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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 1
G.R. No. L-34589 June 29, 1988
ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34656 June 29, 1988
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
In these related petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, the Engineering Construction, Inc. [ECI] and the Manila
Electric Company [MERALCO] question the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47528-R which set aside the orders of the
trial court directing execution pending appeal of a judgment for
P1,108,985.31 in damages in favor of ECI. Petitioners also question
the resolution of said court holding them liable for restitution of
the garnished funds to the National Power Corporation [NPC].
On August 29, 1968, ECI filed a complaint for damages against
the NPC in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 15,
alleging that it suffered damages to its facilities and equipment
due to the inundation of its campsite in Ipo, Norzagaray, Bulacan,
as a direct result of the improper and careless opening by NPC of
the spillway gates of Angat Dam at the height of typhoon "Welming"
on November 4,1967. 1
On December 23, 1970, the trial court found NPC guilty of gross
negligence and rendered its judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant as follows:
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory
damages in the amount of P675,785.31;
2. Ordering defendant to pay consequential damages in the amount
of P233,200.00; *
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000 as
and by way of exemplary damages; and
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000 as
and for attorney's fees ... 2
NPC filed a notice of appeal from that decision but before it
could perfect its appeal, ECI moved for and was granted execution
pending appeal upon posting a covering bond of P200,000 which it
later increased to P1,109,000 to fully answer for whatever damages
NPC might incur by reason of the premature execution of the lower
court's decision. 3
In granting said motion for the exceptional writ over the strong
opposition of the NPC, the trial court adopted the grounds adduced
by movant ECI.
1. x x x.
2. That the substantial portion of the award of damages refers
to the actual or compensatory damages incurred by plaintiff, which
are supported by voluminous documentary evidence, the genuineness
and due execution of which were admitted and further, no evidence
whatever was presented to contest the same;
3. That this case has been pending for years, as the plaintiff
and the Honorable Court were led to believe that the matter in
dispute would be settled amicably;
4. That an appeal by defendant would obviously be for purposes
of delay;
5. That on appeal, the case would certainly drag on for many
years, and in the meantime, the actual loss and damages sustained
by plaintiff, who because of such loss have become heavily
obligated and financially distressed, would remain uncompensated
and unsatisfied
6. That also, plaintiff is willing and able to file a bond to
answer for any damage which defendant may suffer as a result of an
execution pending appeal. 4
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Restituto R. Quemada who was
assigned to enforce the writ of execution, garnished in favor of
ECI all amounts due and payable to NPC which were then in
possession of MERALCO and sufficient to cover the judgment sum of
P1,108,985.31. 5
Attempts to lift the order of execution having proved futile and
the offer of a supersedeas bond having been rejected by the lower
court, NPC filed with the Appellate Court a petition for
certiorari. 6
In its challenged decision of October 20, 1971, the Court of
Appeals granted NPCs petition and nullified the execution pending
appeal of the judgment rendered by the trial court on December 28,
1970, as well as all issued writs and processes in connection with
the execution. One justice dissented. 7
On November 11, 1971, MERALCO sought from the Appellate Court a
clarification and reconsideration of the aforesaid decision on the
ground, among others, that the decision was being used by NPC to
compel MERALCOto return the amount of P1,114,545.23 (inclusive of
sheriff's fees) in two checks which it had already entrusted to the
deputy sheriff on February 23, 1971, who then indorsed and
delivered the same to ECI. Whereupon, in its resolution of January
7, 1972, the Appellate Court held the sheriff, MERALCO and ECI
liable to restore to NPC the amount due
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 2
to NPC which MERALCO had earlier turned over to the sheriff for
payment to ECI. 8
Their two motions for reconsideration having been denied, ECI
and MERALCO filed separate petitions for review before this Court:
Nos. L-34589 and 34656, the very petitions before us for
adjudication. In this connection, it must be made clear that we are
not concemed with the main appeal. For the present, we limit our
discussion to the correctness of the extraordinary writ of
execution pending appeal and the ordered restitution of the
garnished funds---two collateral matters which have greatly
exacerbated the existing dispute between the parties.
We shall deal first with the propriety of the execution pending
appeal.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Execution pending appeal. On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order
execution to issue even before the expiration of the time to
appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. If a
record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special
order shall be included thereon.
While the rule gives the court the discretionary power to allow
immediate execution, the following requisites must be satisfied for
its valid exercise:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice
to the adverse party;
(b) There must be a good reasons for issuing the execution;
and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.
In its assailed decision, the Appellate Court, through Justice
Salvador V. Esguerra, observe that NPC, as defendant in the civil
case for damages, was being ordered to pay the amount of P
1,108,985.31 pending appeal when practically 40% thereof was made
up of awards of damages based on the court's sole and untrammeled
discretion. Such amount might greatly be reduced by the superior
court, especially the items for consequential and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees which by themselves would amount to the
"staggering" sum of P433,220.00
The Appellate Court noted the many instances when on review, the
amounts for attorney's fees and exemplary and moral damages were
drastically cut or eliminated altogether in the absence of proof
that the losing party acted with malice, evident bad faith or in an
oppressive manner.
Inasmuch as the list submitted by ECI of the estimated losses
and damages to its tunnel project caused by the instant flooding on
November 4, 1967 was duly supported by vouchers presented in
evidence, and considering that NPC, for its part, failed to submit
proofs to refute or contradict such documentary evidence, we
are
constrained to sustain the order of execution pending appeal by
the trial court but only as far as the award for actual or
compensatory damages is concemed. We are not prepared to disagree
with the lower court on this point since it was not sufficiently
shown that it abused or exceeded its authority.
With respect to the consequential and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees, however, we concur with the Appellate Court in
holding that the lower court had exceeded the limits of its
discretion. Execution should have been postponed until such time as
the merits of the case have been finally determined in the regular
appeal.
In the fairly recent case of RCPI, et al vs. Lantin Nos. L-59311
and 59320, January 31, 1985 , 134 SCRA 395, 400-401, the Court
said:
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is
dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages
for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach
a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as
the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending
resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the
Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of
damages and their casual relation to petitioners' act will have to
be determined in the light of the assignments or errors on appeal.
It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for
actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may
be reduced.
Indeed, as later events would show, the Appellate Court was
proven right when it postulated that it is not beyond the realm of
probability that NPCs appeal from the lower court's judgment could
result in the substantial reduction of the consequential damages
and attorney's fees and the deletion of exemplary damages.
We take judicial notice of the fact that on August 24, 1987, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision on the main appeal. 9 It
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that NPC was guilty of
negligence but differred in the award of damages. While it upheld
the court a quo's award of P675,785.31 as actual damages, it
reduced the consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,200.00
and the attorney's fees from P50,000 to P30,000.00 The grant of
P50,000 as exemplary damages was eliminated. Altogether, the award
of damages was modified from P1,108,985.31 to P724,985.31. From
that decision, both the ECI and NPC filed their separate appeals to
this Court. 10 Finally, on May 16, 1988, the Court promulgated
its
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 3
judgment affirming in all respects the Appellate Court's
decision in CA-G.R. No. 49955-R, thus putting to rest the question
of negligence and NPCs liability for damages.
The point that the Court wishes to emphasize is this: Courts
look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has
not acquired a final character. Section 2, Rule 39, authorizing the
premature execution of judgments, being an exception to the general
rule, must be restrictively construed. It would not be a sound rule
to allow indiscriminately the execution of a money judgment, even
if there is a sufficient bond. "The reasons allowing execution must
constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will
outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment."' 11
We come now to the second issue of whether petitioners,
including the sheriff, are bound to restore to NPC the judgment
amount which has been delivered to ECI in compliance with the writ
of garnishment.
In line with our pronouncement that we are sanctioning in this
particular instance the execution pending appeal of actual but not
consequential and exemplary damages and attorney's fees which must
necessarily depend on the final resolution of the main cases, i.e.,
Nos. L-47379 and 47481, the direct consequence would be to
authorizeNPC to proceed against the covering bond filed by ECI but
only to the extent of the difference between the amount finally
adjudicated by this Court in the main cases [P724,985.31] and the
amount originally decreed by the trial court relating to the
consequential and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
[P1,108.985.31]. In other words,ECIs bond is held answerable to NPC
for P384,000.
