IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTANDING THE DIALECTICS OF POVERTY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA REGION: EVIDENCES FROM OGONI BY NEKABARI JOHNSON NNA Ph.D DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMIN. STUDIES FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT P.M.B. 5323 PORT HARCOURT NIGERIA Abstract This paper attempts to identify a theoretical paradigm to understanding the deepening poverty, conflict and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Using the Ogoni experience, the paper examines the theory of internal colonialism that has been applied by many scholars. It maintains that those who apply the theory tend to put the blame on domination and exploitation by elements within the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, while ignoring the class character of the Ogoni society. It maintains that the poverty and conflict in Ogoni has been accentuated by the elites within the Ogoni society who act in concert with their partners from other groups. Key words: Conflict, Niger Delta, Internal Colonialism, Political Elites and Poverty. INTRODUCTION
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IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM FOR UNDERSTANDING THE DIALECTICS OF
POVERTY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA REGION:
EVIDENCES FROM OGONI
BY
NEKABARI JOHNSON NNA Ph.D
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMIN. STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT
P.M.B. 5323
PORT HARCOURT
NIGERIA
Abstract
This paper attempts to identify a theoretical paradigm to understanding the deepening poverty, conflict and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Using the Ogoni experience, the paper examines the theory of internal colonialism that has been applied by many scholars. It maintains that those who apply the theory tend to put the blame on domination and exploitation by elements within the major ethnic groups in Nigeria, while ignoring the class character of the Ogoni society. It maintains that the poverty and conflict in Ogoni has been accentuated by the elites within the Ogoni society who act in concert with their partners from other groups. Key words: Conflict, Niger Delta, Internal Colonialism, Political Elites and Poverty.
INTRODUCTION
The Ogoni people inhabit an area between longitudes 7o 101 and 70 30E and
latitudes 4o 301 and 4o 50H along the Coast plains terraces to the north-east of the Niger
Delta region of South Eastern Nigeria. The population of the area, according to the 2006
Nigerian National Census is 934,878 with a density of 771 (NPC, 2006). According to
Saro-Wiwa (1994:29), this translates to 1,200 per square mile, making it one of the
highest in the world and five times the Nigerian national average of 250. There is
therefore severe land scarcity and land hunger, a situation which is further exacerbated by
the fact that the Ogoni area accommodates a large number of agro-chemical, petroleum
and gas industries because of the enormous agricultural and petroleum and gas resources
found in the area. Interestingly therefore the Ogoni area is prone to a high level of
industrial pollution.
In spite of the enormous resources and the large number of industrial
establishments, the Ogoni area has experienced a very high level of youth unemployment,
Saro-Wiwa (1994:26) in his reaction to the deplorable economic condition of the youths
observed that over seventy percent of Ogoni youths are unemployed and those in
employment only find normal jobs, which abound in companies in Ogoni, such as
NAFCON, the two refineries, the petro-chemical complex, even the Eleme people who
have lost almost all their land to the companies do not find employment at a level
commensurate with the sacrifices they have made as hosts of the companies.
This has become a sore point in the relationship between the companies and the
host communities. Added to the problem of unemployment is the issue of environmental
pollution and degradation. In a statement attached to the Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990). Dr.
G. B. Leton, one of Nigeria’s foremost natural scientists and first President of the
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) expressed deep concern about the
adverse environmental and ecological consequences of oil exploration and exploitation
which the Ogoni has suffered and continues to suffer.
The Lands, streams and creeks are totally and continually polluted. The atmosphere
is for ever charged with hydrocarbons; carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide; many
villages experience the informal quaking of the wrath of gas flares which have been
burning 24 hours a day for 33 years; acid rains, oil spillages and blow outs are common.
The result of such unchecked environmental pollution and degradation is that the Ogoni
people can no longer farm successfully. An environment that was once the food basket of
the Eastern Niger Delta, the Ogoni now buy food (when they can afford it). Fish which is
a common source of protein is now rare in the area yet they have the capacity and all it
takes to produce it. Owing to the constant and continued pollution of our stream and
creeks, fish can only be caught in deeper and offshore waters for which the Ogoni are not
equipped. The Ecology is changing fast, the mangrove tree, the aerial roots of which
normally provide a natural and welcome habitat for many a sea food – crabs, periwinkles,
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muds kipper, crockies, mussels, shrimp’s and all – is now being gradually replaced by
unknown and otherwise useless palms. The health hazards generated by an atmosphere
charged with hydrocarbon vapour, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are innumerable.
Interestingly, this view has been supported by many natural scientists in Nigeria.
For instance a Report on Page 3 of the Punch Newspapers of 15 July 2011 and attributed
to some experts at the Ohio State University’s Department of Geosciences, states that
although air pollution is often linked with some heart and lung-related illnesses, it can
also have a negative effect on the brain. The Report revealed that exposure to air
pollution has both short and long term toxic effects that insure the heart and blood vessels
and increase rates of hospitalization for cardiac illness.
The worsening economic situation in Ogoni, manifesting in high rate of
emigration and rural poverty has great consequences on the development of the area.
Naanen (2003:72) observed that the economic situation in Ogoni since the 1950s has led
to the migration of farm labourers to other parts of South-Eastern Nigeria and the Niger
Delta. A significant number traveled to the former Spanish Colony of Fernando Po (now
Equatorial Guinea) as contract labourers. Similarly, Cameroon has attracted a significant
number of Ogoni migrants since the 1950s, most of who were involved in fishing. But the
hostility of Cameroonian Law Enforcement Agencies and the decline of the local fishing
industry have in recent years, considerably reduced the number of Ogoni migrants. Some
of the migrants to other parts of the Niger Delta and across Niger Delta as far as field in
Lagos and Ondo claim to pursue occupations such as palm wine tapping for which the
Ogoni remain famous.
A significant percentage of the agricultural labourers have been boys of school age,
some of whom took to such occupations for an income either to pay their ways through
school or to provide for themselves some money for survival. Naanen, (ibid) also
maintained that majority of these child labourers, never had the opportunity of going to
school and simply had to find a way of earning an income early in life either to help
themselves or support their parent and siblings.
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This sort of development, for sure accounts for the disadvantaged position of the
Ogoni in the Niger Delta. Indeed, Naanen (1995:10) has observed that the Ogoni area is
underdeveloped in all ramifications. Thus it does not only lack basic social infrastructure
but human capital as well. He argued that as at 1969, the Ogonis had only a secondary
school enrolment of less than 400 and approximately 10 university graduates and an
overall in literacy rate of about 15 percent. He reveals that by the late 1950s, the Ogoni
had lost most political rights as part of Biafra. He was referring here to a population of
more than 450,000 cutting across more than 200 village communities.
Naanen (2003:651) maintained that the Ogonis find themselves very much in this
context of national poverty. However, consideration has to be given to the country,
political peculiarities, which tend to be weighed heavily against minorities and
indigenous groups. Control or access to power in Nigeria and to state-centred economy
can make a lot of difference between poverty and progress, group such as the Ogoni have
largely remained marginal in the distribution of power hence the entrenched
discrimination they suffer. Such socio-economic inequality affects access to jobs, the
provision of social facilities, the development of infrastructure and other economic
opportunities.
No wonder, many scholars of Ogoni extraction such as Saro-Wiwa (1994), Naanen
(1995) and Nna (1999) have attempted to analyze the Ogoni condition within the context
of the theory of internal colonialism. In doing so however, they tend to ignore the role of
internal class forces within the Ogoni society and thus failed to follow the theory of
internal colonialism to its logical conclusion. This paper attempts to focus attention on
the nature and character of the class division within the Ogoni society, particularly the
role of political elites as internal agent or collaborators in the deepening of the poverty
condition within the Ogoni society and the competition between them for access to such
and resources through the state.
Theoretical Framework
The dominant theoretical explanation for the Ogoni condition attributes the
poverty situation to the relationship of domination and exploitation by the major or
dominant groups in Nigeria and small ethnic groups such as the Ogoni. This perspective
draws largely on the theory of “Internal Colonialism” adapted from the works of Russian
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scholar and revolutionary, V. I. Lenin. According to Levinson (1994:44), internal
colonialism is a form of majority – group-minority group relations in which the minority
group is treated much the same as a colonized group under exploitative colonialism.
Accordingly, internally colonized groups perform a disproportionately high share of low-
paid, unskilled labour, subject to control by the majority, viewed and treated
ethnocentrically in accordance with dominant culture values.
To Marger (1997:131) it is a type of inequalitarian pluralism which is
characteristic of societies like the United States where ethnic relations otherwise follow a
pattern of assimilation. He reveals that in such cases, racial ethnic groups are treated in a
colonial fashion.
Wolpe (1975:230) has identified two major characteristics of the internal
colonialism model.
(i) The colonial relationship is conceived of as occurring between different countries
total population, nation’s geographical areas or between different races, colours or
cultures.
(ii) The colonial relationship is characterized in a general way as involving
domination, oppression and exploitation
McRoberts (1979:294) reports that the perspective assumes that for various reasons
(economic, political or military) a stronger, more developed core region imposes itself
upon a peripheral region whose subsequent development is geared to the needs of the
core. He posited that out of this colonial relationship between regions, there develops a
cultural division of labour in which high status positions are reserved for members of the
core region and periphery populations are relegated to lower level position.
This perspective thus assumes that resources from the periphery regions that is,
areas inhabited by internally colonized populations are used for the development of the
regions of the dominant groups and this tends to engender in those internally colonized,
feelings of resistance and rebelling and therefore leading to the formation of secessionist
movements (Nna, 1999). Paloni (1979:363) has therefore revealed that under the theory
of internal colonialism, the existence of strong secessionist movement or the persistence
of conflict emerging from religious affiliations, language distinctions or other primordial
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attachment can be expected and would be explained as in the case of the Celtic Fringe,
Belgium or Quebec.
Naanen (1995:19) is a major exponent of this perspective with regard to the Ogoni
condition. He maintains that Internal colonialism in Ogoni land is broadly characterized
by certain fundamental developments. First, ethnic based political domination, which is
used to expropriate Ogoni resources; especially oil and gas for the development of the
power-controlling group while the Ogoni remain underdeveloped and impoverished.
Second, the alliance between these dominant groups – the multinational oil companies
and state enterprises (which are controlled by the dominant groups) operating in Ogoni-
land, which restrict the Ogoni’s access to the modern and more rewarding sectors of the
Nigerian oil economy, establishing a pattern of economic discrimination against the
Ogoni people. Third, oil based environmental degradation which gravely undermines the
traditional peasant and fishing economy of the Ogoni, leaving the people without a
dependable alternative means of livelihood and fourth, gross land widespread human
rights violation in Ogoni land.
Furthermore, Naanen submits that Ogoni-land, which has produced more than 30
billion dollars worth of oil for Nigeria, has virtually nothing to show for the prodigious
wealth and that Ogoni land continues to exist in its original condition: no potable water,
no dependable health facilities, few usable roads, no electricity, no telecommunications,
and for the past three years, the schools have not been functioning because teachers have
not been paid. Poverty and social deprivation are conspicuous, the mortality rate is high.
Paloni (1979:360) has argued that this sort of use of the internal colonialism
model is incomplete at the theoretical level because it leaves aside the consideration
value that the expansion of the core responds to the interests of a class. He thus maintains
that the character of this expansion depends in part on the strength of this class and in
part on the strength of ruling classes in the periphery. Consequently, he submits that the
nature of the process of the expansion of the core is at least a function of the relation
between both dominant classes. He reveals that a variety of strategies can be adopted,
depending on the historical conditions determining the limit of action of these classes.
They include the following:
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(i) The core’s ruling class is sufficiently powerful (economically and militarily) to
completely eliminate the basis of power of the periphery’s ruling classes.
(ii) The completion of the core’s expansion depends on the ability of the core’s
ruling classes to enlist the support of the periphery ruling class. He observes that under
these circumstances, the alliance between both sets of ruling classes is crucial to seal the
process of expansion. He further notes that if the realization of the first strategy could
permanently cripple the basis or authority of the ruling classes in the periphery it could
facilitate the implementation of centralized administration. However, the coalescence of
an alliance, he says, may operate in the opposite direction. Consequently being
recognized as parties in the common enterprise, the ruling classes in the periphery may
strengthen their local influence and maintains the conditions of their legitimacy. Paloni
cautions however, that in most cases, the situation would produce a system of loyalties
gained by the distribution of personal production or other materials of symbolic
advantage. Furthermore, he makes it clear that the relation in which the core and
periphery stand after a certain period of time will depend not only on which of these two
strategies have been implemented but also on the degree to which peripheral regions are
culturally and ethnically homogenous. He nevertheless stresses that regardless of how
distinctive the peripheral regions are when compared with the core regions, the presence
of internal heterogeneity will prevent the crystallization of an ethnic or other segmental
based reaction against the centre in forms other than sporadic outbursts of discontent. He
thus maintains that the alliance of both ruling classes will eventually favour the
maintenance of a system of personal loyalties as the dominant factor behind political
alignments in the periphery.
He however explains that the establishment of this system of alliances can be
traced back to the predominance of feudal relations or some of its variants. He further
explains that the backwardness of the periphery before its contact with the core is both an
effect and a condition of the maintenance of these relations and identifies the two main
characteristics of the relationship as follows:
(i) The existence of personal relations between individuals occupying positions with
unequal control of resources,
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(ii) The existence of systemic instability in which mutable loyalties may be
transferred or displaced or simply withdrawn if resources became scarce or if
alternative resources enter the situation.
In conclusion, therefore, Paloni maintains that in a situation of clientelistic relations
governed by the principle of maximizing immediate personal advantages, there is a
common identification with symbols and no possibility of communal action. It strongly
resembles an aggregate of contractual link, subject to permanent alteration. It is therefore
imperative to unravel and analyze the class relations in Ogoni and the relationship
between the dominant classes, particularly the political class and the state structures.
Political Elites and the Dialectics of Poverty and Conflict: Evidence from Ogoni-
Land.
There is no consensus among historians on when exactly the Ogoni people settled
in their present location or from where they came there. What appears common in some
sources is that they were a relatively egalitarian and well ordered society except for the
position of priests to deities such as the Gbenebeka who were well respected and proud
for by the people. It is also suggested in those sources that the Ogoni build in relative
isolation from the outside world before the advert of British colonialism and this perhaps,
account for why they escaped European sources (Nnanen, 2003:15). Naanen (2003:16)
attributes this relative isolation to the refusal of the Ogoni to engage in inter-marriage
with any groups apart from their Ibibio neighbours to the North-East and their refusal to
participate in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Saro-Wiwa (1994:3) on his part attributes it
to the fierce and independent character of the Ogoni people. He asserts that historically,
the Ogoni people have always been fierce and independent. This is the reason they have
never been colonized by other people and were not sold as slaves in the course of the
notorious Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. They were known to their neighbours as cannibals
and were able to preserve for themselves the most fertile and most healthy parts of the
coastal plain terraces North of the Niger Delta.
He reveals that the refusal of the Ogoni people to engage in inter-marriage with
other ethnic groups except the Ibibio, was as a result of the law passed by their ancestors
in order to preserve the purity of the Ogoni, preserve their language and culture and to
7
stop their absorption or dilution by any of the neighbouring larger groups. Within this
content, it may not necessary be the cause of their isolation. However, Naanen (2007:16)
also has further revealed that the Ogoni people refused to sign any treaty of protection
with the British and had to resist the imposition of British rule by force of arms resulting
in battles of resistance in 1901, 1905 and 1907 when a protectorate was declared over in
Ogoni and in which the Gbenebeka deity served as the major rallying point for the
Ogonis. This resistance was ended in 1914 when one Major G. H. Led a military
expedition which burnt down the Gbenebeka shrine at Gwara, and signaled the eventual
end of Ogonis sovereignty.
Saro-Wiwa (1994:4) attributes the problems of the Ogoni people to the advent of
British colonialism which shatter the Ogoni society and inflict on them a backwardness
from which we are still struggling to escape. It was British colonialism which forced us
into the domestic colonialism of Nigeria, he asserted. Right from 1908 when Ogonis were
administered as a part of Opobo Division, they were made part of the Rivers Province of
the Eastern Region in 1951 and Rivers State in 1967, the Ogoni people have struggled to
resist colonialism and return to their much-cherished autonomy and self-determination.
Saro-Wiwa traced the struggle of the Ogoni people to the 1930s through to the
1950s as organized by Paul Birabi under the Ogoni Central Union and the Ogoni State
Representative Assembly. He lamented that the efforts of Ogoni people have been made
difficult by Nigeria’s domestic colonialism, which is cruel, unfeeling and monstrous; its
method has been an outrageous denial of rights, a usurpation of our economic resources,
a dehumanization which has sought to demoralize our people by characterizing them as
meek, obscure and foolish.
He concluded that this development has made the Ogoni people to lose pride in
themselves and their ability and compelled them to “vote for a multiplicity of parties or
election regard themselves as perpetual clients of other groups and come to think “that
there is nowhere else to go but down.” This perspective has some short-comings: top of
which is that it sees the Ogoni people as a monolithic group devoid of social divisions. It
therefore ignores the actual social impact of colonialism on the structure of Ogoni
society.
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The introduction of British rule over Ogonis was accompanied by same things
which altered the structure and basis of social relationship. For instance, the introduction
of the common law and the subsequent establishment of courts for the dispensation of
justice led to the appointment of warrant chiefs, court clerks, bailiffs and interpreters
among others. These positions were filled with people who had had some form of access
to the colonial institutions in long distance trades and thus had an idea of how to
communicate with representatives of colonial authorities. The introduction of Christianity
and through the western education gave rise to the appointment of catechists’ interpreters
and Sunday school teachers among others. These positions put these individuals in a
vantage position in the new order and thus transformed their position in society vis-à-vis
the rest of the society. They began to serve as clients to those who represented the
dominant political authority at the time and in the process not only sustained their control
of Ogoni political affairs but their own livelihood as well (Nna, 1986:62). It was therefore
possible for the emerging political elites in Ogoni therefore to consolidate their position
in the society by sending their children to patrons and friends in the coastal cities to learn
the ways of the white man by acquiring western education. Indeed Naanen (2003:15) has
revealed that until the second decade of the 20 th century, formal western education was
virtually unknown among the Ogonis, who produced their first university graduate in
1943. This is markedly different from other parts of the country such as Lagos and certain
coastal areas of the Niger Delta where western education had impacted on society much
earlier.
