Central Intelligence Bulletin, 1 Feb 68 · Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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l February 1968

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1 February 1968


Controlled Dis.rem

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart.ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

lntcrpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further infonnation and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may he designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, hut only on a need-to-know basis.

WARNING This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

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Tile CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is prcdttced by theiDireetor of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providingemz'rent intelligence hearing on issues of national security tn the President,the National Security Council, and other senior govemment officials. Itis Produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-—ment of primary concern is not feasible? items or per-tines thereof are pre-dated by CIA and marked with an asterisk.

leterpretatiens 0f intelligence infonnation in this publicaticn representimmediate and preliminary views which are subject to modificatitm in thelight: ef further infimnation and more complete analysis.

ifiertein intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically:t'or no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminatedthither, but only on a need—to-rlmow basis.

VVARNINGThis document contains classified information affecting the national securityiii" the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code"iiitle 1.8, Sections 793, 794, and 798.


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Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation :report, (Page 1)

Central America: Difficulty over picking new OAS chief is causing strains. (Page 8)

USSR-Germany~ New note (Page 9)

Poland: SA-3 missiles (Page 9)

France: Arms embargo (Page 9}

Mali-Cuba~ Technicians (Page 10)

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Panama: Election campaign trouble (Page 10}

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Central Intelligence Bulletin 1CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report (Page 1) ’

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Central America: Difficulty-over picking new OAS.Chief is cauSing strainso ' (Page 8)’ '_

USSR—Germany: New note (PageQ);

Poland: SA-3 missiles (Page-9)

France: Arms embargo (Page '9)

Mali-Cuba: Technicians V (Page 10),

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Panama: Election campaign trouble (Page -10)

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*South Vietnam: The clandestine Viet Cong Liberation Radio in South Vietnam and Hanoi Radio late last night announced the establishment of a "·Revohitiona:ry Administration" in South Vietnam.

The "Revolutionary Administration" purportedly would have authority and administrative power in Saigon and in areas where the Viet Cong have an influence on the people. The purpose of the "Revolutionary Power, " according to the Communists, is to act as an authoritative voice to demand the withdrawal of US forces to end the war and to call for negotiations with the Liberation Front. The Hanoi broadcast asserted that "an unprecedented enthusiastic atmosphere is powerfully mounting throughout Saigon city and its suburbs. "

This maneuver appears to be a further step in the overall enemy Tet offensive strategy .. of creating a stronger Communist position within South Vietnam and discrediting the present Sou.th Vietnam government.

The Tet offensive--now in its third day--appears to be sputtering. Strong enemy influence is still prevalent in several major provincial capitals"but is mostly limited to scattered pockets of resistance throughout the rest of the country.

In the northern half of South Vietnam, Communist main force and local-level units remain entrenched in Hue and the highland cities of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot. New attacks on other key towns yesterday were repulsed, and allied troops are mopping up remnants of enemy forces still resisting in the coastal provinces of South Vietnam's I and II Corps.

Sharp fighting flared at several points in the Saigon area on 31 January and early on 1 February. Within the Tan Son Nhut airfield and headquarters complex northwest of the city allied forces met heavy opposition while clearing out a number of enemy strongpoints. In the capital itself, heavy fighting took plaGe in, th,e race track

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*South Vietnam: The clandestine Viet Cong Libera—tion Radio in South Vietnam and Hanoi Radio late lastnight announced the establishment of a "RevolutionaryAdministration" in South Vietnam.

The "Revolutionary Administration” purportedlywould have authority and administrative power in Saigonand in“. areas where the Viet Cong have an influence onthe people. The purpose of the "Revolutionary Power, ”according to the Communists, is to act as an authoritativevoice to demand the withdraWal of US ferces to end thewar and to call for negotiations with the Liberation

' Front. The. Hanoi broadcast asserted that "an unprece—dented enthusiastic atmosphere is powerfully mounting

_ throughout Saigon city and its suburbs. ”

This maneuver appearsto be a further step in theoverall enemy Tet offensive strategy 'of creating astronger Communist position within South Vietnam anddiscrediting the present South Vietnam government.

The Tet offensive—mow in its third day—-appears_ to be sputtering. Strong enemy influence is still pre-

- valent in several major provincial capitalsbut is mostlylimited to scattered pockets of resistance throughoutthe rest of the country.

In the northern half of South Vietnam, Communistmain force and local—level units remain entrenched inHueand the highland cities of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.New attacks on other key towns yesterday were repulsed,and allied troops are mopping up remnants of enemyforces still resisting in the coastal provinces of SouthVietnam's land 11 Corps. _ . _ - -

Sharp fighting flared at; several points inthe Saigonarea on'31 January and‘early on 1 February. Within _the Tan Son Nhut airfield and headquarters complex north-_west of the city allied forces met heavy opposition whileclearing out a number of enemy strongpoints. In the

---Capital it self, ' heavy fighting_.-t_ook plaice. 1ntherace track

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area, near the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff compound, and at several points downtown where enemy forces have established pockets of resistance. fjhe Viet Cong have held one building in Saigon for more than 30 hours and at last report still held the An Quang Buddhist pagoda]

In the delta area south 9f Saigon sporadic fighting continued early on 1 February in several provincial capitals--particularly at My Tho and Ben Tre--but nowhere was the situation completely out of hand,

Preliminary reports of casualties during the current enemy campaign show more than 6, 000 Communists killed in contrast to some 575 allied troops killed and 1_, 700 wounded. Civilian casualties are expected to be high. Although these figures are not complete, the enemy apparently had little regard for losses in their attempt to stage a spectacular countrywide show of force.