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we
find that the Appellate Court erred in not absolvingMERALCO, the
garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment
to ECI of P1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to
double liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its
prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment. Unless there are
compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the writ or
actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of
entitlement on the part of the garnisher, it is not incumbent upon
the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the
order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid.
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides,
Effect of attachment of debts and credits.-All persons having in
their possession or under their control any credits or other
similar personal property belonging to the party against whom
attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, at the time
of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and
notice as provided in the last preceding section, shall be liable
to the applicant for the amount of such credits, debts or other
property, until the attachment be discharged, or any judgment
recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be delivered or
transferred, or such debts be paid, to the
clerk, sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the
attachment.
Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a
stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the
garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits,
etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts
from liability the person having in his possession or under his
control any credits or other personal property be, longing to the
defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ...,
to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the
action is pending." 12
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as
garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount
of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to
the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all
responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the
sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose
garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would
only undermine the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court in disposing of the two side issues of
execution pending appeal and petitioners' liability for
restitution, hereby MODIFIES the Court of Appeals' decision and
resolution under review, and rules as follows:
[a] NPC is authorized to proceed against the P1,109,000 bond
filed by ECI to the extent of P384,000 which corresponds to the
difference between the awards for consequential and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees upheld by the Court in the main cases
(Nos. L-47379 and 47481) and those decreed for the same items by
the trial court;
[b] MERALCO is declared absolved from any and all
responsibilities in connection with the amount of P1,114,545.23
representing the NPC garnished funds and therefore relieved from
the burden of restoring the same to NPC.
SO ORDERED .
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 4
G.R. No. L-34548 November 29, 1988
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO and PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION,respondents
CORTES, J.:
The crux of the instant controversy dwells on the liability of a
bank for releasing its depositor's funds upon orders of the court,
pursuant to a writ of garnishment. If in compliance with the court
order, the bank delivered the garnished amount to the sheriff, who
in turn delivered it to the judgment creditor, but subsequently,
the order of the court directing payment was set aside by the same
judge, should the bank be held solidarily liable with the judgment
creditor to its depositor for reimbursement of the garnished funds?
The Court does not think so.
In Civil Case No. Q-12785 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch IX entitled "Badoc Planters, Inc. versus
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al.," which was an
action for recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries, an Order (Partial
Judgment) was issued on January 15, 1970 by the Hon. Lourdes P. San
Diego, then Presiding Judge, ordering the defendants therein to pay
jointly and severally, the plaintiff Badoc Planters, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "BADOC") within 48 hours the aggregate
amount of P206,916.76, with legal interests thereon.
On January 26,1970, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a
Writ of Execution of the said Partial Judgment which was granted on
the same day by the herein respondent judge who acted in place of
the Hon. Judge San Diego who had just been elevated as a Justice of
the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Branch Clerk of Court on the
very same day, issued a Writ of Execution addressed to Special
Sheriff Faustino Rigor, who then issued a Notice of Garnishment
addressed to the General Manager and/or Cashier of Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RCBC), the
petitioner in this case, requesting a reply within five (5) days to
said garnishment as to any property which the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (hereinafter referred to as "PVTA") might
have in the possession or control of petitioner or of any debts
owing by the petitioner to said defendant. Upon receipt of such
Notice, RCBC notified PVTA thereof to enable the PVTA to take the
necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on
Appeal, p. 36]
Upon an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated January 27, 1970 filed by
BADOC, the respondent Judge issued an Order granting the Ex-Parte
Motion and directing the herein petitioner "to deliver in check the
amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and Sheriff Rigor in
turn is ordered to cash the check and deliver the amount to the
plaintiff's representative and/or counsel on record." [Record on
Appeal, p. 20; Rollo, p. 5.] In compliance with said Order,
petitioner delivered to Sheriff Rigor a certified check in the sum
of P 206,916.76.
Respondent PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 26,1970 which was granted in an Order dated April 6,1970,
setting aside the Orders of Execution and of Payment and the Writ
of Execution and ordering petitioner and BADOC "to restore, jointly
and severally, the account of PVTA with the said bank in the same
condition and state it was before the issuance of
the aforesaid Orders by reimbursing the PVTA of the amount of P
206, 916.76 with interests at the legal rate from January 27, 1970
until fully paid to the account of the PVTA This is without
prejudice to the right of plaintiff to move for the execution of
the partial judgment pending appeal in case the motion for
reconsideration is denied and appeal is taken from the said partial
judgment." [Record on Appeal, p. 58]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order of April 6,
1970 filed by herein petitioner was denied in the Order of
respondent judge dated June 10, 1970 and on June 19, 1970, which
was within the period for perfecting an appeal, the herein
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from
the said Orders.
This case was then certified by the Court of Appeals to this
Honorable Court, involving as it does purely questions of law.
The petitioner raises two principal queries in the instant case:
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to
garnishment; and 2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly
ordered the herein petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the
Special Sheriff by virtue of the execution issued pursuant to the
Order/Partial Judgment dated January 15, 1970.
The record reveals that on February 2, 1970, private respondent
PVTA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order/ Partial
Judgment of January 15, 1970. This was granted and the
aforementioned Partial Judgment was set aside. The case was set for
hearings on November 4, 9 and 11, 1970 [Rollo, pp. 205-207.]
However, in view of the failure of plaintiff BADOC to appear on the
said dates, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the case
against PVTA for failure to prosecute [Rollo, p. 208.]
It must be noted that the Order of respondent Judge dated April
6, 1970 directing the plaintiff to reimburse PVTA t e amount of
P206,916.76 with interests became final as to said plaintiff who
failed to even file a motion for reconsideration, much less to
appeal from the said Order. Consequently, the order to restore the
account of PVTA with RCBC in the same condition and state it was
before the issuance of the questioned orders must be upheld as to
the plaintiff, BADOC.
However, the questioned Order of April 6, 1970 must be set aside
insofar as it ordered the petitioner RCBC, jointly and severally
with BADOC, to reimburse PVTA.
The petitioner merely obeyed a mandatory directive from the
respondent Judge dated January 27, 1970, ordering petitioner 94 "to
deliver in check the amount garnished to Sheriff Faustino Rigor and
Sheriff Rigor is in turn ordered to cash the check and deliver the
amount to the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record."
[Record on Appeal, p. 20.]
PVTA however claims that the manner in which the bank complied
with the Sheriffs Notice of Garnishment indicated breach of trust
and dereliction of duty on the part of the bank as custodian of
government funds. It insistently urges that the premature delivery
of the garnished amount by RCBC to the special sheriff even in the
absence of a demand to deliver made by the latter, before the
expiration of the five-day period given to reply to the Notice of
Garnishment, without any reply having been given thereto nor any
prior authorization from its
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 5
depositor, PVTA and even if the court's order of January 27,
1970 did not require the bank to immediately deliver the garnished
amount constitutes such lack of prudence as to make it answerable
jointly and severally with the plaintiff for the wrongful release
of the money from the deposit of the PVTA. The respondent Judge in
his controverted Order sustained such contention and blamed RCBC
for the supposed "hasty release of the amount from the deposit of
the PVTA without giving PVTA a chance to take proper steps by
informing it of the action being taken against its deposit, thereby
observing with prudence the five-day period given to it by the
sheriff." [Rollo, p. 81.]
Such allegations must be rejected for lack of merit. In the
first place, it should be pointed out that RCBC did not deliver the
amount on the strength solely of a Notice of Garnishment; rather,
the release of the funds was made pursuant to the aforesaid Order
of January 27, 1970. While the Notice of Garnishment dated January
26, 1970 contained no demand of payment as it was a mere request
for petitioner to withold any funds of the PVTA then in its
possession, the Order of January 27, 1970 categorically required
the delivery in check of the amount garnished to the special
sheriff, Faustino Rigor.
In the second place, the bank had already filed a reply to the
Notice of Garnishment stating that it had in its custody funds
belonging to the PVTA, which, in fact was the basis of the
plaintiff in filing a motion to secure delivery of the garnished
amount to the sheriff. [See Rollo, p. 93.]
