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[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990]
LUZ FARMS,petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
FACTS: On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No.
6657, which includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. On
January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules
and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial
Farms).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the
livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section
3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A.
No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of
the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989.
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules
be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public
respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to
Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. This Court in its
Resolution dated July 4, 1989 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms
prayer the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May
26 and 31, 1989.
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Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989
resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration regarding the injunctive
relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the
amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
ISSUE: WON Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production
and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES. It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A.
6657 which includes private agricultural lands devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry and swine raising in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made
to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply
no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms argument that the requirement in
Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing corporate farms which includelivestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement production-sharing
plans (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are
called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and
ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative
of due process.
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[G.R. No. 61293. February 15, 1990]
DOMINGO B. MADDUMBA and ANITA C. MADDUMBA,petitioners, vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Represented by its Chairman,
Board of Trustees, HONORABLE LEONILO OCAMPO, respondent.
FACTS: On December 10, 1980, respondent GSIS conducted a public bidding
of several foreclosed properties. Included in the properties offered to the
public was a house and lot situated at 3377 New Panaderos Street, Sta. Ana,
Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4749 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila.
Petitioner Domingo B. Maddumba participated in the public bidding and
submitted his sealed bid in the amount of P98,000.00 in Philippine currency.
The bid was subject to the condition that there should be a down payment of
35% of the amount thereof, the 10% constituting the proposal bond with the
remaining 25% to be paid after the receipt of the notice of award or
acceptance of the bid. Accordingly, petitioner enclosed with his sealed bid a
manager's check in the amount of P9,500.00 and cash in the amount of
P300.00 to complete the P9,800.00 proposal bond.
Upon the receipt of the notice of award, petitioner offered to pay the
additional 25% in Land Bank bonds at their face value. These bonds were
issued to petitioner as payment for his riceland consisting of twenty-six
hectares located in Cordon, Isabela acquired by the Government from him
under Presidential Decree No. 27. However, the GSIS rejected the offer,
hence it was withdrawn by petitioner. Petitioner then offered to pay in cash
the remaining 25% down payment "and all future installments." Thereafter,
on November 16, 1981, petitioner paid in cash the balance of the required
down payment.
A "Deed of Conditional Sale" was executed by the parties on November 19,
1981, where the petitioner as vendee agreed to pay the vendor GSIS "the
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balance of the purchase price of SIXTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FIVE & 50/100 (P63,705.50) PESOS. Philippine currency, in SIXTY (60)
monthly installments of ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN & 69/100
(P1,416.69) PESOS. Philippine currency, at twelve (12%) percent interest
per annum, compounded monthly, beginning December 1, 1981."
The first installment in the amount of P1,416.00 was paid by petitioner on
December 3, 1981. When the second monthly installment became due,
petitioner sent a letter dated January 5, 1982, to the GSIS Board of Trustees
requesting that he be allowed to pay the monthly amortizations with his
Land Bank bonds commencing in January, 1982 until the exhaustion of the
said bonds. Petitioner invoked the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act
No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251.
The GSIS Board of Trustees, in its Resolution No. 91 adopted on January 22,
1982, denied petitioner's offer. The board resolved to reiterate the policy
that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted as payment only at a discounted
rate to yield the System 18% at maturity.
In a letter dated February 12, 1982, petitioner asked the Board of Trustees
to reconsider Resolution No. 91. Petitioner reiterated his reliance on Section85 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and further supported his position
with the contention that the policy of the GSIS contravenes the ruling in the
case of Gonzales, et al. vs. The Government Insurance System, etc., et al..
Likewise, petitioner submitted an opinion of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
dated February 12, 1982, wherein it was stated, inter alia, that if the GSIS
accepts the Land Bank bonds as payment thereof, it must accept the same
at par or face value. To accept said bonds at a discounted rate would lessenthe credibility of the bonds as instruments of indebtedness.
In a letter dated May 31, 1982, petitioner was advised by the Manager,
Acquired Assets Department, GSIS that Resolution No. 415 was adopted on
May 18, 1982 by the GSIS Board of Trustees denying the request of
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petitioner. Hence, on August 5, 1982, the instant original action for
mandamus was filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not under the provisions of Section 85 of Republic Act
No. 3844, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 251 effective July 21,
1973, the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face
value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the
bondholder from the GSIS.
HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that under the above quoted provisions, a
government-owned or controlled corporation, like the GSIS, is compelled to
accept Land Bank bonds as payment for the purchase of its assets. As a
matter of fact, the bidder who offers to pay in bonds of the Land Bank is
entitled to preference. What respondent GSIS is resisting, however, is its
being compelled to accept said bonds at their face value. Respondent, in
support of its stance that it can discount the bonds, avers that "(a) PD 251
has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original
provision that Land Bank bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their
face value; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face value will impair
the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity topay death, retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to
its more than a million members, the majority of whom are low salaried
government employees and workers."
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[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA,petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371
or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz
et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestraldomains and ancestral lands which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the
rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted
and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result
transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed
and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.
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[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]
PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL,petitioners, vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein
represented by SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and
GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity as Chairman of Community Special
Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio City, respondents.
FACTS: Cutaran et.al. assails the validity of DENR Special Order31, Special
Order 25, and Department Administrative Order 2 for being issued without
prior legislative authority.- Special Order (SO) 31 (1990): Creation of a
Special Task force on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation
of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region- Special
Order (SO) 25: Creation of Special Task Forces provincial and community
environment and natural resources offices for the identification, delineation
and recognition of ancestral land claims nationwide- DAO 2: Implementing
Rules and Guidelines of Special Order no. 25 The same year SO 31 was
issued, relatives of petitioners filed separate applications for Certificate of
Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) for the land they occupy inside the Camp John
Hay Reservation. -These petitions were denied. Also pursuant to the SOs,
the heirs of A peg Carantes filed application for CALC for some portions of
land in the Camp John Hay Reservation, overlapping some of the land
occupied by the petitioners. The petitioners contend that if not for the
respondents timely resistance to the Orders, the petitioners would be totally
evicted from their land.- Petitioners filed in the CA petition to enjoin
respondents from implementing Orders on ground that they are void for lack
of legal basis. CA ruled that SO31 has no force and effect for preempting
legislative prerogative for it was issued prior to the effectivity of RA7586
(National Integrated Protected Systems), but it sustained SO25and DAO 2
on the ground that they were issued pursuant to powers delegated to DENR
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under RA7586.- Petitioners now contend that CA erred in upholding the
validity of SO25 and DAO 2 and seek to enjoin the DENR from processing
the application of CALC of Heirs of Carantes.
ISSUE: WON SO 25 and DAO 2 are valid
HELD: Not a justiciable controversy. The petition was prematurely filed.
There is yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve. The adverse
legal interests involved are the competing claims of the petitioners and heirs
of Carantes to possess a common piece of land. Since the CALC application
of the Heirs of Carantes has not yet been granted or issued, and which the
DENR may or may not grant, there is yet no actual or imminent violation of
petitioners asserted right to possess the disputed land.- Definition of
justiciable controversy: a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by
a court of law through the application of a law.- Subject to certain well-
defined exceptions, the courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of
a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed
that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its
validity. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners speculation thatthe DENR will approve the application of the heirs of Carantes. There must
be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause
injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before
the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the
petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under
orders from the DENR.
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[G.R. No. 59603. April 29, 1987]
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY,petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E.
DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where
the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be
constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that
the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to
San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the
latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall
be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied
and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA
then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
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The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in
a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding
principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not
be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the justness of the decreed compensation.
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[G.R. No. 127296. January 22, 1998]
EDUBIGIS GORDULA, CELSO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ,
NORA ELLEN ESTRELLADO, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, J.F.
FESTEJO AND CO., INC. AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA,petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES (represented by the National Power Corporation), respondents.