Naanen attributes this development to what he calls the “historically insular
nature” of Ogoni society which was forced by a fierce determination by the group to
defend its cultural identity. He maintained that the Ogoni were isolated from broader
social forces found in the Coastal region, stimulated by European trade, which carried
western education in Nigeria due to the Christian missionaries who followed the trade
route. Ogoni’s capacity to embrace Western education, when it did enter the area was
limited by poverty and customary practices. The trend was not helped by government
policy, which not unexpectedly, tended to favour the power-controlling groups.
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For sure, all government policies were transmitted through warrant chiefs. These,
of course, included policies on education and community development. These people
used this trend to all advantage, denying the poor access to opportunities for education
development. This trend contrasted sharply from other communities in which children of
the warrant chiefs and elites shunned western education and allowed the poor to embrace
it. The implication of this development, of course, was the creation of conditions for
socio-economic disempowerment which reinforced the political domination by the
emergent elites and their patrons.
Naanen (1995:19) locates the historical domination of the Ogoni in the last
decades of the 19th century when Nkwerre traders from the Igbo hinterland, arrived the
area. He premised his analysis on a 1932 Colonial Intelligence Report on Ogoni, which
stated that in its state of (relative) isolation, the only channel of intercourse with the
outside world were the Nkwerre sellers who introduced all the European articles used, did
all the tribe’s blacksmithing, carried on such (internal/slave dealing as there was in the
western side of the area and exploited the Ogoni … (The Nkwerre) settlers remain a
problem in Ogoni affairs to this day.
This is far from the whole truth indeed; the Ogoni also had trade relations with
coastal communities in Okrika, Bonny, Opobo, Andoni and Egwanga (Ikot Abasi).
Again, the Nkwerre traders may have exercised same form of dominance in their
economic, relations with the Ogoni but that did not extend to the exercise of political
authority over the Ogoni people. Naanen (2003:17) stated emphatically that Ogoni’s
fiercely independent disposition in historical times is abundantly attested to by the
traditions of its neighbours and European reward which also emphasize the people’s
reputation for hostility to outsiders. Other sources claimed they were war like and had a
reputation for cannibalism. These were important factors in explaining why Ogoni was
never subjugated by any groups as they successfully defended their independence up to
British conquest.
This position is corroborated by Saro-Wiwa (1999:3). Granted that this was the
situation, it would be near impossible for few Nkwerre traders to have exercised any
meaningful political influence over the Ogoni people in the 1930s. Within this period
10
(1930), political leadership in Ogoni coalescent around Ogoni warrant chiefs and elites
who emerged from the colonial structure and institution. It was these individuals who
formed the Ogoni Central Union in the 1990s. The Union in the preface to its
Constitution Rules and Regulations recognized the relative backwardness of the people
and appealed to Ogoni sons and daughters to take the development of Ogoni-land as a
major challenge.
The only logical conclusion to be drawn from this therefore is that Ogoni political
affairs were in the hands of emergent Ogoni political elites. These elites, however, were
not the autonomous leaders of the pre-colonial period but rather peosuxra of colonial rule
and therefore clients of dominant forces outside of Ogoni. It was these people who
formed the nucleus of the Ogoni Central Union in the 1930s and 1940s.
The Ogoni Central Union appealed to the youths and people in general wherever
they are, reminding them of their backwardness and uneven position among other tribes
of Nigeria and calling them to action. It appeals to those in authority, the Native
Authorities, the District officers, the Resident and Chief Commissioner, Eastern
Provinces for tolerance, sympathy and cooperation.
This challenge was taken up in the 1950s by Paul Birabi and others who
undertook various developments projects, including the establishment of primary schools
and a secondary school, dispensaries, and the award of scholarship, to indigent students.
This dispensation continued during the 1960s under the aegis of the Ogoni Representative
Assembly. It was however short lived by the incessant squabbles among the elites in their
competition for positions with the Native Authority and the political dispensation. These
squabbles came to a head with the Nigerian Civil War which began in 1967. The Civil
War pitched Ogoni political elites into two camps. A few, led by Saro-Wiwa pitched
camp with the Federal side while the vast majority, led by I. S. Kogbara and Dr. G. B.
Leton pitched camp with the rebel Biafran side in which Kogbara served as ambassador
to the United Kingdom and Leton served as head of the scientific unit of the rebel
movement. It was however, made worse when the war ended with the creation of a new
Rivers State.
The creation of the new state came with opportunities that were limited in the
defunct Eastern Region. There emerged many opportunities for recruitment into the civil
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service and appointment into the Executive Council and membership of boards of
parastatals. The elites played the leadership roles in all these and were the direct
beneficiaries of the new developments. The creation of the new Rivers State also
provided new opportunities for the accumulation of wealth through the award of
contracts. In order to consolidate their position, Ogoni political elites, especially those
who resurrected from the Biafran rebellion and got assimilated into the new state
structures formed on organization called KAGOTE.
KAGOTE is an acronym for Khana, Gokana, Tai and Eleme the six clans that
make up Ogoni land, it emerged as the most powerful social organization in Ogoni after
the Civil War and consisted of the pioneer members of the Rivers State Executive
Council, Traditional Rulers and businessmen. Members of the organization effectively
used their position in government and business to create opportunities for private
accumulation of wealth for themselves and their members and thus continued to
consolidate their stranglehold on Ogoni political affairs. Thus, membership of KAGOTE
provided people with leadership position in Ogoni land, for instance members of
KAGOTE within the Rivers State Executive Council were instrumental to the allocations
of six first class chieftaincy stools to Ogoniland. The highest to a single ethnic group in
Rivers State and determined who occupied such stool. It was members of KAGOTE who
determined chairmanship and membership of local government councils, membership of
the Rivers State Executive Council from Ogoni and top positions in the state civil service.
It also assisted its members to win major contract from multinational corporations and
state enterprises within the area and protect them from security agencies where they went
wrong. It was therefore common to see chief who had connection with the group to use
security agents to full advantage in the intimidation and harassment of dissident members
of their communities. Ogoni people subsequently found themselves under a new form of
domination and exploitation, not from major ethnic groups this time but from their own
leaders, leaders thrown up by their own historical circumstances.
The Nature and Character of Ogoni Political Elite
Many scholars on the post-colonial state formation in Nigeria have described it as
a “Rentier State” because of its near total dependence on oil revenue. According to Graf
(1983:19), the essential features of the Rentier State in the world market is that it serves
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the link between production and distribution. State revenues accrue from taxes or rents on
production rather than productive activity. This production depends, however, on
techniques, expertise, investment and markets – generated outside the territory controlled
by the state. For this reason, practically all aspects of exploration, production and
marketing are dominated by international capital, typically in the form of transnational
corporation. For the transnationalized state, rents derive from local ownership of the areas
and/or resources of extraction.
There are certain implications of this for the political leadership in Ogoni. One is
that the Nigerian state is not productive and the leadership lacks an effective economic
base. Being dependent on rents from transnational enterprises, its survival to a large
measure, depends on the stability of the local communities from which resources are
extracted. It must therefore groom an equally parasitic petit-bourgeois sector in those
communities who will help maintain stability and for which protection from the state is
paramount. Thus, the more oil flowed uninterrupted from the soil of Ogoni-land, the
more prosperous the oil companies and the state and the better it is for the Ogoni political
elites. There is therefore an unwritten alliance between international capital, the state and
the Ogoni elites represented by members of the KAGOTE. The political elites in Ogoni
therefore are not likely to serve the interest as the people of such interest do not make for
the prosperity of international oil companies and those who manage state affairs in
Nigeria. It is therefore not capable of lifting the people from their conditions of poverty
and deprivation. S.F. Nwika clearly made this point clear in a public lecture delivered to
Ogoni political elites in 1983; He observed that the last three years have been a period
marked by private prosperity in the midst of public poverty for the Ogoni people. While a
few Ogoni leaders have done exceptionally well for themselves and their families, within
the present political system, the nationality is probably worse off today than it was under
military rule.
He therefore concluded that our present-day leadership is prone to confused and
personal with group interest. This weakens the moral base of leadership. It is my strongly
held view that the problem of the Ogoni nationality in can be placed at the door of our
leaders. Most of our leaders faced for the first time by contract with enormous wealth
have forgotten their bearing and their people. A situation such as this is prone to throw up
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additional challenges; one of such challenges is disunity among the leadership. The
factionalization of leadership may result from the shift competition for state resources,
the type that would pitch one leader against the other(s). Saro-Wiwa (1995:51) makes this
point in the situation in Ojukwu’s rebel Biafra when he reveals that the mentality of the
educated Ogoni was always to keep close to the government of the day in order to pick
up crumbs from the master’s table. Accordingly, although Ojukwu’s rebel Biafran
government was hostile to the Ogoni as a people, the educated few were picking by
groveling off the feet of the administration.
There is thus, a tendency for most of the political elites to lean towards the
government of the day no matter how hostile the policies of that government may be for
the people as a collectivity. This may account for the rather cut throat competition for
government appointments as a means of guaranteeing self aggrandizement. Osaghae
(1995) alludes to the fact that the Ogoni elites are not united, he maintains that, the
Ogonis have fared better than most other minorities (including oil producing minorities in
appointment to top government positions, which is usually the yardstick for measuring
access to state power … since the creation of Rivers State in 1967, every clan in Ogoni
has produced one minister or more at the federal and state levels in addition to other top
political appointment.
It is rather exaggerating to say that every clan in Ogoni has produced one minister
or more at the federal level. The point remains that for the Ogoni political elite,
appointment to government position is not only a measure of one’s status but a
guaranteed access to the means of private accumulation of wealth. It is therefore a major
cause of the factionalization within the elites.
The movement for the Survival of Ogoni People was formed by a fraction of the
Ogoni Political elite in 1990 to establish a broad base approach to Ogoni leadership
question. It emerged as a new strategy to attract the attention of the government and oil
companies to its diminishing access to the means of private primitive accumulation of
wealth. It therefore sought the support of the mass of the people by appealing to their
poverty. As a means of facilitating its access to wealth or state controlled resources.
However, because of the cut-throat competition among the elite, it too became
14
factionalized with one group in strong alliance with the state and the other which did not
have state support radicalized.
In 1990, it had issued a Bill of Rights which demanded among others the
following:
1. Political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name, whether Ogoni State, province,
etc. through political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people;
2. The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources
for Ogoni development;
3. Adequate and direct representation as a right in all Nigerian national institutions;
4. The use and development of Ogoni language in Ogoni territory;
5. The full development of Ogoni culture;
6. The right to religious freedom;
7. The right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.
The Ogoni Bill of Rights was presented to the Nigerian people and government under the
dictatorship of General Ibrahim Babangida. Rather than address the issues raised, the
government merely acknowledge receipt a year after the document was received.
MOSOP was then compelled to issue a demand notice to shell to pay compensation for
environmental damages it caused in Ogoni land and pay royalties and mining rents to the
Ogoni people. The total demand involved amounted to 10 million U.S dollars. Shell
refused to pay and respond to MOSOP letters. What it did later was to rely on obnoxious
laws that are detrimental to the interest of Ogoni people. According to Shell, the demands
of the Ogoni people were outside the business scope of oil operating companies and
within the government’s sphere of responsibility. Their campaign is overtly political and
shell is being used to raise the international profile of the campaign through disruption of
oil operations and environmental accusation.
MOSOP followed up with a shopping list of things it expected shell to do for the
Ogoni people; but the company refused to cooperate. This non-compliance compelled
MOSOP to go international in 1992. The movement addressed the United Nations
Commission on Racial Discrimination and registered with the Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples Organization, (the only group in Nigeria to do so) in December 1992. It was
15
within this framework that Ogoni people celebrated the International year of Indigenous
Peoples, otherwise called the Ogoni Day, on the 4th of January 1993. The Ogoni struggle
was thus internationalized.
The Nigerian government responded with the arrest and detention of Ogoni
leaders and promulgated the treasonable offences Decrees 1993, outlawing the demand
for self-determination and propagation of sub-national ideas aimed at creating “a state
within a state”. Excerpts of the decree published in Newswatch May 24 define offences
that constitute treason as:
A person who levies a war against Nigeria in order to intimidate; or overawe the President and Commander-in Chief of the Armed forces or the Governor of the state is guilty of treason and liable on conviction to death sentence. A person, who utters any word, displays anything or publishes any material, which is capable of causing a community or section to engage in violence against a section of that community or another community is also guilty of treason. A Person, who unlawfully displays anything or publishes any material, which gives or creates the impression that a particular country, state or local government has been located or is being created or established out of Nigeria is guilty of treason. Similarly, guilty of treason is a ‘person, who files or exhibits in any open or public place in that part of Nigeria, state, local government, a flag whether or not the flag is of a national flag or is similar to the flag and represents that such a flag of the country, state or local government.
The Rivers State Government followed up with a similar edict. The editorial of
Newswatch Magazine of 29 May, 2006 maintained that the decree, which saw such
activities as treason, punishable with death, was aimed at Ogoni leaders and to stifle the
Ogoni struggle. Ogoni people already had a flag following their membership of U.N.P.O.
The Ogoni solidarity song was being sung in most quarters as an anthem and their
campaign for self-determination and demand for royalties were also misconstrued as
creating “a state within a state”. The government followed up with a policy of
encirclement. This included propping neighbours against the Ogoni people. Between
1993 and 1994, the Ogoni people were at war with the Andoni, the Ndoki and the Okirika
people. When this is added to the harassment by the security, fortes, the burden on a
collective struggle was clear. Ake intervened in the Ogoni – Andoni conflict and served
16
as the chairman of the peace conference. While efforts were on to disengage the
combatants, the Rivers State Government under Governor Rufus Ada – George hastily
arranged a peace agreement. As chairman of the peace conference, Claude Ake protested
this seeming haste. In a letter dated October 19, 1993 and addressed to Chief Rufus Ada-
George, Executive Governor of Rivers State on the peace agreement, Ake said he was
writing to express his misgiving about the peace agreement on the above conflict, which
was signed on October 6, 1993. He could have preferred to ignore it except that it raises
important issues and also because, having been publicly identified as the Chairman of the
peace conference, it is popularly assumed that he had something to do with it.
Ake’s concerns were that the ‘Peace Agreement’ was hastily arranged and
signed without consideration to the plight of the refugees or any show of compassion
for the dead and suffering. He added that it is ironic that we proceed with such haste
now when we took so long to disengage the combatants even after they had
unanimously called for peace deployment. It may be that the long delay was due to
circumstances beyond one’s control. But the fact is that most of the dying and
destruction occurred during this long interval. We should, at least, have offered an
explanation and expressed regrets.
This was indicting on the part of the Government. However, what was even more
indicting was Ake’s observation that the reports on the conflict have noted the scale and
systematic nature of the destruction as well as the sophistication of the operations. These
features raised questions about whether the conflict is merely communal and also the
possibility that the two communities might have been victims of some other forces
exploiting a local situation. It was surely in the interest of the communities as well as
national security to have looked more closely at these issues.
Ake further expressed concern that the agreement was signed without the prior
consultation with the people neither was it ratified by them. Even then, the agreement had
hastily added that were no outstanding issues as basis of conflict between the two
communities and proclaimed safe, passage for oil companies to operate in the area. The
implication of this was clear; the place must be made safe for oil activities to go on. It
17
also implied that what was important to government was not the suffering of the people
but the need to have unhindered access to oil. The policy of encirclement was also noted
in the class of the Ndoki where the administration of Dauda Komo appeared not only to
have facilitated the war but also to have rewarded the Ndoki people with amenities.
Although, government denied complicity in the crisis had been demonstrated by
the shooting of unarmed Ogoni farmers protesting the destruction of their farmland and
crops by soldiers who had accompanied Wilbros, an American contracting company to
Ogoni land, it was even clearer in the suppression of the report of the Major Taiwo
Commission of Enquiry into the Ogoni-Okirika water Front Conflict in December, 1993.
The various crises and the internationalization of the Ogoni struggle threw up a major
crisis in the leadership of MOSOP and pitied some moderate politicians and traditional
rulers against the younger, more radical elements in the movement.
The impetus was the 1993 Presidential Election. While a segment of the MOSOP
leadership had favoured a boycott of the election based on certain provisions of the 1979
constitution, which legalized the usurpation of Ogoni rights over their resources, a more
moderate segment was disposed towards participation. This moderate group was made up
with (mainly political elements in MOSOP) mostly members of the KAGOTE. While a
boycott was considered necessary in enhancing the international profile of MOSOP, and
its publicity, it was also needed to emphasize the focus of the Ogoni struggle by drawing
attention to the basic flaws of the constitution as it affects the oil producing minorities.
Fundamentally, the boycott was perceived as humiliation of the petit bourgeois
politicians in Ogoni land, in denying them an avenue for accumulation at the expense of the
Ogoni people. A boycott was advocated by more youthful and dynamic segment under K.
B. Saro-Wiwa. Saro-Wiwa endeared himself to Ogoni youths in his 20s when he opposed
the war of secession in Biafra by joining the Federal side. This was in contrast to the elders
like Chief Kobani, Dr. Leton, Mr. Baddey and Chief Kogbara, among others who were on
the side of Biafra. Again, in his days as a member of the State Executive Council, Saro-
Wiwa, did more than any other Ogoni leader in mobilizing the people for education in line
with the legacy of the Ogoni Central Union. It was even said that as Commissioner for
Education, he awarded scholarships to a lot of Ogoni youths to study in the universities. He
18
therefore facilitated the educational empowerment of the new generation of Ogoni youths.
In the voting that ensued, the Saro-Wiwa group won by 11-16 votes in favour of a boycott.
MOSOP was thus polarized with the resignation of most of the pioneer officials.
This development paved way for the more youthful elements to take over leadership
position in MOSOP and its subsequent reorganization around community-based
democratic structures; thus threatening the old power structure in Ogoni land.
According to I.S Kogbara, most elders of MOSOP felt that such situation would
spell the demise of MOSOP, as they would have no control of its components, not to
mention the unintentional exclusion from membership of many Ogoni who might not fit
into any of the independent organization.
