[G.R. No. 122166.March 11, 1998]CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE,
JR.,petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and LETICIA G.
FUERTES,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:In a prosecution
for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is,
causing undue injury to any party, the government prosecutors must
prove actual injury to the offended party; speculative or
incidental injury is not sufficient.The CaseBefore us is a petition
for review of the Decision promulgated on June 23, 1995 and the
Resolution promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 18343, finding Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. guilty
as charged.Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, was charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, under an Information dated October 22, 1992, textually
reproduced as follows:[1]That in or about and during the period of
July, 1990 to October, 1991, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public
officer, being then the Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in
the exercise of his official and administrative functions, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad
faith refuse to sign and approve the payrolls and vouchers
representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of
Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due
process of law, thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia G.
Fuertes.CONTRARY TO LAW.Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993,
petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY.[2]After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayan[3]rendered
the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:[4]WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) MONTH, as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and to pay
the costs.Respondent Court denied the subsequent motion for
reconsideration in the assailed Resolution, thus:[5]WHEREFORE,
accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.His Motion for Marking of Additional
Exhibits Cum Offer of Documentary Exhibits in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial is now rendered moot and
academic.Hence, this petition.[6]The FactsVersion of the
ProsecutionAs found by Respondent Court, the prosecutions version
of the facts of this case is as follows:[7]After appreciating all
the evidence on both sides, the following uncontroverted facts may
be gleaned:1.Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time
the alleged act was committed, was the Municipal Mayor of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.2.Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C.
Fuertes, is the duly appointed Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the
same municipality since October 18, 1985.3.Starting 1986, private
complainant was detailed to different offices, as
follows:(a)Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte from
April, 1986 to August, 1987 as OIC Municipal
Treasurer.(b)Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte from
September, 1987 to March, 1988 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.(c)Office
of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1988
to May, 1988.(d)Municipality of Pian, Zamboanga del Norte from
June, 1988 to June, 1990 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.4.In July,
1990, she was returned to her post as Assistant Municipal Treasurer
in the town of Sindangan.She was not provided with office table and
chair nor given any assignment; neither her daily time record and
application for leave acted upon by the municipal treasurer per
instruction of accused Mayor (Exh. G-2; G-3).5.On July 23, 1990,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, presided
by accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB 214 (Exh. 3), vehemently
objecting to the assignment of complainant as Assistant Municipal
Treasurer of Sindangan.6.On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor
received a letter (SB Resolution No. 36) from the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Pian, demanding from the private complainant
return of the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of
Exh. 4 counter-affidavit of accused Mayor).7.On May 22, 1991,
private complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages
(Exh. E) against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of
Sindangan before Branch II, Regional Trial Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45, for the
alleged unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or
approve her payrolls and/or vouchers representing her salaries and
other emoluments as follows: (a) salary for the month of June, 1990
in the amount ofP5,452.00 under disbursement voucher dated
September 5, 1990 (Exh. H).Although complainant rendered services
at the municipality of Pian during this period, she could not
collect her salary there considering that as of that month, Pian
had already appointed an Assistant Municipal Treasurer.When she
referred the matter to the Provincial Auditor, she was advised to
claim her salary for that month with her mother agency, the
Municipality of Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August 9, 1994; 10th
paragraph of complainants Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. G);
(b) salary differential for the period from July 1, 1989 to April
30, 1990 in the total amount ofP19,480.00 under disbursement
voucher dated August, 1990 (Exh. I); (c) 13th month pay, cash gift
and clothing allowance under Supplemental Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in
the total amount ofP7,275 per disbursement voucher dated December
4, 1990 (Exh. J); (d) vacation leave commutation for the period
from Octoberto December 31, 1990 in the total amount ofP16,356.00
per disbursement voucher dated December 3, 1990 (Exh. K); (e) RATA
for the months of July, August and September, 1990, January and
February, 1991 in the total amount ofP5,900.00 (par. 12 & 16 of
Exh. E); and (f) salaries for January and February, 1991 in the
total amount ofP10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. E).8.Accused Mayor did
not file an answer; instead, he negotiated for an amicable
settlement of the case (p. 24, TSN of August 10, 1994).Indeed, a
Compromise Agreement (Exh. A) dated August 27, 1991, between the
accused and private complainant was submitted to and approved by
the court, hereto quoted as follows:COMPROMISE AGREEMENTThat the
parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case
amicably on the basis of the following terms and conditions, to
wit:(a)That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds
himself to sign and/or approve all vouchers and/or payrolls for
unpaid salaries, RATA, Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing
allowance, salary differentials and other emoluments which the
petitioner is entitled is Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;(b)That the parties herein hereby
waive, renounce and relinquish their other claims and
counter-claims against each other;(c)That the respondent Mayor
Cresente Y. Llorente Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all
subsequent vouchers and payrolls of the herein petitioner.9.On
August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. B) was rendered by Judge Wilfredo
Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid compromise
agreement.10.For his failure to comply with the terms of the
compromise agreement, private complainant, thru counsel, filed a
Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991.A Writ of Execution
(Exh. C) was issued by the Court on September17, 1991, and served
[on] the accused on September 23, 1991.11.As shown in the Sheriffs
Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D), private complainant was
paid her salaries for the period from January, 1991 to August,
1991, while the rest of her salaries including the RATA and other
emoluments were not paid considering the alleged need of a
supplemental budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sindangan per verbal allegation of the municipal
treasurer.12.Complainant was not also paid her salaries from July
to December 1990; September and October, 1991; RATA for the period
from July 1990 to June 1994 (admission of accused, pp. 8-9, TSN of
June 27, 1994, a.m.; Exh. E; p. 17, TSN of June 27,
1994).13.Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor received from
the Municipality of Pian, Bill No. 93-08 (Exh. 1), demanding from
the Municipality of Sindangan settlement of overpayment to
complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93 per SB Resolution
No. 6 sent on July 23, 1990.The bill was settled by the
Municipality of Sindangan in December, 1993 per Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9312487 dated December 2, 1993 (Exh. 2).14.Private
complainant was able to receive complete payment of her claims only
on January 4, 1993 in the form of checks all dated December 29,
1992 (as appearing on Exhs. H, I, J, K of the prosecution, Exhs. 6,
7, 8, of the defense) except her RATA which was given to her only