Lastly, the bank, upon the receipt of the Notice of Garnishment,
duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the
necessary steps for the protection of its own interest [Record on
Appeal, p. 36]
It is important to stress, at this juncture, that there was
nothing irregular in the delivery of the funds of PVTA by check to
the sheriff, whose custody is equivalent to the custody of the
court, he being a court officer. The order of the court dated
January 27, 1970 was composed of two parts, requiring: 1) RCBC to
deliver in check the amount garnished to the designated sheriff and
2) the sheriff in turn to cash the check and deliver the amount to
the plaintiffs representative and/or counsel on record. It must be
noted that in delivering the garnished amount in check to the
sheriff, the RCBC did not thereby make any payment, for the law
mandates that delivery of a check does not produce the effect of
payment until it has been cashed. [Article 1249, Civil Code.]
Moreover, by virtue of the order of garnishment, the same was
placed in custodia legis and therefore, from that time on, RCBC was
holding the funds subject to the orders of the court a quo. That
the sheriff, upon delivery of the check to him by RCBC encashed it
and turned over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff was no longer
the concern of RCBC as the responsibility over the garnished funds
passed to the court. Thus, no breach of trust or dereliction of
duty can be attributed to RCBC in delivering its depositor's funds
pursuant to a court order which was merely in the exercise of its
power of control over such funds.
... The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution
operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a lien by
which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court
issuing the writ. It is brought into custodia legis, under the sole
control of
such court [De Leon v. Salvador, G.R. Nos. L-30871 and L-31603,
December 28,1970, 36 SCRA 567, 574.]
The respondent judge however, censured the petitioner for having
released the funds "simply on the strength of the Order of the
court which. far from ordering an immediate release of the amount
involved, merely serves as a standing authority to make the release
at the proper time as prescribed by the rules." [Rollo, p. 81.]
This argument deserves no serious consideration. As stated
earlier, the order directing the bank to deliver the amount to the
sheriff was distinct and separate from the order directing the
sheriff to encash the said check. The bank had no choice but to
comply with the order demanding delivery of the garnished amount in
check. The very tenor of the order called for immediate compliance
therewith. On the other hand, the bank cannot be held liable for
the subsequent encashment of the check as this was upon order of
the court in the exercise of its power of control over the funds
placed in custodia legis by virtue of the garnishment.
In a recent decision [Engineering Construction Inc., v. National
Power Corporation, G.R. No. L-34589, June 29, 1988] penned by the
now Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, this Court absolved a garnishee
from any liability for prompt compliance with its order for the
delivery of the garnished funds. The rationale behind such ruling
deserves emphasis in the present case:
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we
find that the Appellate Court erred in not absolving MERALCO, the
garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect to the payment
of ECI of P 1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to
double liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its
prompt obedience to a writ of garnishment. Unless there are
compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the writ or
actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of
entitlement on the part of the garnisher, it is not incumbent upon
the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself whether or not the
order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid.
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides:
Effect of attachment of debts and credits.All persons having in
their possession or under their control any credits or other
similar personal property belonging to the party against whom
attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, all the time
of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and
notice as provided in the last preceding section,
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 6
shall be liable to the applicant for the amount of such credits,
debts or other property, until the attachment be discharged, or any
judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property be
delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk,
sheriff or other proper officer of the court issuing the
attachment.
Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching
credits belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a
stranger to the litigation. Under the above-cited rule, the
garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits,
etc. to the proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts
from liability the person having in his possession or under his
control any credits or other personal property belonging to the
defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ...,
to the clerk, sheriff, or other officer of the court in which the
action is pending. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 34
(1970 ed.)]
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as
garnishee, after having been judicially compelled to pay the amount
of the judgment represented by funds in its possession belonging to
the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all
responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the
sheriff. The reason for the rule is self-evident. To expose
garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and processes would
only undermine the administration of justice. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The aforequoted ruling thus bolsters RCBC's stand that its
immediate compliance with the lower court's order should not have
been met with the harsh penalty of joint and several liability. Nor
can its liability to reimburse PVTA of the amount delivered in
check be premised upon the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
order of delivery. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner:
xxx xxx xxx
That the respondent Judge, after his Order was enforced, saw fit
to recall said Order and decree its nullity, should not prejudice
one who dutifully abided by it, the presumption being that judicial
orders are valid and issued in the regular performance of the
duties of the Court" [Section 5(m) Rule 131, Revised Rules of
Court]. This should operate with greater force in relation to the
herein petitioner which, not being a party in the case, was just
called upon to perform an act in accordance with a judicial flat. A
contrary view will invite disrespect for the majesty of the law and
induce reluctance in complying with judicial orders out of fear
that said orders might be
subsequently invalidated and thereby expose one to suffer some
penalty or prejudice for obeying the same. And this is what will
happen were the controversial orders to be sustained. We need not
underscore the danger of this as a precedent.
xxx xxx xxx
[ Brief for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 212; Emphasis
supplied.]
From the foregoing, it may be concluded that the charge of
breach of trust and/or dereliction of duty as well as lack of
prudence in effecting the immediate payment of the garnished amount
is totally unfounded. Upon receipt of the Notice of Garnishment,
RCBC duly informed PVTA thereof to enable the latter to take the
necessary steps for its protection. However, right on the very next
day after its receipt of such notice, RCBC was already served with
the Order requiring delivery of the garnished amount. Confronted as
it was with a mandatory directive, disobedience to which exposed it
to a contempt order, it had no choice but to comply.
The respondent Judge nevertheless held that the liability of
RCBC for the reimbursement of the garnished amount is predicated on
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of
Public Highways v. Hon. San Diego [G.R. No. L-30098, February 18,
1970, 31 SCRA 616] which he found practically on all fours with the
case at bar.
The Court disagrees.
The said case which reiterated the rule in Republic v. Palacio
[G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899] that government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment is definitely distinguishable
from the case at bar.
In the Commissioner of Public Highways case [supra], the bank
which precipitately allowed the garnishment and delivery of the
funds failed to inform its depositor thereof, charged as it was
with knowledge of the nullity of the writ of execution and notice
of garnishment against government funds. In the aforementioned
case, the funds involved belonged to the Bureau of Public Highways,
which being an arm of the executive branch of the government, has
no personality of its own separate from the National Government.
The funds involved were government fundscovered by the rule on
exemption from execution.
This brings us to the first issue raised by the petitioner: Are
the PVTA funds public funds exempt from garnishment? The Court
holds that they are not.
Republic Act No. 2265 created the PVTA as an ordinary
corporation with all the attributes of a corporate entity subject
to the provisions of the Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the
power "to sue and be sued" and "to acquire and hold such assets and
incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations
authorized by the provisions of this Act or as essential to the
proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No.
2265.]
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 7
Among the specific powers vested in the PVTA are: 1) to buy
Virginia tobacco grown in the Philippines for resale to local bona
fide tobacco manufacturers and leaf tobacco dealers [Section 4(b),
R.A. No. 2265]; 2) to contracts of any kind as may be necessary or
incidental to the attainment of its purpose with any person, firm
or corporation, with the Government of the Philippines or with any
foreign government, subject to existing laws [Section 4(h), R.A.
No. 22651; and 3) generally, to exercise all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act [Section 4(k), R.A.
No. 2265.]
From the foregoing, it is clear that PVTA has been endowed with
a personality distinct and separate from the government which owns
and controls it. Accordingly, this Court has heretofore declared
that the funds of the PVTA can be garnished since "funds of public
corporation which can sue and be sued were not exempt from
garnishment" [Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, G.R. No.
L-33112, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 595, 598.]
In National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. CIR [G.R. No. L-17874,
August 31, 1964, 8 SCRA 781], this Court held that the allegation
to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
government and that as such, the same may not be garnished,
attached or levied upon is untenable for, as a government-owned or
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the government. This court has likewise
ruled that other govemment-owned and controlled corporations like
National Coal Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), the National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) the
National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) and the Price
Stabilization Council (PRISCO) which possess attributes similar to
those of the PVTA are clothed with personalities of their own,
separate and distinct from that of the government [National Coal
Company v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924);
Bacani and Matoto v. National Coconut Corporation et al., 100 Phil.
471 (1956); Reotan v. National Rice & Corn Corporation, G.R.
No. L-16223, February 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 418.] The rationale in
vesting it with a separate personality is not difficult to find. It
is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated
like any other corporation [Manila Hotel Employees' Association v.
Manila Hotel Co. and CIR, 73 Phil. 734 (1941).]
Accordingly, as emphatically expressed by this Court in a 1978
decision, "garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the
prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a
corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government"
inasmuch as "by engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro
hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations" [Philippine National Bank v. CIR, G.R No. L-32667,
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 314, 319.]
