Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
101083 July 30, 1993JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO,
all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA
SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by
their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN,
minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE
II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,
minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE
MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA
VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by
her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II
and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID,
FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors,
represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE
MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by
their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their
parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and
ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by
their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE
ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO
S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.Oposa Law Office for petitioners.The Solicitor General
for respondents.DAVIDE, JR., J.:In a broader sense, this petition
bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent
the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."The controversy has its
genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined
by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of,
inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection
of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is
the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that
judgment be rendered:. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1)
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;(2)
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.and granting the plaintiffs
". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
5The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of
flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per
cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial
and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as
well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the
water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion
and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural
productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the
size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and
fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential
destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of
drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence
of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of
multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of
electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global
warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."Plaintiffs
further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of
judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.As their
cause of action, they specifically allege that:CAUSE OF ACTION7.
Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.8.
Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16)
million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that
there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.10.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin
old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.11. Public
records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut
the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas
covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".12. At the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.13. The adverse effects,
disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of
this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's
generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.14.
The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and
their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy
this rare and unique natural resource treasure.This act of
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.15. Plaintiffs have a
clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the
parens patriae.16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs
served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990
is hereto attached as Annex "B".17. Defendant, however, fails and
refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.18. The continued
failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors
who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.19.
Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;(b) to fulfill the
social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)20. Furthermore, defendant's
continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to a.
effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources
(sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);b. "protect
the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);c. "conserve and
promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);d. "protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)21.
Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.22. There is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6On 22 June 1990, the
original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an
order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said
order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case. 8On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a
reply thereto.Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section
4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and
the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise
rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what
is available involves a judicial question.Anent the invocation by
the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if
TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.On the other hand, the respondents aver that
the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources
is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for
the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.As to the
matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the
terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirements of due process.Before going any further, We must first
focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest
not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein
are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites
for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to
the former.This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such
a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and
harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.After
a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged
order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the
said order reads as follows:xxx xxx xxxAfter a careful and
circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they
are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data.
In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.Furthermore, the Court
firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be
taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the
sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3)
co-equal branches of the Government.The Court is likewise of the
impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e.,
to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11We do not agree with the trial court's
conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal
wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of
the complaint itself belies these conclusions.The complaint focuses
on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.This right unites with the right to
health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and
not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in
the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one
of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section
in question:MR. VILLACORTA:Does this section mandate the State to
provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?MR. AZCUNA:Yes, Madam President. The right to
healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.
12The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.Without such
forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.Conformably with the enunciated right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as
the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment
and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the
policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.This policy
declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall
ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.The above
provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to
law and higher authority. Said section provides:Sec. 2. Mandate.
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing
policy.(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.Both E.O. NO.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR.It may, however, be
recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On
6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment
of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities
of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.Thus, the right of the petitioners
(and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology
is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of
its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.A denial or
violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.A cause of action is defined as:. . . an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18It is settled in this
jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should
be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed
hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a
case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down
the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the
legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."After careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the
specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted,
wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.The foregoing
considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right
vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation.
It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise
of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.
The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.Commenting on this provision in his book,
Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:The first part of the
authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law.
The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.As worded, the new provision vests in
the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.In Daza vs. Singson,
23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:In the case
now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .The last ground invoked by the
trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo
declared that:The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to
"impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.
24We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if
not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place,
the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke
in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done
so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:. . . Provided, That when the national interest so
requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .Needless to say, all licenses may
thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process
clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25
this Court held:. . . A timber license is an instrument by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process
clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as
in this case.A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what
otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person
to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J.
168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).We reiterated this
pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State
to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R.
No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].Since timber licenses
are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:Sec. 10.
No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
27cannot be invoked.In the second place, even if it is to be
assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless,
granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only
been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for
the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated:The
freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant
to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare.The reason for
this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in
Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to
wit:Under our form of government the use of property and the making
of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or
exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31Finally, it
is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the
non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to
enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in
cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the
other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is
not entitled to it as a matter of right.WHEREFORE, being impressed
with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing
Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.No
pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no
part.Separate OpinionsFELICIANO, J., concurringI join in the result
reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J.,
in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases
decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the
natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court
appears to be saying.The Court explicitly states that petitioners
have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not
a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly
regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the
legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of
the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class"
here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace
everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it
appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the
course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to
take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be
seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action
in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in
the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left
for future determination in an appropriate case.The Court has also
declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one
specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental"
and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But
although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great
respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without
doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult
to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The
list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs,
factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure
to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin
or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or
cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on.
