Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
90501 August 5, 1991ARIS (PHIL.) INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO
DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO
TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS
DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B.
NADALA,respondents.Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for
petitioner.ZosimoMorillo for respondent Rayosdel Sol.Banzuela,
Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy& Associates for private
respondents.
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:pPetitioner assails the constitutionality of the
amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as
amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement
aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on
Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also
questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of
the said Interim Rules.The challenged portion of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as
follows:SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as
follows:ART. 223.Appeal.xxxxxxxxxIn any event, the decision of the
Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so
far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option
of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided therein.This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the
Article.Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals
Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989,
provide as follows:Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of
Bond. In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or,
at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the
payroll.The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement.xxxxxxxxxSection 17. Transitory
provision. Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to
the effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the
requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the
Commission.The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to
this petition are not disputed:On 11 April 1988, private
respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by
management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their
working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous,
requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and
believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped
together after the end of their work that day with other employees
and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long
silence and inaction on their complaints.On 12 April 1988, the
management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents,
who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most
active participants in the rally requiring them to explain why they
should not be terminated from the service for their conduct.
Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for
violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of
the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or
participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.Private
respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional
office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which
was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88.After due trial,
Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a
decision' the dispositive portion of which reads:ACCORDINGLY,
respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein complainants
Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez,
MarietaMagalad, FlordelizaRayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto
Besmonte, ApolinarioGagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho
Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their former respective
positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled
up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited
backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de
Guzman.All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of
merit.SO ORDERED.On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private
respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of
Execution2pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No.
6715.On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal.3On 26 July 1989,
the complainants, except FlorRayosdel Sol, filed a Partial
Appeal.4On 10 August 1989, complainant FlorRayosdel Sol filed a
Partial Appeal.5On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an
Opposition6to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of
R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied
retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity
because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given
retroactive effect7and to give retroactive effect to Section 12
thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of
an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its
right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of
reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their
Reply8filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that R.A. No.
6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case
since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after
the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on 21 March
1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989.Petitioner
submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989.9On 5
October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion
for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution10as
far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in
consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules
particularly the last sentence thereof.In this Order, the Labor
Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules
in this wise:Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of
appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the
effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the
requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or as may be directed
by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor
Arbiters before March 21,1989. With more reason these interim rules
be made to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof
(sic) was rendered thereafter.11Unable to accept the above Order,
petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 198912raising
the issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision
under the following assignment of errors:A. THE LABOR ARBITER
AQUOAND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE
INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e.,
SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY
OF DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE.B.
GRANTINGARGUENDOTHAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING
APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC
STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY
APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES.In Our resolution of
7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the
petition.Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989.13Meeting squarely
the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision
concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee
whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a
valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested
provision "is then a police legislation."As regards the retroactive
application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in
nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its
effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a
rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the
constitutional provision on protection to labor.On 11 December
1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation14informing the
Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the Solicitor
General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the
requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a
Rejoinder15to the Comment of the Solicitor General.In the
resolution of 11 January 1990,16We considered the Comments as
respondents' Answers, gave due course to the petition, and directed
that the case be calendared for deliberation.In urging Us to
declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the
Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as
the implementing provision covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim
Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the
reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a
dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits that said
portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that
it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues that a reinstatement
pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection
for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be compelled to
continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the
interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is
consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the
destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be
implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or misplaced
antipathy against any group, but even-handedly and fairly.17To
clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness
of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following
consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire
additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply
to have someone watch over the reinstated employee to prevent the
commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b)
reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may
demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and embolden
not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to
commit similar, if not graver infractions.These rationalizations
and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which,
unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature and
scope of the relief of execution pending appeal.Execution pending
appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be
divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing
party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the
former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the
pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a
constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory
privilege of statutory origin18and, therefore, available only if
granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide
limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing
party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.
Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this
jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending
appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.19Before its
amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor
Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending
their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.In
authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of
a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate
policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man.These provisions
are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for
recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the
nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his
welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of
the Constitution,20which principally directs Congress to give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all;
to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law,
security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the
principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes.
Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations
readily reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a
separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no
less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the
strong foundations of a truly just and humane society. This Article
addresses itself to specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and
natural resources reform, urban land reform and housing, health,
working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the
underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice
of this Court Cecilia Muoz-Palma, aptly describes this Article as
the "heart of the new Charter."21These duties and responsibilities
of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the
workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a
primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also
expressly affirms With equal intensity.22Labor is an indispensable
partner for the nation's progress and stability.If in ordinary
civil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized
for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the
discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it
in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees.