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
573[3] withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting aside as
permanent forest reserves, subject to private rights, certain parcels of the
public domain which included Parcel No. 9 - Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Reserve. They were primarily for use as watershed area. The parcel of land
subject of the case at bar is, by petitioners' explicit admission,[4]within
Parcel No. 9, the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve. Petitioner Edubigis
Gordula filed with the Bureau of Lands, an Application[5]for a Free Patent
over the land. Manuel Fernandez and several others also filed free patent
applications covering other parcels of land in the area. Mr. Antonio Aquino,
Jr., the Civil Security Officer of the Cavinti reservoir complex, sent aMemorandum to the President of the Napocor informing him of the fences
and roads being constructed in the saddle area, more particularly, in the lots
sold by petitioner Fernandez to petitioner Estrellado. Respondent Republic,
through the Napocor, filed against petitioners a Complaint for Annulment of
Free Patent and Cancellation of Titles and Reversion with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners. Respondent Republic, through the Napocor,elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals. On June 20, 1996, the
respondent Court of Appeals ruled against petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are non-disposable and
inalienable public land?
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HELD: The two (2) parcels of land were public disposable and alienable lands
before the issuance, by the former President, of Proclamation No.573, on
June 26, 196. The property was, however, later reserved, under
Proclamation No. 573, as a permanent forest, on June26, 196[9]. Since
then, the property became non-disposable and inalienable public land. By
their very nature or by executive or statutory fiat, they are outside the
commerce of man, unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form and
inconvertible into any character less than of inalienable public domain,
regardless of their actual state, for as long as the reservation subsists and is
not revoked by a subsequent valid declassification. Petitioners do not contest
the nature of the land in the case at bar. It is admitted that it lies in the
heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No.
573 classified as inalienable and in disposable. No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the
state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula, did not acquire title to the
subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his
application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) yearsafter the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the
land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer
open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve
for the public good.
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J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. v. LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION
FACTS: R.A. 2616 authorized expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon
City owned by petitioner and 2 others. Lands were to be divided to lots to be
sold. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional because violative of
equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.
ISSUE: WON
HELD: No person shall be denied equal protection. A judicial being is
included within its terms. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that
the governmental act assailed was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at
the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. Petitioner failed
to prove denial of equal protection. Occupants believe in gf that veterans
subdivision is the real owner. Only when the place vastly improved with
building of roads, infrastructure did petitioner claimed for the first time that
they are the owners.
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[G.R. No. 84647. May 23, 1991]
MARIA ALICIA LEUTERIO,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
BENITO LEUTERIO, respondents.
FACTS: Pablo Leuterio died in San Luis, Pampanga on June 15, 1950, leaving
a large estate consisting of several parcels of land in Pampanga. His widow,
Ana Maglanque -- who had been one of his domestic servants and later his
mistress, and whom he had married a few months before his death, more
precisely, on February 25, 1950 -- took possession of his estate and
administered it.
On July 23, 1957, Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of Pablo Leuterio, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for her appointment as
guardian of Maria Alicia Leuterio, then 16 years of age, alleged to be the
legitimated daughter of said Pablo Leuterio.
On November 20, 1957, Benito Leuterio, a brother of Pablo Leuterio of the
full blood, instituted proceedings for the settlement of the decedent's
intestate estate in the same Court of First Instance of Pampanga, praying for
his appointment as administrator. Benito Leuterio's petition pertinently
alleged that Pablo Leuterio had died without leaving a will; that he was
survived, not only by said Benito Leuterio, but also by a) the children of
Elena Leuterio, deceased, sister of the full blood of the decedent; b) Vicente
D. Leuterio, the son of Gregoria Leuterio, also deceased, and also a sister of
the full blood of Pablo Leuterio. That Pablo Leuterio died a widower; and that
the claim of Patrocinio Apostol, a niece of the decedent, that the latter had
left a legitimate daughter was "without foundation in fact and in law."
The petition was opposed by Ana Maglanque and Maria Alicia Leuterio (the
latter being represented by the above named Patrocinio Apostol). After
hearing, the Probate Court appointed Ana Maglanque administratrix of Pablo
Leuterio's estate.
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The event leading directly to the appellate proceedings at bar was the filing
in the settlement proceeding by Maria Alicia Leuterio on October 19, 1962 of
a pleading entitled "Assertion of Rights,"in which she averred that she was
the only forced heir of Pablo Leuterio and therefore entitled to succeed to
the latter's entire estate, subject only to the rights accorded by law to her
mother, Ana Maglanque.
In respect of this claim, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and
issues, as regards the celebration and the validity of the marriage of Pablo
Leuterio and Ana Maglanque; the identity of the decedent's relatives by
consanguinity, supra; the character of the decedent's estate as being "his
own separate, exclusive properties and, therefore, his capital.