on July 25, 1994, covering the period from July 1990 to December,
1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher
dated July 25, 1994 (Exh. 5).Version of the DefenseWhile admitting
some delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner
sought to prove the defense of good faith -- that the withholding
of payment was due to her failure to submit the required money and
property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayans delayed enactment
of a supplemental budget to cover the claims.He adds that such
delays did not result in undue injury to complainant.In his
memorandum, petitioner restates the facts as
follows:[8]1.Complainant xxx was appointed assistant municipal
treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte on October 18,
1985.However, starting 1986 until July 1990, or for a period of
about four (4) and one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other
municipalities and in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Zamboanga del Norte.She returned as assistant treasurer of
Sindangan in July 1990. (Decision, pp. 5-6).2.As complainant had
been working in municipallities and offices other than in Sindangan
for more than four (4) years, her name was removed from the regular
payroll of Sindangan, and payment of past salaries and other
emoluments had to be done by vouchers.When complainant xxx
presented her vouchers to petitioner, the latter required her to
submit clearances from the different offices to which she was
detailed, as well as a certificate of last payment as required by
COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994).Instead of submitting
the required documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that what I did, I
endorsed my voucher to the mayor through the municipal treasurer
(Tsn, p. 13, June 27, 1994).The municipaltreasurer could not,
however, process the vouchers and certify as to the availability of
funds until after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed a supplemental
budget for the purpose(Exhs. D and 6-c Motion), which came only in
December 1992.3.Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12,
1991 SB Resolution No. 36 from the Municipality of Pinan, demanding
from Mrs. xxx Fuertes the reimbursement ofP105,915.00, and because
of this demand, he needed time to verify the matter before acting
on Mrs. Fuertes claims (Exh. 4).Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had
at the time problems of accountability with the Municipality of
Pinan.She testified:Q.Counsel now is asking you, when you went back
to Sindangan there was [sic] still problems of the claims either
against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan by the
municipalities had, [sic] in their minds, overpaid you?A.Yes, your
Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the Municipality of
Pinan to the Municipality of Sindangan. (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3,
194).4.Petitioner also stated that he could not act on complainants
claims because she had not submitted the required money and
property accountability clearance from Pinan (Tsn, 11, Aug. 10,
1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan had not
appropriated funds for the purpose. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug.
10, 1994).Nonetheless, petitioner included Mrs. Fuertes name in the
regular annual budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a
result of which she had been since then receiving her regular
monthly salary.5.On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint
xxx.Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint, alleging as a
defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies.
(Annex B, p. 3, Petition; Exh. 1-Motion).On August 27, 1991, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement, which the trial court
approved (Exh. B).x x x.6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes,
the trial court issued a writ of execution of the compromise
judgment.However, the writ of execution was addressed only to
petitioner; it was not served on the municipal Sangguniang Bayan.x
x x.Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular salary from
January, 1991 because petitioner had included her name in the
regular budget beginning 1991, which fact complainant did not
dispute.With respect to her other claims for past services in other
offices, Municipal Treasurer, Mrs. Narcisa Caber, informed that a
supplemental budget for such purpose to be passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan was necessary before she could be paid
thereof.Being the municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew that without
such supplemental budget, payment of Mrs. Fuertes other claims
could not be made because the law requires that disbursements shall
be made in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or
supplemental appropriations (Sec. 346, RA 7160) and that no money
shall be disbursed unless xxx the local treasurer certifies to the
availability of funds for the purpose. (Sec. 344, RA
7160).7.Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget officer to
prepare the supplemental budget for payment of complainants unpaid
claims for submission to the Sangguniang [Bayan] for enactment.
(Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994).The budget officer, Mr. Narciso
Siasico stated as follows:1.I am the budget officer for the
Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a position I have
held since 1981.xxxxxxxxx3.Immediately after said mandamus case was
settled through a compromise agreement, Mayor Llorente instructed
me to prepare the necessary budget proposals for the deliberation
and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;xxxxxxxxx.8.Instead of
waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to enact the budget or of
securing analiaswrit of execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan
to pass the same, Mrs. Fuertes filed a criminal complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman under date of October 28, 1991, admitting
receipt of her salaries from January 1991 and saying she had not
been paid her other claims in violation of the compromise
judgment.(Exh. F).She had thus made the Office of the Ombudsman a
collecting agency to compel payment of the judgment
obligation.9.While the budget proposal had been prepared and
submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for action, it took time for the
Sangguniang Bayan to pass the supplemental budget and for the
Provincial Board to approve the same.It was only on December 27,
1992 that the municipal treasurer and the municipal accountant
issued a certification of availability of funds for the
purpose.Petitioner approved the vouchers immediately, and in a
period of one week, Mrs. Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced
by the prosecutions Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were the four
vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes, xxxx.xxxxxxxxx11.Petitioner testified
that he could not immediately sign or approve the vouchers of Mrs.
Fuertes for the following reasons:a)The Sangguniang Bayan had not
appropriated the amounts to pay Mrs. Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30,
42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).b)Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs.
Fuertes endorsed her vouchers for processing, and the Municipal
Accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on
December 27, 1992 (Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and K);
and the delay in the issuance of the certificate of availability of
funds was due to the delay by the Provincial Board to approve the
supplemental budget. (Tsn, p. 43, Aug. 10, 1994).[c])He received on
March 12, 1991 a demand from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga
del Norte, where Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of
P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first. (Exh.
4).Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had some problem of
accountability with the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 18,
1994).It took time before this matter could be clarified by the
Municipality of Pinan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the
Municipality of Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh. 2; Decision, p.
9).[d])Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required clearance from
the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994).He did not
insist on this requirement after the trial court issued the writ of
execution to implement the compromise judgment. (Tsn, p. 23, Aug.
10, 1994).Nonetheless, in the post audit of Mrs. Fuertes
accountability, the Commission on Audit issued a notice of
suspension of the amount of P5,452.00 from Mrs. Fuertes for her
failure to submit: 1. Clearance for money & property
accountability from former office. 2. Certification as [sic] last
day of service in former office. 3. Certification of last salary
received & issued by the disbursing officer in former office,
certified by chief accountant and verified by resident auditor.
