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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964
JESUS MA. CUI,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANTONIO MA.
CUI,defendant-appellant,ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector
L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.Romulo Cui in his own behalf as
intervenor-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J .:
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu.The office in contention is that of
Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui,
andappealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the
intervenor, Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the
spouses Don Pedro Cui andDoa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the
care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate
existence by
legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed
27 November 1925) andendowed with extensive properties by the said
spouses through a series of donations,principally the deed of
donation executed on 2 January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the
founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "such
persons as they may nominate or designate,in the order prescribed
to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as
follows:
Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para
administrar, nossustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si
al tiempo de nuestra muerte oincapacidad se hallare residiendo en
la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino
politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano
Cui no estuvieseresidiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestrootro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui.
Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamenteel HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estosdos administradores,
la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILIpasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
desciendalegitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui,Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que
posea titulo de abogado, o medico,
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o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos,
el que pague al Estadomayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferida elvaron de mas edad descendiente de
quien tenia ultimamente la administracion.Cuando absolutamente
faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, laadministracion del
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo
de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica,Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta
Provincia de Cebu, y en sudefecto, al Gobierno Provincial de
Cebu.
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to
administer the Hospicio untilher death in 1929. Thereupon the
administration passed to Mauricio Cui and DionisioJakosalem. The
first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2
July1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the
administrator. Thereafter,beginning in 1932, a series of
controversies and court litigations ensued concerning theposition
of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the
present case,reference will be made later in this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are
brothers, being the sons ofMariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui.On 27 February 1960 the
then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of
Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them
andembodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February,
Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had
no prior notice of either the "convenio" or ofhis brother's
assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote aletter to the defendant demanding that the office
be turned over to him; and on 13
September 1960, the demand not having been complied with the
plaintiff filed thecomplaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the sameoffice, being a grandson of
Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by thefounders of
the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualificationsto the position of administrator. Jesus is
the older of the two and therefore under equalcircumstances would
be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation.However,
before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to
the one,among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo deabogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo
de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from
the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of
the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
althoughdisbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated
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by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumedthe position of administrator of the Hospicio de
Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the
plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulode abogado," taken alone,
means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the
deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the
administrator, it shouldnot be given a strict interpretation but a
liberal one," and therefore means a law degreeor diploma of
Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by
thedefendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context
the term "titulo deabogado" means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws butmembership in the Bar after
due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice oflaw. In
Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento
dado paraejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de
la Lengua Espaola, Real
Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as
follows: "Perito en
el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, losderechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones opuntos legales que se
le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by
alaw school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does
not entitle itsholder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer orattorney-at-law. This term has
a fixed and general signification, and has reference tothat class
of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear,prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities aredevolved by law as a
consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of
law is under the authority
of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission
requires passing the Barexaminations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk ofCourt, this certificate
being his license to practice the profession. The academic degreeof
Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the
Bar, except asevidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has"successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university,officially
approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose,
however,possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribedcourses may be shown in some other way.
Indeed there are instances, particularlyunder the former Code of
Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone throughany formal
legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession
of "the necessaryqualifications of learning ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that suchpersons do not
possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic
degreeof Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have
established the foregoingtest advisely, and provided in the deed of
donation that if not a lawyer, the administratorshould be a doctor
or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all
these,
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should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those
otherwise qualified. Alawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees ofthe Hospicio shall "make
regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3,
b);shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitutepersons may be admitted to the
institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with
the provisions of the Act;and shall administer properties of
considerable value for all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a
working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
professionwould be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is
not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of
administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is amember
of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3
of the deedof donation, which provides that the administrator may
be removed on the ground,among others, of ineptitude in the
discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moralcharacter.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by
this Court
on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It
is also a fact, however,that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960,
before he assumed the office ofadministrator. His reinstatement is
a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proofno less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts beadmitted and approved by this Honorable
Court, without prejudice to the partiesadducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation
offacts.1wph1.t
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a
great extent in the
sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking,on whether or not it decides that the public
interest in the orderly and impartialadministration of justice will
be conserved by the applicant's participation thereinin the
capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must,
like acandidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he
is a person of goodmoral character a fit and proper person to
practice law. The court will take intoconsideration the applicant's
character and standing prior to the disbarment, thenature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his
conductsubsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed
between thedisbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am.
Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled
to reinstatement,notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, andthe requirements for reinstatement
have been held to be the same as for originaladmission to the bar,
except that the court may require a greater degree of proofthan in
an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41,
p. 815.)
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are
whether applicantis "of good moral character" in the sense in which
that phrase is used when
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applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person to be
entrusted with theprivileges of the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications aresuch as to enable him to
discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the
moralattributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mentalqualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of
one seekingreinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less
exacting than that implied inparagraph 3 of the deed of donation as
a requisite for the office which is disputed in thiscase. When the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions
anddisabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped
out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred
by lapse of timeamounting the prescription or laches. Under Section
16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16,Rule 68, taken from section 216 of
Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one(1) year
after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office
in question as long ago as1932. On January 26 of that year he filed
a complaint in quo warranto against Dr.Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. MarianoCui, the
plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case wasdismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by
the defendant there to thecomplaint and complaint in intervention.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from theorder of dismissal, the
case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil.37,
48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision ofthis Court, but acceded to an
arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued asadministrator, Mariano
Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series
of extra-judicialmaneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare
Commissioner, by letter dated 1February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention ofoccupying
the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up
with anotherletter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken
over the administration as of 1January 1950. Actually, however, he
took his oath of office before a notary public onlyon 4 March 1950,
after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from
theSocial Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already
assumed the positionas stated in his communication of 4 February
1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who,
in an opinion dated 3April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting
another opinion previously given, in effectruled that the
plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the
administration ofthe Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court
controversy. On 4 March1950, the Hospicio commenced an action
against the Philippine National Bank in theCourt of First Instance
of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen
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the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a
third-party complaint againstherein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma.
Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath asadministrator. On 19
October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinionof
the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the groundthat he was relinquishing "temporarily" his
claim to the administration of the Hospicio.
The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6
February 1954 he wasable to take another oath of office as
administrator before President Magsaysay, andsoon afterward filed a
second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216.
PresidentMagsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was
pending in Court, stated in atelegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court maydisregard the oath"
thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and
theother parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the
order of dismissal. Theplaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to
be excluded as party in the appeal and the trialCourt again granted
the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants
thereuponinstituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. L-8540), which wasdecided on 28 May 1956, to the effect
that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the
appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was
dismiss upon motion ofthe parties, who agreed that "the office of
administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ...should be ventilated
in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbentby
whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right
to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31
July 1956. At that time the incumbentadministrator was Dr. Teodoro
Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against himby
plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for
dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by
this Court asmember of the Bar, and on the following 27 February
Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned asadministrator in his favor, pursuant to
the "convenio" between them executed on the
same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of
office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially
after this Court decided thefirst case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60
Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for
furtherproceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of
assistant administrator, allowingDr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action in quowarranto
against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil
Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that theconflicting claims of the parties
could be ventilated in such an action all thesecircumstances
militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule
that anaction in quo warranto must be filed within one year after
the right of the plaintiff to hold
the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an
action against Dr. TeodoroCui after 31 July 1956 because of the
latter's illness did not interrupt the running of thestatutory
period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of
the defendant'sassumption of office in September 1960 does not make
the plaintiff's position any better,for the basis of the action is
his own right to the office and it is from the time such rightarose
that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbentbegan to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
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Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This
party is also a lawyer,grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews
of the founders of the Hospicio mentionedby them in the deed of
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than
defendant
Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the
said nephews. Thedeed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those
appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera
el varon, mayor deedad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera
de nuestros sobrinos legitimosMariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... Enigualdad de
circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente
dequien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a
nearer descendant thanRomulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he
and therefore is preferred when thecircumstances are otherwise
equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of thefounders
was to confer the administration by line and successively to the
descendantsof the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are
named. Thus, he argues, sincethe last administrator was Dr. Teodoro
Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, thenext administrator
must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor
belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the
terms of the deed ofdonation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed
from isreversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the
complaint in intervention aredismissed, with costs equally against
plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Paredes and Regala, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-31429 December 19, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROSCOE
DABAN y GANZON, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Roscoe Daban appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, findinghim guilty of murder, sentencing him to
death and ordering him to pay the heirs ofConrado de la Cruz an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 11863).
