Case Doctrines on Transportation Law
De Guzman vs. Court of AppealsArticle 1732 makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population.
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private
respondent held no certificate of public convenience. A certificate
of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts
as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier
has also complied with the requirements of the applicable
regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been
granted a certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To
exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier
because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public
convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would
be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply
with applicable statutory requirements.Planters Products, Inc. vs.
CAIt is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary
course of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting
goods indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered
the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and
compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore
continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly
then can the charterer be charged, a stranger to the crew and to
the ship, with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer
did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is evident
in the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the
manning of the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage
and other technical incidents of maritime navigation were all
consigned to the officers and crew who were screened, chosen and
hired by the shipowner. It is therefore imperative that a public
carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the
whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the
charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a
time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter
includes both the vessel and its crew, that a common carrier
becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering
the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time
or voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship,
although her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the
charterer.Fisher vs. YangcoIn construing Act 98 for the alleged
violation, the test is whether the refusal of YSC to carry the
explosives without qualification or conditions may have the effect
of subjecting any person or locality or the traffic is such
explosives to an unduly unreasonable or unnecessary prejudice or
discrimination. Common carriers in this jurisdiction cannot
lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods unless it
appears that for some sufficient reason the discrimination for such
is reasonable and necessary. YSC has not met those conditions.The
nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment
is such that it is within the power of the State to impose such
just regulations in the interest of the public as the legislator
may deem proper.US vs. QuinahonThere is no pretense that it
actually cost more to handle the rice for the province than it did
for the merchants with whom the special contracts were made. There
was a clear discrimination against the province which is prohibited
by the law. It is however not believed that the law prohibits
common carriers from making special rates for the handling and
transporting of merchandise, when the same are made for the purpose
of increasing their business and to manage their important
interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and
adopted in other trades and pursuits. Absolute equality is not
required in all cases. It is only unjust, undue and unreasonable
discrimination which the law forbids. The law of equality is in
force only where the services performed in the different cases are
substantially the same and the circumstances and conditions are
similar.Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. CALoadstar submits that the
vessel was a private carrier because it was not issued a CPC; it
did not have a regular trip or schedule nor a fixed route; and
there was only one shipper, one consignee for a special cargo.
The SC held that Loadstar is a common carrier. It is not
necessary that the carrier be issued a CPC, and this character is
not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question
was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled.First Philippine
Industrial Corporation vs. CABased on Article 1732 NCC, there is no
doubt that petitioner is a common carrier. It is engaged in the
business of transporting or carrying goods, i.e. petroleum
products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry
for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose
to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does
not exclude it from the definition of a common carrier. (De Guzman
Ruling upheld)
Respondents argument that the term common carrier as used in
Section 133(j) of the Local Government Code refers only to common
carriers transporting goods and passengers through moving vehicles
or vessels either by land, sea or water is erroneous. The
definition of common carriers in NCC makes no distinction as to the
means of transporting as long as it is by land, water or air. It
does not provide that the transporting of the passengers or goods
should be by motor vehicle.Home Insurance Company vs. American
Steamship Agencies, Inc.The NCC provisions on common carriers
should not apply where the common carrier is not acting as such but
as a private carrier. Under American Jurisprudence, a common
carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a
special person only becomes a private carrier. As a private
carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is valid.
The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from
liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent would be void
only if strict public policy governing common carrier is applied.
Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved,
as in the case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single
party. The stipulation exempting the owner from liability for
negligence of its agent is not against public policy and is deemed
valid. Recovery cant be had, for loss or damage to the cargo
against shipowners, unless the same is due to personal acts or
negligence of said owner or its managers, as distinguished from
agents or employees.San Pablo vs. PANTRANCOConsidering the
environmental circumstances of the case, the conveyance of
passengers, trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not
a ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping
service. Under no circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen
be considered a continuation of the highway. While a ferry boat
service has been considered as a continuation of the highway when
crossing rivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters -
separating the land, however, when as in this case the two
terminals, Matnog and Allen are separated by an open sea it can not
be considered as a continuation of the highway. Respondent
PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an
interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the
provisions of law. Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely
amended to include this water service under the guise that it is a
mere private ferry service.The contention of private respondent
PANTRANCO that its ferry service operation is as a private carrier,
not as a common carrier for its exclusive use in the ferrying of
its passenger buses and cargo trucks is absurd. PANTRANCO does not
deny that it charges its passengers separately from the charges for
the bus trips and issues separate tickets whenever they board the
MV "Black Double" that crosses Matnog to Allen, PANTRANCO cannot
pretend that in issuing tickets to its passengers it did so as a
private carrier and not as a common carrier. The Court does not see
any reason why inspite of its amended franchise to operate a
private ferry boat service it cannot accept walk-in passengers just
for the purpose of crossing the sea between Matnog and Allen.
Indeed evidence to this effect has been submitted.National Steel
Corporation vs. CAIn the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI
did not offer its services to the general public. It carried
passengers or goods only for those it chose under a special
contract of charter party. It is a private carrier that renders
tramping service and as such, does not transport cargo or shipment
for the general public. Its services are available only to specific
persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its
owner. Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC,
including their respective liability for damage to the cargo, are
determined primarily by stipulations in their contracts of private
carriage or charter party.
Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private
carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the
general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier.KMU vs. GarciaThe issuance of
a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need.
The presumption of public need for a service shall be deemed in
favor of the applicant, while the burden of proving that there is
no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositor's.