(Exh. 2-Motion).12.The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed
against petitioner alleged that petitioner as mayor did not sign
and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for payment of her
salaries and other emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991,
which caused her undue injury.However, the prosecutions Exh. D, the
sheriffs return dated November 19, 1991, stated that Mrs. Fuertes
had received her salary from January 1, 1991 up to the present,
which meant that even before the information was filed, she had
been paid her regular salaries from January 1, 1991 to October
1991.The supplemental budget to cover payment of her other claims
for past services was passed only in December 1992 and the
municipal treasurer and accountant issued the certificate of
availability of funds only on December 27, 1992, and Mrs. Fuertes
got paid of [sic] all her other claims, including those not claimed
in the Information, within one week therefrom. (Exhs. H, I, J, and
K).xxxxxxxxx.Ruling of the SandiganbayanRespondent Court held that
the delay or withholding of complainants salaries and emoluments
was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury.Being then the
sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries
caused her difficulties in meeting her familys financial
obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four
children.Petitioners defense that complainant failed to attach the
required money and property clearance to her vouchers was held to
be an afterthought that was brought about, in the first place, by
his own failure to issue any memorandum requiring its
submission.That the voucher form listed the clearance as one of the
requirements for its approval had neither been brought to
complainants attention, nor raised by petitioner as defense in his
answer.In any event, the payment of complainants salary from
January to November 1991, confirmed by the sheriffs return, showed
that the clearance was not an indispensable requirement, because
petitioner could have acted upon or approved the disbursement even
without it.The alleged lack of a supplemental budget was also
rejected, because it was petitioners duty as municipal mayor to
prepare and submit the executive and supplemental budgets under
Sections 318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government
Code,[9]and the complainants claims as assistant municipal
treasurer, a permanent position included in the plantilla for
calendar year 1990 and 1991, were classified as current operating
expenditures for the same calendar years, which were chargeable
against the general funds of the town of Sindangan.Except for the
representation and transportation allowance, Fuertes claims for
thirteenth month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance were already
covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year
1990.Petitioners contention that funds covering complainants claims
were made available only in December 1992 was unbelievable,
considering that an ordinance enacting a supplemental budget takes
effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein under Sec.
320 of the Local Government Code.The Sandiganbayan also ruled that
the petitioners evident bad faith was the direct and proximate
cause of Fuertes undue injury.Complainants salaries and allowances
were withheld for no valid or justifiable reasons.Such delay was
intended to harass complainant, because petitioner wanted to
replace her with his political protege whom he eventually
designated as municipal treasurer, bypassing Fuertes who was next
in seniority.Bad faith was further evidenced by petitioners
instructions to the outgoing municipal treasurer not to give the
complaining witness any work assignment, not to provide her with
office table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and
application for leave of absence, instructions which were confirmed
in the municipal treasurers certification. (Exh. G-2).The IssuesIn
his memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues:[10]1.Could
accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the
discharge of his official administrative duties, a positive act,
when what was imputed to him was failing and refusing to sign
and/or approve the vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by
inaction on his obligation under the compromise agreement(ibid., p.
19), a passive act?Did not the act come under Sec. 3(f) of R.A.
3019, of [sic] which accused was not charged
with?2.Assuming,arguendo,that his failure and refusal to
immediately sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes comes
[sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions are:(a)Did not the duty to
sign and approve the same arise only after the Sangguniang Bayan
had passed an appropriations ordinance, and not before?In other
words, was the non-passage of the appropriation ordinance a
justifiable reason for not signing the vouchers?(b)Did Mrs. Fuertes
suffer undue injury, as the term is understood in Sec. 3(e), she
having been paid all her claims?(c)Did petitioner not act in good
faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers and implement
the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted
the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the
clearance from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del
Norte?Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to
establish the elements of undue injury and bad faith.Additionally,
petitioner submits that a violation of Section 3[e] of RA 3019
cannot be committed through nonfeasance.The Courts RulingThe
petition is meritorious.After careful review of the evidence on
record and thorough deliberation on the applicable provision of the
Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees with the solicitor generals
assessment that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of
the crime charged.First Issue:Undue InjuryPetitioner was charged
with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:SEC.
3.Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:xxxxxxxxx(e)Causing any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.To hold a person liable
under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must
be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:(1) that
the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;(2) that said public officer commits the
prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official
duties or in relation to his or her public positions;(3) that he or
she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a
private party; and(4)that the public officer has acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.[11]The solicitor general, in his
manifestation,[12]points out that undue injury requires proof of
actual injury or damage, citing our ruling inAlejandro vs.
People[13]andJacinto vs. Sandiganbayan.[14]Inasmuch as complainant
was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no undue injury
established.This point is well-taken.Unlike in actions for torts,
undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or
a violation of a right has been established.Its existence must be
proven as one of the elements of the crime.In fact, the causing of
undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished
under this section.Thus, it is required that the undue injury be
specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.In
jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual
damage.Unduehas been defined as more than necessary, not proper,
[or] illegal; andinjuryas any wrong or damage done to another,
either in his person, rights, reputation or property[;] [that is,
the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another.Actual
damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in
civil law.[15]In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by
Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:Art. 2199.Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has
duly proved.Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.Fundamental in the law on damages is that one
injured by a breach of a contract, or by awrongful or negligent act
or omissionshall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to
the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendants act.Actual
pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except where
the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of
damages.[16]Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make
good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.[17]Furthermore,
damages must not only be capable of proof, but must be actually
proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.They cannot be based
on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation,
conjecture or guesswork.[18]They cannot include speculative damages
which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the
loss or injury.In this case, the complainant testified that her
salary and allowance for the period beginning July 1990 were
withheld, and that her family underwent financial difficulty which
resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her claims.[19]As
regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from January 1991
until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by the Sheriffs Return dated
November 19, 1991 (Exh. D).She also admitted having been issued a
check on January 4, 1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June
30, 1990; her salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30,
1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and her clothing
allowances.Respondent Court found that all her monetary claims were
satisfied.After she fully received her monetary claims, there is no
longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury, there
being nothing more to compensate.Complainants testimony regarding
her familys financial stress was inadequate and largely
speculative.Without giving specific details, she made only vague
references to the fact that her four children were all going to
school and that she was the breadwinner in the family.She, however,
did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the
specific damage brought by such nonpayment.The fact that the injury
to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the
element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages.As in civil
cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on record,
cannot be considered.[20]Other than the amount of the withheld
salaries and allowances which were eventually received, the
prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage
sustained by the complainant.Respondent Court insists that