In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only
source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family
their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far
better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may
determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating
employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently
overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal.The validity
of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the
foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it
is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if
the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is
subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of
its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of
the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is
more vital than the preservation of corporate profits.23Then, by
and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an
immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating
a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed
to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in
favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee
and its family.The charge then that the challenged law as well as
the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless.
Laws are presumed constitutional.24To justify nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law
shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt.25InParades, et al.
vs. Executive Secretary26We stated:2. For one thing, it is in
accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible
constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and
the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred.
That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself
for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is
one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the
party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a
constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged
act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no
finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does
not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism isapropos: To doubt is to
sustain.27The reason for this:... can be traced to the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper
respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is
that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive
authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and
determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence,
as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts
for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will
not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available
grounds.28The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules
does not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the
Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since
the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this case.
Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on
8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are
procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the
authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect.29There are no vested rights
in rules of procedure.30A remedial statute may be made applicable
to cases pending at the time of its enactment.31WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
115044 January 27, 1995HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as
Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila,petitioners,vs.HON. FELIPE
G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila
and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION,respondents.G.R. No. 117263 January 27,
1995TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
CEPEDA,petitioners,vs.HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,respondents.PADILLA,J.:These two (2) cases which are
inter-related actually involve simple issues. if these issues have
apparently become complicated, it is not by reason of their nature
because of the events anddramatis personaeinvolved.The petition in
G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court
on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of
discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the
part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned
orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No.
88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were
assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim,
in said G.R. No. 115044:a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing
Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue thepermit/licenseto operate
the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation
(ADC).b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain
why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the
order dated 28 March 1994.c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating
the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue
thepermit/licenseto Associated Development Corporation (ADC).The
order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for
execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which
ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC
thepermit/licenseto operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila
Ordinance No. 7065.On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as
executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold
in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to
withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development
Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until
the following legal questions are properly resolved:1. Whether P.D.
771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local
governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.2. Assuming
that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue
a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether
the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has
no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity.3. Whether the
City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to
Associated Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of
executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from
local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to
regulate Jai-Alai.1On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated
Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for
prohibition,mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona
and then GAB chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No.
94-71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional
authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding Judge Vetino Reyes,
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from
withdrawing ADC's provisional authority. This temporary restraining
order was converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon
ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of
P2,000,000.00.2Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic
of the Philippines, through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a
"Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for
reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the
CourtEn Banc" and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attached
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention".In anEn
BancResolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court referred G.R.
No. 115044 to the CourtEn Bancand required the respondents therein
to comment on the aforementioned motions.Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on
19 October 1994 issued another order, this time, granting ADC a
writ of preliminarymandatoryinjunction against Guingona and GAB to
compel them to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate
jai-alai.Guingona, as executive secretary, and DominadorCepeda, Jr.
as the new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263
assailing the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino
Reyes.On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted
petitioner's motion forleaveto file supplemental petition and to
admit attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for
restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file
their comment on the petition and supplemental petition with urgent
prayer for restraining order. The Court likewise set the case and
all incidents thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994.At the
hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were
formulated by the Court as follows:1. whether or not intervention
by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings
is proper;2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not
the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting
franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai;3. whether or not
there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge
Reyes in issuing the aforementioned temporary restraining order
(later writ of preliminary injunction); and4. whether or not there
was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes
in issuing the aforementioned writ of
preliminarymandatoryinjunction.On the issue of the propriety of the
intervention by the Republic of the Philippines, a question was
raised during the hearing on 10 November 1994 as to whether
intervention in G.R. No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the
national government to take in questioning the existence of a valid
ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate action
forquo warrantounder Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was
the proper remedy.We need not belabor this issue since counsel for
respondent ADC agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and
for all settle all substantive issues raised by the parties in
these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed
in G.R. No. 117263 as one for quo warranto which is within the
original jurisdiction of the Court under section 5(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution.3On the propriety of intervention by the
Republic, however, it will be recalled that this Court inDirector
of Lands v. Court of Appeals(93 SCRA 238) allowed intervention even
beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of
Court. The Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions
for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of
injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to
fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claim
be proven to be true."In the present case, the resulting injustice
and injury, should the national government's allegations be proven
correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the
very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the
jai-alai (which is a gambling operation) in favor of ADC. As will
be more extensively discussed later, the national government
contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to
ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void andultra
viressince Republic Act No. 954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very
much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7
September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires alegislative
franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of
jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues that even
assuming,arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid,
ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential
decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly
revokedallexisting franchises and permits to operate all forms of
gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local
governments.On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No.