By its terms, public convenience or necessity generally means
something fitting or suited to the public need. As one of the basic
requirements for the grant of a CPC, public convenience and
necessity exists when the proposed facility or service meets a
reasonable want of the public and supply a need which the existing
facilities do not adequately supply. The existence or non-existence
of public convenience and necessity is therefore a question of fact
that must be established by evidence, real and/or testimonial;
empirical data; statistics and such other means necessary, in a
public hearing conducted for that purpose. The object and purpose
of such procedure, among other things, is to look out for, and
protect, the interests of both the public and the existing
transport operators.Tatad vs. GarciaIn law, there is a clear
distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the
ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and
separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can
own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to
serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in
control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.Samar
Mining Company, Inc. vs. Nordeutscher LloydThe validity of
stipulations in bills of lading exempting the carrier from
liability for loss or damage to the goods when the same are not in
its actual custody has been upheld. There is no doubt that Art.
1738 finds no applicability to the instant case. The said article
contemplates a situation where the goods had already reached their
place of destination and are stored in the warehouse of the
carrier. The subject goods were still awaiting transshipment to
their port of destination, and were stored in the warehouse of a
third party when last seen and/or heard of.Article 1736 is
applicable to the instant suit. Under said article, the carrier may
be relieved of the responsibility for loss or damage to the goods
upon actual or constructive delivery of the same by the carrier to
the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. In
sales, actual delivery has been defined as the ceding of corporeal
possession by the seller, and the actual apprehension of corporeal
possession by the buyer or by some person authorized by him to
receive the goods as his representative for the purpose of custody
or disposal. By the same token, there is actual delivery in
contracts for the transport of goods when possession has been
turned over to the consignee or to his duly authorized agent and a
reasonable time is given him to remove the goods. The court a quo
found that there was actual delivery to the consignee through its
duly authorized agent, the carrier.Eastern Shipping Lines vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court1) The law of the country to which the
goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common
carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. As the
cargoes in question were transported from Japan to the Philippines,
the liability of Petitioner Carrier is governed primarily by the
Civil Code. However, in all matters not regulated by said Code, the
rights and obligations of common carrier shall be governed by the
Code of Commerce and by special laws. Thus, the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, a special law, is suppletory to the provisions of the
Civil Code. (2) Under the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
goods, according to all the circumstances of each case. Common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or
other natural disaster or calamity; Petitioner Carrier claims that
the loss of the vessel by fire exempts it from liability under the
phrase "natural disaster or calamity. However, the Court said that
fire may not be considered a natural disaster or calamity. This
must be so as it arises almost invariably from some act of man or
by human means. It does not fall within the category of an act of
God unless caused by lightning or by other natural disaster or
calamity. It may even be caused by the actual fault or privity of
the carrier.As the peril of the fire is not comprehended within the
exception in Article 1734, supra, Article 1735 of the Civil Code
provides that all cases than those mention in Article 1734, the
common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the
extraordinary diligence required by law.And even if fire were to be
considered a "natural disaster" within the meaning of Article 1734
of the Civil Code, it is required under Article 1739 of the same
Code that the "natural disaster" must have been the "proximate and
only cause of the loss," and that the carrier has "exercised due
diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after
the occurrence of the disaster. This Petitioner Carrier has also
failed to establish satisfactorily.National Development Company vs.
CASignificantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce,
particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or carrier, is not
exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the
fault or negligence of the captain. Primary liability is imposed on
the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted
doctrine that the shipmaster or captain is merely the
representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive
control over the conduct of the voyage.The agreement between NDC
and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough
to include the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact MCP
was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel,
including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. Both owner
and agent should be declared jointly and severally liable since the
obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a
fortuitous act and did not arise from contract. Gelisan vs.
AldayThe court has held in several decisions that the registered
owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise
from consequences incident to its operation or that may be caused
to any of the passengers therein. The claim of the petitioners that
he is not liable in view of the lease contract executed by and
between him and Espiritu which exempts him from liability to 3rd
persons, cannot be sustained because it appears that the lease
contract had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. It
is a settled rule in our jurisprudence that if the property covered
by a Franchise is transferred or lease to another without obtaining
the requisite approval, the transfer is not binding upon the public
and 3rd persons. However, Gelisan is not without recourse because
he has a right to be indemnified by Espiritu for the amount he may
be required to pay. This is due to the fact that the lease contract
in question, although not effective against the public is valid and
binding between the contracting parties.Benedicto vs. Intermediate
Appellate CourtThe prevailing doctrine in common carriers make the
owner liable for consequences having from the operations of the
carrier even though the specific vehicle involved may have been
transferred to another person. This doctrine rests upon the
principle in dealing with vehicles registered under Public Service
Law, the public has the right to assume that the registered owner
is the actual or lawful owner thereof. It would be very difficult
and often impossible as a practical matter, for members of the
general public to enforce the rights of action that they may have
for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated
if they should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The
registered owner is not allowed to deny liability by proving the
identity of the alleged transferee. Thus, contrary to petitioners
claim, private respondents are not required to go beyond the
vehicles certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the
carrier.PHILTRANCO Service Enterprise, Inc. vs. Court of AppealsWe
have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner
of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,
direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to
solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides:Art. 2194. The
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.Since the employer's liability is primary,
direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages
is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee
who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action
based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides:Art.