Furthermore, in the case of PVTA, the law has expressly allowed
it funds to answer for various obligations, including the one
sought to be enforced by plaintiff BADOC in this case (i.e. for
unpaid deliveries of tobacco). Republic Act No. 4155, which
discounted the erstwhile support given by the Central Bank to PVTA,
established in lieu thereof a "Tobacco Fund" to be collected from
the proceeds of fifty per centum of the tariff or taxes of
imported leaf tobacco and also fifty per centum of the specific
taxes on locally manufactured Virginia type cigarettes.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4155 provides that this fund shall
be expended for the support or payment of:
1. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration to FACOMAS and farmers and planters
regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years;
2. Indebtedness of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration and the former Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration to the Central Bank in gradual amounts
regarding Virginia tobacco transactions in previous years;
3. Continuation of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration support and subsidy operationsincluding the purchase
of locally grown and produced Virginia leaf tobacco, at the present
support and subsidy prices, its procurement, redrying, handling,
warehousing and disposal thereof, and the redrying plants trading
within the purview of their contracts;
4. Operational, office and field expenses, and the establishment
of the Tobacco Research and Grading Institute. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Inasmuch as the Tobacco Fund, a special fund, was by law,
earmarked specifically to answer obligations incurred by PVTA in
connection with its proprietary and commercial operations
authorized under the law, it follows that said funds may be
proceeded against by ordinary judicial processes such as execution
and garnishment. If such funds cannot be executed upon or garnished
pursuant to a judgment sustaining the liability of the PVTA to
answer for its obligations, then the purpose of the law in creating
the PVTA would be defeated. For it was declared to be a national
policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to
encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities
needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and foreign
markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic
basis, and to create a climate conducive to local cigarette
manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public,
blending imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the
quality of locally manufactured cigarettes [Section 1, Republic Act
No. 4155.]
The Commissioner of Public Highways case is thus distinguishable
from the case at bar. In said case, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as custodian of funds belonging to the Bureau of Public
Highways, an agency of the government, was chargeable with
knowledge of the exemption of such government funds from execution
and garnishment pursuant to the elementary precept that public
funds cannot be disbursed without the appropriation required by
law. On the other hand, the same cannot hold true for RCBC as the
funds entrusted to its custody, which belong to a public
corporation, are in the nature of private funds insofar as their
susceptibility to garnishment is
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 8
concerned. Hence, RCBC cannot be charged with lack of prudence
for immediately complying with the order to deliver the garnished
amount. Since the funds in its custody are precisely meant for the
payment of lawfully-incurred obligations, RCBC cannot rightfully
resist a court order to enforce payment of such obligations. That
such court order subsequently turned out to have been erroneously
issued should not operate to the detriment of one who complied with
its clear order.
Finally, it is contended that RCBC was bound to inquire into the
legality and propriety of the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment issued against the funds of the PVTA deposited with
said bank. But the bank was in no position to question the legality
of the garnishment since it was not even a party to the case. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioner, it had neither the
personality nor the interest to assail or controvert the orders of
respondent Judge. It had no choice but to obey the same inasmuch as
it had no standing at all to impugn the validity of the partial
judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff or of the processes
issued in execution of such judgment.
RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution
solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was
responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of
Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the consequences of
a subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the
plaintiff can be ordered to restore the account of the PVTA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the petitioner is
ABSOLVED from any liability to respondent PVTA for reimbursement of
the funds garnished. The questioned Order of the respondent Judge
ordering the petitioner, jointly and severally with BADOC, to
restore the account of PVTA are modified accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 9
G.R. No. 107282 March 16, 1994
THE MANILA REMNANT CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, AND SPS. OSCAR C. VENTANILLA AND CARMEN GLORIA DIAZ,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The present petition is an offshoot of our decision in Manila
Remnant Co., Inc., (MRCI) v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on
November 22, 1990.
That case involved parcels of land in Quezon City which were
owned by petitioner MRCI and became the subject of its agreement
with A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., (AUVCI) by virtue of which the
latter was to act as the petitioner's agent in the development and
sale of the property. For a stipulated fee, AUVCI was to convert
the lands into a subdivision, manage the sale of the lots, execute
contracts and issue official receipts to the lot buyers. At the
time of the agreement, the president of both MRCI and AUVCI was
Artemio U. Valencia.
Pursuant to the above agreement, AUVCI executed two contracts to
sell dated March 3, 1970, covering Lots 1 and 2, Block 17, in favor
of spouses Oscar C. Ventanilla and Carmen Gloria Diaz for the
combined contract price of P66,571.00, payable monthly in ten
years. After ten days and without the knowledge of the Ventanilla
couple, Valencia, as president of MRCI, resold the same parcels to
Carlos Crisostomo, one of his sales agents, without any
consideration. Upon orders of Valencia, the monthly payments of the
Ventanillas were remitted to the MRCI as payments of Crisostomo,
for which receipts were issued in his name. The receipts were kept
by Valencia without the knowledge of the Ventanillas and
Crisostomo. The Ventanillas continued paying their monthly
installments.
On May 30, 1973, MRCI informed AUVCI that it was terminating
their agreement because of discrepancies discovered in the latter's
collections and remittances. On June 6, 1973, Valencia was removed
by the board of directors of MRCI as its president.
On November 21, 1978, the Ventanilla spouses, having learned of
the supposed sale of their lots to Crisostomo, commenced an action
for specific performance, annulment of deeds, and damages against
Manila Remnant Co., Inc., A.U. Valencia and Co., Inc., and Carlos
Crisostomo. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 26411 in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City, Branch 7-B.
On November 17, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision
declaring the contracts to sell in favor of the Ventanillas valid
and subsisting, and annulling the contract to sell in favor of
Crisostomo. It ordered the MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale
in favor of the Ventanillas, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P210,000.00 were
also awarded to the Ventanillas for which the MRCI, AUVCI, and
Crisostomo were held solidarily liable.
The lower court ruled further that if for any reason the
transfer of the lots could not be effected, the defendants would be
solidarily liable to the Ventanillas for reimbursement of the sum
of P73,122.35, representing the amount paid for the two lots,
and
legal interest thereon from March 1970, plus the decreed damages
and attorney's fees. Valencia was also held liable to MRCI for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
From this decision, separate appeals were filed by Valencia and
MRCI. The appellate court, however, sustained the trial court in
toto.
MRCI then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari to
review the portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
upholding the solidary liability of MRCI, AUVCI and Carlos
Crisostomo for the payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees to the Ventanillas.
On November 22, 1990, this Court affirmed the decision by the
Court of Appeals and declared the judgment of the trial court
immediately executory.
The Present Case
On January 25, 1991, the spouses Ventanilla filed with the trial
court a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 26411. The writ was issued on May 3, 1991, and served upon
MRCI on May 9, 1991.
In a manifestation and motion filed by MRCI with the trial court
on May 24, 1991, the petitioner alleged that the subject properties
could not be delivered to the Ventanillas because they had already
been sold to Samuel Marquez on February 7, 1990, while their
petition was pending in this Court. Nevertheless, MRCI offered to
reimburse the amount paid by the respondents, including legal
interest plus the aforestated damages. MRCI also prayed that its
tender of payment be accepted and all garnishments on their
accounts lifted.
The Ventanillas accepted the amount of P210,000.00 as damages
and attorney's fees but opposed the reimbursement offered by MRCI
in lieu of the execution of the absolute deed of sale. They
contended that the alleged sale to Samuel Marquez was void,
fraudulent, and in contempt of court and that no claim of ownership
over the properties in question had ever been made by Marquez.
On July 19, 1991, Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan issued the following
order:
To ensure that there is enough amount to cover the value of the
lots involved if transfer thereof to plaintiff may no longer be
effected, pending litigation of said issue, the garnishment made by
the Sheriff upon the bank account of Manila Remnant may be lifted
only upon the deposit to the Court of the amount of P500,000.00 in
cash.
MRCI then filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration
praying that it be ordered to reimburse the Ventanillas in the
amount of P263,074.10 and that the garnishment of its bank deposit
be lifted. This motion was denied by the trial court in its order
dated September 30, 1991. A second manifestation and motion filed
by MRCI was denied on December 18, 1991. The trial
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 10
court also required MRCI to show cause why it should not be
cited for contempt for disobedience of its judgment.
