Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R.
No. 81969 September 26, 1988JOCELYN RULONA-AL
AWADHI,petitioner,vs.HON. ABDULMAJID J. ASTIH, District Judge of
the Fourth Sharia Judicial District Court and NABIL
AL-AWADHI,respondents.Citizens Legal Assistance Office for
petitioner.Talib Umpar for private respondent.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:A
petition for review on certiorari was filed by Jocelyn Rulona-Al
Awadhi, assailing the order dated January 12, 1988 of the Sharia
Judicial District Court of Marawi City which denied her motion to
dismiss Special Proceedings No. 011-87, entitled "Nabil Al-Awadhi,
Petitioner, vs. Jocelyn Rulonba, Respondent" for custody and
guardianship of their minor children named Abdul Wahab Nabil, 5
years old, Adare Nabil, 3 years old, and Sabihab Al Abdullah Nabil,
6 months old.The petitioner and the private respondent were married
in Kuwait on August 1, 1981. The petitioner is a Filipino nurse and
a Roman Catholic. Her husband, the private respondent is a Kuwaiti
student. The petitioner resides with her children in Sta. Cruz,
Calape, Bohol, while the private respondent resides at 49-7 Pamaong
Street, Tagbiliran City.On or about August 25, 1987, she filed an
action for support and guardianship of her three (3) minor children
(who are in her custody) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, in
Tagbilaran City (Civil Case No. 4170, entitled "Jocelyn Rulona-Al
Awadhi Petitioner, vs. Nabil Al-Awadhi Defendant"). Upon her
motion, she was appointed the children's guardian by order of the
court dated August 25, 1987 (Annex B, p. 20, Rollo). The defendant,
her husband filed in the same court a motion to be allowed to
exercise joint parental authority over their children (Annex C, p.
21, Rollo). However, without waiting for the action of the
Tagbilaran Court, he filed on November 4, 1987 a petition for
custody and guardianship of their minor children in the Fourth
Sharia District Court in Marawi City (Annex A, p. 10, Rollo). It
was docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 011-87.After having
been summoned, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds that: (1) the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject of the petition, nor over the parties, least of
all, herself; (2) there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; and (3) improper venue (Annex B, p. 45,
Rollo).In its order dated November 20, 1987, the Sharia District
Court denied her motion to dismiss (Annex C, p. 23, Rollo). Its
order was based on Section 13 of the Special Rules of Procedure in
the Sharia Courts which provides:Section 13.Pleadings and Motions
Disallowed. The court shall not allow the filing of the following
pleadings, petitions or motions, to wit:(a) Motion to dismiss or to
quash;(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;(c) Motion for extension
of time to file pleadings or any other paper;(d) Motion to declare
defendant in default;(e) Reply, third party complaints, or
intervention;(f) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court;(g) Petition
for relief from judgment;(h) Motion for new trial or re-opening of
trial; and(i) Any dilatory motion for postponement.Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of that order (Annex D, p. 24, Rollo)
was also denied by the court on January 12, 1988. Hence, this
petition for review raising only the legal issue of jurisdiction,
or lack of it, of the respondent Sharia District Court over the
parties and the subject matter of the case. Only the Sharia
District Judge filed a Comment on the petition; the private
respondent did not.Article 13, Title II of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (PD 1083) provides:BOOK TWOTITLE
IIChapter OneAPPLICABILITY CLAUSEArt. 13. Application (1) The
provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is
a Muslim, and the marriage issolemnized in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.(2) In case of a
marriage between a Muslim and non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, theCivil Code of the
Philippines shall apply.(3) Subject to the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal
impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation,
guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims
for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry,
solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights and
obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by
this Code and other applicable Muslim laws. (Emphasis supplied.)In
view of the following admitted facts:(1) That the plaintiff husband
in Spl. Proc. No. 011-87 is not a Philippine Muslim but aKuwaiti
national;(2) That he resides at 49-7 Pamaong Extension, Tagbilaran
City, Bohol, not in Marawi City where the Sharia court sits;(3)
That the defendant wife (herein petitioner Jocelyn Rulona) is a
Filipino citizen and a non- Muslim (a Roman Catholic Christian);(4)
That their Muslim marriagewas not solemnized in anypart of the
Philippines,for they were married in Kuwait (Annex A, par. 2, p.
40, Rollo); and(5) That they do not reside within the Fourth Sharia
District, embracing the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del
Sur, and the cities of Iligan and Marawi (Art. 138-d, P.D. No.
1083), for both of them reside in the province of Bohol; it should
have been self-evident to the Fourth Sharia District Court that it
had no jurisdiction over the spouses of their marriage, nor over
the custody and guardianship of their children (Art. 143, P.D. No.
1083).The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, at Tagbilaran City which
had assumed jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint for support
and guardianship of her children on August 25, 1987 (p. 19, Rollo),
may not be divested of its jurisdiction over the parties (the
husband having voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction by filing
a motion therein for joint custody of his children) by the Fourth
Sharia District Court in Marawi City by the husband's filing
therein three (3) months later his own petition for custody and
guardianship of his children (p.10, Rollo). The rule is that once a
court has assumed jurisdiction of a case, its jurisdiction shall
continue until the case is finished. It may not be ousted from its
jurisdiction by a co-equal court (People vs. Layno, 111 SCRA 20;
Denila vs. Bellosillo, 64 SCRA 63; Lat vs. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425; and
People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218).Moreover, Article 3 of the Muslim
Code (P.D. No. 1083 expressly provides:Art. 3. Conflict of
provisions ...(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable
only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to operate to
the prejudice of a Non-Muslim.The application of the Muslim Code to
the Christian wife will be prejudicial to her.The Code of Muslim
Personal Laws was promulgated to fulfill "the aspiration of the
Filipino Muslims to have their system of laws enforced intheir
communities" (Exec. Order No. 442, Dec. 23, 1974). Those
communities are found in the ten (10) Mindanao provinces and six
(6) cities comprised within the five (5) Sharia judicial districts
which were created under Article 138 of the Muslim Code. As neither
the petitioner nor the private respondent and their children live
in or are members of those communities, they do not come within the
ambit of the Sharia courts' jurisdiction.Instead of invoking a
procedural technicality, the respondent court should have
recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and promptly
dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its
proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise.