7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its
delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also
squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative
of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution. In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that
this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be
able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid
franchise.It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice tobothparties in
this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of
constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view,
become the verylismotain resolving the present controversy, in view
of ADC's insistence that it was granted a valid and legal franchise
by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai.The time-honored
doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid
and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court.
Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution
states:Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked.There is nothing on
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers).Neither can
it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of
ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771
was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's
First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
only the CourtEn Banchas that power under Article VIII, Section
4(2) of the Constitution.4And on the question of whether or not the
government isestoppedfrom contesting ADC's possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or
agents (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA
90)Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we
conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of
Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The
Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of
its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its
governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the
general welfare.IIAnent the question of whether ADC has a valid
franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the
pertinent laws is in order.1. The Charter of the City of Manila was
enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof
provides:Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal Board shall
have the following legislative powers:xxxxxxxxx(jj) To tax,
license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on
boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races,
cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or
athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to
establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law
to the contrary.2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was
issued transferring the authority toregulatejai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).3. On 20 June
1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to
Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And
To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of
Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:Sec. 4. No
person, or group of personsotherthan the operator or maintainer of
a frontonwith legislative franchiseto conduct basquepelota games
(Jai-alai),shall offer, to take or arrangebetson any basquepelota
game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device,
method or system to bet or gamble on any basquepelota game or
event. (emphasis supplied).Sec. 5. No person, operator or
maintainer of a frontonwith legislative franchiseto conduct
basquepelota gamesshall offer, take, or arrange bets on any
basquepelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or
other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basquepelota
game or eventoutside the place,enclosure, or fronton where the
basquepelota game is held. (emphasis supplied).4. On 07 September
1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed
Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To
Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To
Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila,
Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes."5. On 20
August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then
President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and
Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And
Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling",in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing
franchises and permits issued by local governments.6. On 16 October
1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The
Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To
Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And
Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was
promulgated.7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of
Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the
incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was convened,
issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and
revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263
argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of
the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling
operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in
Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by
Congress.On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409
(Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to
grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not
specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring
exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the
power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act
No. 409 and consequently it was within the power of the City of
Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of
Manila.On this point, the government counter-argues that the term
"legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to
distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law from the other
powers of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative
franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely
by Congress.Further, the government argues that Executive Order No.
392 dated 01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate
Jai-Alai from the local governments to the Games and Amusements
Board (GAB), a national government agency.It is worthy of note that
neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its
alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the
City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065
uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the Municipal
Board of Manila to "tax, license, permitandregulatewagers or
betting" and to "grant exclusiverightsto establishments", while
Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allowand
permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila.It
is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the
City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting,
including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to
franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep.
Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to
"license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license
or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or
betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted,
would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the
permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to
so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or
regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local
governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the
GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is
that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of
jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is
vested in the GAB.In relation, therefore, to the facts of this
case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the
jai-alai, it may not so operate even if its has a license or permit
from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of
Manila.It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195
to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law,
unless another law is enacted byCongress expressly exempting or
excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law.
Among these form the reach of criminal law. Among these forms of
gambling allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by
Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized
under Presidential Decree No. 1869.While jai-alai as a sport is not
illegalper se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the results of
jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal
offense punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal
Code,unlessit is shown that a later or special law had been passed
allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.Republic Act
No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was
enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board
certaindelegatedlegislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of
the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are
basically regulatory in nature.5The regulatory nature of these
powers finds support not only in the plain words of the
enumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling
inPeople v. Vera(65 Phil. 56).InVera, this Court declared that a
law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine
whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation
law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the
province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of
legislative power.From the ruling inVera, it would be logical to
conclude that, if ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would
likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila
unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal
Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and unlimited
discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling
inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits
to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.We need
not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be
presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws.
Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and
Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be
clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be
understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954
should be understood to refer tocongressional franchises, as a
necessity for the operation of jai-alai.We need not, however, again
belabor this issue further since the task at hand which will
ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in this case is to
determine whether PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's franchise to
operate the jai-alai, assuming (without conceding) that it indeed
possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065.ADC argues that
PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On
the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid
exercise of theinherentpolice power of the State.The police power
has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of
the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine
saluspopuliestsupremalex(the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.) In the early case ofRubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro(39
Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated
thus:The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive
with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of
overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried
onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts
to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean
security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere
with the right of the individual.In the matter of PD No. 771, the
purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as
follows:WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current
drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal
gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of
the country;WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts
of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms
of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development
program under the new society;WHEREAS, in order to effectively
control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and
dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a
necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from
local government to the National Government.It cannot be argued
that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public
morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and
self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good,
honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a
vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not
eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.InMagtajas
v. Pryce Properties Corporation(20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097),
this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:In the exercise
of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibitedjuetengandmontebut
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court
hasno authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said
that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It
is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments,
to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.
(Emphasis supplied)Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line
betweenrightandprivilegein American constitutional law has no
relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there
is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a
mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is
essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so,
under what conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking
authority to determine, talking into account national and local
interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is
paramount.ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771.
Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD
No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given
authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination
of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black,J.)There
is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's
allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In
the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind
the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are
reasonable and even laudable.It should also be remembered that PD
No. 771 provides that thenational governmentcan subsequently grant
franchises "upon proper application and verification of the
qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed
an application for a franchise with the national government
subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations
abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on
conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant
the consideration of this Court.On the other hand, it is noteworthy
that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169
revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to
operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which
had revoked all franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local
governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that
franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government
(not local governments) to consider and approve.On the alleged
violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in
the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more
importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within
the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the
exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always
subject to the exercise of police power for the public
welfare.InRCPI v.NTC(150 SCRA 450), we held that:A franchise
started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's
prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition
was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every
authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege
emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its
existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself
by virtue of its police power through its administrative
agencies.There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be
a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure
and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the
operation of a public utility, such as public transportation
company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch
of royal privilege.As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever
applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and
yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions,
i.e., to give to thenational governmentthe exclusive power to grant
gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were
revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national
government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set
qualifications and requirements.There was no violation by PD No.
771 of the equal protection clause since the decree
revokedallfranchises issued by local governments without
qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the
equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected
by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC
was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked.
Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for
alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have
raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years
ago.Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the
requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are
"riders" to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that
laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the
title, as argued by ADC. InCordero v. Cabatuando(6 SCRA 418), this
Court ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all
laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of the objective.IIIOn the
issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary
restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary
injunction) and the writ of preliminarymandatoryinjunction, we hold
and rule there was.Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court
provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge
should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD
771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the Rules of court. These laws
negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the
reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954
are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the
Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs
issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in
issuing them.WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is
hereby rendered:1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to
intervene in G.R. No. 115044.2. declaring Presidential Decree No.
771 valid and constitutional.3. declaring that respondent
Associated Development corporation (ADC) does not possess the
required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the
jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No.
771.4. setting aside the writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino
Reyes in civil Case No. 94-71656.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 149276.September 27, 2002]JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA
LIM,petitioners, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM,respondents.D E C I S I O
NCORONA,J.:The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties
for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being
challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of
the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the
Constitution.The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the
parties pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.In December 1991,
petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated
checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992
in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated
January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000.Check no. 464728 was
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against
insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for
payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the
dishonored check.When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover
the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa
under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by PD 818.On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a
resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and
recommending the filing of an information for estafawith no bail
recommended.On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa
was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against petitioners.The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-01-101574.Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the
arrest of herein petitioners, thus:It appearing on the face of the
information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining
witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime
charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a
warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued.No Bail
Recommended.SO ORDERED.[1]On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest which was
denied by the trial court.Likewise, petitioners motion for bail
filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same
day.Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant
of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon
City Jail.However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.On
August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City,
arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due
process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court
granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to
Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which
amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article
315, par. 2 (d),and qualified theft.Said Circular specifically
provides as follows:xxxxxxxxx3) Where the amount of fraud is
P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty isreclusion
temporaltoreclusion perpetua, bail shall be based onreclusion
temporalmaximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond
Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00;Provided, however, that
the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00.In view of the
aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no
longer be discussed.Thus, this decision will focus on whether or
not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19of Article III of
theConstitution, which respectively provide:Section 1.No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.xxxSection 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x xx.We shall
deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in
contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.In
this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as
follows:SECTION 1.Any person who shall defraud another by means of
false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4885, shall be punished by:1st.The penalty ofreclusion
temporalif the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years.In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty shall be termedreclusion perpetua;2nd.The penalty ofprision
mayorin its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.3rd.The penalty
ofprision mayorin its medium period, if such amount is over 200
pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos;and4th.Byprision mayorin
itsminimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200
pesos.Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the
subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized withreclusion