2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or
employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered
in satisfaction of the claim.Santos vs. SibugAlthough SANTOS, as
the kabit was the true owner as against VIDAD, the latter, as the
registered owner/operator and grantee of the franchise, is directly
and primarily responsible and liable for the damages caused to
SIBUG, the injured party, as a consequence of the negligent or
careless operation of the vehicle. This ruling is based on the
principle that the operator of record is considered the operator of
the vehicle in contemplation of law as regards the public and third
persons even if the vehicle involved in the accident had been sold
to another where such sale had not been approved by the then Public
Service Commission.Lita Enterprises Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
CourtUnquestionably, the parties herein operated under an
arrangement, comonly known as the "kabit system", whereby a person
who has been granted a certificate of convenience allows another
person who owns motors vehicles to operate under such franchise for
a fee. A certificate of public convenience is a special privilege
conferred by the government . Abuse of this privilege by the
grantees thereof cannot be countenanced. Although not outrightly
penalized as a criminal offense, the "kabit system" is invariably
recognized as being contrary to public policy and, therefore, void
and inexistent under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, It is a
fundamental principle that the court will not aid either party to
enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where it
finds them.Teja Marketing vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtThe
ruling in Lita Enterprises Inc. vs. IAC is upheld. The defect of in
existence of a contract is permanent and cannot be cured by
ratification or by prescription. The mere lapse of time cannot give
efficacy to contracts that are null and void.Magboo vs. BernardoThe
features which characterize the boundary system are not sufficient
to withdraw the relationship between the parties from that of
employer and employee. The owner continued to be the operator of
the vehicle in legal contemplation and as such, he is responsible
for the consequences incident to its operation. To exempt from
liability the owner of a public vehicle who operates it under the
boundary system on the ground that he is a mere lessor would be not
only to abet flagrant violations of the Public Service Law but also
to place the riding public at the mercy of reckless and
irresponsible drivers.Ganzon vs. CAPetitioner Ganzon failed to show
that the loss of the scrap iron due to any cause enumerated in Art.
1734. The order of the acting Mayor did not constitute valid
authority for petitioner to carry out. In any case, the
intervention of the municipal officials was not of a character that
would render impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its
obligation. The petitioner was not duly bound to obey the illegal
order to dump into the sea the scrap of iron. Moreover, there is
absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was
attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower
the will of the petitioners employees.By the delivery made during
Dec. 1, 1956, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the
possession and control of the common carrier, and upon their
receipt by the carrier of transportation, the contract of carriage
was deemed perfected. Consequently, Ganzons extraordinary
responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods commenced. According to Art 1738, such extraordinary
responsibility would cease only upon the delivery by the carrier to
the consignee or persons with right to receive them. The fact that
part of the shipment had not been loaded on board did not impair
the contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody
& control of the carrier.Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of
AppealsThe heavy seas and rains referred to in the masters report
were not caso fortuito but normal occurrences that an ocean-going
vessel, particularly in the month of September which, in our area,
is a month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of
routine. They are not unforeseen nor unforeseeable. These are
conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide
for, in the ordinary course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea
water) found its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear
indication that care and foresight did not attend the closing of
the ship's hatches so that rain water would not find its way into
the cargo holds of the ship. Since the carrier has failed to
establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must
present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order to escape
liability for damage or destruction to the goods that it had
admittedly carried in this case. No such evidence exists of record.
Thus, the carrier cannot escape liability.Sarkies Tours Phils vs.
Court of AppealsUnder the Civil Code, common carriers, from the
nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them, and this liability lasts from the time
the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the person
who has a right to receive them, unless the loss is due to any of
the excepted causes under Article 1734 thereof.Where the common
carrier accepted its passenger's baggage for transportation and
even had it placed in the vehicle by its own employee, its failure
to collect the freight charge is the common carrier's own lookout.
It is responsible for the consequent loss of the baggage. In the
instant case, defendant appellant's employee even helped Fatima
Minerva Fortades and her brother load the luggages/baggages in the
bus' baggage compartment, without asking that they be weighed,
declared, receipted or paid for. Neither was this required of the
other passengers.Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply vs.