According to the prosecution's evidence, at about four o'clock
in the afternoon of July17, 1967 Roscoe Daban, Angel Balasote, Jr.
and three unidentified persons were riding
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in a 1965 Chevrolet Malibu red car with white top (Plate No.
L-19604, Quezon City,1967) which stopped beside a jeep parked in
front of the Philippine National BankBuilding near Plaza Libertad
in Iloilo City.
Right after the car stopped, Daban, who was in the front seat of
the car, pulled his pistol
and fired three or four times at Conrado de la Cruz who was
leaning against the jeep.After the shooting, the driver drove the
car in the direction of the Colegio del SagradoCorazon de Jesus. On
reaching the corner of P. Burgos and J. Rizal Streets, it
abruptlyturned to the right, causing its tires to screech, and then
it disappeared from view.
De la Cruz, on being shot, staggered and fell face down on the
pavement behind theparked jeep. Two Constabulary soldiers arrived
at the scene of the shooting, placed Dela Cruz in their jeep and
took him to the Polyclinic Hospital where he died.
LieutenantColonel Lauro T. Margate, the Constabulary provincial
commander, and his men startedlooking for Daban sometime after the
shooting. They could not find him.
The autopsy disclosed that De la Cruz, 42, had an entrance
gunshot wound in thechest. The bullet perforated his left lung and
exited at the inner scapular region. He hadalso an entrance gunshot
wound in the abdomen. The bullet perforated his colon andtwo loops
of the ilium and exited at the left lateral lumbar region. Another
bullet hit hisleft forearm and exited below his left elbow (Exh.
A). The victim was a forklift driver offormer Congressman Pascual
Espinosa and later of the Negros Navigation Company.
Shortly after eight o'clock in the morning of the following day,
July 18, LieutenantColonel Margate received two telephone cause
from Congressman Espinosa apprisinghim that the car used by Daban
(a nephew of Senator Rodolfo Ganzon) was beinghastily repainted in
Mendoza's Auto Painting Shop located near Senator Ganzon's
residence on Timawa Avenue, Molo.
Margate and his men went to the shop and found that the
Chevrolet Malibu car had justbeen repainted black and that the top
still retained its white color. The black paint wasfresh and the
red paint was still discernible. Margate got the car plates with
No. L-19604from Jaime Mendoza, the owner of the shop.
The peace officers were informed by Mendoza that the car was
brought to the shopbefore seven o'clock on that same morning by a
certain Burton, a factotum of EdwinDaban, the brother of accused
Roscoe Daban, with the request that the car berepainted black
"right away". The car was impounded and towed to the
Constabulary
headquarters.
Found inside its glove compartment was a statement of account of
the Philippine LongDistance Telephone Company mailed to Roscoe
Daban together with the toll chargesfor the long distance phone
calls made through Roscoe's phone number 62-11 (Exh. Lto 0-4).
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Investigation disclosed that the car was shipped from Manila on
the M/S Elcano by D. L.Teruel Tobacco Co., Inc. and was consigned
to Roscoe Daban as shown in the bill oflading dated July 8, 1967
(Exh. D). The bill of lading revealed that the plate number ofthe
car when it was shipped to Iloilo nine days before the killing was
L-7914 '66.
About a month after the shooting, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon
broadcasted over the radiothat he was responsible for the arrest of
the accused in Manila in connection with thekilling of De la
Cruz.
Daban escaped from the national penitentiary on June 15, 1971
(See People vs.Daban, 43 SCRA 185, 189; 68 O.G. 2945). He was
recaptured. But on June 13, 1976,while confined in the Philippine
General Hospital, he again escaped. Up to this time, hiswhereabouts
are unknown. (Note that while at large, Daban was charged with
murder inCriminal Case No. 5655 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for having killed AntolinFerrer on April 25, 1972 in Makati,
Rizal in conspiracy with two other persons.)
In this case, an amended information for murder was filed
against Daban, EdgardoAlfonten, Angel Balasote, Jr., Rafael Velasco
and an unidentified person. Only Dabanand Balasote were brought to
trial. Daban did not testify. Three witnesses declared thaton the
day of the shooting Daban was in Bacolod City.
