover n m en t bu r eaucr acy .

Ced ing en v i r on m en tal app r oval t o the States wou ld be a r et r ogr ade step ; far f r om cr eat ing " one-stop en v i r on m en tal shops" , i t wou ld be r ever sion to the p lethor a of con f l i cted , con fused , par t ial l y over -lapp in g ju r i sd ict ion s, as suggested by t he h istor y of m anagem en t of t he M ur r ay -Dar l ing Basin 7.

__________________________________

2. The scarce financial resources of State Governments are stretched to provide adequate environmental oversight of development applications.

Assessm en t of en v i r on m en tal l y sensi t i ve developm en t app l i cat ions r equ i r es an accum u lat i on of scien t i f i c exper t i se; d ist r i bu t ion of t h e l im i ted r esour ce that i s t h is exper t i se am ong State gover nm en ts i s f inancial l y an d bu r eaucr at i cal l y inef f i cien t .

As Gar r y Wi l lgoose has set ou t i n a 4 Apr i l 2013 on -l i ne ar t i cle ( " Independen t r esear ch i s t he an swer to coal seam gas d i lem m a" ) , State gover nm en ts of ten don ' t even have t he techn ical exper t i se to assess m in ing app l i cat ions. Th i s m eans that when State gover n m en ts don ' t detect en v i r on m en tal p r ob lem s wi th

7 Two Decades of Murray-Darling Water Management: A River of Funding, a Trickle of Achievement, Murray-Darling Basin management (APH Library)

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

app l icat ions, i t m ay be because State gover nm en ts lack the r esou r ces to iden t i f y possib le en v i r onm en tal p r ob lem s when they ' r e look ing st r aigh t at t hem .

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Conclusion

State gover nm en ts shou ld have no au thor i t y for en v i r onm en tal over sigh t ; as ei t h er p r oject p r opon en ts or other wise have pecun iar y in ter ests in al lowing developm en t p r oject s to p r oceed , and ar e yet boun d by no statu tor y or t r eaty ob l igat i ons to ensur e sustainable m anagem en t of t he ter r i t or ies un der t hei r ju r i sd ict ion , t hei r capaci t ies en sur e r espon sib le env i r onm en tal stewar dsh ip ar e com pr om ised .

Th is i s com pound ed by States gener al l y hav ing nei th er f inancial nor tech n ical r esour ces to p r ov ide adequate env i r on m en tal over sigh t of developm en t app l i cat i ons.

The in ter ests of both r esponsib le env i r onm en tal stewar dsh ip and r egu lator y st r eam l in ing ar e best ach ieved i f States cede al l env i r onm en tal over sigh t t o t he Com m on weal th .

Your s sincer ely ,

David Ar t hu r

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Appendix: Submission to the Senate Inquiry - Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Retaining Federal Approval Powers) Bill 2012

Submission author: David Arthur

I am in favour of Senator Waters's bill being enacted in its original form, because the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act should be retained as the overarching environmental legislation in Australia.

Whereas the Commonwealth Government is responsible for assuring compliance with various international treaties such as the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1975, the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat 1975, the Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, the Japan-Australia and China-Australia Migratory Bird Agreements, the (Bonn) Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1976, State governments are under no such obligations.

The conservation and environmental protection provisions of such Commonwealth-State Agreements as various Regional Forestry Agreements may or may not be respected; as described by ANU Fenner School Professor David Lindenmayer in his 17 January 2013 'The Conversation' article "Victorian forestry is definitely not ecologically sustainable"8, the pertinent provisions are not being respected.

State governments are often project proponents, as occurred with the

8 http://theconversation.edu.au/victorian-forestry-is-definitely-not-ecologically-sustainable-11392

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

proposed Dam at Traveston Crossing on Queensland's Mary River. In that case, the State's Coordinator-General approved the proponent's Environmental Impact Statement and hence the project, albeit with over 1500 conditions. However, the project was denied approval by the Federal Minister under the EPBC Act, and did not proceed, which also shows that States may approve actions that do not comply with the EPBC and hence with Australia's treaty obligations.

Since then, there have been major changes in Queensland's own planning and assessment laws and procedures, particularly in the "fast-tracking' of major state-owned projects. This has decreased the rigour of environmental assessments, and reduced or eliminated opportunity for public comment and removal of most of the legal avenues for review of decisions. This is compounded by Queensland Parliament’s lack of an upper house to review decisions made in the lower house, or to review Queensland Government’s extensive use of its State Development Act. This Act is administered by the unelected government position of Coordinator-General (unique to Queensland), a position with a history of direct political appointments and no provision of no judicial review of decisions.

Another case is the proposed "gas hub" at James Price Point on Western Australia's (WA's) Kimberley coast, proposed to liquefy natural gas piped ashore from North-West Shelf gas rigs. The environmental approval for this project by the Western Australian Government (now considered by Minister Tony Burke under the EPBC Act) is the topic of University of Melbourne PhD candidate Malcolm Lindsay's 22 August 2012 'The Conversation' article "James Price Point: environmental significance ignored in failed impact assessment"9.

There are alternatives to the James Price Point option, such as piping the gas and oil down to existing facilities in Karratha, or the as-yet undeveloped ship-mounted Floating Liquefied Natural Gas plants that would negate any requirement for gas to be piped ashore at all before export. These are cheaper for the companies and tax payer, and will create fewer environmental and cultural impacts, which would seem to be a win-win situation for all, except that the WA State Government has long wanted a LNG plant onshore

9 http://theconversation.edu.au/james-price-point-environmental-significance-ignored-in-failed-impact-assessment-8817

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

at James Price Point, as a 'beach-head' for industrialising the Kimberley region.

The environmental approval granted by the WA Government may well be compromised by these policy circumstances, demonstrating the need for the independent approval process afforded by Federal administration of the EPBC Act.

The WA government’s apparently cavalier approach to project profitability (as shown by its preference for the development of James Price Point in preference to lower cost options) seems replicated by the New South Government’s acceptance of the economic case for Whitehaven Coal’s Maules Creek project, supplied as an appendix to the Environmental Impact Statement. Many of the fallacies of the presented economic case were readily identified by public interest economics group Economists At Large, and were the subject of Economist At Large director Rod Campbell’s 10 January 2013 National Times article, “Facts and fiction from the mining proponents”10.

In summary, good governance requires retention of Commonwealth oversight of environmental approvals through the powers under the EPBC Act. At the very least, good governance at the Federal level may to some extent compensate for its apparent absence at the State level.

10 http://www.nationaltimes.com.au/opinion/politics/facts-and-fiction-from-the-mining-proponents-20130109-2cgmk.html).

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

StrandedA Financial analysis of GVK’s proposed Alpha Coal Project in Australia’s Galilee Basin.

Although the danger of stranded assets is, accordingly, limited for the [coal] industry as a whole, individual players can still incur substantial losses on sunk investment. This is particularly true for recent investments in fields which also require the large-scale development of railway and handling infrastructure.

IEA Special Report Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map 10 June 2013

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

2

Date: June 2013

Published by: The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA)

Co-Authors: Tim Buckley Tom Sanzillo

Commissioned by: Greenpeace Australia Pacific

In preparing this report we have relied on publicly available information however many of the entities involved are private entities and therefore this report is necessarily limited by the lack of publicly available information about the operations of those entities.

Background on the authors

TOM SANZILLO

Tom Sanzillo joined the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) as Director of Finance in 2012.

For the past six years Tom has run his own company TR Rose Associates. The company has served several clients working to create alternatives to fossil fuel use in the United States. The work has consisted of research, reports, testimony and advice on construction costs of coal plants and alternatives, financial reviews (involving independent owned utilities, cooperatives, public authorities and hybrid organizational structures), credit analysis, coal market and price analyses, rate impact assessments, federal financing, federal coal leases, coal export markets and policy, load forecast reviews, energy contracts and a series of other topics related to electric generation. He has served as a financial advisor to the innovative Green Jobs/Green New York large scale residential energy efficiency retrofit program in New York State. Tom has served on the Advisory Board on the future management of the Long Island Power Authority in New York State. His clients also have included business, labor and community organizations covering a host of public and private finance and policy issues.

From 1990 to 2007, Tom served in senior management positions to the publicly elected Chief Financial Officers of New York City and New York State. From 2003 to 2007, he served as the First Deputy Comptroller for the State of New York. Tom was responsible for a $150 billion globally invested public pension fund; oversight of state and 1600 units of local government budgets and public debt offerings; audit programs for all state agencies, public authorities (including power generation authorities) and local governments, and review and approval of state contracts. One estimate places the level of public assets under the State Comptroller’s watch at over $700 billion. Due to an early resignation of the elected State Comptroller, Tom, as First Deputy Comptroller, served for a short period as the New York State Comptroller from 2006-07. His most recent publication on New York State government and finance is part of the 2012 Oxford Handbook of New York State Government and Finance.

TIM BUCKLEY

Tim Buckley is an independent financial investment analyst with over twenty five years of experience in analysing major listed companies across a multitude of industries both within Australia and in the global context. Tim was a co-founder of Arkx Investment Management in 2007, a Sydney based fund manager that invests in the leading global listed companies best leveraged to the move to a low carbon economic future. In 2010 Tim became joint-Managing Director and head of Equity Research at Arkx.

Prior to this, Tim was Managing Director, Deputy then Head of Australasian Equity Research at Citigroup from 1998 to 2007. Tim was on the Citigroup Australasian Commitments Committee for five years to 2007 overseeing financial market transactions and underwritings. Tim was a top rated industrial analyst first with Macquarie Equities (1988-91) then County Natwest Securities (1992-96) in Australia, covering the leading industrial conglomerates as well as enjoying a specialization in the forestry, brewing and wine sectors. Tim then moved to Singapore to cover the Asian equity market during 1996-1998 with Deutsche Bank, just in time to experience the Asian Financial Crisis!

Tim has authored a number of financial clean energy articles that have been published over 2011-2012 in RenewEconomy.com and Climate Spectator, Australia’s two leading online renewable industry websites.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

Contents

Executive Summary 04

Section 1: Introduction 05

Section 2: The 2011 Asian “Deal of the Year” 06

Section 3: The Alpha Coal Project Overview 07

Section 4: GVK Coal – Project Approval Status 10

Section 5: GVK Coal – Project Ownership Structure 12

Section 6: GVK Power & Infrastructure – Company Performance 14

Section 7: GVK Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage 17

Section 8: GVK Coal and Aurizon (a White Knight?) 21

Section 9: Project Risks 23

Section 10: Thermal Coal Market Outlook 29

Section 11: Conclusion 34

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

4

In 2011, GVK Coal Developers (Singapore) Pte Limited (GVK Coal) bought the Alpha Coal Project (the project) from Hancock Prospecting in a US$1.26bn deal for which GVK Group’s Chairman, Dr GVK Reddy was awarded “Asia Deal of the Year”.1 Less than two years later, the US$10billion project is struggling with little prospect of financial viability.

The project timelines have been shown to be unrealistic, and further delays are likely due to the unprecedented ambition and complexity of an Indian company with no track record of building mines in Australia, building what would be by far the country’s largest black thermal coal mine in an area with little water, power, or other service infrastructure. The project could require almost 500km of new rail infrastructure, across floodplains and through important farmland, to a new export terminal proposed to be located in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area. This at a time when most major coal producers are seeking to sell or downscale production due to a weakening global outlook for thermal coal.

Key issues include:

“leading global infrastructure owner, manager and operator” GVKPIL has no experience operating any business outside of India. It has never successfully built and operated a coal mine – in India or otherwise. GVKPIL has not operated any business in Australia, let alone a US$10bn greenfield project in the face of massive environmental, operational, logistical and financial challenges.

infrastructure projects across six different asset classes. Many are behind schedule and / or over budget.

geared balance sheet. With a market equity capitalisation of only US$243m, GVKPIL is carrying on-balance sheet net debt of US$2.8bn.

off-balance sheet loans in excess of US$1bn to fund the US$1.26bn purchase from Hancock Prospecting.

a Systematically Important Core Investment Company (SI-CIC), a designation brought into effect on 5 January 2011. However, GVKPIL is currently not in compliance due to excessive financial leverage.

underperformed the Indian index by 80% since 2010.

interest cover was a very low 0.44x. In addition, a significant portion of interest expense is capitalised against the pipeline of greenfield projects.

of coal production is likely to render the project uneconomic. The Newcastle free on board (FOB) thermal coal price is currently around US$88/t, 30% below the peak seen in 2008. This leaves little headroom to move against a largely debt-funded US$10bn project proposal with a cash cost of production we estimate to be at least US$70/t – substantially higher than the US$55/t figure promoted by GVK. We note the energy content of GVK Coal is materially below the Newcastle benchmark, meaning GVK Coal would receive a discounted price.

of over 20% are likely, and have already priced new thermal coal mines out of the money according to the Australian Coal Association.

timetable, this project is scheduled to come up to full 32Mtpa production well beyond 2018, just as China hits a peak in its national thermal coal demand. Thereafter, we project China – the world’s largest consumer of coal – will actually reduce its national coal consumption annually, progressively replacing thermal coal power generation with low carbon alternatives and most importantly, enhanced energy efficiency.

Building Australia’s largest black thermal coal mine in the untapped Galilee Basin would challenge experienced operators, but the combination of an inexperienced developer, slack demand globally for thermal coal and a deteriorating cost of production scenario in Australia moves the project beyond speculative.

GVK‘s Alpha project appears likely to remain “stranded in the valley of death”.

Executive Summary

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5

Section 1

Introduction

The Galilee Basin in central western Queensland has long been known to hold vast reserves of coal. Until now, the lack of infrastructure has meant that these coal reserves have remained untapped, with conventional wisdom being that the Galilee Basin was uneconomic.

In 2010 – 2011, with global coal prices at an all time high, there was a rush to develop mines in the Galilee in the expectation that global coal demand and prices would remain buoyant. At the peak of this cycle, Indian conglomerates GVK and Adani invested significantly in coal reserves in the Galilee, with a view to securing vertically integrated coal supply chains.

The GVK Alpha Project is widely regarded as being the frontrunner in the ‘race to unlock the Galilee’. It is a highly ambitious greenfield project that would include the development of the largest black coal mine in Australia, a 495km long railway line and new coal export terminal in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area.

While much has been reported about the environmental impacts of the project, this report explores the financial issues surrounding the GVK Alpha coal project, and the risks for potential investors.

