Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-18463 October 4, 1922THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS,plaintiff-appellee,vs.GREGORIO
PERFECTOR,defendant-appellant.Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant
in behalf of the latter.Attorney-General Villa-Real for
appellee.MALCOLM,J.:The important question is here squarely
presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse,
or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority .
. .," is still in force.About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the
Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain
documents which constituted the records of testimony given by
witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared
from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having
been called into special session by the Governor-General, the
Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the
documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty
party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7,
1920, the newspaperLa Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto,
published an article reading as follows:Half a month has elapsed
since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery
of records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the
Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication
that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.To
find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the
Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the
case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in
their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable
obstacle of offical concealment.In that case, every investigation
to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.After all,
the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances
that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.The execution
of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the
place in which it was committed.How many of the present Senators
can say without remorse in their conscience and with serenity of
mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How
may?The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the
said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the
example of certain Senators who secured their election through
fraud and robbery.The Philippine Senate, in its session of
September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its committee
on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should
be taken with reference to the article published inLa Nacion. On
September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the
President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his
study and corresponding action, all the papers referring to the
case of the newspaperLa Nacionand its editor, Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal
court of the City of Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which
the editorial in question was set out and in which it was alleged
that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the
municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.During the course of the trial in the Court of First
Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the defense moved for
the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article
256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented,
is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey,
said:This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the
Penal Code of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the
Crown and other representatives of the King against free speech and
action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed
because it was doubtless considered a much more serious offense to
insult the King's representative than to insult an ordinary
individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of
that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines
might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other
representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing
the King of Spain, and said provision, with other articles of the
Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority
decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day.
. . .The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule ofstare
decisis, is binding upon this court until otherwise determined by
proper authority.In the decision rendered by the same judge, he
concluded with the following language:In the United States such
publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and
little importance is attached to them, because they are generally
the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as
more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon
a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law.
Although such publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels
some aversion to the application of the provision of law under
which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the
Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for
persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or
other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of
such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the
Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was
made applicable here. Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty,
our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has held that this
provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting
remark about the President of the United States was punishable
under it. (U.S.vs.Helbig,supra.) If it applicable in that case, it
would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256
must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed
or superseded by other legislation, or until the Supreme Court
shall otherwise determine.In view of the foregoing considerations,
the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the information
and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer
two months and one day ofarresto mayorand the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both instances.The
fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced
by an extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own
behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the
pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the
beginning of this decision.It will be noted in the first place that
the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule
announced in the case of United Statesvs.Helbig (R. G. No.
14705,1not published). In that case, the accused was charged with
having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or
words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court,
with the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal
grounds: (1) That the accused was deprived of the constitutional
right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish
Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of
reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of
First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the
accused of his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set
aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered
the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration
of a new trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not
known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case has never again
been elevated to this court.There may perchance exist some doubt as
to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view of the
circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The
facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term
the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was
an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written
defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts,
could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the
Perfecto case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent
to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as was the trial
court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to
resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the
Helbig decision.This is one of those cases on which a variety of
opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A majority of
the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No.
277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the
Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and
that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither
guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the
Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should
be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute a violation of article 156 of the
Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was
abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent with
democratic principles of government.Without prejudice to the right
of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss
the two main points just mentioned.1.Effect of the Philippine Libel
Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. The
Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission
shortly after organization of this legislative body. Section 1
defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public
theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is
dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish
the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and thereby
expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13
provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so far as
the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . .
."That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took
effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law
abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be
gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the
subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly
affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de
Taveravs.Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court
spoke of the Libel Law as "reformingthe preexisting Spanish law on
the subject ofcalumniaandinjuria." Recently, specific attention was
given to the effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal
Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that those
provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults
in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were
abrogated by the Libel Law. (Peoplevs.Castro [1922], p.
842,ante.)The Libel Law must have had the same result on other
provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance article 256.The facts
here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article,
naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach
the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine
Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law.
Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is
indictable when defaming a "body of persons definite and small
enough for individual members to be recognized as such, in or by
means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal
Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to
prosecute criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator
with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a
legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press,
unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal
Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind,
recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . .writing,
shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other
person in authority," etc.The Libel Law is a complete and
comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of
statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly
covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly
appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are
held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is
evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as
punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.Act No. 292 of
the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also
have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not
necessary to make a pronouncement.2.Effect of the change from
Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article 256
of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main proposition in the
lower court and again energetically pressed in the appellate court
was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force
because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with
democratic principles of government. This view was indirectly
favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion
of three members of this court.Article 256 is found in Chapter V of
title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II
punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or
independence of the state, crimes against international law, and
the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the crimes
oflese majeste, crimes against theCortesand its members and against
the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government,
and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime
against religion and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which
article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of rebellion, sedition,
assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and
contempts, insults,injurias, and threats against persons in
authority, and insults,injurias, and threats against their agents
and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V.
