Casualty Actuaries of Greater New York CAGNY December 2012 Perspectives on Solvency II Ira Robbin, Principal P&C Actuarial Analysts, LLC
Jan 01, 2016
Casualty Actuaries of Greater New York CAGNYDecember 2012 Perspectives on Solvency II
Ira Robbin, PrincipalP&C Actuarial Analysts, LLC
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Disclaimers and Cautions
No statements about the views or proprietary practices of prior employers will be made or should be inferred.
No liability whatsoever is assumed for any damages, either direct or indirect, that may be attributed to use of any of the material in this presentation.
Whatever you allege I said, either I never said it, I said the opposite, I was just joking, or I was quoted out of context.
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Agenda
Solvency II Overview Accounting Changes Capital Requirements Standard Formula Internal Model Perspectives
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Solvency II – Best Thing Since Sliced Bread !
Institutes uniform accounting rules and solvency regulations across Euro zone Replaces hodgepodge of outmoded
regulations Moves to principles-based, market-
consistent accounting Superior to rules-based accounting
Promotes use of internal models to determine required capital Sophisticated models Better at capturing real risk
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Solvency II – Epic Fail !
Overly ambitious- grandiose Breaks with existing P&C accounting
Requires huge IT effort Transition/ new scorekeeping may confuse market
Less priority given to policyholder protection Inadequate understanding of P&C risk Push to internal models impractical
Imposes burden on regulators Makes results non-transparent
Very costly Repeatedly delayed
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Three PillarsPillar 1
Quantitative
Balance sheet (including Technical ProvisionsMin Capital Req’ment (MCR) Solvency Capital Req’ment (SCR)
Market –consistent valuationRisk-based requirements
Pillar 2Qualitative
Governance, risk management and required functionsORSASupervisory review process
Business governanceInternal Control processesRisk-based supervision
Pillar 3Reporting,
disclosure, and market discipline
SFCR and RSRDisclosureTransparencySupport of supervision through market mechanisms
Disclosure Transparent markets
SII Accounting Changes
‘Market-based’ Valuation Mark to model
Removal of prudential margins Explicit discounting Explicit risk margin No accrual
Eliminates UEPR Pre-up front recognition= date obligation is made
Contract boundary different from UWY and AY EPIFP - Expected Profits Included in Future
Premiums9
SII P&C Loss Provision
Technical Provisions (Liability) TP= BE + RM
BE = Best Estimate RM = Risk Margin
Loss Provision (TP2.47-2.48) Best Estimate is Discounted Mean of
Scenarios Discounted with loaded risk –free rates Loaded with illiquidity premium Duration matched
Risk Margin based on Cost of Capital10
Risk Margin for Loss Reserves
Risk Margin = discounted Cost of Capital
r = needed additional return = 6.0% SCR = Solvency Capital Requirement Cost of capital for each year of runoff
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Non-Life Risk Categories
Underwriting risk Premium risk Reserve risk
Lapse risk A new type of P&C risk Risk pre-up front profits not realized
CAT risk
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Solvency Capital Requirement for Unpaid Loss
SCR = 99.5% Percentile excess of the mean
One-year Risk Retrospective look at Best Estimate Except for discounting, one-year risk would
be a measure of how much projected ultimate has changed over one year.
