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I. INTRODUCTION
In the ordinary days of our lives we encounter different people
and we engage in different activities. As human as we are, we may
not be able to control everything that will happen around us. No
matter how we try to be careful, there is the law of nature that
calls for our fault. To do fault is easy but to do better is
difficult. This goes without saying that indeed we, as human being,
were not born perfect. Thus, regardless of the effort to keep away
ourselves from doing harm to others, we still injure someone
without or not even realizing it. Conversely, even if we manage to
secure ourselves from harm or injury, still there is that force
that causes us injury.
Hence, in order to balance these conflicting interests, the law
provides for a remedy in order for a person injured by another to
recover from his losses due to such injury. Citing Article 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, it provides that whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. This very
provision of law affords an aggrieved person to seek redress for
his right that has been violated by another. But before an
aggrieved person may recover, the law also provides that he must
first prove that such person who caused damage to him is indeed the
one liable for the same. The law seeks not only to help a person
injured by another by compensating him his losses but also to
protect a person alleged to be liable for the damage by affording
the latter his rights to due process in order to be able to defend
himself from possible prosecution. In so doing, it is but necessary
for the aggrieved party to first convince the court that the three
elements of quasi-delict are present before an alleged tortfeasor
may be held answerable for his action. These elements are; 1)there
must be an act or omission constituting fault or negligence, 2)
damage caused by the said act or omission, and 3) causal relation
between the damage and the act or omission. Hence, proving
negligence and damage alone will not suffice to consider the
defendant liable.
Corrective justice presupposes that the defendant has caused
harm to the plaintiff. It is this doing of harm that needs to be
corrected. So there must be a causal link between the defendants
conduct and the plaintiffs loss. Hence, without proof of causation,
the action for damages based on tort fails. [footnoteRef:2] Proof
of causation is essential to established that someones act or
omission is indeed the proximate cause of the injury suffered. [2:
Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and damages, 2013 Edition, p. 317]
Based on the foregoing, our main consideration is how do we
determine proximate cause in negligence cases? What are the things
to be considered in order to obtain affirmative relief when we come
across a situation where we will be proving negligence of someone?
Are there factors which we could weigh against to fix or limit the
liability of the tortfeasor after establishing that his action is
the cause-in-fact of the injury?
These queries are what this paper aims to answer. This paper
will discuss two tests which are common law in origin used in
determining proximate cause of the injury. In addition, the paper
aims to consider the applicability of these two tests in the
Philippine jurisdiction. These tests are the cause-in-fact test and
the policy test. In determining the proximate cause of the injury,
it is necessary to determine if defendants negligence was the
cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If defendants
negligence was not the cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it
is a cause-in-fact, the inquiry shifts to the question of limit of
liability of the defendant. The latter determination of the extent
of liability involves a question of policy. Consideration of public
policy may be given due weight in fixing the limit or scope of
legal liability and practical considerations must at times
determine the bounds of correlative rights and duties as well as
the point beyond which the courts will decline causal
connection.[footnoteRef:3] [3: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and
damages, 2013 Edition, p. 328( Comstock v. Wilson, 76 A.L.R. 676,
257 NY 231.)]
In other words, the question of proximate cause does not only
involve cause and effect analysis. It also involves policy
considerations that limit the liability of the defendants in
negligence cases.
II. THIRD ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE: CAUSATION
As earlier pointed out, proof only of negligence and injury in
negligence cases will not suffice to render the defendant liable.
The plaintiff must prove that there is a causal relation or link
between the defendants negligence and the plaintiffs loss or injury
suffered.
Courts in the United States, Canada, and Britain have long
struggled with the slippery concept of causation. Legal doctrine
has been shaped over the years to assist fact finders in
determining the answer to the crucial question in a negligence
action: What made this incident happen? An automobile accident
could be caused by icy road conditions, faulty brakes on the
automobile, or the driver speeding through a stoplight without
stopping. If the defendants negligence is found to be a cause of
the plaintiffs injury, then the defendant is held liable and must
compensate the plaintiff.[footnoteRef:4] [4: Knutsen, Erik S.,
Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A
Multi-Jurisdictional Approach: p. 251. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL, (Volume 38:249)]
A. Proximate Cause
The most widely quoted, and what is said to be the best
definition of proximate cause is that it is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred. [footnoteRef:5] In the case of Bataclan
vs. Medina[footnoteRef:6], the Supreme Court provides for a more
comprehensive definition of proximate cause which provides that,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by settling other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain affecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. This
definition of proximate cause includes the element of
foreseeability. Foreseeability involves the question of
probability. The Supreme Court explain that there is negligence if
a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that the effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his conduct or guarding against its
consequence.[footnoteRef:7] (cite specific event in this case) [5:
Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 317] [6:
Bataclan vs. Medina, G.R. No. L- 10126] [7: Picart v. Smith, G.R.
No. L-12219, March 15, 1918, 37 Phil. 809]
Philippine Bank vs. Court of Appeals[footnoteRef:8] also defines
proximate cause which included the element of foreseeability which
goes this way: [8: 234 SCRA 435 (1994)]
The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of
jurisprudence as any cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated
by a person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence.
It is believed that these definitions, which include the element
of foreseeability, are misleading and inconsistent with the
provisions of the New Civil Code. The actor is liable for the
damages which resulted from his acts, whether the same is foreseen
or unforeseen.[footnoteRef:9] [9: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and
Damages, 2013 Edition,p. 318]
B. Proximate cause distinguished from other terms
i. Distinguished from Remote Cause.
The proximate cause is distinguished from remote cause which is
defined as that cause which some independent force merely took
advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect
thereof. A remote cause cannot be considered the legal cause of the
damage. [footnoteRef:10] [10: Aquino, Timoteo B.,Ibid.]