complainant suffered by reason of the long period of time that her
emoluments were withheld.This inconvenience, however, is not
constitutive of undue injury.InJacinto,this Court held that the
injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was
eventually released and whose position was restored in the
plantilla, was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are
more than necessary or are excessive, improper or
illegal.[21]InAlejandro,the Court held that the hospital employees
were not caused undue injury, as they were in fact paid their
salaries.[22]Second Issue:No Evident Bad FaithIn the challenged
Decision, Respondent Court found evident bad faith on the part of
the petitioner, holding that, without any valid or justifiable
reason, accused withheld the payment of complainants salaries and
other benefits for almost two (2) years, demonstrating a clear
manifestation of bad faith.[23]It then brushed aside the
petitioners defenses that complainant failed to submit money and
property clearances for her vouchers, and that an appropriation by
the Sangguniang Bayan was required before complainants vouchers
could be approved.It said:[24]Secondly, his reliance on the failure
of complainant to submit the clearances which were allegedly
necessary for the approval of vouchers is futile in the light of
the foregoing circumstances:xxxxxxxxxb.The evidence on record shows
that complainants salaries for the period from January to November
1991 (included as subject matter in the mandamus case) were duly
paid, as confirmed in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991
(Exh. D).This means that accused, even without the necessary
clearance, could have acted upon or approved complainants
disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.c.It may be true that a
clearance is an indispensable requirement before complainant will
be paid of her claims, but accused could not just hide behind the
cloak of the clearance requirement in order to exculpate himself
from liability.As the approving officer, it was his duty to direct
complainant to submit the same.Moreover, accused could not just set
aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon himself when he
entered into a compromise agreement binding himself to sign
complainants vouchers without any qualification as to the clearance
requirement.Perforce, he could have seen to it that complainant
secured the same in order that he could comply with the said
obligation.xxxxxxxxxFourthly, accuseds contention that the delay in
the release of complainants claim could not be attributed to him
because the vouchers were only submitted to him for his signature
on December 24-27, 1992; that the approval of the budget
appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan, Budget
Officer and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.As revealed
in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves, particularly x
x x SB Res. No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, both dated
May 21, 1990 (Exh. 5-a- Motion), the Sangguniang Bayan appropriated
a budget ofP5M in the General Fund for calendar year 1991 [the
Budget Officer does not approve the budget but assists the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan in the preparation of the
budget (Sec. 475, Local Government Code of 1991)].Complainants
claims consisted of her salaries and other benefits for 1990 and
1991 which were classified as Current Operating Expenditures
chargeable against the General Fund.It is undisputed that she was
holding her position as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in a
permanent capacity (her position was also designated Assistant
Department Head), which was included in the plantilla for calender
years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. 4-a & '4-b', Motion).In Program
Appropriation and Obligation by Object (Exhs. 4-c & 4-c,
Motion), appropriations were made for current operating
expenditures to which complainants claims properly
appertained.xxx.Verily, complainants claims were covered by
appropriations duly approved by the officials concerned, signifying
that adequate funds were available for the purpose.In fact, even
complainants claims for her 13thmonth pay, cash gift and clothing
allowance, subject matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit J
which would need a supplemental budget was covered by Supplemental
Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the authorities concerned
as shown in the voucher itself.This means that the said claim was
already obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as of
calendar year 1990. xxxx.It is clear, then, that as regards
availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release of all
the complainants claims.The Court disagrees.Respondent Court cannot
shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the complainant who
failed to submit the required clearance.This requirement, which the
complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very
vouchers sought to be approved.As assistant municipal treasurer,
she ought to know that this is a condition for the payment of her
claims.This clearance is required by Article 443 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of
1991:Art. 443.Property Clearances When an employee transfers to
another government office, retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is
separated from the service, he shall be required to secure supplies
or property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the
provincial or city general services officer concerned, the
municipal mayor and the municipal treasurer, or the punong barangay
and the barangay treasurer, as the case may be.The local chief
executive shall prescribe the property clearance form for this
purpose.For her own failure to submit the required clearance,
complainant is not entirely blameless for the delay in the approval
of her claims.Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation
ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such
purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers.As chief
executive of the municipality Llorente could not have approved the
voucher for the payment of complainants salaries under Sec. 344,
Local Government Code of 1991.[25]Also, Appropriation Ordinance No.
020[26]adding a supplemental budget for calendar year 1990 was
approved on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was
transferred back to Sindangan.Hence, she could not have been
included therein.SB Resolution No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance
No. 035,[27]which fixed the municipal budget for calendar year
1991, was passed only on May 21, 1990, or almost another year after
the transfer took effect.The petitioners failure to approve the
complainants vouchers was therefore due to some legal
obstacles,[28]and not entirely without reason.Thus, evident bad
faith cannot be completely imputed to him.Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes
of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE
2ndSeries, 895, 1007).It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or
ill will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA
155, 166-167).Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate
intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause
damage.[29]InJacinto,evident bad faith was not appreciated because
the actions taken by the accused were not entirely without rhyme or
reason; he refused to release the complainants salary because the
latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused to
approve her sick-leave application because he found out that she
did not suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the
plantilla because she was moonlighting during office hours.Such
actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring
employee who studiously ignored, if not defied, his
authority.[30]InAlejandro,evident bad faith was ruled out, because
the accused gave his approval to the questioned disbursement after
relying on the certification of the bookkeeper onthe availability
of funds for such disbursement.[31]Third Issue:Interpretation
ofCausingThe Court does not completely agree with petitioners
assertion that the imputed act does not fall under Sec. 3[e] which,
according to him, requires a positive act -- a malfeasance or
misfeasance.Causingmeans to be the cause or occasion of, to effect
as an agent, to bring into existence, to make or to induce, to
compel.[32]Causingis, therefore, not limited to positive acts
only.Even passive acts or inaction may cause undue injury.What is
essential is that undue injury, which is quantifiable and
demonstrable, results from the questioned official act or
inaction.In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of
failing or refusing to pay complainants salaries on time, while
Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying the payment of
complainants claims.As already explained, both acts did not,
however, legally result in undue injury or in giving any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, [or] administrative x x x functions.Thus, these acts
are not punishable under Sec. 3[e].It would appear that petitioners
failure or refusal to act on the complainants vouchers, or the
delay in his acting on them more properly falls under Sec.
3[f]:(f)Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time
on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter
some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of
favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.Here, the neglect
or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal act, not
the causing of undue injury.Thus, its elements are:1)The offender
is a public officer;2)Said officer has neglected or has refused to
act without sufficient justification after due demand or request
has been made on him;3)Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand
or request without the public officer having acted on the matter
pending before him; and4)Such failure to so act is for the purpose
of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in
the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor
of an interested party, or discriminating against
another.[33]However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of
Sec. 3[f].Hence, further disquisition is not proper.Neither may
this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating his
constitutional right to due process.WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby GRANTED.Petitioner is ACQUITTED of violating Section 3[e] of
R.A. 3019, as amended.No costs.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr. (Chairman),
Bellosillo, VitugandQuisumbing, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009RAMON A.