A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should
not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of
jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the
face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural
doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at
anytime and at any stage of the action (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 29, 35-36; Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54;
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 49 SCRA 1, 6; Nueva
Vizcaya Chamber of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA
856).WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. All the
proceedings in special Proceeding No. 011-87 of the Fourth Sharia
District Court at Marawi City are annulled and the petition therein
is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.SO
ORDERED.Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.FIRST
DIVISIONMOCARAL MACAWIAG,Petitioner,-versus-JUDGE RASAD
BALINDONGand SORAIDA A. MACAWIAG,Respondents.G.R. No.
159210Present:PANGANIBAN,C.J.,
Chairperson,YNARES-SANTIAGOAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,
andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.Promulgated:September 20, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO,
SR.,J.:This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court for the nullification of the Decision[1]of the
Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial
District,MarawiCityand its Order[2]denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.The assailed decision reversed
the Decision[3]of the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court, Fourth Sharia
Judicial District, Iligan City, declaring that the house and lot
with an area of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay, Iligan City
is not a part of thefixed dower given to Soraida Macawiag, herein
private respondent, and directing her to pay attorneys fees in the
amount ofP40,000.00.The factual and procedural antecedents are as
follows:Private respondent Soraida Macawiag and Pangampong Macawiag
contracted marriage onMay 27, 1987, solemnized by Imam Macmod
Ganzo.Private respondent claims that before the celebration of
their marriage, the representatives of the bride and bridegroom
agreed and the solemnizing officer announced, that the customary
dower (mahr)[4]wasP20,000.00 in cash, one head of live carabao, and
house and lot consisting of 300 square meters located at Mahayahay,
Iligan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-28, 147(a.f.).However, despite the oral and written declaration
that the subject house and lot was amahr, Mocaral M. Macawiag,
herein petitioner, and her children, refused to recognize it as
such, without valid and lawful ground.Hence, onOctober 27, 1998,
private respondent filed an action(dawa)[5]against Mocaral M.
Macawiag and her children, for claim, declaration, change of name,
and issuance of new duplicate certificate of title ofmahrwith
damages and attorneys fees, before the Fourth Sharia Circuit Court,
Fourth Sharia Judicial District,IliganCity. Private respondent
prayed that:1.The said house and lot is Mahr property and
absolutely owned by and both possession and name be transferred to
the Moddai (plaintiff) and her children;2.The name appeared (sic)
in the certificate of title of said house and lot be changed from
Sarimanoc Macawiag to the Moddais name and her children;3.The
Register of Deeds of Iligan City be ordered to issue duplicate
certificate of title while still in the name of Sarimanoc Macawiag,
and new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the new owner,
the Moddai and her children;4.That the Moddaalai (defendant) shall
be ordered to pay moral damages ofP5,000.00, exemplary damages
ofP5,000.00, attorneys fee ofP20,000.00, plusP500.00 per
appearances (sic) in the court in the total amount of at
leastP30,500.00 and compensatory damages as maybe (sic) proved in
the course of the trial plus cost;And such other reliefs and
remedies as are just and equitable on the premises.[6]Prior to the
filing of thedawa, Pangampong Macawiag executed an affidavit of
loss of the title covering the subject house and lot.The Register
of Deeds of Iligan City thereafter issued a new duplicate
certificate of title.In their Answer,[7]petitioner and her children
admitted the fact of marriage between private respondent and
Pangampong Macawiag.However, they denied that themahrconsists
ofP20,000.00 cash, one head of live carabao and the house and lot
subject matter of the present controversy.They alleged instead that
the dowry in consideration of their marriage was cash in the amount
ofP5,000.00.They, likewise, averred that the title to the house and
lot had not been lost; rather, it was in the possession of Antonio
Camama, having been used as collateral for a loan
ofP500,000.00.Moreover, out of theP500,000.00 loan,P400,000.00 was
given to Pangampong Macawiag which he used to buy a vehicle and
merchandise and subject to the condition that the amortization
would be paid. Since Pangampong Macawiag failed to pay, petitioner
took possession of the vehicle.During the hearing before the Sharia
Circuit Court, private respondent presented the following
witnesses: Imam Mahmod Ganzo, who testified that before he
solemnized the marriage, he asked the representatives of the
parties if themahrhad been agreed upon, and the mother of the bride
and the bridegroom said that per agreement, themahrconsists of
theP20,000.00 cash, the head of a live carabao, and the subject
house and lot;[8]Pangampong Macawiag, who confirmed the above
testimony and further testified that his marriage to private
respondent was duly registered with the Office of the Sharia
Circuit Court Registrar which also specified the amount ofmahrunder
Registry No. 98-137, and that his father Sarimanoc Macawiag
specified in writing that the house and lot had been set aside as
hismahr;[9]Diora Dimacaling, the mother of the private respondent
who witnessed the celebration of the marriage between Pangampong
Macawiag and private respondent, and corroborated the testimonies
of the two witnesses;[10]and private respondent herself who
likewise confirmed the testimonies of the first three
witnesses.[11]When she testified, petitioner denied that it was
announced during the celebration of the marriage that
themahrincluded the subject house and lot, and that it was
mortgaged to Antonio Camama who now possessed the title to the
property.[12]Antonio Camama testified that the subject house and
lot was mortgaged to him, subject to the condition that if
Sarimanoc Macawiag and petitioner could not comply with the
agreement, the mortgage would be considered as a sale.In view of
the non-fulfillment of the agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed by Sarimanoc Macawiag in his (Antonios) favor.He stated
that Pangampong Macawiag knew of such transaction, and that the
transfer certificate of title covering the subject house and lot
was in his possession.[13]Tocod Macawiag, Papiel Macawiag, Disimban
Didato, and Tadmera Gandamato testified that there was no house and
lot mentioned as part of the dowry.[14]OnApril 13, 2000, the Fourth
Sharia Circuit Court rendered a decision[15]in favor of petitioner
and her children.Thefalloof the decision reads:WHEREFORE, the house
and lot with an area of 300 square meters located at
Mahayahay,IliganCity, registered in the name of the deceased
Sarimanok Macawiag under Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No.