ISSUE: WON the Probate Court had erred -
1) in rejecting (as spurious) Exhibit D, "which is the certificate of the recordof birth of Maria Alicia Leuterio in the Civil Registry of San Luis, Pampanga;"
2) "in not giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of GervacioBagtas and Paula Punzalan who are disinterested witnesses and who areschool teachers at the San Luis Elementary School where appellant MariaAlicia Leuterio was studying;"
3) "in holding that the testimony of Don Sotero Baluyut given in the form ofa deposition appears to be in the form of an accommodation;"
4) in not declaring (on the basis of the evidence) that Maria Alicia Leuteriohas been in the possession of the status of a natural child before and afterthe marriage of her parents * * ."
HELD: "In this case, the Court is not inclined to conclude that there was anexpress desire on the part of Pablo to recognize Maria Alicia as his naturalchild. As previously adverted to, the birth certificate, baptismal certificateand the photographs do not bear the signatures of Pablo expressing hisacknowledgment of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter with AnaMaglanque. Indeed, Maria Alicia is said to have been born, reared andraised in the house of Pablo. Appellees explain this by stating that Ana wasa househelp in the house of Pablo. Pablo has no child with his previous wife,and it is not unusual if he looked upon Maria Alicia as if she were his owndaughter in or outside his residence. Upon these considerations, the court a
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quo was correct in rejecting the testimonies of Dar Juan, Paula Punzalan andGervacio Bagtas, and the deposition of Sotero Baluyut. With respect to DarJuan, Punzalan and Bagtas, the lower court saw and observed theirdemeanor in the witness stand and objected to their vital claims. Withrespect to the testimony of Sotero Baluyut, petitioners admit that he and
Pablo were very close friends.
"What clinches the case in favor of appellees, to Our mind, is the absolutelack of a document or writing, such as receipts of payment of school fees inthe name of Pablo, signatures in school cards, or a letter to relatives orfriends naming Maria Alicia as his daughter, despite the lapse of 9 yearsfrom the birth of Maria Alicia in 1941 up to his death in 1950.
In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that theDecision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed because it was "clearand patent error" on its part -
1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is based onvoluntary recognition," and
2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely onall fours with the case of Colorado et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein petitioner is one forcompulsory recognition and for legitimation."
The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.
It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Courtwere aware of the precise nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicialdeclaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as Pablo Leuterio'snatural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to somelengths to stress the distinction between voluntary and compulsoryrecognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify the exact character ofthe remedy that she was seeking -- whether it be voluntary, or compulsory,recognition -- quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judgeand petitioner's attorney, which culminated in the latter's description of thedesired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense that thedecedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging thepetitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe thata public document is one of the evidence of compulsory acknowledgment." Itsaid:
"There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgmentof a child by the father, made voluntarily; another is the action that should
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be instituted by the child against the father to compel the latter toacknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the statusof a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of thelatter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he isso in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge
him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within theperiods of time prescribed in Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)."
The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at thetime. In fact, it is consistent with the statement of the law attempted bypetitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs. Untaran, 38Phil., 737, 738, viz.:
"The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by avoluntary recognition (Art, 131, civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognitionenforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ. Code; Art. 499,Pen. Code).
"A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record ofbirths; (b) by will; and (c) by any other public instrument. (Art. 131, CivilCode).
"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by anincontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing hispaternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the father,
justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ.Code); and (c) by a criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2,art. 449, Pen. Code)."
It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to haveunderstood and applied the law to the case. As much is apparent from itsdeclaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must be precise,express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whethervoluntary or compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Likethe Probate Court, whose judgment it affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruledthat the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an incontrovertiblepaper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the"giving (to) such child (of) the status of a natural child of the father"conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889. Hence, there was nofactual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition byPablo Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter.
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Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine,conclusive on this Court and are not thus subject of review, specially wherethose findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court. There are, ofcourse, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar.
