cases

CHAP.14Rutter Vs. Esteban Case Digest

Rutter Vs. Esteban93 Phil 68

Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion

for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds.

Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.

Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Reyes62 Phil 461 (GR No. L-43263)

October 31, 1935Facts;

On December 13, 1933, following the enactment of Act No. 4122 or the Installment Sales Law, E.M. Reyes executed in favor of the Manila Trading & Supply Co., a chattel mortgage on an automobile as security for the payment of the sum of P400, which Reyes agreed to pay in ten equal monthly installments. As found by the trial judge, Reyes failed to pay some of the installments due on his obligation. Thereupon the Manila Trading & Supply Co., proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The mortgaged property was sold at public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila for the sum of P200, After applying this sum, with interest, costs, and liquidated damages to Reyes' indebtedness, the latter owed the company a balance of P275.47, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 percent per annum from February 19, 1934.

When Reyes failed to pay the deficiency on the debt, the company instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery thereof. To plaintiff's complaint defendant filed an answer in which he pleaded as a defense that plaintiff, having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage, had no further action against defendant for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him to plaintiff, as provided by Act No. 4122. After trial the lower court sustained defendant's defense and rendered a judgment absolving him from the complaint, with costs.

From this judgment, the plaintiff has taken an appeal and here contends that the lower court erred in not declaring Act No. 4122 of the Philippine Legislature unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) in that it embraces more than one subject,

(2) in that it unduly restrains the liberty of a person to contract with respect to his property rights, (3) in that it is class legislation, and (4) in that it denies vendors and lessors of personal property the equal protection of the laws.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not Act No. 4122 violates the constitutional provision "that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embraced more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

2.) Whether or not the said law violates the non-impairment clause.

Held:

Act No. 4122 known as the enforcement sales law is valid and enforceable.

The Philippine Legislature having had the purpose in mind in enacting Act No. 4122 to provide legislation concerning sales on the installment plan, this subject was sufficiently expressed by indicating in the title that the law had to do with an amendment of the Civil Code in the portion thereof given to purchase and sale. Legislation should not be embarrassed by overly strict construction. The constitutional provision " that no bill which may be enacted into law shall be expressed in the title of the bill" while designed to remedy an evil was not designed to require great particularity in stating the object of the law in its title.

Parties have no vested rights in particular remedies or modes of procedure, and the Legislature may change existing remedies and modes of procedure without impairing the obligations of contracts, provided an efficacious remedy remains for the enforcement of a mortgage may not, even when public policy is invoked as an excuse, be pressed so far as to cut down the security of a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression.

In the Philippines three remedies are available to the vendor who has sold personal property on the installment plan. (1) He may elect to exact fulfillment of the obligation (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Millan [1935], 61 Phil 409). (2) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may cancel the sale. (3) If the vendee shall have failed to pay two or more installments, the vendor may foreclose the mortgage if one has been given on the property. Act 4122 does no more than qualify the remedy.

The question of the validity of an act is solely one of constitutional power. Questions of expediency of motive or of results are irrelevant. Nevertheless it is not improper to inquire as to the occasion for the enactment of a law.

Most constitutional issues are determined by the Court's approach to them. The proper approach should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the constitution. All doubts should be resolved in its favor.

Public policy, obvious from a statute, when defined and established by legislative authority and when violative of no constitutional principle, should be perpetuated by the Courts.

CHAP.15PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present

danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past

conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the

limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

Katigbak v. Solicitor General180 SCRA 540

FACTS:

RA 1379 was enacted providing for the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer.

Court ruled that the properties of the Katigbaks acquired during 1953-1955 shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Gov in the sum of P100 T.

The Katigbaks assail RA 1379 as it was an ex post facto law, principally bec it imposes the penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or EEs acquiring properties allegedly in violation of RA 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted.

ISSUE: Whether RA 1379 is an ex post facto law.

HELD: YES. Forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer which

is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such & other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty & that proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal of penal & hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case fr the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable thereto.

