G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION,petitioners,vs.HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO,respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment.In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:xxx xxx xxxThat I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided:SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986.By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned.1Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading.SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.2Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part,3and limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local governments.4Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 19825should still govern.Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN,petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CECILIA ALMAJOSE,respondents.Legal Services Division for petitioner.Sumulong, Sumulong, Paras & Abano Law Offices for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:In this petition forcertioraripursuant to Section 7, Article IX (A) of the present Constitution, the petitioner Governor of the Province of Rizal, prays for the nullification of Resolution No. 89-868 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dated November 21, 1989 and its Resolution No. 90-150 dated February 9, 1990.The dispositive portion of the questioned Resolution reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission resolved to dismiss, as it hereby dismisses the appeal of Governor Reynaldo San Juan of Rizal. Accordingly, the approved appointment of Ms. Cecilia Almajose as Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal, is upheld. (Rollo, p. 32)The subsequent Resolution No. 90-150 reiterates CSC's position upholding the private respondent's appointment by denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:On March 22, 1988, the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) for the province of Rizal was left vacant by its former holder, a certain Henedima del Rosario.In a letter dated April 18, 1988, the petitioner informed Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV that Ms. Dalisay Santos assumed office as Acting PBO since March 22, 1988 pursuant to a Memorandum issued by the petitioner who further requested Director Abella to endorse the appointment of the said Ms. Dalisay Santos to the contested position of PBO of Rizal. Ms. Dalisay Santos was then Municipal Budget Officer of Taytay, Rizal before she discharged the functions of acting PBO.In a Memorandum dated July 26, 1988 addressed to the DBM Secretary, then Director Abella of Region IV recommended the appointment of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the petitioner. According to Abella, the private respondent was the most qualified since she was the only Certified Public Accountant among the contenders.On August 1, 1988, DBM Undersecretary Nazario S. Cabuquit, Jr. signed the appointment papers of the private respondent as PBO of Rizal upon the aforestated recommendation of Abella.In a letter dated August 3, 1988 addressed to Secretary Carague, the petitioner reiterated his request for the appointment of Dalisay Santos to the contested position unaware of the earlier appointment made by Undersecretary Cabuquit.On August 31, 1988, DBM Regional Director Agripino G. Galvez wrote the petitioner that Dalisay Santos and his other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular No. 31 for the position of a local budget officer. Director Galvez whether or not through oversight further required the petitioner to submit at least three other qualified nominees who are qualified for the position of PBO of Rizal for evaluation and processing.On November 2, 1988, the petitioner after having been informed of the private respondent's appointment wrote Secretary Carague protesting against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit as DBM Undersecretary is not legally authorized to appoint the PBO; that the private respondent lacks the required three years work experience as provided in Local Budget Circular No. 31; and that under Executive Order No. 112, it is the Provincial Governor, not the Regional Director or a Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.On January 9, 1989 respondent DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA) Virgilio A. Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious considering that public respondent DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements.On January 27, 1989, the petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling.On February 28, 1989, the DBM Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.On March 27, 1989, the petitioner wrote public respondent CSC protesting against the appointment of the private respondent and reiterating his position regarding the matter.Subsequently, public respondent CSC issued the questioned resolutions which prompted the petitioner to submit before us the following assignment of errors:A. THE CSC ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT BY DBM ASSISTANT SECRETARY CABUQUIT OF CECILIA ALMAJOSE AS PBO OF RIZAL.B. THE CSC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CECILIA ALMA JOSE POSSESSES ALL THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS.C. THE CSC ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONER'S NOMINEES ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO THE SUBJECT POSITION.D. THE CSC AND THE DBM GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO SUBMIT NEW NOMINEES WHO COULD MEET THE REQUIRED QUALIFICATION (Petition, pp. 7-8,Rollo, pp. 15-16)All the assigned errors relate to the issue of whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which provides that:Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.The petitioner maintains that the appointment of the private respondent to the contested position was made in derogation of the provision so that both the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding Almajose's appointment.There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies ? This is the issue before us.Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon the Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216, subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code states that:(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law, commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.The petitioner contends that since the appointing authority with respect to the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal was vested in him before, then, the real intent behind Executive Order No. 112 in empowering him to recommend nominees to the position of Provincial Budget Officer is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the appointment process. He states that the phrase "upon recommendation of the local chief executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.The questioned ruling is justified by the public respondent CSC as follows:As required by said E.O. No. 112, the DBM Secretary may choose from among the recommendees of the Provincial Governor who are thus qualified and eligible for appointment to the position of the PBO of Rizal. Notwithstanding, the recommendation of the local chief executive is merely directory and not a conditionsine qua nonto the exercise by the Secretary of DBM of his appointing prerogative. To rule otherwise would in effect give the law or E.O. No. 112 a different interpretation or construction not intended therein, taking into consideration that said officer has been nationalized and is directly under the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary or through his duly authorized representative. It cannot be gainsaid that said national officer has a similar role in the local government unit, only on another area or concern, to that of a Commission on Audit resident auditor. Hence, to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer from the local government unit, he must be primarily the choice of the national appointing official, and the exercise thereof must not be unduly hampered or interfered with, provided the appointee finally selected meets the requirements for the position in accordance with prescribed Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations. In other words, the appointing official is not restricted or circumscribed to the list submitted or recommended by the local chief executive in the final selection of an appointee for the position. He may consider other nominees for the positionvis a visthe nominees of the local chief executive. (CSC Resolution No. 89-868, p. 2;Rollo, p. 31)The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.The exercise by local governments of meaningful power has been a national goal since the turn of the century. And yet, inspite of constitutional provisions and, as in this case, legislation mandating greater autonomy for local officials, national officers cannot seem to let go of centralized powers. They deny or water down what little grants of autonomy have so far been given to municipal corporations.President McKinley's Instructions dated April 7, 1900 to the Second Philippine