The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 ofthe present (1950) Civil Code has no retroactive effect. That conclusion wasno doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same Code expresslyaccords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excludingcompulsory recognition for the causes or under the circumstancesenumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all" provision that recognition maybe compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that thedefendant is his father." While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity,may find support in the excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the CivilCode, which gives effect to rights declared for the first time therein, thougharising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided novested or acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there islittle point in pursuing that question insofar as the resolution of this appeal isconcerned.
Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively,the fact is that both the Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected inits entirety -- as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive and spurious --petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her allegedstatus as a natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses theclaim of petitioner to either voluntary or compulsory recognition, be it made
under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her assertedbirth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article283 of the present Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the doorto "any evidence" of paternity in an action to compel acknowledgment,Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence,sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered ina court of law, or strip the courts of their function and prerogative of passingupon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such evidence here havingbeen found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner'sclaim was properly denied.
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[G.R. No. 109490. February 14, 1994]
PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDUARDO C.ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL,ALICE E. SOTTO,petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FIRESTONE
CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, SPOUSESCYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, SPOUSES CARMEN SOCO andLORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, SPOUSES SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA,and LETICIA NOCON CHAN, respondents.
On 11 July 1985, Firestone, Boomtown, spouses Cynthia D. Ching and ChingTiong Keng, spouses Carmen Soco and Lorenzo Ong Eng Chong, spousesSoledad Yu and Yu Sy Chia, and Leticia Nocon Chan filed with the RegionalTrial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro Manila, a complaint for annulment oftitles, recovery of possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio E.Margolles, Virginia E. Villongco, Edgardo C. Espinosa, Lucia E. Laperal,Norma E. Espinosa, Teresita E. Casal, Alice E. Sotto, Veronica Gana, andEquitable Banking Corporation. Also included among the defendants werethe Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of Pasay City.
The complaint averred that the parcels of land in question were registered inthe names of Benito Gonzales and Emeterio Espiritu was issued pursuant toa decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6625, dated 22 July 1969. On 04February 1976, the property was subdivided by Gonzales and Espiritu intofive lots, resulting in the issuance of five TCT.
Months after plaintiffs took possession of the premises, the defendantsdemanded that the plaintiffs vacate the premises. Claiming ownership, thedefendants, on their part, traced their titles from Original Certificate of TitleNo. 4216 issued to the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Ma. Juliana Carlos on 26March 1929 pursuant to Decree No. 35183 in Land Registration Case (LRC)No. 672 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Record No. 30406.
On 04 April 1956, OCT No. 4216 was cancelled and, in its place, TCT No.43555 was issued to Lorenzo Gana and Veronica Gana married to RamonRodriguez. TCT No. 43555 was itself likewise cancelled (on the same day)and TCT No. 43556 was issued, this time in the name of Veronica Ganaalone. On 13 August 1956, Veronica Gana sold the land to PatrocinioMargolles, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 46302.
Margolles subdivided the property into seven (7) lots, each lot beingcovered, respectively, by TCTs No. 379913, No. 379914, No. 379915, No.379916, No. 379917, No. 379918 and No. 379919.
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On 03 November 1972, Margolles sold 1/2 interest in the property to Sto.Nio Estate Management Corporation and TCTs No. 382176, No. 382177,No. 382178, No. 382179, No. 382180, No. 382181 and No. 382182 werethereupon issued in the names of both Sto. Nio Estate ManagementCorporation and Patrocinio Margolles.
On 17 May 1973, Sto. Nio Estate Management Corporation reconveyed itsinterest to the property to Patrocinio Margolles and, again, new TCTs No.410535, No. 410536, No. 410537, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540and No. 410541 were issued in the name of the latter. Subsequently, TCTsNo. 410536, No. 410538, No. 410539, No. 410540 and No. 410541 werecancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. S-17992 was issued to PeltanDevelopment Corporation.
Margolles subdivided the remaining parcels covered by TCTs No. 410535 andNo. 410537 into fifteen (15) lots, each of which was titled in her name, i.e.,TCTs No. S-16369 up to No. S-16383, inclusive. These titles, except TCTsNo. S-16372 and No. S-16373 which were retained in her name, were latercancelled and transferred to her brother and sisters, her co-defendants andco-petitioners in the present case. The transferees Virginia Villongco andNorma Espinosa later mortgaged their own lots to Equitable BankingCorporation.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the genuineness and authenticity of Original Certificate
of Title No. A-S-47, against an overlapping Original Certificate of Title No.4216, was sufficiently established;
(2) Whether or not Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 was issued while theproperty was still unclassified public land; and
(3) Whether or not the claim of the petitioners was correctly barred bylaches.