ALBERT,Petitioner,vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a
petition for certiorari1of the Resolutions dated 10 February
20042and 3 May 20043of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004
Resolution granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit the Amended
Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For
Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).The
FactsOn 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of
the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his
co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in
Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:The undersigned
Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and
ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019,
as amended, committed as follows:That in (sic) or about May 1990
and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President
of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying
the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the
performance of his official function, committing the offense in
relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and
Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue
injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it
appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two
parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate
of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which
Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and
in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property
covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the
NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which is higher than the
loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.4On 26 March
1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan
against petitioner and his co-accused.On 25 May 1999, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following
grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of
law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of
the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial
were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999
finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
is not supported by evidence.5On 18 December 2000, pending the
resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to
Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The
prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition
that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned.6On 12 March
2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following
day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner
who entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution dated 16
April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners Urgent Motion to
Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel.On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
Motion to Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a
Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the
reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment
against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However,
the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the
Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman.In a
Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled
the arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of
the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the
Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.In a
Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the
Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsmans denial of petitioners motion for
reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003
hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with
the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1
December 2003.7On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended Information
reads:The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office
of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D.
SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e)
R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That in (sic) or about
May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the
President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation,
occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in
the performance of his official function, committing the offense in
relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the
Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and
Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident
bad faith and manifest partialityand/orgrossinexcusable negligence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue
injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it
appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two
parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate
of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which
Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and
in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property
covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are
agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the
NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which is higher than the
loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.8Petitioner
opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the
information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after
arraignment.The Ruling of the SandiganbayanIn its Resolution of 10
February 2004,9the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions Motion to
Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan
explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section
3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence"
under Section 3(e), and held thus:In an information alleging gross
neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or
refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging
gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive
element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment
considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert
from the one originally intended.It may be considered however, that
there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of Section
3(e) may be committed in any of the following:1. Through evident
bad faith;2. Through manifest partiality;3. Through gross
inexcusable negligence.Proof of the existence of any of these modes
in connection with the prohibited acts under said section of the
law should suffice to warrant conviction.10However, the
Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of
the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could
still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet
undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of
petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the
prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in
substance.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence
this petition.The IssuesThe issues raised in this petition are:1.
WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED
INFORMATION; AND2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.The Ruling of the CourtThe petition has
no merit.On Whether the SandiganbayanShould Admit the Amended
InformationSection 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:Sec. 14.Amendment or Substitution.--A complaint
or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.x x xPetitioner contends
that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the
information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish
between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent"
arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not
guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the information
may be amended only in form.An arraignment is that stage where in
the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
that confronts him.11The accused is formally informed of the
charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not
guilty. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an
arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside
peremptorily.12The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting
"provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular
Rules of Court.13However, inPeople v. Espinosa,14this Court
tangentially recognized such practice, provided that the alleged
conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express,
informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be
expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment;
otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and
unconditional.15In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner
is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated
13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when
arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is
granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on
accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16In the Resolution of 16
April 2001,17the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of
petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift
Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the
conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to
petitioners itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional
bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk of court; and
written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines. Nothing
on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of
the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down
inEspinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple
and unconditional.The rules mandate that after a plea is entered,
only a formal amendment of the Information may be made but with
leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused.Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty"
with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a substantial amendment of
the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that
under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he
did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was
not required to present under the original information. To bolster
his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes
substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the
accused may divert from the one originally
intended."18lawphil.netWe are not convinced.Petitioner is charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as
follows:SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.This crime has the following essential elements:191.
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.The
second element provides the different modes by which the crime may
be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad
faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."20InUriarte v.
People,21this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be
committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident
bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest
partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination
or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another.22"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or
ill will.23"Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or
self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24"Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the
want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.25The
original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted
with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross
neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand,
alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest
partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence."Simply, the
amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross
inexcusable negligence."Given that these two phrases fall under
different paragraphs of RA 3019specifically, "gross neglect of
duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is
under Section 3(e) of the statutethe question remains whether or
not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of
petitioner.The test as to when the rights of an accused are
prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a
defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when
any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information as amended.26On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at
anytime.27lavvphilIn this case, the amendment entails the deletion
of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information.
Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same
is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to
the accused.28As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence"
would be included in the Information as a modality in the
commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same
constitutes an amendment only in form. InSistoza v. Desierto,29the
Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad
faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged.
"Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the
Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is
committed bydoloorculpa, and although the Information may have
alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the
other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof
thereof.30In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the
pronouncement inCabello v. Sandiganbayan31where an accused charged
with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony
of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely
sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court
held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had
under an information exclusively charging the commission of a
willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the
lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of "gross
inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges
"manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the
commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an
amendment in form.On Whether PetitionersRight to a Speedy Trial was
ViolatedPetitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against
him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it was resolved by the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period
of almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon
reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case against
petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this
recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to
Admit Amended Information was later filed by the prosecution and
granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10
February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office
of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the
complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense
under the Amended Information, in violation of petitioners right to
a speedy trial.Petitioners contentions are futile.The right of an
accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article
III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This
right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured;
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.32A
simple mathematical computation of the period involved is not
sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a
vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.33After
reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of
petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on
the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit
filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the
original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioners
Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in
its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said
delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to
file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by
petitioners co-accused, and that no actual preliminary
investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan
properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner
was in order. Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted
to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have
been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights
of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct
of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is
necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or
sacrificed at the altar of expediency.34The succeeding events
appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial
proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered
vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence,
petitioners contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial
must fail.WHEREFORE, weDISMISSthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Resolutions
dated 10 February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 25231.SO ORDERED.