T-28, 147 (a.f.) is not a part of the fixed dower (mahr musama)
given to Soraida A. Macawiag, herein plaintiff, in connection with
her marriage to Pangampong Macawiag.Plaintiff is hereby directed to
pay defendantsP40,000.00 in attorneys fees and the cost of this
proceedings.SO ORDERED.[16]In finding that the subject house and
lot was not part of private respondentsmahr, the Circuit Court
ruled that, in the first place, she never acted as owner of the
house and lot allegedly given to her as dowry.Even if there was a
fixed dowry, it never included the house and lot under litigation,
which happens to be registered under the name of Sarimanoc
Macawiag.Moreover, the Circuit Court observed that private
respondents claim that the subject house and lot was part of her
fixed dowry had not been annotated on the title to the property
despite the lapse of considerable length of time.[17]Aggrieved,
private respondent appealed to the Sharia District Court, which,
onMarch 14, 2003, reversed the decision of the Fourth Sharia
Circuit Court.Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is
REVERSED and another one entered:(1) DECLARING plaintiff Soraida
Abbas Macawiag the exclusive owner of the house and lot, situated
at Bo. Mahayahay,IliganCity, with an area of 300 square meters,
more or less covered by TCT No. T-28,147 (a.f.) which is still in
the name of the late Sarimanoc Macawiag, being her mahr;(2)
ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
(1)P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
and the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.[18]The Sharia District Court
ruled that one of the essential requisites of a marriage contract
is the stipulation of customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two
competent persons.It is both an inalienable and imprescriptible
right which the wife can demand from her husband.It is inalienable
in the sense that even if not expressly stated in the contract of
marriage, is nevertheless due to the wife and is not lost through
prescription.[19]It further held that the positive testimonies of
the witnesses for private respondent should prevail over the
negative testimonies of petitioner and her children. The court gave
credence to the testimony of the Imam, belonging as he does to the
group of the learned (theulama).Lastly, the district court found
that even if the property was used as collateral for a loan by the
late Sarimanoc Macawiag, private respondent can still recover the
same since the transaction involving her property is null and void
(insofar as the private respondent is concerned).[20]Petitioner now
comes before this Court in this special civil action forcertiorari,
on the sole ground of whetherJUDGE BALINDONG ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR EXCESS IN THE
EXERCISE THEREOF WHEN HE REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE SHARIA
CIRCUIT COURT AND DENIED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.[21]Petitioner insists that the ruling of the Court
inPeople v. Bundang[22]is not applicable in this case, since as
against the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and
the statements of the accused, the former ordinarily deserves more
credence than the latter. In such case, mere preponderance of
evidence will suffice.[23]Petitioner alleges that the Sharia
Circuit Court already weighed the testimonial and documentary
evidence, and found preponderance of evidence in favor of
petitioner; as such, this ruling should have been respected and
upheld by the Sharia District Court. Petitioner questions the
credibility of the testimonies of Pangampong Macawiag and private
respondent, as their testimonies are false.[24]Petitioner
likewisequestions the authenticity of the Deed of Donation signed
by Sarimanoc Macawiag involving the subject house and lot[25]and
the two (2) sets of Certificates of Marriage and Municipal Forms
(Nos. 97-31 and 98-131) registered with the Civil
Registrar.Petitioner, likewise, questions the findings of the
Sharia District Court on the credibility of Imam Ganzo.[26]In her
Comment,[27]private respondent contends that the petition was filed
out of time; it, likewise, violates the principle of hierarchy of
courts since it should have been filed before the CA.[28]Moreover,
private respondent points out that petitioner is not assailing the
very jurisdiction of the Sharia District Court, but only its
findings of facts; this is a ground for an appeal and not a
petition forcertiorari.[29]Lastly, private respondent claims that
petitioner is trying to mislead the Court by including in her
petition annexes/documents which were not appreciated and passed
upon by the Sharia Circuit Court.[30]Petitioner counters that the
petition was timely filed because she received the order denying
her motion for reconsideration onMay 29, 2003; thus, she had sixty
(60) days therefrom or untilJuly 29, 2003.Before the period
expired, she filed a motion for extension of fifteen (15) days or
untilAugust 13, 2003within which to file the petition.Having filed
the petition onAugust 12, 2003, it is within the requested period
of extension, and thus filed on time.Petitioner, likewise, claims
that the rule on hierarchy of courts was not violated, in view of
the rule on finality of decision set forth in P.D. No. 1083.[31]As
to the questioned documents presented before this Court, petitioner
admits that they were not presented during the hearing before the
Sharia Circuit Court.[32]The parties submitted their respective
Memoranda where they reiterated their earlier arguments.The
petition is dismissed.The decision sought to be reviewed was
rendered by the Sharia District Court which is thus governed
primarily by special laws.Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 6734, An Act
Providing for the Organic Act For the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9054 or the New Organic Law
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, provides:The Sharia
Appellate Court shall:x x x xb) Exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Sharia District Courts as
established by law.[33]While the Supreme Courten bancauthorized the
creation of the Sharia Appellate Court, it has not yet been
organized; in any case, it should begin with the appointments of
the Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Consequently,
aggrieved parties can come up only to this Court in view of the
rule set forth in Article 145 of Presidential Decree No.