Viewed by many as inadequate for long-tail LOBs
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Standard Formula or Internal Model
SCR can be computed via SF or IM IMs expected to lead to reduced SCR IM must be approved by supervisor
Extensive documentation required IM algorithms and parameters not
specified IM does not change conceptual
calibration 99.5% excess of mean on one-year risk
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Standard Formula – QIS5
EIOPA ~10 LOBs w Lognormal CVs Complicated but practical Premium and Reserve correlation LOB Correlation matrix Volume measures
Credit for geographic diversity Lognormal assumption for aggregation CAT Capital
“Factor” based - factors applied to premiums “Scenario” based – factors applied to TIVs
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SF CVs for Premium and Reserve Risk
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SF CVsSegment QIS5
JWG Rec
QIS5JWG Rec
Motor vehicle liability 10.0% 9.6% 9.5% 8.9%
Other motor 7.0% 8.2% 10.0% 8.0%
Marine, aviation & transport 17.0% 14.9% 14.0% 11.0%
Fire / property 10.0% 8.2% 11.0% 10.2%
General liability 15.0% 13.9% 11.0% 11.0%
Credit and suretyship 21.5% 11.7% 19.0%
Legal expenses 6.5% 6.5% 9.0% 12.3%
Assistance 5.0% 9.3% 11.0%
Miscellaneous financial loss 13.0% 12.8% 15.0% 20.0%
Medical expenses 4.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.3%
Income protection 8.5% 8.5% 14.0% 13.9%
Workers' compensation 5.5% 8.0% 11.0% 11.4%
Premium risk - gross Reserve risk - net
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LOB Reserve CV Calibration – SF
Heterogeneity within an LOB Size of portfolio and process risk JWG
“… volatility factors for … reserve risks are typically impacted by the size of the portfolio… the SCR will be too large for the larger portfolios and too small for the smaller ones”.
Diversification across LOBs How real are observed correlations?
Comparison Rating agencies used fixed factors RBC adjusts benchmarks for company experience.
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Internal Models under SII
SII encourages use of IM instead of SF “Big Bang” approach Expected to reduce capital required
Requires regulator approval Exact form or type of model not
specified. Many companies using giant simulation
models. IM reduces transparency
Firms unlikely to disclose IM details to public
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IM Documentation – Use Test
Use Test (decision making process) “ … provide evidence … your internal model is widely
used and plays an important role in your decision-making processes …”
Source: G2 – FSA Solvency II Internal Model Approval Process document – Pre-application process p8 July 2010
Does anyone use such a model “widely” in P&C? How does the SII IM relate to existing CAT,
reserving, pricing, and M&A models? The more complicated it gets, the less likely it
can be used for anything other than showing SII compliance.
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IM Documentation – Stat Quality Standards
Statistical quality standards confirmation … methods are based upon current …
information… Please identify … differences in the actuarial …
techniques used and the underlying assumptions ...” Why should methods (not parameters?) be based
on current information? What does it mean for techniques to be different from assumptions?
Different documentation standard than ASOP 41? “sufficient clarity…that another actuary qualified in
the same practice area could make an objective appraisal…”
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IM Challenges and Concerns
Cost in € and time Firms need to hire consultants and new
staff Documentation requirements
Huge (some say excessive) effort Changes will require justification
Management sign-offs IM too technical for leaders to understand
IMs reduce transparency Overwhelming regulatory burden
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RBC HighlightsRegulatory considerations Life vs PCBasel II - BankingNAICInsurance Industry - Negative Comments
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Perspectives
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RBC Required P&C Capital Highlights
Specified Formula Industry based premium and reserve risk factors
adjusted for company avg vs Industry avg Reductions for CM and Loss Sensitive business
Square root of sum of squares for aggregating Investment risk
detailed by asset class and instrument Non-diversification penalties
assets and insurance risk No CAT risk Transparent and accessible to the public
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Regulatory Considerations
Cost to regulator and the regulated Ease of compliance Equal treatment – fairness Effectiveness – does it work? Induced motivations and side effects Transparency and public access Market confidence and acceptance
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Approaches to Regulation
Constrained Free Market
Post-Modern Bureaucratic Regulatory State
Gov’t intervention in response to defined need
Gov’t intervention the norm
Attempts to be cost-effective
Costly
Rules and details Principles, models, and process
Compliance Go beyond compliance exercise
Regulator as umpire Regulator as coach
Minimize opportunities to game the system
Assumes cooperative relationships 29
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Life vs PC Risk
Risk Life PC
Severity Known Highly variable depending on the LOB and coverage
Claim count Known Highly variable – subject to CAT, contagion, mass torts
Lapse rate risk Important Does not exist in US GAAP, STAT
Ultimate Risk Low High
One-year risk Relatively large
Relatively small for long-tail lines
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Basel II – Banking Experience With IMs
Basel II – always more cautious in use of IMs Internally derived parameters could be approved
for use in regulatory algorithm Limited diversification benefits
2012 - Further reduced role of IMs “Risk was not being properly captured by the
models…” --Adkins FSA Floor - Use 80% or 100% of standard approach
Implications for modeling “ If.. sophisticated modeling means you end up
with more capital, … why would banks do this?” “Bye, robot”, Risk July 2012
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Summary of US Regulator Views
No appetite for switching to SII accounting Continue to use IMs on limited add-on basis
to supplement standard approach in life Keep focus on protecting policyholders Support for key components of US system
liquidation approaches in STAT accounting current US IRIS, RBC capital requirements
Proud of system performance in latest crisis NAIC is continuing to improve - SMI
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US Regulator Comments- Leonardi and Vaughn
CT Commissioner Leonardi Aug 2011 “… well-intended but untested European
regulatory changes, known as “Solvency II” … could weaken consumer protections …”
“Solvency II is a much-needed effort to modernize an …outmoded European regulatory regime…”
NAIC CEO Vaughn Nov 2011 “ Our system is one that we're quite
comfortable with… equivalence should be assessed on an outcomes basis. On that basis, we should be found equivalent.”