Court of AppealsIn a contract of private carriage, the parties may
validly stipulate that responsibility for the cargo rests solely on
the charterer, exempting the shipowner from liability for loss of
or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the ship
captain. Pursuant to Article 1306 17 of the Civil Code, such
stipulation is valid because it is freely entered into by the
parties and the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private
carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a
contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate
their duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on
them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private
carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers protecting the
general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public
policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a
charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.Yobido vs. Court of AppealsThe
explosion of the new tire is not a fortuitous event. There are
human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire was
new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing
defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may
the fact that the tire bought and used is of a brand name noted for
quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode
within five days use. It is settled that an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its
driver is not a caso fortuito. Moreover, a common carrier may not
be absolved from liability in case of force majeure. A common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
death or injury resulting from the accident. Thus, having failed to
overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, petitioners are hereby held liable for damages.Compania
Maritima vs. Insurance Co. of North AmericaThe receipt of goods by
the carrier has been said to lie at the foundation of the contract
to carry and deliver, and if actually no goods are received there
can be no such contract. The liability and responsibility of the
carrier under a contract for the carriage of goods commence on
their actual delivery to, or receipt by, the carrier or an
authorized agent and delivery to a lighter in charge of a vessel
for shipment on the vessel, where it is the custom to deliver in
that way, is a good delivery and binds the vessel receiving the
freight, the liability commencing at the time of delivery to the
lighter and, similarly, where there is a contract to carry goods
from one port to another, and they cannot be loaded directly on the
vessel and lighters are sent by the vessel to bring the goods to
it, the lighters are for the time its substitutes, so that the bill
of landing is applicable to the goods as soon as they are placed on
the lighters.Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to
the carrier and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it
can be said with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier
has been established. A bill of lading is not indispensable for the
creation of a contract of carriage. The bill of lading is
juridically a documentary proof of the stipulations and conditions
agreed upon by both parties. The liability of the carrier as common
carrier begins with the actual delivery of the goods for
transportation, and not merely with the formal execution of a
receipt or bill of lading; the issuance of a bill of lading is not
necessary to complete delivery and acceptance. Even where it is
provided by statute that liability commences with the issuance of
the bill of lading, actual delivery and acceptance are sufficient
to bind the carrier.Lu Do vs. BinamiraWhile delivery of the cargo
to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them,
contemplated in Article 1736, because in such case the goods are
still in the hands of the Government and the owner cannot exercise
dominion over them, we believe however that the parties may agree
to limit the liability of the carrier considering that the goods
have still to through the inspection of the customs authorities
before they are actually turned over to the consignee. This is a
situation where we may say that the carrier losses control of the
goods because of a custom regulation and it is unfair that it be
made responsible for what may happen during the
interregnum.American President Lines, Ltd. vs. KlepperWith regard
to the contention of the carrier that COGSA should control in this
case, the same is of as moment. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code
provides that the laws of the country to which the goods are
transported shall govern the liability of the common carrier in
case of loss, destruction and deterioration. This means that the
law of the Philippines on the New Civil Code. Under 1766 of NCC, in
all matter not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations
of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
Special Laws. Art. 1736-1738, NCC governs said rights and
obligations. Therefore, although Sec 4(5) of COGSA states that the
carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding $500 per package
unless the value of the goods had been declared by the shipper and
asserted in the bill of lading, said section is merely
supplementary to the provisions of the New Civil Code.Servando vs.
Phil. SteamThe court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment
in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the
delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the
warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the
goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant. It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of
lading issued for the cargoes in question, the parties agreed to
limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that
may be caused to the shipment therein the following stipulation:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to
shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due
to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss
or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea
or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ... We sustain
the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein
that is contrary to law, morals or public policy.Appellees would
contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it
was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and
that they did not sign the same. This argument overlooks the
pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, where
the same issue was resolved in this wise: While it may be true that
petitioner had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless
bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to
be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon
the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or
assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of
'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that contracts of
adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on
the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in
reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent."Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of AppealsExcept as may be
prohibited by law, there is nothing to prevent an inverse order of
events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior to
actual possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be
transported. There is no law which requires that the delivery of
the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of
lading must coincide in point of time or, for that matter, that the
former should precede the latter. While we agree with petitioners'
statement that "an airway bill estops the carrier from denying
receipt of goods of the quantity and quality described in the
bill," a further reading and a more faithful quotation of the
authority cited would reveal that "(a) bill of lading may contain
constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more
than a contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . .
(However), as between the shipper and the carrier, when no goods
have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop
the carrier from showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor
of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to
the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such
goods were delivered for shipment. As between the consignor and a
receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."There is a
holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a bill of
lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms therein
were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him,
and in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped from
thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This rule
applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill of
lading with full knowledge of its contents, and acceptance under
such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In order that any
presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading limiting
the liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear that the
clause containing this exemption from liability plainly formed a
part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A stipulation
printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on papers
attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if printed
on its face, if it is shown that the consignor knew of its terms.
Thus, where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that its
conditions are to be found on the back, such receipt comes within
the general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted and to
be bound by the conditions there to be found.Explicit is the rule
under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that the extraordinary
responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods
are delivered to the carrier. This responsibility remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored
in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of
stoppage in transitu, and terminates only after the lapse of a
reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee
or such other person entitled to receive them. And, there is
delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and have been
placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the
carrier for the purpose of their immediate transportation and the
carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been
accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier
commences. Only when such fact of delivery has been unequivocally
established can the liability for loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in the custody of the carrier, absent the
excepting causes under Article 1734, attach and the presumption of
fault of the carrier under Article 1735 be invoked.Macam vs. CAThe
extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until
actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or
to the person who has a right to receive them. PAKISTAN BANK was
indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the
notify party. However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named
as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to GPC as such in his
demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the
trial court. This premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of
the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art.
1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was
proper. The real issue is whether respondents are liable to
petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of
lading or bank guarantee. From the testimony of petitioner, we
gather that he has been transacting with GPC as buyer/importer for
around two (2) or three (3) years already. When mangoes and
watermelons are in season, his shipment to GPC using the facilities
of respondents is twice or thrice a week. The goods are released to
GPC. It has been the practice of petitioner to request the shipping
lines to immediately release perishable cargoes such as watermelons
and fresh mangoes through telephone calls by himself or his
"people." In transactions covered by a letter of credit, bank
guarantee is normally required by the shipping lines prior to
releasing the goods. But for buyers using telegraphic transfers,
petitioner dispenses with the bank guarantee because the goods are
already fully paid. In his several years of business relationship
with GPC and respondents, there was not a single instance when the
bill of lading was first presented before the release of the
cargoes.Maersk Line vs. CAWhile it is true that common carriers are
not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise, and
persons are not vested with the right to prompt delivery, unless
such common carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at
a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo should at least
be made within a reasonable time.While there was no special
contract entered into by the parties indicating the date of arrival
of the subject shipment, petitioner nevertheless, was very well
aware of the specific date when the goods were expected to arrive
as indicated in the bill of lading itself. In this regard, there
arises no need to execute another contract for the purpose as it
would be a mere superfluity. In the case before us, we find that a
delay in the delivery of the goods spanning a period of two months
and seven days falls was beyond the realm of reasonableness.Ysmael
vs. BarrettoLimiting the common carriers liability for loss or
damage from any cause or for any reason for less than 1/8 the
actual value of the goods is unconscionable and therefore against
public policy. A common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for
exemption from liability, unless such exemption is just and
reasonable and the contract is freely and fairly made.Shewaram vs.