DEMIE L. URIARTE,G.R. No. 169251Petitioner,Present:
PANGANIBAN,C.J.,Chairperson,*- versus
-YNARES-SANTIAGO,**AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,
andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Promulgated:Respondent.December 20,
2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO,
SR.,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariof the
Decision[1]of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. No. 058 and its
Resolution[2]denying the motion for partial reconsideration
thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the
Decision[3]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ofCantilan,SurigaodelSur, Branch 41, convicting
petitionerDemieL.Uriartefor violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019.Petitioner was the Municipal Assessor of
theMunicipalityofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur. In
1948,JoventinoCorreosdeclared for taxation purposes a .9434-hectare
parcel of land under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3352.[4]The pertinent
entries read:Location:Batong,Carrascal,SurigaoArea:.9434
hectaresBoundaries:North:CarrascalRiver;South:MaximoLevaandBotongRill;East:BotongCreek;West:CarrascalRiverIn
1974, TD No. 3352 was cancelled by TD No. 5249.[5]In 1980, the
previous tax declaration was revised by TD No. 116,[6]where the
entry pertaining to the location of the property was changed from
Batong,Carrascal,SurigaodelSur to (S)Botong,
(B)Doyos,Carrascal,SurigaodelSur.In 1985, TD No. 116 was cancelled
by TD No. 121,[7]where the boundaries of the property were also
changed, as
follows:Boundaries:North:CarrascalRiverSouth:BotongRillEast:BotongCreekWest:AntiocoUriarteTD
No. 121 thus contained significant revisions. The subsequent tax
declarations, however, no longer contained alterations: TD No.
132[8]which canceled T.D. No. 121; ARP No. 93-08-00344[9]in 1994;
and ARP No. 96-08-00349[10]in 1997. However, in ARP No.
96-08-00328[11]filed in 2000, the entries in the original tax
declarationTD No. 3352were restored.Meantime, in
1954,AntiocoUriarte, petitioners father, declared a two-hectare lot
for taxation purposes under TD No. 4642.[12]The pertinent entries
are the following:Area: 2
hectaresLocation:Doot,Poblacion,Carrascal,SurigaoBoundaries:North:CarrascalRiver;South:MaximoLeva;East:BotongRill;West:MaximoLevaandCarrascalRiverIn
1974, TD No. 4642 was canceled by TD No. 1534,[13]and the entries
regarding the boundaries of the property were also altered.[14]In
1980, TD No. 1534 was cancelled by TD No. 243,[15]where Embarcadero
was inserted on the entry pertaining to the location of the
property.In 1985 TD No. 243 was canceled by TD No. 247.[16]This
time, the area of the property was changed from two (2) to three
(3) hectares, and the boundary in the east became JoventinoCorreos.
The subsequent tax declarations, TD No. 270[17]which canceled TD
No. 247 and ARP No. 96-09-00290[18]effective 1997, did not contain
any further alterations. Thus, the boundaries of the lot
becameNorth:CarrascalRiver;South:PantaleonCervantes;East:JoventinoCorreos;West:MaximoLevaThe
above alterations were allegedly committed by petitioner when she
was the Municipal Assessor and Deputy Provincial Assessor
ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur. OnMay 21, 1999, EvelynArpilleda, through
counsel, sent a letter[19]informing petitioner of the alterations
that had been made on the tax declarations of her
predecessor,JoventinoCorreos. She requested that the erroneous and
prejudicial entries be rectified.Petitioner complied with the
request. Thus, in ARP No. 96-08-00328, the original entries were
restored.OnJuly 5, 1999,Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a
letter[20]to the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) stating the
alleged unlawful acts of petitioner in altering the tax
declarations ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte. It was alleged
that the alterations prejudiced her since they became the basis of
petitioners forceful and unlawful possession of the subject
property.The Office of the Ombudsman requestedArpilledato formalize
the charges.[21]She later complied by filing a Sworn
Complaint[22]datedAugust 19, 1999.Petitioner filed his
Counter-Affidavit,[23]to whichArpilledafiled her
Reply-Affidavit[24]onOctober 28, 1999.The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao later filed an Information[25]datedNovember 24,
1999before the RTC[26]ofTandag,SurigaodelSuragainst petitioner for
violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.OnDecember 15, 1999, the
Administrative Officer of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
ofTandag,SurigaodelSurforwarded[27]the entire case record to the
RTC ofCantilan,SurigaodelSur, Branch 41.OnMarch 13, 2000, private
complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to
SuspendPendenteLite,[28]alleging that the immediate suspension of
petitioner is proper in view of the provisions of R.A. 3019 and
existing jurisprudence.[29]Petitioner was arraigned onMarch 14,
2000, and pleaded not guilty.On even date, the trial court
ordered[30]his preventive suspension.The case was then set for
pre-trial and the parties submitted their respective pre-trial
briefs.OnJune 15, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension,[31]pointing out that he had already served
three months suspension. The trial court granted the motion onJune
16, 2000.[32]OnOctober 2, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information.[33]He claimed that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case because in the first place, the special
prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had no
authority to file the information. To support his claim, petitioner
citedUyv.Sandiganbayan,[34]where it was held that the authority to
file the corresponding information before the RTC rests in the
prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, and that the latter exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
The trial court provisionally dismissed[35]the case and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners bail bond.OnJuly 12, 2001, the private
prosecutor moved to reinstate the case,[36]claiming that the
Supreme Court likewise declared in a Resolution
inUyv.Sandiganbayan[37]that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority
to conduct preliminary investigation, and to prosecute all criminal
cases involvingpublic employeesnot only those involving public
officers within the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayanbut also those
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.OnNovember 6, 2001,
the trial court ordered the case reinstated. Since the bail bond of
petitioner had been cancelled, the trial court further ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.Petitioner posted bail.Private
complainant filed a Reservation to File Civil Action[38]which the
trial court granted in an Order[39]datedMarch 15, 2002.She likewise
filed a Manifestation and/or Motion for Inhibition,[40]which was
however denied in an Order[41]datedJuly 3, 2002.Trial on the merits
ensued, and the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
private complainantArpilleda, who testified that petitioner, as
Municipal Assessor, took advantage of his position and caused
changes in the location and boundaries of various tax declarations
ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte, and that these changes were
designed to promote petitioners own interest, thus causing damage
and prejudice to her and her co-heirs;[42]TremyCorreoswho
corroborated private complainants testimony, specifically on the
damage they sustained when petitioner evicted them from the land
they had been occupying;[43]RichardPaniamoganwho, asbarangaycaptain
of Embarcadero, issued a certification thatBotongis located in
thatbarangayand testified thereon;[44]CharmelindaA.Yaez, then the
provincial assessor who testified on the limitations of the powers
of the municipal assessor;[45]SPO2SaturninoCubero, whose testimony
was, however, dispensed with in view of the parties admission of
the copy of the police blotter on the alleged eviction of private
complainant and her co-heirs from the
lot;[46]andCarlitoA.Ladromawho likewise testified thatBotongis part
ofbarangayEmbarcadero.[47]On the other hand, the defense presented
four (4) witnesses, namely:LeovinoConstantino, an employee of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources who testified that
the land covered by the subject tax declarations had not been
surveyed and no title had been issued by the City Environment and
Natural Resources Office;[48]Florida Coma who was once
thebarangaycaptain ofBarangayEmbarcadero and testified
thatSitioorPurokDoot,Pelongbelongs toBarangayEmbarcadero,
whileBotongbelongs toBarangayDoyos;[49]andGaudiosaTolentinowho
testified on the creation ofbarangaysEmbarcadero andDoyosas well as
the existingsitios.[50]Petitioner, for his part, admitted that he
had made changes on the tax declarations. He however justified the
changes, stating that they were the result of the general revision
made in 1978. He also claimed that as municipal assessor, he has