The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the offense
of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame,
abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person
in authority. The with an article condemning challenges to fight
duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in the
balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or
writing, shall defame, abuse, or insultany Minister of the Crown or
other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that
the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not
addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty ofarresto mayor," that
is, the defamation, abuse, or insult of anyMinister of the Crown of
the Monarchy of Spain(for there could not be a Minister of the
Crown in the United States of America),or other person in authority
in the Monarchy of Spain.It cannot admit of doubt that all those
provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such
subjects as treason,lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion,
sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer
in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of
whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically
stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political
law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States and the characteristics and institutions of the American
Government.It is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the
inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co.vs.Canter
[1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
Co.vs.McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roavs.Collector of Customs
[1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States
Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion
in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway
Co.vs.McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws,
ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political
character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are
at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction
and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former to
the United States,the laws of the countryin support of an
established religion orabridging the freedom of the press, or
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments,and he like, would at
once cease to be of obligatory forcewithout any declaration to that
effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It
cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or
otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal
prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have
capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation
acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject
to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not
according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollardvs.Hagan
[1845], 3 Hos., 210.)On American occupation of the Philippines, by
instructions of the President to the Military Commander dated May
28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of
the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and
property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally
continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new
order of things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to
General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of the
military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of
the former political relation of the inhabitants and the
establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the
ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of
the United States Supreme Court in Weemsvs.United States ([1910],
217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise
questions were presented, a careful consideration of the codal
provisions and a determination of the extent to which they accorded
with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and
law' which had been 'made the basis of our governmental system.'"
But when the question has been squarely raised, the appellate court
has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish
codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S.vs.Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18;
U.S.vs.Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S.vs.Balcorta [1913], 25
Phil., 533; Weemsvs.U.S.,supra.)The nature of the government which
has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty was
outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine
liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In
part, the President said:In all the forms of government and
administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe,
the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they
are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent
with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and
effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear
in mind, andthe people of the Islands should be made plainly to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government
which have been made the basis of our governmental system, which we
deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual
freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the
experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical
rules of government which we have found to be essential to the
preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that
these principles and these rules of government must be established
and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and
happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws
of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the
most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully
appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they
will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.The
courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott,
speaking for our Supreme Court, in the case of United Statesvs.Bull
([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the
government on the model with which American are familiar, and which
has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests
and the protection of individual rights and privileges."Therefore,
it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made
that the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and prejudices, to
follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to
authority, and royal protection for that authority.According to our
view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the
Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although
merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and
laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and
makes, on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer
is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such
exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated
breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a
sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every
other man. We have no rank or station, except that of
respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and
ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to
freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he
is qualified or not depends upon the life and character and
attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may
lawfully do what he will, so long as it is notmalum in seormalum
prohibitumor does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of
others." (Statevs.Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R.,
624.)It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and
institutions of the United States are derived, there were once
statutes ofscandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be
actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if
spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of
the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of
England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of
other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus, Caesar,
and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since,
become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense
ofscandalum magnatumis not known. In the early days of the American
Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel
the Government, the Congress, or the President of the United
States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it
was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is
recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is
regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his poisonous
words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as
making his character free plunder for any one who desires to create
a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p.
245; Sillarsvs.Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A.,
680.)Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and
fundamental principles of the American character and system of
government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit
which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide
as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like
that of the United States. This article was crowded out by
implication as soon as the United States established its authority
in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion to the
gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the
American conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of government
in the Islands.1awph!l.netFrom an entirely different point of view,
it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against
executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover
the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial
officers has no place in a government based upon American
principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent
of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and
servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled
to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of
their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government
is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect
and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual
who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people
any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.The crime oflese majestedisappeared in the
Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers
of the Crown have no place under the American flag.To summarize,
the result is, that all the members of the court are of the
opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should
be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costsde
officio. So ordered.Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.Separate
OpinionsARAULLO,C.J.,concurring:I concur with the dispositive part
of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the
accused, for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the
Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to
calumny, injuria, or insult, by deed or word, against an authority
in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside of
his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it
refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an
authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said
information.ROMUALDEZ,J.,concurring:I concur with the result. I
believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown
either under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.I
am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in
force, except as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do
not have in our Government, and to calumny,injuria, or insult, by
writing or printing, committed against an authority in the
performance of his duties or by reason thereof, which portion was
repealed by the Libel Law.Johnson, Street, Avancea and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA.M. No.