1083,viz:Article 145.Finality of decisions. The decisions of the
Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit
Court or not shall be final.Nothing herein contained shall affect
the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in the Constitution.The original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution
is not altered.Specifically, this refers to the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over petitions
forcertiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,andhabeas
corpus.[34]It likewise refers to the power of the Supreme Court to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal orcertiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the jurisdiction of
any lower court is in issue[35]and all cases in which only an error
or question of law is involved.[36]In fine, the decisions of the
Sharia District Courts may reach the Supreme Court by way of
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if there
is a question of jurisdiction, or petition for review
oncertiorarias a mode of appeal under Rule 45.From the
circumstances surrounding the present case, as well as the
allegations set forth in the petition, the remedy available to
petitioner is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 and
not a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65.Indeed, when a court,
tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions
arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction.Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of
said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.Under prevailing
procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not
proper subjects of a special civil action forcertiorari.[37]The
well-settled rule is thatcertiorariis not available where the
aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in
the ordinary course, the reason being thatcertioraricannot co-exist
with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.The existence and
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the
availment of the special civil action forcertiorari.These two
remedies are mutually exclusive.[38]Consequently, when petitioner
filed her petition in this Court, the decision of the Sharia
District Court was already final and executory.In view of the
foregoing, as much as we want to review the merits of the petition,
we are constrained by the procedural lapse which this Court cannot
ignore. When a decision becomes final and executory, the court
loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court
would have the power to review a judgment that has acquired
finality.Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would
set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist
in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace
and order by settling justiciable controversies with
finality.[39]Moreover, the complaint filed before the Sharia
Circuit Court included as defendants the children of Mocaral
Macawiag, who are the heirs of the late Sarimanoc Macawiag.On the
other hand, the present petition was filed only by Mocaral Macawiag
without the inclusion of the other parties.Considering that the
other heirs of Sarimanoc are indispensable parties who had not been
impleaded below, the Court is further prevented from previewing the
merits of the case.Admittedly, in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice,
this Court has the discretion to treat a petition forcertiorarias
having been filed under Rule 45,[40]but not when the petition is
filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review and without offering any reason therefor.[41]The Court ruled
inSebastian v. Morales[42]that:Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice.Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits
and not on technicalities.This does not mean, however, that
procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the
convenience of a party.Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective
enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that
obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the
settlement of disputes.Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other,
or as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants.Litigation is not a game of
technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly
presented and justly resolved.Hence, rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure.Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.[43]The
fact that petitioner used the Rule 65 modality as a substitute for
a lost appeal is made plain by the following:First.While the
petition was filed within the 60-day period for filing a petition
forcertiorari,it was nevertheless filed beyond the 15-day period
for filing a petition for review.As earlier stated, petitioner
received the order denying her motion for reconsideration onMay 29,
2003.She thus had untilJune 13, 2003within which to file the
petition, but instead of doing so, filed onJuly 24, 2003, a motion
for extension of time[44]to file petition forcertiorari.The Court
granted the motion in a Resolution datedSeptember 1, 2003.Thus,
onAugust 12, 2003, which is within the extension period, petitioner
filed the instant petition.Second. The petition makes specious
allegations of grave abuse of discretion but questions the
credibility of witnesses and the authenticity of documents that
were either presented during the trial of the case before the
Sharia Circuit Court or submitted for the first time before this
Court.In short, petitioner seeks the review of the factual findings
of the courts below.Admittedly, the Court has, in previous cases,
reviewed the factual findings ofthe Sharia District
Court.[45]However, the petitioners in these cases came before this
Court via petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45, not an
original action forcertiorarias in the present case.In a petition
forcertiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in
scope.It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction.It is
not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in
which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction; an error of jurisdiction is one where the acts
complained of were issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.[46]Indeed, judicial review does not go as far as to
examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the
probative value thereof.[47]An examination of these issues would
require the elevation of the records below, which cannot be done in
the present case.IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
herebyDISMISSED.SO ORDERED.ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate JusticeWE
CONCUR:ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief JusticeChairpersonCONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGOMA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate
JusticeAssociate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate JusticeC E
R T I F I C A T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice
Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaSECOND
DIVISIONATTY. MARIETTA D.ZAMORANOS,Petitioner,- versus -PEOPLE OF
THEPHILIPPINESandSAMSON R. PACASUM,
SR.,Respondents.x--------------------------------------------------xATTY.
MARIETTA D.ZAMORANOS,Petitioner,- versus -SAMSON R. PACASUM,
SR.,Respondent.x--------------------------------------------------xSAMSON
R. PACASUM, SR.,Petitioner,- versus -ATTY. MARIETTA D.
ZAMORANOS,Respondent.G.R. No. 193902G.R. No. 193908G.R. No.
194075Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD,
andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:June 1, 2011
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:These
are three (3) consolidated petitions for review oncertiorariunder
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]dated July
30, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN,
dismissing the petition forcertiorarifiled by petitioner Atty.
Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos)in G.R. No. 193902, thus,
affirming the Order[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by
petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075.Before
anything else, we disentangle the facts.On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos
wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior
thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam
on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the two wed
again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio
(Laguio) of the RTC,Quezon City.A little after a year, on December
18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce bytalaq.The
dissolution of their marriage was
confirmedbytheShariaCircuitDistrictCourt,1stCircuit,3rdDistrict,
Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18,
1992, as follows:DECREE OF DIVORCEThis is a case for divorce filed
by the herein complainant Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman
against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the
wife, herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the
authority to exercise Talaq, as provided for and, in accordance
with Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.When this case was called
for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein respondent, Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to confirm their
divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 18,
1983.This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein
parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and the
respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to
their Muslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility
of reconciliation by and between them, hereby issues this decree of
divorce.WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the
provisions of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of thePhilippines,
this petition is hereby granted. Consequently, the marriage
betweenMarietta(Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad)
de Guzman is hereby confirmed dissolved.Issued this 18thday of
June, 1992, at Isabela,Basilan Province,Philippines.(signed)HON.
KAUDRI L. JAINULPresiding Judge[3]Now it came to pass that
Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously
done in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson
Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at the Bureau of Customs
where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte.
Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties
of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed their marriage
vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the
RTC,IliganCity. However, unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De
Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with progeny,
namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.Despite their three
children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned
sour and, in 1998, the two werede factoseparated. The volatile
relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter
battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October
18, 1999, Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement
which vested primary custody of the children in the former, with
the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.As it turned out,
the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a flurry of cases
against Zamoranos, to wit:1.Petition for Annulment of Marriage
filed on March 31, 2003 before the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6249. Subsequently, on May 31, 2004,
Pacasum amended the petition into one for Declaration of a Void
Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Zamoranos, at the
time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously married to
De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage,
solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge
Laguio, subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and
Pacasums marriage; (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous
and voidab initio; and (d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse,
should forfeit: (i) custody of her minor children to their father,
who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii) her share in the
community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her
inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate
succession.2.Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.3.Separate
administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from service and
disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the
Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue
Integrity Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the
administrative cases were dismissed in due course. However, as of
the date of the assailed CA Decision, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs
dismissal of the administrative case was still pending
resolution.Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in
Civil Case No. 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with
Catherine Ang Dignos on July 18, 2004.[4]Meanwhile, on the criminal
litigation front, the Office of the City Prosecutor, through
Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated February 2,
2005, findingprima facieevidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
Bigamy.[5]Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for
Bigamy was filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch
6,IliganCity, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]Zamoranos
filed a motion for reconsideration of the City Prosecutors February
2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before the RTC,
Branch 6,IliganCity, were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005,
the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of
Iligan City at the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos
motion for reconsideration and dismissing the charge of Bigamy
against Zamoranos.[7]Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for
reconsideration of the April 29, 2005 resolution of the City
Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution dated August 15,
2005.[8]Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before the
Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his
criminal complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]In yet another
turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on February 7, 2006,
issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review and
reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the
City Prosecutor.[10]Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion
and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1)for
Reconsideration; (2)to Hold in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case;
and (3)to Hold in Abeyance or Quash Warrant of Arrest, respectively
dated February 20, 2006 and February 24, 2006, before the Secretary
of Justice.[11]Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin motions were
denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
2006.[12]Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her
previous motions, was likewise denied.On the other civil litigation
front on the Declaration of a Void Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, rendered a decision in
favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, found that Zamoranos
and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their
marriage, whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of thePhilippines:From the foregoing uncontroverted
facts, the Court finds that the allegation of [Pacasum] to the
effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on December 28, 1992 is a
bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage
between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced. The previous
marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long been
terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce
byTalaqwas entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in
accordance with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and
consequently thereof, [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry.
Moreover, the second marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her
first husband Jesus de Guzman under the Family Code on July 30,
1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does not
modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered
into by them under PD 1083.Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and
[Zamoranos], their second marriage on December 28, 1992 under the
Family Code does not in any way modify, alter or change the
validity of the first marriage on December 20, 1989 entered into by
[Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under PD 1083, as amended. In fact,
according to Ghazali, one of the renowned Muslim author and jurist
in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence and concurred in by retired
Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and also a Professor on
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of combined marriage[s],
the first marriage is to be considered valid and effective as
between the parties while the second marriage is merely ceremonial,
being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the divorce
byTalaqdissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her first
husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x.Article 13,
Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, provides x
x x:ApplicationThe provisions of this title shall apply to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and
divorce of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,]
shall be governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall
be properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sharia Circuit Court.Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the
Muslim code, provides x x x:Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:x x x x2. All civil
actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have
been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes
relating to:a)Marriage;b)Divorce recognized under this Code;x x x
xThe above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent
jurisdiction with any civil courts or other courts of law. And any
divorce proceeding undertaken before theShari[a] Court is valid,
recognized, binding and sufficient divorce proceedings.Moreover,
the instant case is one of the several cases filed by [Pacasum]
against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for
immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which
were all similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and
simple harassment.In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court
is of the considered view and so hold that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the above-entitled case for
annulment of marriage entered into under PD 1083, x x x. It is the
Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original
jurisdiction.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative
defenses which are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby
granted.The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.SO ORDERED.[13]On separate appeals, the CA and the
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 6249 by the
RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the
Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory and was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.[14]In the meantime,
on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, upon motion of
Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for
Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15]Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a
Motion to Quash the Information, arguing that the RTC, Branch
6,IliganCity, had no jurisdiction over her person and over the
offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the
decision of the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, in Civil Case No. 6249
categorically declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the
mootness of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of
the RPC provision on Bigamy to her marriage to Pacasum. In all,
Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. 06-12305 ought to be
dismissed.[16]On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity,
denied Zamoranos Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion
for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied.[17]Undaunted,
Zamoranos filed a petition forcertiorarifor the nullification and
reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch
6,IliganCity. As previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos
petition. The CA dwelt on the propriety of a petition
forcertiorarito assail the denial of a Motion to Quash the
Information:A petition forcertiorarialleging grave abuse of
discretion is an extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to
extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is
wholly void. The aim ofcertiorariis to keep the inferior court
within the parameters of its jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of
discretion may be imputed to a court on the basis alone of an
alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. To prosper, a
petition forcertiorarimust clearly demonstrate that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it
of its very power to dispense justice.Simply put, in a petition
forcertiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is narrow in
scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It
is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its
competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined as one in
which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where
the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.x x x xIn the present case, [w]e have circumspectly
examined [Zamoranos] Motion to Quash Information and the action
taken by the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and
[w]e found nothing that may constitute as grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated
December 21, 2009, which first denied [Zamoranos] [M]otion to
[Q]uash Information meticulously explained the factual and legal
basis for the denial of the issues raised by [Zamoranos] in said
motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6,IliganCitys] stance in upholding
the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and taking cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the bounds of its
jurisdiction. Even assumingarguendothat the denial of petitioners
motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18]Interestingly, even Pacasum
was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of Zamoranos petition
forcertiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by Zamoranos and
Pacasum.We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases,
filed by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908,
respectively, which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon
motion of counsel for Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and
superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos to withdraw her petition in
G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R. No. 193902 to
remain.Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to
ignore the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, and
affirmed by the CA and this Court, to wit:1.Zamoranos is a Muslim
and was validly married to another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic
rites;2.Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil
rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the
ambit of P.D. No. 1083;3.Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos
divorce bytalaqto De Guzman severed their marriage
ties;4.Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce
of [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are]
governed by the Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit
Court.5.Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic
rites; and6.On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC,
Branch 6,IliganCity, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case for declaration of nullity of marriage entered into under P.D.