Provisions of the law cannot be given retroactive effect. Penalty of forfeiture cannot be applied to acquisitions prior

to its enactment without running afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws because (1) it makes criminal an act b4 the passage of the law & which was innocent when done, & punishes an act AND (2) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in

effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.

Chap.16Serafin Vs

. Lindayag67 SCRA 166

Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff’s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?

Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any o

ffense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she

promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly.

G.R. No. L-25091 November 29, 1968

Sura vs. martinFacts:CFI of Negros Occidental rendered a decision ordering defendant Vicente S. Martin, Sr. to pay past and future support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision.

A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated September 21, 1964, stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides."

In 1964, counsel for plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court.

In the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, CFI of Negros Occidental ordered the arrest and imprisonment of defendant Martin.

Issue:

Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were legal

Held:

The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerandos:

(1) The writ of execution was a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ.

(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property."

CHAP.17US VS. POMPEYA

FACTS:This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and

that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which

guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law

W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed

HELD:

Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good

order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render

the same.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the

Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and

good government?

In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds"

-- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the

individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the

state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are

constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

Is there a cause of action?

The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of

the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law.

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered."

Caunca Vs. Salazar 82 Phil 851

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was

employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has

already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to

another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained.

The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the

province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance

payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no

physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her

personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or

groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly

obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.

If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the

protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

CHAP.18LANSANG VS. GARCIA

FACTS:Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et alquestioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Gumaua vs.espinoFacts:In 1972, a Chinaman was kidnapped by allegedly the group of a certain Sgt. Cordova. Gumaua, an ex – PC aided Cordova as he even sheltered them in his sari-sari store. After

surveillance, Gumaua’s house was raided and he was arrested. Since martial lawis being imposed at that time, Gumaua was held under the custody and trial of the military court [No. 2]. Gumaua then petitioned for prohibition and mandamus with restraining order and preliminary injunction against Major General Romeo Espino as Chief of Staff of the AFP and Military Commission No. 2, challenging the validity of the creation and jurisdiction over him as a civilian of respondent Military Commission No. 2. He filed for habeas corpus and averred that (a) military tribunals cannot try civilians if civil courts are open; (b) the President cannot deprive the civil courts of their jurisdiction to try criminal cases involving civilians; (c) as a civilian, he is entitled even during Martial Law to his constitutional right to counsel during the preliminary investigation, to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts only upon his arrest or voluntary submission.ISSUE: Whether or not Gumaua can be validly tried before the military court.HELD: The SC first and foremost affirmed that the declaration of martial law is valid. The 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified by the sovereign people and is now in full force and effect. Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire country under martial law is valid. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. That the President of the Philippines, “as Commander-in-Chief and as enforcer or administrator of martial law, . . . can promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession

or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed countries . . .” . That the President of the Philippines, as legislator during the period of martial law, can legally create military commissions or courts martial to try, not only members of the armed forces, but also civilian offenders, for specified offenses including kidnapping.And finally, there is likewise ample proof that Sgt. Aguinaldo Cordova and Sgt. Barbelonio Casipi, co-accused of petitioners in the kidnapping charge, belonged to the armed forces at the time of the commission of the crime, in much the same way that the evidence demonstrates that petitioner Gumaua himself is a retired PC non-commissioned officer. Consequently, the trial of petitioners Gumaua and Halasan before the respondent Military Commission No. 2, along with the two other accused who are members of the Armed Forces is valid under General Orders Nos. 8.

CHAP.19Conde vs. rivera

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to

respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on

eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the

passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away

from a definite resolution of her troubles as

she was whenoriginally charged.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial.

Held: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal

prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in

order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We

lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protestbeyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus

to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain

his freedom.