148°E

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Cairns

Townsville

Bowen

Mackay

Brisbane

Gladstone

Townsville

Charters TowersBowen

Collinsville

Mackay

Moranbah

Clermont

EmeraldAlpha

Abbot Point Port

Pacific Ocean

Pacific Ocean

Abbot Point Port

Dudgeon Point

Gregory Developm

ental Rd

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Alpha Coal Project (Mine)MLA 70426

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RomaCharleville

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Alpha Coal Project Location

Mt Isa

QUEENSLAND

NORTHERN TERRITORY

SOUTHAUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES

0 25 50km

Scale 1:2 000 000 (A4)

Mining Lease Application (MLA70426) Boundary

Railway Corridor

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

6

The deal payment was structured as:

(and no later than 3 years after close of deal).

Even with this staggered payment schedule, GVK Coal would have accrued in the order of US$70m of interest payments in the 20 months since purchase (with an estimated 6.5% pa cost of corporate debt). With the large scale production still at least 4-5 years away, interest expense will continue to grow significantly in this period.

As part of the deal GVK Coal acquired 100% of the Kevin’s Corner coal deposit and 100% of the Hancock rail and port infrastructure projects, plus a 79% stake in the Alpha and Alpha West coal deposits. Hancock Prospecting retained a minority 21% stake in the Alpha and Alpha West deposits. Of the three deposits, the Alpha mine is the closest to commercialisation. While Hancock Prospecting retains a stake in any profits generated from the Alpha mine should it ever be built, it is free from the funding commitment in the A$6bn rail and port infrastructure assets.

As part of the deal Gina Rinehart, Chair of Hancock Prospecting, was invited to join the board of GVKPIL as a non-executive director.4 To date this invitation has not been accepted.

Hancock Prospecting sold the vast majority of it’s Galilee Basin coal deposits to GVK at the peak of the global thermal coal market in 2011. While GVK won an award for “Asia Deal of the Year”, Hancock Prospecting made close to A$1billion in profit from the deal, while GVK is left with a high risk project and a growing interest burden.

Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd sold the majority of its Hancock Coal business in the Galilee Basin, Queensland, to GVK Coal Developers (Singapore) Pte Limited (GVK Coal) in September 2011 for US$1.26bn, realising a A$1bn dollar after tax capital gain in the process.

For this transaction, Dr GVK Reddy, Chairman of GVK Group, was awarded “Asia Deal of the Year”. However, it is now increasingly evident that Hancock Prospecting’s Chair Gina Rinehart may have been the more appropriate recipient.

Hancock Prospecting acquired the Exploration Permit (EPC 570) in October 1994 and Mineral Development Licence in April 1998. For a long time, it was conventional wisdom that the Galilee Basin was uneconomic, however this began to change as the thermal coal price soared to historical highs. At the time of the GVK transaction, the Newcastle thermal coal price was US$131/t FOB, 50% higher than the US$88/t today.

We doubt there is any coincidence that the timing of this sale is close to the peak in the thermal coal price cycle, with 2011 being the second highest year for the thermal coal price in a century. Hancock Prospecting booked an A$1,103 million after tax gain in the 2011/12 year as a result.3 Netting off Queensland coal project development costs expensed in prior years (e.g. an A$103m net loss in 2010/11), this still leaves close to a A$1bn net gain overall for Hancock Prospecting.

Section 2

The 2011 Asian “Deal of the Year”

You only get one Alan Bond in your lifetime. And I’ve had mine.2

Kerry Packer, 1987

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7

In September 2011, the GVK Group, an Indian conglomerate, through its new subsidiary GVK Coal, acquired a controlling stake in three huge thermal coal deposits in the Galilee Basin in Central Queensland, Australia.6

The acquisition of the Alpha Project by GVK involves four key assets:

1. A shareholding of up to 79% in each of the Alpha Coal Project (Alpha) and Alpha West Coal Project (Alpha West) in the Galilee Basin, with Hancock Prospecting retaining the remainder (down to 21%);

2. A 100% shareholding in the Kevin’s Corner Coal Project (Kevin’s Corner), adjacent to Alpha; and

3. A 100% shareholding in the proposed T3 coal export terminal at Abbot Point and the rail line linking the Galilee basin coal deposits with Abbot Point – GVK Galilee Infrastructure (see Section 5).

The projects have a combined 7.9bn tonnes of coal compliant with Australia’s Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC) resource categorisation (see Figure 1). The actual measured resource at Alpha, the coal deposit likely to be progressed first, is 821m tonnes.7

Figure 1 GVK Coal Resource Profile (Mt)

Resource (t) Type Status Measured Indicated Inferred Total Targeted net coal output pa

Alpha Open cut BFS Complete 821 700 300 1,821 30

Alpha West Underground PFS 0 500 1,300 1,800 30

Kevin's Corner Open cut & U/G EIS approved 229 1,040 3,000 4,269 20

Total 1,050 2,240 4,600 7,890 80

Significant challenges need to be overcome in order for these projects to be developed and for the region to become a coal producer. These include commercial (finance and cooperation on rail and port alignment), technical (design and coordination of rail and port infrastructure) and marketing (securing off-take agreements with customers) challenges. There are also constraints in terms of social infrastructure (housing, town amenities for workers), water and energy to support large scale projects and infrastructure developments. All of these challenges can be overcome, but they are likely to take time and will involve substantial costs.5

Bureau of Resource Energy & Economics, 2012

Section 3

The Alpha Coal Project Overview

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8

Refer Figure 2 for the key coal mine statistics. These are sourced from the March and May 2013 GVK Coal presentations.8 We would note the strip ratio cited of <6.5:1 is materially more favourable than the 12.2:1 in the 2011 Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).9 Relative to production of 30Mtpa, overburden is cited as 466Mtpa in 2011 vs the implied 247M pa bank cubic metres (bcm) per Life of Mine (LOM) tonne of coal used in the 2013 corporate presentation.

Figure 2 The Alpha Coal Mine Parameters

Reserves 1,193 million tonnes

Reserves & Indicated Resource 1,521 million tonnes

Strip ratio (tonne:tonne) 12.2:1

Strip ratio (bcm: tonne) <6.5: 1

Overburden removal 466 million tonnes pa

Run of Mine (ROM) Coal 38 million tonnes pa

Average yield 76%

Saleable production 30 million tonnes pa

Life of mine 30 years

Distance from port 495 kilometres

Distance from dam water 220 kilometres

Refer Figure 3 for the key coal statistics. When compared to typical Australian thermal coals, Alpha coal displays a higher than average moisture content (at 16-17% vs 9-10%) but lower ash content (9-10% vs 14-15%). Total sulphur content is in line. The calorific value is 5,847 kcal/kg gross as received (GAR), 7% below the energy content of Newcastle FOB benchmark of 6,300 kcal/kg GAR (6,080 kcal/kg net as received).

Figure 3 The Alpha Coal Mine – Coal Statistics

Calorific value ~5,800 kcal/kg GAR

Total Moisture (TM) ~17%

Ash – as received 8.7% (9.5% air-dried)

Volatile Matter (VM) 30.80%

Total Sulphur 0.51%

Fixed Carbon 44.50%

Gas content 0.20m3 / t (90% CH4)

Hancock Prospecting had plans for export agreements with numerous interested parties. It was reported in 2011 that Korea South-East Power Co and China’s Zhejiang Provincial Energy Group Co had signed non-binding letters of intent and satisfactorily tested the coal from the Alpha deposit in commercial quantities.10 GVK Coal state non-binding agreements are still in place, with letters of intent for the entire Alpha mine’s output in place.11

The Galilee Coal Basin has very significant coal deposits, but is well inland far away from both railway and export port facilities. The area is also far away from a major population base (an issue in terms of access to skilled labour) and lacks basic power and water infrastructure. As Figure 4 details, there are at least six major thermal coal resource projects being contemplated by four different consortia. Together, these projects could hypothetically produce 272Mtpa of saleable thermal coal, sufficient to more than double Australia’s total thermal coal exports of 171Mt in 2012.

The Alpha Coal Project Overview

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9

Source: GVK Coal “Coaltrans Goa” Presentation, 12 March 2013

The Alpha Coal Project Overview

Figure 4 The Galilee Coal Basin – Projects

Owner Project Type Status Targeted net coal output pa Capex (A$bn)

Adani Group (India) Carmichael Coal Open cut & U/G EIS active 60 7.1

GVK Coal Alpha Open cut BFS Complete 30 10.0

GVK Coal Alpha West Underground PFS 30

GVK Coal Kevin's Corner Open cut & U/G EIS active 20

Waratah Coal P/L (Clive Palmer) China First Open cut & U/G EIS active 40 8.1

AMCI Group & Bandanna Energy Ltd JV South Galilee Coal Open cut & U/G EIS active 17 4.2

Macmines Austasia Pty Ltd China Stone Open cut & U/G EIS active 45 n.a.

Vale SA Degulla Open cut & U/G EIS active 30 8.0

Galilee Basin - Total 272 37.4

Source: Queensland Government – Coordinator-General projects Assessments and approvals

Figure 5 The Galilee Coal Basin – Projects

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10

Section 4

GVK Coal – Project Approval Status

a shambolic joke 12

Federal Environment Minister Tony Burke, 2012

The environmental impacts of the GVK Coal project are significant and bring considerable project risks, in terms of both legal costs and likely delays in achieving final environmental approvals for the mine, rail and port. The location of GVK’s proposed T3 coal export terminal within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area has galvanised widespread opposition from the environmental community. At least one legal challenge has been lodged against the Alpha mine and there is currently a Federal Government investigation into GVK over potential ‘false and misleading conduct’ in relation to the environmental impacts of the proposed T3 coal terminal at Abbot Point.

In Australia, mining projects require a combination of State, Federal and Local Government approvals. In Queensland, it is noteworthy that “The declaration of the project as a ‘significant project’ does not indicate support for, or approval of, the project by the Coordinator-General of the Queensland Government. Rather, it is a requirement for the project to undergo a rigorous EIS (Environmental Impact Statement) process.” 13

The Alpha coal mine, rail line and corresponding coal export terminal at Abbot Point is the most advanced of the GVK Coal’s three proposals, with the Alpha West and Kevin’s Corner projects following some years behind in the approvals process. For the purposes of government approval processes, the Alpha coal mine and the rail project were treated as a single project. The Kevin’s Corner and coal port terminal projects are each subject to separate approvals. No approval process has been initiated for the proposed Alpha West mine.

GVK Coal estimates that together, the Alpha mine, rail and port project will cost in the vicinity of US$10bn to develop.

In January 2009, the Alpha Project, comprising the mine and rail line, was determined to be a “controlled action” under the federal Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).14 The Commonwealth determined that

the project could be assessed under a bilateral agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the Queensland Government, whereby the Queensland Government managed the assessment process on behalf of the Australian Government’s Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities.

In May 2012, shortly after the election of the Liberal National Party into power in Queensland, the Queensland Coordinator General issued a report recommending that the Alpha Project be approved.15 It was subsequently revealed that this report and the assessment for the Alpha Project had not satisfied the requirements of the Commonwealth Government. The Federal Environment Minister, the Hon Tony Burke MP, exercised his powers under the EPBC Act to secure more time to make his own determination for the project, describing the Queensland Government’s environmental assessment of the Alpha Project as a “shambolic joke” in the process.16 In the political maelstrom that followed, the Federal Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities put forward additional requirements for the assessment, resulting in a delay of several months.

In August 2012, the Alpha Project was given conditional approval under the EPBC Act, with 19 conditions attached. The Federal Environment Minister Tony Burke took the unusual position of requiring that several of the conditions be met prior to construction commencing, with the approval of the Minister required to determine if the work undertaken has met those conditions. The additional environmental conditions that GVK Coal is required to meet relate primarily to supplying information that the Federal Environment Department requested previously be included in the formal assessment documents, including cumulative impacts on water availability in the Galilee Basin, impacts of the mine and rail line on nationally threatened species and the impacts of the rail line on the Caley Valley Wetlands, an area that supports internationally significant migratory and threatened shore bird habitat, and the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area.17 These conditions are considered to be very strict by normal standards and will require additional detailed work to be done by GVK Coal.

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In March 2013, the Queensland Government, acting on the Coordinator General’s recommendation from April 2012, issued a mining license to GVK Coal for the Alpha mine and a draft Environmental Authority was issued by the Queensland Department of Environment and Heritage Protection.18 The granting of this Environmental Authority is currently under challenge in the Queensland Land and Environment Court, following objections by several landowners and environmental organisations. The court hearing is set for September 2013.19

GVK Coal’s proposed coal port terminal (Terminal 3, T3) at Abbot Point also received approval under the Federal EPBC Act in October 2012. This approval also requires significant additional information to be supplied on the ecological and heritage impacts of the terminal. Much of this work must be submitted to the Environment Minister for approval prior to work commencing. The Federal Department of Sustainability,

Environment, Water, Population and Communities is now also investigating allegations by Greenpeace that GVK Coal committed an offence under the EPBC Act by failing to include important results of bird surveys in the Caley Valley Wetlands in the documents they prepared for the assessment process.20

It is unclear when the results of that investigation will be made public.

In May 2013 GVK Coal received environmental approval by the Coordinator-General of the Queensland Government for its US$4.2bn Kevin’s Corner mine project, adjancent to the Alpha coal mine project.21

The Alpha Project is yet to reach financial close. It is said to be waiting on finalisation of a lease for the Alpha coal mine and completion of necessary approvals for Abbot Point.22

GVK Coal – Project Approval Status

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Section 5

GVK Coal – Project Ownership Structure

Development of the Galilee Basin looks increasingly remote, Macquarie Group Ltd., Australia’s biggest investment bank, said in a May 1 research note. Prospects for project paybacks look extremely poor, the bank said. Further delays are likely unless ‘deep pocket’ backers are able to ignore conventional economics.23

Macquarie Group Ltd, 2013

GVK Group has created a complicated, heavily debt-funded corporate structure that has the effect of keeping GVK Coal off GVKPIL’s balance sheet. A deal with a strong backer such as Aurizon appears to be critical for GVK if they are to have any chance of financing the project.