With the emergence of more youths in the decision-making organ of MOSOP (the
steering committee) the organization emerged as a force for those who were hitherto
denied access to power and economic opportunities, including those who were denied
their rightful positions as Chiefs. MOSOP mobilized the people through the affiliate
community-based organizations to the extent that the basis, of the authority of the old
power elites (KAGOTE) was undermined. It was not only the authority of KAGOTE that
was threatened, its means of livelihood, its members were also put in jeopardy following
the harassment of Shell and the stoppage of oil exploration activities. It was of this ‘born
again’ MOSOP that Professor Ake spoke of when he stated that, MOSOP and Ogoni land
must survive and flourish for the sake of us all, for better or for worse; MOSOP and
Ogoni land are the conscience of this country. They have risen above our slave culture of
silence, and have found courage to be free and they have evolved a political
consciousness, which denies power to rogues, hypocrites, fools and bullies.
At the height of the confrontation between the State and oil companies on the one
hand and the Ogoni people represented by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni
People (MOSOP) on the other, a group of Politicians and Traditional Rulers of Ogoni
extraction put up a paid advertorial in the State government owned newspapers on May 4
1993, not only distanced themselves from the Movement activities but castigated its
leadership. They decided to register their anger and complete disapproval of the lawless
activities of certain elements in Ogoni who claim to be operating under MOSOP or the
19
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni people and apologized to the then Governor
Chief Rufus Ada George for the insult and disrespect organized and insinuated on him.
Similarly, the apology was extended to the Federal government for any embarrassment
caused to the nation and stated that they appreciated the steps being taken by the federal
government to address the issues of the development of oil producing areas in general
and Ogoni in particular (Saro-Wiwa, 1995:158)
Some of these individual were signatories to the Ogoni Bill of Rights and cannot
claim ignorance of the demands of Ogoni people presented by MOSOP. Saro-Wiwa
(1995:159) reveals that the stipulated cost of the advertorial was beyond the reach of the
advertisers, implying that they were sponsored by the state government which allowed
them free access to the state media. He also reveals that the Shell Petroleum
Development Company, the main target of MOSOP’s environmental campaign used the
same advertisement in international circles to portray Saro-Wiwa as not popular and that
MOSOP was working at cross-purposes with the Ogoni people. This notwithstanding, an
alleged Ogoni person under the false name of Baridan Lekara in a paid advertisement in
the influential Guardian Newspapers, on the 26th of September 1993 castigated the
leadership of MOSOP, saying that Ken-Saro-Wiwa is out to gain cheap popularity and
has brainwashed the people, promising each adult Ogoni 3 Million Naira reparation if the
struggle succeeds.
The same pattern of attack was made on the return to civil rule in 1999 by Ogoni
political elites who claimed to be Ogoni representatives in government. On return to civil
democratic rule in 1999, many had expected that the crisis of development in Ogoni-land
would be resolved. This was particularly so for the fact that many international
development agencies and Human Right groups had anchored the resolution of the crisis
in the return to democratic rule in Nigeria. This expectation was further raised when
President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice-President Atiku Abubakar paid visit to Ogoni
land on different occasions with the first two years in the life of the administration. Each
of these leaders was given high level civic reception and chieftaincy titles by Ogoni
traditional rulers and political elites. The visits came with a promise to normalize strained
relationship between the Ogoni people and Shell Petroleum Development Company
20
which had been forced out of the area of the height of the Ogoni agitation in 1993. This
promise brought to the fore old rivalries between fractions of the political elites. Those
serving in government who supported reconciliation with Shell and those opposed to
reconciliation, mainly remnants of the radical elements within the Movement for the
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).
In 1999, the Obasanjo administration appointed a commission to look into past
Human Right Violations under the military. It was headed by a renowned jurist, Justice
Chudifu Oputa. More than three thousand petitions were received from Ogoni alone,
(about three quarters of the total received by the commission). This was the only
government hoped to assuage the feelings of the people and pave the way for
reconciliation within Ogoni society. The success was limited. Those elected, in
government were not ready to commit class suicide. They kept up their antagonism
against the MOSOP which had now lost much of its potency caused by in-fighting and
desertion. In 2005, the Federal Government appointed Reverend Father Matthew Hassan
Kukah to facilitate reconciliation between Shell Petroleum, the government and Ogoni
people with a view to opening up the area for full economic activities. The whole process
was stalemated because of mistrust between the parties concerned.
The attempt by the Obasanjo administration to push through the commencement
of oil exploration on the eve of its departure was vehemently opposed by the radical
elements in MOSOP but was as expected, supported by the dominant political elites,
particularly those serving at the various levels of government. This pushed Ogoni back to
the brink of disaster. In a release issue by the Ogoni representatives in government on 14th
May, 2007, they applauded the efforts of government in tackling the Ogoni crisis. They
specially listed the following as the achievement of the civilian administration with
regard to the Ogoni crisis.
1. A visit by the President of Federal Republic of Nigeria to Ogoni land on May,
2007. During that visit, the President laid the foundation stone for the monument
of the Ogoni heroes, marking for the first time a concrete expression of the end of
internal hostilities within Ogoni land. The symbolism of this event was not lost on
the Ogoni people, in particular, and the nation in general.
2. Resettlement of the families of the Ogoni 13.
21
3. Incorporation of more Ogonis into Federal and State Government.
4. A visit by a delegation of nearly 100 Ogoni people spread across the length and
breadth of Ogoni land to meet with the President in Abuja.
5. Getting the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to undertake the
assessment study and subsequent clean up of Ogoni land.
For a people who have sacrificed so much, this is surprisingly an achievement;
particularly so, when put side by side with the demands in the Ogoni Bill of Rights. This
however, goes to show the extent of the division in Ogoni and the trend in loyalty of the
political elites. The situation is critical when seen in the context of the depth of the
bitterness and rivalry within the political class. The press release contained a catalogue of
attack on the more radical elements in the Movements for the Survival of Ogoni People
(MOSOP).
It said among other things that all Ogoni people know the role that MOSOP
played in the struggle against the dictatorship of the military. They claimed of improved
living condition since the return of democracy and maintained that the Rivers State
Government, has, by a succession of policies, exhibited its commitment to ending the
suffering and repositioning the Ogoni people to attain greater heights. They also claimed
that many key positions in the Rivers State Government were held by Ogoni sons and
daughters, and hundreds of kilometer of road networks existed in Ogoni land, not to talk
of the infrastructure that were on ground.
Apparently, a study conducted by Naanen and others on “progress of the Ogoni in
Nigeria towards the attainment of the International Development Targets for Poverty
eradication, education and health” in 2004 does not give room for optimism. Indeed, it
noted that the Ogoni, as an indigenous people, mainly minorities have been marginalized
just like other indigenous people elsewhere. Their powerlessness and exclusion in multi-
ethnic Nigeria has naturally translated into a corresponding magnitude of
underdevelopments.
This view notwithstanding, Ogoni representatives in government accused the
leadership of MOSOP of trading with the plight of Ogoni people, stating that the plight of
the Ogoni people has been turned into an industry ending this situation therefore creates a
22
vacuum for those whose relevance depends on it. We appreciate what the state and
Federal government have done for us in the last seven years. We remain committed to
collaborating with the government agencies, men and women of goodwill in ensuring the
best deal for the people of Ogoni. It accused the leadership of MOSOP of corruption and
lack of accountability and transparency, arguing that this has cost Ogoni people a great
deal.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing, we were concerned with identifying the most appropriate
theoretical model for dealing with the crisis of development and conflict in Nigeria’s
Niger Delta region. We specially looked at the Ogoni experience. We noted that the most
dominant model applied is the internal colonialism model. We observed, however that
scholars who apply this model do not take cognizance of its inbuilt class analysis and
thus see the situation specifically as a dichotomy between a majority-controlled state
system and a pauperized minority. We suggested that this approach is not adequate and
thus not appropriate. We then suggested the use of clientelism, bearing in mind the fact
that Ogoni is not only sectionally divided but also class divided. In the situation which
existed, the political elites were divided and most of them derive their status and power
from sources outside Ogoni society.
These sources may be related to oil multinational corporations or the state system.
It is these sources, which define the nature and character of the conflict in Ogoni and it is
this link which elites have with these sources that provide their major means of survival.
It is therefore no wonder that Ogoni elites have remained predominantly pawn in the
political system. The conflict between elected representatives and MOSOP at the
inception of democratic politics is a manifestation of the development and it is this too,
which underscored the killing of the four moderate Ogoni leaders on May 21, 1994. Will
history repeat itself? Only time will tell. It is an understatement just to say that there is
sectional and class division in Ogoni. The case is that the ordinary people have lost
power. There must be conscious effort to empower the people and in that process
empower the communities. The way to begin is to recreate the conditions for the
regeneration of the traditional economies of the people. By this, we mean the farming and
23
fishing activities for which the Ogoni people, once the food basket of Rivers State are
known. The ongoing process of environmental audit by the United Nations Environment
programme (UNEP) is welcome. It is the expectation that the environmental clean-up of
the area will also follow. We do hope the issue of gas flaring, oil spillages and other
forms of environmental degradation will be resolved so as not to endanger the flora and
fauna in future. Then, there will be need to follow up with the required injection of
resources into agriculture. To this end, communities should be organized on the basis of
clusters and particular agricultural products for which these clusters are known should be
identified and funded. The cluster communities should then be encouraged to form the
elected representative assemblies, the responsibility of which will be to manage the
cluster communities industries. These companies, specializing in the production,
processing and marketing of products of community industries, oil companies and the
various level of government will be expected to provide funding as well as technical
assistance while the communities provide land and labour. This type of public-private
partnership is expected to relieve the oil companies and governments of the burden of
providing jobs, social amenities and basic infrastructure for the communities and thus
help to minimize the level of conflict and violence in the area.
It is interesting to note that the Nigerian Federal Government has proposed a
Petroleum Industry Bill which is now being considered by the National Assembly. A key
ingredient in that Bill is the proposal to allocate ten percent equity in the oil industry to
the oil bearing communities. This is far from the clamour for resources control by the
communities of the Niger Delta. However, it can provide initial investment into the
cluster community agro-allied industries.
This proposal is expected to engender a period of economic empowerment
revolution in Ogoni. Once peoples are empowered economically, they are expected to
make political demands and seek representation in politics. This will end the dominance
of political clients who derive their power from outside Ogoni and have the political
affairs of the communities for personal aggrandizement. This will however work on two
conditions. First, the human capital base of Ogoni must be developed and expanded
through increase investment in public education. The current effort by the Rivers State
government in building and equipping model primary and secondary schools is
24
commendable. The government must however follow up by instating on the training and
posting of teachers to rural schools in Ogoni. It must also insist on monitoring and
evaluation of the performance of these teachers in partnership with community based
performance monitoring and evaluation committees in this context, government must
encourage the formation of viable civil society/community based organization as part of
its development agenda.
Beyond this, government must revive technical colleges and vocational education,
to pursuer for middle level technical manpower in the area. It must also encourage the
enthronement of community values and institutions and with that, the empowerment of
rural communities. This will give communities a greater say in their own affairs.
REFERENCES
Ake, C. Statement on the Ogoni – Andoni Conflict, April 1994, Port Harcourt.
Ake, C. Interview, Liberty Magazine, 1 April 1993, pg. 32.
Alberto, P. (1970). “Internal Colonialism or Clientelism Politics? The Case of Southern Italy”, Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 2, No. 3, July, 1979.
David, L. (1994). Ethnic Relations: A Cross-Cultural Encyclopedia. California : ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara.
Draft Press Statement: Report to MOSOP, 14 May 2007.
Eghosa, O. (1995). “The Ogoni Uprising and Oil Politics: Minority Agitation and the Future of the Nigerian State”.
Kenneth, M.C. R. (1979). “Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec” Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol. 2, No. 3, July 1979.
Kogbara, I. S., Interview in Newswatch Magazine, May 24, 1993.
Leton, E.B (1990). “Address at the Launching of the Ogoni Bill of Rights. Lagos: NUJ Light House.
MOSOP (1990). The Ogoni Bill of Rights. Port Harcourt : Saro’s International Publishers.
Naanen, B. (1999). “Nigeria: Ogoni, an Endangered Indigenous Peoples” Indigenous Affairs, April-June 1995.
Martin, N. M. (1997). Race and Ethnic Relations: America and Global Perspective. New York: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
25
Naanen, B. Appendix A, “Progress of the Ogoni people in Nigeria Towards the Attainment of the International Development Targets (IDTs) for Poverty, Education and Health”, in Richard Bourne, Invisible Lives, Undercounted Underrepresented and Underneath. The Socio-economic plight of Indigenous people in the Commonwealth CPS unit, May, 2003.
Naanen, B (2003). “History, Politics and the Niger Delta: A Reply to Bala Usman”, kiabara in the Journal of Humanities. Vol. 9 No 1, pp 13-21.
Newswatch Magazine, May 24, 1993.
Nna, N.J. (1999). Oil and the National Question in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Expreince. Ph.D Dissertation, submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria.
Nna, N.J. (1986). The Colonial Impact on the Political Economy of Tai, an Unpublished B.Sc Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria., June.
Nwika, S.F. (1982). This is not our Finest Hour. Key-note Address at the General Meeting of the Ogoni Nationally, held at Bori on Saturday 15th May 1982.
Saro-Wiwa, K. (1999). A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.
SPDC (1996). People and Environment, Annual Report.
The Guardian, Sept. 26, 1993.
The Ogoni Central Union, Constitution, Rules and Regulations
Wolpe, H. (1975). The Theory of Internal Colonialis’ The South African Case; Ivra Oxaol, Tony Barnett and David Booth (Ed) Beyond the Sociology of Department, Economy and Society, in Latin America. USA: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Dr Nekabari Johnson Nna is a Senior Lecturer in the Department Of Political and Administrative
Studies, Faculty Of Social Sciences, University Of Port Harcourt Port Harcourt, Nigeria. He Has
Published widely in both Local and International Journals in Political Science particularly and Social
Sciences generally.
26
THE READINESS OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CHANGE
Successful Nigerian organizations of the future must not only be efficient, effective, competent and competitive within any specific domain, but must be able to adapt, respond, manage change and turbulence in their environment. The paper seeks to identify factors that get managers and employees of manufacturing firms in Anambra and Enugu States ready for change management implementation. It examines equally whether middle managers in these organizations act as dinosaurs or dynamos of change management implementation. The survey research method was adopted. Data was collected from a population of 177 manufacturing organizations from the two states. The Yamane’s statistical formula was employed for sample size determination. Out of the four
readiness factors of change content, change context, change process, and individual attributes, individual attributes was ranked highest with a mean of 4.31. The paper reveals that middle managers in the organizations are not dinosaurs but dynamos of change management implementation. It recommends that those who will be affected by change management implementation must be involved in the work of structuring it from the outset with a view to identifying their interests, their knowledge, their attitude toward the change project and their mental state.
The management literature has claimed that the complexity of business activities
has made firms to confront hyper-competitive or high-velocity environments (D’Aveni
1994; Brown and Esienhardt, 1997) or shaped by jolts (Meyer et al, 1990). The Nigerian
corporate profile has not been spared in these phenomenal changes taking place all over
the world accentuated by the wave of globalization. Since 1990s, we have seen dramatic
changes in this direction, and its impact on business and corporate practice in Nigeria.
The environment for business has changed tremendously and so have the consequences
for business practices (Osisioma, 2004). These environmental features have been
exacerbated by a sudden opening of the markets to free competition accelerated by hyper-
competitivity among the business firms. In these circumstances, rapid adaptive and
organizational processes are essential to a firm’s survival and success. A myriad of
complex and often contradictory factors help determine who wins, who loses and how the
game is played. Moreover, many of these factors change, often abruptly and in
unpredictable ways-over time. Managers therefore must continually be alert to these
changes in the environment, as well as challenges and be prepared to take decisive action
when appropriate.
Ohmae (1999) asserts that the inevitability of globalization cannot be de-
emphasized pointing out that competition is increasing from all quarters and modern
corporations no longer have any place to hide. If they cannot compete globally they run
the risk of becoming extinct due to manufacturing inefficiencies or poor products and
service. Again customers are increasingly demanding more for less. They are putting
28
increased pressure on both the price and the quality of products and services that various
firms offer. This creates increased pressures for efficiency that many firms would prefer
not to face.
This is why managers must be skilled in change management techniques. There are
a number of reasons why managing change becomes inevitable in a hyper competitive
environment:
To change the direction of an organization in order to accelerate growth and
productivity.
To improve the performance of weaker divisions or units, and
To train and develop managers to adapt to changing conditions.
Organizations are designed to accomplish some objectives or functions and to
continue doing so for as long as possible. But change can affect all types of
organizations, from giants to the smallest business. No one can escape change. A change
in one part of the system will have an impact on one or more of the other parts. Drucker
(cited by Herbert (2002:2) succinctly puts it in corporate parlance: “Managers must learn
to build and manage a human group that is capable of anticipating the new, capable of
converting its vision into technology, products, processes and services, willing and able
to accept the new”. The challenge facing Nigerian organizations therefore is not to avoid
change and attain a state of changelessness. It is to manage change. That is seek change,
initiate it, keep looking for something new to do, something old to discard and do all
these with minimum disruption of the status quo, thus attaining a state of profitable
dynamic equilibrium. Organizations that do not change are forced to change from
existence to non-existence (Ejiofor, 1998). Given the prevalent and importance of
organizational change and the difficulty of successfully bringing it about, there has been
much debate over the last two decades in particular as the most appropriate way to
manage change (Pettigrew, 1990; Stacey 2003; and Dawson, 2003). There is a consensus
among academics and practitioners that organizations are facing unprecedented levels of
change and consequently the ability to manage change successfully should be a core
organizational competence (Cooper and Jackson, 1997). From the foregoing, the
following pertinent research questions become imperative:
29
Research Questions
From the foregoing the following research questions, could be deciphered.
What are the readiness factors that get organizational employees for change
management?
What is the level of commitment of the top management for change management
implementation?
To what extent is a middle level manager dinosaur or dynamos of change
management in organizations?
Research Objectives
Using Anambra and Enugu States as research areas, this study sought to investigate
the readiness of organizations for a successful change management. Accordingly, the
following research objectives were set for the study:
To identify factors that get organizational employees ready for change
management.
To examine the commitment of top management in crafting out a successful
change management.