Indeed, not all causes that occur prior to the damages can be
considered proximate. For example, in the lobby of the second floor
of a building, there are several flower pots placed therein which
if it will fall may cause injury to someone walking in the first
floor underneath. Juan, a janitor of the building while cleaning
that lobby accidentally shoves one of the flower pots and causes it
to fall harming a woman standing in the first floor just below the
lobby where the flower pots exactly are. If we follow the theory
that causes prior to the damage be considered proximate then it
would lead to an absurd conclusion that the owner of the building
who placed the flower pots in that lobby would be held liable.
Thus, a remote cause cannot be considered the legal cause of the
damage.
ii. Distinguish from Nearest Cause
The word proximate is defined as being in immediate relation
with something else; next and near.[footnoteRef:11] Hence, the
impression that is being given by the word is that it is the
nearest cause. Contrary to the impression being given by the term,
however, proximate cause is not necessarily the nearest cause.
Proximate cause is not necessarily the last link in the chain of
events but that which is the procuring efficient and predominant
cause.[footnoteRef:12] As the Supreme Court in one case, the
requirement is that the act was the proximate cause, not implying,
however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in
point of time or relation, but rather the efficient cause, which
maybe the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that sets
the other in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere
pre-existing condition upon which the effective cause operates, and
must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the
intervention of an independent cause.[footnoteRef:13] [11: Websters
Dictionary, 1992 Ed.] [12: Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. V. Sikes, 166
ALR 375, 196 Okla. 137, 168 P2d 1016. ] [13: Aquino, Timoteo B.,
Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 321]
This rule is illustrated in Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad
Company.[footnoteRef:14] In the said case, embers were negligently
emitted from one of the trains of the defendant resulting in the
fire in one of the houses near the tracks (house 1). Because of the
wind, fire was communicated to another house (house 2) and then to
another (house 3). One of the arguments of the railroad company in
trying to escape liability to the owners of houses 2 and 3 is that
the fire did not come directly from its train but from house 1. The
Supreme Court rejected the argument ruling that what was important
was the admitted fact that the fire originated in the negligent
acts of the defendants and the circumstance that fire may have been
communicated to the two other houses through the first house
instead of having been directly communicated from the locomotive
through the action of the wind, is immaterial. [14: G.R. No.
L-15688, November 19, 1921]
iii. Effects of Concurrent Causes
The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the
accident. The defendant is still liable in case there are
concurrent causes brought about by acts or omission of third
persons. The actor is not protected from liability even if the
active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a
third persons innocent, tortuous or criminal act is also a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm so long as the actors
negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about
harm to another.[footnoteRef:15] [15: Africa v. Caltex, G.R. No.
L-12986, March 31, 1966]
In the same vein, the primary cause remains the proximate cause
even if there is an intervening cause which merely cooperated with
the primary cause and which did not break the chain of causation.
These rules were summarized in the case of Far Eastern Shipping
Company v. Court of Appeals[footnoteRef:16], where the Supreme
Court held that: [16: G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 199 and G.R. No.
130150, October, 1998 (consolidated case)]
It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to
render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It
is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce
injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is
responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an
extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured.
To find out further about proximate cause, two tests will be
discussed in the succeeding sections. The cause-in-fact test and
policy test are introduced by common law to assist our courts and
as well as our lawyers with their clients in determining proximate
cause of an injury and matters which should be considered in each
and every case.
III. TESTS OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
A. Cause-in Fact Doctrine
Under traditional tort analysis, "cause in fact" has long been
an essential element in finding a defendant liable for a
plaintiff's injury. Tort theory generally has required that a
plaintiff identify that the defendant's act, omission, product, or
dangerous animal was sufficiently connected to the plaintiff's
injury. By requiring that the plaintiff prove identification and
causation before a defendant is required to pay for a plaintiff's
injuries, tort law satisfies society's notion of
justice.[footnoteRef:17] [17: Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN
TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume
31,p.769:
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review]
Cause-in-fact is traditionally considered to be less contentious
and more predictable than proximate cause. Indeed, many torts
scholars and fact finders argue that cause-in-fact is a
straightforward question of common sense.[footnoteRef:18] Around
the turn of the twentieth century, however, courts divided the
causation issue into two distinct inquiries: a determination of
proximate or legal cause, and cause in fact. This dual analysis was
viewed as demonstrating the courts' increased proficiency in
analyzing the separate causes that produced injuries to the
plaintiff." The cause in fact analysis focused on possible causes
of the injury before an inquiry into legal or proximate cause
proceeded. This analytical separation did little, however, to
clearly define the distinctive characteristics of the cause in fact
element." Although a number of causes for an injury could exist,
the courts reserved inquiry into these causes until after a
determination of whether a defendant was sufficiently connected to
the injury."[footnoteRef:19] [18: Knutsen, Erik S., Ambiguous
Cause-in-Fact and Structured Causation: A Multi-Jurisdictional
Approach: p. 252. TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Volume 38:249):
http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/38/num2/Knutsen249.pdf] [19:
Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.774, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER,
(Vol. 31:769):
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review]
Unfortunately, the two causation inquiries often commingled, and
failure to clearly define proximate cause yielded further
confusion. The most common method for distinguishing the two
inquiries treated cause in fact as a question for the trier of
fact, and proximate cause as a question of law."