These orders were questioned by MRCI in a petition for
certiorari before the respondent court on the ground that they were
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the contract to sell in favor of
Marquez did not constitute a legal impediment to the immediate
execution of the judgment. Furthermore, the cash bond fixed by the
trial court for the lifting of the garnishment was fair and
reasonable because the value of the lot in question had increased
considerably. The appellate court also set aside the show-cause
order and held that the trial court should have proceeded under
Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and not Section 9
thereof. 1
In the petition now before us, it is submitted that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals committed certain reversible errors
to the prejudice of MRCI.
The petitioner contends that the trial court may not enforce it
garnishment order after the monetary judgment for damages had
already been satisfied and the amount for reimbursement had already
been deposited with the sheriff. Garnishment as a remedy is
intended to secure the payment of a judgment debt when a
well-founded belief exists that the erring party will abscond or
deliberately render the execution of the judgment nugatory. As
there is no such situation in this case, there is no need for a
garnishment order.
It is also averred that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it arbitrarily fixed the amount of the cash bond
for the lifting of the garnishment order at P500,000.00.
MRCI further maintains that the sale to Samuel Marquez was valid
and constitutes a legal impediment to the execution of the absolute
deed of sale to the Ventanillas. At the time of the sale to
Marquez, the issue of the validity of the sale to the Ventanillas
had not yet been resolved. Furthermore, there was no specific
injunction against the petitioner re-selling the property.
Lastly, the petitioner insists that Marquez was a buyer in good
faith and had a right to rely on the recitals in the certificate of
title. The subject matter of the controversy having passed to an
innocent purchaser for value, the respondent court erred in
ordering the execution of the absolute deed of sale in favor of the
Ventanillas.
For their part, the respondents argue that the validity of the
sale to them had already been established even while the previous
petition was still pending resolution. That petition only
questioned the solidary liability of MRCI to the Ventanillas. The
portion of the decision ordering the MRCI to execute an absolute
deed of sale in favor of the Ventanillas became final and executory
when the petitioner failed to appeal it to the Supreme Court. There
was no need then for an order enjoining the petitioner from
re-selling the property in litigation.
They also point to the unusual lack of interest of Marquez in
protecting and asserting his right to the disputed property, a
clear indication that the alleged sale to him was merely a ploy
of
the petitioner to evade the execution of the absolute deed of
sale in their favor.
The petition must fail.
The validity of the contract to sell in favor of the Ventanilla
spouses is not disputed by the parties. Even in the previous
petition, the recognition of that contract was not assigned as
error of either the trial court or appellate court. The fact that
the MRCI did not question the legality of the award for damages to
the Ventanillas also shows that it even then already acknowledged
the validity of the contract to sell in favor of the private
respondents.
On top of all this, there are other circumstances that cast
suspicion on the validity, not to say the very existence, of the
contract with Marquez.
First, the contract to sell in favor of Marquez was entered into
after the lapse of almost ten years from the rendition of the
judgment of the trial court upholding the sale to the
Ventanillas.
Second, the petitioner did not invoke the contract with Marquez
during the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution filed by the private respondents. It disclosed the
contract only after the writ of execution had been served upon
it.
Third, in its manifestation and motion dated December 21, 1990,
the petitioner said it was ready to deliver the titles to the
Ventanillas provided that their counterclaims against private
respondents were paid or offset first. There was no mention of the
contract to sell with Marquez on February 7, 1990.
Fourth, Marquez has not intervened in any of these proceedings
to assert and protect his rights to the subject property as an
alleged purchaser in good faith.
At any rate, even if it be assumed that the contract to sell in
favor of Marquez is valid, it cannot prevail over the final and
executory judgment ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of
sale in favor of the Ventanillas. No less importantly, the records
do not show that Marquez has already paid the supposed balance
amounting to P616,000.00 of the original price of over P800,000.00.
2
The Court notes that the petitioner stands to benefit more from
the supposed contract with Marquez than from the contract with the
Ventanillas with the agreed price of only P66,571.00. Even if it
paid the P210,000.00 damages to the private respondents as decreed
by the trial court, the petitioner would still earn more profit if
the Marquez contract were to be sustained.
We come now to the order of the trial court requiring the
posting of the sum of P500,000.00 for the lifting of its
garnishment order.
While the petitioners have readily complied with the order of
the trial court for the payment of damages to the Ventanillas, they
have, however, refused to execute the absolute deed of sale. It was
for the purpose of ensuring their compliance with this portion of
the judgment that the trial court issued the garnishment order
which by its term could be lifted only upon the filling of a cash
bond of P500,000.00.
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 11
The petitioner questions the propriety of this order on the
ground that it has already partially complied with the judgment and
that it has always expressed its willingness to reimburse the
amount paid by the respondents. It says that there is no need for a
garnishment order because it is willing to reimburse the
Ventanillas in lieu of execution of the absolute deed of sale.
The alternative judgment of reimbursement is applicable only if
the conveyance of the lots is not possible, but it has not been
shown that there is an obstacle to such conveyance. As the main
obligation of the petitioner is to execute the absolute deed of
sale in favor of the Ventanillas, its unjustified refusal to do so
warranted the issuance of the garnishment order.
Garnishment is a species of attachment for reaching credits
belonging to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger
to the litigation. 3 It is an attachment by means of which the
plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant
in the hands of a third person or money owed by such third person
or garnishee to the defendant. 4 The rules on attachment also apply
to garnishment proceedings.
A garnishment order shall be lifted if it established that:
(a) the party whose accounts have been garnished has posted a
counterbond or has made the requisite cash deposit; 5
(b) the order was improperly or irregularly issued 6 as where
there is no ground for garnishment 7 or the affidavit and/or bond
filed therefor are defective or insufficient; 8
(c) the property attached is exempt from execution, hence exempt
from preliminary attachment 9 or
(d) the judgment is rendered against the attaching or garnishing
creditor. 10
Partial execution of the judgment is not included in the above
enumeration of the legal grounds for the discharge of a garnishment
order. Neither does the petitioner's willingness to reimburse
render the garnishment order unnecessary. As for the counterbond,
the lower court did not err when it fixed the same at P500,000.00.
As correctly pointed out by the respondent court, that amount
corresponds to the current fair market value of the property in
litigation and was a reasonable basis for determining the amount of
the counterbond.
Regarding the refusal of the petitioner to execute the absolute
deed of sale, Section 10 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 10. Judgment for specific act; vesting title If a judgment
directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or to deliver
deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act, and
the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may
direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by
some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like
effect as if done by the party. If real or personal property is
within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance
thereof may enter judgment divesting the title of any party and
vesting it in others and such judgment shall have the force and
effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.
Against the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to accept
payment of the balance of the contract price, the remedy of the
respondents is consignation, conformably to the following
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been
made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be
released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or
sum due. . .
Art. 1258. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things
due at the disposal of the judicial authority, before whom the
tender of payment shall be proved, in a proper case, and the
announcement of the consignation in other cases.
The consignation having been made, the interested parties shall
also be notified thereof.
Art. 1260. Once the consignation has been duly made, the debtor
may ask the judge to order the cancellation of the obligation.
Accordingly, upon consignation by the Ventanillas of the sum
due, the trial court may enter judgment canceling the title of the
petitioner over the property and transferring the same to the
respondents. This judgment shall have the same force and effect as
conveyance duly executed in accordance with the requirements of the
law.
In sum, we find that:
1. No legal impediment exists to the execution, either by the
petitioner or the trial court, of an absolute deed of sale of the
subject property in favor of the respondent Ventanillas; and
2. The lower court did not abuse its discretion when it required
the posting of a P500,000.00 cash bond for the lifting of the
garnishment order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 12
G.R. Nos. 112438-39 December 12, 1995
CHEMPHIL EXPORT & IMPORT CORPORATION (CEIC), petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS JAIME Y. GONZALES, as Assignee of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION (RCBC), LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INTERNATIONAL BANK (PCIB) and THE PHILIPPINE
INVESTMENT SYSTEM ORGANIZATION (PISO), respondents.
G.R. No. 113394 December 12, 1995
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL BANK (AND ITS ASSIGNEE JAIME Y.