The project is being developed by GVK Coal, which is in turn owned by various companies owned and/or controlled by the family of Dr G V Krishna Reddy, including the 54% owned, Indian stock exchange listed GVKPIL. GVK Coal acquired this project from Hancock Prospecting in 2011 for US$1.26bn. Hancock Prospecting retained a minority stake in two of the coal deposits, Alpha and Alpha West (owned Hancock Coal Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of GVK Coal).24

In 2010 a WorleyParsons Ltd and Ausenco Ltd joint venture announced it had won an Alpha mine related program management contract (PMC). The actual contract awarded was for the preparation of the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contract. The actual mine EPC contract has not been awarded, only the contract to prepare the EPC contract. This supports our premise that further project delays are inevitable (see Section 9).

In June 2013 GVK Coal signed an Early Services Agreement with Thiess to be the preferred mine operations contractor for the Alpha coal mine. This requires Theiss to develop a mine plan during the second half of 2013. Again, this does not look like GVK Coal has signed an EPC contract, rather it has signed an early stage planning contract.25

In October 2012 GVK Coal signed a joint venture agreement with Samsung C&T Corp (Korea) and Smithbridge (Australia) to explore the development of an EPC contract for the construction of the greenfield infrastructure T3 port facility at Abbot Point. There has been no further announcement confirming if this EPC contract has been finalised.

In March 2013 GVK Coal signed a non-binding memorandum of understanding with Aurizon Holdings (Australia’s largest listed rail freight company) whereby Aurizon would fund a 51% stake in the rail and port development assets.

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Figure 6 The GVK Coal Project Structure

The company press release announcing the deal interchangeably uses the terms “GVK” and “GVKPIL” (the listed entity, GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited). The corporate description reads: “About GVK: GVKPIL is one of India’s largest infrastructure developer with experience and expertise spanning areas such as Energy, Airports, Roads and Urban Infrastructure. In addition, GVK is also involved in many other businesses held by it privately including Real Estate, Hotels, Pharmaceuticals, Resources, etc.”26 This description, perhaps unintentionally, makes it unclear which businesses are held by the listed entity and which are held privately. The same press release also states that GVK Coal “in joint venture with GVKPIL has entered into various acquisition documents with Hancock Prospecting P/L.” This gives rise to a possible confusion about the delineation of entities, ownership and activities. Some financial implications of this joint acquisition are discussed in Section 7.

GVK Coal – Project Ownership Structure

igure6:TheGVKCoalProjectStructure

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WorleyParsons/AusencoJV HancockProspectingP/L AurizonHoldings;ĚĞƐŝŐŶŝŶŐWĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚͿ ;ŽǁŶĞĚďLJ'ŝŶĂZŝŶĞŚĂƌƚͿ (ASX:AZI.AX)

CurrentasofJune2013

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Section 6

GVK Power & Infrastructure – Company Performance

GVKPIL is a financially constrained company that is attempting to concurrently build a 16 greenfield projects in 6 different asset classes. A multitude of issues will likely see further project delays, cancellations and/or cost blowouts across this portfolio. GVKPIL has no material experience of construction, or operation, of projects outside of India. The complexity of building the largest greenfield thermal coal mining project in Australia in the remote Galilee Basin would challenge any company, let alone one that is debt constrained and has never operated in the Australian market.

GVKPIL Return on Equity… averaging 1% pa and declining

GVKPIL delivered a return on book value of equity of 5.7% in 2009/10, then 4.7% in 2010/11 and 1.8% in 2011/12, before falling to negative 10.1% in 2012/13 on the back of a net loss for ordinary shareholders of Rs3.4bn (US$62m).27 This is well below cost of capital, and declining.

GVKPIL Share Price… significant and sustained underperformance

Figure 7 details the share price of GVKPIL over the last five years relative to the iPath MSCI India Index ETN (code: INP). A significant and sustained underperformance is clear, with GVKPIL underperforming the Indian index by 80% in this period.

GVKPIL’s market capitalisation has been reduced to US$243m (see Section 7). This makes any prospective equity raising to pay down some of GVKPIL’s US$2.8bn of net debt highly dilutive to existing shareholders and therefore highly unlikely. This financial leverage will also significantly inhibit GVKPIL’s ability to raise further debt or project financing for its US$20bn pipeline of new projects.

Figure 7 GVK Power & Infrastructure – Relative Share Price Performance

Source: Yahoo Finance

GVKPIL… experience overstated

GVKPIL is a company that describes itself as “a leading global infrastructure owner, manager and operator”.28

Prior to investing in GVK Coal, GVKPIL’s entire focus of operations was within India. That is, they did not own any noteworthy business outside of India. GVKPIL does have an office in Indonesia, having won a contract relating to building two greenfield international airports, but has no revenues nor substantive asset base there.

To claim the company is a leading global operator is an overstatement of the firm’s international experience. There are significant cultural, staffing, political, financial and environmental risks to this project – the largest of its kind in Australian coal mining history.

GVKPIL goes on to describe itself as “One of India’s leading Business Groups” with “significant experience in financing and developing large scale projects”.29

GVKPIL has significant experience in financing proposed large scale projects, but the implication that it has the managerial, staffing and technical abilities to successfully develop a multitude of projects across six dramatically different asset classes simultaneously is a claim yet to be established.

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The 2008/09 annual report states “Your company has a diversified portfolio of gas based, coal fired and hydro-electric power plants. With over a decade of experience in the power sector, GVKPIL has acquired the technical skills and financial expertise and is now in a position to build on this proven track record.” 30

At the time this statement was made, the company actually only had a single gas power plant of 216MW in operation (Phase One). The two additional gas power plants in Phase Two were unable to be commissioned in 2008/09. They “remained stranded due to non-availability of gas and incurred cost overrun.” 31 The Phase Two expansion of 220MW gas electricity generation was completed by Alstom in January 2006 and handed over to GVKPIL in May 2006. The lack of gas availability meant this facility was immediately mothballed for the next three years.

None of the coal mines, coal fired power stations and hydro electricity power stations referred to have as yet entered into commercial operation, three years after this statement of GVKPIL’s expertise.32

The scale and rate of expansion… creates risk…

GVKPIL has expanded its scope dramatically in the last three years – another central risk. The company has 16 greenfield projects and two brownfield expansions, compared to an existing operating base of only five facilities, four of which were either acquired or commissioned since 2009. The speed, scale and scope of the company’s expansion poses significant risks.

GVKPIL has yet to demonstrate a sustained successful ramp-up to full capacity utilisation of some of its first projects, namely the Jegurupadu and Gautami gas-fired power plants. We perceive significant financial and cashflow pressures (see Section 7). Even in isolation, the managerial and operational risks associated with concurrently trying to commission 16 major greenfield businesses across coal mining, expressways, airports, hydro, coal fired power stations, special economic zones, ports and deep sea oil & gas exploration are material (see Figure 8).

The pressures of this excessive rate of expansion are clear:

expansion of Jegurupadu gas fired power station;33

Expressway concession (a Rs8bn project) on 14 January 2013, a year into the project.34 However, the National Highway Authority of India chairman, R. P. Singh, immediately countered this, saying: “The notices of GMR Infra and GVKPIL are untenable and their claims for terminating their contracts are incorrect. They can’t renege from the contracts… The reality is that both companies had highly leveraged balance sheets and were unable to raise equity which was proving to be a stumbling block in getting a financial closure for the two respective projects”;35

commissioning later in 2013 – more than three decades in planning and construction36 and over two years behind the July 2011 schedule and double the 2006/07 Rs2,069 crore (US$380m) budget.37 Commissioning is being delayed while GVKPIL seeks a Supreme Court judgement relating to a request to relocate a historic religious temple;38

station – 10% over budget and has been undergoing construction for eight years and commissioning scheduled for early 2014;39

in 2008 – and was initially flagged for planning completion in 2010,40 its Rs26bn cost is 35% over the initial planned budget, with the 2011/12 annual report suggesting it is still in the government approvals stage and completion possibly by 2015;41 and

GVKPIL a ‘caution notice’ in January 2012 for failing to develop coal deposits it has been allocated, with the threat of cancellation. The Central Bureau of Investigation is inquiring into allocation irregularities.42

GVKPIL has rapidly expanded into airports… overpaying and committing to massive capital upgrades

Since its 2006 initial public offering (IPO), GVKPIL has undertaken a series of greenfield expansion programs. GVKPIL has been similarly expanding its equity shareholding in a range of new businesses at the same time.

One recent move was the 2011 decision to acquire the 14% stake in Bangalore International Airport (BIAL) that was put up for sale by Siemens, paying Rs614 crore (US$114m) under a right of first refusal.43 This took GVKPIL to a 43% ownership position in BIAL.

GVK Power & Infrastructure – Company Performance

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GVKPIL publically expressed the view that this holding “was offering only Rs60 per share as it felt that the (high) 2009 valuations were no longer valid due to change in business conditions”,44 but ended up paying Rs114 per share for the extra 14% stake, a 90% premium to what GVKPIL said it was worth.

Managing Director of BIAL, Sanjay Reddy, was quoted at the time as saying: “BIAL is an important and strategic asset for us and when Siemens had an offer of Rs114 per share, we had no choice but to exercise that right [of first refusal].” 45 This US$114m incremental acquisition was both a massive premium and served to further leverage GVKPIL’s already distressed balance sheet, particularly in light of GVKPIL’s intent to invest Rs4,000-5,000 crore (US$740-925m) to expand BIAL (see Section 7.)

Further, in October 2011, GVKPIL acquired another 13.5% stake in the Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL) at a cost of US$231m, raising its holding to 50.5%.46

In November 2010, India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests approved construction of the Rs150bn (US$2.7bn) Navi Mumbai airport to help ease congestion at the main Mumbai Airport. According to Bloomberg, the Government had set a goal to complete the first phase of the new airfield by 2014, but land acquisition delays have stalled the work.47

Figure 8 GVK Power & Infrastructure – Structure

GVK Power & Infrastructure – Company Performance

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Airports

MumbaiInternationalAirport(MIAL)ϱϬϱй

BangaloreInternationalAirport(BIAL)ϰϯϬй

MOUͲ2greenfieldAirports(Indonesia)ϱϬϬй

Expressways

GVKJaipurExpressway(A90kmexpresswayMumbaitoNewDelhi)

ShivpuriDewasExpressway;ϯϯϮŬŵƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶͿ

GVKDeoliKotaExpressway;ϴϯŬŵƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶͿ

GVKBagodaraVasadExpressway;ϭϬϭŬŵƵŶĚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶͿ

Resources

GVKCoal(Qld)ϭϬйΎ ;ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůͿΎtŝƚŚĂŶŽƉƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŽϰϵйƐƚĂŬĞ

GVKCoalͲTokisudCo.ϳϯϵй ;ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐŽĂůŵŝŶĞŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂϱϮŵƚƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐͿ

SeregarhaMinesLtdϯϲϰй ;ϮƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚĐŽĂůŵŝŶĞƐŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂϭϭϵŵƚƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐͿ

GVKEnergyϳϯϵй

GVKGautamiPowerϲϯϲй ;ϰϲϰDt'ĂƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚLJͿ

;ƐŽϳϯϵйŽĨϲϯϲйсϰϳϬйͿ

GVKIndustriesͲJegurupadu;/ϮϭϲDtĂŶĚ//ϮϮϬDt'ĂƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚLJͿ

GVKIndustriesͲJegurupadu;///ϴϬϬDt'ĂƐĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚLJͿ

AlaknandaHydroPower;ϯϯϬDtŚLJĚƌŽƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚͿ

Εϴϰй GVKRatleHydroPower;ϴϱϬDtŚLJĚƌŽƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉŽƐƚϮϬϭϱͿ

GorigangaHydroPowerΕϴϴй ;ϯϳϬ DtƌƵŶŽĨƌŝǀĞƌŚLJĚƌŽƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚͿ

GVKPowerͲGoindwalSahib;ϱϰϬDtĐŽĂůƉŽǁĞƌƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚͿ

GVKPowerͲKhadurSahib;ϮΎϲϲϬDtĐŽĂůƉŽǁĞƌƉůĂŶƚDKhͿ

GVKOil&Gas

OffshoreOil&Gasdrillingpermits;ŝŶĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ,WͿ

OkhamandiPort,India;DKhǁŝƚŚ'ŽǀƚŽĨ'ƵũĂƌĂƚƚŽďƵŝůĚŐƌĞĞŶĨŝĞůĚƉŽƌƚͿ

GVKPerambalurSEZ;DKhǁŝƚŚd/KƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂϯϭϴϰĂĐƌĞ^Ϳ

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Section 7

Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage

The massive scale, speed and scope of GVKPIL’s expansion has put the company in a highly leveraged position, raising serious alarm bells about the prudence and viability of GVK‘s commitment to raise the US$10bn capital cost of the Alpha Coal, Rail and Terminal Project. With a market capitalisation of only US$243m, GVKPIL has a net debt of US$2.8bn. As a result, it will be increasingly difficult for GVK Coal to raise the finance for the Alpha Coal Project. Aurizon will need to convince itself and its bankers that any take-or-pay contract with GVK Coal is practically enforceable and backed by a vehicle with sufficient equity capital. The Reserve Bank of India may suggest otherwise.

GVKPIL… overcommitted to 16 greenfield projects concurrently

“Committed investments of over US$20bn globally with a pipeline of US$6.6bn in India and US$10bn of investment plans in Australia.” 48

The magnitude of GVK’s US$20bn pipeline of 16 greenfield projects currently under development can only be described as ambitious. However, the underlying assets of GVKPIL now produce a market capitalisation of only US$243m.49 This level of financial leverage is unlikely to be acceptable in a post 2008 debt crisis marketplace – refer Figure 9.

Figure 9 GVK Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage

GVKPIL… significant operational cash flows still some way off

GVKPIL references “Cumulative capacity of 6,000 MW”,50 leaving it to a footnote to clarify that this 6,000 MW includes capacity that is operational, under construction and in the development stage. The corporate presentations provide pictures of gas, coal and hydro electric power plants, plus coal mines and offshore oil production platforms apparently in operation. Only 914 MW of this stated capacity are revenue producing assets. The majority of these assets have been operating well below design capacity for much of the last five years due to the inability of GVKPIL to access sufficient natural gas.51

Debt to equity ratio… excessive even at the reported level

GVKPIL has an estimated net debt of Rs151bn52 (US$2.8bn) as of March 2013, up Rs28bn (US$500m) from March 2012. Relative to a current ordinary equity capitalisation of Rs13bn (US$243m), this is a net debt to equity ratio of 1,149% (see Figure 10). With financial market forecasts suggesting a further Rs32bn (US$585m) of capital expenditures in 2013/14, this extreme level of gearing is forecast to materially increase again in the next financial year.