Cause- in - fact analysis, however, necessitated more than a
simple factual inquiry established through production of
testimony." From his understanding of, and experience with, the
world, the trier of fact was required to make a judgment that
certain effects follow certain antecedents. To ascertain whether a
cause in fact existed, the trier of fact's "judging capacity"
needed to be furnished with enough evidentiary facts to enable him,
based on his experience, to rationally connect the defendant's act
with the plaintiff's injury, in order that the trier of fact could
label the defendant's act as the cause."[footnoteRef:20] [20:
Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER,
(Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review]
The problem with cause in fact is related intimately to the
philosophical search for ultimate cause. In determination of
causality, a greatest philosopher, David Hume observed in Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding that our knowledge of cause and
effect is not, in any instance, attained by reasoning a priori, but
arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular
objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Thus, our notion
of causality according to Hume is not some mysterious quality in
the objects themselves. Rather, we consider that there is such
causality because we have hitherto observed that objects of those
two types are regularly conjoined, we expect them to go together on
this occasion too. John Stuart Mill refined Humes account of
causality. He observed in A System of Logic that the invariable
antecedent is termed the cause and the invariable consequent, the
effect. Hence, universality of the law of causation consists in
this, the every consequent is connected in this manner with some
particular antecedent or set of antecedents. Legal theorists Hart
and Honore elaborated on the theories of David Hume and John Stuart
Mill. Hart and Honore explained that when we look for the cause of
an occurrence, we are looking for something, usually earlier in
time, which is abnormal or an interference in the sense that it is
not present when things are as usual.[footnoteRef:21] [21: Aquino,
Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 edition, p.331]
Although the analytical element of cause in fact has not always
been specifically identified in common law torts," courts
continually insisted on some measure of causation. Thus courts have
developed but-for test and substantial factor test to determine
cause in fact.
B. Different Cause-in-fact Tests
i. But-for Test or Sine Qua Non Test
The majority of common law cause-in-fact inquiries involve a
courts application of one of two well-established torts principles:
the but for test or the substantial factor test of causation. The
but for test is the simpler of the two and is used for the majority
of factual circumstances. A plaintiff in a negligence action must
prove on a balance of probabilities that, but for the defendants
negligent conduct, the plaintiff would not have suffered injury.
Fact patterns which fit the but for test of causation are those
where it can be established on a balance of probabilities that the
defendants negligence was a necessary component of the cause that
gave rise to the plaintiffs injury. In most negligence actions
where one plaintiff sues one negligent defendant, that defendants
negligence is usually one of two or more equally competing and
mutually exclusive possible causes. A court weighs the evidence of
causation to determine whether or not, on a balance of
probabilities, it can be proven that the defendant caused the
plaintiffs injury.[footnoteRef:22] [22: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts
and Damages, 2013 Edition, p.]
The but for test is also known as the sine qua non test. Sine
qua non is a Latin term meaning a necessary requirement. The
defendants action (inaction) was a necessary requirement for the
plaintiff to be injured. If the defendants action is not a
necessary requirement for an injury to occur, then the defendant
was not the cause in fact of the injury.
For example, Timothy stopped at the four-way stop. Lee did not
see the stop sign at the same intersection. Timothy proceeds into
the intersection. Lee did not stop and plows into Timothy. But for
Lee running the stop sign, Timothy would not have
injured.[footnoteRef:23] [23: Morissette, Emily Lyn, Personal
Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals; Chapter 4: Third
Element of Negligence: Causation of Injury; p. 44]
A further example, if the plaintiff was injured because a
portion of a negligently constructed wall that collapsed hit him,
the negligence in the construction of the wall is the cause in fact
of the injury because the injury to the plaintiff would not have
resulted had there been no negligence on the part of the defendant.
On the other hand, if the object that fell from the window of the
same building hit the plaintiff, the negligent construction of the
wall is not the cause in fact of the injury the injury could not
have been avoided in the absence thereof.[footnoteRef:24] [24:
Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages;2013 Edition, p. ]
Another example would be, Ernie is sitting in the law library,
looking at a rare legal manuscript. He pulls out a can of cola he
concealed in his backpack and brought into the library. He sips the
cola while reviewing the document. When he goes to grab the open
can of cola, he accidentally knocks it over, destroying the rare
document. But for Ernie knocking over the can of soda, the document
would not have been destroyed.
More than one defendants action might be the reason why the
plaintiff is harmed. Two actions might be necessary for an accident
to occur. The but for test does not require there be only one
action that brings about an injury. However, if there is more than
one action, then each action must be a but for cause (necessary
cause) of the injury. The more contributors to an injury and the
more events necessary to cause an injury, the less helpful the
but-for test is. The but-for test should not be used when there are
two or more causes to an injury, either one of which, by itself,
would have been enough to cause the injury.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Minneapolis, Saint
Paul & Sault Sainte Marie Railway, adopted a test which was
designed to better handle the determination of cause in fact in
cases involving multiple causes. This test considers whether the
defendant's action was a "material element" or a substantial factor
in producing the plaintiff's injury.[footnoteRef:25] [25: Zwier,
Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER,
(Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review,
p. 779-780]
ii. Substantial Factor Test
Similar to the "but for" test, this substantial factor or
material element test included the notion that the defendant's act
or object needed to be possessed by the defendant and produced the
plaintiff's injury. According to the Minnesota Supreme Court and a
majority of courts that adopted Minnesota's approach, the
substantial factor test was the minimum requirement for assessing
liability. [footnoteRef:26] [26: Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN
TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume
31,p.776, DE PAUL LAW REVIEWER, (Vol. 31:769). @
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review,
p. 780]
The substantial factor test asks the following: was the
defendant a substantial factor, or big contributor, in causing the
injury to the plaintiff? The defendant will be liable for the
injuries to the plaintiff where the defendant was the substantial
factor in causing the injury. The substantial factor test, unlike
the but-for test, addresses the issue of concurrent causes.
Concurrent causes are causes acting together to cause the injury,
although each cause by itself would not have caused the injury. If
two causes combine into one harm, one which cannot be cleanly
divided, then each cause will be considered as a substantial factor
of the harm. For example if two fires merge to cause an injury, the
test to apply would be the substantial factor test rather than the
but-for test.