No. 1083 because it is the Sharia Circuit Court that has original
jurisdiction over the subject matter.For his part, Pacasum,
although he agrees with the dismissal of Zamoranos petition, raises
a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of the CA. Pacasum
vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was previously
married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a
second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.
We impale the foregoing issues into the following:1.Whether the
CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition forcertiorari;
and2.Whether the RTCs, Branch 2,IliganCityand the CAs separate
factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct.As a
rule,certiorarilies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[19]The writ ofcertiorariserves to keep an inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of
courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to
perform.[20]The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar,
is not appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the
subject of an appeal.[21]Moreover, it is settled that a special
civil action forcertiorariand prohibition is not the proper remedy
to assail the denial of amotion to quash an information. The
established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order
is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith tocertiorarior
prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when
an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the
manner authorized by law.[22]However, on a number of occasions, we
have recognized that in certain situations,certiorariis considered
an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order,
specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have recognized
the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court
issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and
substantial justice;[23](d) to promote public welfare and public
policy;[24]and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the
consideration thereof.[25]The first four of the foregoing
exceptions occur in this instance.Contrary to the asseverations of
the CA, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, committed an error of
jurisdiction, not simply an error of judgment, in denying Zamoranos
motion to quash.First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by
Zamoranos on the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch
2,IliganCity, which heard the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by Pacasum on the ground that his marriage to
Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, the decision of
which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity,
dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil
courts. The RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, declared that it was the
Sharia Circuit Court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter
thereof.Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the
principle ofres judicata. The provision reads:SEC. 47.Effect of
judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of thePhilippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:(a)In case
of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the
estate of a deceased person,or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or
his relationship to another,the judgment or final order is
conclusiveupon the title to the thing, the will or administration,
or the condition,status or relationship of the person; however, the
probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only beprima facieevidence of the death of the testator or
intestate.The requisites forres judicataor bar by prior judgment
are:(1)The former judgment or order must be final;(2)It must be a
judgment on the merits;(3)It must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and(4)There must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.[26]The second and
fourth elements ofres judicataare not present in this case. Suffice
it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity,
was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found
that the Sharia Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the
dissolution of the marriage of Muslims who wed under Islamic
rites.Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, which heard the
case for Bigamy, should have taken cognizance of the categorical
declaration of the RTC, Branch 2,IliganCity, that Zamoranos is a
Muslim, whose first marriage to another Muslim, De Guzman, was
valid and recognized under Islamic law. In fact, the same court
further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman validly
severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented
the following evidence:1.Affidavit of Confirmation[27]executed by
theUstadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, who solemnized the marriage of
Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic rites, declaring under oath
that:1.I am anUstadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as
such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims;2.On May
3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that both
parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of Jesus
(Mohamad) de Guzman andMarietta(Mariam) Zamoranos in accordance
with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan;3.Sometime in 1992[,]
Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to
see me and asked my assistance to have their marriage and the
subsequentTalaqby the wife, which divorce became irrevocable
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
registered [by] the Sharia Circuit Court in the province of
Basilan; and, after I was convinced that their divorce was in
order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of [C]ourt of the Sharia
Circuit Court;4.Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent
divorce were in accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of
Court registered their documents;5.In June of 1993, the old Capitol
building, where the Sharia Circuit Court was housed, was razed to
the ground; and, I found out later that all the records, effects
and office equipments of the Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost
[in] the fire;6.This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to
establish the above statements of fact; and7.This is issued upon
the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever legal purposes it may
serve.2.Certification[28]issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge
Jainul), which confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos
and De Guzman.3.Affidavit[29]executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge
Usman), former Clerk of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the
confirmation of Zamoranos and De Guzmans divorce agreement by the
latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in pertinent part:1.I am the
presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the City
ofPagadian;2.The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was
established in the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the
Honorable Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was
then the First Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit
Court;3.The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of
Basilan was housed at the oldCapitolBuilding, in the City
ofIsabela,Basilan,Philippines;4.As the Clerk of Court of the
Sharias Circuit Court since 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr.
Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman, who is a province mate of mine in
Basilan, and his former wife, Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly
asked for the confirmation of their Talaq, by the wife; which
divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1083;5.In June of 1993, all the records of
the Sharias Circuit Court were lost by reason of the fire that
gutted down the oldCapitolBuildingin the City ofIsabela;6.This is
executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the above
statements of fact.From the foregoing declarations of all three
persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court, it is
evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De
Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the nature, consequences,
and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.True,
the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch
6,IliganCity, is correct when it declared that:The Regional Trial
Courts are vested the exclusive and original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. 129] The Code
of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created theShariaDistrict Courts
andShariaCircuit Courts with limited jurisdiction. Neither court
was vested jurisdiction over criminal prosecution of violations of
the Revised Penal Code. There is nothing in PD 1083 that divested
the Regional Trial Courts of its jurisdiction to try and decide
cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction over this
case.[30]Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal
cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on
Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to
De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously far from the
truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been
apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, and
the CA.The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the
accused contracting a second marriage while a prior valid one still
subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC,
Branch 6,IliganCity, should havesuspendedtheproceedings until
Pacasum had litigated the validity of
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit
Court and had successfully shown that it had not been dissolved
despite the divorce bytalaqentered into by Zamoranos and De
Guzman.Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition
forcertioraribefore the CA when her liberty was already in jeopardy
with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.In a
pluralist society such as that which exists in thePhilippines, P.D.
No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to
promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their
customs, traditions, beliefs and interests in the formulation and
implementation of its policies.Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply
because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on
Muslim Filipinos.Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083
provides:TITLE II.CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF
TERMSArticle 3.Conflict of provisions.(1)In case of conflict
between any provision of this Code and laws of general application,
the former shall prevail.(2)Should the conflict be between any
provision of this Code and special laws or laws of local
application, the latter shall be liberally construed in order to
carry out the former.(3)The provisions of this Code shall be
applicable only to Muslims and nothing herein shall be construed to
operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim.In Justice Jainal Rasul
and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Muslim Code of thePhilippines, the two experts on the subject
matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon:The first provision
refers to a situation where in case of conflict between any
provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code
shall prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision
on bigamy under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general
application and Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage,
the latter shall prevail, in the sense that as long as the
subsequent marriage is solemnized in accordance with the Muslim
Code, the provision of the Revised Penal Code on bigamy will not
apply. The second provision refers to a conflict between the
provision of this Code which is a special law and another special
law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally
construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31]On
Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083
provides:TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCEChapter OneAPPLICABILITY
CLAUSEArticle 13.Application. (1) The provisions of this Title
shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
in any part of thePhilippines.(2) In case of marriage between a
Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim
law or this Code, the Civil Code of thePhilippinesshall apply.x x x
x
Chapter TwoMARRIAGE (NIKAH)Section 1.Requisites of Marriage.x x
x xSection 3.Subsequent Marriagesx x x xArticle 29.By divorcee.(1)
No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has
observed an idda of three monthly courses counted from the date of
divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce,
she may remarry only after delivery.x x x xChapter ThreeDIVORCE
(TALAQ)Section 1.Nature and FormArticle 45.Definition and forms.
Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in
accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion
of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may
be effected by:(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);x
x x xArticle 46.Divorce by talaq.(1) A divorce by talaq may be
effected by the husband in a single repudiation of his wife during
her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within which he has totally
abstained from carnal relation with her. Any number of repudiations
made during one tular shall constitute only one repudiation and
shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the prescribed
idda.(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or
second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within
the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a
new contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation
shall become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).x x x xArticle
54.Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as
soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following
effects:(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may
contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;(b) The
spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;(c) The
custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article
78 of this Code;(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the
husband her whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after
the consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected
before its consummation;(e) The husband shall not be discharged
from his obligation to give support in accordance with Article 67;
and(f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage
settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.For our edification,
we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis Commentaries
and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of thePhilippines:If both
parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code or
Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to
it, the marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil
marriage rites whichever comes first is the validating rite and the
second rite is merely ceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as
both parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect,
two situations will arise, in the application of this Muslim Code
or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and when the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s] when the
Civil Code of thePhilippineswill govern the marriage and divorce of
the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]Moreover, the two
experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of the
effects of irrevocabletalaq, as well as other kinds of divorce,
refers to severance of matrimonial bond,entitling one to
remarry.[33]It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce
from De Guzman, as confirmed by anUstadzand Judge Jainul of the
Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid,
and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently,
the RTC, Branch 6,IliganCity, is without jurisdiction to try
Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R.
No. 193902 isGRANTED.The petition in G.R. No. 194075 isDENIED.The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN
isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy isGRANTED.SO
ORDERED.ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate JusticeWE
CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeChairpersonDIOSDADO M.
PERALTAAssociate JusticeROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice
JOSE CATRALMENDOZAAssociate JusticeA T T E S T A T I O NI attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate
JusticeChairperson, Second DivisionC E R T I F I C A T I O
NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.RENATO C. CORONAChief JusticeRepublic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 174975 January
20, 2009LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH
MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN,Petitioners,vs.SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH
SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER,Respondents.D E C I S I O
NPUNO,C.J.:This Petition forCertiorariand Prohibition seeks to set
aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia
Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061and September
21, 2006.2On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman
Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3Petitioners Alejandro
Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor
Montaer-Dalupan are their children.4On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died.5On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling
Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both
Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Sharia District Court.6The said complaint was
entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M. Disangcopan v.
the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa
Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and
Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action
No. 7-05."7In the said complaint, private respondents made the
following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr.