The use of current equity market capitalisation makes this net gearing calculation look worse than would be the case if we used the last reported book value of equity (at Rs31bn (US$582m)).53 However, GVKPIL shares are currently trading at only half book value, and have consistently traded at around a 58% discount to book value over the last year. We view the Rs21bn (US$390m) of intangibles included on the balance sheet as likely to prove hard to realise in any financially distressed sale of assets. As such, we consider the share price a better reflection of current equity value than book value suggests.US$m

CurrentGVKPILmarketcapitalisation $243

PurchasepriceofGVKCoal $1,260

Netdebtonbalancesheet $2,797

TotalcapexcostofAlphaproject $10,000

$0

$2,000

$4,000

$6,000

$8,000

$10,000

$12,000

h^Ψŵ

CurrentGVKPILmarket

capitalisation

$243

PurchasepriceofGVKCoal $1,260

Netdebtonbalancesheet $2,797

TotalcapexcostofAlphaproject

$10,000

1

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122

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Figure 10 GVK Power & Infrastructure – On-Balance Sheet Financial Leverage

As at 31 March IR Lakhs 2010 Act.

IR Lakhs 2011 Act.

IR Lakhs 2012 Act.

IR Lakhs 2013 Act.

US$m 2011 Act.

US$m 2012 Act.

US$m 2013 Act.

Long term debts 444,548 421,133 1,109,444 1,502,360 779 2,052 2,779

Short term debts 0 114,849 279,010 206,160 212 516 381

Other ST debts (classified as other) 161 21,704 40,790 40,790 40 75 75

Defined benefits liability 184 296 817 817 1 2 2

Less Cash and bank balances -5,081 -32,820 -172,626 -208,016 -61 -319 -385

Short term loans and advances -7,736 -3,550 -21,022 -30,403 -7 -39 -56

Net Debt 432,076 521,612 1,236,413 1,511,708 965 2,287 2,797

Exchange rate – INR : USD 54.05

Market cap. of ordinary equity @ 8.33 131,531 243

Ordinary shareholders funds

(BV)315,597 338,678 348,137 314,531 627 644 582

Minority Interests 25,000 115,336 311,678 331,884 213 577

Net Debt to Book Value of Equity 137% 154% 355% 481% 154% 355% 481%

Net Debt to Market Capitalisation 1149% 1149%

Source: GVKPI annual reports

Minority Interests of Rs15bn… with a put option

GVKPIL’s net debt to market value of equity referred to above at 1,149% is before consideration of a Rs15bn (US$278m) financial transaction undertaken over 2010/11 and 2011/12 that would have significant financial consequences for GVKPIL if the associated five year 20% pa IRR put option were to be effected.

The transaction was initiated in November 2010 between GVKPIL and three private equity firms: 3i India Infrastructure Fund; Actis Infrastructure India PCC Limited; and an affiliate of the Government of Singapore Investment Corp. GVKPIL has received a cash injection against a book value of Rs15bn (US$278m) of “minority equity”.54 The private equity firms are entitled to a 25% equity share of GVK Energy Limited55 and its subsidiaries. At face value, this looks like a prudent equity raising to diminish GVKPIL’s financial leverage.

However, a reference in the back of the 2010/11 annual report56

details that the private equity firms hold a put option that if exercisable would require GVKPIL to repay the entire Rs15bn plus a compound 20% interest for five years i.e. Rs37bn (US$691m).

Under the terms of the transaction, GVKPIL has committed to float the GVK Energy group via a qualified initial public offering (QIPO) within five years of the transaction. Failure to do a QIPO would entitle the private equity investors to then exercise their put – that is, they would be entitled to have their original cash injection returned in addition to interest of 20% pa for the five years. In GVKPIL’s currently leveraged financial position and negative free cashflow, the exercise of this put would make GVKPIL unsustainable in its current form.

Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage

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GVK Coal… a US$1.26bn transaction, almost entirely off-balance sheet, for now

The financial reports for GVKPIL understate the financial leverage resulting from the GVK Group’s US$1.26bn purchase of a controlling shareholding in GVK Coal. GVK created GVK Coal Developers (Singapore) Pte Limited, which in turn set up a loan agreement for US$1.035bn with Axis Bank Ltd of India (Singapore)57 to fund the purchase of a majority stake in Hancock Coal. Given GVKPIL only holds a paid-up equity stake of 10% in GVK Coal Developers (Singapore), the financial accounts of this publicly listed entity do not include any of this off-balance sheet debt, for now.

GVK Coal… huge loans, minimal equity

GVK Coal has an ordinary equity base of 500,000 shares fully paid-up to U$1 per share i.e. US$0.5m, with GVKPIL holding a 10% stake worth US$50,000.58 However, the accounts clearly state that GVKPIL holds “an option to increase its stake up to 49%.” 59

The accounts also state “The Company has given an undertaking to infuse equity aggregating to Rs229,590 Lakhs in GVK Coal Developers (Singapore)…” 60 This represents Rs23bn or US$425m at current exchange rates (Rs54.05 per US$). The nature of this callable equity undertaking suggests the 49% is truer reflection of GVKPIL’s economic exposure to GVK Coal than the 10% figure used. A guarantee from GVKPIL for 49% of the outstanding facility amount includes the pledge of the shares of its subsidiaries GVK Energy Limited and GVK Transportation Limited to secure the equity requirements of the debt service.

Were GVKPIL to provide a more transparent accounting of its holdings and associated liabilities it would account for the total nature of its financial relationship with GVK Coal. GVKPIL could be required to use equity consolidation to include GVK Coal more fully in its reports, bringing on balance sheet its associated 49% share of US$1bn plus of borrowings and amounts outstanding, an amount that will be growing daily given the US$10bn capex program underway.

The GVKPIL annual report details that a substantial number of GVKPIL subsidiaries’ shareholdings have been pledged as collateral for loans outstanding to GVK Coal. Again, this clearly gives the financial effect that GVKPIL is carrying a substantial economic exposure and financial risk relating to GVK Coal. This is well beyond the current financial resources of the listed company as it is currently configured, and contrary to GVK Coal’s current presentation in GVKPIL’s accounts.

Thin Capitalisation Rules… Changes in the 2013 Australian Budget

One of the many ways large foreign investors limit their liability for Australian tax is to create an onshore legal structure with as little equity and as much debt as the banks will allow. Generally secured against hard assets like a mining project to keep the banks happy, the result is a large tax deductable interest expense at Australian taxpayers’ expense.

As noted above, GVKPIL’s last annual report states GVK Coal had a paid up ordinary equity base of US$0.5m. Against this, there are lines of debt in excess of US$1bn. The Australian Government has put forward changes to the thin capitalisation rules to reduce foreign firms’ ability to exploit this loophole by capping the tax deductibility of interest for such structures. In a briefing note on the change, the international corporate law firm Allens stated that “Therefore, for income years commencing on or after 1 July 2014, interest deductions will be denied to the extent that the interest-bearing debt of foreign-controlled entities… exceeds the new safe harbour limits.” 61

GVK’s effective after-tax cost of debt will increase materially, potentially requiring GVK and GVKPIL to increase equity funding to pay down some of this off-balance sheet debt.

Sale of assets… pressure to sell not evident, yet

GVKPIL’s Chief Financial Officer, Issac George, has suggested the group is looking at asset sales to address excessive gearing, stating: “As a standard policy, we will offload stake in our subsidiaries to raise equity and reduce debt as and when the opportunity comes up.” 62 Since the firm’s IPO in 2006, with the exception of the proposed deal with Aurizon (see Section 7), GVKPIL has been constantly acquisitive. The company’s actions to-date do not suggest the critical nature of the financial distress has been acknowledged to any material extent.

In May 2013 Paul Mulder, Managing Director of GVK Coal, was quoted as saying that GVK was in discussions with potential buyers to sell a stake in the Alpha mine.63

Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage

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Net interest expense... Not covered by EBIT

Another perspective on financial leverage is provided by a review of net interest expense and how that sits relative to the EBIT. GVKPIL’s interest expense in the year to March 2013 rose an estimated 56% year-on-year to Rs6.7bn (US$125m). By comparison, EBIT in the same period was Rs2.9bn (US$54m) – insufficient to cover the reported interest expense.

GVKPIL capitalises a significant amount of interest expense against assets yet to be commissioned. This is a standard and accepted accounting practice meaning that recognition of the interest expense in the financial statements can be deferred,

Figure 11 GVK Power & Infrastructure – On-Balance Sheet Net Interest Ratios

As at 31 March IR Lakhs 2010 Act.

IR Lakhs 2011 Act.

IR Lakhs 2012 Act.

IR Lakhs 2013 Act.

US$m 2011 Act.

US$m 2012 Act.

US$m 2013 Act.

Finance costs 21,710 26,314 46,727 70,793 49 86 131

Less: Interest income -677 -984 -3,462 -3,462 -2 -6 -6

Net Interest Expensed 21,033 25,330 43,265 67,331 47 80 125

Plus Interest capitalised on capex 82,143 20,087 54,685 54,685 37 101 101

Total Net interest 103,176 45,417 97,950 122,016 84 181 226

Net interest paid (as per cashflow statement) 19,913 44,332 97,393 n.a. 82 180 n.a.

EBIT 35,173 35,021 43,510 29,391 65 80 54

EBIT / Net Interest 167% 138% 101% 44% 138% 101% 44%

EBIT / Cash net Interest 177% 79% 45% 24% 79% 45% n.a.

Net interest expense – increase yoy 20% 71% 56%

Assumption - FY2013 capitlised interest and interest income equals FY2012 rate

Source: GVKP&I annual reports

GVKPIL’s high leverage makes it non-compliant with RBI rules

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has deemed GVKPIL a Systematically Important Core Investment Company (SI-CIC), a designation brought into effect on 5 January 2011. Companies designated as such are required to apply for registration with RBI within six months. GVKPIL has applied for such registration, but according to the company’s last two annual reports, is not in compliance with the requirements of the designation due to excessive financial leverage.64 The RBI guidelines do not detail the implications for such non-compliance.

Power & Infrastructure – Financial Leverage

but the magnitude of interest being capitalised is reflective of the excessive rate of expansion relative to current cashflows. In 2011/12, capitalised interest was Rs5.4bn (US$101m), in addition to the Rs4.3bn (US$80m) net interest expense. This means that GVKPIL’s net cash interest paid to banks was Rs9.7bn (US$180m) last financial year, double the reported net interest expense.

Figure 11 details GVKPIL’s net interest expense for FY2010/11 and FY2011/12. For FY2012/13, we have made an estimate using the preliminary financial results released 17 May 2013. We have provided a US dollar equivalent using the current rate of Rs54 to US$1 for ease of reference.

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Section 8

GVK Coal and Aurizon (a White Knight?)

GVKPIL’s high levels of debt, combined with the delays and complexities of the US$10bn Alpha Coal Project mean that they are seeking a ‘white knight’ investor to underwrite the financial viability of the project. Australian rail operator, Aurizon, is in negotiations with GVK over the construction of a single-purpose thermal coal export rail and port facility at a cost of US$6bn to be fully operational towards 2020 and with a life of 50-plus years. Given general market trends this project runs the risk of becoming a stranded legacy asset.

Aurizon and GVKPIL… a non binding term sheet

On 11 March 2013 GVK Coal and Aurizon Holdings jointly announced they have signed a “non binding term sheet to jointly progress the development of rail and port infrastructure to unlock Galilee Basin coal reserves”.65

Under the proposed framework, Aurizon would acquire a majority (51%) interest in Hancock Coal Infrastructure P/L, which owns GVK Coal’s potential 60Mtpa rail and port projects at a construction cost in the order of US$6bn.

This transaction is non-binding to both parties: “Completion of the proposed transaction, including the (still unquantified) upfront consideration from Aurizon, would be subject to the satisfaction of a number of conditions including satisfactory due diligence, final Board approvals, third party approvals (some of which are outside of the control of the parties) and negotiation of final terms and definitive documentation.” 66

The rail project location is yet to be determined, with two alternatives:

A. A direct greenfield standard gauge 495km line across a number of floodplains as originally envisaged by Hancock Prospecting (independent of and not connecting to the existing Queensland narrow gauge rail system). This option has received EPBC approval and is one of the rail corridors for the Galilee Basin defined by the Queensland Government;67 or

B. A combination greenfield/brownfield narrow gauge line named “Central Queensland Integrated Rail Project”. This would be integrated into Aurizon’s existing system that already facilitates the rail shipment of the coal produced in the Bowen Basin.

To appreciate the size of this rail project, Option A involves a 60Mtpa greenfields railway line. This 495km railway would require 20 major bridges and 127km of culverts.68 Phase II of the project plans to double this to 120Mtpa, envisioning the development of other GVK Coal and possibly the Waratah Coal and/or South Galilee Coal Project. Each train would carry 25,000 tonnes of coal on 240 wagons with a train length of 4 km pulled by three 4,400 hp locomotives travelling at a fully loaded average speed of 50km/hour.69

Apart from thermal coal from the Galilee Basin, there is no other commodity that this rail line or the proposed T3 export terminal at Abbot Point would service. In light of the coal market trends outlined in section 10, this increases the risk that the investment may become a stranded asset. Aurizon’s latest presentation suggests it is heavily pushing for a more progressive brownfields/greenfields version based around Option B. Aurizon states “Expanding the brownfield Central Queensland Coal Network is a commercially sensible solution”.70

Aurizon… to vertically integrate into ports?

Should Aurizon move forward with this proposal, it means a move outside its core competency of rail freight into a totally new field of port ownership and operation. Additionally, we note that Abbot Point port has handled 10-12Mtpa of coal exports over the last decade. To step up to the 200Mtpa being reviewed currently is a 2,000% expansion – a move involving considerable risk of delay, cost blow-outs and/or difficulties.

The port facility at Abbot Point (25km north of Bowen) is in the middle of its second major transformation, changing the port dramatically. For the last decade it was a small Queensland Government-owned port exporting 10-12Mtpa of coal. In 2011 the 3km long existing terminal (T1) completed a major expansion of its rated capacity to 50Mtpa (refer Figure 12). However, to-date it is still only operating at half its rated capacity (see Figure 13). In support of this expansion, Aurizon completed the A$1.1bn Goonyella to Abbot Point Expansion (GAPE) rail project in December 2011.