Flores vs. PeopleGR L-25769 | December 10, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. Information was filed in December 1951. They

were found guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in December 1955. It was until February 1958 that action was taken by CA—a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959 which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case was returned to the lower court but nothing was done for about a year because the offended party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify the 2 accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of the case against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from

December 1955- May 1965). CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last

order being a denial of a second MR dated January 1966. CA’s defense is that the case was not properly captioned as “People of the Philippines” and without “Court of Appeals” being made a

party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to Reconsideration are set

aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be

oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude

from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. “Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the

manner in which it is authorized to be commenced”.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too much significance attached to the

procedural defect (refer to CA’s defense). CA failed to accord respect to this particular constitutional right amounting at the

very least to a grave abuse of discretion.

CHAPTER 20:RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED1.CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS:Pesigan vs. angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)]Facts: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination.

They were provided with three certificates: 1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to transfer/transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town’s police station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was based on EO No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of carabaos & carabeef from one province to another.

Issue: WON EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982Held: No. The said order isn’t enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because it’s a penal regulation published more than 2 mos. later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in A2 of the CC & §11 of the Revised Administrative Code. The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars & regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential EOs having general applicability should be published in the OG. It provides that “every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation & forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It

results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation wasn’t in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda & Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos, reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations & make the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice & fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.2.SELF-INCRIMINATIONUS VS.TAN TENG, 23PHIL145Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police.

Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same

symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea.

The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority.

The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him.3.CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONMiranda Vs. Arizona

FACTS:In March 1963, Ernesto Arturo Miranda (born in Mesa, Arizona in 1941, and living in Flagstaff, Arizona) was arrested for the kidnapping and rape of an 18 year old woman. He later confessed to robbery and attempted rape under interrogation by police. At trial, prosecutors offered not only his confession as evidence (over objection) but also the victim's positive identification of Miranda as her assailant. Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years imprisonment on each charge, with sentences to run concurrently. Miranda's court-appointed lawyer, Alvin Moore, appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court which affirmed the trial court's decision. In affirming, the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request an attorney.

ISSUE:WON the admissions made by Miranda are admissible as evidence considering he was not advised of his rights?

HELD:Due to the coercive nature of the custodial interrogation by police no confession could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights and the suspect had then waived them. Thus, Miranda's conviction was overturned.

The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

4.BAILEnrile vs. Salazar,june 5,1990Facts:In February 1990, Sen Enrile was arrested. He was charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan for the crime ofrebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. That he was charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process; denied his right to bail; and arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What

Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being used by a lo t of opportunists to attempt to grab power.5.presumption of innocenceDumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980Facts: Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to

which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:1. Did petitioners have standing2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:

1. No2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.Petition granted

Ratio:1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are present:a. actual case and controversyb. proper partyc. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.

It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed

in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.6.RIGHT TO BE HEARDPEOPLE VS. HOLGADO,85 PHIL.752Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the

fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.7.NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATIONSORIANO VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN,131 SCRA 184Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of .RA.3019.

Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly or indirectly

requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b). The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3 (b).

The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.

The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.

Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under Art.210 of the RPC.8.THE TRIALMARTINvs.VER,july 25,1983FACTS: Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when hewas still in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz

at P50.00 each, one of whichexploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons, includingRogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others.He was arrested, discharged and charged under 85thand 97thArticles of War.I. The petitioner contends that having been discharged from the military service, he is nolonger subject to court-martial even if the offenses of which he is charged were committedwhile he was still subject to military law. He therefore, concludes that his continueddetention pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War is illegal and he, accordingly, shouldbe released.II. The petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trialbecause the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months after his arrest.HELD:This posture has no merit. A discharged soldier charged before a court-martial of illegal saleordisposition of military hardware may still be detained by that court even after discharge from militaryservice. Despite being discharged from military service he is still subject to military law and that hispreventive suspension-pending trial and punishment is lawful. (Articles of War Art. 95)Undue delay in trial is counted from the time the information is filed not before the filing. The test of violation to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information isfiled not before filing.

... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancingtest, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courtsshould consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant'sassertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay,in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied (Barker vs. Wingo)9.THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATIONTALINO v SANDIGANBAYAN148 SCRA 598CRUZ; March 16, 1987FACTS- Talino, along with several others, were charged infour separate informations with estafa throughfalsification of public documents for having allegedlyconspired to defraud the government in the totalamount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, butactually not needed and never made, on fourgovernment vehicles, through falsification of thesupporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. The cases were tried jointly for all the accused untilGenaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang andpetitioner Talino asked for separate trials, whichwere allowed. At one of the proceedings, Pio Ulatgave damaging testimony against Talino. TheSandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the fourcases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat andRenato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrimes charged while absolving the other defendantsfor insufficient evidence. This decision is nowchallenged by Talino on the ground that it violateshis right of confrontation as guaranteed by theConstitution.- In

its decision, the court made the ff remarks: The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the factthat We allowed, upon their petition, separatetrials for the accused Basilio and Talino andMacadangdang. This being the case, We can onlyconsider, in deciding these cases as against them,the evidence for the, prosecution as wen as theirown evidence. Evidence offered by the otheraccused can not be taken up. It would really havebeen simpler had there been no separate trialbecause the accused Pio Ulat said so manyincriminatory things against the other accusedwhen he took the stand in his own defense. Butbecause Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang weregranted separate trials and they did not crossexamine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, theywere not even required to be present when theother accused were presenting their defenses, thelatter's testimonies can not now be consideredagainst said three accused.- The grant of a separate trial rests in the sounddiscretion of the court and is not a matter of right tothe accused, especially where, as in this case, it issought after the presentation of the evidence of theprosecution. The rule in every case is that the trialcourt should exercise the utmost circumspection ingranting a motion for separate trial, allowing thesame only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the seriousdifficulties that may arise, such as the oneencountered and regretted by the respondent court,in according the accused the right of confrontation.- The right of confrontation is one of the fundamentalrights guaranteed by the Constitution to the personfacing criminal prosecution who should know, infairness, who his accusers are and must be given achance to cross-examine them on their charges. Noaccusation is permitted to be made against his backor in

his absence nor is any derogatory informationaccepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison penletters sent by persons who cannot stand by theirlibels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. InUnited States v. Javier confrontation is essentialbecause cross-examination is essential. A secondreason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may havebefore it the deportment and appearance of thewitness while testifying.ISSUEWON the decision of the court violates Talino’s rightof confrontation as guaranteed by the ConstitutionHELD

NO- The court have carefully studied the decision underchallenge and find that the respondent court did notconsider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting Talino. The part of that decision finding Talino guiltymade no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself tothe petitioner's own acts in approving the questionedvouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot toswindle the government. Talino makes much of thestatement in the Comment that the petitioner's guiltcould be deduced "from the evidence for theprosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat,"butthat was not the respondent court speaking. Thatwas the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as theSandiganbayan was concerned, the said testimonywas inadmissible against the petitioner because he"did not cross examine Ulat and was not evenrequired to be present when the latter was

testifying.In fact, the respondent court even expressed thewish that Ulat had been presented as rebuttalwitness in the separate trial of the petitioner as therewould then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other accused. " As it wasnot done, the trial court could not and did notconsider Ulat's testimony in determining thepetitioner's part in the offenses.10.COMPULSORY PROCESSG.R. No. L-38675 July 2, 1980

OSCAR FAJARDO, CESAR FAJARDO and RODRIGO DOLIENTE, petitioners, vs.HON. HIMERIO B. GARCIA, as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of Olongapo City, respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The basic assumption of petitioners in this certiorari proceeding is the expanded concept in the present Constitution, which, in addition to granting an accused, as provided for in the 1935 Charter, the right to have compulsory process to secure the "attendance" of witnesses of his choice, 1 includes his right to compulsory process to secure "the production of evidence in his behalf. 2 It is their contention that medical testimony from a doctor who could testify on the wounds inflicted on them during the incident in question would be crucial to their defense. Unfortunately for them, however, the doctor had left the Philippines and was