died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3)
petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling
Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated
value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the
decedent.8Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court
to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the
estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator
for the estate of the decedent.9Petitioners filed an Answer with a
Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia
District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2)
private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket
fees; and (3) private respondents complaint is barred by
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen
Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the
Family Code.10On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court
dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court
held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the
estate of deceased Muslims.11On December 12, 2005, private
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12On December 28,
2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing.13On January 17, 2006, the Sharia
District Court denied petitioners opposition.14Despite finding that
the said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the
district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were
notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance
of the said motion.15The Sharia District Court also reset the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16In its first assailed
order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered
its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.17The district court
allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.18In its
second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District
Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits,
adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19Seeking
recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following
issues:I.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS
JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND
NON-MUSLIMS.II.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON
WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.III.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID
NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING
FEES.IV.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH
WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF
HEARING."V.RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY
REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS
RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION
PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26,
1995.In their Comment to the Petition forCertiorari, private
respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the
opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent
is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has
jurisdiction.20Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
MuslimsPetitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District
Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether
the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this
argument is the premise that there has already been a determination
resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a
Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the
purpose of resolving this issue.Article 143(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims:ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1)
The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:x x x x(b) All cases involving disposition,
distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims,
probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature
or the aggregate value of the property.The determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments
and character of the relief sought in the complaint or
petition.21The designation given by parties to their own pleadings
does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the
said designation. Rather than rely on "afalsa descriptioor
defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments
of the pleadings."22Although private respondents designated the
pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a "Complaint"
for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution
of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim,23such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death
as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition
also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so
far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the
properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties
sought to be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the
decedent.24These include the following: (1) the prayer for the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the
appointment of an administrator of the said estate.We cannot agree
with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does
not have jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation in
their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and
its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in
an answer25or a motion to dismiss.26Otherwise, jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely on the defendant27or result in having "a
case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed
by simple stratagem.28Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction
which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court
to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."29The same rationale
applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30In the case at bar,
the Sharia District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply
because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the
deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has
jurisdiction, which requires ana prioridetermination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court
determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district
court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.Special
ProceedingsThe underlying assumption in petitioners second
argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is
an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the courta quo.
Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before
the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either
as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a
special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the
courta quoare for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which
is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has
applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.31In a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement,
and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the
fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedents heirs, which would allow them to exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32Here, the respondents seek to establish
the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for
private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.Petitioners argument,
that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action33applies to a special proceeding
such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced.
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a
civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong"34necessarily has definite adverse
parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35On the other
hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a
status, right, or a particular fact,"36has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar,
it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued
for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of
the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all
the assets of the estate,37pay its liabilities,38and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.39Docket FeesPetitioners
third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for
non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to
private respondents petition in the proceeding before the courta
quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate
as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid
as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly
assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid
the correct assessment of the docket fees.Filing the appropriate
initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees
vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.40If
the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the
docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of
court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies
with the same clerk of court.41In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a
partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of
the docket fees.42As "every citizen has the right to assume and
trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties
knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law," the
party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts
insufficient assessment.43However, the party concerned will be
required to pay the deficiency.44In the case at bar, petitioners
did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees.
Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be
no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the
docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.Exception to
Notice of HearingPetitioners fourth argument, that private
respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District
Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as
the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an
exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written
motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the
notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45The Rules also provide
that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof."46However, the Rules allow
a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the]
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding."47Moreover, this Court has upheld a
liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing
in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final
and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein."48In these exceptional cases, the Court
considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.49The case at bar falls under this exception. To
deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of
the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its
inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation
simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will
result in a miscarriage of justice.In addition, the present case
calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court
has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is
where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not
affected.50The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with
procedural due process,51for the court to determine whether the
adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not
fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.52In
probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard."53In the case at bar, as evident from the
Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners
counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in
question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to
study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition
to the same. Since the Sharia District Court reset the hearing for
the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were
not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a
hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose
for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly
observed.Prescription and FiliationPetitioners fifth argument is
premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent.
In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship,
including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation,
should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54The court, in
its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who
are the heirs of the decedent.55In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District
Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District
Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively,
are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.SO ORDERED.REYNATO S.
PUNOChief JusticeWE CONCUR:ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate JusticeRENATO
C. CORONAAssociate JusticeADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeC E R T I F I C A
T I O NPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI
SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA,petitioners,vs.HON. COROCOY
D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA
ABDURAHIM, respondents.Randolph C. Parcasio for
petitioners.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:pQuestions of jurisdiction of the
Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding
are herein raised.Involved is the intestate estate of the late
Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December 1987. He had
six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty
three (23) children. He had extensive real and personal properties
located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur and Davao
Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are
among those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a
ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and
BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.On 7 July 1989, Respondent
ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and
Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC
Spec. Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court
embraces the province of Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but
not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.The Petition
averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi,
Maguindanao, left various properties located in the provinces of
Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao
Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast
estate, also prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM and the
segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2)
share.Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA,
the divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased:
RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the
decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was
improperly said and that the properties of the decedent located
outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.Finding the Joint Petition
to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the
Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for
hearing on 18 September 1989.All interested parties were duly
represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners,
through counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably
settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and harmony
among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the
following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties
situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties situated in
Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao
del Sul.However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation
and Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of
having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in
Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an
"Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that
ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the decedent and, as such,
there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal
partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid.
Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued Letters of
Administration instead.In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989,
ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was admitted
by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were
presented as documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable
settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were conducted,
commencing on 27 December 1989.On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge,
issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon
the finding that she was legally married to the decedent.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration.In the interim, Respondent
Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the
testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by
Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990.
Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix
was maintained.On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly
the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court
over the real properties of the decedent situated in the provinces
of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.Respondent Judge denied both
Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22
August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for
Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin respondent Judge
Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition
."Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have
dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for
impro