Philippine AirlinesIt can not be said that a contract has been
entered into between a passenger and the common carrier, embodying
the conditions as printed at the back of the ticket. The fact that
those conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in
letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the
presumption that the passenger was aware of those conditions such
that he had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. The
passenger is considered not having agreed to the stipulation on the
ticket, as manifested by the fact that he did not sign the
ticket.Ong Yiu vs. Court of AppealsWhile it may be true that the
passenger had not signed the plane ticket, he is nevertheless bound
by the provisions thereof. "Such provisions have been held to be a
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the
passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to
the regulation". It is what is known as a contract of "adhesion",
in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on the
other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not
entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in
reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent. A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation
does not offend against the policy of the law forbidding one from
contracting against his own negligence.Sea Land Services, Inc. vs.
IACSince the liability of a common carrier for loss of or damage to
goods transported by it under a contract of carriage so governed by
the laws of the country of destination and the goods in question
were shipped from the United States to the Philippines, the
liability of common carrier to the consignee is governed primarily
by the Civil Code. Applying the Civil Code provisions (Article 1749
and 1750) the stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the
liability of the common carrier for loss or damages to the shipment
covered by said rule unless the shipper declares the value of the
shipment and pays additional charges is valid and binding on the
consignee.Citadel Lines, Inc. vs. CABasic is the rule that a
stipulation limiting the liability of the carrier to the value of
the goods appearing in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or
owner declares a greater value, is binding. Furthermore, a contract
fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for
the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it
is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly
and freely agreed upon.
In this case, the award based on the alleged market value of the
goods is erroneous. It is provided in a clause in the BOL that its
liability is limited to US$2.00/kilo. The consignee also admits in
the memorandum that the value of the goods does not appear in the
bill of lading. Hence, the stipulation on the carriers limited
liability applies.Everett Seamship Corp. vs. CAIn the bill of
lading, the carrier made it clear that all claims for which it may
be liable shall be adjusted and settled on the basis of the
shipper's net invoice cost plus freight and insurance premiums, if
paid, and in no event shall the carrier be liable for any loss of
possible profits or any consequential loss. Its liability would
only be up to One Hundred Thousand (Y100,000.00) Yen. However, the
shipper, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value
of its cargo was higher than the limited liability of the carrier.
Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it
had itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.The
commercial Invoice does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly
show that the common carrier has knowledge of the value of the
cargo as contended by the shipper. British Airways vs. CAThe
contract of transportation was exclusively between the passenger
and common carrier BA. The latter merely endorsing the Manila to
Hong Kong log of the formers journey to PAL, as its subcontractor
or agent. Conditions of contracts were one of continuous air
transportation. Well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible
for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable
for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its
negligent act. When an action is based on breach of contract of
carriage, the passenger can only sue BA and not PAL, since the
latter was not a party in the contract.The contention of BA with
respect to limited liability was overruled although it is
recognized in the Philippines, stating that BA had waived the
defense of limited liability when it allowed Mahtani(the passenger)
to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the
misplacement of his luggage, without any objection.H.E. Heacock Co.
vs. MacondrayThree kinds of stipulations have often been made in a
bill of lading. The first is one exempting the carrier from any and
all liability for loss or damage occasioned by its own negligence.
The second is one providing for an unqualified limitation of such
liability to an agreed valuation. And the third is one limiting the
liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless the shipper
declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
According to an almost uniform weight of authority, the first and
second kinds of stipulations are invalid as being contrary to
public policy, but the third is valid and enforceable.If a common
carrier gives to a shipper the choice of two rates and if the
shipper makes such a choice, understandingly and freely, and names
his valuation, he cannot thereafter recover more than the value
which he thus places upon his property. A limitation of liability
based upon an agreed value does not conflict with any sound
principle of public policy; and it is not conformable to plain
principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order
to reduce the rate and then recover a larger value in case of
loss.Sweet Lines Inc. vs. TEVESConsidered in the light of
circumstances prevailing in the inter-island shipping industry in
the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed
at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances
obligation in the inter-island shipping industry, it is not just
and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed
at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is
Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the
public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature,
since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable
passengers located in different places of the country who, under
Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only
in the City of Cebu. Considering the expense and trouble a
passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a
claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to
file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of
enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels
and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the
filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in
the instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less
prejudice, petitioner.Under Art. 2220 of the Civil Code, moral
damages are justly due in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Both the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court found that there was bad faith on the part of
petitioner in that:(1) Defendants- Appellants did not give notice
to plaintiffs-appellates as to the change of scheduled of the
vessel;(2) Knowing fully well that it would take no less than
fifteen hours to effect the repairs of the damaged engine,
defendants- appellants instead made announce ment of assurance that
the vessel would leave within a short period of time, and when
plaintiff-appellees wanted to leave the port and gave up the trip,
defendants- appellants employees would come and say, we are leaving
already.(3) Defendants- appellants did not offer to refund
plaintiffs-appellees tickets nor provide them with transportation
form Tacloban to Catbalogan.Quisumbing Sr. vs. Court of AppealsThe
highjacking-robbery was force majeure. The hijackers do not board
an airplane through a blatant display of firepower and violent
fury. Firearms, hand-grenades, dynamite, and explosives are
introduced into the airplane surreptitiously and with the utmost
cunning and stealth, although there is an occasional use of
innocent hostages who will be coldly murdered unless a plane is
given to the hijackers' complete disposal. PAL was not negligent so
as to overcome the force majeure nature of the hi-jacking.