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Figure 12 Abbot Point Port with the Existing T1 Rail and Coal Loading Facilities 71

Figure 13 Abbot Point – Coal Exports by financial year

Adani Enterprises (of India) acquired a 99 year lease over the existing 50Mtpa Abbot Point coal terminal in April 2011 from the Queensland Government for A$1.8bn.72

The Abbot Point port has proposals underway to more than quadruple coal export capacity in a move from one to potentially four terminals. Having acquired a long-term lease on the existing port, Adani Abbot Point Terminal is planning to add a second terminal (T0) adjacent to T1 to the South, with a proposed capacity of 70Mtpa as part of its own plans to open up part of the Galilee Coal Basin via its Carmichael Project. To the immediate north, BHP Billiton has paused but not withdrawn plans to develop T2, a 60Mtpa coal facility. Alongside this is GVK Coal’s proposal for T3, a fourth facility with 60Mtpa rated capacity. All proponents seeking to build this mega-billion dollar complex “recognise the sensitivity of the marine environment of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area” (GBRWHA).73

The Australian Government has come under heavy criticism from the UN’s World Heritage Committee for allowing continued coastal development in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, including, most recently, the conclusion that “some of the actions of the State Party [Australia] appear inconsistent with the requests made by the World Heritage Committee”.74

The T3 port expansion and coal storage facility will lie directly adjacent to the 5,154 hectare Caley Valley Wetland and the assorted threatened bird, reptile, mammal and flora species, including a nationally significant population of a species listed as endangered under the EPBC Act. The rail loop for the Alpha coal project and T3 coal terminal would develop and enclose part of this wetland.

Source: North Queensland Bulk Ports

GVK Coal and Aurizon (a White Knight?)

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Section 9

Project Risks

Greenfields are risky. Greenfields do have capital over-runs. Greenfields do have delays that kill the NPV on those projects... They may be good projects afterwards and they do generate good cash because they are lowest quartile in the area, but returns for the original investors (are) not so pretty.

Glencore CEO Ivan Glasenberg, April 2013 75

GVK Coal faces a significant number of risks in bringing to fruition what would prove to be the largest black coal mine in Australia’s history. The ability of resource firms to deliver major capital projects on time and on original budget is highly questionable and evidence to-date would suggest GVK Coal is no different. Full production before 2018 is unlikely. GVK Coal’s US$55/t cash cost estimate is outdated in our view. Power and water infrastructure is critical but not expected any time soon. Any outsourcing of the rail and port infrastructure projects to the Aurizon joint venture (JV) is likely to see the Alpha Project cash cost rise to at least US$70/t, more in line with Australia thermal coal averages and far above the price which has formed the basis of the project’s public disclosures.

Probably the largest risk for GVK Coal is the ability to finance this US$10bn project, given the heavily constrained financial position of GVKPIL (as discussed in Section 6). We address a selection of other project risks below, particularly in relation to:

1. project timing.

2. capital costs; and

3. operating costs.

GVK has set an aggressive timetable, with GVKPIL Vice Chairman Sanjay Reddy in March 2013 stating “I expect construction on the projects to commence by FY-end.” (This implied the project would start by March 2014.) Asked when GVK Coal would start yielding coal to GVKPIL’s Indian coal-fired power plant, Reddy continued “Yes, it is a three year construction period. We expect that before the end of this year, we should start construction.” 76 However, in September 2011 GVK stated “First coal production is expected in 2014.” 77 So two years on GVK Coal is three years behind schedule. And we note that a recent Right to Information release by

Queensland Treasury suggests first coal exports are only expected in 2019 at 1.6Mt, rising slowly to 15Mt by 2022, this suggests another three years delay ahead.78

Given the size of this project and the associated rail and port infrastructure project requirements, plus outstanding environmental, regulatory and legal issues yet to be resolved, there is a high probability of delays to GVK Coal’s plan is to start construction at the beginning of 2014. These delays suggest that a meaningful volume of coal exports is unlikely until 2018 at the very earliest.

With interest expenses of some US$5m per month this year, rising to some US$10m per month next year and rising with every step forward, the cash drain of the upfront US$1.26bn purchase plus the US$10bn of (currently unfunded) capex will really stack the odds against this project seeing a profitable outcome for shareholders.

In addition to the expected delays, there is also a high risk of capital cost over-runs, combined with the likely underestimation of operating costs for the mine. GVK estimates the production costs for the Alpha mine to be in the order of $55 per tonne, well below the industry average. However our analysis, based on standard industry factors indicates that the production costs are likely to be in the order of $70 per tonne. Mounting interest expenses will create an additional burden.

Timing is likely to be optimistic… expect delays

Building a $10b integrated mine, rail and port project would be challenging for even the most experienced operator. However, there are a number of environmental factors that combine to amplify the risks of prolonged delays for GVK’s Alpha Coal Project.

While concerns have been raised over the likely water impacts of the mine and rail line, as well as flooding risks, perhaps the most significant environmental risks relate to GVK’s proposed T3 coal export terminal which is located within the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area.

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The T3 port expansion and coal storage facility will lie directly adjacent to the 5,154 hectare Caley Valley Wetland and the assorted threatened bird, reptile, mammal and flora species, including a nationally significant population of a species listed as endangered under the Federal Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC) Act. The rail loop for the Alpha Coal Project and T3 coal terminal would develop and enclose part of this wetland.

The Federal Environment Department is currently investigating allegations of ‘false and misleading conduct’ by GVK’s “Hancock Coal Pty Ltd” following the release of documents obtained under Freedom of Information by Greenpeace. The investigation centres on the alleged omission of important ecological data relating to bird surveys of the Caley Valley Wetland from the environmental assessment submitted by the company.79 At the time of writing, this investigation was still underway.

In addition to this investigation, the granting of an environmental authority of the Alpha Coal Project (mine and rail) is being challenged by a number of environmental groups and landowners in the Queensland Land and Environment Court.80 The court hearing is set for September with a ruling not due for several months afterwards.

Power infrastructure is not in place – further costs and risk of delay

GVK Coal is most likely to source electricity via a purpose built 160-200km high voltage greenfields power line linked up to the Lilyvale Substation 81 (see Figure 14). This again adds to the challenges and cost of establishing this greenfield project, particularly given that Powerlink Queensland is not planning to finish construction of the transmission line until 2016/17 82 (see Figure 15).

Figure 14 Proposed Powerlink Galilee Basin Transmission Line Project

Figure 15 Proposed Powerlink Galilee Basin Timeline

Lack of water infrastructure… further costs and risk of delay

The Alpha Coal mine would be expected to consume more than 8,000m litres of water per annum at peak production.83 Together with Kevin’s Corner, the two mines would be expected to consume over 11,000m litres per annum at peak.84

The original plan for mine water was based on SunWater’s proposed A$1.2-2.0bn Connors River Dam and Pipeline project, but in July 2012 SunWater announced it had decided not to proceed with this work: “A number of changes to our customers’ project timeframes and investment horizons have resulted in an incompatibility of timing for customer financial commitments to the project priorities.” 85 GVK Coal was the key proposed customer, proposing to take a significant portion of the pipeline’s capacity.

Following the cancellation of the Connors River Dam and Pipeline, GVK Coal has proposed to source water for the mine and associated coal washing and coal dust suppression systems via a purpose built 220km water pipeline from the Fairbairn Dam.86 However, we understand this proposed pipeline (to be developed by the Queensland Government owned SunWater) is not yet in the public planning system, suggesting construction of this key infrastructure is some way off.

Capital costs… likely to be significantly under-estimated

The history of large resource projects is littered with significant cost overruns relative to the original feasibility budget. Figure 16 takes a small sample of major mining projects from the last decade, with average 20-30% capital cost blowouts. Given in excess of US$100bn of investments in liquid natural gas export terminals currently underway in Queensland, the scope to add another US$10bn of capital expenditure for the GVK Coal project would add upward price pressure on an already tight regional construction market. Rio Tinto and Hancock Prospecting recently lifted their estimate of their Hope Downs 4 iron ore project in Western Australia by 30% to US$2.1bn, in part due to the strength of the Australian dollar.87

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Figure 16 Recent Major Mining Project CAPEX Overruns

Project Country Company Feasibility budget cost Actual / forecast cost overrun

Ravensthorpe/Yabilu expansion Australia BHP Billiton A$1.40 bn 30%

Spence Chile BHP Billiton US$0.99 bn 10%

Telfer Mine Australia Newcrest A$1.19 bn 18%

Stanwell Magnesium Australia AMC A$1.30 bn 30%

Boddington Australia Newmont A$0.87 bn 100%

Goro Project Indonesia Inco US$1.45 bn 15%

Prominent Hill Australia Oxiana A$0.35 bn 51%

Source: D.J.Noort and C.Adams 2006

The Australian Coal Association (ACA) has also warned that the thermal coal industry in Australia is not competitive in the global context for new mines, in May 2013 citing “a recent study by Port Jackson Partners, capital costs for Australian thermal coal projects are 66% above the global average… Energy and transportation costs are also much higher in Australia than in competitor countries.” 88

The ACA cites Port Jackson Partners as saying the cost of building a new thermal coal mine in Australia in 2012 has risen to US$176/t of capacity 89 (more than double the 2007 cost of US$61/t of capacity) – Figure 17. This suggests the 32Mtpa Alpha mine alone will have a capital cost approaching US$5.6bn, before the rail, water and port infrastructure capital cost is added. This compares to the A$3.4bn cited in the May 2012 Queensland Coordinator-General’s report.

Figure 17 Capital Spend to Build a Tonne of New Capacity

Source: Australian Coal Association, May 2013 – referencing Port Jackson Partners September 2012 page 26 “Opportunity at Risk”

Remote operation of the mine… new and largely untested

GVK Coal, having never operated a coal mine, proposes to build the biggest black thermal coal mine in Australian history. While this is a massive challenge in itself, GVK faces several other technical challenges including its requirement to operate the mine remotely, as cited in Ausenco’s Case Study on the Alpha Coal Project:90

“The Owner requires to operate this plant from a remote operations centre several hundred kilometres away from the site, which introduces some unique challenges in automation and the application of cutting edge technologies.”

Building a mine in an area prone to flooding… risking a repeat of Ensham?

Ausenco’s Alpha Case Study goes on to say the project has another key challenge:

“The plant site is located in an area where black soils present unique construction challenges and a degree of seasonal variability in access conditions to work areas. January 2011 saw the minesite and surrounding areas isolated by floodwaters.”

Black soils are highlighted due to their high clay content making unsealed roads impassable after even light rain, making weather interruptions to work progress inevitable and unpredictable.

We are reminded that in January 2008, the Ensham mine in central Queensland was inundated by floodwaters which filled two of its six coal pits with more than 100,000 megalitres of water due to underestimation of flood risks. Damage was estimated at $300m,91 ignoring the uncalculated cost of all the coal pollutants that were washed into the Queensland water system.

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Figure 18 Ensham Coal Mine 2008

Figure 19 Ensham Coal Mine 2008

Coal production costs… likely to be materially underestimated

The financial viability of any project to open up the Galilee Basin to coal mining for export has been long debated. Most recently, commentators observed, “The (Galilee) basin holds vast quantities of thermal coal but analysts estimate the economics do not stack up with thermal coal prices needing to rise above US$120 a tonne (to make any project viable).” 92

The managing editor of Platts International Coal Report, James O’Connell, was quoted by Forbes India as saying Australian thermal coal production costs are about US$70/t.93

Figure 20 provides the current cost curve for Australian thermal coal producers and indicates a median cash cost of US$80/t.94 Morgan Stanley suggests the cost curve has increased from an average of US$70/t to US$80/t over the last twelve months,

Project Risks

leaving cash costs not far short of the current US$88/t spot price. This would suggest that the US$55/t cash cost estimate published by GVK Coal in February 201395 could be optimistic and require updating given the significant resource sector cost inflation over the last few years.

Figure 20 Australian Thermal Coal Mines Cash Cost vs Spot (US$/t)

Source: Wood Mackenzie, Morgan Stanley Research

Freight costs… double the distance of the Queensland average

Aurizon publishes its Queensland Coal Rail divisional sales and volumes – as per Figure 21. We estimate Aurizon will generate an average A4.3c/km per tonne of coal transported in FY2013 and its average coal shipment is 224km. By comparison, the Galilee Basin is 495 km from Abbott Point using the more direct route, more than double the average for Queensland. Assuming the economies of scale will more than offset the higher capital costs of the greenfields nature of this potential new contract, we have allowed a 10% discount for scale, giving A3.9c/km/t over 495km gives cash cost of A$19.30/t for the transportation of coal from the Alpha mine to the port at Abbot Point.

From Aurizon’s perspective, GVK’s 32Mtpa would generate annual revenues of A$618m. At Aurizon Coal Rail’s current EBIT margins of 14%, this would equate to A$86m EBIT, generating a 4% pre-tax return on an estimated A$2bn investment (under rail Option B). Aurizon would be counting on additional coal tonnage from other mines in the Galilee (refer Figures 4 & 5) and scope to lift its EBIT margins closer to Tier 1 US rail freight levels of 20% in order to ensure an adequate return on investment.

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Figure 21 Rail Costs per Tonne (A$/t)

Aurizon - Coal FY2011 Est. FY2012 Est. FY2013 Est.

Tonnage (million) 181.6 185.6 194.0

ntk (billion) 40.9 41.9 43.4

Revenue ($m) 1,691 1,828 1,880

Km / tonne 225 226 224

Revenue (per ntk) $0.041 $0.044 $0.043

Alpha to Abbott Point 495

Rail cost per tonne (A$) $21.44

Rail cost – assuming a 10% discount (A$/t) $19.30

ntk - revenue per net tonne km Source: Aurizon annual report 2012, own estimates

When GVK Coal stated its target cash cost of production was US$55/t, we assume this reflects the rail and port costs being carried on internally 100% owned facilities, i.e. mostly of a capital nature, with limited cash operating costs. Outsourcing the rail and port operation to an Aurizon-led joint venture could take GVK Coal’s estimate of US$55/t up to US$70-80/t and in line with average Australian thermal coal cash costs. With the Aurizon JV, the Alpha mine would bear the full A$19/t in cash costs of rail plus an estimated A$5/t in port charges.