To find out if middle managers in these organizations are dinosaurs or dynamos
of change management.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND REVIEW OF RELATED
LITERATURE
Organizational theorists worldwide might agree that readiness for change is often
the crux to any change management strategy (Armenakis, Harris and Mossholder, 1993).
If people are not ready for change, they tend to resist (Lewin, 1945; Prochaska et al,
1994). The key question for change agents appears to be how people get ready for
changes in their environment in such a way that they are eager to implement effective
changes within their organizations. Change is seen as a departure from the status quo. It
implies movement towards a goal, an idealized state or a vision of what should be and a
movement from present conditions, beliefs of attitudes. Readiness can be defined as
prepared mentally and physically for an experience or action (Merriam-Webster, 2005).
30
However, (Walinga, 2008) defines readiness as being at peace, tolerant or open to
change. Thus, change readiness is defined as the state in which one is best prepared to
change intentionally because one is best prepared for change in the environment, and the
challenge of change readiness becomes “getting managers ready to get employees ready
for change”. Readiness is arguably one of the most important factors involved in
employees’ initial support for change initiatives (Armenakis, Harris and Feild, 1999).
The concept of readiness may have been first introduced by Jacobson (1957), the
foundation for readiness as a unique construct has been embedded within several
theoretical models of the process through which change unfolds. Van de, Ven and Poole
(1995) synthesized change theories across several disciplines giving researchers
managers and organizational development professionals a theoretical means to better
understand the phenomenon.
Readiness takes its roots in early research on organizational change (Schein and
Bennis, 1965). Perhaps, the greatest challenge of change lies with the assumption in the
organization change literature that employees needed to “be made ready” for the change
that is imminent within the organization (Armenakis and Harris, 2002). Increasing
employee decisional latitude, participation and power often requires a further change in
managerial approach from authoritative to participative. Perhaps, more important than
facilitating employee readiness for change would be exploring how leaders can get ready
to get employees ready for change.
The theoretical basis for change readiness begins with early studies on creating
readiness “by reducing reassure to change”. Coch and French (1948) illustrated the power
of participation in their experiments involving garment workers. Experiments in creating
readiness involve proactive, attempts by a change agent to influence the beliefs, attitudes,
intentions and ultimately the behaviour of organizational members. At its core, it is
believed that change readiness involves changing individual recognitions (Bandura,
1982). Most change readiness models emphasize the importance of the need for
generating an awareness of the need for change and supporting people’s perceived ability
to change.
31
Defining change management is tough under any circumstances write Holland and
Skarke (2003) especially in the context at a new technology being implemented in an
existing organization. In its simplest sense, change management means the process of
helping an individual, group or organization change. Thus, change management implies a
purposeful effort to bring about change (Rothwell et al, 2009). Contributing, Kudray and
Kleiner (1997) define change management as the continuous process of aligning an
organization with its market place and doing it more responsively and effectively than
competitors. In their own commentary, Anderson and Anderson (2001) define change
management as a set of principles, techniques and prescriptions applied to the human
aspect of exerting major change initiatives in organizational settings. Its focus is not on
what is driving change (technology, reorganization plans, merger and Acquisition (M &
A), globalization etc.) but on how to orchestrate the human infrastructure that surrounds
key projects as that people are better prepared (ready) to absorb the implications affecting
them.
Readiness for Change
The change readiness model explores and elaborates on the gap between
preparation and action by asserting first that effective organizational change begins at the
individual level of analysis. Whereas social information processing models (Griffin,
1987) suggest that an individual's readiness to change may be shaped by the readiness of
others, the present research begins from the assumption that all organizational change
must first be enacted at the individual level and perhaps even more specifically at the
leadership level. Leaders, after all, are individuals. Ultimately, it would seem that all
change, whether organizational, individual, externally, or internally initiated, depends on
the individual's resolve or willingness to change. Edmondson and Woolley (2003)
discovered that variance in interpersonal climate and behavioural norms across different
work groups are likely to affect responses to a change program or other organizational
intervention, even when implementation methods are consistent in their delivery.
Researchers in the area of individual change or “personal transformation” have described
the individual change process in terms of unfreezing, moving, and refreezing (Lewin,
1951). Researchers have identified the “stages of change” (Prochaska et al., 1997), while
32
suggesting a variety of psycho-socio-emotional factors that may contribute to an
individual's movement from one stage to the next, including self efficacy, perceived
behavioral control, and social support (Lazarus and Folkman, 1987).
However, as these purposeful changes are introduced, differences and conflicts
between the organizational leaders and members may be confronted. For change to occur
in the direction that leadership desires, conflicts must be resolved such that organizational
members’ beliefs and cognitions align with those of the leaders (termed dialectical
change by Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). In essence, a state of readiness must be
developed. Therefore, it is not surprising that the assessment of readiness prior to the
introduction of change has been encouraged and several instruments have been developed
to fulfill that gap (Cunningham et al, 2002; Weeks et al, 2004).
These instruments measure readiness from one of several perspectives namely,
change process, change content, change context and individual attributes, (Jones,
Jimmieson and Griffiths, 2005). The change process refers to the steps followed in
implementation. One dimension of process can be the extent to which employee
participation is permitted. A second perspective is the organizational change content
which refers to the particular initiative that is being introduced (and its characteristics).
Content typically is directed toward administrative, procedural, technological or
structural characteristics of the organization. The third perspective is organizational
context. Context here consists of the conditions and environment within which employees
function. For example, a learning organization is one in which employees are likely to
embrace continuous change. The fourth and final perspective is the individual attributes
of the employees. Because of the differences between individuals, some employees are
more inclined to favour organizational changes than others may be. So in this paper;
readiness for change can be seen as a comprehensive attitude that is influenced
simultaneously by the content (i.e. what is being changed), the process (i.e. how the
change is implemented), the context (i.e. circumstances under which the change is
occurring) and the individuals (i.e. characteristics of those being asked to changed
involved. Collectively, it reflects the extent to which an individual or individuals are
cognitively and emotionally inclined to accept, embrace and adopt a particular plan to
purposefully alter the status quo.
33
Middle Management: Dinosaurs or Dynamos of Change Management
A central debate within the literature on middle management is whether the middle
management plays a destructive or productive role through the way it responds to and
tries to influence senior management. A search through the literatures shows that middle
management has more often than not been singled out as the primary locus for resistance
to change management (Biggart, 1977; Dopson and Neumann, 1998; Dopson and
Stewart, 1990). A frequent complaint of senior executives is that middle operating
managers fail to take actions necessary to implement strategy or that they interfere with
the implementation process by trying to manipulate the process. Added to this is the
pressure on organizations on cutting costs, being adaptable and flexible have made
middle management more vulnerable. More often, they are seen as adding costs and
obstructing information flow. And implementation problems connected to change
management issues are often heaped at the door steps of middle managers citing poor
understanding and commitment to strategy (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Guth and Mac
Millan, 1986).
However, recent studies have questioned this notion of “foot-dragging” middle
managers, suggesting that middle management can have an important role promoting and
facilitating change management strategy in organizations (Currie, 1999; and Huy, 2002).
This perspective views middle managers as strategic assets championing new ideas,
facilitating adaptability and synthesizing strategic information for senior managers in
formulating strategies (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Moreover, it argues that middle managers
can have a key role in implementing strategic intents because they are uniquely suited to
communicate the change across different organizational strata and above all, they can
address their employees’ emotions during change management. Leading scholars have
suggested that whether middle management takes a constructive or disruptive role
depends on its commitment to the strategy (Macmillan and Guth, 1985). In general, the
middle management’s strategic commitment depends on: how the contemplated strategy
fits with what the managers perceive as the interest of the organization; how it fits with
the managers’ own personal self-interest. It must be pointed out for middle managers’ to
behave like dynamos in the implementation of change management strategy, the top
34
managers must play their role very well. Huy, (2001) says that the main problem is that
the top managers fail to listen to their middle managers because they view them as
inherently resistant to change. Since senior managers ‘know’ middle managers resist
change, they only pretend to listen to them. Middle management in turn, learns that they
won’t be listened to, so they take the role as “the complaint child”. The above assertion is
in tandem with (Igwe, 2008:158) where it was pointed out that leadership and middle
management commitment were the key drivers to both success and failure toward the
realization of organizational competitive challenges such as productivity, performance
and profitability via organization development.
Whether middle management takes a constructive or destructive role also depends
on how top management defines its role in the implementation process. In studying a top-
down change, (Balogun and Johnson, 2004) find that senior management was largely
absent in operationalizing strategic intent. Rather than being active directors of change,
senior management became “ghosts” in the implementation process. In terms of structural
changes, this implied that top management outlined the new structure and left it to the
middle managers to develop the operational details of this structure in its absence (Meyer,
2006).
METHODOLOGY
The study adopted a survey design in order to facilitate the realization of the
research objectives as earlier stated (Eboh, 2009). The research frame utilized consists of
organizations in Anambra and Enugu States Southeastern Nigeria. The population of the
study was 177 manufacturing organizations. It is made up of 157 organizations registered
with Manufacturers Association of Nigeria and 20 other organizations not registered but
whose amount of capital was more than N20 million. The principal instrument for data
collection was the structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered to both
management and non management employees of 372 obtained from a population of 5407
employees using Yamane (1964) for sample size determination. The questionnaire
containing 31 questions with issues raised in the study was divided into two (2) sections:
section A and Section B. section A sought to collect bio-data of the respondents. Section
B dealt with the core subject matter. Structured questionnaire was considered inevitable
because of the population of the target respondents coupled with the technical nature of
35
the information sought. The researchers utilized open ended and check list questions. The
open ended questions were centred on change management readiness, the commitment of
top management and middle management in the implementation process. After
calculating the sample size, this value was allocated proportionally to the two states
depending on the proportion of the employees that came from each state using Kumar
(1976) proportional allocation formula. Again the questions were optioned using a five
point Likert type of responses namely: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and
strongly disagree. In addition to the primary data, secondary data were drawn from
published works and the internet.
Table 1.0: Distribution of Questionnaire among the two states
S/N State Number of
organizations
Number of personnel
in the organizations
Number of
questionnaire
served
1. Anambra MAN members
Non MAN members
135
14
4075
352
305
Total 149 4,427 305
2. Enugu MAN members
Non MAN members
22
6
852
128
67
Total 28 980 67
Grand Total 177 5407 372
Source: Field Survey, 2011.
36
Table 2.0: Distribution of respondents based on organizational level
S/
N
Organizational level Number of
respondents
Percentage
1. Upper management 52 14.0
2. Middle management 110 29.6
3. Lower management
Total management
92
(254)
24.7
4. Operatives 188 31.7
Grand total 372 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2011.
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The data collected from the survey were analyzed using frequency and percentages
to provide clues to the problems under investigation. This enabled the researchers come
up with the findings and recommendations. Out of the three hundred and seventy two
copies of questionnaire administered on respondents, (362) three hundred and sixty two
(97.31%) were retrieved in a usable form Eight (2.1%) were not returned and two (0.5%)
were not usable that is badly filled.
The demographic distribution of the respondents (organizations employees) is
shown below on table 3.0. The data on sex 215 or 59.4 percent of the respondents were
male while 147 or 40.6 percent were female. On marital status of the 362 respondents,
162 or 44.8 percent were single, 128 or 35.4 percent were married, 46 or 12.7 percent
were widowed, 18 or 4.9 percent of the respondents have separated from their spouses
while 8 or 2.2 percent claimed that they were divorced. Details on age, religion and
highest education of the respondents are shown on the table.
37
Table 3.0: Demographic characteristics of the 362 respondents
S/
N
Question Response Frequency Percentage
1. Sex? Male
Female
215
147
Total 362 100.0
2. Marital status? Single
Married
Widowed
Separated
divorced
162
128
46
18
8
44.8
35.4
12.7
4.9
2.2
362 100.0
3. Aged? Less than 20
21-30
31-41
41-50
51-60
Above 60
12
120
157
45
16
12
3.3
33.2
43.4
12.4
4.4
3.3
362 100.0
4. Religion? Christianity
Moslem
Other religion
325
30
07
89.8
8.3
1.9
362 100.0
5. Highest educational
qualification?
SSCE
RSA
OND
HND/B.Sc
M.A/M.Sc/MBA
Ph.D
55
-
75
160
72
-
15.2
-
20.7
44.2
19.9
-
362 100.0
Source: From the 362 questionnaire returned 2011.
38
Table 4.0: Ranking of Change Readiness Factor
S/N Factors N Mean ( Χ ) SD Rank
1. Change content 362 4.16 2.05 3
2. Change context 362 4.22 2.08 2
3. Change process 362 3.90 1.87 4
4. Individuals attributes 362 4.31 2.16 1
Source: Field survey, 2011. See Appendix III.
Key: N stands for total number of respondents
Χ stands for mean
SD stands for standard deviation
Table 4.0 shows the respondents’ ranking of the four readiness factors for change
management in the selected organization based on their mean importance. Individual
attributes of the employees ranked highest followed by change context with means of
4.31 and 4.22 respectively. Change context factor was third (4.16) and change process
was ranked least (3.90). This finding collaborates earlier researches by Van de Ven and
Poole, 1995; Weeks et al, 2004 and Jones, Jimmieson and Griffiths, 2005.
These writers assert that assessment of readiness prior to the introduction of change
is very essential for change management success. It has been suggested that a variety of
psycho-emotion factors may contribute to an individual’s readiness for change
management.
These are perceived behavioural control, self efficiency and social support
(Lazarus and Folkman (1987).
39
Table 5.0: Level of commitment of top management
S/N Response Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency
1. Very high 182 50.3 50.3
2. High 80 22.1 72.4
3. No opinion 36 10.1 82.4
4. Low 50 13.8 96.2
5. Very low 14 3.8 100.0
Total 362 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2011.
As shown on table 5, 182 (50.3%) and 80 (22.1%) of the respondents agreed that the
level of commitment of top management was very high and high respectively. However,
36 (10.1%) expressed no opinion. 30 (13.8%) and 14 (3.8%) responded that the level of
commitment by leaders of organization was of low and very low respectively. This result
reveals that change readiness in the part of the employees can be enhanced greatly by the
commitment of the top management/leaders in the organization. Edmondson and
Woolley (2003), discovered that variation in international climate and behavioural norms
across different work groups in organizations are likely to affect response to change
program or organizational intervention, Griffin, (1987) agreed with the above assertion
when he suggested that an individual’s readiness for change can be shaped by the
readiness of others, especially the top leaders.
40
Table 6.0: Middle level managers as Dinosaurs
S/
N
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative
frequency
1 Strongly agree 40 11.0 11.0
2 Agree 43 11.9 22.9
3 No opinion 25 6.9 29.8
4 Disagree 72 19.9 49.x
5 Strongly disagree 182 50.3 100.0
Total 362 100.0
Source: Field survey, 2011.
As evidenced on table 6, 40 (11.0%) and 43 (11.9%) of the respondents agreed that
middle level managers are dinosaurs (that is they ‘foot drag’ on change management
implementation. Only 25 (6.9%) expressed no opinion on the issue. However, there was a
sharp distinction as 72 (19.9%) and 182 (50.3%) of the respondents disagreed and
strongly disagreed respectively. This finding contradicts earlier researches on the issue by
Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Gouth and Macmillan, 1986) who submitted that
implementation problems connected with heaped management are often heaped at the
door steps of middle level managers.
Table 7.0: Middle level managers as Dynamos
S/
N
Response Frequency Percent Cumulative frequency
1 Strongly agree 203 56.1 56.1
2 Agree 102 28.2 84.3
3 No opinion 12 3.3 87.6
4 Disagree 30 8.3 95.9
5 Strongly disagree 15 4.1 100.0
41
Total 362 100
Source: Field Survey, 2011.
As indicated on table 7, 203 (56.1%) and 102 (28.2%) of the respondents respectively
strongly agreed and agreed. 12 (3.3%) of the respondents had no opinion on the matter.
However, 30 (8.3%) and 15 (4.1%) of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree
respectively. There are some similarities between the findings of this study and the
findings of earlier researchers on middle level managers in implementing change
management strategy. This is consistent with the findings of (Currie, 1999 and Huy,
2002) who view middle managers as strategic assets, championing new ideas and
facilitation of adaptability of change implementation strategy. However, (Culbert and
McDonough, 1980) emphasized that for middle level managers’ to behave like dynamos
in the implementation of change management process, the top managers must play their
role accordingly too. After all, it takes two to tango.
CONCLUSION
Organizational leaders and managers are regularly faced with challenges in
attempting to effectively steer their organizations or teams through rapidly changing
conditions in the environment. The key drivers of change readiness and management is
an ability to treat as reality the individual attributes on the characteristics of employees
being asked to change and the role of middle managers as dynamos of change
management implementation.
RECOMMENDATIONS/SUGGESTIONS
Without expecting managers to be psycho-analysts, it is useful to realize that
creating organizational readiness for change involve proactive attempts to influence the
beliefs, attitudes, intentions and ultimately the behaviour of organizational member. With
this in mind, the following recommendations become relevant:
Generating an awareness of the need for change is necessary to determining the
extent of the problem at hand. If the people affected by the change do not perceive
genuine awareness, readiness will not be there and implementation resisted.
42
Engagement of top management goals and support are a sine qua non for a
successful change management readiness. A clear innovation goal should be
articulated so that employees will know that they are expected to initiate, and
adopt new ideas. Lack of management genuine support is one of the most frequent
causes of implementation failure.
Need to overcome resistance: No matter how impressive the performance
characteristics of a change management strategy are, its full implementation is
bound to conflict with some entrenched interests and jeopardize some alliances in
the organization. This is because employees may be uncertain about the impact of
the proposed strategy on their careers and thus may not be disposed mentally or
emotionally to support it. This can be reduced with open communication - not
information.
Planners of change management techniques should never treat with kid gloves the
perceived destructive dynamics of middle management. Their early and extensive
participation should be part of the implementation strategy.
Need to foster ideas champions in the organization is one of the most effective in
winning change management battles. The idea champion sees that all technical
activities are correct and ready. Middle management sponsors are also needed to
move the idea through for effective implementation.
Finally employees or even middle managers who are passing through major life
transitions such as bereavement, relocation hassles, redundancy threats, e.t.c. are
never ready for organizational change. This is because such people may view the
new strategy as the ‘last straw’ and consequently their coping mechanisms and
psychological resources may collapse.