His two other witnesses testified that the killer was tall, dark
and slender and has nomole on the left cheek. (Daban has a mole on
the left cheek). As rhetorically asked bythe trial Court: how did
they know that the killer was tall when he was sitting at the
timehe shot De la Cruz? The testimonies of the defense witnesses
evoked disbelief insteadof generating credence.
The trial court did not believe Daban's alibi. It gave credence
to the testimony of VicenteFelisario, 38, a bystander who claimed
to be an eyewitness to the shooting. He surfacedas a witness more
than six months after the shooting or on February 3, 1968 when
hegave his statement to the constabulary investigator (Exh. GG).
The trial court regardedFelisario's testimony as sufficient for the
conviction of Daban. It acquitted Balasote.
Appellant Daban, in order to show that Felisario was mistaken
and that the trial courterred in assuming that the repainted car
was the one used in the killing, tried to provethat the said car
was a red and blackcar because its white top was covered bya
detachable black vinyl material (Exh. 2).
Edwin Daban, 29 (the elder brother of the accused), who
allegedly got the car fromthe M/S Elcanowhen it arrived in Iloilo
City, testified that the black vinyl materialconcealed the white
top of the car. Mendoza declared that after placing black paint
onthe red body of the car, it took him about ninety minutes to
remove the black vinyl coverof the top, thus exposing its original
white color. At that juncture, the Constabulary menarrived in his
shop and informed him that the car was used in shooting De la Cruz.
So,Mendoza was not able to complete the repainting of the car.
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We hold that even if it were assumed that Felisario was mistaken
in testifying that thecar had a white top, that error would not be
sufficient to cast doubt as to RoscoeDaban's guilt. Felisario
correctly Identified the car as having a red body and twoantennas
at the rear and as bearing the plate number which is the number
found in thetwo plates surrendered by Mendoza to the Constabulary
officers (Exh. HH).
That car was consigned to Roscoe Daban nine days before the
shooting (Exh. D) andits glove compartment contained the telephone
bills sent to Roscoe by the PLDT (Exh. Lto 0-4).
Appellant's counsel contends that the trial court erred in
finding that Roscoe shot De laCruz. That finding was based mainly
on the eyewitness-testimony of Felisario, a Koreanwar veteran
familiar with firearms, who after his discharge from the army
became ataxicab driver. He testified that he was only about six or
seven meters from theChevrolet car when Roscoe at a distance of
about two to two and a half meters fired atDe la Cruz.
He even testified that immediately after the shooting, when
Balasote, who was in theback seat, saw Felisario looking at him,
Balasote or Dagol instinctively sought cover bysinking on his
seat.
Felisario recognized Roscoe as the assailant because the latter
is well-known in IloiloCity, having been linked to the killing of a
man nicknamed "Sweetheart" and a lawyernamed Garin. Felisario had
seen Roscoe on several occasions and had heard Roscoe'scompanions
call him by that name (No. 6, Exh. GG).
In spite of a rigorous cross-examination, Felisario did not
waver in his Identification of
Roscoe as the gunwielder.
Appellant's last contention is that the trial court erred in
using his failure to testify in hisbehalf as an indication of
guilt. The trial court conceded that the neglect or refusal of
theaccused to be a witness should not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him(Sec. 1 [d], Rule 115, Rules of Court). At the same
time, it observed that Roscoe couldnot escape the unfavorable
inferences arising from his failure to deny incriminating facts(p.
838, Record).
The trial court erred if it based the judgment of conviction on
Roscoe's failure to testify,a negative fact which cannot be
conclusive as to his guilt. The truth is that it convicted
Roscoe on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution which
points to him as the killerwho used a Chevrolet car as his shield
and coign of vantage for consummating thekilling with impunity and
as a means for making a fast getaway. (See People vs. UpaoMoro, 101
Phil. 1226, unpublished and Pendleton vs. U.S., 216 U.S. 305, 54 L.
ed. 491,40 Phil. 1033).
The record does not show the motive for the killing
Notwithstanding that deficiency inthe prosecution's evidence, the
guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
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doubt. He was positively Identified by Felisario as the killer.
Any lingering doubt as to hisguilt was dissipated by his becoming a
fugitive from justice and by the overtures foramicable settlement
of the case for P3,000 made in his behalf by his father,
VictorDaban, Gerson Espinosa and Pascual Espinosa and the assistant
provincial warden(391-394, tsn, April 10, 1969).