Taxes on coal… inevitably will continue to increase

In his February 2013 budget speech the Indian Finance Minister, Palaniappan Chidambaram, stated that the “Overseas purchases of steam and bituminous coal, both used by power producers, will attract a customs duty and a countervailing duty of 2% each.” 96 While only small, this is the second increase in this import tax in the last few years. In our view, this tax will continue to increase as a source of funding for the rollout of renewable energy and upgraded transmission grid infrastructure in India, plus as a means to combat the significant health effects of coal-fired power station and coal dust pollution.

Taxes are increasingly being levied both by the importing nations, and those allowing the mining and export of coal. In Australia, over the longer term GVK Coal will be subject to the Mining Rent Resources Tax, introduced 1 July 2011, unless it is repealed following a change of Government.

However, the much more significant tax imposed is the Queensland Government royalty on coal, which is currently set at a rate 7% of coal revenue up to A$100/t. But from 1 October 2012, beyond A$100/t the rate was increased from a flat 10% to the new rate of 12.5% and then 15% of

incremental revenue, not profits 97 (see Figure 22). This royalty is possibly the third largest cash cost component of production behind labour and rail freight.

Figure 22 Queensland Government Coal Royalties

Coal price range % royalty

A$0-100/t 7.0%

A$100-150/t 12.5%

>A$150/t 15.0%

China has a surcharge applied to all electricity usage, with all the proceeds used to fund the rollout of renewable energy infrastructure. Created under the China Renewable Energy Law in 2006,98 this surcharge was doubled in December 2011 from Rmb0.004/kWh to Rmb0.008/kWh, creating a fund flow we estimate at Rmb43bn (US$7bn) annually by 2013. We understand China is expecting again “to double the current renewable energy surcharge levied on all consumers in 2015 to Rmb0.016” 99 We estimate this would generate US$16bn pa.

An import tax on coal, and/or a carbon tax is also likely to be implemented in the next 2-3 years, again as a measure designed to reduce China’s coal consumption and to encourage the development of nuclear, natural gas, renewable generation and energy efficiency (see Section 10).

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China’s National Energy Administration has also released draft regulations proposing to ban the importation of low-quality coal in May 2013. Low quality coal is defined in the proposal as imported coal with a calorific count of less than 4,544kcal/kg, or an ash content more than 25% or sulphur more than 1%.100 This is yet another measure China will use to reduce its reliance on coal and reduce atmospheric pollution.

In May 2013 the National Energy Administration has also proposed a new taxation law that for the first time includes carbon tax into the existing environmental protection taxation system. In addition, the rates of pollutant discharge fees and related taxes have been increased as compared with the ongoing pollution charges.101

Cash cost of production… more like US$70/t than US$55/t

GVK have repeatedly claimed a cash cost of production from the Alpha mine of US$55/t. However, given the factors and costs outlined above, we estimate a cash cost of production of at least US$70/t (see Figure 23), even before the interest costs on this US$1.26bn purchase and U$5bn of mine development capital expenditure is taken into account. Excluding the interest expense generated by the Aurizon JV rail and port infrastructure, the interest costs to GVK Coal could be over US$400m pa by 2018 (US$5bn of capital expenditure on the mine plus US$1.26bn on purchase @ 6-7% cost of borrowings) – on 30Mtpa this is another US$13.56/t cash cost that needs to be covered by the project. For the project to make GVK Coal a commercial return on its capital will require a sustained thermal coal price well in-excess of the current spot rates of US$88/t FOB Newcastle.

Figure 23 US$70/t Estimated Cash Cost of Production – Post-Aurizon JV

Cash cost of production A$/t US$/t % of cash cost % of revenue

Labour & Overheads 11.50 11.15 16% 13%

Water/Electricity/Explosives/Consumables 19.46 18.88 27% 21%

Diesel (assume 1.9L/tonne of ROM coal) 3.81 3.69 5% 4%

Coal preparation 5.00 4.85 7% 6%

Rail costs 19.30 18.72 27% 21%

Port costs 5.15 5.00 7% 6%

Marketing cost (assume 2% of revenue) 1.81 1.76 3% 2%

State Govt. Royalty 6.13 5.95 8% 7%

Cash cost per tonne 72.17 70.00 100%

Interest expense (on $5bn + $1.26bn @ 6.5%) 13.98 13.56

Cash cost including cash interest $86.15 $83.57 95%

Interest expense (on $5bn + $1.26bn @ 6.5%) $90.72 $88.00

Cash cost including cash interest 0.97

We note that the most recent GVK Coal presentation on 2 May 2013 for the first time refers to a ~US$75/t “2019 Australia FOB Cost Curve – Energy Adjusted” for Alpha.102 This presentation is indistinct as to if this assumes the rail and port costs are primarily of a capital or operating cash cost per tonne basis.

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Section 10

Thermal Coal Market Outlook

Investors need to challenge the assumption that coal demand will continue to rise in China and elsewhere, otherwise billions of dollars of taxpayer, superannuation and shareholder funds will be wasted in assets linked to unburnable carbon.103

James Leaton, Research Director, Carbon Tracker, 2013

With global demand for thermal coal lower than previous market expectations and export supply expanding, thermal coal prices are more than 30% below the 2008 peak. The substitution of coal by natural gas and renewable energy is expected to accelerate over the medium term, capping the thermal coal price to levels around the current spot price at best. In particular, we project that China’s total thermal coal consumption will peak by 2018, and progressively decline thereafter, a fundamental trend reversal compared with the last four decades. Renewables will have an increasingly deflationary impact on global energy prices. In the current market a surplus of Australian coal would act to depress Australia’s export terms of trade to the economic benefit of coal importing nations like India and China.

Project cancellations… coming rapidly across the resource sector

There has been a raft of resource project cancellations and deferrals over the last year, reflecting the end of the commodity price boom. Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton, Glencore Xstrata and Woodside have led this process. This was recently highlighted by ANZ Research’s report “Bracing for Change” which stated:

“We have again revised lower the potential pipeline of major projects in Australia to AUD440bn as at March 2013 from… AUD498bn in July 2012. An estimated AUD75bn of mining projects have been removed from the potential investment pipeline over 2013-2016.” 104

Since this report was published, Glencore Xstrata announced the cancellation of a US$1bn 35Mtpa coal export terminal at Balaclava Island, just north of Gladstone in Queensland. “This decision has been made as a result of the poor current market conditions in the Australian coal industry, excess port capacity in Queensland, specific shipping limitations and concerns about the industry’s medium-term outlook.” 105

Macquarie Group recently stated:

“hopes for the Galilee Basin development look increasingly remote. With huge upfront capex to build the >500km rail lines and coal quality which compares poorly to peers, at current ~85-90/t FOB pricing and a flat market outlook project paybacks look extremely poor. Unless conventional economics are ignored due to deep pocket financial backing, further delays to Galilee development look certain.” 106

The Australian Coal Association summarises the current state of the industry in their May budget report:

“The Australian coal industry is experiencing the most difficult operating conditions in ten years, with the suspension of major projects, the closure of mines and some 9,000 jobs shed over the past 12 to 15 months.” 107

China… coal demand should decline post 2017, way earlier than most forecast

China’s future coal consumption will be dramatically impacted by a moderation of economic growth, improved energy efficiency and rapid development of renewable and low carbon energy sources. As the largest coal producing nation (Figure 24) accounting for 45.7% of global coal production and consuming 49% of global coal supply, even small shifts in domestic Chinese demand has the potential to significantly impact the global market.

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Figure 24 Global Coal Production, Largest Producers

Million tonne 1981 1991 2001 2011 Change ‘11 vs ‘01 Share of total 2011

China 622 1,087 1,472 3,520 139% 45.7%

United States 747 904 1,023 993 -3% 12.9%

India 130 240 342 588 72% 7.6%

Indonesia 0 14 93 325 251% 4.2%

Russia n/a 353 270 334 24% 4.3%

Australia 127 218 335 415 24% 5.4%

South Africa 130 178 224 255 14% 3.3%

Germany 493 346 202 189 -7% 2.5%

Rest of World (ROW) 1,587 1,216 959 1,077 12% 14.0%

Total 3,836 4,557 4,918 7,695 69% 100.0%

Source: BP Statistical Review 2012

The rate of coal consumption growth in China is driven by three key factors:

1. The rate of economic growth;

2. The rate of energy efficiency improvement; and

3. The rate of development of alternative energy sources.

Rate of economic growth: Graham Kerr, CFO of BHP Billiton was quoted saying that for China “Their moderated growth is around the 7-8% mark for the next couple of years, then trending down towards the 6% mark.” 108 Even this rate of growth may prove optimistic given the increasing propensity for China’s new leadership team to focus on the quality of growth over quantity. Air pollution and declining coal consumption is a key measure of success in this major economic reform. The years of double digit annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates are history for China, to the sustainable benefit of the nation.

Rate of energy efficiency improvement: China has set a target of 3% pa for energy efficiency improvements – 16% over the 12th Five Year Plan for 2011-2015. This translates into a 17% reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit of GDP).109

The rate of development of alternative energy sources: In the interests of energy security, new industry development, employment growth and increased self-reliance in energy policy, China is developing low-carbon energy alternatives to coal faster than any country in history. We forecast that China will

commission ~6 gigawatts (GW) of nuclear annually over the next five years, plus 18 GW of hydro-electricity, 11-12 GW of solar, 17 GW of on-shore wind, 1-2 GW of offshore wind and 2 GW of biomass/EfW (see Appendix A).

The net result of the interplay of these factors is that China will progressively reduce its reliance on coal (as a percent of total electricity production), an acceleration of the trend evident over the last five years. By 2017, China’s total coal consumption for electricity is likely to peak in absolute terms, and steadily decline thereafter.

United States… reduced domestic coal uses increases export availability

The US is the second largest producer of coal at 12.9% of global production. A combination of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s tightening of its Mercury and Air Toxics Standards110 and the US shale gas boom, improved energy efficiency and renewable energy investments are causing many coal-fired power station proposals to be scrapped. By the end of 2012, the US had a cumulative installed capacity of 60 GW of wind farms (13.4 GW of installs in 2012 alone), plus 7.7 GW of solar capacity (3.2 GW in 2012 alone). This is considered likely to permanently displace domestic demand for coal. Figure 25 shows the weekly US carload shipments of coal, clearly showing the 25% step down in demand between 2011 and 2013 to below 30,000 carloads per week.

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This may help explain why the Indian Government is supportive of GVK Coal, Adani and Reliance’s push to develop Australian coal deposits for export. The more the global supply, the lower the total import costs of thermal coal to India.

Additionally, the continued rapid expansion of coal fired power generation in India is far from certain given conflicts over water availability, land access, fuel constraints, pollution and increasing financial distress in the Indian power sector. The Reserve Bank of India has flagged it will not intervene to bailout defaults on new power sector loans.114 Should current disruptions with respect to coal fired power generation continue, it is increasingly likely India will increasingly bypass coal in favour of developing a distributed solar with storage energy system, backed up by centralised hydro and wind energy generation.

Coal demand falling in Europe… the fossil fuel model is broken – where is next?

Moody’s April 2013 report: “European Utilities: Wind and Solar Power Will Continue to Erode Thermal Generators’ Credit Quality,” encapsulates the change underway in European energy markets:

“Large increases in renewables have had a profound negative impact on power prices and the competitiveness of thermal generation companies in Europe. What were once considered stable companies have seen their business models severely disrupted and we expect steadily rising levels of renewable energy output to further affect European utilities’ creditworthiness.”

The dramatic decline in market value of German fossil fuel utilities over the last five years is in our view a precursor to the transformation of the European Union and then the global electricity sector. With the continued rise of gas and renewable energy generation globally as an increasing substitute to coal fired electricity generation, the outlook for the thermal coal export industry is in our view troubled.

Former Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani once said “the stone age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.” The world is moving beyond the coal age, not because we are running out of coal, but because the market is increasingly turning to cleaner and/or self generated alternatives. At the same time, significant new supply of coal is opening up to the export market, with significant increased supply from the US as the shale gas boom permanently displaces domestic demand for coal. Market forecasts for the outlook for thermal coal prices are increasingly reflecting lower demand combined with higher supply.

Figure 25 US Coal Shipments (Weekly Carloads)

Source: Union Pacific Corp, 18 April 2013

With this fall in domestic demand, US coal producers have intensified their efforts to place more U.S. coal production on the global market. According to the United States Energy Information Administration:

“This increase in exports marks a significant reversal from the general downward trajectory of U.S. coal exports beginning in the early 1990s… Coal exports in 2011 rose 171% from 2002, with only a brief interruption by the global recession. Export growth accelerated after the recession…Current data for 2012 (through August) show coal exports are growing even faster and should more than double 2009 export levels, buoyed by growth in U.S. steam coal.” 111

Arch Coal, a leading U.S. coal producer optimistically estimates that coal export capacity in the United States will double by 2020.112 Industry analysts warn of an oversupply of coal in the seaborne markets going forward.113

India… increasing chance India will bypass coal as it did with fixed line phones

India is an increasingly significant player in the global coal market with 7.6% of total world production in 2011 and 12% of world seaborne trade in thermal coal. Despite having the fifth largest thermal coal reserves at 60bn tonnes, India’s coal is generally of very low calorific value and high ash content making it less efficient and more polluting than other coal. Much of India’s coal reserves are located either under significant population masses or in national parks that are covered by the Wildlife Protection Act (1972), creating environmental permitting difficulties and causing social tension around coal mining development. This is leading to considerable domestic coal supply constraints.

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Deutsche Bank’s May 2013 report provides a market outlook for coal demand, supply and hence thermal coal pricing that reflects these new realities. Titled “Commodities Special Report: Thermal Coal at a Crossroads”, Deutsche forecasts a significant oversupply of thermal coal globally, building progressively through 2020115 (see Figure 26).

Figure 26 Market Balance to 2020, Thermal Coal

Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank

Australian prices… following international trends

Figure 28 details the 10 year Australian thermal coal price chart to April 2013. Prices are reported to be 5% weaker to-date in May 2013, with spot currently at US$88/t.

Figure 28 Australian Thermal Coal Export Price, Newcastle FOB (US$/t)

Description: Coal, Australian thermal coal, 12000- btu/pound, less than 1% sulfur, 14% ash, FOB Newcastle/Port Kembla, US Dollars per Metric Ton Source: Indexmundi.com

The conclusion of this is that thermal coal prices are likely to continue to track the global marginal cost curve, as Deutsche Bank’s analysis highlights (see Figure 27).