The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive
Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as
the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15
("the right to health").P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977,
entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of
topics:(a) air quality management;(b) water quality management;(c)
land use management;(d) natural resources management and
conservation embracing:(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;(ii)
wild life;(iii) forestry and soil conservation;(iv) flood control
and natural calamities;(v) energy development;(vi) conservation and
utilization of surface and ground water(vii) mineral resourcesTwo
(2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision
or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which
give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking
to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies
with notable care the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing
with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to
contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.As a matter of logic,
by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal
right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the
Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this
doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be
hinted at here.My suggestion is simply that petitioners must,
before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right
cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than
Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent
by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the
Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more
specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution
and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the
trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity
so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion
to dismiss.It seems to me important that the legal right which is
an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for
at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification
in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend
themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are
due process dimensions to this matter.The second is a broader-gauge
consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:Section 1. . . .Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)When
substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience
and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given
a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that
the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be
impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent
upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency.
They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines
set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.# Separate OpinionsFELICIANO, J.,
concurringI join in the result reached by my distinguished brother
in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is
one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are
likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.The Court
explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary
to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision,
pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim
that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand
locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must
have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may
be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek
to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary
locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a
beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency
directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in
the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such
beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be
shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not
discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.The Court has also declared
that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that,
accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that
it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive
violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character
than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of
particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to
be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of
oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland
and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open
land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative
Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the
constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16
("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the
right to health").P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled
"The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas"
clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:(a)
air quality management;(b) water quality management;(c) land use
management;(d) natural resources management and conservation
embracing:(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;(ii) wild life;(iii)
forestry and soil conservation;(iv) flood control and natural
calamities;(v) energy development;(vi) conservation and utilization
of surface and ground water(vii) mineral resourcesTwo (2) points
are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners
nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions
(if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable
care the particular government agency charged with the formulation
and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.As a matter of logic, by finding
petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised
in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in
their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to
be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.My suggestion is
simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly
lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act,
imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial
court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may
well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the
Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate,
instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.It seems
to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two
(2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have
been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.The second is a broader-gauge
consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to
fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
which reads:Section 1. . . .Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)When
substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and
healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and management, our
courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience
and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms
and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given
a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those
norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that
the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be
impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if
petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent
upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the
specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and
this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to
dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency.
They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines
set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be
subjected to closer examination.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. Nos.
171947-48 December 18, 2008METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners, vs.CONCERNED RESIDENTS
OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO
ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
respondents.D E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR., J.:The need to address
environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late
gained the attention of the international community. Media have
finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the
destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and
the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the
magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever
foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But amidst
hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold
action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can
still be heard.This case turns on government agencies and their
officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by
direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at
the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas
polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their
official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry
the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are
to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad
commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.At the core of
the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past,
once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the
past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a
dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject
official indifference of people and institutions that could have
otherwise made a difference.This case started when, on January 29,
1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners,
for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the
RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine
Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint
stated, stemmed from:x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated
and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants]
resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in
the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay,
[for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or
solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.3In
their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the
continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the
Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:(1) Respondents
constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;(2)
The Environment Code (PD 1152);(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD
984);(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);(5) The Sanitation Code (PD
856);(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);(7) The
Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);(8) Executive Order No. 192;(9) The
Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);(10) Civil
Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;(11) The Trust
Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and(12) International
LawInter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the
RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The trial
of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club
followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz,
the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples
collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that
the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000
most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order
No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not
exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution
along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project.
For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as
part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being
conducted on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its
Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean
Up and Rehabilitate Manila BayOn September 13, 2002, the RTC
rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it
fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact
recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR
as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from
receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action
for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay. In
particular:Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and
maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic
places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its
wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the
proper disposal of waste.Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency
in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste
facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the
discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid
and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the
pollution of the bay.Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and
maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of
wastes.Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock
its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.Defendant
DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the
purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant
DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that
obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances
discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila
Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government,
DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as
carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in
the bay.Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the
operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge
and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate
in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.Defendant
Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at
all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.No
pronouncement as to damages and costs.SO ORDERED.The MWSS, Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were
eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.On the
other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP)
Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies
filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45.