43
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APPENDIX I
DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRE AMONG THE TWO STATES.
S/
N
State Number of
Organizations
No. of Personnel in
the Organizations
No. of Questionnaire
Served
1 Anambra MAN members
135
Non-MAN
members
14
Total
4075
352
4,427 305
47
149
2 Enugu MAN members
22
Non-MAN
members
06
Total
28
852
128
980 67
Grand Total 177 5,407 372
Source: Field Survey, 2011 and Statistical Analysis
Sample size determination
Using Yamane (1964) formula
n =
N1 + N (e2 )
Where
n = Sample size
N = The finite population
e = Level of significance/limit of tolerable error.
I = Unity (a Constant)
Substituting
n =
54071 + 5407 (0 .0025 )
=
54071 + 13 .5175
48
=
540714 . 5175
= 372 . 45
372
APPENDIX II
Questionnaire Distribution Format: Applying Kumar (1976) proportional or allocation
formula for the two states.
nh = n (Nh )
N
Where
nh = Group population from each stratum
n = Overall sample size
N = The overall population
nh = Sample size from each stratum, in this case each state.
For Anambra State:
nh = n (Nh )
N
= 372(4427 )5407
=
16468445407
= 304.58
For Enugu State:
nh = n (Nh )
N
= 372(980 )5407
49
=
3645605407
= 67.42
Checking
Anambra state - 304.58
Enugu state - 76.42
372.00
Computation of 5-point livert state
X = 5 x4 x3 x2 x15
= 3 . 0
APPENDIX III
COMPUTATION OF CHANGE READINESS FACTORS
Change Process Factor
X Respondents
Frequency
(F)
FX
5 170 750
4 100 400
3 60 180
2 30 60
1 22 22
N= 362, X =
Σ FXN =
1412362
= 3 .90
Change Content:
X Respondents FX
50
(F)
5 170 830
4 110 440
3 60 180
2 12 24
1 10 10
1504
X = ∑ Fx
N≈
1504362
= 4 .16
Change Context
X Respondents
(F)
FX
5 173 865
4 120 480
3 50 150
2 15 30
1 4 4
362 1504
X = ∑ Fx
N≈
1529362
= 4 .22
Change Content
X Respondents
(F)
FX
5 183 915
4 130 520
3 30 90
2 15 30
1 4 4
362 1504
51
X = ∑ Fx
N≈
1559362
= 4 .31
Computation of Variance for change process with X = 3.90
Chad, the percentages were 46% and 64 percent respectively in 2002 (Cilliers, 2003).
Poverty still stands as a serious threat to the wellbeing of CEMAC citizens.
In the areas of peace and security CEMAC has no effective security agency that
can overcome the threat to peace and security as seen in ECOWAS where we have
ECOMOG. In this light, whenever there is a security problem in the region, member
states are not always willing to deploy troops to overcome such threats. A clear example
is that of Central Africa Republic in 2002 where Gabon was the only country that
dispatched troops to overcome the instability in the country. This lack of effective
CEMAC support in times of threat could also be seen in the case of Chad where no
support was given by member states to end the strife there. The ineffectiveness of
CEMAC to handle such security issues has been of negative consequences to the
development of the region.
CEMAC is also faced with rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2007, the prevalence
among the sexually active population of the region was 4.6 %, compared to 1.3% in the
developing countries. Malaria is a pandemic that pose serious threat to the region, it is the
most deadly disease in the region. Infant mortality rate in the region is also high as
compared to the rate given for developing countries. Mortality related to both pandemics,
that is, HIV/AIDs and Malaria has significantly affected the regions life expectancy
which is 51.1 years compared to 65.4 years in developing countries and 54.2 years in
Africa as in 2007 (World Health Organization, 2007). This has depopulated the region
thereby weakening economic activities which would have led to the development of the
region.
Environmental Constraints
Apart from the environmental issues related to the preservation of the ecosystem
in central Africa, oil pollution is a particular threat to the development of the region. The
Gulf of Guinea which is located in the CEMAC region is very rich in oil production and
this has worked negatively to the region due to poor management of oil waste. This waste
imperils the region’s marine waters and ecosystems. As a result, it is a threat to
agricultural production such as fisheries; the health of the populations and other habitats.
Prospects
67
So far, CEMAC has had growth-retarding phases in the pursuit of its objectives.
Drawing inspirations from the steering committee of CEMAC’s institutional reform
programme, which examined the reports at meetings in Yaounde on November 2006,
Douala in January 2007 and Bata in February 2007; in collaboration with recent
developments in CEMAC, it shows that CEMAC has the following prospects:
- CEMAC is a pivotal region in Africa and it is the only region sharing boundaries
with all regions of the continent: Western (ECOWAS and CEN-SAD), Northern
(AMU and CEN-SAD), Eastern Northern (AMU and CEN-SAD), Eastern (EAC,
COMESA, IGAD and CEN-SAD) and southern Africa (SADC). The region thus
ensures the physical continuity of African spatial integration. This geo-strategic
position of this sub-region gives it greater economic development potential,
owing especially to oil from the Gulf of Guinea, vast metal and mineral deposits,
enormous water resources in the Congo-Oubangui-Sangha Basin and the Great
Lakes e.g. the Lake Chad Basin. If all these resources are well managed by
CEMAC, it will enable CEMAC to attain its objectives fully;
- The emergence of Equatorial Guinea as an important actor on the regional stage
could progressively erode the powers Gabon and Cameroon play in the region in
the near future;
- CEMAC achievement would vary remarkably once good infrastructures are built
within the region. To booster this, countries within the region need to popularised
CEMAC objectives to their citizens and as well abide to CEMAC principles;
- The future of CEMAC shows that the integration scheme though haven’t been
very successful as intended, it will move on progressively should CEMAC leaders
implement objectives and reforms agreed upon effectively;
- CEMAC should endeavour to popularize it principles and values to the CEMAC
member states. This will help the masses to understand the rationale that CEMAC stands
for and as well help CEMAC attain its goals effectively;
- If CEMAC member states carry on positive political reforms in their individual
countries, it will help give these states good legitimacy as they carry on their activities
with CEMAC. Such genuine democracy would facilitate the realisation of CEMAC goals
since the masses would be involved in the formation and implementation of policies;
68
- CEMAC members should stop depending on their former colonial masters if they
must attain their goals in the integration-scheme. They should adopt ideals of good
governance with the aim of ensuring that intra-trade in the region grows;
- Infrastructural development within CEMAC will foster intra-trade in the region. It
will also make the region to fully utilize all the advantages it has in the continent due to
its geo-strategic positions in the continent; and
- Multiple-membership in different integration schemes by CEMAC members can
turn out to be positive to CEMAC should member states devote full commitment. This is
because they will be able to share good experiences acquired in different schemes while
in CEMAC and it will help advance CEMAC greatly. Due to their poor commitment at
present, duplication of integration should not be encouraged because it hampers the
vision of CEMAC.
Conclusion
The quest for development in the CEMAC sub-region has been the main driving
force behind CEMAC. This goal has hardly been attained in the sub-region because of
numerous problems that member-states face. For CEMAC to fully, attain its development
objectives as seen in its principles, member states need to devote full commitment to the
policies of the sub-region. By doing this, they will be more united to initiate and
implement policies that will lead to development. This will be the first step of
overcoming the other challenges which emanates because member states are not fully
committed to CEMAC. In this light, infrastructural development which foster good trade
relations between countries in regional bloc(s) will be achieved and this will act as spill
over to the acquisition of other better things in the region. CEMAC will use its geo-
strategic position in the continent well if it embarks on reforms that leads to development
as proposed in the recommendations below.
Recommendations
- CEMAC member states should adopt developmental state approach which gives
them power to act independently, this will enable them to effectively work
towards the attainment of development which is the prime goal of CEMAC;
69
- They should invest more on infrastructural development e.g. road networks
linking all the countries in the sub-region, communication networks and many
others that foster socio-economic development;
- Member states should devote full political commitment to the sub-regional body;
- CEMAC values and principles need to be well popularised to its citizens so as to
enable its legal, functional and institutional ideals work smoothly;
- All CEMAC members should respect treaties signed and not respect only those
that are in their favour;
- CEMAC members should devote more of their resources on the improvement of
technical and training sectors (educational sector);
- They should collectively fight against environmental pollution that pose threat to
habitants in the region e.g. oil waste pollution; this will help to improve
agriculture (food production) and the wellbeing of people; and
- CEMAC should work strongly with other regional groupings in Africa to ensure
good intra-trade relations among countries in the continent.
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Owona Nguinni E.M. (2006). La Guinee Equatoriale en perspective vues, visees et vision geopolitique.
Oyeijide, T. Ademola ((2000). Policies of Regional Integration in Africa. Abidjan-Cote-D’Ivoire: African Development Bank.
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Godlove Aka Binda Is Of The Department Of Political Science And Public Administration, University Of Buea, Buea S.W.R. Cameroon. Godlove Aka Binda Is A Research Fellow At The University Of Buea.
GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE VITAL INGREDIENT FOR BUSINESS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA
The 2007 presidential election brought into sharp focus the numerous challenges that Nigeria faces in her quest to achieve sustained growth and development. According to expert observers, the low turnout at polling stations attested to the fact that most Nigerians have over the years become disenchanted with the performance of past administrations in economic development and empowerment. As elsewhere in Africa, people are beginning to realize that the dramatic words and phrases that politicians dole around only provides a platform for temporary crowd pleasing and ego satisfaction, and that they cannot solve any fundamental problems nor satisfy their aspirations for a better life. Some of these pronouncements are, at best sheer demagoguery, and at worst, criminal hypocrisy. There are many like Adebayo Adedeji, who believes that the solution to Nigeria’s problems may remain unresolved, if the country does not get its leadership right. This paper therefore aimed at giving an overview of doing business in Nigeria. The researcher gives the general information about Nigeria, her culture, communication, economy, forms of business in Nigeria and its challenges. We recommend, amongst others that government should improve on the energy sector of the economy by resorting to the development of alternative source of power like the solar system since it is one the major problems facing business operators in Nigeria
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT NIGERIA
Nigeria is situated in West Africa. It borders the Gulf of Guinea and lies between
Benin and Cameroon. Nigeria is also bordered by Chad and Niger in the North. Its
capital(s) is Abuja, and has a population of 152 000 000 according to 2010 census. Her
area is 923768Km2, Coastline: 853Km, Language(s): English, Hausa, Ibo, Fulani and
Yoruba, ISO Code: NG, her currency is 1 naira = 100 kobo, her time zone is
1 EZEIBE Christian Abd and 2Osadebe Nnabuike1 Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka. Nigeria.
2Lecturer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria
Nsukka, Nigeria.
Abstract
This paper unravels the rationale behind the non implementation of the Justice Uwai’s electoral reform recommendations in Nigeria. After a decade of observation of Nigerian electoral caricature, the author analyzed the challenges of electoral reforms in Nigeria
84
from a historical perspective. Our major finding is that political leaders in Nigeria assume their positions through questionable means (electoral malpractices), hence, attempt to make electoral reforms is stalled by political leaders (lawmakers and even when actualized, they are thwarted by the executive during implementation). The paper observed that the Justice Uwai’s electoral reform recommendations were not implemented because the political leaderships in Nigeria are not ready to welcome total transformation of the political system.
Dissatisfaction with electoral practices is no longer limited to voters in Europe
and America; it is no longer a late nineteenth century phenomenon, it has been
transported to Africa and other parts of the third world in the 21st century. In fact, we live
in the era of highly competitive elections with relatively close margins of victories, when
political parties have recognized the need for greater order and stability within the
electoral system (Ware, 2002).
Since the end of cold war, the global spread of democratic government has
created a tremendous sense of possibility in many African countries that were long
dominated by autocrats, closed and corrupt regimes. Lewis (2005) rightly noted that
elections serve as an important tool for holding leaders to account and promoting
transparency of government. Indeed, open, fair and competitive elections have become a
litmus test for distinguishing democracies from other types of governments, many of
which would like to claim the label of democracy without honoring its requirements.
In Africa, many new democracies face immediate challenges of survival, as
governments struggle to maintain constitutional rule and electoral processes that are
threatened by conflict, military coups, or aspiring dictators waiting in the wings. Nigeria
face repeated episodes of election rigging, political violence, and disorderly
administration of elections in 1999, 2003, 2007 and more or less 2011.
The electoral system in Nigeria is technologically and administratively inadequate
and considered unfair (Jega, 2005). In discharging the aforementioned responsibilities in
course of administering elections, Nigerian election bodies have also faced many
persistent problems, which have portrayed them as ineffective, inefficient, and somewhat
85
fraudulent. According to (Jega, 2005), these include the following: lack of rational and
transparent criteria in the registration of parties and in the screening of candidates for
elections; fraudulent methods of compilation and/or display of the voters’ register; late
commencement of registration or inadequate time for both registration and display of the
voters’ register, or even improper display, characterized by omissions, placement in
wrong polling areas; inadequate logistics preparation in provision and distribution of
polling stations/booths and ballot boxes; under-funding; influence/interference/control
by the executive arm; bad officiating including false/fraudulent counting, entries and
declaration of results; inadequate personnel and lack of proper training of staff ; poor
remuneration of staff, which results in consequent lack of motivation and which often
induces corrupt practices ; partisan appointment; lack of administrative and financial
autonomy of the electoral bodies from the executive arm of government; the role of
police, army and other security agencies in election administration has been inefficient,
corrupt and often counter-productive; the role of the judiciary in adjudication has been, in
many cases undesirable.
Notably, the security system is highly compromised such that the police, army
and some other security agencies were used to ensure safe electoral malpractice. Despite
these inadequacies, Osinbajo (2010:2) observed that ‘there is almost complete absence of
sanctions and punitive measures on electoral offenders’. In fact previous elections in
Nigeria provide copious materials for reflection and analysis and in any event are
probably more relevant to our present circumstances and the future.
Again, Peter M. Lewis argued that the most obvious liability of troubled elections
is that political choices are foreclosed and if elections are not fair and transparent,
citizens lose personal confidence in their political influence. Most Nigerians have become
disillusioned by flawed electoral processes and have consequently withdrawn into apathy
or cynicism.
Electoral reforms become inevitable to overcome these electoral shortcomings.
Electoral reform may sound pretty small within such a grand vision but electoral reform
is the key, the opening up the political system, the means for restoring hope and
confidence to the Nigerian people (Princeton N. Lyman, 2005). Electoral reform is an
urgent challenge for Nigeria’s developing democracy. Controversies over past elections
86
have undermined previous regimes and dissents over elections can be a divisive influence
with serious consequences for political stability and national development.
After an elaborate review of the recommendations of the Justice Uwais-led
Electoral Reform Committee which many Nigerians considered inevitable in order to
ensure free and fair election in Nigeria, we noted that the political leadership in Nigeria
appears to have swept under the carpet both the legal and institutional reforms
recommendations of the committee. We analyzed the challenges of electoral reforms in
Nigeria from a historical perspective.
Overview of Electoral Reforms in Nigeria
Oyediran has aptly observed that,
Elections in Nigeria, with the possible exception of the 1959 and 1979 elections, have been a recurring source of disputes, strong arm tactics, crises and conflict. Electoral crisis characterized by abuses of the electoral process by political parties, and refusal to accept electoral verdicts have had deleterious effects on democracy in Nigeria (1981: 103)
Today, the observations of Oyediran have become even more realistic as both pre
and post election periods in Nigeria could be likened to civil war periods in Somali or
Sudan with fierce violence, brutality and waste of lives and property.
The aspirations of Nigerians for stable democracy have been constantly frustrated
by, among other things, poor administration and the conduct of elections. It is widely
recognized that elections are among the most important pillars of democracy. In Nigeria,
election administration has been profoundly inefficient, characterized by muddled
processes, and lacking in the desirable attributes of ‘free and fair’ elections, a situation
which often induces acrimony and even violence (Jega, 2005)
Historically, electoral formation in Nigeria started with the 1914 amalgamation
of the Northern and Southern protectorates (Crowder, 1966). Meanwhile, electoral law
was formally introduced under the 1922 Clifford’s Constitution, which allowed the
election of only four (4) natives into the parliament (Ogbonna, 2005). These conditions
limit popular franchise (universal adult suffrage), and is constantly subjected to electoral
reforms.
87
In the post independent era in Nigeria, electoral reforms under the presidential
system of government in 1963 allowed for multi-party system. Six parties were formed
for the elections including Nigeria People’s Party (NPP) headed by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe,
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Great Nigeria Peoples’ Party
(GNPP) controlled by Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri, Peoples’ Redemption Party (PRP) managed
by Mallam Amino Kano and National Advance Party (NAP) headed by Dr Tunji
Braithwaite (Ogbonna, 2005). In 1964 the electoral body, called Federal Electoral
Commission (FEC), was headed by Mr E.P. Esua and appointed by the then Governor-
General, Rt. Hon. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The elections at the time were grossly marred by
malpractices and crisis in the Western region between 1963 and 1965 (Crowder, 1966).
It is the anomalies of this era that necessitated subsequent electoral reforms which persist
till date (Ogbonna, 2005).
Today political reforms have opened political space in which citizens can more
easily speak their minds, express their concerns, organize for common interests, seek out
information, join political associations and parties, and choose their leaders through
election. According to Osinbajo:
…outright rigging of elections in Nigeria began with the general elections in 1964…, despite an all-party consensus to ensure a free and fair election… The UPGA in sworn affidavits submitted to the President of the Republic, showed how the agreements to lift bans on public meetings were breached, how permits for rallies in the North were denied and mass arrests of their candidates and polling agents in the North…(2010:1)
Alongside all these are other problems that resulted to the first military coup in
Nigeria. With the military in power, the development of the Nigerian electoral law
simply stagnated as the Constitution is usually suspended by military governments and
efforts at reforms were dictates of the military leaders.