Although there has been little evidence of panic in Saigon, various reports suggest increased fear among the population of several other major towns and diminished confidence in the government I s ability to provide protection. Wild rumors circulated in some northern towns that President Thieu may have been killed or that the US permitted the Communist attacks in order to convince Saigon to negotiate an end to the war.

While these rumors are likely to subside quickly where allied control has been re- established, there is certain to be extensive residual damage to the pacification program and related activities which have been seriously disrupted in some areas.

Vietnamese Communist propaganda is continuing to give heavy play to the upsurge in military activity and to stress that its size and scope demonstrate the Communist capabilities to stand up to US military power.

Viet Cong action in the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien .. has received particular attention. In

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area, near the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff com—pound, and at several points downtown where. enemy forceshave established pockets of resistance. EI‘he Viet Conghave held one building in Saigon for more than 30 hours .and at last report still held the An Quang Buddhist pagoda}

In the delta area south .of Saigon Sporadic fightingcontinued early on1 February in several provincial cap-itals—-particular1y at My Tho and Ben Tre—-but nowherewas the situation completely out of hand. '

Preliminary reports of casualties during the currentenemy campaign show more than 6, 000 Communists killedin contrast to- some 575. allied. troops killed and 1!, 700

- wounded. Civilian casualties are expected to be high. Al-though these figures are not complete, the enemy apparentlyhad little regard for losses in their attempt to stage aspectacular countrywide show of ferce. . '

Although there has been little evidence of panic inSaigon, various reportssuggestincreased fear amongthe population of several other majOr towns and diminishedconfidence in the'governmenti's ability to provide protection.Wild rumOrs circulated in some northern towns that Presi-dent Thieu may have been killed or that the US permittedthe Communist attacks in order to convince Saigon to nego-tiate an end to the war. '

While these rumors are likely to subside quickly whereallied control has been re—established, there is certain tobe extensive residual damage to the pacification programand related activities which have been seriously disruptedin some areas. - . -

Vietnamese Communist propaganda is centinuing togive heavy play to the upsurge in military activity and tostress that its size and scope demonstrate the Communistcapabilities to stand up to US military power.

Viet Cong action in the two northern provinces of QuangTri and Thua Thienqhas received particular attention. In

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a broadcast of 31 January Hanoi reported that the populace of these provinces was supporting the Communist efforts. It claimed that the Viet Cong were in control of Hue and were advancing toward seizing control of both provinceso Viet Cong attacks in Saigon have also been singled out as particularly significant in demonstrating Communist ability to· strike at the heart of the enemy camp.

Hanoi has made no attempt to portray the current offensive as the conclusive phase in the Communist struggle although there are a few propaganda claims that it regresents a step toward "Jinal" or "total" victory.

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a broadcast of 31 January Hanoi reported that the popu—lace of'these provinces ‘was supporting the Communist

' efforts. It claimed that the Viet Cong were in contrOlof Hue and were advancing toward seizing control ofboth provinceso Viet Cong attacks in Saigon have alsobeen singled out asparticularly significant in demon-

. strating Communist ability to strike at the heart of theenemy camp. ' ' -

Hanoi has made no attempt to portray the currentoffensive as the conclusive phase in the Communiststruggle although there are a few propaganda claimsthat it represents a Step toward Ilfinal" or ”total” victorye

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Central America: [The difficulty in electing a new OAS secretary general has become a source of strain among the Central American republics.]

LThe lack of consensus is the only certain result of a meeting among the foreign ministers from Panama and Central America held on 26 January. The promoters of the meeting had hoped the ministers could agree on how to force the withdrawal of the three present candidates in favor of a more acceptable one. The foreign ministers will meet again on 5 February in a last-ditch attempt t~ achieve regional unity before the fifth ballot is taken!_/

L None of the present candidates can be sure of a clear-cut victory. Another impasse or even a close victorv would further tarnish the image of the OAS.1

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_ Central America: [The difficulty in electing a newOAS Secretary general has become a source of strainamong the Central American republicsj '

LThe lack of consensus is the only certain resultof. a meeting among the foreign ministers from Panamaand Central America held on 26 January. .The pro—_moters of the meeting had hoped the ministers couldagree on how to force the withdrawal of the three 'present candidates in favor of a more acceptableone.The foreign ministers will meet againbn 5 February

' in a last— ditch attempt to achieve regional unity beforethe fifth" ballot is takenj

[None of the present Candidates can be sure of aclear- cut victory. Another impasse or even 'a closevictory would further tarnish the image of the OAS.7