GONZALES) petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OR APPEALS and CHEMPHIL
EXPORT AND IMPORT CORPORATION (CEIC),respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a legal tug-of-war between the Chemphil Export and
Import Corporation (hereinafter referred to as CEIC), on one side,
and the PISO and Jaime Gonzales as assignee of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB), on the other (hereinafter
referred to as the consortium), over 1,717,678 shares of stock
(hereinafter referred to as the "disputed shares") in the Chemical
Industries of the Philippines (Chemphil/CIP).
Our task is to determine who is the rightful owner of the
disputed shares.
Pursuant to our resolution dated 30 May 1994, the instant case
is a consolidation of two petitions for review filed before us as
follows:
In G.R. Nos. 112438-39, CEIC seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Court of Appeals (former Twelfth Division) promulgated on 30
June 1993 and its resolution of 29 October 1993, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in the consolidated cases
entitled "Dynetics, Inc., et al. v. PISO, et al." (CA-G.R. No.
20467) and "Dynetics, Inc., et al. v. PISO, et al.; CEIC,
Intervenor-Appellee" (CA-G.R. CV No. 26511).
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads,
thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves in these consolidated cases as
follows:
1. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated March 25, 1988,
and May 20, 1988, subject of CA-G.R. CV No. 10467, are SET ASIDE
and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the consortium and
against appellee Dynetics, Inc., the amount of the judgment, to be
determined by Regional Trial Court, taking into account the value
of assets that the consortium may have already recovered and
shall have recovered in accordance with the other portions of
this decision.
2. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated December 19,
1989 and March 5, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
judgment is hereby rendered confirming the ownership of the
consortium over the Chemphil shares of stock, subject of CA-G.R. CV
No. 26511, and the Order dated September 4, 1989, is
reinstated.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1
In G.R. No. 113394, PCIB and its assignee, Jaime Gonzales, ask
for the annulment of the Court of Appeals' decision (former Special
Ninth Division) promulgated on 26 March 1993 in "PCIB v. Hon. Job
B. Madayag & CEIC" (CA-G.R. SP NO. 20474) dismissing the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by PCIB and
of said court's resolution dated 11 January 1994 denying their
motion for reconsideration of its decision. 2
The antecedent facts leading to the aforementioned controversies
are as follows:
On September 25, 1984, Dynetics, Inc. and Antonio M. Garcia
filed a complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction against
the PISO, BPI, LBP, PCIB and RCBC or the consortium with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 45 (Civil Case No. 8527),
seeking judicial declaration, construction and interpretation of
the validity of the surety agreement that Dynetics and Garcia had
entered into with the consortium and to perpetually enjoin the
latter from claiming, collecting and enforcing any purported
obligations which Dynetics and Garcia might have undertaken in said
agreement. 3
The consortium filed their respective answers with counterclaims
alleging that the surety agreement in question was valid and
binding and that Dynetics and Garcia were liable under the terms of
the said agreement. It likewise applied for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against Dynetics and Garcia. 4
Seven months later, or on 23 April 1985, Dynetics, Antonio
Garcia and Matrix Management & Trading Corporation filed a
complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction against the
Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC case) before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 135 docketed as Civil Case No. 10398. 5
On 2 July 1985, the trial court granted SBTC's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and on 9 July 1985, a
notice of garnishment covering Garcia's shares in CIP/Chemphil
(including the disputed shares) was served on Chemphil through its
then President. The notice of garnishment was duly annotated in the
stock and transfer books of Chemphil on the same date. 6
On 6 September 1985, the writ of attachment in favor of SBTC was
lifted. However, the same was reinstated on 30 October 1985. 7
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 13
In the meantime, on 12 July 1985, the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 8527 (the consortium case) denied the application of
Dynetics and Garcia for preliminary injunction and instead granted
the consortium's prayer for a consolidated writ of preliminary
attachment. Hence, on 19 July 1985, after the consortium had filed
the required bond, a writ of attachment was issued and various real
and personal properties of Dynetics and Garcia were garnished,
including the disputed shares. 8 This garnishment, however, was not
annotated in Chemphil's stock and transfer book.
On 8 September 1987, PCIB filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint of Dynetics and Garcia for lack of interest to prosecute
and to submit its counterclaims for decision, adopting the evidence
it had adduced at the hearing of its application for preliminary
attachment. 9
On 25 March 1988, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint of Dynetics and Garcia in Civil Case No. 8527, as well as
the counterclaims of the consortium, thus:
Resolving defendant's, Philippine Commercial International Bank,
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH MOTION TO SUBMIT DEFENDANT PCIBANK's
COUNTERCLAIM FOR DECISION, dated September 7, 1987:
(1) The motion to dismiss is granted; and the instant case is
hereby ordered dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court, plaintiff having failed to comply with the order
dated July 16, 1987, and having not taken further steps to
prosecute the case; and
(2) The motion to submit said defendant's counterclaim for
decision is denied; there is no need; said counterclaim is likewise
dismissed under the authority of Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog
City, L-63194, January 21, 1985, wherein the Supreme Court stated
that if the civil case is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim
filed therein. "A person cannot eat his cake and have it at the
same time" (p. 645, record, Vol. I). 10
The motions for reconsideration filed by the consortium were,
likewise, denied by the trial court in its order dated 20 May
1988:
The Court could have stood pat on its order dated 25 March 1988,
in regard to which the defendants-banks concerned filed motions for
reconsideration. However, inasmuch as plaintiffs commented on said
motions that: "3). In any event, so as not to unduly foreclose on
the rights of the respective parties to refile and prosecute their
respective causes of action, plaintiffs manifest their conformity
to the modification of this Honorable Court's order to indicate
that the dismissal of the complaint and the counterclaims is
without prejudice." (p. 2, plaintiffs' COMMENT etc.
dated May 20, 1988). The Court is inclined to so modify the said
order.
WHEREFORE , the order issued on March 25, 1988, is hereby
modified in the sense that the dismissal of the complaint as well
as of the counterclaims of defendants RCBC, LBP, PCIB and BPI shall
be considered as without prejudice (p. 675, record, Vol. I). 11
Unsatisfied with the aforementioned order, the consortium
appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
20467.
On 17 January 1989 during the pendency of consortium's appeal in
CA-G.R. CV No. 20467, Antonio Garcia and the consortium entered
into a Compromise Agreement which the Court of Appeals approved on
22 May 1989 and became the basis of its judgment by compromise.
Antonio Garcia was dropped as a party to the appeal leaving the
consortium to proceed solely against Dynetics, Inc. 12 On 27 June
1989, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court. 13
Hereunder quoted are the salient portions of said compromise
agreement:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Defendants, in consideration of avoiding an extended
litigation, having agreed to limit their claim against plaintiff
Antonio M. Garcia to a principal sum of P145 Million immediately
demandable and to waive all other claims to interest, penalties,
attorney's fees and other charges. The aforesaid compromise amount
of indebtedness of P145 Million shall earn interest of eighteen
percent (18%) from the date of this Compromise.
4. Plaintiff Antonio M. Garcia and herein defendants have no
further claims against each other.
5. This Compromise shall be without prejudice to such claims as
the parties herein may have against plaintiff Dynetics, Inc.
6. Plaintiff Antonio M. Garcia shall have two (2) months from
date of this Compromise within which to work for the entry and
participation of his other creditor, Security Bank and Trust Co.,
into this Compromise. Upon the expiration of this period, without
Security Bank and Trust Co. having joined, this Compromise shall be
submitted to the Court for its information and approval (pp. 27,
28-31, rollo, CA-G.R. CV No. 10467). 14
It appears that on 15 July 1988, Antonio Garcia under a Deed of
Sale transferred to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (FCI) the disputed shares
and other properties for P79,207,331.28. It was agreed upon that
part of the purchase price shall be paid by FCI directly
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 14
to SBTC for whatever judgment credits that may be adjudged in
the latter's favor and against Antonio Garcia in the aforementioned
SBTC case. 15
On 6 March 1989, FCI, through its President Antonio M. Garcia,
issued a Bank of America Check No. 860114 in favor of SBTC in the
amount of P35,462,869.62. 16 SBTC refused to accept the check
claiming that the amount was not sufficient to discharge the debt.