then residing in the United States. Since under the circumstances, compulsory attendance would not be feasible, their counsel relying on the constitutional provision, sought from respondent Judge Himerio L. Garcia to send written interrogatories on the aforesaid doctor in his residence in the United States. A motion to that effect was duly filed, but it was denied by respondent Judge. The Solicitor General 3 was required to comment. It is his submission that the constitutional guarantee could not be stretched to include the right to serve interrogatories on a witness living in abroad. According to the comment: "1. Service of written interrogatories is not a compulsory or coercive process. It is be merely the delivery to a proposed deponent of a set or series of questions, the answers to which will constitute his deposition. 2. Service of written interrogatories by itself, does not obtain for the person utilizing them the twofold objectives specified in the constitutional guarantee which are a) to secure the attendance of witnesses and b) to secure the production of evidence in behalf of the accused. It merely apprises the proposed deponent of the questions which he is requested to answer. He may decline to give the deposition, which ultimately win be submitted as his testimony. Clearly, therefore, service of written interrogatories is completely different or worlds apart from the compulsory process that is established in the constitution and accorded as an inviolate right of the accused. 4

This Court, in view of the importance raised, resolved to consider such comment as answer and thereafter to set the case for hearing. Such a hearing was held; the parties were then given leave to submit simultaneously memoranda in

amplification of their oral arguments. With the filing thereof, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The facts are undisputed. To an information charging petitioners, Oscar Fajardo, Cesar Fajardo and Rodrigo Doliente, with the crime of murder, a plea of not guilty was entered. After which, the case was set for trial. The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at the time of the arrest of petitioners on the evening of September 11, 1972, all of them were suffering from wounds on different parts of their bodies. The next day, the father of the accused Oscar Fajardo and Cesar Fajardo sent for a doctor, Dr. Herminio Academia by name, to examine and thereafter treat such wounds. Accordingly, that was done at the detention cell in Subic, Zambales. The corresponding medical certificates were then issued by such doctor. At the trial, during the reception of the evidence for the defense on March 19, 1974, petitioner Oscar Fajardo testified. Reference was made by him to such medical certificate When respondent Judge asked counsel for the defense where Dr. Herminio Academia was, the answer was that said doctor had left the country for abroad and was then residing in the United States. It was after the direct examination of petitioner Oscar Fajardo that respondent Judge was asked for leave to serve written interrogatories on Dr. Herminio Academia at his place of residence in the United States. It was argued that his testimony on the examination and treatment of the wounds on the bodies of all of the accused would be crucial for the defense, the offense charged being of a very serious character. Respondent Judge asked that a motion to that

effect be filed That was done, but in May of 1974, such motion was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.

This is a certiorari petition. It is undoubted, to quote born Panaligan v. Adolfo 5 that the availability of this remedy is conditioned on a showing of "a capricious, arbitrary and w/ physical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions." 6 It is from that perspective that the success or failure of petitioners must depend. It is not to be forgotten, though, that the Constitution accords a high respect to the rights of an accused person conformably to the presumption of innocence. As was pointed out at the outset, it was further bolstered by the expanded concept of not only the attendance but likewise the production of evidence in his behalf. There is thus the need for the utmost caution on the part of the trial judge lest in the exercise of his on, what the Constitution allows may be disregarded. His judgement on the matter should be guided by due recognition of the high estate accorded these constitutional rights. Certainly, if the denial thereof would lead to the defense of the petitioners being rendered nugatory, then a case for grave abuse of discretion has been shown.

This Court, after careful consideration of the matter, however is of the thinking that it would be premature, at the very least, to conclude that such a fatal infirmity has infected the proceeding. The fact that the petitioners were treated in the hospital by a doctor in question could be testified to by other witnesses, including the nurses who must have been present. It cannot be assumed that there would be an