The killing was correctly characterized by the fiscal and the
trial court as murder, a cold-blooded assassination perpetrated in
a public place in daytime in the view of severalpersons. The manner
of its perpetration reveals the high degree of perversity
anddangerousness of the culprit.
The killing is qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use
of a motor vehicle. Themeans employed by the accused were intended
to surprise the victim and prevent himfrom making any retaliation
and at the same time to facilitate the malefactor's escapefrom the
scene of the crime. Evident premeditation cannot be considered
aggravating.
There being no mitigating circumstances, the capital punishment
has to be imposed onthe accused (Art. 64[3] and 248, Revised Penal
Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos,
De Castro,Melencio-Herrera Ericta, Plana and Escolin JJ.,
concur.
Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ., is on leave.
Fernando, CJ., took no part.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SOPHIA ALAWI, com plainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court
VI, Shari'aDistrict Court, Marawi City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NARVASA, C.J.:
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Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales
representative (or coordinator) ofE. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari'aDistrict in Marawi City. They were
classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed
for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentionedfirm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.);
and in connection therewith, a housing loan wasalso granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed aletter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract withthe company. He
wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying
you of my intent to terminate
the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company,
as represented by yourSales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by
gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contractvoid ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith
perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized actswhich made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite
acerbic language on the"grounds which could evidence the bad faith,
deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closedwith the plea that
Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, evenas I inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract **. Ihope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated
contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled
by your sales agent,hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of
Villarosa & Co. at SanPedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually wentthrough the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
descriptionof the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had
been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr.
Fermin T. Arzaga,Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of
the National Home Mortgage FinanceCorporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent andvoid his
contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of
his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions
at the rateof P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I
hereby annul, cancel, rescind andvoided, the 'manipulated contract'
entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co.,
Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA
ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab
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initioin view of the attending circumstances, that my consent
was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds
between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in
some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.Alauya wrote three other
letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the
same reasons alreadycited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance ofdeductions from his salary on
account thereof.aHe also wrote on January 18, 1996 toMs. Corazon M.
Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
theChief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions
from his salary in relationto the loan in question, again asserting
the anomalous manner by which he wasallegedly duped into entering
into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996," andbegan negotiating with Villarosa & Co.
"for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and** the refund of **
(his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, SophiaAlawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which sheappended a copy of
the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing
thetypewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1]In that complaint,
she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid
grounds through manifestignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and
established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;"
and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar
may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous,
swindler, forger,manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence
to cloth (sic) his allegations with theessence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies,baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith," and asserting that
all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closedwith the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from
the service, or be appropriately disciplined(sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
Conformably withestablished usage that notices of resolutions
emanate from the corresponding Office ofthe Clerk of Court, the
notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo
P.Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.
[2]
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Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3]in which he
questioned theauthority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining,according to him, not to
"a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an ExecutiveClerk
of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator
or the ChiefJustice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution
was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred
that the complaint hadno factual basis; Alawi was envious of him
for being not only "the Executive Clerk ofcourt and ex-officio
Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
RoyalFamily **."
[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much
less aggressive,even obsequious tones,[5]Alauya requested the
former to give him a copy of thecomplaint in order that he might
comment thereon.
[6]He stated that his acts as clerk of
court were done in good faith and within the confines of the
law; and that Sophia Alawias sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound himto a
housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10
from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5,
1996, Alauyacontended that it was he who had suffered "undue
injury, mental anguish, sleeplessnights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months,a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7]He declared that
there wasno basis for the complaint; in communicating with
Villarosa & Co. he had merely actedin defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that hegave
P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted
with themailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage
PD 26," were typewritten onthe envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of
Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself,and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8]and
as far as he knew, his subordinate
mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if thoseletters were indeed mixed with the official
mail of the court, this had occurredinadvertently and because of an
honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the
assertion that it is "lexicallysynonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightfulclaim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is oftenmistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or
the Maranao term "consial," connoting a locallegislator beholden to
the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did
"is expected of anyman unduly prejudiced and injured."[10]He claims
he was manipulated into reposing his
trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.