absolute authority to determine thebarangayto which a particular
property belongs. He further asserted that the prosecution failed
to cite any law that prohibits a municipal assessor from making
revisions on (a) the location of the property according
tobarangay;(b) the names of the adjoining owner; or (c) the
boundaries of the property. Petitioner likewise insisted that the
case is civil and not criminal in nature.[51]Petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence[52]datedJune 25,
2003.However, the trial court denied the motion in its
Order[53]datedAugust 1, 2003.After the parties rested their
respective cases, the RTC, onApril 29, 2004, rendered a
decision[54]convicting petitioner of violating Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019.Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
DEMIE URIARTE Y LIMGUANGCO, Municipal Assessor
ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
principal for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this
Court imposes upon the accused the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY; perpetual disqualification from holding public office and
forfeiture of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under
any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the
government.The bail bond put up by the accused for his temporary
liberty is ordered cancelled.Accused shall serve his sentence at
theDavaoPrison and Penal Farm,PanaboCity,Davaodel Norte pursuant to
Circular No. 63-97 of the Supreme Court datedOctober 6, 1997.To pay
the cost.SO ORDERED.[55]OnApril 29, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice
of Appeal[56]to the Court of Appeals (CA), which was later
withdrawn.[57]OnMay 6, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal[58]before theSandiganbayanon the following grounds:I.THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEMIE L. URIARTE FOR VIOLATION OF
SEC. 3(E) OF R.A. 3019 UNDER THE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT CHARGED
(SIC) SUCH AN OFFENSE.II.EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT
(THAT) THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3
(E) OF R.A. 3019, STILL, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON FACTS NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE.III.ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE INFORMATION CHARGED
VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, AGAIN, THE TRIAL COURT
SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO SPECIFY, QUANTIFY
AND PROVE THE ELEMENT OF UNDUE INJURY PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT INLLORENTE V. SANDIGANAYAN(SIC) [G.R. NO.
122166.MARCH 11, 1998].IV.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR.[59]Petitioner averred that the prosecution
failed to allege in the information any prohibited act which he had
committed in the performance of his official duties or in relation
to his public position. He further averred that no mention was made
of the injury caused to any party, which is essential in a charge
under Section 3(e), R.A. 3019; this violated his constitutional
right to be informed of the accusation against him.[60]Petitioner
also claimed that the RTC erred in concluding that he had intended
to dispossess private complainant of their property, since this was
not alleged in the information.[61]He pointed out that private
complainant could not prove, much less impute, any undue injury
because the original entries in the tax declarations had already
been restored.He also invoked the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official function as an additional
ground.OnApril 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC.[62]Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE,
in the light of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds no
cogent reason to disturb or reverse, and therefore AFFIRMS, the
findings and conclusion of the trial court, with modification of
the imposable penalty, such that the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and
ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.The clause and
forfeiture of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under
any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the government is
hereby ordered deleted.SO ORDERED.[63]The anti-graft court held
that all the elements of violation of the offense had been alleged
in the information; the allegation that the appellant willfully
changed the location and boundaries of the subject properties was
the prohibited act, while the element of undue injury was alleged
in the phrase to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs. The
facts that had not been alleged in the information were evidentiary
matters.As to the prosecutions alleged failure to specify the
element of undue injury, the anti-graft court held that the injury
caused by petitioner was not in terms of money but, on the part of
private complainant, the deprivation of three-fourths of her
property. Lastly, the court held that under the General
Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General
Revision of Real Property Assessment,[64]the municipal assessor had
no discretion to change the entries in tax declarations. Moreover,
the failure of petitioner to notifyJoventinoCorreosof the changes
in the entries defies the provision therein that owners should
participate in the revision. Lastly, the presumption of regularity
has been overcome by petitioners unilateral act of restoring the
original boundaries and location of the property owned
byJoventinoCorreos.Petitioner comes before this Court on the
following issues:I.CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED UNDER AN INFORMATION
THAT CHARGES AN OFFENSE WHICH THE COURT ADMITTED THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE AS A VIOLATION OF ANY LAW?II.CAN AN ACCUSED BE
CONVICTED OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019 BASED ON
CONCLUSION OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT HE COMMITTED
LANDGRABBING AND/OR DISPOSSESSING THE COMPLAINANT OF HER PROPERTY,
WHICH OFFENSES WERE NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION?[65]The
resolution of the issues raised by petitioner hinges on the
interpretation of the elements of the crime of violation of Section
3(e), R.A. 3019, in relation to the facts alleged in the
information and those proven during trial. The provision
reads:Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.xxxx(e)
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.The essential elements of this crime have been
enumerated in several cases[66]decided by this Court, as follows:1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial or official functions;2.He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and3.That
his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.A perusal
of the Information filed against petitioner shows that all these
elements were sufficiently alleged, as correctly ruled upon by both
the RTC andSandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:That in 1993, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
DEMIE L. URIARTE, a public officer being the Municipal Assessor
ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, while in the performance of his official
functions, committing the offense in relation to office, taking
advantage of his position, acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously cause the change of the location and boundaries of the
property of oneJoventinoCorreosas indicated in Tax Declaration (TD)
Nos. 121 and 132 despite knowing fully well that in the previously
issued TD Nos. 3352 and 5249, of the same property state different
location and boundaries and also, cause the change of the location
and boundaries of the property of his own father,AntiocoUriarte,
particularly, to make it appear that the property is adjacent to
the property ofJoventinoCorreos, in order to favor his own interest
being an heir ofAntiocoUriarteand occupant of the land subject of
the application of the heirs ofJoventinoCorreos, to the damage and
prejudice of the said heirs.CONTRARY TO LAW.[67]Section 3(e) of
R.A. 3019 may be committed either bydolo,as when the accused acted
with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or byculpaas when
the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is
manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another.[68]Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do
moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or
ill will.[69]It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest
or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[70]Gross inexcusable
negligencerefers to negligence characterized by the want of even
theslightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar
as other persons may be affected.[71]From the evidence adduced by
the parties, petitioner indeed acted with evident bad faith in
making the alteration on the entries in the tax declarations of
bothJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte. The fact of alteration is
shown not only in the tax declarations presented in evidence;
petitioner also admitted that he made the alterations himself.