Further attempts at electoral and political reforms were initiated by the General
Murtala Mohammed regime in October 1975. The Constitutional Drafting Committee
was mandated to strengthen and streamline the presidential system’s principles and
practices. The demise of the then leader resulted to the emergence of General Obasanjo
as the new leader. He instituted a Constituent Assembly that debated and legitimized the
88
draft on 6th October, 1977 which resulted to the 1979 Constitution. In accordance with
the 1979 Constitution Drafting Committee recommendation headed by Chief Rotimi
Williams and subsequent 1979 Constituent Assembly recommendations by Justice Udo
Udoma, the electoral body in a reformation was simply recoded Federal Electoral
Commission (FEDECO) which functioned between 1978 – 1983 and held the 1979
election under the headship of Chief Michael Ani (Ogbonna, 2005).
The election under the military regime allowed multi-party contest among five
parties. The parties include the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the United Party of
Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian Peoples’ Party (NPP), the Great Nigerian Peoples’ Party
(GNPP) and the Peoples’ Redemption Party (PRP). The difference between the past
elections and that of the 1979 was not far-fetched, namely military determination of
electoral results. The same was the case of 1983 elections stage-managed by the then
civilian regime under the Chairmanship of Retired Justice Ovie Whisky; the crisis
ensuing brought back the military.
Under the General Babangida military regime, a group of 17-member Political
Bureau was setup on January 13, 1983. On September 7, 1987, a 46-man Constitution
Review Committee (CRC) was established to use the report of the Bureau for the review
of the 1960, 1963 and 1979 Constitutions. Sequel to the final reports obtained, a 563-
member Constituent Assembly headed by Justice Anthony Aniagolu was initiated on
May 11, 1988 to review and ratify the report of the Constitution Review Committee. Out
of the total number, 113 members were nominated by the government. Despite the
efforts made, the reforms failed to provide the much desired result, as electoral
malpractices persist . After the reform activities, the electoral body was renamed
National Electoral Commission (NEC) and existed between 1987 and 1993 under the
chairmanship of Professor Eme Awa and later, Professor Humphrey Nwosu, who finally
organized the 1993 elections.
Nwankwo (1992) noted that the military President gave guidelines for the formation
of political parties. The coalition groups were reduced to thirteen (13) and only six (6)
finally succeeded to scale the hurdles for party registration.
At the inception of General Abacha’s regime, the amended Decree 3 of 30 April,
1994 as recommended by the Constitutional Conference gave way to Decree No 4 of 24
89
June, 1994. It enabled for the constitution of 380 members, with nine (9) elected
delegates per state totaling 273, and three (3) government nominees per state totaling 94,
as well as other stakeholders.
The result of the reform was that the electoral body was renamed National Electoral
Commission of Nigeria (NECON) which existed between 1995 and 1998, and it allowed
for the return of multi-party system. The parties registered include the Congress for
National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), Grassroots Democratic
Party (GDP), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN) and the United Nigeria Congress
Party (UNCP).
The exit of General Abacha in 1998 paved way for the General Abdulsalam
Abubakar regime. He instituted a Constitution Debate Coordinating Committee headed
by Justice Niki Tobi to fine-tune the past Constitutions for the projected 1999
Constitution under which the 1999 elections were conducted. It created the electoral
body, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) through a decree in 1998
which was legalized under section 153 (f) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria. Retired Justice Ephraim Akpata was the first Chairman and
conducted the 1999 election that produced Chief Olusegun Obasanjo with nine parties
contesting.
Dr Abel Guobadia was appointed INEC Chairman in 2000 and served up until May
2005 with thirty (30) political parties contesting. Subsequently, Prof Maurice Iwu
succeeded him and has recently been removed from office. Party registration increased
to forty-two (42), and Chief Obasanjo’s incumbent government was returned for the
second tenure. The government instituted the National Political Reform Conference on
February 21, 2005 which produced though hurriedly, the current 2006 Electoral Act used
for the 2007 elections with 51 parties contesting. The anomalies in the electoral system
were witnessed by observers across the globe and even affirmed by the beneficiary,
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, thus the need for electoral reforms currently being
organized.
Osinbajo (2010) avers that the major election rigging tactics deployed by the INEC in
connivance with the PDP was that of unlawful exclusion of validly nominated candidates.
This tactics was effectively used to exclude validly nominated candidates of ANPP, AC
90
and APGA in the 14th of April (2007) gubernatorial elections in Anambra State, and the
AC’s candidate in the Delta state gubernatorial elections. In 2010, political party
registration climaxed to fifty-nine (59) and still counting.
The Justice Mohammed Uwais- led Electoral Reform Committee in Nigeria
From assumption of office, President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua acknowledged the
weaknesses of the electoral process that brought him into office and vowed to make
serious electoral reforms to address the salient issues. In view of that, a 22-member
Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) headed by retired Justice Mohammed Uwais was
appointed on August, 2007. The Committee commenced work with identification of
areas necessary for reforms before embarking upon consultations with relevant
stakeholders. Assuring Nigerians of the all-embracing efforts in consultations, the
Committee chairman, Uwais quoted by (Idonor, 2008) explained that the Committee
consulted widely with individuals, institutions, state and local government and received
1,466 memoranda while public hearings were held in 12 selected states and the Federal
Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja with about 907 representations. Experts from 11 countries
and past leaders were also consulted in arriving at the report. On the receipt of the report
on December 12, 2008, President Yar’Adua asserts that the focus of the electoral reform
is predicated on the belief that elections are the very heart of democracy.
Recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee
Recommendations made by the Committee as noted by Onuorah (2009) and
Anenih (2009) are listed below.
1. For a truly independent and impartial INEC, there is the need for the appointment
of a Chairman, Deputy Chairman and six persons of unquestionable integrity one
of who must come from each of the six geo-political zones. Six other nominees
are to be nominated from Organized Labour, the Nigerian Bar Association, the
Media, National Youth Council, Nigerian Civil Society and Women
Organizations. The appointments are to be made by the Judiciary subject to
confirmation by the Senate.
91
2. To ensure free and fair election, Option A4 designed in the form of Open Secret
Ballot System should be adopted
3. Funding of INEC should be channeled from the First-Line-Charge of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the federation so that finance of election will not
be hampered by bureaucratic delays in release of funds. This will also ensure
administrative and financial independence that will ensure the independence of
INEC.
4. Unbundling of INEC to also have the Political Parties Registration and
Regulatory Commission (PPRRC). While INEC faces the herculean task of
organizing elections, the PPRRC will supervise political parties’ activities in
terms of registration, revalidation, funding compliance, annual auditing, internal
democracy, mass participation, among others.
5. Abolition of the State Independent Electoral Commission (SIEC) which the
Committee argues is the major source of distortion at the state and local
government levels, while federal INEC should organize all elections.
6. New funding parameters for political parties on the basis of attaining at least 5%
of votes cast to be eligible to receive grants from public funds.
7. Establishment of the Electoral Offences Commission (EOC) to deter the electoral
officers and participants from electoral malpractices. The Commission is to
investigate and prosecute offenders.
8. Establishment of Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) to undertake broad civic
and political education for legislators, political office-holders, security agencies,
political parties and the general public.
9. Reduction of the number of judges from 5 to 3 so as to create more tribunals in a
state and facilitate electoral litigations.
10. Disposition of electoral litigations before elected officials will be sworn-in. This
also includes the speedy adjudication of electoral cases within three months.
11. Banning of politicians convicted for violence and thuggery during elections for 10
years in addition to any other punishment stipulated by the law.
12. Introduction of independent candidature to allow for mass participation and
freedom of expression (of interest and choice).
92
13. Establishment of the Constituency Delimitation Commission (CDC) for the
revaluation and delimitation of constituency using the Geographic Information
System (GIS) enabled by the Nigerian Communication Satellite I (Nig Com Sat
I).
This affirms the fact that lack of political will to make positive reforms
materialize in Nigeria is a deliberate act of leadership. It is based on the fact that the
apparatuses of government as well as the security forces are tools in the hand of any
leader for ensuring effective control of the functioning of the system. Accordingly,
Akintuotu (2007) criticized the electoral process. Nigerians who participated in on April
14 and 21, 2007, observed that it was not an election, yet Maurice Iwu the then chairman
of INEC announced winners and insisted that it was a free and fair elections.
Osinbajo (2010) noted that events of the past in Nigeria have proven that the
government is not committed to genuine electoral reforms. With President Yar’Adua
abridging the salient recommendations of the Uwais Report and the National Assembly
playing ludo with the political destiny of the country, it appears that the electoral reforms
are dead on arrival… It must be argued, however, that no electoral reform can stop a
determined president or political class from engineering the kind of electoral outcome
that they prefer, at least not under our current political structure of overbearing executive
supremacy.
Amidst the turbulence of leadership dominance in ensuring weak legal and
institutional instruments, opposition is highly uncoordinated, or silenced, and masses
were alienated due to poor voter education, political apathy, et cetera. Based on the
foregoing, Bakare (2009) is of the view that there is no doubt that this nation is moving at
a high speed on the bumpy road to state failure. It is therefore, the moral obligation of
every right-thinking Nigerian to do everything within the law to stop this mad rush to
destruction. Bakare describes the position of masses and opposition’s role in Nigerian
politics as supportive to large-scale rigging and power of incumbency which complement
the lack of cohesion among the opposition groups.
Concluding the ideas above, Agina quoted Utomi saying that the two factors are
responsible for the rotten governance of Nigeria today. Factor number one, our National
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FBM
BB
PSDI
SI
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NOB
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OI
Assembly is highly compromised. The second factor is that we as a people are
disgracefully apathetic. We have disgracefully relinquished our birthrights to a few
individuals that have no integrity, and they run our country like their private property.
Explaining the Nigerian Political System
The Systems theory attributed to David Easton shall be used as our framework of
analysis. The theory was based on behaviourism which assumes that the understanding
of a system lies in the analysis and understanding of variables interaction as a unit. Such
variables include structure, function, process, boundaries, adaptation, feedback, storage,
memory, input-output protocols, stability, information processing, signal detection, self-
Jega Attahiru. “Election Administration in Nigeria: Organizing the 2007 Election.” Report of a Conference on Electoral Reform: Building Confidence for the Future at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja, Nigeria March 17-19, 2005.
Lewis Peter. “Troubled Election Outcomes as a Threat to Democracy: A Global Perspective.” Report of a Conference on Electoral Reform: Building Confidence for the Future at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja, Nigeria March 17-19, 2005.
Lyman Princeton N. “Electoral Reform: The Next Milestone in Nigeria’s Democracy.” Assessed 27th March, 2010. www.africaaction.org.
Nwankwo, Basil.C. Authority in Government. Enugu: Almond Publishers,1992.
Ogbonna, Chiedozie A. Group and Party Politics in Nigeria. Enugu: D-Ideal Ventures Nigeria Ltd, 2005.
Onuorah, Madu. “Council of State Restores SIECs.” The Guardian, Wednesday, March 25,2009.
Osinbajo, Yemi. “Elections and Electoral Malpractices in Nigeria.” Assessed 27th March, 2010. www.thenationonlineng.net/we2/articles/13425/1/Elections-and- Electoral-Malpractices-in-Nigeria/Page1:html.
Oyediran, O. Here We are, and Where Do We Go From Here? The Past, Present and Future of Elections in Nigeria. Ibadan: No Name of Publisher, 1981. pp. 103 – 137.
Patterson, Thomas. The American Democracy. Fourth Edition. Harvard: McGraw-Hill Company Inc, 1999.
Princeton N. Lyman. “Electoral Reform: The Next Milestone in Nigeria’s Democracy.” Report of a Conference on Electoral Reform: Building Confidence for the Future at the Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Centre, Abuja, Nigeria March 17-19, 2005.
Somorin Zacheaus. “Nigeria: Just Before Another Constitutional Review Takes Off.” Assessed 11th December, 2008. www.C:Documents%20and%20Settings/user/Desktop/ Constitutional %20Development.html
Songi Ondotimi. “Electoral Reform in Nigeria: Prospects and Challenges.” Assessed 14 th
Ware, Alan. The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and Transformation in the North. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Ezeibe Christian holds a First Class Honors degree in Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka. He lectures in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka. He has published widely in both local and international journals in Political Science particularly and Social Sciences generally. His major research interest is on African political economy and democracy. He awaits his Ph.D dissertation defense. [email protected]
Osadebe Nnabuike currently lectures in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nigeria Nsukka from where he obtained M.Sc. He has published widely in both local and international journals.
THE ARAB SPRING AND THE ASCENDANCE OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN NIGERIA
GEORGE I.J. OBUOFORIBO Ph.D
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF PORT HARCOURT, NIGERIA.
ABSTRACT
After independence the modernizing elites of virtually all predominantly Muslim countries undertook radical reforms of family law, notably to empower women. They targeted inter-alia the aspects of Islamic family law relating to polyandry, unilateral repudiation distribution of inheritance. A host of new laws were adopted to promote women’s right including the criminalization of polygamy. This however, did not go on without some level of opposition and resistance. To achieve the goal of re-Islamizing post-colonial Muslim societies, they adopted diverse strategies, from peaceful proselyzation to armed opposition. Their ultimate ambition is to capture political power. It is true that the Islamists ascendance through the ballot box is the most visible outcome of the Arab Spring. There is however, more to it than what meets the eye. Of particular importance is their strong opposition to secular ethos in favour of fundamentalist Muslim ethos that would not be in the interest of non Muslims and other secular minded Muslims.
It is against the background of the above scenario that one has to appreciate the ascendance of Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle-East and the contemporary challenges in Nigeria being made visible by a Muslim Sect the Boko Haram. It would therefore not be out of place for one to say that Boko Haram sect and its heinous crimes against the people and nation was more of a dangerous diversion of real issues that impinges on the national project. It is the fuel subsidy crises that one could say tend to strike a code with the Arab Spring in the Middle-East and North Africa. A popular disenchantment and demonstrations against the Nigerian government on removal of fuel subsidy with the subsequent revelation of the rot that has engulfed the entire fabric of the Nigerian state structures at all level have unfortunately ended whatever legitimacy the Nigerian project might be said to have had in the past. In actual sense the Boko Haram’s major preoccupation is to Islamize the entire northern region and make its states to be governed in accordance with Islamic laws and injunctions which are very much in line with the fundamentalist struggle in the Middle East and North Africa. We found out in the course of this paper that the Arab Spring and the ascendance of Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle-East was due to a reaction to the modernizing instincts of post-colonial leaders of the Muslim dominated Arab countries.
Keywords: Arab Spring, Muslim Brotherhood, Boko-Haram and Nigerian Problem
Introduction
The Arab spring is a recent development which is attributable to the martyrdom of
a Tunisian Youth who set himself on fire and latter died in the Hospital. Even though it is
said to be a recent development, the way and manner in which it spread like a wildfire
into different parts of the Arab World shows that, there is more to it than what meets the
eye. Its impact is felt in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. What seem to boggle the minds
of most scholars is the extent to which the spring has given rise to the ascendance of the
Muslim brotherhood in almost all parts of the Arab World. The Islamist ascendance
through the ballot box is the most visible outcome of the Arab spring. This is a group that
exists in different parts of the Arab World with different approaches adopted in the
respective countries for the capture of political power.
The Arab Spring is a name given to the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and
protests occurring in the Arab world that began on 18 December 2010. It is also known as
the Arab Revolutions (Arabic: العربية الث��ورات , al-Thawrāt al-ʻArabiyyah) or Arab
Intifada. The term Arab Spring was first coined in the American political journal of
Foreign Policy. The question is does this Muslim brotherhood just sprang up to occupy
its current pre-eminence or was operating in a low key form prior to this time. Again,
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though it is said to have tremendous influence in the Arab World ie Middle East and
North Africa; does its influence spread to other parts of world particularly sub-Saharan
Africa where recent events tend to show some level of linkage with other Muslim
fundamentalist groups. It is our position in this paper, that answers to questions of this
nature world go a long way in making us to understand the linkages that exist among the
Muslim brotherhood network not just in the Arab-World but also in sub-Saharan Africa,
that are experiencing fundamentalist activities such as Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram
Sect. It is in this context that we need to appreciate the contemporary challenges in
Nigeria. The basic trust of this paper therefore is to examine the extent to which the
Muslim brotherhood in the Middle-East and North Africa has influenced recent Muslim
fundamentalist violence in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. The paper is
divided into five parts. The first is the introduction, which is followed by a discussion of
the origin and growth of Muslim brotherhood, thirdly we talked about its sudden re-
appearance within the period of the Arab Spring and the fourth is on the contemporary
challenges in Nigeria while the fifth is the conclusion.
The Origin and Growth of Muslim Brotherhood
The term Muslim brotherhood has a lot to do with the concept of Islamism which
is shown in most studies carried out by western scholars. It is a twentieth century
phenomenon starting with the rise of Egyptian society of the Muslim Brotherhood of
Egypt and reaching its peak in the 1970s after the decline of Arab nationalism, in the
after math of the defeat of the Arab armies in their war with Israel (Usuman 2008, 158).
The views expressed by Oliver Roy is a pointer to this fact; he said, “Beginning in the
1930s Hassanal-Banna, the founder in Egypt of the Muslim brotherhood, and Abdul-Ala-
Mawdudi the creator of the Indo-Pakistan Jamat -i- Islami party introduced a new
movement of thought that endeavored to define Islam primarily, as a political system in
keeping with the major ideologies of the twentieth century (Usuman 2008, 158).
This kind of revivalist thinking is really not peculiar to the Arab-World or Islam
perse. It was a predominant way of thinking on the nationalists of various parts of the
world fighting for the liberation of their people from the hands of the colonial authorities.
A typical example is the Hindu revivalist thinking among the members of the Indian
National Congress that were fighting for the liberation of India from the British. The likes
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of Orobindo Ghosh, Lukman Tilak, Ghokhole, Ranade were among the very strong
advocates of Hindu revivalism at the time. This is also why Ali Jinah the father of
Pakistan who himself was a member of the Indian National Congress had to disagree with
the other members of the congress, giving rise to the partition of India. Even Mahatina
Ghandi who returned from South Africa to join the congress was a strong advocate of the
rivalist movement.
The contention of most Muslims scholars and thinkers was why the miserable
infidels previously were always vanquished by the victorious armies of Islam, now
winning the day, and why were the armies of Islam suffering defeat. It was also a reaction
to the modernizing instincts of post colonial leaders of the Muslim dominated and
predominant Arab countries. After independence, the modernizing elites of virtually all
predominantly Muslim countries undertook radical reforms of family law, notably to
empower women. They targeted inter-alia the aspects of Islamic family law relating to
polyandry, unilateral repudiation and unequal gender distribution of inheritance. Tunisia
for example, went further than other countries in its efforts at legal reform. A host of new
law was adopted to promote women’s rights including the criminalization of polygamy
and unilateral repudiation (Lewis 2008, 277).