In Summer vs. Tice, there were two hunters, who separately fired
their guns at the same time in the direction of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff was struck in the eye. Which defendant should be held
liable for the injury? How can liability be determined? Is it not a
fifty-fifty chance where one defendant or the other shot the
plaintiff? The court determined the plaintiff was not in the best
position to determine which defendant was at fault. Therefore, the
court ruled the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to show
each of them was not liable. The burden of proof requires a party,
in this case, the defendant to prove a fact in dispute between the
parties. The defendants could not prove which defendant was more
liable, so both were found liable. The ruling prevented the
defendants, who were both negligent, from avoiding responsibility
from their negligence. [footnoteRef:27] [27: Morissette, Emily Lyn,
Personal Injury and the Law of Torts for Paralegals; Chapter 4:
Third Element of Negligence: Causation of Injury; p. 45]
As earlier stated, the substantial factor test is important in
cases where there are concurrent causes. Here the issues are not
factual but conceptual: When are harms attributable to the
defendant whose own actions are combined with those of other
persons and natural events? The application of the but-for test
will lead to an absurd conclusion if concurrent causes are
involved. For example, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from
a horse, which was frightened by two approaching vehicles. If the
drivers of both vehicles, A and B, were negligent and either
vehicle was sufficient to frighten the horse, the resort to the
but-for test will result to an absurd conclusion that the
negligence of either driver cannot be considered the cause in fact
of the injury because the damage have likewise resulted if only one
driver was negligent. It cannot be said that the damage would not
have resulted had there been no negligence on the part of A. It
cannot likewise be said that damage would not have resulted had
there been no negligence on the part of B. However, under the
substantial factor test, the concurrent causes will still be
considered as the cause-in-fact of the injury because the
negligence of both A and B are substantial factors in bringing
about the injury. [footnoteRef:28] [28: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts
and Damages, 2013 Edition,p.]
Another case in point, the but for test is unworkable in sorting
out the cause-in-fact of damage to a plaintiffs property resulting
from two separately burning fires that converge together to cause
indivisible damage. If one fire is caused by the defendants
negligence and one is caused by natural circumstances, a court is
not aided by asking whether, but for the one fire, the plaintiff
would not have suffered damage. The second fire exists and makes
dividing the source of causation impossible. Therefore, a court
uses the substantial factor test of causation to determine if a
defendants negligent conduct was a material element, or substantial
factor, in bringing about the injury of the plaintiff. The role of
the defendants negligence in bringing about this injury must be
beyond the de minimus range in order to be considered the cause of
the injury.
iii. Necessary Element of Sufficient Set (NESS) Test
Another alternative test is the so called NESS Test. The NESS
test is especially effective in solving problems regarding
concurrent causes. Under this test, the negligent act or omission,
is a cause-in- fact of the damage if it is a necessary element of a
sufficient set (NESS). The test is based on the concept of
causation by David Hume and Stuart Mill, and systematically
elaborated for legal purposes by professors Hart and Honore in
Causation in Law and Professor Wright in Causation in Tort Law.
[footnoteRef:29] [29: John G. Fleming, The Law of torts, 7th
Edition,p. 173]
Professor Fleming restated the test as follows : Whether a
particular condition qualifies as casually relevant factor will
depend on whether it was necessary to complete a set of conditions
jointly sufficient to account for the given occurrence. A necessary
condition for the occurrence of a specified event is a circumstance
in whose absence the event cannot occur while a sufficient
condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose
presence the event must occur.[footnoteRef:30] [30: Irving Copi and
Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 10th Edition,pp. 496-497]
However, what is considered as a necessary cause is not one that
occurs in vacuum. Under the NESS Test, it is acknowledged that the
candidate cause is just part of the sufficient set. Professor
Richard W. Wright explained the NESS Test in this
wise:[footnoteRef:31] [31: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages,
2013 Edition, p. 337]
The basic concept of causation is formalized in the NESS
(necessary element of a sufficient set) test of causal
contribution, which in its full form states that a condition
contributed to some consequence if and only if it was necessary for
the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that was
sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence. The relevant
notion of sufficiency is not merely logical or empirical, but
rather requires each element of the applicable causal
generalization, in both the antecedent (if part) and the consequent
(then part) must have been in actual existence on the particular
occasion.
The NESS test subsumes and integrates the Restatements necessary
condition test and its independently-sufficient condition test,
which are merely corollaries of the NESS test that apply in certain
types of situations. The NESS test reduces down to the necessary
condition (but for) test if there was only one set of conditions
that was or would have been sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence on the particular occasion, or, if there was more than
one such set, if the condition was necessary for the sufficiency of
each of the sets. Yet the NESS test is more inclusive than the
but-for test. A condition was a cause under the NESS test if it was
necessary for the sufficiency of any actually sufficient set, even
if, due to other duplicative or pre-empted set of conditions, it
was not, as acquired by the but-for test, necessary in the
circumstances for the consequence.
B. Policy Test or Cut-off Test
A finding that the defendants negligence was the cause in fact
of the damage to the plaintiff will not necessarily result in a
finding that the same negligence is the proximate cause of the
damage or injury to the plaintiff. The law, as a matter of policy,
may limit the liability of the defendant to certain consequences of
his action. If the damage or injury to the plaintiff is beyond the
scope or limit of the liability fixed bylaw, the defendants conduct
cannot be considered the proximate cause of the damage. Such scope
or limit of liability is determined by applying what are known as
policy tests.
Thus, in deciding negligence cases, it is likewise necessary to
determine the policy tests adopted in a particular jurisdiction.