133-J May 31, 1982BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA,complainant,vs.HONORABLE
ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte,respondent.MAKASIAR,J:In a verified complaint dated August 6,
1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B.
Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."The
factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27,
1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom
this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation,
thus:Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and
Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco
Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.In her
defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged
among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a
daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs
of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the only
offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties
left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were acquired
by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be
partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated
solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased
mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of
the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.On June 8, 1963, a decision was
rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the
dispositive portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a preponderance of evidence, finds
and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2)
Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an
illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145 as
belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco
Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4
of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz
and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of
Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola,
being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras,
as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475,
4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and
one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to
the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be
the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half
(1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half
(1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene
Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary
share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and
the remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the
plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total
share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate
shall not exceed the equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total
share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the defendant
(Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal
shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil.
528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9)
Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment shall
have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project
of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above
indicated, and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement,
deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration
the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties
involved; (10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in
the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds
(2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of
the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].The decision in civil case 3010
became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a
project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is
marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of
partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for
convenience is quoted hereunder in full:The parties, through their
respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval the
following project of partition:COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the
defendant in the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:l. The whole
of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to
Bernardita Reyes Macariola;2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting
of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of the lot shall
be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;3. Lots Nos. 4803,
4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;4. A
portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along
the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes-Bales;5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally
among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;6. Lot No. 1184 and the
remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded
under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining portion
of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla
Reyes.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of
Partition indicated above which is made in accordance with the
decision of the Honorable Court be approved.Tacloban City, October
16, 1963.(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban
City(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban
CityWhile the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties
to have signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon
assurance of both counsels of the respective parties to this Court
that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made
after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the
defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both
lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full
authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the
Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to
be in accordance with law, hereby approves the same. The parties,
therefore, are directed to execute such papers, documents or
instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of the
rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the
respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the
delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in
view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such other acts
as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of
Partition.SO ORDERED.Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of
October, 1963.(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION JudgeEXH. B.The above Order
of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the
purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates
of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the
project of partition (see Exh. U).One of the properties mentioned
in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof
with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to
the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco
Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the
plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all
surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition
was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to
be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E
inclusive (Exh. V).Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a
stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1),
while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was
sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was
issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of
Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).On March 6, 1965, Dr.
Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an
area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife,
Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was
declared by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).On August 31,
1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At
the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary
(Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E)
[pp. 378-385, rec.].Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on
August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging
four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of
those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him;
[2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the
Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a
ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor
and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing
with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly
advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in
fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not
a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent
Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September
24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968
by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We
referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court
of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After
hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated
May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action,
respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is
prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third and
fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent
Judge be exonerated.The records also reveal that on or about
November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein
instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R.
Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No.
4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders
issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with
damages. It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped
from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest
when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on
March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant
Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no
longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil
Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her
and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on
August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P.
Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial
and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla,
Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were
dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff
therein, and her counsel.On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D.
Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now
Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:A. IN
THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION(1) declaring that only
Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the
Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C"
and "C- 3"] approving the partition;(2) dismissing the complaint
against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs.
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B.
Asuncion,(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00]
for moral damages;(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and(d) he sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.B. IN THE CASE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE
HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN (1) Dismissing the complaint
against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the
deceased Gerardo Villasin;(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the
defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R.
BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 (1)
Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales,
Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R.
Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO
RAMO (1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;(2)
Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the
cost of the suit.SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]It is further
disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to
the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22,
1971.IWE find that there is no merit in the contention of
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of
action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article
1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties
involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:Article
1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial action, either in person or through the
mediation of another:xxx xxx xxx(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].The prohibition in the aforesaid
Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified
therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to
operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take
placeduring the pendencyof the litigation involving the property"
(The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979],
Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646
[1978]).In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
onMarch 6, 1965a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010 which he rendered onJune 8, 1963was already final because
none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary
period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent's order datedOctober 23, 1963and the amended order
datedNovember 11, 1963approving the October 16, 1963 project of
partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long
become final for there was no appeal from said orders.Furthermore,
respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased onJuly 31, 1964Lot 1184-E
from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more
specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and
Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As
aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon
for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot
to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for taxation
purposes only. The subsequent sale onAugust 31, 1966by spouses
Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and
interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and
his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two
aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.While
it appears that complainant herein filed on or aboutNovember 9 or
11, 1968an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of
partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same,
however, is of no moment.The fact remains that respondent Judge
purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered onJune 8, 1963in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two
questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963.
Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.The
subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234
can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice,
was effected and consummated long after the finality of the
aforesaid decision or orders.Consequently, the sale of a portion of
Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well
as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.It is also argued
by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R.
Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and
unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a
consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this
connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice
thus:And so we are now confronted with this all-important question
whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot
1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was
intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project
of partition, Exh. A.Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
participation in the transactions between the Reyeses and the
Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no
evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the
purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p.
14 of Respondent's Memorandum).xxx xxx xxxOn this point, I agree
with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing
that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in
acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this
investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I
believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good
faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any
intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).On the contention of complainant herein that
respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of
partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with
approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:1. I
agree with complainant that respondent should have required the
signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola
on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done
in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by
Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That
he was authorized by his client to submit said project of
partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it
is true that such written authority if there was any, was not
presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the
only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain
actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that
she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that
she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following
documents:1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering
Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased
Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills
certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U)
approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered
on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed
of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola onOctober
22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of
the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the
vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth
share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the
estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A).
The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of
OCT 19520 on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).In connection with the
abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of
partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent
on October 23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11,
1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold
to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the
preparation of the project of partition.Counsel for complainant
stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth
share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and
not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is
absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half
of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share of
complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision
did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the
herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became
the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the
project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot
1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she
was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased
father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point
to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the cross-examination
that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot
1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can
deduce that she could not have been kept ignorant of the
proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of
partition.Complainant also assails the project of partition because
according to her the properties adjudicated to her were
insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however,
did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the
alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the
real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting
evidence on the area, location, kind, the assessed and market value
of said properties. Without such evidence there is nothing in the
record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of
the properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).Finally,
while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph
5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be
reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires
that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly
observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and
indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired
a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation
in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of
which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such
transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has
the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of
the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be
truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give
cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent,
he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging
and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if
respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in
litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third
person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and
transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were
financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause
for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his
court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness
of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp.
395396, rec.).IIWith respect to the second cause of action, the
complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and
5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself
with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been
organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:Article
14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by
proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct,
administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces,
or towns in which they discharge their duties:1. Justices of the
Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be
applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting
attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging
the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.xxx xxx xxx5. Those
who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in
commerce in a determinate territory.It is Our considered view that
although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines,
it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it
regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees, like justices and judges.Political
Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with
the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the
State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of
its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It
may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law
of public corporations, administrative law including the law on
public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in
essence.It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce
is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications
made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal
Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this
jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.Upon the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there
is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.Thus, We held
inRoa vs. Collector of Customs(23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912])
that:By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by
one nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise,
... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to
the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon
the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10,
1899).While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in
conflict with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force
without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14).
However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in
conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new
sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so
declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs.
United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of
American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26
U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:On such
transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.
Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new
relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and
the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed,
although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct
of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the newly-
created power of the State.Likewise, inPeople vs. Perfecto(43 Phil.
887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code
of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and
binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of
the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals.It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent
Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which
provides that:Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:xxx
xxx xxx(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection
with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or
in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from
having any interest.Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under
the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervenedin his officialcapacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the
corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no
relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of
said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or
takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance.
As was held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of
the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on public
officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene,
"(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this
crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to
intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the
official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no
relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs.
Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C.
Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).It does not
appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained
any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of
respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation
benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it
in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which
the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except
Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.,"wherein the complainant herein
sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It
must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on
November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected
with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on
January 31, 1967.Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the
same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law
expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having interest in any lawful business.It may be pointed out that
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a
matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of
law after office hours but with the permission of the district
judge concerned.Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which
prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore
stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in
nature.Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a property in
litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform
their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of
the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his
decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving
the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject
of litigation.In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging
in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of department, the same,
however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the last
portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by
theConstitution or lawon any public officer from having any
interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer
or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private
business without a written permission from the Department Head may
not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.On the
contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do
not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12:
"No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the Head of Department ..."It must be
emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the
Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.Under Section 67 of said law, the
power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President
of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and
only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency,
and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is
authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds
and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of
judges.And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973
Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of
inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.It is
true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The
Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service
Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the
interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee
from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than
one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six
months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a
ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and
employees.However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil
service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority
of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the
Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which
they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the
Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the
department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260)
[1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII
cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would
be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as
aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two
grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency.Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act
of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has original
and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty
days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
againstpermanent officers and employees in the competitive service,
and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass
upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters
relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such
officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and
regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis
supplied). There is no question that a judge belong to the
non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a
Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the
aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in
interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized
that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the
classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA
710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).Although
the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business
by joining the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the
provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly
unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
expressly declares that:A judge should abstain from making personal
investments in enterprises which are apt to be involved in
litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he
should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a
period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious
loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment,
or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of
his judicial duties. ...WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact
that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31,
1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective
shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of
the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on
March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the
eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said
corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of
their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent
realized that early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife
therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal
from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved
in any court litigationIIIWith respect to the third and fourth
causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of
coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum,
and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard
for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the
Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because
the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the
pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:The basis
for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa
Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said
Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and
is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.The
"respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an
"impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the latter
was abona fidemember of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving
this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his
name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate
his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any person
for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent
is guilty of fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent
of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at
baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render
respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long
as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not
influence his official actuations as a judge where said persons
were concerned. There is no tangible convincing proof that herein
respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador
Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law
from his personal relations with respondent, or that he used his
influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of
the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.Of course it is highly
desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as
possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising
attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that
his social or business relations or friendship constitute an
element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of
Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that
in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action
unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded his
official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).In conclusion, while respondent Judge
Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not
violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was
in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a
private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet
in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a
member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.WHEREFORE, THE
RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY
REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-32432 September 11, 1970MANUEL B. IMBONG,petitioner,vs.JAIME
FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR
MILAFLOR, as members thereof,respondents.G.R. No. L-32443 September
11, 1970IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M.
GONZALES,petitioner,vs.COMELEC,respondent.Manuel B. Imbong in his
own behalf.Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.Office of the
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor
General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco,
Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and
Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino,
Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici
curiae.MAKASIAR,J.:These two separate but related petitions for
declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132
by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members
of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for
delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral
argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After
the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents,
hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae,
namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator
Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.It will
be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution,
passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a
Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to
be composed of two delegates from each representative district who
shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with
the Revised Election Code.After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in
1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914
implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically
restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.On June
17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed
Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March
16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320
delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided,
that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two
delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required
of members of the House of Representatives,"1"and that any other
details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates,
election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional
Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation:
Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of
this Resolution."2On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A.
No.4914.3Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the
entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in
Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong
impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said
R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by
petitioner Gonzales.IThe validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which
considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or
appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or
enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained
by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely
an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2
of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a
denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law.
Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A.
No. 6132 was upheld.4IIWithout first considering the validity of
its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body
in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a
Constituent Assembly, because 1. Congress, when acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has
full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or
to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of
each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention
were passed by the required three-fourths vote.2. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to
call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the
doctrine of necessary implication, all other powers essential to
the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the
power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to
meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the
operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all
other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned
details, except the appropriation of funds.3. While the authority
to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details,
which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in
R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within
the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive
legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as
such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of
the constitution, they are valid.4. Consequently, when Congress,
acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention,
Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No.
4.5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details
may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding
such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any
difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the
Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.IIIPetitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that
Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with
proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution
and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific
provision of the Constitution with which it collides.Unlike in the
apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does
not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates
to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional
district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may
constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional
district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid
having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present
Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the
convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each
representative district, they would have done so in so many words
as they did in relation to the apportionment of the representative
districts.5The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed
therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of
Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of
Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be
apportioned among the existing representative districts according
to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum
of at least two delegates for a representative district. The
presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available
official population census, for such apportionment was presented to
Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary
computation to effect the desired proportional representation.The
records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by
Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this
Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment
of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census
taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30,
1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable
apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census
and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July
30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the
population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the
Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to
32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of
distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint
Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at
the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last
night, we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on
the basis of the above-stated method."Even if such latest census
were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis
for such apportionment.6The fact that the lone and small
congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because
it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that
it has a population very much less than several other congressional
districts, each of which