perpetuaor 30 years of imprisonment.This penalty, according to
petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they
committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III,
Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment.Settled is the rule that a
punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or
disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is
flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to
the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community.It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution.[2]Based on this principle, the Court has consistently
overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involvedis cruel and
degrading.InPeople vs. Tongko,[3]this Court held that the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity
in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments
which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as
cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at
the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake,
breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like.The fact that the
penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law
unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it
cruel and inhuman.Petitioners also argue that while PD 818
increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under
Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not
increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties.Thus,
the original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have
remained the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible
and insignificantcompared to the present value of the peso.This
argument is without merit.The primary purpose of PD 818 is
emphatically and categorically stated in the following:WHEREAS,
reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling)
cases committed by means of bouncing checks;WHEREAS, if not checked
at once, these criminal acts would erode the peoples confidence in
the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial
transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and
commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the
country;WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the
rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing
penalties provided therefor.Clearly, the increase in the penalty,
far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable
purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that
undermines the countrys commercial and economic growth, and to
serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing
bouncing checks.The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is
immaterial and inconsequential.What the law sought to avert was the
proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing
checks.Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law
was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of
Article IIIof the Constitution.Moreover, when a law is questioned
before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a
clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative one.[4]The burden of proving the invalidity of a
law rests on those who challenge it.In this case, petitioners
failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the
presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.With respect to the
issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of
the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in
the Official Gazette.This claim is incorrect and must be rejected.
Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is
imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and
executive orders.[5]PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on
December 1, 1975.[6]With the foregoing considerations in mind, this
Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.WHEREFORE,the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru
Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E.
SALVACION,petitioners,vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y
NORTHCOTT,respondents.TORRES, JR.,J.:In our predisposition to
discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of thestatus quo. Ligle do we realize that
statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown
our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute
may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.The petition
is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:a.)
Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued
restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960;b.) After hearing, judgment be
rendered:1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of
petitioners and respondents;2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoeveri.) has
taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the
judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive
due process guaranteed by the Constitution;ii.) has given foreign
currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;iii.)
has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil
liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money
to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency
deposit account with an authorized bank.The antecedent facts:On
February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist,
coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to
go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen
Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to
rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on
February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen
and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested
and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered
from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368,
Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank
Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China
Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine
Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll
(Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.On February 16, 1989,
Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg
Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and
Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of
Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day
there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the
latter escaped from jail.On February 28, 1989, the court granted
the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused
Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an
Order dated February 28, 1989.Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214,
the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the
application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4)
1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on
February 28, 1989.On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati
served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a
letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China
Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to
the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy
Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking
Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy
of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order
which has placed the subject deposits incustodia legis. In answer
to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking
Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar
deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body,
whatsoever.This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an
inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on
whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or
whether said section has been repealed or amended since said
section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the
plaintiff to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil
action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Central Bank responded as follows:
May 26, 1989Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino12 Pres. Osmena AvenueSouth
Admiral VillageParanaque, Metro ManilaDear Ms. Carolino:This is in
reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on
Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).The cited provision is
absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor
has the same been repealed nor amended.The purpose of the law is to
encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system which
would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention
to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in
your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but
it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.Very truly
yours,(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDODirector1Meanwhile, on April 10,
1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to
serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled
"Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons
with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week
for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his
answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7,
1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment
in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion
of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter:1. To pay
plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N.
Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00
each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them;3. To pay
plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and4. To pay
attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount
of damages herein awarded;5. To pay litigation expenses of
P10,000.00; plus6. Costs of the suit.SO ORDERED.The heinous acts of
respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related
in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:The
defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal
jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24,
1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding
Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape
and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons
was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a
newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising
Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said
newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from
the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through
counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were
authorized to present their evidenceex parte.In support of the
complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E.
Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph
Aguilar and a certain LiberatoMadulio, who gave the following
testimony:Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's
Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano
University for her second year.In the afternoon of February 4,
1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her
friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m.
while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of
Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone because
Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN,
Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)The American asked her name and
introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he
talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he
has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a
daughter who is about Karen's age and who was with him in his house
along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)The American
asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she
could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy
to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)They walked from
Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the
defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)When they
reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged
niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his
niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside
the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and
invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)Upon entering the bedroom
defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because
his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and
tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried
for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he
covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id.,
p. 7)Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which
was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to
the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in
her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no
sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When
defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt
more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)He then
got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well
as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her
but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it
difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe
pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sex organ
a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how
long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)After that,
he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to
take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the
sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the
bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood
came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress
because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed
by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way
of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch.
Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep.
Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id.,
pp. 9-10)The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a
breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant
raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took
biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00
to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which
defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that
is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped
again during the night. During those three times defendant
succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether
the organ was inserted wholly.Karen did not see any firearm or any
bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put
a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear
that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were
closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her.
She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able
to call the police, it was still possible that as she was still
inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant
did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help.
At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp.
12-14)On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times,
once in the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of
biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At
first, Karen did not know that there was a window because
everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the
window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and
she found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood.
After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the
styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)That Monday
evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant
left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a
small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small
hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the
hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so
akin.Tulungann'yoakongmakalabasdito.Kinidnapako!" Somebody heard
her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and
said she was "istorbo". Karen pleaded for help and the woman told
her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep
but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16)She woke up
at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in
bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he
woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked.
As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day,
February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at
about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 9:00, and the
third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the
second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he
caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was
shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the
house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the
bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about five
minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name
and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard
a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were
also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom
to the room but she did not change her clothes being afraid that
should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant see her
in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her
dress. (Id., p. 16)Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the
door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were
many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her
clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday.
He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and
willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She
could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they
were saying. (Id., p. 19)When she heard the voices of many people
who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door
as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when
the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her
name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and
the defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag-aregloposamgapulis,"
Karen added. "The policeman told him to just explain at the
precinct. (Id., p. 20)They went out of the house and she saw some
of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a
certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the
policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong
Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub-Station I and
there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her
father arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their
neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police
headquarters. (Id., p. 21)At the headquarters, she was asked
several questions by the investigator. The written statement she
gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to
the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator
and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer,
examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early
morning of the following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been
marked as Exhibit B.She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in
Pasay City at the time of the incident but she subsequently
transferred to ApolinarioMabini, Arellano University, situated
along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of
conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose
Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light
Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission after she told
the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their
denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug.
15, 1989, p. 46)xxxxxxxxxAfter the incident, Karen has changed a
lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she
is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is
ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10)
She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays
for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking
experience which probably, she would always recall until she
reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover from
this experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)Pursuant to an
Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive
weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the
last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the
trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on
Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise,
the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960.Thus,
petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.The issues
raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to
two:May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact
that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief
rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D.
1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?Petitioners aver as heretofore
stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing
that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds
that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the
bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to
satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of
substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has
given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class
privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like
the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals
could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely
converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a
foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.)
The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi-legislative power when it
took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim
sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the
writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised
Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the
judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of
the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment
creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond
its power to do so.On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in
its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113
of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority
because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of
R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the
Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment
to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended)
itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law;
b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to
regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of
a class.Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for
exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency
Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines;
that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency
deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such
institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to
loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country; that the
subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits
made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.Respondent Central Bank
further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote
the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot
just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society
suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some
measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing
persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints
or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are
exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and
R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically
provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.For its part, respondent China
Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of
respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is
not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor
Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it
is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which
may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has
undergone; but it is restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No.
6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that
despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no
other alternative but to follow the same.This Court finds the
petition to be partly meritorious.Petitioner deserves to receive
the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a
petition formandamusto require respondents to honor and comply with
the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214.This Court has no
original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief.2However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized.
Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises
questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one
formandamus.3Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief
that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by
teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by
the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment,
and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not
once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days.
This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid
punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a
favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of
more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the
humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered
and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that
this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however
get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This
questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated
by the trial court in its decision,Indeed, after hearing the
testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a
shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could
haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which
could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually
humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos
High School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from
another school, simply because the school authorities of the said
High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared
that they might be implicated in the case.xxxxxxxxxThe reason for
imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and
bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a
period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the
minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive
and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American
national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable
of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when
that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old
Filipino adage that in every forest there is asnake, . . . .4If
Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be
difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency
deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said
award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from
this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a
country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the
flaw in the questioned provisions.It is worth mentioning that R.A.
No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal
and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted.
But the realities of the present times show that the country has
recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still
denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good
when enacted. The law failed to anticipate t