This however, did not go on without some level of opposition and resistance by
Islamic clerics and their radical supporters. But the Arab rulers have prevented secular
opposition from operating. This again is made possible by virtue of the fact that those in
powers were dictators. Inspite of the fact that the dictatorial rulership of the Arab
Monarchs and the sit tight one party oligarchies did not give them breathing space, there
is also the absence of a reliable transparent institutional framework for political
opposition to work within, not only hampers the realization of opposition of all kinds but
magnifies the profile and broadens the constituency of rejectionist or disloyal parties.
This development instead of pacifying the situation by way of being less draconian in
their handling of the affairs of the nation and the entire citizenry, they became more
brutal using state resources exclusively for their families and cronies particularly the
military. They therefore resort to go underground in their activities.
What this gave rise to was that the radical clerics and their supporters were driven
underground and continued their activities of sensitizing the people underground in low
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key manner. To achieve the goal of re-Islamizing post-colonial Muslim societies, militant
Muslims have adopted diverse strategies, from peaceful proseleyxization to armed
oppositions. Other groups such as the Muslim brothers of Egypt, combined charity work
to gain and retain members with military operations in the 1960s. To a very great extent,
their perspective was purely religious. Their contention was that they Worship God to
receive salvation in the hereafter (Usuman 2008, 161). However, this perspective is not
isolated from the political aspect. Their ultimate ambition is to capture political power.
To them the post colonial development project which is being driven by corrupt elites has
given rise to poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment.
They emphasized the acquisition of knowledge to the Maliki School of law. Thus
no particular doctrinal persuasion is more prone than others to political mobilization.
Rather, it is the specific political context of struggle for influence and resources which
determine the political agenda of Muslim groups. As such, there is really nothing new in
terms of the perspective as well as the reason deter of the old Muslim clerics thinking and
that of the new. To them true Muslims must withdraw from such a society in the same
way as the Prophet Muhammad, who left Mecca in 622 to seek refuge in Medina.
Furthermore, Muslims must make it a priority to bring down those illegitimate rulers and
have them replaced by real Muslims who would establish the rule of God. This thinking,
which is both old and new, spread wildfire into all the nooks and crannies of the Muslim
World (Usuman 2008, 166).
On the other hand, another group of youths began to think and also propagated the
idea that the developmental failure of and decline of Muslim societies is the adoption of
Western civil and commercial codes and institutions and suggested that the dismantling
of such codes would be the panacea. For most of them, the Islamic revolution of Iran
became the tangible corroboration that greater self-reliance and Islam could provide an
alternative. The view of Usuman tend to support the above analysis when he said that,
“To repute the notion of the newness of Islamism; I have argued that the rhetoric of leaders of West Africa Jihads in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries shows a striking similarity to so-called Islamist movements of the twentieth century, a strong opposition to European hegemony, a denunciation of exploitation and a commitment to festering a political system governed by Islamic laws. The anticolonial dimensions of their
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actions paralleled very much the opposition to westernization by many contemporary Islamist nineteenth century Islamic militants in West-Africa aimed at replacing the dominant forms of mixed Islam in West Africa with a legal system based on the Sharia. Similarly, contemporary Islamists have their principal aim the dismantling of modern European inspired legal codes and constitutions and replacing them with Sharia law” (Usuman 2008, 179).
In pursuit of this goal, while the radical clerics and other Muslim network were
busy using their sermons during the Friday Jumat prayers to sensitize their followers, the
youths being inpatient resorted to violent methods in different parts of the Muslim world.
To them anything that symbolize western influence and infiltration into either their
society or way of life has to be resisted with if need be violence. These violent activities
that started in early 1980s, spread to every part of the world. To achieve this objective,
any means available was used. Even past enemies who seem to have similar interest were
co-opted into achieving this objective. For example, the collaboration between America,
Pakistan, a Pan movement of Jihadists across the Muslim World in support of the
Talibans against the Soviet invation and occupation of Afghanistan is a case in point. A
movement of this nature needed a symbolic charismatic leader to inspire followers hence
Osama Bin Laden made possible by his family back ground and other attractive traits
became the rallying point and the symbol of this struggle.
However, prior to his ascendance there were other methods used by the radical
fundamentalist groups to advance this course. What was in vogue within this period was
the hijacking of American Airlines which were forced to land in territories that are
friendly and also in support of such activities. Berute the capital of Lebanon where
Ishulan has a strong hold or Kampala in Uganda during Idi Amin’s regime are favourable
spots to land hijacked planes of Americans or Israel or airlines in which Americans or
Israeli’s constitutes a significant percentage of the passengers. Apart from the clan distant
support they receive from Muslims all over world tacitly and overtly, some Muslim
leaders or Heads of governments that are notorious in their acts of State terrorism often
gives support and are major source of inspiration to members of such groups. Notable
among such Presidents are Gaddafi of Libya and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Infact,
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Ghaddifi’s involvement in the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster, also commonly referred to as
the Lockerbie bombing is a case in point.
The Post Cold War Era, and the aftermath of the 9/11 episode in the US.
Developments within the post cold war era with the demise of the Soviet Union
tend to create a fluid atmosphere. Of particular importance was the ascendance of
America as the only super power. This made her to attain the status of pre-eminence in
World affairs. It may well seem that, the cold war era tend to drive most issues
underground essentially due to the competition for influence between the two super
powers. However, the emergence of America in the centre stage of World affairs came
along with it the emergence of different Arab groups and nations to resist this
ascendance. In Iran the replacement of a moderate President Rafthsajani to Ahmadenjada
radical Islamist fundamentalist who had a tremendous amount of influence in the radical
Muslim youths in the entire Muslim World. The gaining of political power and the
ascendance to a pre-eminence position by Hamas in Palestine a radical Islamist sect and
growing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics are clear indications of the capture
of political power by radical Islamic groups following the model of Iran.
This era witnessed different forms of radical militant Islamist violence in different
parts of the world carrying out suicide bombing activities. Prior to this time, it was
hijacking but now it is suicide bombing starting with the members of Hamas over Israeli
target areas. This was followed by Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait which was
condemned by the international community. A follow up to that was UN sponsored
operation desert shield and storm which drove away Saddam from Kuwait.
The operation of the UN was more of the Biblical story of “Esau and Jacob.
While the hands were like the UN the voice and smell was that of the US. What this
implies is that, though it was sponsored in actual sense by the UN it was the US that was
carrying out the real operations. This operation not only gave America the opportunity to
be based in Kuwait but also in Saudi Arabia the Muslim Holy land at the invitation of the
King of Saudi Arabia.
This again flared up anger against the US in the entire Arab World. This was
followed by a spate of sporadic suicide bombings in different parts of the Middle East. A
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very glaring case was the bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
that were linked to the militant Muslim Sect the Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama
bin laden. The US under the presidency of Bill Clinton resorted to reprisals by bombing
the Talaban and Al Qaeda strong holds in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical weapons
factory in Khartoum Sudan. Thus began a declaration of a Jihad by Al Qaeda on America
and her interests both at home and abroad. This is shown through an interview granted to
Aljazera by Osa bin Ladin.
At this point in time, the United States is seen as the intrusive, outside power.
Close identification of the ruling families with the United States means that the
unpopularity of a regime can easily be translated into anti-American or anti-western
feeling. A reaction has developed against what is seen as excessive westernization and
the Islamic resurgence, which is in part an exercise in cultural self-assertion, reinforces
anti-western tendency. Besides, the US support for Israel makes military co-operation
with America difficult for Gulf regimes (Shaub 1988, 135).
This gave rise to a resurgence of Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism,
Islamic radicalism, liberalism and socialism. The Islamic Republic in Iran, with its
emphasis on revolutionary military Islamic law, economic justice and intransigence
towards the United States is seen by radical Arab youths as a model of revolutionary
Middle East regimes that challenge the legitimacy of traditional Persian Gulf rulers
(Shaub 1988, 137). Iran therefore resorted to a deliberate exportation of her brand of
Islamic ideology to every nook and crannies of the Islamic world through the agency of
the annual hajj pilgrimage to the Holy Places in Saudi Arabia. This is in addition to the
annual conference in Tehran of Friday prayer leaders from various Islamic states.
The excessive radical and militant Islamic ideology spread like wildfire into
different parts of world and was imbibed by Muslim youths regardless of country of
origin. It cuts across race, colour or creed, in its activities in Europe, Asia, Africa and the
Americas. The height of it however was the hijacking of the American Airlines and the
crashing into the twin towers of WTO and the Pentagon building in September 11 2001.
While this tend to cow the Americans with disbelieve, it sent shock waves across the
world. At the same time making radical Muslims all over the world in a celebration
mood.
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American reaction under the Presidency of George W. Bush Jnr. was the
deceleration of operation Desert in Fox collaboration with NATO. Thus began the
unilateral NATO invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan at the instance of the US. Though
Saddam was smoked out of the hole like a rabbit and the Talibans dislodged from
Afghanistan, there was no end on sight to the crisis. The spate of sporadic clandestine
sectarian violence of suicide bombing became the order of day in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Palestine and other parts of the world particularly Malaysia in South East Asia.
However, the fluid post cold war atmosphere made possible by globalization and
I.T revolution created yet another dimension to the crisis. It gave rise to the spreading of
the militant ideology through the internet into clandestine networks. The exchange of
views and happenings across the world through the net and face book it could be said
tend to create awareness resulting to diffusion of knowledge over so many events
occurring in the world at the time. What really triggered and ignited the situation was the
martyrdom of the Tunisian youth who set himself on fire due to lack of employment. The
crisis that followed his death in Tunisia which was shown live by CNN, Aljazera, BBC
and other internet sources and face book exchanges became the breaking of the Pandora
box that gave rise to the spring spreading first to Egypt, to Libya, Yemen and later Syria.
One of the most significant consequences of the so-called Arab Spring is the
forceful emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as an influential political force and social
movement in the Middle East. This rise of the Muslim brotherhood is noticeable
throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In effect, it is today a very influential
social and political movement that is represented in parliament in countries as far as field
as Mauritania where the party Tawassoul is one of the major opposition parties. After the
fall of the dictatorship of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood uprising turned out to be the
most politically and socially organized political force. The triumph of the Islamist party
Ennahda Movement in the first free and democratic elections of Tunisia constituent
Assembly, in addition to the victory of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in
Morocco and in Egypt is a testimony of its startling emergence. Moreover, the victory of
the Libyan rebels, who had close connection at the grass roots as well as the leadership
level with the local chapter of the MB, constitutes another indication of what may be a
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prelude to a new political dimension in the whole Middle East and North Africa
(Muhamed EL Moktar 16/12/2011).
It is true that the Islamist ascendance through the ballot box is the most visible
outcome of the Arab spring. There is however, more to it than what meets the eye of
particular importance is their strong opposition to secular others in favour of
fundamentalist Muslim ethos that would not be in the interest of non Muslims and other
secular minded Muslim. For instance, their opposition to the right of women to
participate, vote and contest even minimalist elections revealed their conservative
ideological orientation. The international community is often preoccupied with the
foreign policy implications of an Islamist victory. Attitude towards the West, peace
agreements with Israel and contributions to peace in the region dominated its interests
and assessment. However, the real impact would be felt internally especially with regards
to the socio-political arena and rights of women and minorities. The Islamist victory has
few examples (Kumaraswamy 2011, 2).
The argument that power has an inherent moderating ability was not indicated in
Iran. The Islamic Republic continue to be a in a revolutionary mood and limited
moderation introduced by President Mohammad Khatami during 1998-2004 was quickly
reversed by his successor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The same goes to Hamas ruled Gasa
strip. The victory of the Islamist military group in 2006 elections not only radicalized the
Palestinian society but also contributed to deep internal divisions and schism among
Palestinians. The same holds for Lebanon and the electoral victory of Hezbollah has only
intensified internal-divisions. Above all, in the early 1990s, open election saw the victory
of the FIS in Algeria, plunging the country into a prolonged civil war (Kumaraswamy
2011, 1-2).
As such, the argument being advanced in some quarters that the justice and
Development Party in Turkey could be a model for the Arab Islamists may be missing the
point. This can be seen from two angles. While its successes in limiting the power of the
military are welcome, its policy concerning the role of religion is not without its share of
problems. Besides, we cannot overlook the influence of the modernizing instinct of
Kamal Atatuke. As such the problem of the Arab World is not the absence of elections
but the nonexistence of pillars of democracy such as vibrant parliament, political parties,
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autonomous judiciary and proactive civil society (Kumaraswamy 2011, 2). It is against
the background of the above scenario that one have to appreciate the ascendance of such
a Muslim Brotherhood and contemporary challenges in Nigeria being made visible by a
Muslim Sect the, Boko Haram.
Contemporary Challenges in Nigeria
Jihadist activities in Northern Nigeria predate the Boko Haram insurgence. Such
activities can be traced to the pre independence era of Usman Dan Fodio, the Fulani
Jihadist who invaded and conquered the entire Hausa communities and introduced Islam.
This Jihadist spirit has always been there in Northern Nigeria after independence. This is
shown in most cases through the statements of some radical Muslim scholars and clerics
from time to time. For instance, there is a popular statement that is credited to some
Muslim radicals when provoked by one event or the other often says either they would
declare a Fatua on the south or they would Islamize the entire Nigerian nation.
However, such statements are often waved aside by Christians in the South
because they consider it as a mere statements or rhetoric. But there are instances that such
acts of infiltration had been tried usually, with influence from some of the neighboring
countries such as Niger and Chad. A case in point is the Maitasinen invasion, a Jihadist
movement led by a Muslim cleric from Niger aimed at Islamizing the entire country.
Ordinarily, Northern Nigeria is not a place where Islamism is predominantly Salafi. Such
fundamentalist instincts are usually infiltrations from outside the shoes of the country,
mainly from neighboring border countries such as Niger and Chad. This is predicated on
the fact that, after independence in 1960 Nigerian Muslims adopted a largely secular
criminal code. They also accepted the idea of a federation in which no religion would be
a state religion. However, from time to time particularly in the 1980s, a tiny minority of
Muslim students spoke out against the secular State and advocated that Nigeria should
become an Islamic state (Usuman 2008, 175).
As stated earlier, there is no such orientation or background from within the
country going by the nation’s colonial background and the system that was put in place
after independence. It is understandable that as Muslims most of them often go on
pilgrimage to the Holy Land from time to time and mixed with Muslim from other parts
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of the World. As such one could say such activities are the outcome of such influence
from outside. Even leaders of some Arab nations particularly North Africa often make
statements that agitates the minds of Northern Muslims to think or toe such lines. A case
in point is late Col. Ghaddafi’s statement that Nigeria should be divided into North and
South on religious ground.
While such statements may have been treated with levity, they often make
fundamentalist radical Muslims to think in such lines. For instance in 1999, the Governor
of the tiny Zamfara State re-enacted Islamic criminal Law (Usuman 2008, 175). Even
such an action by a serving Governor was treated with a wave of hand by Nigerians
generally and even the President of the country. President Olusegun Obasanjo attributed
Yerima and his sharia law as political sharia that would fizzle away with time. Though it
did fizzled away, eventually, but it was still in the minds of those who were behind its
introduction, biding their time until when it may be considered appropriate to reintroduce
it.
Overtime, constant warnings by foreign security agencies such as the American
CIA and FBI that there are terrorists’ infiltrations into Northern Nigeria was often treated
with levity by the governments and the security agencies. However, the involvement of a
Nigerian Youth in an attempt to detonate an explosive device in a Pan Arab flight became
an eye opener to the world generally and Nigerians in particular that all the security
reports emanating from foreign security agencies are true. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a
Youngman from a wealthy Northern influential Muslims family’s attempt in bombing the
PAN Arab Airline sent shock waves and disbelieve to most Nigerians. Apparently, the
Youngman while studying in London had the opportunity to mix with other radical
fundamentalist Muslim students and was indoctrinated with a fundamentalist’s instinct.
He even traveled to Yemen where he had to undergo Al Qaeda training.
The irony of it all is that, even with such a revelation coming out through
Abdulmutallab’s involvement, Nigerians still behave as if all is well. At a point, the US
came to the conclusion that she has to do something to protect her investments in Nigeria
and the entire Gulf of Guinea hence her establishment of the African command in the
Gulf of Guinea.
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However, the straw that breaks the camel’s back and convinced the doubting
Thomases as to the level of terrorist infiltration into northern Nigeria was the spate of
bomb attacks in the Northern State of Bornu which was attributed to a fundamentalist
Muslim Sect with affiliation to Al Qaeda called Boko Haram. Boko Haram in Hausa
language means Western Education is bad. However with its activities and what it stands
for there is no doubt that they are working in tandem with other Muslim fundamentalist
groups all over the World and the Middle East in particular. In fact there was a time that
security agents in Nigeria intercepted an Iranian shipment of different types of assorted
riffles. As it is often the case in Nigeria, that case fizzled out without anybody hearing
anything about it.
As the spate of bombings of Christian Churches and Government establishment
to be helpless. The bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja sent shock waves across
the World as the level of terrorist’s activities being perpetrated by the Boko Haram sect.
This attack seem to confirm an earlier warning given by the a British security Chief cited
in This Day Newspaper that, a London based newspaper, ‘The Mirror’ reported that
Prime Minister David Cameron had been alerted by the spy Chiefs on the determination
by the terrorist group to make Nigeria a base for plotting terrorist attacks on the West.
The report aligned the attention of Al-Qaeda, with the attacks by Boko Haram whom they
described as dramatically stepping up their campaign” (This Day, July 4 2011). This is
corroborated by Reuters report that, an Al-Qaeda group in North Africa had offered to
give Nigerian Muslims training and weapons to fight Christians. We are ready to train
our people in weapons and give you whatever support we can in men, arms and
ammunitions to enable you to defend our people in Nigeria”.