[11]
He was induced to sign a blank contract onAlawi's assurance that
she would show the completed document to him later forcorrection,
but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and
follow-ups" hestill does not know where the property -- subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi'sprincipal, Villarosa & Co.
-- is situated;
[12]He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy
from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next
day, she did not do sountil after several months. He also claims
that in connection with his contract withVillarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those
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regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salarydeduction, none of which he ever saw.
[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without
malice, Alauya prays forthe dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious andbaseless
allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean
hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to
Assistant Clerk of CourtMarasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April
22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters bothdated December 15,
1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in
hisComment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation,report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid
letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifestignorance and evident bad faith," resulting
in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing herhonor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia
that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by
gross misrepresentation, deceit,fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and
unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial
to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who
had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the
contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his)
authority and against ** (his)will," and "concealed the real facts
**."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements,
he was merelyacting in defense of his rights, and doing only what
"is expected of any man undulyprejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, woundedfeelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
totalof P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees (RA6713) interaliaenunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics andutmost responsibility in the
public service.
[16]Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the
rights of others, and ** refrainfrom doing acts contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,public
safety and public interest."
[17]More than once has this Court emphasized that
"the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in theadministration of justice, from the presiding
judge to the most junior clerk, should be
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circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times becharacterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keepthe respect of the
public for the judiciary."
[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good
morals, good customs orpublic policy, or respect for the rights of
others, to couch denunciations of acts believed
-- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessivelyintemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has aright of
action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that
right withpropriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue
harm to anyone; in a mannerconsistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; orotherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honestyand good faith."
[19]Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot
justify resort to
vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of
the Shari'a Bar andan officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a
standard of conduct more stringent than formost other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language whichis
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.
[20]As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others atall times, and that his every act and
word should be characterized by prudence,restraint, courtesy,
dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
mightperhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that hehad been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court
has already hadoccasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged membersof the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
[21]While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to thePhilippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of"attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the studyof law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it isthey only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law,"because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusinglysimilar to that given
to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment.His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not
warrant his use of the title ofattorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the
franking privilege, therecord contains no evidence adequately
establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for
the useof excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language,
i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he
is warned that any similar orother impropriety or misconduct in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn24http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn23http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn22http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/feb1997/am_sdc_97_2_p.htm#_edn21
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Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, andPanganiban, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1submitted
its Report datedNovember 30, 1972, with the "earnest
recommendation" on the basis of thesaid Reportand the proceedings
had in Administrative Case No. 526
2of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board ofConsultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Benchand Bar" that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar assoon
as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration ofthe Philippine Bar, after due hearing,
giving recognition as far as possible andpracticable to existing
provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16,
1962,arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition
were orally expoundedbefore the Court. Written oppositions were
admitted,
3and all parties were thereafter
granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
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Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed
significant developmentsrelative to the matter of the integration
of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown
a strong nationwidesentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court
created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled
"An Act Providingfor the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." Themeasure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 andtook effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
SupremeCourt may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the PhilippineBar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standardsof the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated,out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, tocarry out the purposes of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may benecessary for the same purpose shall
be included in the annualappropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Reportof the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on
the advisability(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration.
Also embodied therein are the views,opinions, sentiments, comments
and observations of the rank and file of the Philippinelawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration CourtRule drafted by the Commission and presented to
them by that body in a national Barplebiscite. There is thus
sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Courtmay
decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Barintegration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by theCommission on Bar
Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
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Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entirelawyer population of the Philippines. Thisrequires
membershipand financial support(in reasonable amount) ofevery
attorney as conditions sine qua nonto the practice of law and
theretention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
namesappear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified
Bar) perforcemust include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an
entity withpower to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the settingup by Government authority of a national
organization of the legalprofession based on the recognition of the
lawyer as an officer of thecourt.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justiceand the Rule of Law, integration fosters
cohesion among lawyers, andensures, through their own organized
action and participation, thepromotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to theprinciple of maximum Bar autonomy
with minimum supervision andregulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals
of integrity,learning, professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and
brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence,
law reform,pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to theBench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in
substantive andadjective law, and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
effectively.