Hijackers do not board an airplane through a blatant display of
firepower and violent fury. Firearms and grenades are brought to
the plane surreptitiously. PAL could not have been faulted for want
of diligence, particularly for failing to take positive measures to
implement Civil Aeronautics Administration regulations prohibiting
civilians from carrying firearms on board the plane. The use of the
most sophisticated electronic detection devices may have minimized
hijacking but still ineffective against truly determining
hijackers.Pan American World Airways, Inc. vs. RapadasThe Warsaw
Convention governs the availment of the liability limitations where
the baggage check is combined with or incorporated in the passenger
ticket. In the case at bar, the baggage check is combined with the
passenger ticket in one document of carriage. The passenger ticket
complies with Article 3, which provides: (c) a notice to the effect
that, if the passenger's journey involves an ultimate destination
or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the
Warsaw Convention may be applicable and that the Convention governs
and in most cases limits the liability of carriers for death or
personal injury and in respect of loss of or damage to baggage.The
provisions in the plane ticket are sufficient to govern the
limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The
passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the
plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is
concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome
the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability
limitations. The facts show that the private respondent actually
refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him
despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. In
attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the
line, private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on
allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a reasonably careful
person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from
checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried
Manila-paper or plastic envelope.The alleged lack of enough time
for him to make a declaration of a higher value and to pay the
corresponding supplementary charges cannot justify his failure to
comply with the requirement that will exclude the application of
limited liability.Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate CourtThe
Warsaw Convention's provisions, do not regulate or exclude
liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier' or
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or
exceptional type of damage, Otherwise, an air carrier would be
exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which
is absurd. In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper
conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and
Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it
is true, but without appreciable damage.There can be no doubt that
Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety, which gradually
turned to panic and finally despair, from the time she learned that
her suitcases were missing up to the time when, having gone to
Rome, she finally realized that she would no longer be able to take
part in the conference. Certainly, the compensation for the injury
suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the circumstances be restricted
to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the
transport of baggage.She is not, of course, entitled to be
compensated for loss or damage to her luggage. As already
mentioned, her baggage was ultimately delivered to her in Manila,
tardily, but safely.Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus CompanyFairness
demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its
passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be
reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in
regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a
passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives
and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be
lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each
passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and
nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In
other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a
passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but
beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested by
the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the
passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger
had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a
constitutionally protected domain. Mecenas vs. CAThe behaviour of
the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong
"before and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that
is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to
whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty
(750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt.
Santisteban was "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of
actual collision is quite immaterial; there is, both realistically
speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty"
hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier
upon whom the law imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. The
record shows that the "Don Juan" sank within ten (10) to fifteen
(15) minutes after initial contact with the "Tacloban City. While
the failure of Capt. Santisteban to supervise his officers and crew
in the process of abandoning the ship and his failure to avail of
measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his vessel after
collision, did not cause the collision by themselves, such failures
doubtless contributed materially to the consequent loss of life
and, moreover, were indicative of the kind and level of diligence
exercised by Capt. Santisteban in respect of his vessel and his
officers and men prior to actual contact between the two (2)
vessels. The officer-on-watch in the "Don Juan" admitted that he
had failed to inform Capt. Santisteban not only of the "imminent
danger of collision" but even of "the actual collision itself "
There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more
passengers than she had been certified as allowed to carry.Under
these circumstances, a presumption of gross negligence on the part
of the vessel (her officers and crew) and of its ship-owner
arises.Negros Navigation Co., Inc. vs. CAThe Duty to exercise due
diligence includes the duty to take passengers or cargoes that are
within the carrying capacity of the vessel. (Same Ruling with
Mecenas)Korean Airlines Co., LTD. vs. CAThe status of Lapuz as
standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger when
his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its
Flight No. KE 903. His clearance through immigration and customs
clearly shows that he had indeed been confirmed as a passenger of
KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the contract of
carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his
destination. This Court has held that a contract to transport
passengers is different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation. The business of the carrier is mainly with
the traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Passengers have
the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any
discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
carrier.Fortune Express Inc. vs. CAArt. 1763 of the Civil Code
provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered
by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if
the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.
In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and
his men was made possible.Despite warning by the Philippine
Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the
assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that
the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to
protect the safety of its passengers. Had petitioner and its
employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety
of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their
baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal
detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed
without violating the passenger's constitutional rights.
The acts of Maranaos could not be considered as caso fortuito
because there was already a warning by the PC.
No contributory negligence could be attributed to the deceased.