insuperable objection to the presentation of the mechanical indicate as to the wounds alleged to have been inflicted, as they could very weld show traces of such maltreatment. Even the length of their stay in the hospital could be verified by its records. On this point, an excerpt from People v. Montejo 7 may furnish guidance: "Respondent Judge certainly has not been shown to be remiss in the ent of his judicial duties. On the contrary, the petition would impute not only abuse of discretion, but grave abuse thereof, when precisely he was manifesting fealty to the well-settled doctrine that a trial judge should display receptivity to offers of evidence as well as to searching questions with the end in view of having the truth come out. It would appear then that the provincial fiscal who filed this petition was motivated more by the apprehension and misgiving that with further information and data furnished the Court, an acquittal would be likely. That of itself is no argument for a petition of this character. Precisely, the constitutional rights granted an accused are intended to assure a full and unimpeded opportunity for him to meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation. Moreover, at the stage of the trial reached, there was an element of prematurity to this proceeding. At any rate, the presumption to be indulged is that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the respective parties. Petitions of this character certainly deserve no encouragement from this Tribunal. 8 Nor must it be forgotten that, according to the facts, the prosecution was not oblivious to the demands of fairness when the evidence offered by it disclosed that petitioners at the time of their arrest were suffering from wounds inflicted on various parts of their bodies.

In the light of what has been stated, it becomes obvious why as of now, there is no need to make a definite pronouncement on the scope of the expanded concept of the constitutional right to secure not only the attendance of witnesses but the production of evidence. All that the decision stands for is that the standard required for the grant of certiorari has not been met.11.PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTSPEOPLE vs. TONGKOG.R. No. 123567 June 5, 1998

Facts:

Accused was charged of estafa under Article 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Accused pled not quilty and underwent trial.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 21, 1990, accused opened savings and current account with Amanah Bank. In the morning of August 20, 1993, Marites Bo-ot brought the accused to the office of Carmelita V. Santos at Room 504 Pacific Place, Pearl Drive, Ortigas Center, Pasig City to borrow money. The accused asked for P50,000.00 to be paid not later than December 1993. He assured Santos that his receivables would come in by November 1993. He persuaded Santos to give the loan by issuing five (5) check, each in the sum of P10,000.00, postdated December 20, 1993 and by signing a promissory note. The promissory note was co-signed by Bo-ot. In the afternoon of the same date, the accused returned to Santos

and borrowed an additional P50,000.00. Again, he issued five (5) checks, each worth P10,000.00 postdated December 20, 1993. He also signed a promissory note together with Bo-ot.

Later, Amanah Bank closed accused’s current account for lack of funds. Also on a different date, accused himself requested for the closing of his savings account. Santos did not present accused’s checks to the drawee bank on their due date upon the request of accused himself. Instead, the checks were presented on March 1, 1994 but were dishonored as accused’s accounts had been closed. Accused was informed that his checks had bounced. He promised to make good the checks. He failed to redeem his promise, hence, the case at bar.

He admitted the evidence of the prosecution but alleged that the postdated checks were issued a day or two after he signed the promissory notes. Obviously, he was relying on the defense that the checks were in payment of a pre-existing obligation.

RTC convicted him. According to him, the penalty of 27 years of reclusion perpetua is too harsh.

Issue: WON the checks issued by accused constituted fraud which led the private party to extend a loan to him?

Held:

Yes. Estafa, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 4885, has the following elements: (1) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.

Santos is the best person who can testify on what induced her to lend P100,000.00 to the appellant. Santos categorically declared that it was the issuance of postdated checks which persuaded her to part with her money.

A look at the two promissory notes will show that they bear the date August 20, 1993 and they referred to the postdated checks issued by the appellant. There could be no reference to the postdated checks if they were issued a day or two after the loans. In this appeal, however, appellant offers the new thesis that since the checks were postdated December 1993, ergo, they were issued in payment of the P100,000.00 he got from Santos on August 20, 1993. The postdating of the checks to December 1993 simply means that on said date the checks would be properly funded. It does not mean that the checks should be deemed as issued only on December 1993.

The legislature was not thoughtless in imposing severe penalties for violation of par. 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The history of the law will show that the severe penalties were intended to stop the upsurge of swindling by issuance of bouncing checks. It was felt that unless aborted, this kind of estafa “. . . would erode the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a

medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country.”12.DOUBLE JEOPARDYESMENA VS.POGOY,102 SCRA 861Facts: Petitioners Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainant’s failure to

appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainant’s incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been

dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.