Figure 27 Global Thermal Coal FOB Cash Costs, Real 2013 US$/t

Source: AME, Deutsche Bank Research

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The shifting dynamics in the global coal market are set to place Australia, as the second largest exporter of thermal coal in the world, as a price taker in an increasingly oversupplied market across the period of operation of the proposed Alpha project. The likely timeframe for the ramp-up to full production of GVK Coal will be parallel to China’s projected peak in demand. Falling global demand as coal is displaced by gas and renewables, combined with surplus supply is likely to see real thermal coal prices falling further, diminishing the likely returns for large, capital intensive, long term thermal coal infrastructure projects such as GVK’s Alpha project.

We do not doubt coal will remain a significant if declining energy source for the next few decades. However, the shift in China away from coal is likely to be replicated globally. We expect developing countries to adopt a variety of distributed, low-carbon renewable energy sources in a similar way they have adopted mobile telephones, increasingly skipping the need to develop a massively capital intensive grid model reliant on centralised generation.116 One of the world’s best sources of information on this energy revolution is Bloomberg New Energy Finance, who recently wrote that they “project that 70% of new power generation capacity added between 2012 and 2030 will be from renewable technologies (including large hydro).” 117

We view this as a highly probable scenario, with scope for this 70% to be well exceeded should energy efficiency initiatives really take off, combined with further big strides in solar technology and economies of scale. We see a global ‘solar with storage’ energy revolution really starting to bloom, as a recent Citi report118 detailed (see Figure 29).

Figure 29 Solar System Costs (In Recent Years the Learning Rate has Accelerated to 40%)

Source: Citi Research, Bloom berg New Energy Finance

As distributed solar electricity generation becomes cheaper than delivered coal-fired power, the demand for new coal power stations will correspondingly diminish. Further, as existing coal fired power stations become obsolete and are closed, demand for thermal coal will diminish.

The financial markets are increasingly likely to devalue the legacy fossil fuel assets, railway and port infrastructure such as that being proposed for GVK Coal.

Unburnable coal… Australia’s carbon bubble

The concept of unburnable carbon is based on a scientific analysis that burning more than 886 Gt of CO2 between 2000-2050 will result in more than 2°C of global warming, triggering dangerous climate change. By 2011, globally, over one third of this carbon budget of 886 Gt CO2 had already been burnt. The known fossil fuel reserves owned by resources companies if exploited and burnt would easily exceed the remaining allowance. The reserves beyond this limit are increasingly being referred to as “unburnable carbon”. To stay within the carbon budget only 20-40% of existing coal, gas and oil reserves can be burnt.

Australia’s known coal reserves alone, if burnt represent almost 25% of the global carbon budget.

As the consequences of global warming become more apparent, it is likely that there will be increasing public pressure for political and regulatory change. Europe, Australia, and some U.S. states are already supporting emissions trading schemes. Reports last month suggested China is considering capping emissions in its next five year plan (2016-2020). There will be increasing global pressure to leave these unburnable reserves of coal in the ground.

Companies currently holding coal assets, face an increasing political risk of those reserves being stranded by a dramatic global shift to limit carbon emissions and domestic policy changes to support these demands. As a result, long-term thermal coal investments such as GVK’s Alpha Coal Project face long term climate related (regulatory) risks.

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Section 11

Conclusion

The proposal by GVK to build a $10bn greenfield thermal coal project in Australia’s remote Galilee Basin at a time of a global downturn in coal markets is a high risk proposition.

The project timelines have been shown to be unrealistic, and further delays are likely due to the unprecedented ambition and complexity of an Indian company with no track record of building mines in Australia, building what would be by far the country’s largest thermal coal mine in an area with no water, power, or other service infrastructure. The project would require almost 500km of new rail infrastructure, across floodplains and through important farmland, to a new export terminal proposed to be located in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area. This at a time when most major coal producers are seeking to sell or downscale production due to a weakening global outlook for thermal coal.

While the project would be ambitious even for an experienced developer with a strong balance sheet, GVK are attempting to develop the US$10bn Alpha Coal Project at a time when they have a total of 16 greenfield infrastructure projects under development across 6 different asset classes.

It is likely that both capital and operating costs have been under-estimated, while project timelines are expected to continue to slip.

In the context of the longer term trend towards low carbon energy and increased regulation and restrictions over coal use in China, the US and in other countries, the investment in thermal coal export infrastructure in the Galilee Basin runs a risk of becoming a stranded asset.

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Appendix A: China’s Electricity Sector Transformation: 2008-2020

Fuel Breakdown – PRC Net Capacity

Additions (GW)2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

% of 2020 total

Coal 586 632 683 733 777 819 849 876 893 900 897 889 876 49%

Natural Gas 15 20 26 33 39 46 54 63 72 82 93 104 115 6%

Hydro 172 197 216 231 246 267 284 301 318 335 352 369 386 22%

Nuclear 9 9 11 13 13 17 21 28 28 28 28 28 28 2%

Wind Power – onshore 12 26 43 60 74 92 110 127 144 160 176 191 205 12%

Wind Power – Offshore 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5 9 13 19 27 2%

Solar Power 0 0 1 3 8 17 27 39 52 65 80 95 111 6%

Other (Biomass, EfW, CHP) 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 13 16 19 23 30 2%

Year End 796 887 984 1,077 1,164 1,265 1,354 1,448 1,526 1,596 1,658 1,717 1,778 100%

Fuel Breakdown – PRC Net Capacity Additions (GW) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Coal 49.2 71.9 62.2 54.0 44.6 42.0 30.0 27.0 17.0 7.0 -3.0 -8.0 -13.0

Natural Gas 0.0 5.0 6.4 6.2 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.5

Hydro 23.2 25.3 19.3 14.5 15.5 21.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0 17.0

Nuclear 0.0 0.2 1.7 1.7 0.7 3.2 4.0 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Wind Power 4.7 13.8 17.0 17.6 13.8 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.0 16.2 15.5 14.7 14.0

Wind Power – Offshore 0.2 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 6.0 8.3

Solar Power 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.0 5.0 8.7 10.3 12.3 12.8 13.3 14.3 15.3 15.8

Other (Biomass, EfW) 1.0 -1.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0

Year End 78.1 114.3 108.2 97.0 86.9 101.4 89.1 93.5 78.2 69.8 62.0 59.6 57.5

Fuel Breakdown – PRC Hours pa operation

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Coal 4,911 4,839 5,031 5,294 5,135 5,042 5,080 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100 5,100

Natural Gas 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,040 3,080 3,120 3,160 3,200

Hydro 3,621 3,264 3,404 3,028 3,000 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,263 3,204 3,204 3,204 3,210

Nuclear 7,731 7,914 7,924 7,772 7,772 7,823 7,823 7,823 7,823 7,838 7,823 7,806 7,817

Wind Power 2,046 2,077 2,047 1,907 1,892 1,949 2,036 2,048 2,078 2,108 2,138 2,168 2,200

Wind Power – Offshore 3,000 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200

Solar Power 0 0 1,400 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,520 1,540 1,560 1,580 1,600

Other (Biomass, EfW) 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750 3,750

Fuel Breakdown – PRC M MWh 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

% of 2020 total

Coal 2,759 2,884 3,281 3,737 3,878 4,026 4,239 4,401 4,513 4,574 4,585 4,557 4,503 64%

Natural Gas 45 53 70 89 107 126 149 174 205 237 273 310 350 5%

Hydro 579 601 702 676 715 837 899 955 1,010 1,046 1,101 1,155 1,212 17%

Nuclear 68 71 79 91 101 117 145 188 215 216 215 215 215 3%

Wind Power 20 39 70 98 103 130 185 231 271 312 352 393 435 6%

Wind Power – Offshore 0 1 3 6 13 22 35 52 75 1%

Solar Power 0 0 1 3 8 18 33 50 69 90 113 138 164 2%

Other (Biomass, EfW) 5 15 13 17 21 25 31 38 46 56 67 80 105 1%

Power production (M MWh) 3,476 3,663 4,216 4,711 4,932 5,280 5,683 6,041 6,342 6,553 6,740 6,899 7,058 100%

Electricity Output Growth * 5.7% 5.4% 15.1% 11.7% 4.7% 7.1% 7.6% 6.3% 5.0% 3.3% 2.9% 2.4% 2.3%

GDP Growth 9.0% 8.7% 10.3% 9.2% 7.5% 7.0% 6.8% 6.6% 6.3% 6.0% 5.6% 5.2% 4.8%

Electricity Output vs GDP Growth * 0.63 0.62 1.47 1.28 0.63 1.01 1.12 0.96 0.79 0.56 0.51 0.45 0.49

* Net of energy efficiency gains of 3% pa or 16% over the 2015 vs end 2010 levels (12th Five Year Plan)

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End Notes

1. Rishi Kumar, ‘GVK Power gets ‘Asia Deal of the year’ award’, The Hindu Business Line, 29 March 2012. Available at: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/gvk-power-gets-asia-deal-of-the-year-award/article3257801.ece

2. Harold Mitchell, ‘Remember Bond? Let’s not return to troubled past’, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 March 2013. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/remember-bond-lets-not-return-to-troubled-past-20130315-2g68r.html#ixzz2UZQJSNLb

3. Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd 2011/12 annual report, page 12. Available from ASIC 26/4/2013.

4. GVKPIL, ‘GVK acquires Hancock Coal and Infrastructure Projects in Australia’, Media Release, 16 September 2011, p. 4. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/pressreleases/GVK_acquires_Hancock_Coal_and_Infrastructure_Proje_e8df5a7c006c4176be7df7ae70263780.pdf

5. Bureau of Resource Energy & Economics, “Australian bulk commodity exports and infrastructure – outlook to 2025”, Australian Government, July 2012, p. 82. Available at: http://www.bree.gov.au/documents/publications/_other/export-infrastructure-report.pdf

6. GVKPIL, ’GVK acquires Hancock Coal and Infrastructure Projects in Australia’, Media Release, 16 September 2011.

7. P. Mulder, ‘GVK’s Coal Assets’, Presentation at Coal Markets Singapore Conference, 22 February 2012, p.11. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations

8. P. Mulder, Group Managing Director Coal & Infrastructure GVK Hancock Coal, ‘Pioneering strategies to ensure India’s coal security’, Presentation to Coaltrans Goa conference, 12 March 2013, p. 9 and 2 May 2013, p8. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations/GVK%20Resources%20-%20Coaltrans%20Conference%20Goa%20-%20March%202013.pdf

9. Alpha Coal Project Supplementary EIS Vol 1 2011 – page 16, accessed 20 May 2013. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/index.php/publications/24-environmental-impact-statements/97-alpha-coal-project-supplementary-eis-2011

10. Hancock Coal, ’First Coal from Galilee Basin’, Media Release, 26 June 2011. Available at: http://gvkhancockcoal.com/images/Documents/News/20110629%20-%20First%20Coal%20from%20Galilee%20Basin.pdf

11. P. Mulder, Group Managing Director Coal & Infrastructure GVK Hancock Coal, ‘Alpha and Kevin’s Corner Projects’, Presentation to MESCA – Brisbane Briefing, 2 May 2013, p. 3. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations/MESCA%20presentation%20-%20May%202013.pdf

12. Federal Environment Minister Tony Burke. Transcript of Press Conference. 5 June 2012. http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/burke/2012/tr20120605.html

13. Queensland Government, The Coordinator-General – Central Queensland Integrated Rail Project, September 2012.

14. EPBC Reference number 2008/4648. The approval and associated documents are available here: http://environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/epbc/epbc_ap.pl?name=referral_detail&proposal_id=4648

15. http://www.dsdip.qld.gov.au/resources/project/alpha-coal-project/alpha-report-summary.pdf

16. S. Lane, ‘Qld Alpha project assessment ‘shambolic joke’: Burke’, The World Today, ABC Radio National, 5 June 2012. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3518454.htm

17. The approval with all conditions is available at: http://environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/epbc/epbc_ap.pl?name=referral_detail&proposal_id=4648

18. The Draft Environmental Authority is available at: http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au/land/mining/alpha-coal-project.html

19. See notice from Environmental Defenders Office Qld, 4 April 2013. Available at: http://www.edo.org.au/edoqld/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-04-04-alert.pdf

20. Letter to Environmental Defenders Office Qld from Department of Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities, 25 March 2013. Available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/122581/sub014-major-projects.pdf

21. GVK Coal. “GVK’s second coal mine project in Australia (Kevin’s Corner) gets environmental approval” Media Release, 31 May 2013. Available at: http://gvkhancockcoal.com/index.php/news-and-presentations/105-deputy-premier-s-media-release-kevin-s-corner-project-moves-forward

22. ‘GVK aims to complete financing for Galilee Coal as early as 2013’, Livemint, 20 May 2013. Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Companies/71UhtBbim1vIHnnam3aeSJ/GVK-aims-to-complete-financing-for-Galilee-Coal-as-early-as.html

23. B. Sharples, ‘Australia Lures $21 Billion Bet on Coal Rebound’, Bloomberg, 24 May 2013. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-24/australia-lures-21-billion-bet-on-coal-rebound-energy-markets.html

24. http://hancockcoal.com.au/index.php/about-gvk-hancock-coal

25. GVK Coal and Theiss “GVK Hancock Coal and Theiss sign Alpha coal mine operations agreement” Media Release, 6 June 2013. Available at: http://gvkhancockcoal.com/images/Documents/News/Alpha%20ESA%20Media%20Release%20Final.pdf

26. GVKPIL, ’GVK to acquire Hancock Coal and Infrastructure Projects in Australia’, Media Release, 16 September 2011.

27. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, GVKPIL annual summary of results – 2012/13.

28. P. Mulder, Group Managing Director Coal & Infrastructure GVK Hancock Coal, ‘Pioneering strategies to ensure India’s coal security’, Presentation to Coaltrans Goa conference, 12 March 2013, p. 3. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations/GVK%20Resources%20-%20Coaltrans%20Conference%20Goa%20-%20March%202013.pdf

29. Ibid.

30. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2008/09 Annual Report, p. 26.

31. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2008/09 Annual Report, p. 27.

32. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2011/12 Annual Report, p. 10-11. http://www.gvk.com/files/investorrelations/financialinformation/annualreports/2011__12_630cd3abcee849e5b603c2ec7471edae.pdf

33. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2009/10 Annual Report, April 2010, p. 27. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/investorrelations/financialinformation/annualreports/2009__10_d6e842762f984e1f8a809ebc92d3af3b.pdf

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End Notes

34. GVKPIL, ’Development under Subsidiaries’, Announcement to Bombay Stock Exchange, 14 January 2013. Available at: http://www.bseindia.com/corporates/anndet_new.aspx?newsid=07edfc6f-980d-43df-8416-82ca0dda3f50

35. ‘Ready to reconsider notices of GMR and GVK says NHAI chief’, Infrawindow.com, 18 January 2013. Available at: http://www.infrawindow.com/news/ready-to-reconsider-notices-of-gmr-and-gvk-says-nhai-chief_8356/

36. C. Gutka, ‘GVK Power To Raise R1200Cr’, DealCurry, 3 February 2012. Available at: http://www.dealcurry.com/2012023-GVK-Power-To-Raise-R1200Cr.htm

37. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2006/07 Annual Report, p. 113. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/investorrelations/financialinformation/annualreports/2006__07_681e9e4f7d8e483da825fd9f306ccbe9.pdf

38. S. Basu, ‘MoEF changes stand on relocation of Dhari Devi temple for Alaknanda dam’, Down to Earth, 10 May 2013. Available at: http://www.downtoearth.org.in/content/moef-opposes-relocation-dhari-devi-temple-hydropower-project-alaknanda

39. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2006/07 Annual Report, p. 125.

40. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2008/09 Annual Report, p. 27. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/investorrelations/financialinformation/annualreports/2008__09_df58f75bf8bd48779a6b08558429f33c.pdf

41. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, ‘Investor Presentation’, February 2011, p. 10. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/investorrelations/irpresentation/investor-presentation-2011.pdf

42. A. Malik, ‘Govt may take back 30 more coal blocks’, Livemint, 15 May 2013. Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/fSaK2FTKXOlxc288goe2RL/Govt-may-take-back-30-more-coal-blocks.html

43. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, GVKPIL stock exchange announcements 22 August 2011 and 19 October 2011.

44. M. Singhal, ’GVK Power and Infrastructure buys BIAL stake for Rs614 crore’, The Economic Times, 23 August 2011. Available at: http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-23/news/29918816_1_bial-gvk-power-and-infrastructure-gvk-plans

45. Ibid.

46. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2011/12 Annual Report, p. 10.

47. K. Sundaram, ’India Mulls Linking Mumbai Airfields to Ease Congestion’, Bloomberg, 6 March 2013. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-05/india-mulls-linking-mumbai-airfields-to-ease-congestion.html

48. GVK corporate presentation, 25 July 2012, p. 6. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/corpppt250712final.pdf

49. GVKPIL share price Rs8.33 as at 3 May 2013 and 1,579m issued shares to give Rs13.2bn, converted at Rs54.5/USD

50. GVK corporate presentation, 25 July 2012, p. 10.

51. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2011/12 Annual Report p. 30; GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2010/11 Annual Report p. 9; and GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2008/09 Annual Report, p. 27.

52. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, 2012/13 annual results summary, p. 4.

53. Ibid.

54. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, Annual Report 2011/12, p. 11.

55. GVK Energy includes GVK Industries Limited, GVK Gautami Power Limited, GVK Power (Goindwal Sahib) Limited, Alaknanda Hydro Power Company and GVK Coal (Tokisud) Company.

56. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, Annual Report 2010/11, p. 67.

57. Private company registered in Singapore (Company number 201109842D) – Extract accurate on 3 June 2012.

58. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, Annual Report, 2011/12, p. 69.

59. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, Annual Report 2011/12, p. 10.

60. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited, Annual Report 2011/12, p. 81.

61. Allens, ‘Focus: 2013 Budget – thin capitalisation: safe harbour limits slimmed’, Allens website, 20 May 2013. Available at: http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/tax/fotax20may13.htm

62. S. Mansuri ‘Will sell stake in subsidiaries for right offer: GVK’s CFO’,Moneycontrol.com, 30 March 2013. Available at: http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/will-sell-stakesubsidiaries-for-right-offer-gvks-cfo_844015.html

63. ‘GVK aims to complete financing for Galilee Coal as early as 2013’, Livemint, 20 May 2013. Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Companies/71UhtBbim1vIHnnam3aeSJ/GVK-aims-to-complete-financing-for-Galilee-Coal-as-early-as.html

64. GVK Power & Infrastructure Limited 2011/12 Annual Report, p. 87.

65. urizon Holdings and GVK Hancock Coal Infrastructure, ’Aurizon and GVK Hancock proposed development of Galilee Basin rail and port infrastructure’, ASX Announcement, 11 March 2013. Available at: http://gvkhancockcoal.com/images/Documents/News/20130311%20-%20Aurizon%20ASX%20announcement%20GVK%20Hancock%20and%20Aurizon.pdf

66. Ibid.

67. J. Seeney, Deputy Premier, Minister for State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, ‘Two rail corridors defined for Galilee Basin’, Queensland government Media Release, 6 June 2012. Available at: http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/Id/79468

68. Hancock Coal Infrastructure Pty Ltd, ’The Rail Corridor’, Media Release, 17 January 2012. Available at: http://gvkhancockcoal.com/images/Documents/News/20120130%20-%20Rail%20Corridor%20Media%20Statement.pdf

69. P. Mulder, ‘GVK Coal Projects’ Presentation at Galilee Basin Coal & Energy Conference, 12 November 2012, p. 9. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations/Galilee%20Basin%20Coal%20Energy%20Conference%20-%20November%202012.pdf

70. J. Moutafis, Senior Vice President, Coal Business Development, Aurizon “Co-ordinated Rail and Port Development.” Presented at the International Cargo Handling Cordination Association, 5 June 2013.

71. Photo from the Abbot Point Cumulative Impact Assessment, February 2013.

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End Notes

72. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, ‘Adani Enterprises – possible acquisition of interests in the Abbot Point Coal Terminal’, ACCC website, 21 April 2011. Available at: http://transition.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/984637/fromItemId/751043

73. Abbot Point Cumulative Impact assessment – ecological Australia /Open Lines report, February 2013.

74. World Heritage Centre. State of conservation of World Heritage properties inscribed on the World Heritage List. preparation document for 37th session of the World Heritage Committee http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2013/whc13-37com-7B-en.pdf

75. S. Bartholomeusz, ‘Glencore’s convenient greenfield gripe’, Business Spectator, 7 March 2013. Available at: http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2013/3/7/global-financial-crisis/glencores-convenient-greenfield-gripe

76. ‘Queensland projects to begin by FY14: GVK’s Sanjay Reddy’ CNBC-TV18 interview, 11 March 2013. Available at: http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/queensland-projects-to-begin-by-fy14-gvks-sanjay-reddy_836541.html

77. GVKPIL, “GVK acquires Hancock Coal and Infrastructure Projects in Australia” Media Release, 16 September 2011, p. 4. Available at: http://www.gvk.com/files/pressreleases/GVK_acquires_Hancock_Coal_and_Infrastructure_Proje_e8df5a7c006c4176be7df7ae70263780.pdf

78. Queensland Treasury Right to Information, 5 November 2012 page 67 (BAL247).

79. J. McCarthy, ‘Federal inquiry into T3 Project’, p 24, The Courier Mail, 2 April 2013.

80. Bloomberg News, ‘Activists fight Rinehart’s ‘monster’ Queensland coal mine’, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 February 2013. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/carbon-economy/activists-fight-rineharts-monster-queensland-coal-mine-20130221-2euhp.html Accessed 2 June 2013.

81. P. Mulder, ‘GVK Coal Projects’ Presentation at Galilee Basin Coal & Energy Conference, 12 November 2012, p. 19.

82. Powerlink Queensland, ‘Galilee Basin Transmission Project’, Powerlink Queensland website, accessed 31 May 2013. Available at: http://www.powerlink.com.au/Projects/Central/Galilee_Basin_Transmission_Project.aspx

83. Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd (2011) Alpha Coal Project - Site water management system and water balance technical report. Volume 2, Appendix L. Alpha Coal Project Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement

84. For Kevin’s Corner water needs, see Hancock Galilee Pty Ltd (2011) Site Water Management System and Water Balance Technical Report. Appendix M3 Kevin’s Corner Project Environmental Impact Statement

85. SunWater, ’SunWater discontinues work on Connors River Dam’, Media Release, 27 July 2012. Available at: http://www.sunwater.com.au/about-sunwater/media-room/latest-news/latest-news/2012/sunwater-discontinues-work-on-connors-river-dam-and-pipelines-project

86. P. Mulder, ‘GVK Coal Projects’ Presentation at Galilee Basin Coal & Energy Conference, 12 November 2012, p. 18.

87. Jamie Freed, ’Hancock’s balance grows’, Australian Financial Review, 9 May 2013.

88. Australian Coal Association “Budget Priorities 2013”, 7 May 2013, p. 5. Available at: http://www.australiancoal.com.au/images/2013-05-06%20Prosperity%20Certainty%20Responsibility%20-%20Australias%20Future%20with%20Coal.pdf

89. Australian Coal Association “Budget Priorities 2013”, 7 May 2013, p. 6.

90. Ausenco, ‘Alpha Coal Project’, Ausenco website, accessed 31 May 2013. Available at: http://Ausenco.com/case-studies/alpha-coal-project

91. M. Lewis, ‘Ensham mine avoids repeat of disastrous 2008 floods’, ABC News, 2 December 2010. Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-12-01/ensham-mine-avoids-repeat-of-disastrous-2008-floods/2358678

92. P. Manning and A. Remeikis, ’Single rail deal to Galilee Basin’, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 2013. Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/single-rail-deal-to-galilee-basin-20130311-2fwcn.html

93. Cuckoo Paul, ’GVK’s Big Australian Bet’, Forbes India, 25 January 2013. Available at: http://forbesindia.com/article/cross-border/gvks-big-australian-bet/34513/0

94. N. Robison & B. Fitzpatrick, ’Australia Mining Cost Survey’, Morgan Stanley Research, 8 May 2013, p. 36.

95. P. Mulder, Group Managing Director Coal & Infrastructure GVK Hancock Coal, ‘Pioneering strategies to ensure India’s coal security’, Presentation to Coaltrans Goa conference, 12 March 2013, p.5.

96. R. Kumar Singh & A. Shanker, ’India Will Increase Taxes on Power-Station Coal, Bauxite’, Bloomberg, 28 February 2013. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-28/india-will-increase-taxes-on-power-station-coal-bauxite.html

97. Queensland Government Office of State Revenue, ‘Royalty Rates’, Queensland Treasury and Trade website, 20 November 2012. Available at: https://www.osr.qld.gov.au/royalties/rates.shtml

98. China’s Renewable Energy Sector: an overview of key growth sectors, Solidiance, 8 January 2013. Available at: http://www.solidiance.com/whitepaper/china-renewable.pdf

99. K.-Ting Wong & M. Tong, China Longyuan, Deutsche Bank Market Research , 26 March 2013.

100. A. Grigg, ’China to reject low-quality coal in bid to cap emissions’’, Australian Financial Review, 23 May 2013. Available at: http://www.afr.com/p/business/companies/china_emissions_reject_low_quality_68WgvvCAMhJzg0IcB0NHfN (subscription required).

101. ‘China Introduces Carbon Tax into Environmental Protection Taxation System’, ChinaScope Financial, 24 May 2013. Available at: http://www.chinascopefinancial.com/en/news/post/26415.html,

102. P. Mulder, Group Managing Director GVK Hancock Coal, ‘GVK Hancock Coal – Alpha and Kevin’s Corner Projects’, Presentation to MESCA – Brisbane Briefing, 2 May 2013, p. 29. Available at: http://hancockcoal.com.au/images//Documents/Presentations/MESCA%20presentation%20-%20May%202013.pdf

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End Notes

103. The Climate Institute, “Australia’s exposure to the carbon bubble”, Media Release, 29 April 2013, Available at: http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/www.climateinstitute.org.au/articles/media-releases/australias-exposure-to-the-carbon-bubble.html

104. ANZ Research “Bracing for change”, 22 April 2013 (customer access only).

105. GlencoreXstrata, ‘Glencore Xstrata relinquishes Balaclava Island Coal Export Terminal (BICET) development’, Media Release, 13 May 2013. Available at: http://www.glencorexstrata.com/assets/Uploads/20130513-GlencoreXstrata-relinquishes-Balaclava-Island-Coal-Export-Terminal-development.pdf

106. Colin Hamilton & Jim Lennon, “Commodities Comment”, Macquarie Research, 1 May 2013.

107. Australian Coal Association, “Budget Priorities 2013”, 7 May 2013

108. E. Behrmann, L. Hays & S. Permatasari, ’BHP CFO says China Growth may slow towards 6% after two years’, Bloomberg, 10 April 2013. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/bhp-s-kerr-says-china-growth-may-slow-toward-6-after-2-years.html

109. http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/china/energy-climate-goals-twelfth-five-year-plan United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Mercury and Toxics Standards (MASTS): Basic Information,

110. United States Environmental Protection Agency website, accessed 31 May 2013. Available at: http://www.epa.gov/mats/basic.html

111. ‘U.S. coal exports on record pace in 2012, fueled by steam coal growth’, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 12 October 2012. Available at: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8490

112. John Eaves, CEO, Arch Coal, Inc J.P. Morgan Dinner Series, 8 May 2013. Available at: http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW-50SUQ9MTg0OTY3fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8VHlwZT0z&t=1

113. D. Lowrey, “U.S. Thermal Coal exports could face oversupplied market through 2020”, SNL Energy, 9 May 2013. Available at: http://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/ArticleAbstract.aspx?id=17675508 (subscription only).

114. A. Sasi, “RBI to banks: Take call on stressed sector exposure”, The India Express, 3 February 2012. Available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/rbi-to-banks-take-call-on-stressed-sector-exposure/907233/1

115. M. Hsueh & M. Lewis,“Commodities Special Report: Thermal Coal at a Crossroads”, Deutsche Bank AG, 9 May 2013.

116. For a discussion of the nature of fossil fuel policy and likelihood of develop-ing nations to minimize fossil fuel dependence see: M.l Spence, The Next Convergence: The Future of Economic Growth in a Multi Speed World, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. Mr. Spence is a Nobel Prize winning economist without any known biases for or against fossil fuel use.

117. ’Strong growth for renewables expected through to 2030’, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 22 April 2013. Available at: http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/strong-growth-for-renewables-expected-through-to-2030/

118. J. Channell, “Battery storage – the next solar boom?”, Citi Research, 30 April 2013.

Certain Aspects of Queensland Government AdministrationSubmission 122