The different policy tests that are being used to determine the
extent of the defendants liability for negligence include: a)
foreseeability test; b) natural and probable consequence test; c)
natural and ordinary or direct consequences test; d) hindsight
test; e) orbit of risk test; and f) the substantial factor
test.[footnoteRef:32] [32: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages,
2013 Edition, p. 340]
The above-specified policy tests may be divided into two (2)
groups. The first group involves the element of foreseeability
while the other does not require that the injury is within the
foreseeable risk created by the defendant. The first may be
referred to as the foresight perspective while the other as the
directness perspective. [footnoteRef:33] The two perspectives were
briefly explained in this wise: [33: Epstein, p. 468]
Analytically, the problem of proximate cause in turn can be
addressed in two distinct ways. One possibility is to ask whether
the chain of events that in fact occurred was sufficiently
foreseeable, natural, or probable at the outset for the defendant
to be held liable for the ultimate harm that ensued, assuming the
causation in fact can be established. That judgment is made from
the standpoint of the defendant at the time the tortuous conduct
was committed. The second approach starts with the injury and works
back towards the wrongful action of the defendant, seeking to
determine whether any act of a third party or the plaintiff, or any
event, severed the causal connection between the harm and the
defendants wrongful conduct. Here the question is only whether,
when all the evidence is in, it is permissible to that the
defendant did it, that is, brought about the plaintiffs
harm.[footnoteRef:34] [34: Epstein, Ibid. ]
Under the foreseeability test and other similar tests like the
natural and probable consequence test, the defendant is not liable
for unforeseeable consequences of his acts. The liability is
limited within the risk created by the defendants negligent act.
Direct consequence test, on the other hand, makes the defendant
liable for damages that are beyond the risk. Direct consequences
are those which follow in the sequence from the effects of the
defendants act upon conditions existing and forces already in
operation at the time, without the intervention of any external
forces, which come into active operation later.[footnoteRef:35]
[35: Prosser and Keeton, p. 294]
I. Foreseeability Test
In most personal injury cases, the answer to the question "Who
was at fault?" comes down to figuring out who was negligent.
Negligence is the failure, on the part of the person causing the
injury, to use the reasonable amount of care that is required in a
particular situation. In order to prove negligence, you have to
establish that the person causing the injury was not only the
actual cause of the injury, but also the proximate cause (or legal
cause), of the injury.
In order to be liable for negligence, the type of harm that
occurred must have been foreseeable. However, the extent of the
harm is not limited by what was or was not foreseeable. In this
article, well discuss some of the issues that may arise with
respect to proximate cause and foreseeability, when you're trying
to prove fault in a personal injury case.
What is Foreseeability?
Foreseeability is the leading test that is used to determine
proximate cause. The foreseeability test basically asks whether the
person causing the injury should have reasonably foreseen the
general consequences that would result because of his or her
conduct.
Foreseeability and Proximate Cause
The law limits the scope of liability based upon the
foreseeability of the type of the harm and the manner of the harm,
but not the extent of the harm. In this section, we'll explain the
distinctions.
A. Unforeseeable Type of Harm. A person who causes injury to
another is not liable if the type of harm does not foreseeably flow
from the negligent act.
For example, if Damon drops a glass bottle on the floor and does
not clean it up, Damon would be liable for the injuries caused to
anyone who cut themselves on the glass. However, if a freak fire is
somehow caused by sunlight that is magnified through the broken
glass, it is arguable that Damon would not be liable for injuries
caused by the fire because they are not a foreseeable type of harm
that would flow from the negligent act. In other words, a fire is
not a foreseeable result that might stem from leaving shards of
glass on the ground.
B. Unforeseeable Manner of Harm. A person who causes injury to
another person is not liable for a superseding cause when the
superseding cause itself was not foreseeable. In such a situation,
it is said that the superseding act breaks the causal chain between
the initial negligent act and the injury. That means the person who
committed the initial negligent act will be relieved of
liability.
For example, if David left a candle burning in his apartment
while he was at work, and, subsequently, a burglar broke into his
apartment and knocked the candle over, burning down the entire
building, David would likely not be liable for injuries sustained
because the burglar was an unforeseeable, superseding cause. In
reality, the issue would be argued by both sides of the case -- the
people who suffered losses from the fire arguing that the burglar's
presence was foreseeable, and David arguing that it was not.
Other examples of superseding causes that are usually deemed
unforeseeable:
1. acts of God (i.e., earthquakes)
2. criminal acts of third persons (i.e., burglary), and
3. intentional torts of third persons (i.e., assault, battery,
false imprisonment).
Examples of superseding causes that are typically deemed
foreseeable (so that the defendant does not escape liability):
1. harm caused by rescuers (i.e., firefighters or other people
that come to the injured persons aid)
2. ordinary negligence of health care providers (i.e., doctors
and nurses), and
3. disease or subsequent injury that is sustained as a result of
the injured person being in a weakened condition.
C. Unforeseeable Extent of Harm. A person who causes injury to
another person is liable for the full extent of the harm, whether
or not the extent of the harm is foreseeable. For example, if
Dallas is negligently driving through a small, suburban town and
collides with Pariss Ferrari, Dallas is liable for the full amount
of damage caused to the car, despite the fact that it would not be
foreseeable to see such a car driving through a small, suburban
town.[footnoteRef:36] [36: Tikriti, Amir; Foreseeability and
Proximate Cause in an Injury Case;
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/foreseeability-proximate-cause.html;
]
The foreseeability test is sometimes used in conjunction with
the natural and probable consequence test, which, although
expressed in different terminology, is closely related, if not an
essentially a similar test.[footnoteRef:37] [37: Sangco, J Cesar
S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0-Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false,
]
ii. Natural and Probable Consequence Test
The test of proximate cause which has been stated and applied
more often than any other is that which determines an injury to be
the proximate result of negligence only where the injury is the
natural and probable consequence of the wrongful act or omission.