The assailant's motive was to retaliate for the loss of life of two
Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioner's bus and
the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were riding. The armed men
actually allowed deceased to retrieve something from the bus. What
apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the
bus by pleading for his life.Gatchalian vs. DelimThe record yields
affirmative evidence of fault or negligence on the part of
respondent common carrier. The driver did not stop to check if
anything had gone wrong with the bus when the snapping sound was
heard and made known to him by the passengers, instead told them
that it was normal. The driver's reply necessarily indicated that
the same "snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous
occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked
physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver
had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a
motor vehicle in good operating condition, and even a modicum of
concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus be
checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent
to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the bus, coupled
with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he
had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from
one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of
respondent and his driver.Because what is involved here is the
liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers
in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver
most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid
and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public
policy or good customs. A cursory examination of the purported
waiver will readily show that appellees did not actually waive
their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's
failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said
document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the
waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver
of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be
clear and unequivocal.A person is entitled to the physical
integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or
compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian
is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition
that she was before mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of
the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a
violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim
for restoration to her condition ante.Del Castillo vs.
JaymalinCommon carriers are responsible for the death of their
passengers (Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code). This
liability includes the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased. It appears proven that the defendant corporations failed
to exercise the diligence that was their duty to observe according
to Articles 1733 and 1755. The conductor was apprised of the fact
that Mario del Castillo was deaf and dumb. With this knowledge the
conductor should have taken extra-ordinary care for the safety of
the said passenger. In this he failed.Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs.
IACThe principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence."It is the rule under the
substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the jeepney. It
cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the
accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per
hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the
speed limit allowed in highways.Bustamante vs. CAThe doctrine,
stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other
words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and
an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As
the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to
the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.All premises considered, the Court is
convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in
applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners
and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the
heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in
absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from
liability.Lara vs. ValenciaThe owner and driver of a vehicle owes
to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to
exercise reasonable care so that they may be transported safely to
their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by weight of
authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty
to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation,
and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by
increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle in the
case at bar is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not
in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by
our law.A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a
family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to
the passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence,
the carrier cannot be held liable.Necessito vs. ParasWhile the
carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it
should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its equipment if
such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the
manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the
agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will
not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity
with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.Japan Airlines
vs. CAAccordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable
to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure," the general
rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for
non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming
its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption,
whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses
the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it
is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents
for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.It has been
held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or
extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air
travel, the consequences of which the passenger must assume or
expect.While JAL was no longer required to defray private
respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account
of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary
arrangements to transport private respondents on the first
available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on
its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its
passengers when it declassified private respondents from "transit
passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private
respondents were obliged to make the necessary arrangements
themselves for the next flight to Manila.Layugan vs. IACRes ipsa
loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant,
and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by
the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. The
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to
the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking
into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene
lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But
despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck
driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent,
still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on
his left forearm and left foot. It is clear therefore that the
absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by
clear and convincing evidence. It follows that the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, making the employer of the driver
liable for the negligence of his employee.La Mallorca vs. CAThe
liability of the carrier for the child, who was already led by the
father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus for her safety
under the contract of carriage, persists. The relation of carrier
and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter, after
alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in
removing his baggage from the car. It has been recognized as a rule
that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues
until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a
reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances.Aboitiz Shipping Co. vs.
CAThe rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and
has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time
after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what
is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to
be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable
time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The
carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact
that the person transported has been carried to his destination if,
for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to claim
his baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour
earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only
one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard
procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading
operations shall start only after that time.Mallari Sr. vs.
CAClearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the
death of a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the
driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.,
who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the
Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Under
Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard
for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil
Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier
is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further,
pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death
of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the former's employees. This liability of the common carrier
does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection of its employees.Bayasen
vs. CAIt is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy
or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account
of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or
complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not
necessarily implying negligence. It may occur without fault.Under
the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner-
driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding
being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid
excuse for his departure from his regular course. Cervantes vs.
CASince the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and
petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL
was necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his
advantage. The said agents, acted without authority when they
confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the
New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the
same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person
(herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his
power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the
acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits
of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover
damages from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the
principal's ratification.Calalas vs. CAIt is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the
obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to
the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence
in cases of death or injury to passengers.In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
The driver of jeepney did not carry safely as far as human care
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. These are
violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore,
there is no assumption of risk by the passenger.Pestao vs.
SumayangIn the case at bar, Pestao, as a professional driver
operating a public transport bus, should have anticipated that
overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus
have exercised extreme caution.Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused
by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be
negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that
employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily
showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.Gillaco vs. Manila RailroadWhile a passenger is entitled
to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents
or employees, since the contract of transportation obligates the
carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the
responsibility of the carrier extends only to those acts that the
carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree
of care and diligence required of it. In the present case, the act
of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the
passenger (because of a personal grudge nurtured against the latter
since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the
Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or
anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee
every personal rancor that might exist between each one of its many
employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers
riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso
fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code
(which is the law applicable), being both unforeseeable and
inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to
established doctrine, the resulting breach of the company's
contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused
thereby.Maranan vs. PerezThe basis of the common carrier's
liability under NCC for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or
(2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to
transport the passenger safely.Under the first, which is the
minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not
sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only.
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later
cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of
the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that
it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by
its own employees. Art. 1759, evidently follows the rule based on
the second view.Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation
to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not
only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also,
no less important, to their total personality, including their
patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.PNR vs.