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Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it
possible for thelegal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of
Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of
tyrannical judges andprosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the
disciplining and/orremoval of incompetent and unworthy judges and
prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend
itself exceptwithin its own forum, from the assaults that politics
and self-interest maylevel at it, and assist it to maintain its
integrity, impartiality andindependence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and
prosecutingofficers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any
monopolyof local practice maintained through influence or
position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and
deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices
and set uplawyer reference services throughout the country so that
the poor may notlack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are
difficult toobtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education
forpractising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the
professionthroughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum
feesschedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal
research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal
rights andobligations, on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on thefunctions and duties of the Filipino lawyer;
and
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(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful
country-wideinvolvement of the lawyer population in the solution of
the multifariousproblems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may
integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, "to promulgaterules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission tothe practice of
law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court'sconstitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that
"the Supreme Court may adoptrules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397
neitherconfers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislativedeclaration that the integration of
the Bar will promote public interest or, morespecifically, will
"raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administrationof justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issuewhether the unification of the Bar
would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutionalrights of freedom of association and freedom
of speech, and on the nature of the duesexacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion
made by theCommission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its
Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has
been put inissue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the
practice oflaw.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a
privilege,moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer
owes duties notonly to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts,
and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important
functions ofthe State, the administration of justice, as an officer
of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public
interest, it isfar and just that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assurecompliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
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These public responsibilities can best be discharged through
collectiveaction; but there can be no collective action without an
organized body; noorganized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses;therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute tothe support of such organized
body; and, given existing Bar conditions,
the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through arule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the IntegratedBar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not
violative ofhis constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not toassociate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he
passedthe Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is
to provide anofficial national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized andincohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. Heis free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapteror vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The bodycompulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the
duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a
question ofcompelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntarymembership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function
of elevatingthe educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the
end of improvingthe quality of the legal service available to the
people. The SupremeCourt, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating thequality of professional
services, may require that the cost of improving theprofession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries ofthe
regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a
member ofthe Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of thepolice power of the State. The legal profession has
long been regarded asa proper subject of legislative regulation and
control. Moreover, theinherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes theauthority to integrate the Bar.
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2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does
not meanthat the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for
regulation, whilethe purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has
inherent power toregulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident
to regulation, it may imposea membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to pushthrough an Integrated Bar program
without means to defray theconcomitant expenses. The doctrine of
implied powers necessarilyincludes the power to impose such an
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar
is that theregulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interestpromoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required
payment ofannual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on
any subjectin any manner he wishes, even though such views be
opposed topositions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures
towhich said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely
affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to
practice law uponmembership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult
to understand why it shouldbecome unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill thevery purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be
suspect. The objectionwould carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. Theconscientious objector, if his liberties were
to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other
endcondemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right
ofprivate judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and
thecompulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
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Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising
becausealthough the requirement to pay annual dues is a new
regulation, it willgive the members of the Bar a new system which
they hitherto have nothad and through which, by proper work, they
will receive benefits theyhave not heretofore enjoyed, and
discharge their public responsibilities in
a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the
past.Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatorypower by the Court, because it will apply equally to all
lawyers, young andold, at the time Bar integration takes effect,
and because it is a newregulation in exchange for new benefits, it
is not retroactive, it is notunequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issuewhether the Court should
ordain the integration ofthe Bar at this time requires a careful
overview of the practicability and necessity aswell as the
advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the
United States, Barintegration has yielded the following benefits:
(1) improved discipline among themembers of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better andmore meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the
IntegratedBar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5)
elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status
forthe Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge bythe Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to thepublic.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact
expectedfrom the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the
event of integration,Government authority will dominate the Bar;
local Bar associations will be weakened;cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar
willbecome an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its
affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied
by opponents of Barintegration have failed to materialize in over
fifty years of Bar integration experience inEngland, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Barhas
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the
other hand, it hasrestored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energizedthe Bar's responsibilities to
the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration?
The official statisticscompiled by the Commission on Bar
integration show that in the national pollrecentlyconducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar,
of atotal of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have
turned in their individualresponses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent)
voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378(or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital.
Inaddition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and
lawyers' groups all over the
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Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualifiedendorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while
not a single local Bar associationor lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802individual lawyers
who cast theirplebiscite ballotson the proposed integration
CourtRule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent)
voted in favor thereof, 662
(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent)
are non-committal.
5
Allthese clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at thistime.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all thearguments adduced in Adm. Case No.