The natural consequence of an act is the consequence which
ordinarily follows it. A probable consequence is one which is more
likely to follow than fail to follow its supposed cause but it need
not be one which necessarily follow such cause. Where this test is
used, ii is not enough to prove that an accident is the natural
consequence of the negligence. It must also have been the probable
consequence. Thus there was lack of causal relationship between the
plaintiffs injury and the alleged negligence of the defendant, the
operator of the market, in grabbing the robber and attempting to
disarm him, where after the struggle had ended, the robber had
commenced his flight, and shot the plaintiff, since the robbers act
was neither a natural and probable consequence of the defendants
resistance, although if the gun has been discharged during the
struggle there would have been a causal relationship. In order to
warrant a finding of negligence or an act not amounting to wanton
wrong, was the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that
the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligence. Where there is danger of a particular injury which
actually occurs, it must be said that the injury is the usual,
natural and probable result of the act exposing the person or thing
injured to the danger.[footnoteRef:38] [38: Sangco, Caesar J,
Ibid.]
iii. Ordinary and Natural or Direct consequence Test
The extent of the actors liability is for all consequent damage
naturally flowing from such conduct, whether such damage were
reasonably to be anticipated or not. This test states, as a matter
of legal policy, that if a negligence is a cause in fact of an
injury under the criteria previously discussed, the liability of
the wrongdoer extends to all injurious consequences. Such based is
based on the principle that in tort the wrongdoer is liable for all
the consequences that naturally flow from his wrongful act,
provided only that they are not too remote, and that as far as
proximate cause is concerned the question is not whether the damage
was foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where in fact it resulted
as a direct consequence of the defendants act. According to this
view, reasonable anticipation has no logical connection with
causation. It is not the consequence that the defendant as a
reasonably prudent person should have foreseen as within the risk
of his conduct which controls the limitation of his liability, but
the risk that the court, after the conduct has taken place and the
injury has been suffered, considers shall fall within the scope- or
orbit of the defendants duty under the law.[footnoteRef:39] [39:
Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0-Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false;
p 111]
iv. Hindsight Test
Another test which seems to eliminate foreseeability as an
element of proximate cause and which has been referred to as the
hindsight test, has been stated as follows: A party guilty of
negligence or omission of duty is responsible for all the
consequences which a prudent and experienced party fully acquainted
with all the circumstances which in fact exist, whether they could
have ascertained by reasonable diligence, or not, would have
thought at the time of the negligent act as reasonably possible to
follow, if they have been suggested to his mind. Seemingly, these
words mean that a wrongdoer is responsible for all the consequences
which a prudent man charged with knowledge of all the facts would
have thought possible to follow from his negligent act and they
appear to obviate foreseeability as an element of proximate cause.
[footnoteRef:40] [40: Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts
and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0-Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false]
v. Orbit of the Risk Test
The orbit of the risk doctrine as formulated in the prevailing
opinion in the celebrated Plasgraf case was intended to be a test
of duty and not a test of proximate cause, an issue which was not
reached by the court since it disposed of the case by determining
that the defendant under the circumstances had breached no duty
that was owed to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court in Palsgraph v. Long Island R.R.
Co.[footnoteRef:41] held that that the conduct of Long Island
Railroads guard was wrongful in relation to the man carrying the
parcel, but not in relation to Palsgraf standing far away. No one
was on notice that the package contained fireworks which when
dropped could harm a person as far from the zone of danger as
Palsgraf. To find negligence there must first be a finding that a
duty was owed and breached, and that the injury could have been
avoided if the defendant had been following that duty. The orbit of
the danger or risk associated with a danger or risk is that which a
reasonable person would foresee. Even if the guard had
intentionally taken the package and thrown it he would not have
threatened Palsgrafs safety from the appearances of the
circumstances to a reasonable person. Long Island Railroads
liability for an inadvertent or unintentional act cannot be greater
than it would be if the act had been intentional. [41: Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co.,Ct. of App. of N.Y., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928)]
If foreseeable risk to the plaintiff created a duty which the
defendant breached, liability is imposed for any resulting injury
within the scope or orbit of such injury, it is not the unusual
nature of the act resulting in injury to plaintiff that is the test
of foreseeability, but whether the result of the act is within the
ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the
defendant.[footnoteRef:42] [42: Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law
on Torts and Damages, Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0-Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false
; page 114]
IV. APPLICABILITY OF CAUSE-IN-FACT AND
POLICY TEST IN THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION
The determination of the applicable test is likewise a problem
in Philippine jurisdiction. The problem is being compounded by the
fact that there is little literature on proximate cause.