The first issue is basically factual. Ordinarily, only questions of law may beraised in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is subject to
exceptions, such as when there are compelling reasons to justify otherwise,or when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the evidence onrecord. This case is so illustrative of such exceptional instances.
To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners havesubmitted, among other things, the following pieces of documentaryevidence:
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(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicatecertificates, on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
(2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the OfficialGazette (1927 editions), containing notices of the initial hearing in Land
Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406), instituted by thespouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, covering a parcel of land inTindig na Mangga, Las Pias;
(3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March 1961,in LRC Case No. N-2126 (GLRO Record No. N-6564), denying the registrationof a parcel of land by reason of the certification, dated 26 June 1959, of theLand Registration Commissioner, Antonio N. Noblejas, that a portion of theproperty covered in this post-war land case had been decreed under DecreeNo. 351823, issued on 05 March 1929, in the name of the spouses LorenzoGana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No.30406), and while said case covered only a part of the property in dispute, itdid show, however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Ganaand Carlos;
(4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration Commission'sVerification Committee, sustaining the validity of Decree No. 351823 in favorof Lorenzo J. Ganaand Maria Juliana A. Carlos;
(5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land RegistrationCommission, showing that a decree was "okayed" in GLRO Record No. 30406
(LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for Decree" on "1-22-29"(22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued under the entry "DateDecree Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929);
(6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273 covering aparcel of land in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, surveyed for LorenzoGana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1926;
(7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415, pointingto the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC CaseNo. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos; and
(8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor GeneralFrancisco Chavez, stating that the information and documents submitted tothe Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands and the LandRegistration Commission were not sufficient to support an action forcancellation of OCTNo. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.
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HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to besimply brushed aside. It is our considered view that the appellate court hascommitted serious error in refusing to give any probative value to suchevidence. All that the private respondents could basically proffer againstOCT 4216 are that
(1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious, which must have been the work of"some unscrupulous elements" who could have access to "the Registry Bookof the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal," that explainspetitioners' failure to present a copy of the decision in Land RegistrationCase No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and
(2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid havingbeen issued on still unclassified land of the public domain.
Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section 321of Act No. 190, states:
"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When thesubject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall beadmissible other than the original document itself, except in the followingcases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot beproduced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of theparty against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails toproduce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or otherdocuments which cannot be examined in court without great lossof time and the fact sought to be established from them is onlythe general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a publicofficer or is recorded in a public office."
It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce theDecree is due to the burning of the Archives of the Court of First Instance ofRizal during the liberation of Pasig, in consequence of which all pre-war landregistration cases in Rizal have been destroyed. The respondents ownwitness, Eduardo Santos, Jr., has testified that the records of pre-warregistration cases are thus incomplete as can be expected. The Certification,
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dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara, Acting Chief of the DocketDivision of the Land Registration Authority, states that the pre-war record ofLRC Case No. 672, GLRO Record No. 030406 for the province of Rizal, is notamong the records on file with the Vault Section of the Docket Division sincethe same must have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last
world war. Certainly, the petitioners cannot be held to account for those lostor destroyed records.
The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have askedfor the reconstitution of the LRC case and the decree in accordance with ActNo. 3110 and Republic Act No. 26, or that they could have opposed, orintervened in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) where OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, thepetitioners, it is now contended, should be held bound by the order ofdefault issued by the land registration court. The argument isunacceptable. The petitioners are not covered by the general order ofdefault in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act No. 26 only covers lost ordestroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not extant; ithas, in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on the other hand,applies only to pending judicial proceedings. This Court has heretofore held,thus -
"The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost ordestroyed so that said records may be complete and court proceedings maycontinue from the point or stage where said proceedings stopped due to theloss of the records. x x x.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are notreconstituted, the parties and the court should go back to the next precedingstage where records are available, but not beyond that; otherwise to ignoreand go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarilyignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the greatprejudice not only of the parties and their witnesses, but also of the courtwhich must gain perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then try thecase and decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point orstage are intact and complete, and uncontroverted.