526 and the authoritative materials and the massof factual data
contained in the exhaustive Reportof the Commission on
BarIntegration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional andlegally unobjectionable," within the
context of contemporary conditions in thePhilippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legalprofession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of ArticleVIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines inaccordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo,Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for
thepurpose of ascertaining the advisability of the integration of
the Bar in thisjurisdiction," the Commission is composed of Supreme
Court AssociateJustice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J.
Roy, retiredSupreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez,
Supreme Court
Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice)
Salvador V.Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito Pascual,
Ex-Senator TeclaSan Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and
Constitutional ConventionDelegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma
(Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W.
Diokno,
Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo
A.Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus
of 53Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in
convention atthe Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on
June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and
VicenteL. Arcega, the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty.
Fructuoso S.
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Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila
BarAssociation.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association
submittedmemoranda in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila
Bar Association
submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
Resolution March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
UnsuccessfulCandidates of 1946 to 1953;ALBINO CUNANAN, ET
AL.,petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio
Enrile Inton forpetitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Juan R.
Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J .:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and
concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953."Under the Rules of Court governing admission
to the bar, "in order that a candidate (foradmission to the Bar)
may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without fallingbelow 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec.
14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946
andthe varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, thiscourt passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of
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only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered andpassed by this court, and feeling conscious of
having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages ofa few percentage lower than those admitted to
the Bar agitated in Congress for, andsecured in 1951 the passage of
Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced thepassing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
ThePresident requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request,seven members of the court subscribed
to and submitted written comments adversethereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override
theveto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions ofthe vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views onthe
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21,
1953 without hissignature. The law, which incidentally was enacted
in an election year, reads in full as
follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONSFROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO ANDINCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED
AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
thePhilippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen,
Rule numberedone hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any
bar candidate who obtaineda general average of seventy per cent in
any bar examinations after July fourth,nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-onebar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-two barexaminations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-threebar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-fourbar examinations;
seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
barexaminations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty
per cent in anysubject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of officeas member of the Philippine Bar:
Provided, however, That for the purpose of this
Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one andincluded as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five
per cent in anysubject in any bar examination after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-sixshall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade orgrades shall be included
in computing the passing general average that saidcandidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
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SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates
filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose
motions for the revisionof their examination papers were still
pending also invoked the aforesaid law as anadditional ground for
admission. There are also others who have sought simply
thereconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the
law in question. To avoidinjustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,irrespective
of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, thecourt has found no reason to revise their grades.
If they are to be admitted to the bar, itmust be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be
appliedequally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions
or not. A complete list of thepetitioners, properly classified,
affected by this decision, as well as a more detailedaccount of the
history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision
as
Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the
law, the followingstatistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by
section 1 of RepublicAct No. 972 total 1,168, classified as
follows:
1946 (August) 206 121 18
1946 (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953 2,555 968 284
TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586have filed either motions for admission to
the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2of said Republic Act. These candidates had
each taken from two to five differentexaminations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,however,
their highest grades in different subjects in previous
examinations, with theirlatest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for byRepublic Act No.
972.
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(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this
Republic Acts is therefore1,094, of which only 604 have filed
petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in1946 to 1951
had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied,while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
had presented similarmotions, which are still pending because they
could be favorably affected by Republic
Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal
finds no sufficientreasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects
on the practice of thelegal profession and the administration of
justice, and because some doubts have beenexpressed as to its
validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned
petitions foradmission on the sole question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing,
on the various aspectsin which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. VoltaireGarcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor
ofthe validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle,
the Solicitor General,Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M.
Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A.Barrios, Vicente del
Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and RomanOzaeta
against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners,
Messrs. JoseM. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitionersCabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. Thelegal
researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of
intense deliberation
for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting,
the preparation of themajority opinion was assigned to a new member
in order to place it as humanly aspossible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar,those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequatepreparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its
authorHonorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade
is thetremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
readingmaterials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up lawsoon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to
1952, 5,236 passed.And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and
of"inadequacy of preparation."
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By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public
interest because it qualifies 1,094law graduates who confessedly
had inadequate preparation for the practice of theprofession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations.
Thepublic interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation
and efficiency,precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law thatshould be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the