Examinations of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals do not immediately reveal the applicable rule because more
often than not, the discussion of proximate cause contains mere
salutary citations of definitions and previous
decisions.[footnoteRef:43] [43: Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and
Damages, 2013 Edition, p. 343]
Nevertheless, it had also been acknowledge that the
determination of proximate cause depends on whether public policy
requires that the plaintiff or defendant should bear the
loss.[footnoteRef:44] The difference between this jurisdiction,
however, with that of other jurisdictions is that the New Civil
Code contains a chapter on Damages which specifies the type of
damage for which the defendant may be held liable as well as the
limit to such liability. In other words, the policy on the kind of
damage to be awarded to the plaintiff is already expressed in
statutory provisions.[footnoteRef:45] [44: Reyes and Puno, p. 167]
[45: Aquino, Timoteo B, Ibid. ]
A. Applicable Cause-in-Fact Test in the Philippines
There is no statutory provision in this jurisdiction that
mandates the use of a particular cause-in fact test. However, there
is no question that the but-for test is being applied in this
jurisdiction. The definition of proximate cause includes a
statement that indicates the applicability of the but-for test. The
definition of Bataclan v. Medina[footnoteRef:46] includes a
statement that the cause should be that without which the damages
would not have resulted. [46: G.R. No. L- 10126]
The substantial factor test is likewise being applied in this
jurisdiction. The substantial factor test as it is contemplated in
the Restatement, Second, Torts of the American Law Institute had
been cited in cases decided in this jurisdiction.[footnoteRef:47]
The very the same definition adopted in Bataclan reflects the
observation of one legal writer that the issue of proximate
causation asks whether the defendants conduct could be regarded as
a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs harm, and the
inquiry is often translated into one that asks whether any of the
human actions or natural events that occur after defendants but
before the plaintiffs harm severs the causal connection between
them.[footnoteRef:48] [47: See Philippine Rabbit v. Court of
Appeals, G.r. No. 66102, August 30, 1990] [48: Epstein, p.468]
It is believed that the NESS test can also be applied in
multiple causation cases. Since there is no statutory provision
that fixes the applicable test, there is room for the application
of NESS test. The NESS test is gaining wider acceptance because it
is even reflected in the latest version of the Restatement of
torts. In Restatement (Third) of Torts, if a tortuous conduct of a
tortfeasor fails the but-for test because there is another set of
conduct also sufficient to cause the harm, the tortfeasors conduct
is still a cause in fact or factual cause.[footnoteRef:49] [49:
Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition,p.344]
B. Applicable Policy Test in the Philippines
There is a conflict of opinion regarding the applicability of
the foresight perspective in determining proximate cause. The
ruling in the early case of Algarra v. Sandejas[footnoteRef:50]
indicates the applicability of the foreseeability test: [50: G.R.
No. L-8385 ,March 24, 1914]
The liability of the present defendant includes only those
damages which were foreseen or may have been foreseen at the time
of the accident, and which are necessary and immediate consequence
of his fault. In discussing the question of damages under the civil
law, Gutierrez (vol. 4, pp.64,65) says:
In the impossibility of laying down a surer rule, the Code
understands known damages to be those which in the prudent
discernment of the judge merit such a qualification, although their
consequences may not be direct, immediate, inevitable.
If it is a question of losses occasioned through other causes,
except fraud, and the contracting parties have not covenanted any
indemnity for the case of non fulfilment, then the reparation of
losses or damages shall only comprise those that are the necessary
and immediate consequence of that fault. This rule may not be very
clear, but is the only possible in a matter more of the domain of
prudence than of law.
These authorities are sufficient to show that liability for acts
ex delicto under the Civil Code is precisely that embraced within
the proximate cause of the Anglo-Saxon Law of Torts.
The general rule as frequently stated, is that in order that an
act or omission may be the proximate cause of an injury, the injury
must be the natural and probable consequence of the act or omission
and such as might have been foreseen by an ordinary responsible and
prudent man, in the light of the attendant circumstances, as likely
to result therefrom.
According to the later authorities foreseeableness, as an
element of proximate cause does not depend upon whether an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent man would or ought in advance to
have anticipated the result which happened, but whether, if such
result and the chain of events connecting it with the act
complained of had occurred to his mind, the same would have seemed
natural and probable and according to the ordinary course of
nature. Thus as said in one case, A person guilty of negligence, or
an unlawful act, should be held responsible for all the
consequences which a prudent and experienced man, fully acquainted
with all the circumstances which in fact existed, would at the time
of the negligent or unlawful act have thought reasonable to follow,
if they had occurred to his mind. (Wabash R. Etc. Co. V. Coker, 81
Ill. App. 60, 664; Cooley on Torts, sec. 15).
The view which I shall endeavour to justify is that, for the
purpose of civil liability, those consequences, and those only, are
deemed immediate, proximate, or, to anticipate a little, natural
and probable, which a person of average competent and knowledge,
being in the like case with the person whose conduct is complained
of, and having the like opportunities of observation, might be
expected to foresee as likely to follow upon such conduct. This is
only where the particular consequence is not known to have been
intended or foreseen by the actor. If proof of that be forthcoming,
whether the consequence was immediate or not does not matter. That
which a man actually foresee is to him, at all events, natural and
probable (Webbs Pollock on Torts, p. 31).
Almost half a century thereafter, Justice J.B.L. Reyes clarified
that the rule under the Old Civil code is the same as the rule in
contracts. He explained in Silva vs. Peralta[footnoteRef:51] that:
[51: 2 SCRA 1025 (1961)]
As to the award of damages, against Saturnino Silva, it is to be
noted that while the latters liability was exta-contractual in
origin, still, under the Civil Code in 1889, the damages resulting
from a tort are measured in the same manner as those due from a
contractual debtor in bad faith, since he must answer for such
damages, whether he had foreseen them or not, just as he must
indemnify not only for damnum emergens but also for lucrum cessans,
as required by Article 1106. Article 1002 of the 1889 Civil Code of
Spain formulated no standard for measuring quasi-delictual damages,
the article merely prescribing that the guilty party shall be
liable for the damages so done. This indefiniteness led modern
civil law writers to hold that the standart set in Article 1106 and
1107, placed in the general rules on obligations rigen por igual
para las contractuales y las extras contractuales, las
preestablicidas y las que borten ex-lege de actos ilictos.(Roces
Notes to Fisher) Los Daos Civiles y su Reparacin. (1927). Since
liability for damages arises in either case from a breach of a
pre-existing obligation (to behave without fault or negligence in
case of quasi- delicts, and, in the case of contracts, to observe
the conduct required by the stipulation), it is logical to conclude
with Planiol that La reponsibilidad contractual y la extra
contractual tienen el mismo fundamento, pou to que se hallan
sujetas en principio a identicas reglas. (6 Planiol-Ripert, Derecho
Civil, pp. 133, 207-208). [footnoteRef:52] [52: Aquino, Timoteo B.,
Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, pp. 347-349.]