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NOTES

*USSR-Germa1_1y_: [Moscow has poured more cold water on West German hopes to negotiate an exchange of declarations with the USSR renouncing the use of force. In a note delivered on 29 January, the Russians indicated that Bonn would have to go a long way toward recognizing East Germany as the price of such an · agreement. The note, in addition to mollifying the East Germans, will test how far Bonn will go in its eagerness for progress on its eastern policy. Foreign Minister Brandt is evidently determined to continue the dialogue with the Soviets despite this latest rebuff, but support for his efforts within the Bonn coalition is bound to diminish as a result of this Soviet action:)

-Poland~ @:'he first SA-3 surface-to-air missile site

in Poland has been sighted at Brzeg, near Wroclaw in the southwestern part of the country, Like the 22 SA-3 sites recently deployed with Soviet troops in East Germany, the site in Poland is at a tactical airfield, The SA-3 low-altitude air defense missile system probably will be made available to Soviet troops elsewhere in Poland and to the USSR's forces in Hungary. All but a few of the sites in Germany have now received equipment, and missiles have been seen at four sites, sug-gesting that they are nearly operational.1 I I

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France: LDe Gaulle told departing Ambassador Bohlen that France's embargo on arms to Israel is in effect and gave the impression that it would remain so for a long time. De Gaulle confirmed that France would sell Mirages to Iraq, since it was not in his eyes a "battlefield. 11 He indicated, however, that it would be some years before the planes would be produced. Iraq's President Arif arrives in Paris on 7 February, and arms sales are ex-pected to figure prominently in talks thenJ \ 3.5(c)

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NOTES

*USSR» Germany: [Moscow has poured more coldwater on West. German hopes to negotiate an exchangeof declarations with the USSR renouncing the use offorce. In a note delivered on 29 January9 the Russiansindicated that Bonn would have to go a long way towardrecognizing East Germany as the price of such an 'agreement‘ The note, in addition to mollifying theEast Germans? will test how far Bonn will go in itseagerness for progress on its eastern policy. Foreign.

. Minister Brandt is evidently determined to continuethe dialogue with the Soviets despitethis latest rebuff,but supportfor his efforts within the Bonn coalition isbound to diminish as-‘a result of this Soviet action?)

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Poland: [The first SA-3 surfacee-to-air missile sitein Poland has been sighted at Brzeg,’ near Wroclaw inthe southwestern part of the country, Like the 22 SA-3

. sites recently deployed with Soviet troops in East Ger-many, the site in Poland is at a tactical airfield, TheSA-3 low—altitude air defense missile system probablywill be made available to Soviet troops elsewhere inPoland and to the USSR's forces in Hungary". All but afew of the sites in Germany have now received equip- 3 5. .. a . . . . (c)ment, and m1ss1les have been seen at four s1tes, sug—gesting that they are nearly operationalf? \. \

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_ France: LDe Gaulle told departing Ambassador Bohlenthat Francefs embargo on arms to Israel is in effect andgave the impression that it would remain so for a. longtime. De Gaulle confirmed that France would sell Miragesto Iraq, since it was not in his eyes a ”battlefield, " Heindicated, however: that it would be some years beforethe planes would be producecL Iraq’s President Arif ar-rives in Paris on 7 February, and arms sales are ex-pected to figure prominently in talks then; T 3.5(0)

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Mali-Cuba: r Cuba has agreed to send 400 technicians to Mali over an extended period of time,

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L__ ___________ The first contingent of Cubans reportedly will arrive in March. Some probably will be involved in training the Malian civilian militia. Cuban assistance at the scale indicated

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would represent a substantial effort by the Castro regime to expand its influence in Mali. Only "'-'-'----'--'-'.LLUJ.L,l

nonmilitar are there now. 3.5(c)

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Panama: (?artisans of presidential candidates Samudio and Arias could clash at a campaign rally to be staged by Arias in western Panama on 3 February. Both sides are preparing for trouble, and Samudio 's supporters reportedly have plans for a deliberate provocation. National Guard Commandant Vallarino has vowed to maintain order, but the anti-Arias local guard commander could allow the situation to get out 3.5(c)

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Mali-Cuba:YCuba has agreed to send 400 techni- . 3.3(h)(2)cians to Mali over an extended period of time, -

1 1 The first contingent of 3 3(h)(2)Cubans reportedly will arrive in March” Some prob— 'ably will be involved in training the Malian civilianmilitia. Cuban assistance at the scale indicatedwould represent a substantial effort by the Castroregime to expand its influence in Mali.» Only 25 Cuba 3 5technicians. all nonmilitarv. are there now.? ' (C)

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Panama: [Partisans of presidential candidatesSamudio and Arias could clash at a campaignrallyto be staged by Arias in western Panama on 3 February.Both sides are preparing for tr0ub1e-, and Samudio'ssupporters reportedly have plans for a deliberateprovocation. National Guard Commandant Vallarinohas vowed to maintain order, but the anti—Arias localguard copmander could allow the situation to get out

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