Petitioner even attempted to justify his act by stating that such
changes were made pursuant to the General Instructions issued in
1978 for the general revision of tax declarations, and that he was
authorized to make the alterations because municipal assessors were
mandated to identify the properties according to thebarangaywhere
the property is located.Petitioner likewise justified his act of
changing the boundaries of the property covered by the tax
declarations ofJoventinoandAntiocobecause of the alleged
instruction that the boundaries should be designated using the name
of the landowner.Paragraph 28 of the General Instructions Governing
the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property
Assessments[72]provides:28) The boundaries which will appear in the
field sheets shall be the name of persons, streets, rivers or
natural boundaries adjoining the property subject of revision.The
technical descriptions of the land to be revised should not be
written down on the field sheets, not only to follow the prescribed
form but also to avoid additional or unnecessary typing costs.Tax
declarations are issued for taxation purposes and they are not
titles to lands.In case boundary conflict arises, the parties can
refer to the titles.[73]Thus, contrary to petitioners contention
that the boundaries should be designated only according to the
names of persons, the provision clearly allows the streets, rivers,
and natural boundaries of the property to be placedon the tax
declarations. Petitioner was aware of the consequences of altering
the entries in the tax declarations, particularly in the untitled
properties. Petitioners bad faith is further strengthened by the
fact that he did not informJoventinoCorreosor the private
complainant of the alterations, including his act of restoring the
original entries in the tax declarations. Assuming for the sake of
argument that he was not motivated by ill will but merely committed
a mistake in the interpretation of the wording of the Instructions,
petitioners act is nevertheless unjustified. We cannot fathom why a
municipal assessor would think that the boundaries of a particular
property should only be designated by persons names. Even one of
ordinary intelligence would know that a property may be bounded by
a street, a river, or a mountain. In any event, therefore,
petitioner may still be considered guilty of inexcusable
negligence.Petitioner contends that due to the prosecutions failure
to cite any law that prohibits the municipal assessor from altering
tax declarations, the presumption is that he regularly performed
his official duties. However, the very Instructions petitioner
relies upon to justify his acts outlines the limitations on the
authority of municipal assessors to revise tax
declarations.Paragrah27 provides:27) Utmost care should be taken
that the fullchristianand surname appearing in the existing 1978
tax declaration must exactly be the samechristianand surname which
has to be carried forward to the field sheets.For obvious
reasons,no transfer or change of ownership of real property be made
by assessors or appraisers in the process of general revision.The
primary purpose of general revision is not to transfer or change
ownership of property from one person to another during the period
of revision but to update or upgrade property values for real
property taxation purposes.However, real property declared for the
first time shall be appraised and assessed for taxation
purposes.Lands declared for the first time shall be accepted
provided the declaration is supported by corresponding
certification of the Bureau of Forest Development and the Bureau of
Lands that the land so declared is in the alienable or disposable
area (emphasis supplied).The third element provides for the
modalities in which the crimemay be committed, namely: (a) by
causing undue injury to any party, including the Government;or(b)
by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference.[74]The use of the disjunctive term or connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as
aptly held inSantiago v.Garchitorena,[75]as two (2) different modes
of committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that
each mode constitutes a distinct offense, rather, that an accused
may be charged undereithermode or underboth.We affirm
theSandiganbayansfinding that there was substantial compliance with
the requirement. The wording of the information shows that
petitioner, in willfully changing the boundaries of the tax
declarations ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte, both caused undue
injury to private complainant and gave himself and his father
unwarranted benefit. In jurisprudence,[76]undue injury is
consistently interpreted as actual damage.Unduehas been defined as
more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; andinjuryas any wrong
or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation
or property, that is, the invasion of any legally protected
interest of another. On the other hand, inGallegov.
Sandiganbayan,[77]the Court ruled thatunwarrantedmeans lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without
justification or adequate reasons.Advantagemeans a more favorable
or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind;
benefit from course of action.Preferencesignifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above
another.[78]From the foregoing definitions, petitioners act of
altering the boundaries of the property in question as stated in
the tax declaration clearly falls under the very act punishable by
Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.It bears stressing that it is beyond the
power of this Court to settle the issue of who, between petitioner
and private complainant, has the better rightto own and possess the
subject property. This Court has no jurisdiction over the issue,
and the evidence presented is not sufficient to make a definite
determination of ownership. Suffice it to state that the alteration
of the entries in the subject tax declarations, especially on the
boundaries of the property, caused undue injury to private
complainant as an heir ofJoventinoCorreos. The alteration
substantially changed the identity of the property. Considering
that the property in question was not titled and no survey had yet
been conducted to settle the actual areas and boundaries of the
properties, the tax declarations constitute important evidence of
thedeclarantspossession and ownership, though not
conclusive.Indeed, the alterations made by petitioner are too
substantial to ignore.It was made to appear that petitioners
property is between theCarrascalRiverand that of the private
complainant. In the original tax declaration, no such property
existed. The new entries in effect lessened the area of private
complainants property, which would have been evident had the lot
been surveyed. Moreover, the deletion of the entry MaximoLeva in
the south boundary ofJoventinoCorreos property was also
prejudicial, since this alteration had the effect of deleting the
property entirely.Petitioner in fact admitted that while he
declared that the subject property was in the name
ofJoventinoCorreos, he was in possession thereof; he later stated
that the property in his possession was declared for taxation in
the name of his father.[79]From this testimony, it can be inferred
that the identities of the properties in his possession, the lot in
his fathers name and that declared underJoventinoCorreos name, are
not certain.While tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of
ownership, they do not constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They
areprima facieproofs of ownership or possession of the pro