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US Regulator Comments - McCarty
NAIC President McCarty Mar 2012, May 2012 “ We’re not interested in taking our
system and putting it through the ..analysis undertaken by… Switzerland, Bermuda and Japan”
“No disrespect to the EU but …at best, they would want to make a comparison to a system [Solvency II] that isn't in place yet. .. It's kind of silly to even consider that an equivalence process."
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Industry Commentary – ACE Annual Report 2011 – Evan Greenberg on Solvency II
“…simply wrong-headed…overly bureaucratic, process-oriented, costly …
… I am not sure what problem we are trying to solve.
Solvency II-…would do great harm. a framework of minimum standards
….that results in similar outcomes is far more practical and effective…”
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Commentary – European Insurance Industry
Insurer groups tell EC to calm down on Solvency II or face ‘dire consequences’ Commercial Risk Europe, April 7, 2011 “At the very time that Europe is
experiencing significant economic, financial and social challenges, … the draft Solvency II implementing measures…risk driving insurers out of their long-term business” Letter from PEIF, CEAA, CFO Forum. …
The group said …publication of QIS5 intensified rather than assuaged their fears …their ‘valid concerns’ have been consistently ignored.
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Solvency II – Latest Delay
“EU may now delay Solvency II till 2015 following proposal from EU Commissioner Barnier” - Commercial Risk Europe, Sept 20, 2012 final agreement should wait until the latest study
into Solvency II is completed in March 2013. Chief executive of Hiscox, agreed. "I'd rather
it be delayed and made better than have it rammed through and have to be changed later”.
October 2012: plenary vote on Omnibus 2 in the European Parliament was rescheduled from November 2012 to March 2013
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Solvency II – EIOPA Response to SII Delay
EIOPA chairman Gabriel Bernardino - WRIN TV Oct 5, 2012
“blames political maneuvering for delays…
“ ‘delay undermining EU credibility’ …”
" ‘still no clear and credible timetable…’ ”
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Solvency II – BaFin Response to SII Delay
“BaFin considers Solvency 1.5” - Solvency II Wire Nov 15, 2012
President of BaFin Dr. Elke Konig “ Having debated something for such a long time and having had the brightest minds of the industry …means you have created a massively complex system which is probably only fully understandable for those that have created it.”
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Solvency II – Summary Observations
P&C concerns about SII One-year reserve risk Discounting with rate including illiquidity premium CAT risk calculation Overreliance on IMs
SII delay is being driven by concerns from Life With exception of CAT, P&C issues not high on
radar US NAIC has staked out position against
submitting to SII equivalence process Some form of SII is probably inevitable
not as inevitable as it was last year 40
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Solvency II – Closing Remarks
US actuaries should become familiar with SII In increasingly interconnected world, need to
be aware of developments in EU Many of the accounting concepts may be
adopted in some form in IFRS Actuaries may be best able to bridge gap
between modelers and insurance executives View EU regulatory change as opportunity
What loopholes in SII can be legally exploited? What markets will EU insurers abandon/
become more aggressive in due to SII?
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