The check was thus consigned by Antonio Garcia and Dynetics with
the Regional Trial Court as payment of their judgment debt in the
SBTC case. 17
On 26 June 1989, FCI assigned its 4,119,614 shares in Chemphil,
which included the disputed shares, to petitioner CEIC. The shares
were registered and recorded in the corporate books of Chemphil in
CEIC's name and the corresponding stock certificates were issued to
it. 18
Meanwhile, Antonio Garcia, in the consortium case, failed to
comply with the terms of the compromise agreement he entered into
with the consortium on 17 January 1989. As a result, on 18 July
1989, the consortium filed a motion for execution which was granted
by the trial court on 11 August 1989. Among Garcia's properties
that were levied upon on execution were his 1,717,678 shares in
Chemphil (the disputed shares) previously garnished on 19 July
1985. 19
On 22 August 1989, the consortium acquired the disputed shares
of stock at the public auction sale conducted by the sheriff for
P85,000,000.00. 20 On same day, a Certificate of Sale covering the
disputed shares was issued to it.
On 30 August 1989, 21 the consortium filed a motion (dated 29
August 1989) to order the corporate secretary of Chemphil to enter
in its stock and transfer books the sheriff's certificate of sale
dated 22 August 1989, and to issue new certificates of stock in the
name of the banks concerned. The trial court granted said motion in
its order dated 4 September 1989, thus:
For being legally proper, defendant's MOTION TO ORDER THE
CORPORATE SECRETARY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES OF THE PHILS., INC.
(CHEMPIL) TO ENTER IN THE STOCK AND TRANSFER BOOKS OF CHEMPHIL THE
SHERIFF'S CERTIFICATE OF SALE DATED AUGUST 22, 1989 AND TO ISSUE
NEW CERTIFICATES OF STOCK IN THE NAME OF THE DEFENDANT BANKS, dated
August 29, 1989, is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the corporate secretary of the aforesaid corporation,
or whoever is acting for and in his behalf, is hereby ordered to
(1) record and/or register the Certificate of Sale dated August 22,
1989 issued by Deputy Sheriff Cristobal S. Jabson of this Court;
(2) to cancel the certificates of stock of plaintiff Antonio M.
Garcia and all those which may have subsequently been issued in
replacement and/or in substitution thereof; and (3) to issue in
lieu of the said shares new shares of stock in the name of the
defendant Banks, namely, PCIB, BPI, RCBC, LBP and PISO bank in
such
proportion as their respective claims would appear in this suit
(p. 82, record, Vol. II). 22
On 26 September 1989, CEIC filed a motion to intervene (dated 25
September 1989) in the consortium case seeking the recall of the
abovementioned order on grounds that it is the rightful owner of
the disputed shares. 23 It further alleged that the disputed shares
were previously owned by Antonio M. Garcia but subsequently sold by
him on 15 July 1988 to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. (FCI) which in turn
assigned the same to CEIC in an agreement dated 26 June 1989.
On 27 September 1989, the trial court granted CEIC's motion
allowing it to intervene, but limited only to the incidents covered
by the order dated 4 September 1989. In the same order, the trial
court directed Chemphil's corporate secretary to temporarily
refrain from implementing the 4 September 1989 order. 24
On 2 October 1989, the consortium filed their opposition to
CEIC's motion for intervention alleging that their attachment lien
over the disputed shares of stocks must prevail over the private
sale in favor of the CEIC considering that said shares of stock
were garnished in the consortium's favor as early as 19 July 1985.
25
On 4 October 1989, the consortium filed their opposition to
CEIC's motion to set aside the 4 September 1989 order and moved to
lift the 27 September 1989 order. 26
On 12 October 1989, the consortium filed a manifestation and
motion to lift the 27 September 1989 order, to reinstate the 4
September 1989 order and to direct CEIC to surrender the disputed
stock certificates of Chemphil in its possession within twenty-four
(24) hours, failing in which the President, Corporate Secretary and
stock and transfer agent of Chemphil be directed to register the
names of the banks making up the consortium as owners of said
shares, sign the new certificates of stocks evidencing their
ownership over said shares and to immediately deliver the stock
certificates to them. 27
Resolving the foregoing motions, the trial court rendered an
order dated 19 December 1989, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion dated
September 25, 1989 filed by CEIC is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Order of September 4, 1989, is hereby SET ASIDE, and any and
all acts of the Corporate Secretary of CHEMPHIL and/or whoever is
acting for and in his behalf, as may have already been done,
carried out or implemented pursuant to the Order of September 4,
1989, are hereby nullified.
PERFORCE, the CONSORTIUM'S Motions dated October 3, 1989 and
October 11, 1989, are both hereby denied for lack of merit.
The Cease and Desist Order dated September 27, 1989, is hereby
AFFIRMED and made PERMANENT.
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 15
SO ORDERED. 28
In so ruling, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
After careful and assiduous consideration of the facts and
applicable law and jurisprudence, the Court holds that CEIC's
Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of September 4, 1989 is
impressed with merit. The CONSORTIUM has admitted that the writ of
attachment/garnishment issued on July 19, 1985 on the shares of
stock belonging to plaintiff Antonio M. Garcia was not annotated
and registered in the stock and transfer books of CHEMPHIL. On the
other hand, the prior attachment issued in favor of SBTC on July 2,
1985 by Branch 135 of this Court in Civil Case No. 10398, against
the same CHEMPHIL shares of Antonio M. Garcia, was duly registered
and annotated in the stock and transfer books of CHEMPHIL. The
matter of non-recording of the Consortium's attachment in
Chemphil's stock and transfer book on the shares of Antonio M.
Garcia assumes significance considering CEIC's position that FCI
and later CEIC acquired the CHEMPHIL shares of Antonio M. Garcia
without knowledge of the attachment of the CONSORTIUM. This is also
important as CEIC claims that it has been subrogated to the rights
of SBTC since CEIC's predecessor-in-interest, the FCI, had paid
SBTC the amount of P35,462,869.12 pursuant to the Deed of Sale and
Purchase of Shares of Stock executed by Antonio M. Garcia on July
15, 1988. By reason of such payment, sale with the knowledge and
consent of Antonio M. Garcia, FCI and CEIC, as party-in-interest to
FCI, are subrogated by operation of law to the rights of SBTC. The
Court is not unaware of the citation in CEIC's reply that "as
between two (2) attaching creditors, the one whose claims was first
registered on the books of the corporation enjoy priority."
(Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Gan, 96 Phil. 974.)
The Court holds that a levy on the shares of corporate stock to
be valid and binding on third persons, the notice of attachment or
garnishment must be registered and annotated in the stock and
transfer books of the corporation, more so when the shares of the
corporation are listed and traded in the stock exchange, as in this
case. As a matter of fact, in the CONSORTIUM's motion of August 30,
1989, they specifically move to "order the Corporate Secretary of
CHEMPHIL to enter in the stock and transfer books of CHEMPHIL the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale dated August 22, 1989." This goes to
show that, contrary to the arguments of the CONSORTIUM, in order
that attachment, garnishment and/or encumbrances affecting rights
and ownership
on shares of a corporation to be valid and binding, the same has
to be recorded in the stock and transfer books.
Since neither CEIC nor FCI had notice of the CONSORTIUM's
attachment of July 19, 1985, CEIC's shares of stock in CHEMPHIL,
legally acquired from Antonio M. Garcia, cannot be levied upon in
execution to satisfy his judgment debts. At the time of the
Sheriff's levy on execution, Antonio M. Garcia has no more in
CHEMPHIL which could be levied upon. 29
xxx xxx xxx
On 23 January 1990, the consortium and PCIB filed separate
motions for reconsideration of the aforestated order which were
opposed by petitioner CEIC. 30
On 5 March 1990, the trial court denied the motions for
reconsideration. 31
On 16 March 1990, the consortium appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 26511). In its Resolution dated 9 August 1990,
the Court of Appeals consolidated CA-G.R. No. 26511 with CA-G.R.
No. 20467. 32
The issues raised in the two cases, as formulated by the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF THE
CONSORTIUM IN CIVIL CASE NO. 8527;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. 8527 RESULTED IN
THE DISCHARGE OF THE WRIT OF ATTACHMENT ISSUED THEREIN EVEN AS THE
CONSORTIUM APPEALED THE ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 8527;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT BASED ON COMPROMISE RENDERED BY THIS
COURT ON MAY 22, 1989 HAD THE EFFECT OF DISCHARGING THE ATTACHMENTS
ISSUED IN CIVIL CASE NO. 8527;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTACHMENT OF SHARES OF STOCK, IN ORDER TO
BIND THIRD
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 16
PERSONS, MUST BE RECORDED IN THE STOCK AND TRANSFER BOOK OF THE
CORPORATION; AND
V
WHETHER OR NOT FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. (FCI), AND ITS
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST, CEIC, WERE SUBROGATED TO THE RIGHTS OF
SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY (SBTC) IN A SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION. (This issue appears to be material as SBTC is alleged to
have obtained an earlier attachment over the same Chemphil shares
that the consortium seeks to recover in the case at bar). 33
On 6 April 1990, the PCIB separately filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
(CA-G.R. No. SP-20474), likewise, assailing the very same orders
dated 19 December 1989 and 5 March 1990, subject of CA-G.R. No.