V. ANALYSIS/RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the foregoing, causation of an injury as an element
in negligence cases has been a matter which different scholars and
diverse jurisdictions have been studied for a long time. Such
studies continue to create different aspects of causation of an
injury which have been or would be a basis in determining
negligence in each and every case in different jurisdictions. Many
tests have been used to determine causation of an injury which
tests may be based on experiences, natural law, or varieties of
laws in each country. Determination of proximate cause has been
decided in different cases and different jurisdictions dependent
upon the findings of each Courts or juries upon examining the
particular facts and evidences adduced upon it. While other courts
may use one type of tests in its jurisdiction to derive at a
solution in a case the same may not be applicable in other
jurisdictions. However, since natural law dictates, that each
action or omission may have the same effects in two or more
countries or jurisdictions, the Court in another country may refer
or used the same test as applied by another Court in one State as
it may deem applicable in a particular case within its
jurisdiction.
Thus, the tests discussed above, cause-in-fact and policy tests
and their different types, were used for so long in different
jurisdictions in resolving negligence cases. Cause-in- fact test
usually had been used to determine the cause of an injury created
or as a result of a defendants action or omission towards the
plaintiff. It determines whether or not indeed committed the act
complained of by ascertaining whether the injury and the negligence
of the defendant has a causal relationship. On the other hand, by
determining cause-in-facts, does not necessarily mean that the
defendants negligence is the proximate cause of such injury. The
policy tests explains that, a defendant may be a cause-in fact of
an injury but the law may limit or fix its liability and the court
by practical considerations must at times determine the bounds of
correlative rights and duties as well as the point beyond which the
courts will decline causal connection. In other words, attendant
facts and circumstances in a particular or given case must be
measured in order to determine the degree of defendants negligence.
There is no hard and fast rule in these cases. This gives us an
idea that justice may not be at all times dispense by finding an
alleged tortfeasor liable when his acts or omission is found to be
a cause in fact but rather we must consider policy as a matter of
law if not to negate liability of the defendant but to mitigate the
same if called by circumstances of the case.
The Philippine jurisdiction had been using some of these tests
to decide negligence cases despite the absence of a particular
statutory provision to that effect. High accord should be given to
our Courts in applying these tests in determining liability in
negligence cases. It is also recommended that may be our Courts
would try to study some of these test as they would certainly be
helpful and applicable in our jurisdiction. Even though our New
Civil Code already included chapter on damages which provides for
specific type of damage which the defendant may be held liable,
nevertheless, the foregoing tests as discussed may strengthen the
disposition of negligence case if our Courts would endeavour to
study them for a successful dispensation of justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
What are the things to be considered in order to obtain
affirmative relief when we come across a situation where we will be
proving negligence of someone? Are there factors which we could
weigh against to fix or limit the liability of the tortfeasor after
establishing that his action is the cause-in-fact of the
injury?
These questions as posed in the introductory statement may now
attain their satisfying answers.
Based on the above discussions, we come into conclusion that an
injured person must always determine the cause of his injury, who
causes his injury, and what are the factors which one way or
another severs his injury. Action for damages may be futile if
these instances cannot be proven or identified before an aggrieved
person rests his case.Thus, it is but necessary that the plaintiff
should know the defendant in the first place. The Courts cannot
settle a case when in the first place there is no accused therein.
In our jurisdiction of course, it is but the duty of the Lawyer to
help his client to come up with answers to this questions and
gather evidence to establish his case. On the other hand, a
defendant may not be held liable for an act he has not committed or
an allegation that he did an act which caused an injury to another
will not be successful in the absence of proof thereto. More so, a
defendants liability may be mitigated if warranted by facts of the
case.
Therefore, in deciding negligence cases, our Courts always look
at the factual circumstances in each case, the applicable laws and
jurisprudence which will help them achieve a just and reasonable
decisions. The Tort law, as applicable law in our jurisdiction will
indeed achieve its major purposes: 1) to provide a special means
for adjusting the rights of the parties who might otherwise take
the law into their own hands, 2) deter wrongful conduct, 3) to
encourage social responsible behaviour; 4) to restore injured
parties to their original conditions, in so far as the law can do
this by compensating them for their injury.[footnoteRef:53] [53:
Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition, p.11]
VII. REFERENCES
1. Aquino, Timoteo B., Torts and Damages, 2013 Edition
2. Knutsen, Erik S., Ambiguous Cause-in-Fact and Structured
Causation: A Multi-Jurisdictional Approach: p. 251. TEXAS
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Volume 38:249)
3. Morissette, Emily Lyn, Personal Injury and the Law of Torts
for Paralegals; Chapter 4: Third Element of Negligence: Causation
of Injury; p. 45
4.Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,Ct. of App. of N.Y., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)
5. Sangco, J Cesar S., Philippine Law on Torts and Damages,
Volume 1;
https://books.google.com.ph/books?id=lIJuucgYpAsC&pg=PA113&lpg=PA113&dq=hindsight+test,+torts&source=bl&ots=hvPg3E0-Rb&sig=6ObKUtaOmwGRbJqCMQU_Iixu8cc&hl=en&sa=X&ei=gEsKVdS3IojW8gXQoYCoCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=natural%20and%20probable%20consequences%20doctrine%2C%20torts%20and%20damages&f=false
; page 114
6. Tikriti, Amir; Foreseeability and Proximate Cause in an
Injury Case;
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/foreseeability-proximate-cause.html;
7. Zwier, Paul J., "CAUSE IN FACT" IN TORT LAW- A PHILOSOPHICAL
AND HISTORICAL EXAMINATION; Volume 31,p.769:
http://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2326&context=law-review