The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said
petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals
of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
74944.Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main
that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152)
relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns
about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is
not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. The CA
Sustained the RTCBy a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA
denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in
toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did not require
petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.7Petitioners are now before this Court praying
for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground
and supporting arguments:THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF
[PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL
POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL
COLIFORMS. ARGUMENTSI[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY
TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER
CLEANING IN GENERALIITHE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA
BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED
BY MANDAMUS. The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections
17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality
and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And
second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted
and heard the parties on oral arguments.Our RulingWe shall first
dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila BayCan be
Compelled by MandamusGenerally, the writ of mandamus lies to
require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is
one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite
duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when
refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.Petitioners
maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate
solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate,
has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should
be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates,
all of which entail the exercise of discretion.Respondents, on the
other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear
mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are
without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water
they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners
are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem
of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs
ministerial duty to attend to such services.We agree with
respondents. First off, we wish to state that petitioners
obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand,
and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the
law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is
ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so
in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed
the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its
Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to
cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory
imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section
defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal
services to include:Solid waste disposal and management which
include formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It
shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary
land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid
waste. (Emphasis added.)The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec.
41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which
prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary
landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating
requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs.
36 and 37 of RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government
units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February
15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and
disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of
controlled dumps. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste
disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty
of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be
characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries
to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.13 A
discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise
judgment and choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion
that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid
waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of
legal basis.A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or
like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this
conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating
directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection,
and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: (1) The DENR, under
Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible
for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand,
designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible
for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all
aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR,
under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects
of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent,
severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on
pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."The DENR, under
RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status
Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a
10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is
nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas.
Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the implementation
and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein.
As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities: a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report
within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;b) Prepare an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12)
months following the completion of the status report;c) Prepare a
ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12
months following the completion of the framework for each
designated water management area. Such action plan shall be
reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every
five (5) years or as need arises.The DENR has prepared the status
report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it
has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17
Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the
tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.Parenthetically, during the oral
arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies
and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December
2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated
budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila
Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
rehabilitation of the Manila Bay. The completion of the said action
plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more
than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are
assigned them under existing laws.(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA
6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over
all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising
what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the
provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:(g) To
construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities
and towns comprising the System; x x x(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has
the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It
can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the
operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local
water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct,
operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.
Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the
DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities,
inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the
country.19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is
mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the
Manila Bay. (4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency
tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting
the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery
resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code
of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a
monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that
fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are
judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise
under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and
DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine
waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for
the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and
aquatic resources.(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction
arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide
integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in
accordance with national development objectives and approved
government plans and specifications. In Metro Manila, however, the
MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which
include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system."On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was
entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the
agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For
the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing
agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH
on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of
structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD
1067, and other pertinent laws.(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec.
5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6
of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the
primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National
Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for
the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall,
under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:a. discharge, dump
x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or
any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by
any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and
inland navigable waters of the Philippines;b. throw, discharge or
deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or
other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore,
wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing
from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state
into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and c. deposit x x x
material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable
water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where
the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water,
either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed
or increase the level of pollution of such water.(7) When RA 6975
or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act
of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime
Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the
Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975,
the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when
the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since
the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to
assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with
regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing
marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines.
This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws,
rules, and regulations.25(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513,
the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and
operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and
national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that
the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as
may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain
its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of
the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement
bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the
following:x x x xb) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and
movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as
movement within the port of watercraft.27Lastly, as a member of the
International Marine Organization and a signatory to the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the
PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at
ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships
docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such
measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the
violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within
Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
that have jurisdiction over said vessels.(9) The MMDA, as earlier
indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as
other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal
provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29Among the prohibited
acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently
violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in
open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or
non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or
operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of
waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed "when
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other
public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The
MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and
concerned agencies, can dismantle and r