Commission ordered the new Government "to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which natives of the Islands, both in the cities and rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.In this initial organic act for the Philippines, the Commission which combined both executive and legislative powers was directed to give top priority to making local autonomy effective.The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between presidential control and supervision as follows:The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. (Sec. 11, Article VII, 1935 Constitution)the Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.InTecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 282 (1970), this Court stated:. . . Hebron v. Reyes, (104 Phil. 175 [1958]) with the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion as theponente, clarified matters. As was pointed out, the presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter. Moreover, as had been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice Padilla in Mondano V. Silvosa, (97 Phil. 143 [1955]) referred to by the present Chief Justice in his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." (Ibid, pp. 147-148) Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the President had to abide by the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he could rightfully exercise, the law clearly specifying the procedure by which such disciplinary action would be taken.Pursuant to this principle under the 1935 Constitution, legislation implementing local autonomy was enacted. In 1959, Republic Act No. 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to local governments governments."The provisions of the 1973 Constitution moved the country further, at least insofar as legal provisions are concerned, towards greater autonomy. It provided under Article II as a basic principle of government:Sec. 10. The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.An entire article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It called for a local government code defining more responsive and accountable local government structures. Any creation, merger, abolition, or substantial boundary alteration cannot be done except in accordance with the local government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. The power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically settled upon local governments.The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governmentsThe 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however, is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves a sharing of power between the two levels of government.It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the appointments of Justices and Judges.1wphi1Under Article VIII of the Constitution, nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees, and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's personal choice.The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion are manifest.In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.CitingTocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are SET ASIDE. The appointment of respondent Cecilia Almajose is nullified. The Department of Budget and Management is ordered to appoint the Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal from among qualified nominees submitted by the Provincial Governor.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991RODOLFO T. GANZON,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS,respondents.G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA,petitioner,vs.HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA JR.,respondents.G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991RODOLFO T. GANZON,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.SARMIENTO,J.:pThe petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1The personalities involved are Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals.2We quote:xxx xxx xxxIn her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries He was released only the following day.3The Mayor thereafter answered4and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:xxx xxx xxxThe initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and their witnesses.Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the complainants testified including their witnesses.On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6(Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him7arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party8and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections;9and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.10He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988),11notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases.12He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request.13He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and justifiable"14grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital"15witness was also hospitalized16but that the latter unduly denied his request.17Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them18for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution20no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase21as may be provided by law to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads as follows:Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we quote:Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:Sec. 62.Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.25The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics."26Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code,27a local tax law,28income distribution legislation,29and a national representation law,30and measures31designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.32As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress,sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.33The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34thus:xxx xxx xxxIt is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...35xxx xxx xxx"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.37As we held,38however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases,Lacson v. Roque,39Hebron v. Reyes,40andMondano v. Silvosa,41and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42InLacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law,"43a rule we reiterated inHebron, andMondano. InPelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board."44However, neitherLacsonnorHebronnorMondanocategorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according toLacson:The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.45InHebronwe stated:Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ...46InMondano, the Court held:... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.47xxx xxx xxxInPelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.48Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as inGanzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.49The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President,50Commissioner Blas Ople would not.51The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."53The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.As we observed in one case,54decentralization means devolution of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.55The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yieldprima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held:562. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.57The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons,58and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,59is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses"60or to keep him off "the records and other evidence.61It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days,62which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent.It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate an arbitrary act.As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings ofprima facieevidence.In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy;4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have);6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),respondent.H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS,J.:A TV ad proudly announces:"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7,Rollo)In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21,Rollo).The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez,supra).InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the . . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W.2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.2nd660, 663; 59 SCRA 66;see alsoe.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta,supra)It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed thatno state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be anintra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be animperiuminimperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.Asgamblingis usually anoffense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact,ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals.