For all practical purposes, it must be recognized that religion extremism and/or
terrorism has become a mark in many cities in Northern Nigeria. It has become obvious
by the frequency and systematic occurrence of these events that they are planning to
intimidate or cause terror in pursuit of religious, political and other goals. This is
certainly the perception of victims of these crimes and majority of Nigerians who
sometime are passers byes or friends and relatives of victims of such crimes (Nigerian
Tribune, Thisday 4 Feb. 2010).
121
The generality of Nigerians out of either confusion or disbelief of the events
unfolding due to the atrocities being perpetrated by the Boko Haram keep asking how did
all these events started and what has caused it?. People were actually bewildered as to
how it all started. Though there were spates of violent protests in some parts of Northern
Nigeria during the April 2011 elections, nobody knew that they would escalate to the
magnitude of full blown terrorist activities on innocent Nigerians. It need to be pointed
out that, political players and institutions embrace the principles of true democracy and
allow open, free and fair competition, which are essential in the process of aggregation of
national opinions and development choice. In a normal liberal democratic atmosphere
what should be of utmost concern to the players is to play the game by the rules (The
Nation, Friday, Jan. 7 2011). In an issue and value based politics, the idea of winner takes
it all that often agitates the mind of the loser does not arise. This is what we see in the
advanced democracies. In fact, the struggle and acquisition of political power is seen as a
way of bettering the lives of the people in a party’s own perspective as different from that
of the other.
As such, one of the challenges facing the Nigerian democratic process is how to
make this happen so that the idea of winner takes it all will be a thing of the past.
Looking at issues in this perspective makes one to wonder as to the vituperations that are
coming from some quarters, which obviously seem to be completely off the mark. This
can be seen within the context of how some powerful northern elites are making up
stories with a view to confuse and deceive the World particularly United States of
America as to what Boko Haram is or is not.
The United States had long standing relationship with key military and
intelligence leaders from the Northern part of the country, who had reportedly submitted
briefings to Washington on the security situation. While most of these Northern security
Chiefs are against violence and actions of the sect, they had reportedly, nonetheless,
identified national injustices, poverty and southern near monopoly of national revenue as
the fuel for the insurgency and widening violence across the north. Aside the above, such
intelligence chiefs, most of whom are retired now, are said to have also convinced the
Americans that the reported link between Nigerian Islamist and foreign Jihadist groups is
exaggerated as the nation had in the past witnessed similar Islamic uprising with solution
122
handled with diplomacy and developments. The alleged briefings from these old friends
of America was married with the arguments of northern political leaders, who cited
subsisting inequality in national developmental focus as well as political frustration
among Northerners, following the 2011 elections (The Nigerian Tribune, 19 April 2012).
The blame for the economic rationalization is however not being appropriately
apportioned. The existing narration tends to blame federal neglect of the north as behind
its backwardness. No attempt is made to trace who control that federal machinery since
independence and how the north came to find itself in the subsisting status quo. The
known facts of history of Northern control of federal machine for close to two thirds of
the nation’s independent existence was swept under the carpet and the gross culpability
of Northern leaders for the parlous state of affairs was overlooked. Worse still, while the
past was forgotten, no thought is given to the continuous responsibility for the continuous
laxity about developmental focus. As recently noted, present conduct of some elected
officials in the North is worsening rather than alleviating the terrible economic state of
the North. Reports from the north indicated that the violence in the area is exacerbated by
the stoppage of a long-time practice of funds sharing of local government funds at
secretariats on monthly basis. This practice was said to involve sharing among elected
officials and local leaders who in turn move to the villages to reach other lower strata
(The Nigerian Tribune 19, April 2012).
In a situation of this nature wherein lies the essence of comparing Boko Haram
Sect with militant activities in the Niger Delta as being advocated by some sympathizers
of the sect. Even the argument that government should have dialogue with the sect does
not hold water. There can be no correlation between the two. The Niger Delta militants
were fighting against a long period of neglect of an area that has been the main source of
the nation’s economic sustenance. The Boko Haram group who were of the view that
western education is bad used that as a basis of letting mayhem on innocent hapless
citizens of the country. Besides, this people are faceless and not identifiable. Even if the
government decided to dialogue, who is to represent them becomes a problem.
It would therefore not be out of place for one to say that the Boko Haram sect and
its heinous crimes against the people and nation was more of a dangerous diversion of
real issues that impinges on the national project. An issue within the period that really
123
posed a threat to the survival of the nation is the fuel subsidy crisis. In as much as one
could not say that the government may have good intentions in the actions but the way
and manner it was introduced tend to trigger a wide spread opposition from the organized
labour, human right activists and the generality of the people. This is the issue that one
could say the influence of the Arab spring seem to have a lot of influence on and not that
of the Boko Haram which was an afterthought. That the unified positions of the people
against government neglect and injustices as shown by the Arab Spring were big sources
of inspiration for the fuel subsidy uprising within the period.
The government’s action was vehemently condemned and rejected by members
of civil society including non-governmental organizations, trade unions, and political
parties in opposition to the ruling party at the centre. Protests, rallies and demonstrations
were organized in various cities and towns all over the country. The demand was uniform
– a reversal of the pump price of petrol to N65 per litre from the high jump price of N141
officially announced (Alaba, 2012).
The popular mobilization against the subsidy removal was organized by civil
society and movements. Within a few days however, the central labour congress and
trade unions congress – had taken the central stage announcing an indefinite national
strike which would commence on January, 9 2012 and continue indefinitely until the
Federal Government reverted the pump price to N65 per litre. By far, the most
frightening of the three levels or categories of action against the government of President
Goodluck Jonathan, was the second categories – civil society organizations mobilizing
tens of thousands in urban areas for rallies and protests. Through an effective networking
of several groups across the country, the popular anger against the government was
clearly demonstrated in the presence of international media which carried live interviews
with all and sundry (Alaba, 2012).
This is an aspect one could say that tend to strike a code with the Arab Spring in
the Middle East and North Africa. A popular disenchantment and demonstrations against
the Nigerian government on removal of fuel subsidy with the subsequent revelation of the
rot that has engulfed the entire fabric of the Nigerian state structures at all levels have
unfortunately ended whatever legitimacy the Nigerian project might be said to have had
in the past. Even though some sympathizers of Boko Haram seem to argue that their
124
violent activities were due to a perceived neglect and poverty, it is doubtful going by the
meaning of their name, what they stand for and their atrocities. As such it could be said
that such statements are more after thoughts geared towards deceiving members of the
international community. In actual sense, the Boko Haram sect’s major preoccupation is
to Islamize the entire northern region and make its states to be governed in accordance
with Islamic laws and injunction which is very much in line with the fundamentalist
struggle in the Middle East and North Africa. This is an aspect that tallies remarkable
with the Muslim brotherhood across the Muslim world. As events unfolding in the
countries being ruled by members of the brotherhood indicates, the secular ethos of the
nation would give way for the introduction of a theocratic Muslim state. This is the more
reason why President Mosi of Egypt is being criticized by the minorities and secular
minded Muslim in Egypt.
Be that as it may, the truth of the matter is that Government has a lot to do to
assuage the apprehensions of the people by providing their basic needs. Corruption has to
be tackled head on. Again, the attitude and opulent life style being displayed by occupant
of political offices helps to infuriate the people thereby using the slightest opportunity to
vent their anger as shown in the fuel subsidy crisis that engulfed the entire nation. What
is vividly shown as the influence of the Arab Spring on contemporary challenges in
Nigeria is that people have come to realize that a popular uprising on the part of the
people against an injustice by Government perceived to be common to the generality of
the people can be resisted at all cost. This is a development that has a lot of influence
from the Arab Spring considering the strong will of the people through their level of
resistance. This was vividly shown during the fuel subsidy uprising indicating an
inspiration from the Arab Spring.
On the other hand, the challenge emanating from the Boko Haram which was
equally inspired by Muslim fundamentalist in the Middle East, North Africa and other
parts of the Muslim World is antithetical to the secular ethos of the country, and should
be resisted and fought by all Nigerians in support of the Government. It is therefore,
interesting to note that, majority of Nigerians are unified on protecting the secular ethos
as well as the one indivisible entity of Nigeria. That is what the government should
continue to encourage and foster among the people. In other words it should be a
125
conscious government effort towards the achievement of that goal. Government should
not leave any stone unturned towards the achievement of that goal. Both media, and
institutions responsible for the dissemination of information such as NOA- National
Orientation Agency, NTA- Nigeria Television Authority etc, should be mobilized for the
achievement of this objective. Slogans such as to ‘Keep Nigeria One’ are a task that must
be done as used by the Gowon regime during the civil war which helped to unite the
people hence the saying: no victor no vanquished.
CONCLUSION
We found out in the cause this paper that the Arab Spring and the ascendance of
Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East was due to a reaction to the modernizing instinct
of post colonial leaders of the Muslim dominated Arab countries. After independence, the
modernizing elites of virtually all predominantly Muslim countries undertook radical
reforms of family law, notably to empower women. They targeted inter-alia the aspects
of Islamic family law relating to polyandry unilateral repudiation and unequal gender
distribution of inheritance. A host of new laws were adopted to promote women’s rights
including the crimination of polygamy and unilateral repudiation.
This however, did not go on without some level of opposition from operating.
This again is made possible by virtue of the fact that those in power were dictators. They
became more brutal using state resources exclusively for their families and cronies-
particularly the military. The people therefore resorted to go underground in their
activities. To achieve the goal of re-Islamizing post-colonial Muslim societies, they
adopted diverse strategies, from peaceful proselyzation to aimed oppositions. Their
ultimate ambition is to capture political power. A movement of this nature needed a
symbolic charismatic leader to inspire followers, hence Osama Bin Laden made possible
by his family background and other attractive traits became the rallying point and the
symbol of this struggle. It is true that the Islamists ascendance through the ballot box is
the most visible outcome of the Arab spring. There is however, more to it than what
meets the eye. Of particular importance is their strong opposition to secular ethos in
favour of fundamentalist Muslim ethos that would not be in the interest of non-Muslims
and other secular minded Muslims. Therefore, the argument that power has an inherent
126
moderating ability was not indicated in Iran. The same goes to Hamas ruled Gasa strip
and for Lebanon and the electoral victory of Hezbollah. It is against the background of
the above scenario that one has to appreciate the ascendance of Muslim Brotherhood and
contemporary challenges in Nigeria being made visible by a Muslim sect the “Boko
Haram”. The Jihadist spirit has always been there in Northern Nigeria before and after
independence. After independence in 1960, Nigerian Muslim adopted a largely secular
criminal code. They also accepted the idea of a federation in which no religion would be
a state religion.
For all practical purposes, it must be recognized that religious extremism and/or
terrorism has become a mark in many cities in Northern Nigeria. It has become obvious
by the frequency and systematic occurrence of these events that they are planned to
intimidate or cause terror in pursuit of religious, political and other goals. It would
therefore not be out of place for one to say that the Boko Haram sect and its heinous
crimes against the people and nation was more of a dangerous diversion of real issues
that impinges on the national project.
It is the fuel subsidy issue that one could say tend to strike a code with the Arab
Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. A popular disenchantment and
demonstrations against the Nigerian government on removal of fuel subsidy with the
subsequent revelation of the rot that has engulfed the entire fabric of the Nigerian state
structures at all levels have unfortunately ended whatever legitimacy the Nigerian project
might be said to have had in the past. Even though some sympathizers of Boko Haram
seem to argue that their violent activities were due to a perceived neglect and poverty, it
is doubtful going by the meaning of their name, what they stand for and their atrocities.
As such it could be said that such statements are more of after thoughts geared towards
deceiving members of the international community. In actual sense, the Boko Haram
sect’s major preoccupation is to Islamize the entire Northern region and make its states to
be governed in accordance with Islamic laws and injunction which is very much in line
with the fundamentalist struggle in the Middle East and North Africa. This is an aspect
that tallies remarkably with the Muslim brotherhood across the Muslim World. As events
unfolding in the countries being ruled by members of the brotherhood indicates, the
secular ethos of the nation would give way for the introduction of theocratic Muslim
127
States. This is the more reason why President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt is being
criticized by the minorities and secular minded Muslims in Egypt.
The truth of the matter is that Government has a lot to do to assuage the
apprehensions of the people by providing their basic needs. Corruption has to be tackled
head on. What is vividly shown as the influence of the Arab Spring on contemporary
challenges in Nigeria is that people have come to realize that a popular uprising on the
part of the people against an injustice by Government perceived to the common to the
generality of the people can be resisted at all cost. This is a development that has a lot of
influence from the Arab Spring considering the strong will of the people through their
level of resistance. On the other hand, the challenge emanating from the Boko Haram sect
which was equally inspired by Muslim fundamentalist in the Middle East, North Africa
and other parts of the Muslim world is antithetical to the secular ethos of the country, and
should be resisted and fought by all Nigerians in support of the Government. It is
therefore interesting to note that, majority of Nigerians are unified on protecting the
secular ethos as well as the one indivisible entity of Nigeria.
REFERENCES
Kane, O. (2008). Islamism: What is New, What is Not? Lessons from West Africa, in African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, PP.157-187.
Lewis, B. (1995). The Middle East: 2000 years of History, from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Shaul, B. (1988). Persian Gulf in Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World in Litwak, R.S. and Wells Jr, S.F. (ed), A Wilson Center Book. Cambridge: Brallinger Publishing Company.
Mohamed. E. (2011). The Reemergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, 16/2/2011. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1047/eg40.htm. Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM.
Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2011). Arab Spring Gets Chilly, Saturday, 31 Dec. culled from http://www.dailypioneer.com/sunday-edition/sundayagenda/cover-story-agenda/31860-arab-spring-gets-chilly.html on 26-09-2012
This Day Newspaper, A daily Newspaper in Nigeria, July 4 2011.
The Nigerian Tribune, A daily Newspaper in Nigeria, Thursday, February 4 2010.
The Nation, A daily Newspaper in Nigeria, January 7, 2011.
The Nigerian Tribune, A daily Newspaper in Nigeria, April 19 2012.
Alaba, O. (2012). The Arab Spring And Contemporary Challenges in Nigeria an Unpublished Paper Presented at 22nd National Conference of the Nigerian Society for International Affairs (NSIA) April 4 & 5, , at the Lead City, University, Ibadan.
George I.J Obuoforibo Ph.d, is a Senior Lecturer and a renowned scholar in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. He specialized in International Relations and has published widely in both national and international academic journals including a Working Paper No.12 for the Center for African Studies University of Mumbai, Vidyanagari, Santacruz (E) on: Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and Instability in the Niger Delta: An Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Process. Email: [email protected]
Literature as Tool for Language Teaching: An Assessment of the GSP 101
Experience at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka
By
1Ogenyi, Laz Chinedu, Ph. D. and 2Ogbodo, Joseph C.
It is commonly believed that there is an interrelation between literature and language. Possession of a good command of language enables the literary artist to create a literary work. Literature is, therefore, language personified. This underlines the relevance of literature in the teaching and learning of language, especially when such literary work is in current idiom of the language being learned and taught. The use of English Unit of the University of Nigeria, aware of the importance of literature in the proper acquisition of language, introduced the reading of one of the three literary genres – novel – into the Use of English course during the 1999/2000 academic year. The programme is now twelve years. This study investigated the impact of this exercise from the students’ perspective. It tries to find out how the students feel as to whether or not they benefit from it. A total of five hundred and forty-four (544) students, comprising two hundred and sixty-six (266) females, and two hundred and seventy-eight (278) males were used for the study. Questionnaire, made up of thirty (30) questions, was used to elicit data for the investigation. The results of the study show that the students are improving in their English language learning strategies. It also indicates that they have improved significantly in the various aspects of the language investigated.
Keywords: Language Teaching, Assessment of the GSP, Teaching and Learning of Language
Introduction
Language and Literature are related to life. The three – literature, language and life – are
important and inseparable in every society. While life provides the standpoint, language develops and
using the language, literary works are created. “… language and art are … ‘bound up entirely’ with
each order ‘as a concrete, undivided entity” (Akwanya 144). Information available in the literature has
it that even the Ford Foundation’s report on English language teaching in Nigeria sees English
literature as an aid to English language teaching (195). It is apparent from the foregoing that experts
are agreed that teachers/learners of English in second language environment, such as Nigeria, Ghana,
Liberia, to mention no more, can teach/learn the various aspects of the English language through the
medium of literary works.
However, information in the literature points to the fact that English language learners in second
language environments are usually familiar with the names of tenses and the usual examples
taught to them by their teachers since their (learners’) childhood
(http://esl.about.com/gi/library/weekly/aa100499.htm). It is however regrettable that in real life,
the learners fail to use the same tenses aptly; this implies that learners are deficient in applying
the tenses in the required contexts. Language experts further state that this discrepancy can be
overcome by reading contemporary fiction or plays. Information available in the literature has
Oral proficiency of a student, that is, the capacity of the student to speak errorless English with fluency is what is expected in a student to be employed in a job, may be teaching, or in any software or IT related jobs of today. Thousands of disadvantaged Engineering graduates and science graduates are longing to have English fluency and are left disappointed with ordinary English institutes. Hence, it is necessary that a teacher should know [how] to coordinate language and literature to bring a learning atmosphere for the learners (www.uscollegesearch.org/teaching).
In a related vein, Williams agrees with the above view when he avers:
The study of literature confronts the student with various operations of
language … Since literature organizes language in the most exemplary
fashion, the second language learner must be aware of the importance of
applying the language of literature as a model for his own use. The
teaching of literature has the practical value of enabling the student to learn
the second language as well as use it (255).
The Use of English Unit, School of General Studies of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, during
the 1999/2000 academic year, introduced novel reading as one of the components of its GSP 101
(Study Skills & Basic Research Methods) course. The goal was not to teach literature; the goal was to
teach language – English – in order to increase students’ group and/or individual learning strategies
and linguistic competence. Akwanya’s view lends credence to this:
… the acceptable approach to language teaching and learning has to be
the one which can ensure mastery, awaken all the individual’s energies,
and lay open before the learner the full resources of this language for
exploitation in the task of self-construction, in the project of living, of
selfhood, reading high quality literature … is the chief, perhaps the only point
of encounter with the vicissitudes of the language as it records and shapes the
language community… (English language learning in Nigeria (27 – 31).
This novelty, supposedly premised on the foregoing reason(s), was aimed at increasing learning
strategies, and making language learning/acquisition more application-oriented. The programme is
now twelve years; no study has been conducted to find out the efficacy and/or relevance of the