CAWhen a train boarded by the deceased passenger was so
over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to
sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train, the
common carrier is negligent.Likewise when the train did not even
slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair
at the time, neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised
by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam
Bridge, there was negligence. The petitioner has the obligation to
transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe
extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered
by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was
negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract
of carriage. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary
diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was
chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on
the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have
held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the
side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding
train.Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co.If the carriers employee is
confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same
degree of care he would otherwise, be required in the absence of
such emergency. By placing his left arm on the window, petitioner
is guilty of contributory negligence. It cannot however relieve the
carrier but can only reduce its liability (ART. 1762). It is a
prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a
railroad to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can
be had for an injury.Bachelor Express Inc vs. CAThe running amuck
of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it
triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that
the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other
resulting in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and
Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the
passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the
context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier
may be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is not
enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common
carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the
injuries resulting from such accident. In this case, Bachelor was
negligent.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus
driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height of the
commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell
from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was
still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after
people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly
equipped with doors in accordance with law. Cariaga vs. LTB CoThe
income which deceased could earn if he should finish the medical
course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed
to be within the same category provided for by Art. 2201 of the
Civil Code, which are those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted. LTB could not be held liable to pay moral damages
under Article 2220 of the Civil Code on account of breach of its
contract of carriage because it did not act fraudulently or in bad
faith. LTB had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees like the drivers of its buses in
connection with the discharge of their duties and so it must be
considered an obligor in good faith. Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs.
CALife expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an important
element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents
herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said
amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard
and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary
standard, such as a four-year rule. When the liability of common
carrier had been fixed at a minimal rate of only of P2,184.00 a
year, which is the annual salary of deceased at the time of his
death, as a young "training assistant" and when the deceaseds
potentiality and capacity to increase his future income was not
considered said liability may be enforced upon finality of the
decision.Pan American World Airways vs. IACBy refusing to
accommodate plaintiff in said flight, defendant had willfully and
knowingly violated the contract of carriage and failed to bring the
plaintiff to her place of destination under its contract with
plaintiff. Bad faith was also present. Self enrichment or fraternal
interest and not personal ill will may have been the motive of
defendant, but it is malice nevertheless. The fact that plaintiff
was ordered out under some pretext in order to accommodate a white
man in an airline owned by an American firm with a reputation for
bumping off non- Caucasian to accommodate whites is very
regrettable.Defendant having breached its contract with plaintiff
in bad faith, it is not error to have awarded exemplary damages.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
name implies, to provide an example or correction for public good .
In view of it nature, it should be imposed in such amount as to
sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contract in
the future by defendant and other airlines.An award of attorney's
fees is also in order, having found bad faith on the part of
defendant.Soberano vs. MRRIn case of physical injuries, moral
damages are recoverable only by the party injured and not by his
next of kin, unless there is express statutory provision to the
contrary. In this case it was Juana Soberano, not her husband Jose,
who sustained the bodily injuries.Attorneys fees may only be
awarded when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to
protect his interest, or when the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim. It will be observed that the
defendant companies offered to settle the case by offering to the
Soberanos the additional sum of P5,000. The Soberanos, however,
rejected the offer and proceeded to court to recover damages in the
total sum of P76,757.76.Marchan vs. MendozaIt is argued that this
Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the exemplary damages
since there was no allegation nor prayer, nor proof, nor
counterclaim of error for the same by the respondents. It is to be
observed however, that in the complaint, plaintiffs "prayed for
such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and
equitable." Now, since the body of the complaint sought to recover
damages against the defendant-carrier wherein plaintiffs prayed for
indemnification for the damages they suffered as a result of the
negligence of the driver who is appellant's employee and since
exemplary damages is intimately connected with general damages,
plaintiffs may not be expected to single out by express term the
kind of damages they are trying to recover against the defendant's
carrier. Suffice it to state that when plaintiffs prayed in their
complaint for such other relief and remedies that may be availed of
under the premises, in effect, therefore, the court is called upon
the exercise and use its discretion whether the imposition of
punitive or exemplary damages even though not expressly prayed or
pleaded in the plaintiffs' complaint. Exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among
others, to compensatory damages, but that they cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the
discretion of the court. If the amount of exemplary damages need
not be proved, it need not also be alleged, and the reason is
obvious because it is merely incidental or dependent upon what the
court may award as compensatory damages.De Caliston vs. Court of
AppealsThe deletion of the P10,000.00 awarded for loss of pension
is unjustified. Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code: The amount of
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be
liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. . The
pension of the decedent being a sure income that was cut short by
her death for which Dalmacio was responsible, the surviving heir of
the former is entitled to the award of P 10,000.00 which is just
equivalent to the pension the decedent would have received for one
year if she did not die. On the other hand, the P5,000.00 paid to
the herein petitioner by the insurer of the passenger bus which
figured in the accident may be deemed to have come from the bus
owner who procured the insurance. Since the civil liability
(ex-delicto) of the latter for the death caused by his driver is
subsidiary and, at bottom, arises from the same culpa, the
insurance proceeds should be credited in favor of the errant
driver.Philippine Airlines vs. CA 185 SCRA 110Petitioner relies on
"the principle of law generally recognized and applied by the
courts in the United States" that "the controlling element in
determining loss of earnings arising from death is, as established
by authorities, the life expectancy of the deceased or of the
beneficiary, whichever is shorter. However, resort to foreign
jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is
available locally to settle a controversy. Even in the absence of
local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence is only
persuasive.For the settlement of the issue at hand, there are
enough applicable local laws and jurisprudence. Under Article 1764
and Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, the award of damages for
death is computed on the basis of the l