"x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure toobserve or invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It wasenacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court records aredestroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a newcase and starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and
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continue the case. If they fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that canhappen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by thereconstitution law. x x x.
"x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the
expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance and vexation incident to the filing ofpleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that someof the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to requirethe court to again rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and thendecide the case, when all along and all the time the record of the formerpleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are notdisputed, all this would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fairand just to the parties, including the trial court which has not committed anynegligence or fault at all.
Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing containedin (the) Act shall be construed to repeal or modify the provisions of SectionThree Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety."Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3 (aforequoted), Rule 130, of theRevised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule." Hence,even if the petitioners have failed to have the records of the LRC casereconstituted, they are not precluded from establishing by other evidencethe requisite proof of validity of OCT No. 4216.
Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs. Courtof Appeals, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano,
said:
"x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copyof the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the Register ofDeeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court proceedings is anexception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is infact mandated by Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act).Under the Land Registration Act which was in force at the timeOCT No. 351issued, the original thereof found in the Registration Book of the RegisterofDeeds of Rizal was an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respecttothe land covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal.
"Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree No.1425 upon which the Ortigas TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are based. x xx." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.)
The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued infavor of the spouses Gana and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it
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supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private respondentsbase their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141 (1968),implementing LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, LasPias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of which 1,200 hectares have beendeclared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map No.
766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered therebyuntil the reclassification in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in 1929, did not acquirejurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitionerspredecessors-in-interest.
No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention.To the contrary, in fact, is the letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then SolicitorGeneral Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:
"Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedlycovers land within the forest zone. There is no clear-cut proof to thateffect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber ManagementDivision, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply statesthat the tract of land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, MetroManila containing an area of 197,525 square meters as shown and describedon this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable orDisposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as suchon January 3, 1968 per BFD Map LC-2623. The certification refers to landwith an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the relationship ofsaid land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of
99.6157 hectares.
"xxx xxx xxx.
"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation ofOCT No. 4216 is premised mainly on the allegation that the land is withinthe forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D land only in 1968.But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. de la Rosaof the Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does notmake any clear reference to the land covered by OCT No. 4216 and is,therefore, vague and inconclusive."
Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766,Project 13, could be presented, albeit understandably, considering that eventhe records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority (NAMREA) haveapparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.
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In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court ofAppeals (a case to annul a 1912 decision of the land registration court), theRepublic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate of title wasissued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offeredas evidence a land classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in
1961. The Court ruled:
x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic beforethe Court of Appeals, the petitioner contended that when the decree in favorof De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels of land werestill part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case restedsolely on land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance ofthe decree in 1912. These maps failed to conclusively establish the actualclassification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before thisCourt, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservationand alleging that the subject parcels of land are parts thereof. These x x xare insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree'sregularity x x x."
Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides:
"1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, I hereby declare as alienable or disposableand place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for
administration and disposition in accordance with the Public LandAct, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the conditionsherein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in theMunicipalities of x x x Las Pias, x x x Province of Rizal x x xwhich are designated and described as alienable or disposable onBureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968."(Underscoring supplied.)
The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is thenamply protected by FAO No. 4-1141; otherwise, certificates of title issuedprior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.
Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of thepetitioners. Laches is "the failure or neglect for an unreasonable andunexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligencecould or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission toassert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
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party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or has declined to assertit.
Contrary to private respondents claim that no action was taken by thepetitioners until a petition for quieting of title was filed in 1985 by the
private respondents themselves, the records would indicate that upon thesubdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and thesubsequent transfers of the same to the private respondents in 1976, ademand was seasonably made by the petitioners for the private respondentsto vacate the premises. From the time OCT No. A-S-47 was issued to theprivate respondents in 1969 until the demand was made in 1976, only seven(7) years had elapsed.
Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued todifferent persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the earlier indate must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations where more thanone certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificateis entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequentcertificate. The titles of the petitioners, having emanated from an older title,should thus be upheld.
.
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Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 50464, Jan. 29, 1990
FACTS:
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued
by the Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was
thereby issued. The Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the
ground that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable.
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable
HELD:
The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the
Government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an officialproclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not
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confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent
is part of the public forest.