26511. 34
On 30 June 1993, the Court of Appeals (Twelfth Division) in
CA-G.R. No. 26511 and CA-G.R. No. 20467 rendered a decision
reversing the orders of the trial court and confirming the
ownership of the consortium over the disputed shares. CEIC's motion
for reconsideration was denied on 29 October 1993. 35
In ruling for the consortium, the Court of Appeals made the
following ratiocination: 36
On the first issue, it ruled that the evidence offered by the
consortium in support of its counterclaims, coupled with the
failure of Dynetics and Garcia to prosecute their case, was
sufficient basis for the RTC to pass upon and determine the
consortium's counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals found no application for the ruling in
Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog, 134 SCRA 243 (1985) that "a person
cannot eat his cake and have it at the same time. If the civil case
is dismissed, so also is the counterclaim filed therein" because
the factual background of the present action is different. In the
instant case, both Dynetics and Garcia and the consortium presented
testimonial and documentary evidence which clearly should have
supported a judgment on the merits in favor of the consortium. As
the consortium correctly argued, the net atrocious effect of the
Regional Trial Court's ruling is that it allows a situation where a
party litigant is forced to plead and prove compulsory
counterclaims only to be denied those counterclaims on account of
the adverse party's failure to prosecute his case. Verily, the
consortium had no alternative but to present its counterclaims in
Civil Case No. 8527 since its counterclaims are compulsory in
nature.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals opined that unless a
writ of attachment is lifted by a special order specifically
providing for the discharge thereof, or unless a case has been
finally dismissed against the party in whose favor the attachment
has been issued, the attachment lien subsists. When the consortium,
therefore, took an appeal from the Regional Trial Court's orders of
March 25, 1988 and May 20, 1988, such appeal had the effect of
preserving the consortium's attachment liens secured at the
inception of Civil Case No. 8527, invoking the rule in Olib v.
Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692 (1988) that where the main action is
appealed, the attachment issued in the said main case is also
considered appealed.
Anent the third issue, the compromise agreement between the
consortium and Garcia dated 17 January 1989 did not result in the
abandonment of its attachment lien over his properties. Said
agreement was approved by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 22 May 1989. The judgment based on the compromise agreement
had the effect of preserving the said attachment lien as security
for the satisfaction of said judgment (citing BF Homes, Inc. v. CA,
190 SCRA 262, [1990]).
As to the fourth issue, the Court of Appeals agreed with the
consortium's position that the attachment of shares of stock in a
corporation need not be recorded in the corporation's stock and
transfer book in order to bind third persons.
Section 7(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court was complied with by
the consortium (through the Sheriff of the trial court) when the
notice of garnishment over the Chemphil shares of Garcia was served
on the president of Chemphil on July 19, 1985. Indeed, to bind
third persons, no law requires that an attachment of shares of
stock be recorded in the stock and transfer book of a corporation.
The statement attributed by the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme
Court in Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.vs. Gonzalo Chua Guan, G.R. No.
L-7252, February 25, 1955 (unreported), to the effect that "as
between two attaching creditors, the one whose claim was registered
first on the books of the corporation enjoys priority," is an
obiter dictum that does not modify the procedure laid down in
Section 7(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, ruled the Court of Appeals, the attachment made over
the Chemphil shares in the name of Garcia on July 19, 1985 was made
in accordance with law and the lien created thereby remained valid
and subsisting at the time Garcia sold those shares to FCI
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 17
(predecessor-in-interest of appellee CEIC) in 1988.
Anent the last issue, the Court of Appeals rejected CEIC's
subrogation theory based on Art. 1302 (2) of the New Civil Code
stating that the obligation to SBTC was paid by Garcia himself and
not by a third party (FCI).
The Court of Appeals further opined that while the check used to
pay SBTC was a FCI corporate check, it was funds of Garcia in FCI
that was used to pay off SBTC. That the funds used to pay off SBTC
were funds of Garcia has not been refuted by FCI or CEIC. It is
clear, therefore, that there was an attempt on the part of Garcia
to use FCI and CEIC as convenient vehicles to deny the consortium
its right to make itself whole through an execution sale of the
Chemphil shares attached by the consortium at the inception of
Civil Case No. 8527. The consortium, therefore, is entitled to the
issuance of the Chemphil shares of stock in its favor. The Regional
Trial Court's order of September 4, 1989, should, therefore, be
reinstated in toto.
Accordingly, the question of whether or not the attachment lien
in favor of SBTC in the SBTC case is superior to the attachment
lien in favor of the consortium in Civil Case No. 8527 becomes
immaterial with respect to the right of intervenor-appellee CEIC.
The said issue would have been relevant had CEIC established its
subrogation to the rights of SBTC.
On 26 March 1993, the Court of Appeals (Special Ninth Division)
in CA-G.R. No. SP 20474 rendered a decision denying due course to
and dismissing PCIB's petition for certiorari on grounds that PCIB
violated the rule against forum-shopping and that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by respondent Regional Trial Court in
issuing its assailed orders dated 19 December 1989 and 5 March
1990. PCIB's motion for reconsideration was denied on 11 January
1994. 37
On 7 July 1993, the consortium, with the exception of PISO,
assigned without recourse all its rights and interests in the
disputed shares to Jaime Gonzales. 38
On 3 January 1994, CEIC filed the instant petition for review
docketed as G.R. Nos. 112438-39 and assigned the following
errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE
AND REVERSING THE ORDERS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED DECEMBER
5, 1989 AND MARCH 5, 1990 AND IN NOT CONFIRMING PETITIONER'S
OWNERSHIP OVER THE DISPUTED CHEMPHIL SHARES
AGAINST THE FRIVOLOUS AND UNFOUNDED CLAIMS OF THE
CONSORTIUM.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED:
(1) In not holding that the Consortium's attachment over the
disputed Chemphil shares did not vest any priority right in its
favor and cannot bind third parties since admittedly its attachment
on 19 July 1985 was not recorded in the stock and transfer books of
Chemphil, and subordinate to the attachment of SBTC which SBTC
registered and annotated in the stock and transfer books of
Chemphil on 2 July 1985, and that the Consortium's attachment
failed to comply with Sec. 7(d), Rule 57 of the Rules as evidenced
by the notice of garnishment of the deputy sheriff of the trial
court dated 19 July 1985 (annex "D") which the sheriff served on a
certain Thelly Ruiz who was neither President nor managing agent of
Chemphil;
(2) In not applying the case law enunciated by this Honorable
Supreme Court inSamahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Gonzalo Chua Guan, 96
Phil. 974 that as between two attaching creditors, the one whose
claim was registered first in the books of the corporation enjoys
priority, and which respondent Court erroneously characterized as
mere obiter dictum;
(3) In not holding that the dismissal of the appeal of the
Consortium from the order of the trial court dismissing its
counterclaim against Antonio M. Garcia and the finality of the
compromise agreement which ended the litigation between the
Consortium and Antonio M. Garcia in
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Section 8 Provisional Remedies 18
the Dynetics case had ipso jure discharged the Consortium's
purported attachment over the disputed shares.
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT CEIC HAD BEEN SUBROGATED TO THE RIGHTS OF SBTC SINCE CEIC'S
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST HAD PAID SBTC PURSUANT TO THE DEED OF SALE
AND PURCHASE OF STOCK EXECUTED BY ANTONIO M. GARCIA ON JULY 15,
1988, AND THAT BY REASON OF SUCH PAYMENT, WITH THE CONSENT AND
KNOWLEDGE OF ANTONIO M. GARCIA, FCI AND CEIC, AS PARTY IN INTEREST
TO FCI, WERE SUBROGATED BY OPERATION OF LAW TO THE RIGHTS OF
SBTC.
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND MADE
UNWARRANTED INFERENC