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Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)
Labels: 1986, Case Digest, Juris Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land Titles
and Deeds Case Digest
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and
Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied
by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domainAcme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor ofISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies- NO
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HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant
of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29,
1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisitionThe only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
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Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A whichnot only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well
as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by
EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is avalid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of
the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does
not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should begiven to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure
is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment onthe administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates
against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
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granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
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JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG,
wrote then President Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign
the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson andWoods International, Inc
concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacaang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of
the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990,
then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off
the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On
15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signedthe Consignment Agreement with Christie's of New York. According to the
agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the
eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum
of Manila as well as the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the
custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as
may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be
subject to the provisions of the agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and
observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to
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the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into
the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was
highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in
asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were
historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was
prohibited by law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued
immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction
to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners
had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper
parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and
the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of
Treasury.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are
embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation".
(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public
dominion on which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the
President and Congress.
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(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and
other statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject
items.
(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so,
whether the above Issue warrant resolution from this Court.
Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which
provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject
of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case
is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise
the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue andto be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of
the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions
to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamusto procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public
right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the
validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
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Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in
law. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the
opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed
on exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however
should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on the government without complying
with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just
compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government,
any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their
subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true
owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary
rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to
show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued
pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but
the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to
note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that thiscase should be resolved by this Court as an exception to the rule on moot
and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings and silver has
long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove
is nil, yet the novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition
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deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the resolution by the Court
of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines
on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions
for the benefit of the public as a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual
case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case
must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot
and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before
us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular
date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the Issue raised in the
petition have become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of
the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the"national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural
treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical,
cultural, artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and
important to this country and nation. This Court takes note of the
certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings
and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural
properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural Properties Registerof the National Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is
DISMISSED.
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MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Case Digest
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3
Feb 1997]
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
thePhilippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a closebidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid priceof P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the
MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with
the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy
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of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative
of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and
void.
Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion
call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman
of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other actsand deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and
desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong
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Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10,
second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory
provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc
emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as
mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of
the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated
how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will
fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question
should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien initself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges
and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also
argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that
the foreigners are qualified, too.
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Manosca Vs CA Case Digest
Manosca Vs. Court Of Appeals
252 SCRA 412
G.R. No. 106440
January 29, 1996
Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by
Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the
birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the
Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the
expropriation was not for a public purpose.
Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be
granted.
Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking
is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture
and history of the Philippines.
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MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner
herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in
Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein,
received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of
Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street
will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to regulate the
flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act
No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the
perimeter wall separatingthe subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the
wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lowercourt decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of
the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Streetto public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity
http://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/mmda-vs-bel-air-village-328-scra-836-gr.htmlhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Political%20Lawhttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/search/label/Case%20Digestshttp://cofferette.blogspot.com/2009/01/mmda-vs-bel-air-village-328-scra-836-gr.html7/28/2019 Cases in Natres
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toexercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government
unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be
delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic
Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants
of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area.
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Technology vs CA (193 scra 147)
Facts: Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and
exporting charcoal briquette. On February 16, 1989, they received a letter
from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also
requested the company to show to the office of the mayor some documents,
including the Building permit, mayors permit, and Region III-Pollution of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the
company failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent
Acting Mayor, without notice, caused the padlock of companys plant
premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation. Technology
Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
with preliminary injuction against respondents, alleging that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower court ruled against
the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the mayor has authority to order the closure of theplant. YES.
2. Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse of
discretion. NO.
Ruling:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of
determining whether there is a pollution of the environment that requirescontrol if not prohibition of the operation of a business is essentially
addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry
of Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be recognized
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that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise close the
same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or avoid injury
to the health of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in the letter, called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only
pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the
area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further
orders and it was required to bring the following: a. Building permit; b.
Mayor's permit; and c. Region III-Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an
investigation was made. It found that the fumes emitted by the plant ofpetitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.
Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the
then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, thepermit was good only up to May25, 1988.
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much
less to install any device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to
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the health of the residents of the community. Petitioner takes note of the
plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning
industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to
promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of
the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.